The American Political Science Association APSA Volume 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014 In This Issue CD Qualit y of Government and Democratic Consolidation “What Do We Bo Rothstein, University of Gothenburg Know about Democratic hat is a consolidated democracy and why is it sometimes difficult to achieve? One way to get a better understanding of this is to look Consolidation?” at the opposite. What should count as a failed consolidation of a democratization process could be debated. Yet, it may be safe to argue that when 1 Editorial Board Note W political conflicts (a natural ingredient in any democracy) escalate into full blown civil wars, Benjamin Smith and Staffan I. Lindberg consolidation has failed. Two such cases will be discussed here, namely the outbreak of the 1 Quality of Government and civil wars in former Yugoslavia in 1991and the Spanish Civil War in 1936. Democratic Consolidation Bo Rothstein The civil war in former Yugoslavia has been thoroughly analyzed from a great many 1 The Constitutional Foundations of Democratic Consolidation perspectives and this is not the place to give a complete explanation of this tragic conflict. José Antonio Cheibub Instead, I want call attention to an often overlooked causal factor in analyses of conflicts like 2 Why Democracy Scholars Need to Learn More about State this, namely, what takes place at the “output side” of the political system. My starting point Building Sheri Berman is an argument put forward by Michael Ignatieff, according to which in many respects this conflict was unlikely to happen. Firstly, he argues that the central government’s policy from 2 State Firewalls and Democratic Deepening the 1960s to replace the various national identities with a Yugoslav identity was not without Agnes Cornell, Marcia Grimes, and Victor Lapuente success. Secondly, especially when it comes to Serbs and Croats, Ignatieff underlines their 17 News from Members similarities in language and habits and states that “these people were neighbors, friends and spouses, not inhabitants of different planets.” There are several analyses of ethnically 21 New Research (continued on page 3) 29 Editorial Committee

The Constitutional Foundations of Democratic Consolidation From the Editorial José Antonio Cheibub, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Board n this article, I discuss the role of political institutions in democratic This is the final issue of consolidation. Regarding the forms of democratic government, I like to think the Newsletter under the that there are essentially two: those with a separation of powers and those University of Florida editorial that require assembly confidence. The first are typical presidential democracies, regin. It has been four years I systems with constitutions that prescribe a fixed term in office for both a popularly and that our group has been charged with this task, first independently elected president and a congress. The second are the parliamentary (and under the leadership of semi-presidential) democracies, in which the government must be at least tolerated by a professor Michael Bernhard parliamentary majority in order to exist. and then we just had to follow in his tracks and continue I will therefore focus on the effect of political institutions, whether parliamentary or the job accordingly. This last presidential, on democratic consolidation. I start by briefly reviewing the earlier debate on the issue features a symposium relationship between democratic form of government and consolidation. I then discuss what on democratic consolidation I see as two challenges we face today to advance the study of democratic consolidation: its with contributors who proper definition and conceptualization, an to understand how the phenomena of democratic highlight the latest we know breakdown and consolidation changed since we first started to think about them. I conclude about well-known factors (continued on page 3) (continued on page 7) Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

Articles

Why Democracy Scholars Need to Learn More about State-Building Sheri Berman, Barnard College

fter years of relative neglect, state building has come to be recognized by growing numbers of observers as an essential prerequisite for both political and economic development. Voices both inside the academy and out have proclaimed that without strong, effective states such goals as the establishment of order, the overcoming of socioeconomic inequality Aand communal divisions, the consolidation of democracy, and the emergence of well-functioning economies are impossible. Yet despite this growing recognition, our understanding of the process of state building has lagged far beyond our recognition of its importance. Many recent studies show why strong, effective states are good or explain how they differ from weak, predatory ones, but very few tell us how they can be acquired.1

This is partially because much of the historical literature on state-building focused on structural variables such as the development of trade2 or capitalism,3 geography, resource endowment4 or, of course, war-making.5 While valuable, such explanations leave several crucial questions unanswered, not least the “how” questions, and from a policy perspective such questions are crucial. Even if we accept 1. Francis Fukuyama, State Building (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Ashraf Ghani and Claire Lockhart, State Building (N.Y.: Routledge, 2007); and idem, Fixing Failed States (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2009).

2. Joseph Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

3. Ernst Gellner, Nationalism (New York: New York University Press, 1997); Gianfranco Poggi, The State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1974); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York: Academic Press, 1974, 1980).

4. Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Thad Dunning, Crude Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Robert Bates, When Things Fell Apart (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

5. Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 42. (continued on page 11)

State Firewalls and Democratic Deepening Agnes Cornell, Aarhus University Marcia Grimes, University of Gothenburg Victor Lapuente, University of Gothenburg

any young democracies, such as those that came into being in the so called third wave, are today considered beyond risk of reversal to authoritarianism. As per the oft-cited criterion, democracy is, in these countries, “the only game in town.” Yet, as some observers note, one can still ask M“what game is it, exactly?” Reflecting on such experiences as the Arab Spring, Ukraine’s Orange revolution, gridlock in the U.S. policy making, and the tendency toward over-indulgent short-term spending in Brazil and India, a recent issue of The Economist poses the question: What’s gone wrong with democracy? The piece notes that “…building the institutions needed to sustain democracy is very slow work indeed, and has dispelled the once-popular notion that democracy will blossom rapidly and spontaneously once the seed is planted.”1

Indeed, there are striking differences among “new” democracies regarding the type of political game being played and whether it suggests democratic deepening. As key elements of such deepening one could mention, for example, stable party systems and programmatic party platforms; deep-seeded respect for fundamental democratic tenets such as press freedom and political competition; horizontal accountability enhancing the congruence between the public will and government performance; universal endorsement of democratic means and channels for expressing preferences and grievances and, as a result, condemnation of violent or extremely disruptive political strategies. The question then becomes why these elements characterize some young democracies (such as Portugal and Spain in the late 1. Dan Slater, “Democratic Careening,” World Politics 65 (October 2013): 729-63, 730; “What’s Gone Wrong with Democracy,” The Economist, 1 March 2014, www. economist.com/news/essays/21596796-democracy-was-most-successful-political-idea-20th-century-why-has-it-run-trouble-and-what-can-be-do. (continued on page 13)

2 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

Editors

rom the ditorial oard continued F(continued from page 1) E B ,

such as stateness, quality of government, section hosts a wonderful cast of members catching and correcting and constitutionalism. We find the four who have been incredibly generous and our mistakes, and for essays terrific both as individual pieces and collaborative making our job a very easy, flawless editing is beyond as a joint effort to provide a great overview and immensely rewarding task. It is a great words. It has been a great of the state of the art in this area. Finally, the section and on behalf of the collective time. pieces are excellent examples of the high- membership we would like to extend the quality work in our field and signifying for warmest and most grateful thank you to all Ironically, you will be left with one of us. the willingness to contribute to this section’s the contributors! The editorialship of the newsletter is newsletter by our best scholars. now passed on to the V-Dem Institute We are also extremely grateful to our terrific in the Department of Political Science We have both enjoyed these last two team on the editorial committee, and to at University of Gothenburg. Staffan I. years as Executive Editors tremendously. our assistant Adam Bilinski with funding Lindberg will be joined by Eitan Tzelgov, To everyone who consider these sorts provided by Professor Michael Bernhard Yi-ting Wang, and Kelly McMann to form of service to the profession, we can only from the Raymond and Miriam Ehrlich the next committee of Executive Editors. encourage you to do so for the Comparative Eminent Scholar Chair, by the Department Democratization section. We are very proud of Political Science, and by the College of On behalf of the Editorial Committee, of the series of symposia published in the Liberal Arts and Sciences at University of Newsletter during our reign but should be Florida. As always, our gratitude to Melissa Benjamin Smith and Staffan I. Lindberg given no, or very little credit for them! This Aten-Becnel for keeping us on track,

Rothstein, continued (continued from page 1)

mixed villages that substantiate this. explode into nationalist violence. of which a considerable number live in Thirdly, Ignatieff argues convincingly On the contrary, these people had a specific area – the Krajina province. that the conflict cannot be traced to be transformed from neighbors to This Serbian minority worried about back to some kind of “uniquely Balkan enemies.1 what would happen to them in the viciousness.” The type of “ethnic new Croatian state, especially as the cleansing nationalism,” and murderous My summary interpretation of what first elections resulted in a parliament practices that had taken place during happened runs as follows. First, Slovenia where a nationalist Croat party led by the Second World War in the Balkans, decides to secede. This meets opposition Franjo Tudjman received the majority were according to him all imports in Belgrade, but since Slovenia only has of the seats. However, in the beginning from Western Europe and if Western a small population of Serbs, very little of this process, the Serb leaders within Europe could erase these habits during fighting takes place before Slovenia is de Croatia had pretty modest political the post-war era, the same should have facto acknowledged as an independent demands and had no intention of taking been possible in former Yugoslavia. As state. When Croatia wants to go the the Serb minority out of the new Croat Ignatieff states: same way, a major problem is that Republic.2 In a speech in front of 10,000 within its borders there is a fairly large Serbs delivered in June 1990, the then Therefore, we are making excuses Serbian minority (about 11 percent), most important Serb leader in Croatia,

for ourselves when we dismiss the 1. Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys Jovan Rašković, stated that: Balkans as a sub-rational zone of into the New Nationalism (New York: Farrar, Straus, intractable fanaticism. And we are and Giroux, 1994), 13, 15; Anthony Oberschall, “The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Cooperation ending the search for explanation just to Violence and War in Yugoslavia,” Ethnic and when it should begin if we assert that Racial Studies 23 (November 2000): 982-1001; V. P. 2. Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Gagnon, The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (New York: Cambridge local ethnic hatreds were so rooted in the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); University Press, 2005). in history that they were bound to Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging, 15f.

3 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

Rothstein

The Serbs respect the Croatian People and all other “nations” were Fourthly, there is evidence that from people’s right to their sovereign reduced to national minorities. This very early on (summer of 1989) police state, but they (the Serbs) demand was an important change, since in the forces of the new Croatian regime failed in that state an equal position for the constitution of the Yugoslav Federation, to protect the security of Serb minorities Serbian and other peoples. The Serbs the Serbs in Croatia had been a “from vicious outbursts of anti-Serb do not want a second state in Croatia, “constituent nation of the Republic terror in some mixed communities.” but they demand autonomy... The of Croatia.” According to Silber and It is noteworthy that this took place Serbian people in Croatia should Little, this “was a hammer-blow to before the above statements were given be allowed to speak their language, Rašković. It strengthened the hand of by the moderate Serb leaders. Lastly, to write their scripts, to have their Serb nationalists much more radical the Tudjman regime deliberately leaked schools (cheers), to have their than he: those who wanted territorial information given by the moderate education programs, their publishing autonomy, and finally, secession from Serb leaders about their willingness to houses, and their newspapers.3 Croatia.”4 compromise and their negative opinion about the more radical fractions in Rašković’s claims were thus quite Secondly, the Tudjman regime began to the Serb community. This served to modest. What the leaders of the Serb fire employees from various government delegitimize the moderate Serb leaders minority asked for was something jobs simply because they were Serbs in the eyes of their own community akin to the status of the Danish – also in the Krajina province where and served to strengthen the support of speaking minority in Germany and the ethnic Serbs dominated. As two more militant Serb leaders in Krajina German speaking minority in Italy. observers write: “massive layoffs of whose aim “was not to secure for the This indicates that for these “initial” Serbs took place almost immediately Serbs autonomy inside Croatia, but to Serbian minority leaders, the prospect after Tudjman’s election, striking Serbs take the Serbs, and the land on which of becoming a permanent minority in a in the police, army, the judiciary and they lived, out of Croatia altogether.”6 new Croatian state was not seen as a the educational institutions.” Thirdly, problem that would delegitimize the non-Croats were differentiated from In sum, these five conditions sent new Croatian State in their opinion. Croats in yet another way: a loud and clear signal to the Serb However, the newly elected nationalist minority that their possibilities to live Tudjman regime did not accept An official document called a securely and have their human rights this invitation for negotiations and Domovnica (a form providing proof respected in the new Croatian state compromise from the Serb leaders, still of Croatian origin) was instituted were seriously in question. The police moderate at the time. Instead, it did five and became an instrument of in the new state could not be trusted to things that served to ignite the conflict differentiation between Croats and protect them from attacks, they would and led to the outburst of violence in non-Croats when it came to jobs and encounter a “no Serbs need apply” Krajina that then spread to other parts privileges. Opening a private business, policy when looking for government of former Yugoslavia. obtaining medical coverage and the jobs, they would have difficulties in right to retirement pay, getting a their contacts with the new state’s civil First, in the constitution for the passport or a driver’s license, even in service because they would not have the new Croatian state, the Tudjman some cases being qualified to make necessary documents, and they could government put in formulations that withdrawals from one’s own savings count on meeting only ethnic Croats made it clear to the Serb community accounts - all these things hinged on in their encounters with government that from now on they would be second the possession of a Domovnica.5 authorities. rate citizens in their country. The 4. James Gow, The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s demand from the moderate Serb leaders University Press, 2003), 44; Silber and Little, The events between Croats and Serbs for the Serbs in the new Croatian state Yugoslavia, 97. in Croatia that followed led to violent

to be defined as a constituent nation on 5. Oberschall, The Manipulation of Ethnicity; Gow, conflict over the control of the police an equal footing with the Croats was The Serbian Project; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia; forces in Krajina and this made it denied. The new constitution stated Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1997), and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington: 94-95. that the new state was for the Croatian Brookings Institution, 1995), 107; Jasminka Udovički 3. Cited in Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: and Ivan Torov, “The Interlude: 1980:1990,” in 6. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 107; Silber and Little, Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), Jasminka Udovički and James Ridgeway, eds., Burn Yugoslavia, 97. 95. This House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia

4 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

Rothstein

possible for radical (secessionist) shown that many structural factors that of society would no longer have equal political entrepreneurs in the Serb have been put forward for explaining protection under the laws. Instead, the community to rise to power, mobilize the outbreak of this war do not hold actions taken by the new government support for their cause in Belgrade, up for a closer empirical scrutiny. Spain signaled that what would come would outmaneuver the more moderate Serb was an economic laggard in Western be illegal seizures of property, arbitrary leaders and receive military support Europe at the turn of the century, police arrests of members of right- from the Serb-dominated National but from 1913 to 1929 the country wing parties, impunity for criminal Yugoslav Army.7 It is noteworthy that experienced an important acceleration action for members of parties that the Milosevic regime in Belgrade did in growth. The SCW broke 15 years of formed the new majority, politicization not publicly recognize or support uninterrupted improvements in both of justice through new legislation and the self-declared “Serb Autonomous the levels of inequality and poverty, as policies, and arbitrary political arrests Province of Krajina” until later. It is also stated in one recent analysis.9 and prosecution which would place remarkable that the first two persons the rightist parties outside the law. were killed in this conflict during a Leaders of the Spanish Socialist Party In addition, there were also actions clash between the new Croatian police had participated and held central signalling the political subversion of the forces and the Krajina-Serb militia over positions in coalition governments security forces through reappointment the control of a local post office when during the early 1930s In addition, as of revolutionary police officers earlier the post-office workers belonging to measured by the number of votes in prosecuted for violent and subversive the Serb minority refused to leave their national elections, the Fascist party actions, as well as confiscation of jobs.8 in Spain was weaker in 1936 than the property (land) without compensation.10 Fascist and Nazi parties in Sweden. In short, we argue that the violations This interpretation of the causal logic Likewise, it was not the case that of the rule of law and civil liberties behind the outbreak of the civil war employers’ organizations were unwilling by the Popular Front government implies that it was not becoming a to meet many of the radical demands persuaded two key political groups, “permanent minority” that led the from the union movement. On the the middle-classes and the lower-and- Serbs in Croatia to take to violence contrary, as late as of June 7, 1936, only middle-rank army officers, to move against the new Croatian state. Instead, one month before the outbreak of the from being natural constituencies of it was the clear signals from the war, 126 local and regional employers’ the democratically elected centre-left new government that they would be associations published a manifesto in parties in the government to become, constantly discriminated at the “output” which they showed their willingness to in a few months, active supporters of side of the political system that led to reach a broad labor-capital compromise. Franco’s military uprising. the failed consolidation of the new They were also ready to accept many Croatian state. points from the leftist Popular Front’s The conclusion from these two historical economic program, including some of cases is that the degeneration of political The second example for why the output the most controversial labor regulations. legitimacy and absence of democratic side is of great importance for the In a forthcoming article together consolidation are influenced more by consolidation of fragile democracies is with Victor Lapuente we explain the factors located at the “output” side of the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War outbreak of the SCW by two hitherto the political system, than by factors at (SCW) in 1936. Recent research has neglected factors. First, the high level the “input” side. This is corroborated by of political appointments in the civil several recent empirical studies that use 7. Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: service meant that the political conflict cross-country survey data. They show Causes, Course and Consequences (New York: New York University Press, 1995); Oberschall, Manipulation of to a large extent became a conflict over quite a surprising result, namely, that Ethnicity; Silber and Little, Yugoslavia; Udovički and jobs and thereby people’s livelihood. perceptions of having democratic rights Torov, The Interlude. This interpretation of the history of the outbreak of the war should not be taken as Secondly, the newly elected government or of being adequately represented by an excuse for the many horrible war crimes that the in 1936, through many concrete and Serbian military and para-military forces committed 10. The previous section is based on a forthcoming during the war that was to follow these events. highly visible actions, made clear that article: Victor Lapuente and Bo Rothstein, “Civil However, what the Tudjman regime initially did was their political opponents at all levels War Spain Versus Swedish Harmony: The Quality to give the nationalist hatemongers among the Serbs of Government Factor,” Comparative Political Studies all the arguments that they needed. 9. Victor Lapuente and Bo Rothstein, “Civil War (2015). It should be added that this disregard of the Spain versus Swedish Harmony: The Quality of rule of law and civil liberties was not confined to the 8. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 137. Government Factor,” Comparative Political Studies Popular Front but was also the preferred choice by (forthcoming, 2015). the previous center-right government.

5 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

Rothstein

elected politicians does not seem to be third of the electorate does not bother Think if you were the victim of a the most important cause behind an to vote. For some, the electoral system natural disaster and help does not come individual’s view that a political system makes voting meaningless since many because the National Rescue Agency is is legitimate. Instead, “performance” or voters’ preferred party or candidate does run by an incompetent person who got “output” measures, such as control of not stand a chance to win the election. his job because he is a close friend to the corruption, government effectiveness Few citizens write op-ed articles, President. Living in a state where the and the rule of law trump democratic participate in demonstrations, sign quality of government is low seriously rights in explaining political legitimacy. petitions, or take other political actions. affects peoples’ well-being. For once, As stated by Bruce Gilley, “this clashes And perhaps, for many people who do the large-n data gives us a clear result. with standard liberal treatments of not make use of their democratic rights While the correlations between most legitimacy that give overall priority to on the input side of the political system, standard measures of human well-being democratic rights”. Using a different nothing of importance happens to them. and measures of a country’s degree of comparative survey data set, Dahlberg Their life is likely to just go on as before. democracy vary from non-existent to and Holmberg conclude in a similar However, if your children will not get weak, they change from medium to vein that “government effectiveness medical treatment because you cannot strong if the measure of democracy is of greater importance for citizens’ afford to pay the bribes demanded by is exchanged for measures of quality satisfaction with the way democracy the public health care workers; if the of government or “good governance.” functions, compared to factors such police will not protect you because you Thus, the findings from the survey as ideological congruence on the belong to an ethnic minority; if your studies reported above shows that input side. Impartial and effective property will be confiscated or you will when people all over the world make bureaucracies matter more than lose your job because you belong to the up their mind if their governments representational devices.”11 “wrong” political party; if you will never are legitimate, they give much greater get that building permit because you are weight to factors at the “output side” How can we make sense of that citizens’ not well-connected in the City Hall; or of the political system such as the perceptions of rights on the input if the fire-brigade will not come to your rule of law and control of corruption side of the political system are less part of the city, your situation affected than factors at the input side, that is, important for political legitimacy and in a very direct and concrete way. democratic rights. The implication is of the consolidation of democracy than this is that studies of democratization what takes place in the (mundane) Consider a situation when electricity should pay more attention to factors implementation of public policies? One and sanitation does not work in your related to state capacity and the quality way to think about this is the following. neighborhood because the people of government.12 In many electoral democracies, about a who run these services got their jobs 11. Bruce Gilley, “The Determinants of State because they belong to the ruling party Bo Rothstein is the August Röhss Chair Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries,” International regardless of their level of competence. in Political Science at the University of Political Science Review 27 ( January 2006): 47-71, 58; Bruce Gilley, The Right to Rule: How States Win Or imagine that you do not get the right Gothenburg and director of the Quality of and Lose Legitimacy (New York: Columbia University medical treatment for a deadly disease Government Institute. Press, 2009); Torbjørn Gjefsen, “Sources of Regime because the ever-so democratically Legitimacy. Quality of Government and Electoral Democracy” (Department of Political Science: elected President is surrounded by University of Oslo, 2012); Stefan Dahlberg and political cronies instead of competent Sören Holmberg, “Democracy and Bureaucracy: 12. Bo Rothstein, ”What is the opposite to How Their Quality Matters for Popular Satisfaction,” non-partisan civil servants and experts. corruption,” Third World Quarterly (forthcoming, West European Politics (2013). 2014).

6 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

heibub continued (continuedC from page 1) ,

with a few remarks on the kind of advice Thus, according to Linz, presidential between presidential institutions and political scientists can give regarding institutions are simply not conducive democratic breakdown is still a reality the best constitutional form for the to governments capable of handling and hence the intuitive arguments that consolidation of democracy. the explosive issues that are central to have been made connecting the two the new democracies in the developing still resonate. But to move forward The impact of separation of powers world. These issues make governing it may be helpful to address some or assembly confidence on democratic difficult under any circumstances. unresolved issues while recognizing consolidation is no longer at the center Governing becomes almost impossible how the political reality has changed of the democratization research agenda. when the institutional setup is likely since Linz’s theory was formulated. Probably everyone is familiar with to generate governments with weak Even though not a long time has passed the argument, first developed by Juan legislative support as well as parties and since that moment, it is fair to say that Linz, according to which presidential politicians whose dominant strategy is the features of many of the cases we institutions are likely to lead to to act independently from one another. are confronted with today are quite crises that may ultimately cause the Given the lack of constitutional different from the ones confronted by breakdown of democracies.1 Although solutions to the crises that are almost Linz. Linz offered more than one reason inevitable in these countries, political for the observed negative correlation actors have no choice but to appeal to But before we address these differences, between presidentialism and democracy, those with the means to resolve their let me say something about an important most important, in my view, was his differences, even if at the price of unresolved issue which affects the argument about incentives for coalition democracy itself. study of democratic consolidation: the formation. This argument was also the definition and operationalization of most fully developed in subsequent Here is not the place for rehashing the concept itself. We may know, or studies. His reasoning was as follows: the debate around these ideas. Let me think we know, what a consolidated presidential institutions fail to generate simply say that Juan Linz’s view of the democracy is: it is the regime in which incentives for cooperation among negative impact of presidentialism on no relevant actor seeks to advance its individual politicians, among parties and democratization was critically examined political goals outside of the democratic between the legislative and executive along two main lines. The first institutional framework. We often say powers. Because presidentialism focused on the fact that parliamentary that a democracy is consolidated when provides no incentives for inter-branch democracies were not altogether its rules constitute the proverbial “only cooperation, presidential democracies immune to the institutional crises game in town.” Yet, how can one tell are characterized by frequent minority that were supposed to characterize that democracy is the only game in governments as well as conflict and presidential ones. The second sought town? We act as if one simply knows deadlocks between the government and to show that the sequence of events it; as if we would be able to recognize the legislature. Because presidential that would lead to the breakdown a consolidated democracy when we saw regimes lack a constitutional principle of presidential democracies did not one. Yet, is this satisfactory? that can be invoked to resolve materialize with the frequency implied conflicts between the executive and by the argument. Consequently, if the Some scholars use the survival of the legislature, such as the vote of relationship between presidentialism democracies, the number of years no confidence in parliamentary and democratic breakdown is causal, they have existed, to talk about their democracies, minority presidents and the mechanism might not be the one consolidation: we may know what deadlock provide incentives for actors postulated by Linz. affects the latter by studying the factors to search for extra-constitutional that make democracies last in time. In means of resolving differences. As a Of course, the discussion around the this view, the notion of consolidation is consequence, presidential democracies “perils of presidentialism” did not actually quite meaningless since no one become more prone to instability and represent the last word in the debate has identified a benchmark that would eventual death. about the impact of forms of government separate consolidated from fragile 1. Juan J. Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary on democratic consolidation. This Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?” in Juan question still generates considerable J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America interest, as it should. The correlation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

7 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

Cheibub

democracies.2 Moreover, this approach are there forces in these countries that Today, many countries that are is often dismissed on the grounds that seek to advance their interests outside facing regime crises are presidential, many democracies survive but do so in of democratic institutions? Probably which provides new support for the a state of permanent existential danger, not; and yet, those democracies are notion that the relationship between which excludes them from the set of rarely even candidates for receiving presidentialism and (failure of ) consolidated democracies. In other the “badge of consolidation” conferred democratic consolidation is causal. words, some think that survival is a by the community of democratization Examples such as Putin in Russia, bad indicator of consolidation because scholars. This denial happens because Chavez in Venezuela and Yanukovych democracies may be “old” and yet not of insufficient thinking about the in Ukraine suggest that the fact that consolidated and, less intuitively, they meaning of democratic consolidation they were popularly elected for a fixed can be “young” and entirely consolidated. and lack of specification of conditions term in office may be related to the The problem of differentiation between necessary to classify a democracy as failure of democratic consolidation. the two types is ignored, perhaps on consolidated. The aforementioned Yet, simply invoking the usual “perils the grounds that identification of truly regimes are excluded from the set of of presidentialism” argument to account consolidated democracies should be consolidated democracies on the basis for these cases will not do. obvious to all. of criteria that have nothing to do with whether conflicts are processed within The original argument about the But this, of course, is not the case. the rules of the game. detrimental effects of presidentialism Perusing the different samples used in for democratic consolidation must be studies of democratic consolidation, We need, thus, to think about the understood in the context of the virtual one is stricken by the fact that the only factors that contribute to democratic disappearance of democracy from truly consensual set of consolidated consolidation; we need to identify the Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. democracies consists of the rich, set of democracies that, at any point in Between 1960 and 1975, almost every industrialized countries of Western time, can be considered consolidated; Latin American country experienced Europe and North America, plus we need to ask whether it is possible a democratic breakdown. Most of Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. that consolidated democracies will these democracies collapsed in the Democracies located in Latin America, become de-stabilized and then identify hands of the military, who inaugurated Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa are the conditions under which this what O’Donnell called a new type assumed to be unconsolidated, fragile, happens; and finally, we need to identify of dictatorship – the bureaucratic- fledging, weak, transitional, or… They the set of democracies that were once authoritarian regime. As a matter of fact, are anything but consolidated. unconsolidated and then became during the Cold War, the vast majority immune to breakdown. Although these of democracies collapsed as the result But when the regimes in Chile, Brazil, are obvious questions, I am not familiar of a military coup, in a pattern that, at Mexico, Poland, India, Taiwan, South with a single work that seeks to answer least superficially, corroborated Linz’s Korea, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, them directly at the basic, purely view of a conflict between a fixed-term Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Hungary, descriptive, level.3 executive who did not have the support South Africa, and Kenya, to name only of a majority in congress. “a few,” will be considered reasonably 3. Although not descriptive in the sense I have in mind here, Svolik (2008) constitutes an exception. consolidated democracies? True, these Thus, although the Svolik’s paper is not about Democratic breakdown happens countries are faced with a variety of identifying concrete examples of consolidated and nowadays in a very different way. problems: in some crime rates are non-consolidated democracies, it does provide Institutionalized militaries cannot be an empirical basis for distinguishing them. For high, or corruption is rampant, or drug Svolik the set of democracies is heterogeneous: it counted on to intervene into politics cartels challenge the central state. In consists of regimes that survive because they face and take the reins of government from a low propensity to revert to authoritarianism, and others, governments adopt bad policies, of regimes that survive because they experience the hands of civilian politicians. If they face frequent economic crises, favorable conditions for survival. Although only democracies fail to consolidate today, inequality is high, or people organize, survival of democracies is directly observable, it authoritarian regimes that replace is possible to empirically distinguish the factors vote and live along ethnic lines. But that matter for survival because they affect a them are more likely to be led by democracy’s propensity to breakdown (i.e. the scope civilians, often the elected incumbent 2. This, of course, has not prevented scholars from of consolidation) from the factors that affect the using an arbitrary number of years for defining the actual timing of breakdown. This is, in my view, one who, by a process of overt and covert sample of democracies they study and, implicitly, the of the most original contributions to the literature on manipulation, progressively removes the ones that are consolidated. democratic consolidation. 8 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

Cheibub

conditions necessary for competitive assures that such support is present, and If this conclusion reminds the reader of elections to occur in the future. To (multiparty) presidentialism virtually Madison and his view about separation use the terminology employed by assures that it will be lacking. However, of powers, it is not a mere coincidence. Adam Przeworski and his co-authors,4 some of the contemporary cases suggest transitions to authoritarianism after the the opposite: democracy may be “saved” Thus, the correlation between Cold War are more likely to be “from by the fact that the government does not presidential institutions and (failure above” and occur at the hands of the have strong support in the legislature of ) democratic consolidation in the incumbent. They are likely to violate and it may be threatened in situations contemporary world, if it exists at all, two of the three conditions which the when the executive enjoys sufficient should not be considered intuitive and above mentioned authors identified backing of the legislature to shut off explainable in terms of hypotheses as necessary for a democracy to exist: the opposition. generated from a framework that sees “ex ante uncertainty,” namely, the the lack of legislative support for requirement that electoral outcomes are Take a few recent examples. In Slovakia, presidents as the crux of the problem. not pre-determined, and “repeatability,” Vladimír Mečiar was hampered in his That framework was generated with that is, the requirement that democratic authoritarian ambitions by repeated a specific set of historical examples incumbents hold competitive elections defections from his coalition, which in mind, and it became popular in such as the ones that brought them into eventually resulted in a vote of no- the context of the debt crisis in Latin office.5 confidence in 1994 and the failure America and the concerns about the to form governments in 1998. This ability of governments in the region Thus, if it is true that there is a happened in spite of Mečiar’s control to implement structural policies that correlation between presidentialism of a plurality of legislative seats. In were at the time considered necessary. and the recent failures of democratic Hungary, on the other hand, the While implementation of these policies consolidation (something that has not overwhelming legislative support for required the preference alignment of been established yet, as far as I know), Prime Minister Victor Orbán allowed the executive and the legislature, all and if it is true that these episodes of him and his party to introduce changes countries operated under a constitution failure rarely if at all involve a military that are widely seen as non-democratic. that provided no such guarantee. coup, we need to formulate new Similarly, as Sebastian Saiegh shows By contrast with presidentialism, explanatory hypotheses. What is it about using an example of the fall of Bolivian assembly confidence was seeing as the presidentialism that may lead to the president Sánchez Lozada in 2003,6 the institutional mechanism that assured entrenchment of incumbents in power? danger for democratic consolidation support of legislative majority to the Conversely, which characteristics posed by an unconstitutional transfer of executive and parliamentarism as the of parliamentary institutions might power should be attributed to situations form of government that would prevent prevent such entrenchment? which are in their nature opposite to the failure of the new democracies in deadlocks. As Saiegh suggests, in some Latin America and Eastern Europe. One thing is sure, namely, that the circumstances the government may We know where this story went: Linzian approach to these questions actually govern too much. Consequently, few democracies, parliamentary or will not take us far. The reason is that what threatens democracy is not so presidential, failed in the way that was this approach is focused on the problem much that there is a deadlock between then expected. Perhaps this is the fact of legislative support for the executive, a constitutionally irremovable president that requires explanation. that is, on how parliamentarism virtually and legislature but the fact that the two are aligned and can change the status Yet, what kind of constitution is best 4. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy quo in a direction that may suit their suited to help consolidate democracy? and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being interests but not those of democracy. Unfortunately, in my view, some in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge Deadlocks and minority governments scholars believe that there is a clear University Press, 2000). may be precisely what save democracy answer to this question and are not shy 5. The one that is not violated is “ex post certainty,” from being suffocated by aspiring to advocate their views. For instance, namely the assurance that whoever wins the election will take office. Note that the “alternation” rule autocrats. in an opinion piece published in July introduced by Przeworski et al. to operationalize the 2013, Bruce Ackerman, a professor three conditions of democracy speaks directly to the 6. Sebastian Saiegh, Ruling by Statute: How of Law and Political Science at Yale problems related to the measurement of incumbent- Uncertainty and Vote Buying Shape Lawmaking caused subversions of democracy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). University, stated that the failure

9 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

Cheibub

of the military rulers who had just Egypt beginning to trail behind) and on the basis of this exercise requires taken power in Egypt to replace references to the correlation between courage, the courage of fools who believe presidentialism with “a European- presidentialism and regime breakdown, that they have successfully found the style parliamentary system,” “virtually as if correlation was evidence of solution to the problem that has eluded guarantees a repetition of the tragic causation. (But we know better than everyone else. events of the past year.”7 Furthermore, this!). Moreover, parliamentarism as he argues counterfactually, the and presidentialism are very broad I thus end with a note which suggests adoption of a parliamentary constitution constitutional frameworks: as recent more humbleness than confidence in after Mubarak’s departure “could well research has demonstrated, they can our ability to provide positive advice have avoided the current upheaval and be configured in an infinite number of of the sort given by Ackerman. The bloodshed in the first place.” The reason, ways; they interact with other, small vast majority of studies have failed according to him, is that “the presidency and large, institutional features of to establish convincingly that there is a winner-take-all office,” which may be the political system; and, of course, exists a causal relationship between the suitable for a country such as the United they interact with non-institutional form of government and democracy. States, “where well-organized parties factors, unique to the country where Consequently, unless in some specific contend for the prize,” but “is a recipe they are being adopted. This last point case there is a broad consensus across for tyranny in places like Egypt, where is particularly relevant for Egypt. It is the political spectrum about the need for Islamists have powerful organizational possible that Ackeman is right and a change, it is not certain that the benefit advantages in delivering the vote.” parliamentary constitution may do the of adopting a new type of constitution Although Ackerman stands out in the trick in Egypt and allow for the peaceful will outweigh the costs of implementing forcefulness and clarity with which he processing of conflicts between Islamists it. defends a constitutional overhaul in and secularists. On the other hand, we countries that adopt presidentialism, have good reasons to believe that, given José Antonio Cheibub is professor of he certainly does not hold this opinion the nature of its military, the main political science at the University of Illinois alone. Yet, we may ask: is this view problem in Egypt at this point is far at Urbana-Champaign. The author would warranted? from being institutional; perhaps given like to thank Milan Svolik for the many the presence of such an actor, any kind of discussions on the topic (without which he This kind of advice is based on generic constitutional arrangement would have would have not been able to write this essay) and one-sided arguments, which are failed. Thus, to reduce parliamentarism and asserts that Svolik is not responsible supported by scant historical and and presidentialism to one essential for anything outrageous that is said here. statistical evidence: isolated regime feature, to look at specific situations Cheibub also would like to acknowledge the crises (Chile in 1973 is favorite, with from the lens provided by this essential support of the Research Council of Norway 7. Bruce Ackerman, “To Save Egypt, Drop the feature, and offer constitutional advice (FRISAM 222442). Presidency,” New York Times, July 10, 2013.

10 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

erman continued (continuedB from page 2) ,

that broad structural forces like warfare, than actual rulers. As is the case in many Beginning in about the seventeenth increasing trade, the emergence of underdeveloped states today, they had century, many European monarchs began capitalism, geography, or particular ideas6 little power outside of a “capital” city; to centralize authority and engage in what help explain why state building occurs, most people had little contact with or even we now recognize as the beginnings of state such explanations tell us little about how it knowledge of the king and his court; and building. Among the many theories as to actually comes about. How does political the king’s authority was open to constant why this process began at this time the most authority in fact get centralized? How can challenge. Indeed, the dominant authority influential stresses the changing nature and state builders manipulate environments in in most peoples’ lives during this time was frequency of warfare.8 And it is certainly order to achieve their goals? Answering local or religious. Direct responsibility for the case that the seventeenth century was a these questions requires a more direct focus the provision of defense and welfare up period of extraordinary conflict in Europe. on what state building in reality entails— through the early modern period lay for However, it is important to note that not all that is, on the mechanisms and mechanics the most part not with kings, but rather of these conflicts were international. of state building. Structural accounts tend with regional or provincial nobles (today to downplay or even ignore this aspect of we refer to analogous figures as “warlords” This period was also marked by immense state building since the construction of or perhaps tribal chiefs). In general, kings domestic upheaval—revolts, rebellions and states (or lack thereof ) is seen as flowing could not engage in warfare on their own, uprisings were a characteristic feature of inexorably from structural pressures or they needed the approval and support the age. It is worth noting that up through conditions. of local nobles who often provided the the 19th century, European militaries spent resources and men necessary for battle. Far probably as much time fighting internal as Fortunately, if we look back carefully from any central leader having a “monopoly external enemies. These revolts, rebellions, over the historical record we can at least over the use of violence,” control over and uprisings, in turn, were themselves begin to find answers to these questions. domestic violence in pre-modern Europe largely a consequence of the centralization In comparison to the social scientific was dispersed and decentralized. Nobles drive. As monarchs and their agents began literature, the historical literature is less retained their own private arsenals, armed trying to centralize authority, challenging focused on macro-processes and structural forces and fortresses, and used them to long-standing fragmented and segmented factors and more concentrated on the actual defend their land and the people who lived authority structures, local, regional and mechanisms and technologies of state under their rule. In many parts of Europe, religious elites (as well as many of the building. In particular, much historical therefore, nobles, rather than kings, were ordinary people who had long lived research zeroes in on the challenge of the key authority figures in the lives of under them) engaged in various forms of centralizing authority in contexts where most Europeans before the seventeenth resistance. So frequent and severe were there are powerful opponents of it. century. In addition, the Catholic Church center-provincial-local confrontations, and ecclesiastical figures exerted immense and so acute and disorienting was the Up through the early modern period, social, cultural and political influence larger debate about the nature and locus of Europe was divided into a large number and carried out many of the functions authority occurring during this time that of small political units with fairly porous, we would normally associate with “states” many historians view them as the cause of undefined borders. Although border (e.g. education, care for the poor, running the “general crisis” that Europe experienced regions were particularly unstable, a hospitals, etc.). Thus, before the early during the seventeenth century. As one king’s hold over the rest of his ostensible modern period, authority in Europe well respected treatment of the period territories was often not much stronger. was segmented and fragmented rather puts it, “behind the internal conflicts in Most of the “countries” of the day were than centralized and most Europeans’ the European countries in the middle of

really loose collections of provinces, regions identities remained primarily regional, 1994); and Wolfgang Reinhard, ed., Power Elites and and people, effectively governed by local local or religious rather than national. The State Building (London: Clarendon Press, 1996). rulers, legal systems, and traditions. Where geographical, ethnic or linguistic unity that 8. Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of kings existed, they were often more titular we associate with modern states did not European State-Making,” in Tilly, ed., The Formation 6. Kenneth Dyson, The State Tradition in Western exist in the Europe of this time.7 of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Europe (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); Reinhard Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 42 and also Bendix, Kings or People. Power and the Mandate 7. Dan Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Tilly. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD to Rule (Los Angeles: University of California Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009): 990-1990 (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, Press, 1978), 7ff; Daniel Nexon, The Struggle J. S. Elliot, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” 1990). For an influential contemporary version of for Power in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Past and Present, 137, November 1992: J.H. Elliot, this argument see Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Princeton University Press, 2009); Philip Gorski, Europe Divided 1559-1598 (NY: Harper and Row, “Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridicial The Disciplinary Revolution (Chicago: University of 1968); Janice Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates and Statehood and the African Crisis,” Journal of Modern Chicago Press, 2003.) Sovereigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, African Studies, 24, 1, 1986

11 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

Berman

the seventeenth century, we find the same It is impossible to go into details here, but formation critically influences the type of factor: the growth of state power.”9 In short, learning more about the different strategies political regime that subsequently develops. in Europe, as in much of the world today, pursued by early modern European rulers The most obvious historical example of turmoil and violence was the consequence and why some were successful while others this process is the French case. In this of leaders’ attempts to centralize authority. were not, would go a long way towards instance, understanding of the nature Even where successful, European state- helping us build a better understanding of of the ancien régime French state is a building was marred by constant conflicts how a central characteristic or pre-requisite necessary prerequisite for understanding and setbacks, and required endless deal- of state building—the centralization of of both the French revolution and the making and bargaining. This is because even authority—actually got and gets done. political trajectory that followed. It is when faced with a desperate need to raise similarly impossible to understand English, revenue to fight wars—a classic Tillyesque In pre-modern Europe as in many parts of Prussian, Spanish, Polish or indeed any situation—most European monarchs were the world today, state building could only country’s political development without initially unable to eliminate those opposed really get underway once the interests of examining the type of state these countries to the centralization of authority. What elites had been transformed: they needed experienced, and the process in which the historical literature reveals, in other to begin seeing their own fortunes as being it was built. In short, if we really want to words, is that when faced with opposition linked to, or at least not mortally threatened understand why not just democracy, but to centralization, many monarchs (and by, centralized authority. In order to effect also economic development, social stability in particular those that turned out to be this transformation European monarchs and other critical tasks are achieved in some successful, and many were not) turned to a relied on the use of material incentives places but not others, we need to spend variety of co-optation strategies in order to to try to gain at least the acquiescence of more time studying how the states tasked get the job done. their adversaries. These material incentives with carrying out these goals develop in the and strategies varied greatly, were more or first place. 9. Geoffrey Parker and Lesley Smith, The General less successful, and had diverse political Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (New York: Routledge, 1997), 47; Perez Zagorian, Rebels and consequences. Learning more about Sheri Berman is professor of political Rulers, 1500-1660 (New York: Cambridge University them would fill out our picture of state science at Barnard College. Press, 1982); see also Theodore K. Rabb, The Struggle building as well as other aspects of political for Stability in Early Modern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 33. development given that the form of state

12 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

ornell rimes and apuente continued (continuedC from page 2), G , L ,

twentieth century or Chile and Estonia in overlooked in the democratization Consequences of Excessive Political the early twenty-first century) while remain literature. We contend that the division Control over the Bureaucracy elusive in the others (e.g. many post-Soviet between the political and administrative Politicians, if elected through free and fair republics or current Venezuela)? sectors of the government, functioning as elections, provide the best approximation a firewall around the processes of political of the aggregate of citizens’ preferences, The areas most often scrutinized in efforts contestation may, somewhat paradoxically, and must in any democracy exert control to understand these syndromes are those strengthen the congruence between popular over the means, ways and aims of the directly involved in process of preference will and policy outcomes. The existence of bureaucracy. All states, in order to aggregation and policy-making, i.e. those institutional firewalls also lengthen control bureaucracies, use a mix of various political parties, the electoral system, the time horizons of policymaking and tips instruments, ranging from organizational legislatures or the executive.2 Democracy the calculus of political action away from (such as budget allocation and objective- and political contestation operate in a larger certain strategies considered less consistent based governing) to individual ones institutional space, however, and attributes with well-functioning democracy, such (such as civil service codes and personnel of this landscape may have far-reaching as wooing voters with promises of private policies). In fact, one of the means used implications for the strategies, objectives, goods. to ensure an obedient civil service corps and logics of various sets of political actors, is to control staff policy through political which in turn may alter the nature of the Institutions set the normative frameworks appointments.4 However, as stated above, political contest. In this essay we present for actors’ behavior, inform what is allowed the problem is that this kind of control over the underpinnings of a research agenda that and appropriate, but also constitute bureaucracy might be too excessive, and in examines how the relationship between the incentive structure for choices in a this case it blurs the distinction between input (policy making) and output (policy broad range of strategies not specifically political and administrative spheres of implementing) institutions in the political stipulated in rules and procedures. In a government. system may affect numerous aspects of state, what matters are not only structures the democratic process. We therefore of each institution per se, but also their We argue that the firewall between the advocate broadening the scope of analysis, interrelations since an institution (e.g. the political and bureaucratic spheres of the and in particular directing attention at the legislature or executive) can be a principal state should be an important constituent structure of the relationship between the and an agent at the same time. In textbook part of the government since it would affect political and the administrative spheres of definitions of democracy, however,incentives of various groups of agents: the state. This institutional interface may institutions of preference aggregation and politicians, bureaucrats, but also civil society either be highly porous or alternatively policy formation are construed as principals actors. The discussion below explores how a characterized by safeguards and restrictions while bureaucratic institutions act as agents. politicized bureaucracy affects incentives of aimed at maintaining a clear division of Concerning the relationship between each of these categories of actors. roles and jurisdictions. political and administrative spheres of the state, a balance must be struck between Politicians – Incumbents and Opposition. The virtuousness of a firewall separating control and stimulus, but they should also To start with, when politicians have politicians and bureaucrats has been be appropriately separated in order to allow excessive control over the bureaucracy, noted by public administration scholars, for effective oversight and corrective action. and in particular over careers of individual from classical authors such as Woodrow This trade-off accounts for the vast across- bureaucrats, incumbent politicians have Wilson and Max Weber to contemporary state and within-state variation in the much greater opportunities to engage in researchers,3 but has been largely degree to which political institutions control discretionary allocation of public goods administrative institutions. With too little and services to reward party supporters or 2. Scott Mainwaring, and Timothy Scully (eds.). Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in control, the state ceases to be a democracy, build support among potential voters. A Latin America. (Stanford, Calif. Stanford University transforming into a “technocracy.” Yet, politically controlled bureaucracy, in short, Press, 1995). too much control creates incentives for enables parties to carry out clientelistic 3. Weber, M. [1921]. Economy and Society, Roth, politicians, bureaucrats and citizens to and particularistic politics, and to reward G. and Wittich, C. (eds) (Berkeley: University of engage in behaviors which in the aggregate politically loyal groups or individuals. This California Press, 1978. Wilson, W. 1887. “Study of Administration.” Political Science Quarterly 2(2): inhibit a deepening of democracy. control of the bureaucracy thus allows 197-222.; D. E. Lewis. The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic 4. Barbara Geddes, Politician’s Dilemma: Building Performance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University State Capacity in Latin America (Berkeley: University Press, 2008). of California Press, 1994).

13 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

Cornell, Grimes, and Lapuente

the incumbent to use state resources to goods and services. Consequently, electoral may be the most rational strategy in terms strengthen the ruling party and increase its losers are left to wait until it becomes their of career advancement.7 In other words, chances of reelection. This happens when, “time to eat”, or otherwise they may resort bureaucrats will have incentives to carry let’s say, political appointees are used for to more unconventional means of exerting out the will and whim of the appointing campaigning, or personnel in state-owned pressure on incumbents, such as instigating politicians, even when such actions might media broadcasts the incumbent’s political supporters to engage in disruptive protests.6 not concur with the spirit of the law or the messages. Personnel employed in the stated aims and performance objectives of “misiones” (a type of state-funded social In the system of politicized bureaucracy the the agency in which they are employed. programs) in Venezuela participated, for logic of politics tips in favor of clientelistic Such effects would of course be more instance, in political campaigning for Hugo exchanges at the expense of more universal intense in settings where politicians not Chavez.5 policies, and there is a reason to believe that only have the power to appoint, but also to in such a system, the logic of accountability dismiss. In such arrangements, bureaucrats’ This is not to say that political appointments will be quite similar. Incumbent politicians obedience is synonymous with continued under all circumstances result in increased would, in a politicized setting, have weak employment. selective apportionment of public goods incentives to hold bureaucratic agencies and resources, but merely that the to account as a whole so that the latter Moreover, strong political control of the opportunities for such apportionment would be pressured to improve the bureaucracy curtails its ability to inject expert increase with the scope of politicization quality of services available to all citizens. knowledge and evaluative feedback into the of the bureaucracy. Once a ruling party Instead, politicians would hold individual policy formation process. Organizational opts for short term clientelistic strategies, bureaucrats accountable in order to assure volatility or threats of dismissal may affect it may create further incentives for other that their clients receive promised goods bureaucrats’ time horizons negatively, with politicians and parties to follow suit if and services. A degree of separation is detrimental consequences for professional they have the ability to do so. However, required for accountability to function development, long-term planning and these actions contribute to an uneven optimally, and this separation erodes in a overall performance. In sum, political electoral playing field because opposition highly politicized administration. appointments resulting in high turnover politicians obviously do not have the same rates creates a situation in which the opportunity to use state resources as the Moreover, the ability of the legislature bureaucracy is composed to a larger extent government. Autonomous bureaucracies, to hold the executive accountable may of inexperienced officials and the scope on the other hand, prevent politicians suffer if the power of the two branches of invaluable organizational and policy from policy micro-management and thus of government becomes substantially knowledge fails to accumulate.8And make implementation of particularistic imbalanced. Extensive control of the needless to say, when offices of audit goals more difficult. In settings where bureaucracy may strengthen the executive and oversight are politicized, horizontal bureaucracies are autonomous, politicians power precisely because it is primarily the accountability is eroded. Politicization may therefore be more inclined to carry out executive that has the right to appoint public of institutions responsible for drawing more programmatic policies. officials. In this situation the legislature electoral districts may distort electoral may become relatively toothless despite accountability as well. In any democracy the opposition will find it formal powers of recall, impeachment or hard to put its constituents’ preferences on questioning. Civil Society. In a system of politicized the policy agenda. However, in situations bureaucracy, civil society organizations where the flow of government resources Bureaucrats. If bureaucrats are politically 7. Nolan McCarty, “The Appointments Dilemma,” American Journal of Political Science 48 ( July 2004): is politicized, the position of opposition recruited, loyalty to the incumbent and 413-428; David E. Lewis, The Politics of Presidential supporters is even worse as they suffer not the ruling party rather than to the agency Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, only from smaller influence over policy 6. E.g. Martin Shefter, “Party and Patronage: 2008); Daniel Gingerich, Political Institutions and decisions, but also from poorer access to Germany, England, and Italy,” Politics & Society Party-Directed Corruption in South America: Stealing 5. Agnes Cornell and Victor Lapuente, “Meritocratic 7 (December 1977): 403-451; Michela Wrong, for the Team (New York: Cambridge University Press, Administration and Democratic Stability,” It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle 2013). Democratization (forthcoming). For description of Blower (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009); Agnes “misiones” in Venezuela, see Scott Mainwaring, Cornell and Marcia Grimes, “Disruptive Protests 8. Agnes Cornell. “Why Bureaucratic Stability “From Representative Democracy to Participatory and Bureaucratic Structures in Latin America and Matters for the Implementation of Democratic Competitive Authoritarianism: Hugo Chávez and the Caribbean” Quality of Government Institute Governance Programs.” Governance 2014; 27 Venezuelan Politics,” Perspectives on Politics 10 Working Paper Series 2014:4. (2): 191-214 (available online at: http://dx.doi. (December 2012): 955-967. org/10.1111/gove.12037).

14 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

Cornell, Grimes, and Lapuente

may also face a different type of incentive presence of a strong civil society increases the emergence of a large middle class. In structure than in a polity with a more the risk of recurrent protests and disruptive contrast, lack of separation between politics autonomous administrative branch. Both actions. This may be one of the reasons of and administration exacerbates the negative individual citizens and associations alike high incidence of protests in some Latin effects of other factors on democratic may have incentives to develop clientelistic American countries, such as Bolivia, which stability. In particular, economic crises bonds of reciprocity with individual also is among the ones with the highest may affect system performance differently politicians or political parties. This happens degree of politicized bureaucracy in the depending on the nature of the relationship because in such a system clientelistic region.10 between the political and bureaucratic exchanges turn out to be the most spheres of the state. When a crisis negatively effective means of provision of goods and A porous or robust firewall: Moving affects state revenues, the incumbent may services to civil society members. Whether beyond state capacity have difficulty upholding the clientelistic community-based organizations or labor Though narrower, our answer to the linkages with its support base, which may unions, citizens associations may adapt to question posed by the The Economist is even prompt electoral winners to engage in the logic of political machines, promising to similar to the journal’s own answer: “The disruptive protest.11 deliver votes in order to secure the desired most successful new democracies have all regulations or club goods. Here too, a worked in large part because they avoided In our argument, we share a concern with constituent part of the larger accountability the temptation of majoritarianism—the a number of other authors for how the chain breaks down. Civil society no longer notion that winning an election entitles structure and capacity of the state affects serves to strengthen horizontal networks the majority to do whatever it pleases.” The the functioning of democracy.12 We agree in a way that allows citizens to mobilize, discussion above describes ways in which that clientelism, poor service provision, monitor and hold government accountable. an insufficiently robust firewall between the failure in representative channels, and Rather, it is more likely to be polarized political and administrative spheres may overall deficient aggregation of citizens’ and focused on members’ specific needs. affect the nature of the political game. If the preferences and implementation of policy Research on Brazil shows, for example, spheres are separated, political contestation weaken support for democracy and how neighborhood organizations use is constrained to the electoral and policy- diminish the willingness to abide by the clientelistic tactics to secure street lighting making arenas, and majoritarianism rules of the game. The insight we seek to and how clientelistism even in some cases and extreme polarization of the political add is that a politically controlled civil permeates participatory budgeting.9 game is curtailed. Obviously, democracies service in particular changes the logic of must have electoral winners and losers. politics and political action, transforming Moreover, citizens’ associations lacking Yet, in democracies with porous firewalls politics from a battle of ideas and interests, connections to incumbents may choose, between politics and administration, losing into a battle over state resources. as the most effective recourse, to secure elections entails also forfeited access to goods and services through various forms state resources. We seek to develop this line of inquiry by of disruptive actions. Disruptions such as advancing a theoretical account regarding roadblocks, destruction of public buildings A robust firewall is not a sufficient the institutional crux of the problems in and looting transform the problems of condition for democratic deepening, many democratic states. We argue that while a specific group into the problem of the but it could tip the balance in its favor. an autonomous bureaucracy may not suffice general public, including constituents This would be especially likely if it was to correct all democratic dysfunctions, a of ruling parties. Paradoxically, a better combined with other factors that have 11. See for example Jan Teorell, Determinants of organized citizenry, in such a system, been more extensively studied, such as a Democratization : Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972-2006 (Cambridge: Cambridge contributes to destabilization of the strong civil society, economic growth or University Press, 2010). For an example from political system to a larger extent. Hence, 10. Agnes Cornell and Marcia Grimes. Argentina on how a crisis undermines ruling party’s when bureaucracy is autonomous, a strong “Disruptive Protests and Bureaucratic Structures clientelistic linkages, see Javier Auyero and Timothy in Latin America and the Caribbean” Quality of Patrick Moran, “The Dynamics of Collective civil society holds politicians accountable Government Institute Working Paper Series 2014:4.; Violence: Dissecting Food Riots in Contemporary and improves the quality of democracy. Marcia Grimes, “The Contingencies of Societal Argentina,” Social Forces 85 (March 2007): 1341-67. Accountability: Examining the Link Between But when bureaucracy is politicized, Civil Society and Good Government” Studies in 12. Fabiana Machado, Carlos Scartascini, and 9. Robert Gay, Popular Organization and Democracy Comparative International Development 48 (December Mariano Tommasi, “Political Institutions and Street in Rio de Janeiro: A Tale of Two Favelas (Philadelphia, 2013): 380-402; Agnes Cornell, “Why Bureaucratic Protests in Latin America,” Journal of Conflict PA: Temple University Press, 1994); Brian Wampler. Stability Matters for the Implementation of Resolution 55 ( June 2011): 340-65; Edward D. “When does participatory democracy deepen Democratic Governance Programs” Governance Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why the quality of democracy? Lessons from Brazil.” 2014; 27 (2): 191-214 (available online at: http:// Emerging Democracies Go to War (Cambridge: MIT Comparative Politics 2008; 41(1): 61-81. dx.doi.org/10.1111/gove.12037). Press, 2005).

15 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

Cornell, Grimes, and Lapuente

highly politicized bureaucracy is a sufficient The theoretical account presented here necessary feature of democracy, become too condition for instability of the political suggests a number of testable claims that restrictive so that it starts to undermine system as a whole. The incentive structure warrant empirical scrutiny as better measures democratic performance? Efforts to resulting from a system that affords of bureaucratic autonomy become available, conceptualize the relationship between politicians extensive power to intervene in part through our own research efforts. input and output institutions in both theory in the workings of the bureaucracy is Do the various groups of actors discussed and measurement of state institutions will one of the factors lowering the quality of here regard the political game in a way that advance the study of democratic deepening, democracy. To the extent that the incentive is consistent with the expectations outlined as well as state performance, state capacity structure described here captures the in this article? For example, do civil society and institutional sequencing, and in the dynamics actually at work, political control associations see clientelistic strategies longer term help to inform efforts to of the bureaucracy may in fact undermine as more viable than other forms of civic further democratic development. representation, give clientelistic parties an engagement in countries with a politicized advantage over more programmatic parties, bureaucracy? Does their behavior concur Agnes Cornell, is a postdoc, in the department of weaken accountability mechanisms, and with the predictions we suggest? What are political science at Aarhus University. Marcia result in poor quality of service provision. the various mechanisms of political control Grimes is an associate professor, of political An overly politicized bureaucracy is, in of the bureaucracy? Finally, one might ask science at the University of Gothenburg. Victor other words, the institutional source of at what point more precisely does political Lapuente ia an associate professor of political these ills. control of the bureaucracy, which is a science at University of Gothenburg.

16 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

News from Members

Leslie E. Anderson, University of Florida Rutgers University, edited Twenty Years the Modern Age (Basic Books, 2014). The Research Foundation Professor of Political After Communism: The Politics of Memory book examines the past hundred years in Science, published “Democratization and and Commemoration, which will be political leadership, arguing that history’s Oppositional Consciousness in Argentina” published by Oxford University Press in truly transformational leaders have not in the April 2014 Polity. The article July 2014. The volume helps readers to always employed the forceful leadership concludes that Argentine groups engaged understand the utility of historical memory style often assumed to be most desirable. in collective action do not fully comprehend as an important and understudied aspect of Brown also published a review article the oppressive systemic environment democratization and examines patterns of entitled “Alfred Stepan and the Study of in which they operate, limiting their extrication from state socialism, patterns Comparative Politics” in the April 2014 effectiveness. of ethnic and class conflict, the strategies Government and Opposition. of communist successor parties, and the Anderson was also awarded the “Doctoral cultural traditions of a given country that Lenka Bustikova, assistant professor Mentoring Award,” the University of influence the way official collective memory of politics and global studies, Arizona Florida’s highest university-wide honor is constructed. State University, published “Revenge of for doctoral dissertation mentors. She also the Radical Right” in the February 2014 served as the graduate coordinator in the Kamran Bokhari, PhD researcher and Comparative Political Studies. By using a department of political science for the past visiting lecturer of politics and international party-election dataset, the article claims academic year. relations, University of Westminster, that the success of right-wing political published Political Islam in the Age of parties is a result of the backlash to the Diego Avaria was awarded the first Democratization (Palgrave Macmillan, politics of minority accommodation. prize at the Contest on Chilean Foreign 2013) with Farid Senzai. The book provides Policy, Security, Defense, and Integration “a theoretical framework, classification of Melani Cammett, associate professor organized by the Chilean Career Diplomats Islamists, and rich historical context” to of political science, Brown University, Association, National Academy of Political explore modern political Islam’s relationship published Compassionate Communalism: and Strategic Studies, and Alberto Hurtado with democracy. The book was listed as one Welfare and Sectarianism in Lebanon University. Avaria was awarded the prize of the ten most significant books in 2013 by (Cornell University Press, 2014). The book for his paper entitled “La administración the Foreign Policy Association in 2013 and examines “how and why sectarian groups Reagan y el plebiscito en Chile: La política has been reviewed by the London School deploy welfare benefits for such varied goals de presión (1987-1989)” (“The Reagan of Economics. as attracting marginal voters, solidifying Administration and the Plebiscite in Chile: intraconfessional support, mobilizing mass The Politics of Pressure (1987-1989)”). The Catherine Boone, professor of government support, and supporting militia fighters.” paper will be published in a book. and international development, London School of Economics, published Property Cammet also co-edited The Politics of Non- Michael Bernhard, Raymond and Miriam and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights State Social Welfare (Cornell University Ehrlich Eminent Scholar Chair in Political and the Structure of Politics (Cambridge Press, 2014) with Lauren Morris MacLean; Science, University of Florida, published University Press, 2014). The book analyzes published “Is There an Islamist Political an article with Ruchan Kaya entitled “Are patterns of land ownership and access to Advantage?” with Pauline Jones Luong Elections Mechanisms of Authoritarian natural resources shape dynamics including in the May/June 2014 Annual Review Stability or Democratization? Evidence “land-related competition and conflict, of Political Science and “Governance and from Postcommunist Eurasia” in the territorial conflict, patron-client relations, Health in the Arab World” in the August September 2013 Perspectives on Politics. electoral cleavage and mobilization, 2013 issue of The Lancet; and contributed He also published “From Formlessness ethnic politics, rural rebellion, and the the chapter entitled “Epilogue: A Political to Structure? The Institutionalization of localization and ‘nationalization’ of political Economy of the Arab Uprisings” in Competitive Party Systems in Africa,” competition.” A Political Economy of the Middle East coauthored with Keith Weghorst, in the (Westview Press, August 2013) with Ishac June 2014 Comparative Political Studies. Archie Brown, Emeritus Professor of Diwan. Politics and International Relations, Bernhard and Jan Kubik, professor and University of Oxford, published The Myth chair of the political science department, of the Strong Leader: Political Leadership in Bonnie N. Field, associate professor of

17 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

News from Members

global studies, Bentley University, published political science and international affairs, in sociology, University of North Carolina, “Minority Parliamentary Government the George Washington University, and published “Alliances and Perception Profiles and Multilevel Politics: Spain’s System of Timothy J. Colton published “Putin’s in the Iranian Reform Movement, 1997- Mutual Back Scratching,” in the April 2014 Uneasy Return and Hybrid Regime 2005” in the November 2013 American Comparative Politics. The article analyzes Stability: The 2012 Russian Election Sociological Review. how multilevel territorial politics impact Studies Survey” in the March/April 2014 the performance of minority parliamentary Problems of Post-Communism. The authors Karrie J. Koesel, assistant professor of governments, suggesting that particular argue that despite the fact that Putin’s political science, University of Oregon, regional governing dynamics can assure regime retains broad and deep connections published Religion and Authoritarianism: or complicate a minority government’s with the electorate, ominous signs of Cooperation, Conflict, and the Consequences ability to attain the parliamentary support erosion portend bigger problems despite (Cambridge University Press, 2014). The necessary to govern. the coercive force and other resources at the book explores how religious and political authorities’ disposal. authorities in authoritarian settings manage Jonathan Fox is now a professor of their relationship—often with unexpected development studies at American Manal A. Jamal was recently promoted to levels of mutually beneficial cooperation. University’s School of International associate professor of political science (with Service. tenure) at James Madison University. She Maria Koinova, associate professor of also published “Western Donor Assistance politics and international studies, Warwick Carlos Gervasoni, professor of & Gender Empowerment in the Palestinian University, published “Why Do Conflict- political science and international Territories and Beyond” which appeared in Generated Diasporas Pursue Sovereignty- affairs, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, the winter issue of International Feminist Based Claims through State-Based or and Alberto Porto edited Consecuencias Journal of Politics. Transnational Channels? Armenian, Económicas y Políticas del Federalismo Fiscal Albanian, and Palestinian Diasporas Argentino (Consequences of Argentina’s Fiscal “The Most Important Topic Political Compared” in the March 2014 European Federalism) (Universidad Nacional de La Scientists Are Not Studying: Adapting Journal of International Relations. The article Plata, 2013). The book analyzes the effects to Climate Change,” by Debra Javeline, asks why diaspora entrepreneurs in liberal of federal transfers and other aspects of associate professor of political science, states pursue sovereignty goals through the Argentina´s intergovernmental revenue- University of Notre Dame, is available as a institutional channels of their host-states, sharing system on a number of political and FirstView Article in Perspectives on Politics. or through transnational channels. economic outcomes: presidential survival, The piece reviews the literature on climate gubernatorial incumbent advantage, rates change, highlighting questions that might Koinova also published Ethnonationalist of economic growth of provinces, the benefit from political science research. Conflict in Postcommunist States: Varieties territorial distribution of income, the of Governance in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and compensation of adverse macroeconomic Maiah Jaskoski, assistant professor of Kosovo (University of Pennsylvania Press, shocks, the geographic distribution national security affairs, Naval Postgraduate June 2013). of manufacturing production, and the School, received an award for “Best structure of provincial public spending. Published Article on Defense and Security Yoonkyung Lee, associate professor of Affairs in 2013” from the Defense, Public sociology, SUNY-Binghamton, published J. Paul Goode, associate professor of Security, and Democracy section of the “Political Parties and Social Movements: political science and director of graduate Latin American Studies Association. The Patterns of Democratic Representation studies, University of Oklahoma, published award was given for the publication of in Korea and Taiwan,” in the June “Legitimacy and Identity in Russia’s “Private Financing of the Military: A Local 2014 Asian Survey. Lee also published Gubernatorial Elections” in Region: Political Economy Approach” in the June “Digital Opportunities and Democratic Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, 2013 Studies in Comparative International Participation in Tech-Savvy Korea” in and Central Asia (Volume 3, no. 1). Goode Development. The article identifies two the Winter 2013 Korea Observer and has also been awarded a Fulbright Scholar paths to local military-client relations: weak contributed a chapter entitled “Global Research Grant to conduct fieldwork in state capacity or demand from powerful Ascendance, Domestic Fracture: Korea’s Russia. industries or subnational governments. Economic Transformation since 1997” in New Challenges for Maturing Democracies Henry E. Hale, associate professor of Mohammad Ali Kadivar, PhD candidate in Korea and Taiwan (Stanford University

18 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

News from Members

Press, 2014), edited by Larry Diamond, The book presents a new theory of the (Cambridge University Press, 2014). The senior fellow, Stanford University, and Gi- emergence and collapse of political regimes, book asks, “Why have seemingly similar Wook Shin. focusing on the preferences of powerful African countries developed very different actors and the impact of transnational forms of democratic party systems?”, Peter Lorentzen, assistant professor of influences to explain regime outcomes. The positing that during democratic transitions, political science, University of California, authors employ this framework to account the preceding regime uses its reservoir of Berkeley, published “China’s Strategic for the emergence, survival, and fall of local support to shape political institutions Censorship” in the April 2014 American democracies and dictatorships in Latin to their interests. Journal of Political Science. The article America since 1900. examines how China has managed to permit Sharon Werning Rivera, associate more independent journalism without Julie Fisher Melton, board member, professor of government, Hamilton engendering a broader liberalization, and World Affairs Council of Maine, will College, and David W. Rivera, scholar-in- shows how the spread of the Internet can be presenting a paper entitled “Loyal residence, Hamilton College, published “Is induce authoritarian regimes to tighten Opposition: NGOs and Political Parties” Russia a Militocracy? Conceptual Issues controls on traditional media. in July at the International Society for and Extant Findings Regarding Elite Third Sector Research conference in Militarization,” in Post-Soviet Affairs (Vol. Lorentzen also published “Undermining Muenster, Germany. The paper will 30, no. 1). The authors investigate the Authoritarian Innovation: The Power of compare her research on civil society as a widespread assumption that since former China’s Industrial Giants,” with Pierre loyal opposition with recent work on the KGB lieutenant-colonel Vladimir Putin Landry and John Yasuda, in the January future of political parties suggesting that assumed the presidency, large numbers 2014 Journal of Politics. This article they are experiencing a long-term decline of siloviki, individuals with experience in demonstrates that authoritarian regimes throughout the world. the military and security agencies, have may face political barriers to implementing been recruited into positions of power quasi-democratic reforms even when these Pippa Norris, McGuire Lecturer in and authority throughout the polity and are intended to preserve authoritarian rule Comparative Politics, Harvard University, economy. This framework – which they call rather than undermine it. edited Advancing Electoral Integrity (Oxford the “militocracy paradigm” – has provided University Press, 2014) with Richard the most widespread explanation of the de- Ellen Lust, associate professor of political W. Frank and Ferran Martinez i Coma. democratization that has been a hallmark science, Yale University, and Miriam The book collects essays by international of the Putin years. Wakim, research associate, Council on experts comparing and applying innovative, Middle East Studies, received a five- alternative methods of election evaluation. Ms. Rivera also recently completed her year grant from the Moulay Hicham residence at the Linguistics University Foundation to found the Program on Norris was also awarded the 2014 Karl of Nizhny Novgorod as a Fulbright U.S. Governance and Local Development at Deutsch Award, given to prominent Scholar to the Russian Federation. Yale University. The Program will “[foster] scholars engaged in cross-disciplinary innovative research that breaks new ground research. Kim Lane Scheppele, Laurance S. in the understandings of governance and Rockefeller Professor of Sociology and development issues focused on the Middle Marc F. Plattner, co-editor, Journal of International Affairs and director, Program East.” Its inaugural conference, “Mapping Democracy, and vice president for research in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton Local Governance,” was held on May 1-2, and conferences, National Endowment University, has published a number of items 2014. for Democracy, delivered the Alexis de on Hungary’s elections and constitutional Tocqueville Annual Lecture at the Catholic reform. The first, a five-part series entitled Scott Mainwaring, Eugene and Helen University of Portugal in February 2014. “Hungary: an Election in Question,” ran Conley Professor of Political Science, The lecture’s theme explored “The Era of in the New York Times in February 2014. University of Notre Dame, and Aníbal Democratic Transitions.” A follow-up post in April 2014 ran under Pérez-Liñán, associate professor of the title “Legal but Not Fair (Hungary).” political science, University of Pittsburgh, Rachel Beatty Riedl, assistant professor A later piece, in The Nation, “Hungary published Democracies and Dictatorships in of political science, Northwestern and the End of Politics,” criticized Prime Latin America: Emergence, Survival, and University, published Authoritarian Origins Minister Victor Orbán’s consolidation of Fall (Cambridge University Press, 2013). of Democratic Party Systems in Africa power. Schepple also published “Making

19 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

News from Members

Infringement Procedures More Effective: Edmund Fung and Steven Drakely. Lise Rakner and Lars Svåsand; Christian A Comment on Commission v. Hungary, Göbel; Emil Uddhammar; and Michael Case C-288/12 (8 April 2014) (Grand Maya Tudor, university lecturer in Wahman. The issue was launched at a Chamber)” in Eutopia Law in April 2014. government and public policy, Oxford public symposium at Lund University on University, published “Renewed Hope December 10, with the Swedish Minister Benjamin Smith, associate professor of in Pakistan” in the April 2014 Journal of Foreign Aid as the key-note speaker. political science, University of Florida, of Democracy. The article argues that the Dan Slater, associate professor of political smooth transfer of power following the Wahman also published “Democratization science, University of Chicago, and Gautam May 2013 elections is a milestone in the and Electoral Turnovers in Sub-Saharan Nair published “Economic Origins of consolidation of Pakistan’s democracy. Africa and Beyond” in Democratization Democratic Breakdown? The Redistributive 21, no. 2 and “Electoral Coordination in Model and the Post-Colonial State” in the Milada Anna Vachudova, associate Anglophone Africa” in Commonwealth and June 2014 Perspectives on Politics. professor of political science, University Comparative Politics 52, no. 2. of North Carolina Chapel Hill, published Etel Solingen was named the Thomas T. “EU Leverage and National Interests in Kurt Weyland, Lozano Long Professor and Elizabeth C. Tierney Chair in Peace the Balkans: The Puzzles of Enlargement of Latin American Politics, University of and Conflict Studies at the University of Ten Years On,” in the January 2014 Journal Texas at Austin, published Making Waves: California Irvine. Solingen also served as of Common Market Studies. The article Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin the president of the International Studies argues that “the enlargement process America since the Revolutions of 1848 Association from 2012 to 2013 under continues to have a ‘democratizing effect,’ (Cambridge University Press, April 2014). the theme “The Politics of Transnational as Western Balkans candidates and proto- The book explores how changes in political and Regional Diffusion,” highlighting a candidates respond to the incentives of EU organization between the nineteenth and large number of panels on comparative membership.” twentieth centuries simultaneously slowed democratization, the Arab Spring, and the spread of democratic revolution while related topics. Her forthcoming book on Vachudova also published “The Thieves making revolutionary movements more Comparative Regionalism: Economics and of Bosnia,” in the February 2014 Foreign successful. Security will be published by Routledge. Affairs. In May 2014, she is teaching in the Interdisciplinary Joint Master’s Programme Matthew S. Winters, assistant professor Netina Tan, assistant professor of political in South-Eastern European Studies in the of political science, University of Illinois, science, McMaster University, published University of Belgrade’s Faculty of Politics. published “Public Service Provision under “The 2011 General and Presidential Conditions of Insufficient Citizen Demand: Elections in Singapore,” available online Michael Wahman, Swedish research Insights from the Urban Sanitation Sector as part of the September 2014 Electoral council fellow, London School of in Indonesia” in the August 2014 World Studies. She also published “Ethnic Economics, edited a special issue of Development. The article is coauthored Quotas and Unintended Effects on Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift on “Scandinavian with Abdul Gaffar Karim and Berly Women’s Political Representation in Research on Authoritarian Resilience Martawardaya. With Rebecca Weitz- Singapore” in the January 2014 Electoral 115, no. 4. The special issue included Shapiro, Stanley J. Bernstein Assistant Quotas and “Manipulating Electoral Laws contributions (in Swedish and English) by Professor of Political Science, Brown in Singapore” in the December 2013 Staffan I. Lindberg, professor of political University, Winters published “Partisan Electoral Studies, and contributed a chapter science, University of Gothenburg; Jan Protesters and Nonpartisan Protests in entitled “Democratization and Embracing Teorell, professor of political science, Lund Brazil” in the April 2014 Journal of Politics Uncertainty in Post-2011 Singapore” in University; Sten Widmalm; Merete Bech in Latin America. Democracy in Eastern Asia: Issues, Problems, Seeberg; Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik and Challenges in a Region of Diversity Skaaning, professor of political science (Routledge, October 2013), edited by and government, Aarhus University; Journal of Democracy

20 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

New Research

Mangongera sections of society. The April 2014 (Vol. 25, no. 2) Journal By militarizing key state institutions of Democracy features clusters of articles and using violence against the opposition, V. “Sri Lanka’s Postwar Descent” by Jason on Zimbabwe and South Asia, as well as Zimbabwe’s military elites have hindered G. Stone individual case studies on Mandela’s legacy, the country’s transition to democracy. In With the defeat of the Tamil Tigers in a 26- ethnic power sharing, and democratic return, they have been richly rewarded. Can year civil war, Sri Lanka had a chance for parliamentary monarchies. the military’s tentacles be untangled from genuine reconciliation, but that chance is being Zimbabwean politics? squandered by the government of President “Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Mahinda Rajapaksa. Problems” by Donald L. Horowitz The Freedom House Survey for 2013 In severely divided societies, ethnic cleavages “The Democratic Leadership Gap” by Arch VI. “Bhutan’s Deferential Democracy” by tend to produce ethnic parties and ethnic Puddington S.D. Muni voting. Power-sharing institutions can Civil-liberties scores have notably declined An opposition victory in this Himalayan ameliorate this problem, but attempts to over the past several years, while political- kingdom’s second elections in 2013 showed establish such institutions, whether based on rights scores have slightly improved—perhaps that surprises are possible even in a democratic a consociational or a centripetal model, face because modern authoritarians have begun to transition that has been guided from above by formidable difficulties. adopt subtler means of repression. Overall, the monarchy. however, freedom experienced a global decline “Mandela’s Legacy at Home and Abroad” for the eighth straight year in 2013. VII. “Tumult in the Maldives” by Fathima by Princeton N. Lyman Musthaq Nelson Mandela, who died in late 2013, Shifting Tides in South Asia After a brief era of political opening, the fought for freedom for all the people of South I. “India and Its Neighbors” by Sumit authoritarian old guard has ridden a dubiously Africa and masterfully guided his country’s Ganguly conducted presidential election back into power. transition to a nonracial democracy. His record Home to about a quarter of the world’s on foreign policy is more ambiguous, but also people, South Asia presents a murky and not Democratization instructive. very encouraging picture when it comes to democracy. The Volume 21, no. 4 (2014) issue of “Democratic Parliamentary Monarchies” Democratization includes articles on by Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, and Juli F. II. “Renewed Hope in Pakistan?” by Maya democracy promotion in Ghana, Turkish Minoves Tudor civil society, deviant democracy, political How do democracies emerge from monarchies? Long prone to coups, Pakistan now for the first parties in Tanzania, regime transitions in In an essay that eminent political scientist Juan time has seen a freely elected government duly Italy and Russia, and the role of civil society J. Linz was working on when he passed away serve out its full term and peacefully hand the in oil-reliant countries. in October 2013, he and his coauthors draw reins of power to another. lessons from the European experience about “Promoting Democracy in Ghana: whether and how Arab monarchies might aid III. “Bangladesh’s Failed Election” by Ali Exploring the Democratic Roles of or resist democratic development. Riaz Donor-Sponsored Non-Governmental After two decades of elections that produced a Organizations” by Jelmer Kamstra and A New Twilight in Zimbabwe? number of alternations in power, an impasse Luuk Knippenberg I. “The Perils of Power Sharing” by over “caretaker government” crippled the 2014 Adrienne LeBas contest and has made single-party rule all too “Turkish Civil Society Divided by the After four years of sharing power with the real a prospect. Headscarf Ban” by Sema Akboga opposition, Zimbabwe’s longtime president Robert Mugabe and his party claimed a huge IV. “Reform and Resistance in Nepal” by “Mapping Deviant Democracy” by Michael victory in the 2013 elections. What accounts Mahendra Lawoti Seeberg for the opposition’s stunning electoral decline? After a decade of upheavals, Nepal elected in November 2013 its Second Constituent “Party Matters: The Institutional Origins Assembly, but it is still unclear whether elites of Competitive Hegemony in Tanzania” by Yonatan L. Morse II. “The Military vs. Democracy” by Charles will accept reforms that empower wider “Exploring the Link between Patronage

21 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

New Research

and Party Institutionalization: An Divided Societies: The Liberal-Corporate Fjelde Historical-Institutional Analysis of the Distinction” by Allison McCulloch Italian Transition” by Fabrizio Di Mascio “Is Democracy the Only Game in Town? “Impeachment and Presidential Politics in Tension between Immigrants’ Democratic “The Limited Agency and Life-Cycles New Democracies” by Young Hun Kim Desires and Authoritarian Imprints” by of Personalized Dominant Parties in the Antoine Bilodeau Post-Soviet Space: The Cases of United “Support for Democracy and Early Russia and Nur Otan” by Rico Isaacs and Socialization in a Non-Democratic The Volume 21, no. 1 (2014) issue of Sarah Whitmore Country: Does the Regime Matter?” by Democratization includes articles on social Malina Voicu and Edurne Bartolome Peral tolerance and democracy, democratization “Can Oil-Reliant Countries Democratize? in Singapore, coalitional politics, electoral An Assessment of the Role of Civil Society The Volume 21, no. 2 (2014) issue of fraud, regime type and good governance, in Algeria” by Charity Butcher Democratization includes articles on and executive format. electoral turnovers in sub-Saharan Africa, “Citizenship, Social Rights and Judicial democratic consolidation in Timor-Leste, “Pluralistic Conditioning: Social Tolerance Review in Regime Transition: The Case of student activism in Iran, and institutional and Effective Democracy” by Kris Dunn Russia” by Andrea Chandler design in post-conflict societies. and Shane P. Singh

The Volume 21, no. 3 (2014) issue of “How Well Ordinary Citizens Understand “The Bonsai under the Banyan Tree: Democratization includes articles on framing Democracy: The Case of the South Korean Democracy and Democratisation in the past in post-conflict societies, semi- Electorate” by Youngho Cho Singapore” by Michael D. Barr presidentialism in Lusophone countries, Muslim support for European integration, “Democratization and Electoral Turnovers “Is Successful Democracy Promotion civil society and democratization, and in Sub-Saharan Africa and Beyond” by Possible? The Conceptual Problem” by presidential politics in new democracies. Michael Wahman Hans Agné

“Policing Politics: Framing the Past in “Moderation of Religious and Secular “Rethinking the ‘Presidentialism Debate’: Post-Conflict Divided Societies” by Cillian Politics: A Country’s ‘Centre’ and Conceptualizing Coalitional Politics McGrattan Democratization” by Murat Somer in Cross-Regional Perspective” by Paul Chaisty, Nic Cheeseman, and Timothy “Conditional Effect of Economic“Semi-Presidentialism, Moderating Power Power Development on Democracy: Theand Inclusive Governance: The Experience Relevance of the State” by Min Tang and of Timor-Leste in Consolidating “The Role of Infrastructural and Coercive Dwayne Woods Democracy” by Rui Graça Feijó State Capacity in Explaining Different Types of Electoral Fraud” by Jessica Fortin- “Semi-Presidentialism in Lusophone “Iranian Student Activism between Rittberger Countries: Diffusion and Operation” by Authoritarianism and Democratization: Octavio Amorim Neto and Marina Costa Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation “Regime Type and Good Governance in Lobo between the Office for the Strengthening Low and High Income States: What Is the of Unity and the Regime” by Paola Rivetti Empirical Link? By Daniel Stockemer “Muslims’ Support for European and Francesco Cavatorta Integration: The Role of Organizational “Party ‘Capacity’ in New Democracies: How Capacities” by Arolda Elbasani and Beken “The Transnational Protection Regime and Executive Format Affects the Recruitment Saatçioğlu Democratic Breakthrough in Taiwan and of Presidents and Prime Ministers” by South Korea” by Su-Mei Ooi David J. Samuels and Matthew S. Shugart “Civil Society and Democratization: A Counter-Case from India” by Sarbeswar “Pre-Designing Democracy: Institutional “Economic Foundations of Subnational Sahoo Design of Interim Governments and Authoritarianism: Insights and Evidence Democratization in 15 Post-Conflict “Consociational Settlements in Deeply Societies” by Julia Strasheim and Hanne from Qualitative and Quantitative

22 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

New Research

Research” by John T. Sidel Blair Individual Level Analysis” by Natia Mestvirishvili and Maia Mestvirishvili SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES “Opening the Black Box of Social Capital ON DEMOCRACY Formation” by Patricio Valdivieso and “US Democracy Assistance Programs in Benjamin Villena-Roldan Ukraine after the Orange Revolution” by This section features selected articles Povilas Žielys and Rūta Rudinskaitė on democracy that appeared in journals “The Impact of Recentralization on Public received by the NED’s Democracy Resource Services: A Difference-in-DifferencesComparative Political Studies, Vol. 47, no. Center, February 1– May 15, 2014. Analysis of the Abolition of Elected 7, June 2014 Councils in Vietnam” by Edmund J. “Opinion Climates and Immigrant African Affairs, Vol. 113, no. 451, April Malesky, Cuong Viet Nguyen, and Anh Political Action: A Cross-National Study 2014 Tran of 25 European Democracies” by Aida Just “Policing, State Power, and the Transition and Christopher J. Anderson from Apartheid to Democracy: A New American Political Science Review, Vol. Perspective” by Jonny Steinberg 107, no. 4, November 2013 “The Forgotten Side of Partisanship: “Latin American Attitudes toward Women Negative Party Identification in Four “South Sudan: Civil War, Predation and in Politics: The Influence of Elite Cues, Anglo-American Democracies” by Mike the Making of a Military Aristocracy” by Female Advancement, and Individual Medeiros and Alain Noël Clemence Pinaud Characteristics” by Jana Morgan and Melissa Buice Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 47, no. “The Risks of African Military Capacity 6, May 2014 Building: Lessons from Rwanda” by “Social Networks and the Mass Media” by “Who’s in Charge? How Voters Attribute Danielle Beswick David A. Siegel Responsibility in the European Union” by Sara B. Hobolt and James Tilley “Navigating the Middle Ground: The “Trade, Institutions, and Ethnic Tolerance: Political Values of Ordinary Hutu in Evidence from South Asia” by Saumitra Jha “The Legislative Dynamics of Political Post-Genocide Rwanda” by Anuradha Decentralization in Parliamentary Chakravarty “Public Opinion and the Democratic Democracies” by Francesc Amat and Albert Peace” by Michael R. Tomz and Jessica L. Falcó-Gimeno “New Media and the Developmental State P. Weeks in Ethiopia” by Iginio Gagliardone “Electoral Particularism, Bank Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Concentration, and Capital Account American Political Science Review, Vol. Vol. 47, no. 1, March 2014 Liberalization in Developing Democracies” 108, no. 1, February 2014 “Not Much Happened: The Impact of by Bumba Mukherjee, Vineeta Yadav, and “Transforming Power Relationships: Gender Quotas in Poland” by Frances Sergio Béjar Leadership, Risk, and Hope” by James H. Millard Read and Ian Shapiro “A Global Trend Toward Democratic “Coercive Capacity and the Durability of Convergence? A Lijphartian Analysis of “States Held Hostage: Political Hold-Up the Chinese Communist State” by Yuhua Advanced Democracies” by Adrian Vatter, Problems and the Effects of International Wang Matthew Flinders, and Julian Bernauer Institutions” by Allison Carnegie “‘Dear Mr. President’: The Blogosphere as Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 47, no. “How to Promote Order and Property Arena for Communication between People 5, April 2014 Rights under Weak Rule of Law? An and Power” by Natalia Moen-Larsen “A Discreet Critique of Discrete Regime Experiment in Changing Dispute Type Data” by Matthew C. Wilson Resolution Behavior through Community “Transformation of the Welfare State in Education” by Christopher Blattman, Lithuania: Towards Globalization and “Bicameralism and the Logic of Party Europeanization” by Jolanta Aidukaite Organization” by Julie VanDusky-Allen and William B. Heller Alexandra C. Hartman, and Robert A. “Emancipative Values in Georgia: An “Election Boycotts and Hybrid Regime

23 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

New Research

Survival” by Ian O. Smith 2014 2014 “When Politicians Cede Control of “Media Democratization in Russia and “Veto Bargaining and the Legislative Resources: Land, Chiefs, and Coalition Eurasia” by Peter Rollberg Process in Multiparty Presidential Systems” Building in Africa” by Kate Baldwin by Valeria Palanza and Gisela Sin “Russia’s Nongovernmental Media Under “Fading Colours? A Synthetic Comparative Assault” by Maria Lipman Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 47, no. Case Study of the Impact of ‘Colour 4, March 2014 Revolutions’” by Ryan Kennedy “Russia and the New Authoritarians” by “When the Stakes Are High: Party Jonathan Becker Competition and Negative Campaigning” “Minority Parliamentary Government by Annemarie S. Walter, Wouter van der and Multilevel Politics: Spain’s System of “Media in Post-Soviet Belarus: Between Brug, and Philip van Praag Mutual Back Scratching” by Bonnie N. Democratization and Reinforcing Field Authoritarianism” by Oleg Manaev “Saving the Banks: The Political Economy of Bailouts” by Emiliano Grossman and “The Impact of Participatory Democracy: “Ukraine’s Media in the Context of Global Cornelia Woll Evidence from Brazil’s National Public Cultural Convergence” by Marta Dyczok Policy Conferences” by Thamy Pogrebinschi Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 47, no. and David Samuels “Networked Apathy: Georgian Party 3, March 2014 Politics and the Role of Social Media” by “State Capacity and the Environmental “The Dark Side of Power-Sharing: Middle Kornely Kakachia, Tamara Pataraia, and Investment Gap in Authoritarian States” Managers and Civil War Recurrence” by Michael Cecire by Hugh Ward, Xun Cao, and Bumba Sarah Zukerman Daly Mukherjee “Glasnost 2.0” by Sarah Oates Comparative Politics, Vol. 46, no. 2, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 47, no. January 2014 “Coercion or Conformism? Censorship 2, February 2014 “International Pressure, Domestic Politics, and Self-Censorship among Russian “Government Responses to Fiscal and the Dynamics of Religious Freedom: Media Personalities and Reporters in the Austerity: The Effect of Institutional Evidence from Turkey” by Ramazan Kilinç 2010s” by Elisabeth Schimpfossl and Ilya Fragmentation and Partisanship” by Yablokov Carsten Jensen and Peter B. Mortensen “Better Safe than Sorry: How Property Rights and Veto Players Jointly Affect Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 22, no. 1, Winter “How Context Matters? Mobilization, Economic Growth” by Mogens K. Justesen 2014 Political Opportunity Structures, and “Two Can Play at that Game: Social Nonelectoral Political Participation in “Drowning in Oil: Angola’s Institutions and Media Opportunities in Azerbaijan for Old and New Democracies” by Kateřina the ‘Resource Curse’” by Inge Amundsen Government and Opposition” by Katy Vráblíková Pearce “Seeking Offense: Censorship as Strategy “Staying Quartered: Civilian Uprisings and in Indian Party Politics” by Ameya Balsekar “No Laughing Matter: Humor as a Means Military Disobedience in the Twenty-First of Dissent in the Digital Era: The Case of Century” by David Pion-Berlin, Diego “When Winning Seats is Not Everything: Authoritarian Azerbaijan” by Katy Pearce Esparza, and Kevin Grisham Tactical Seat-Loss during Democratization” and Adnan Hajizada by Nina S. Barzachka “The Politics of Financial Booms and “Elections, Appointments, and Human Crises: Evidence From Latin America” by “Political Trust in extremis” by Antonis A. Capital: The Case of Russian Mayors” by Daniela Campello Ellinas and Iasonas Lamprianou Noah Buckley, Guzel Garifullina, Ora John Reuter and Alexandra Shubenkova

Comparative Politics, Vol. 46, no. 3, April Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 22, no. 2, Spring “The Impact of Semi-Presidentialism on

24 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

New Research

Democratic Consolidation in Poland and Legislative Elections, 2003–2005” by by Rollin F. Tusalem and Minion K.C. Ukraine” by Oleksii Sydorchuk Grigorii V. Golosov Morrison

East European Politics, Vol. 30, no. 2, May “Party Politics after the Colour “Explaining Variation of Executive 2014 Revolutions: Party Institutionalisation and Instability in Presidential Regimes: “The 2014 Sochi Olympic Mega-Project Democratisation in Ukraine and Georgia” Presidential Interruptions in Latin and Russia’s Political Economy” by Robert by Melanie G. Mierzejewski-Voznyak America” by Leiv Marsteintredet W. Orttung and Sufian Zhemukhov “The Construction of Success in Anti- “How Does Political Trust Affect Social “Exit, Choice and Legacy: Explaining Corruption Activity in Georgia” by Lili Di Trust? An Analysis of Survey Data from the Patterns of Party Politics in Post- Puppo Rural China Using an Instrumental Communist Slovakia” by Tim Haughton Variables Approach” by Ran Tao, Dali L. “The Ethno-Violence Nexus: Measuring Yang, Ming Li, and Xi Lu “Uploading as Political Strategy: the Ethnic Group Identity in Chechnya” by European Parliament and the Hungarian Craig Douglas Albert International Political Science Review, Vol. Media Law Debate” by Agnes Batory 35, no. 1, January 2014 East European Politics & Societies, Vol. 28, “Electoral Quotas and Political “Digging into the Breeding Ground: no. 2, May 2014 Representation: Comparative Perspectives” Insights into the Electoral Performance of “What the Party Wanted to Know: Citizen by Mona Lena Krook and Pär Zetterberg Populist Radical Right Parties in Central Complaints as a ‘Barometer of Public and Eastern Europe” by Andrea L.P. Pirro Opinion’ in Communist Bulgaria” by “Ethnic Quotas and Ethnic Representation Martin K. Dimitrov Worldwide” by Karen Bird “Co-optation in the Process of Dominant Party System Building: the Case of Russia” “Democracy between Ethnos and Demos: “Ethnic Quotas and Unintended Effects by Grigorii V. Golosov Territorial Identification and Political on Women’s Political Representation in Support in the Baltic States” by Kjetil Singapore” by Netina Tan East European Politics, Vol. 30, no. 1, Duvold and Sten Berglund February 2014 “Quotas and Intersectionality: Ethnicity “Disciplining the ‘Second World’: the “For Rule of Law, Political Plurality, and and Gender in Candidate Selection” by Relationship between Transnational and a Just Society: Use of the Legislative Veto Karen Celis, Silvia Erzeel, Liza Mügge, Local Forces in Contemporary Hungarian by President Václav Havel” by Vlastimil and Alyt Damstra Women’s Social Movements” by Katalin Havlík, Milan Hrubeš, and Marek Pecina Fábián “Playing with Different Cards: Party Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, no. 3, May/June Politics, Gender Quotas and Women’s “Parliamentary Sovereignty and 2014 Empowerment” by Tània Verge and Maria International Intervention: Elite Attitudes “What Iran Really Wants” by Mohammad de la Fuente in the First Central European Legislatures” Javad Zarif by Mihail Chiru and Sergiu Gherghina “Who Benefits from Gender Quotas? “Russia’s Latest Land Grab” by Jeffrey Assessing the Impact of Election Procedure “Corruption and Social Responsibility: Mankoff Reform on Members’ of Parliament Bribe Offers among Small Entrepreneurs Attributes in Uganda” by Cecilia Josefsson in Azerbaijan” by Turkhan Sadigov “The Rise of Rwanda’s Women” by Swanee Hunt Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 52, “The Eastern Partnership: Civil Society in no. 2, June 2014 between the European and Domestic Level: International Political Science Review, Vol. “Trade Networks in West Africa: A Social the Case of Georgia” by Thijs Rommens 35, no. 2, March 2014 Network Approach” by Olivier J. Walther “The Impact of Diamonds on Economic “The Last Resort of Political Regionalism: Growth, Adverse Regime Change, and Electoral Blocs in Russia’s Regional Democratic State-Building in Africa” “‘Can Someone Get Me Outta This

25 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014 New Research

Middle Class Zone?!’ Pressures on Middle Instability: Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Aspects” by Onn Winckler Class Kikuyu in Kenya’s 2013 Election” by Tunisia, 1983–2004” by Hamed El-Said Dominic Burbidge and Jane Harrigan “The Fall of the Muslim Brotherhood: Implications for Egypt” by Elizabeth “The Politics of Civil Service Reform in Middle East Journal, Vol. 67, no 4, Autumn Iskander Monier and Annette Ranko the Democratic Republic of Congo” by 2013 Stylianos Moshonas “Wedded to Mubarak: The Second Careers “Ahmadinejad’s Legacy” by Jahangir and Financial Rewards of Egypt’s Military Amuzegar Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 52, Elite, 1981–2011” by Hicham Bou Nassif no. 1, March 2014 “Iran’s Foreign Policy: A Shifting Strategic “Ultranationalism, Democracy and the “Understanding the Success of Mass Civic Landscape” by Mahmood Monshipouri Law: Insights from Côte d’Ivoire” by Giulia Protest in Tunisia” by Michele Penner and Manochehr Dorraj Piccolino Angrist Party Politics, Vol. 20, no. 3, May 2014 “The African Union as a Norm Entrepreneur “Egypt: Diplomacy and the Politics of “Choosing the Enemy: Attack Behaviour on Military coups d’état in Africa (1952– Change” by Robert Bowker in a Multiparty System” by Annemarie S. 2012): An Empirical Assessment” by Issaka Walter K. Souaré Middle East Policy, Vol. 21, no. 1, Spring 2014 “The Block-Weighted Cleavage Salience Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. “Troubled Political Transitions: Tunisia, Index” by Hila Federer-Shtayer and 56, no. 1, Spring 2014 Egypt and Libya” by Ann M. Lesch Michael F. Meffert “A Two-Level Theory of Presidential Instability” by Aníbal Pérez-Liñán “Islam, Democracy and Islamism After the “Putting the Damper On: Do Parties De- Counterrevolution in Egypt” by Muqtedar Emphasize Issues in Response to Internal “Democratization Through Contention? Khan Divisions among Their Supporters?” by Regional and Local Governance Conflict in Marc van de Wardt Peru” by Gary Bland and Luis A. Chirinos “Turkey after the Arab Spring: Policy Dilemmas” by Yaşar Yakış “Parties, Cleavages and Issue Evolution: The “Supporting the Iron Fist: Crime News, Case of the Religious–Secular Cleavage in Public Opinion, and Authoritarian Crime “The EU and Lebanon in the Wake of the Chile” by Christopher Raymond and Brian Control in Guatemala” by Krystin Krause Arab Uprisings” by Tamirace Fakhoury M. Barros Feltch

“Democracy and Social Welfare in Uruguay “Jordanian Foreign Policy and the Arab “Political Parties and Rallies in Latin and Paraguay” by Davide Grassi Spring” by Curtis R. Ryan America” by Mariela Szwarcberg

“The Organization of the Executive Branch Middle East Policy, Vol. 20, no. 4, Winter Party Politics, Vol. 20, no. 2, March 2014 in Latin America: What We Know and 2013 “Party Adaptation and Change and the What We Need to Know” by Alejandro “Coping with Kaleidoscopic Change in the Crisis of Democracy” by Luciano Bardi, Bonvecchi and Carlos Scartascini Middle East” by Chas W. Freeman, Jr. Stefano Bartolini, and Alexander Trechsel

“Explaining the Rise of Ethnic Politics in “Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy” by Turki Al “Power and the (Il)Legitimacy of Political Contemporary Latin America” by Cristóbal Faisal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud Parties: An Unavoidable Paradox of Rovira Kaltwasser Contemporary Democracy?” by Piero “Bahrain: A Very Complicated Little Ignazi Middle East Journal, Vol. 68, no 1, Winter Island” by Ronald E. Neumann 2014 “No Man Can Serve Two Masters: Party “‘State of Barbary’ (Take Two): From the “Regional Upheaval: The Stakes for the Politicians, Party Members, Citizens and Arab Spring to the Return of Violence in GCC” by Amal A. Kandeel Principal–Agent Models of Democracy” by Syria” by Philippe Droz-Vincent Richard S. Katz “Economic Reform, Social Welfare, and “The ‘Arab Spring’: Socioeconomic“The Discreet Charm of Political Parties”

26 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

New Research

by Zsolt Enyedi Distribution” by Ryan S. Jablonski Public Diplomacy, and America’s Image Abroad. By Martha Bayles. Yale University “The Decline of Membership-Based SELECTED NEW BOOKS ON Press, 2014. 326 pp. Politics” by Ingrid van Biezen and Thomas DEMOCRACY Poguntke Turbulent and Mighty Continent: What ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES Future for Europe. By Anthony Giddens. “Fighting the System? Populist Radical American Constitutional Law. Volume 1, Polity, 2014. 242 pp. Right Parties and Party System Change” by The Structure of Government. 9th edition. Cas Mudde By Ralph A. Rossum and G. Alan Tarr. AFRICA Westview Press, 2014. 678 pp. Economic and Political Reform in Africa: “Allure or Alternative? Direct Democracy Anthropological Perspectives. By Peter D. and Party Identification” by Matthias Fatke American Constitutional Law. Volume Little. Indiana University Press, 2014. 240 2, The Bill of Rights and Subsequent pp. Party Politics, Vol. 20, no. 1, January 2014 Amendments. 9th edition. By Ralph A. “Towards a Classification of the World’s Rossum and G. Alan Tarr. Westview Press, Identity, Citizenship, and Political Conflict Democratic Party Systems, Step 2: Placing 2014. 927 pp. in Africa. By Edmond J. Keller. Indiana the Units into Categories” by Grigorii V University Press, 2014. 208 pp. Golosov The American Political Landscape. By Byron E. Shafer and Richard H. Spady. Law and the Public Sphere in Africa: “Party Systems and Cleavage Structures Harvard University Press, 2014. 342 pp. La Palabre and Other Writings. By Jean Revisited: A Sociological Explanation of Godefroy Bidima. Translated and edited Party System Institutionalization in East Campaigns and Elections American Style. by Laura Hengehold. Indiana University Central Europe” by Fernando Casal Bértoa 4th edition. Edited by James A. Thurber Press, 2014. 197 pp. and Candice J. Nelson. Westview Press, “Two Routes to Personalized Politics: 2014. 340 pp. ASIA Centralized and Decentralized Battles Half Won: India’s Improbable Personalization” by Meital Balmas, Gideon Democracy as a Way of Life in America: A Democracy. By Ashutosh Varshney. Rahat, Tamir Sheafer, and Shaul R. History. By Richard Schneirov and Gaston Penguin, 2013. 415 pp. Shenhav A. Fernandez. Routledge, 2014. 222 pp. Battling Corruption: Has NREGA Reached “Outsourcing Candidate Selection: The Democracy Without Justice in Spain: India’s Rural Poor. By Shylashri Shankar Fight against Clientelism in East Asian The Politics of Forgetting. By Omar G. and Raghav Gaiha. Oxford University Parties” by Olli Hellmann Encarnación. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. 272 pp. Press, 2014. 249 pp. “What’s Not to Trust? Rubrics of Political Derailing Democracy in Afghanistan: Party Trustworthiness in Chile and Maximalist: America in the World from Elections in an Unstable Political Argentina” by Ryan E. Carlin Truman to Obama. By Stephen Sestanovich. Landscape. By Noah Coburn and Anna Alfred A. Knopf, 2014. 402 pp. Larson. Columbia University Press, 2014. “An Initial Look into Party Switching in 284 pp. Africa: Evidence from Malawi” by Daniel Propaganda and American Democracy. J. Young Edited by Nancy Snow. Louisiana State Getting It Right in Afghanistan. Edited University Press, 2014. 220 pp. by Scott Smith, Moeed Yusuf, and Colin “Socio-Economic Voter Profile and Cookman. USIP Press, 2013. 333 pp. Motives for Islamist Support in Morocco” Rescaling the European State: The Making by Miquel Pellicer and Eva Wegner of Territory and the Rise of the Meso. By India: Political Ideas and the Making of Michael Keating. Oxford University Press, a Democratic Discourse. By Gurpreet World Politics, Vol. 66, no. 2, April 2014 2013. 233 pp. Mahajan. Zed Books, 2013. 181 pp. “How Aid Targets Votes: The Impact of Electoral Incentives on Foreign Aid Through a Screen Darkly: Popular Culture, Taming Tibet: Landscape Transformation

27 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

New Research

and the Gift of Chinese Development. By Mo(ve)ments of Resistance: Politics, of Legitimacy and Development in Modern Emily T. Yeh. Cornell University Press, Economy and Society in Israel/Palestine States. By Hilton L. Root. The MIT Press, 2013. 324 pp. 1931–2013. By Lev Luis Grinberg. 2013. 332 pp. Academic Studies, 2014. 346 pp. The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Justification and Critique: Towards a Contemporary World. By T.V. Paul. Oxford Party Politics and the Prospects for Critical Theory of Politics. By Rainer Forst. University Press, 2014. 272 pp. Democracy in North Africa. By Lise Storm. Polity, 2014. 216 pp. Lynne Rienner, 2014. 244 pp. EASTERN EUROPE AND THE Local Leadership in Democratic Transition: FORMER SOVIET UNION The Second Arab Awakening: And the Battle Competing Paradigms in International The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian for Pluralism. By Marwan Muasher. Yale Peacebuilding. By Chavanne L. Peercy. Relations in the Twenty-First Century. University Press, 2014. 210 pp. Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 225 pp. By Angela E. Stent. Princeton University Press, 2014. 355 pp. Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper: War to the Arab Uprisings. By Frederic M. Civil-Military Relations and the United Russia vs. the EU: The Competition for Wehrey. Columbia University Press, 2014. Nations. By Arturo C. Sotomayor. Johns Influence in Post-Soviet States. By Jakob 328 pp. Hopkins University Press, 2014. 255 pp. Tolstrup. Lynne Rienner, 2014. 295 pp. COMPARATIVE, THEORETICAL, Political Creativity: Reconfiguring The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s GENERAL Institutional Order and Change. Edited Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality by Gerald Berk, Dennis C. Galvan, the End of the Cold War. By James Graham of Democracy. Edited by Diego Abente and Victoria Hattam. University of Wilson. Cornell University, 2014. 264 pp. Brun and Larry Diamond. Johns Hopkins Pennsylvania Press, 2013. 374 pp. University Press, 2014. 267 pp. LATIN AMERICA AND THE Political Leadership: Themes, Contexts, CARIBBEAN Comparative International Politics of and Critiques. By Michael Foley. Oxford Cities from Scratch: Poverty and Informality Democracy Promotion. Edited by Jonas University Press, 2013. 398 pp. in Urban Latin America. Edited by Wolff, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Hans- Brodwyn Fischer, Bryan McCann, and Jürgen Puhle. Routledge, 2014. 292 pp. Rough Justice: The International Criminal Javier Auyero. Duke University Press, 2014. Court in a World of Power Politics. By 293 pp. Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes. David Bosco. Oxford University Press, Edited by Tom Ginsburg and Alberto 2014. 297 pp. Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin Simpser. Cambridge University Press, America: Emergence, Survival, and Fall. 2014. 271 pp. Social Movements in Global Politics. By By Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez- David West. Polity, 2013. 251 pp. Li~nán. Cambridge University Press, 2013. Democracy, Dictatorship, and Term Limits. 353 pp. By Alexander Baturo. University of A Theory of Militant Democracy: The Ethics Michigan Press, 2014. 333 pp. of Combatting Political Extremism. By Democratic Chile: The Politics and Policies of Alexander S. Kirshner. Yale University a Historic Coalition, 1990–2010. Edited by Democracy Disfigured: Opinion, Truth, and Press, 2014. 208 pp. Kirsten Sehnbruch and Peter M. Siavelis. the People. By Nadia Urbinati. Harvard Lynne Rienner, 2014. 375 pp. University Press, 2014. 307 pp. The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West. By Ewan Harrison and Sara Hard Times in the Marvelous City: From Dictatorship: From the Origin of the Modern McLaughlin Mitchell. Palgrave Macmillan, Dictatorship to Democracy in the Favelas of Concept of Sovereignty to Proletarian Class 2014. 265 pp. Rio de Janeiro. By Bryan McCann. Duke Struggle. By Carl Schmitt. Translated by University Press, 2014. 249 pp. Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward. Polity, 2014. 314 pp. MIDDLE EAST Dynamics Among Nations: The Evolution

28 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

Editorial Committee

is the official newsletter of the American Political Science Association’s Comparative Democratization section. Formerly known as CompDem, it has been published three times a year (October, January, and May) by the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies since 2003. In October 2010, the newsletter was renamed APSA-CD and APSA-CDexpanded to include substantive articles on democracy, as well as news and notes on the latest developments in the field. The newsletter is now jointly produced and edited by faculty members of the University of Florida’s Department of Political Science and the International Forum.

The current issue of APSA-CD is available here. A complete archive of past issues is also available.

To inquire about submitting an article to APSA-CD, please contact Staffan I. Lindberg, Benjamin Smith or Melissa Aten.

Editorial Board Members Executive Editors Staffan I. Lindberg is a professor of political Europe. Among the issues that have figured prominently in his science at the University of Gothenburg. He research agenda are the role of civil society in democratization, is also PI (with John Gerring and Michael institutional choice in new democracies, the political economy Coppedge) the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) of democratic survival, and the legacy of extreme forms of project; and a research fellow at the Quality of dictatorship. Government Institute. His research focuses on state building, political clientelism, political parties, legislative- Petia Kostadinova is an assistant professor of executive relations, women’s representation, voting behavior, political science at the University of Illinois elections, and democracy in Africa. He is the author of Democracy Chicago (UIC). Dr. Kostadinova’s main area of and Elections in Africa ( Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) research involves the role of citizens’ preferences, and the editor of Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of and media’s transmission of these preferences, in shaping social Transition? ( Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). and economic policies in the post-communist countries. A second stream of research focuses on the social and economic policies of Benjamin Smith is an associate professor of political the European Union. Prof. Kostadinova’s research has been science at the University of Florida. His research published in Europe and National Economic Transformation: The focuses on ethnic conflict, regime change, and the EU After the Lisbon Decade, Mitchell Smith, ed, the European politics of resource wealth. His first book, Hard Journal of Communication, the Central European Journal of Times in the Land of Plenty: Oil Politics in Iran and Indonesia, was Communication, and is forthcoming in East European Politics and published in 2007 by Cornell University Press, and his articles Journalism & Mass Communication. have appeared in World Politics, the American Journal of Political Science, Studies in Comparative International Development, the Bryon Moraski is an associate professor of political Journal of International Affairs, and other journals and edited science at the University of Florida. His research volumes. Dr. Smith is currently working on a book exploring the considers the politics of institutional choice, long-term factors that shape the success of separatist movements. institutional development, and the influence of short- term electoral incentives on long-term political trajectories. His Members first book, Elections by Design: Parties and Patronage in Russia’s Kate Baldwin is an assistant professor of political Regions (Northern Illinois University Press, 2006) explores the science at the University of Florida. She studies origins of Russia’s sub-national legislative electoral systems. He state-building, clientelism, and the political economy has published numerous book chapters and articles, including of development with a regional focus on sub-Saharan works in The American Journal of Political Science, Government and Africa. Her current research projects seek to Opposition, and the Journal of Politics. He is currently completing a understand the political consequences of involving non-state co-authored book manuscript with William Reisinger (University actors, such as traditional chiefs and non-governmental of Iowa) that examines the links between federal elections and organizations, in the provision of goods and services. gubernatorial (s)election in Russia and their influence on the country’s post-Soviet trajectory. Michael H. Bernhard is the inaugural holder of the Raymond and Miriam Ehrlich Eminent Scholar Conor O’Dwyer is an associate professor of political Chair in Political Science at the University of Florida. science at the University of Florida. His book His work centers on questions of democratization Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and and development both globally and in the context of Democratic Development examines the relationship

29 Vol. 12, No. 2 Comparative Democratization May 2014

Editorial Committee

between party-building and state-building in new democracies, Managing Editor looking specifically at the relationship between party competition Melissa Aten-Becnel is the senior research and conferences officer and patronage politics in postcommunist Eastern Europe. His at the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum latest research examines the European Union’s use of conditionality for Democratic Studies and associate director of the Network of to promote more liberal minorities policies in postcommunist Democracy Research Institutes. She earned an M.A. from The states. Specifically, it examines the EU’s role in the contentious George Washington University’s Elliott School of International politics of homosexuality in postcommunist societies. Looking Affairs, where she focused on foreign policy and Central Europe. beyond just policy adoption, it examines the impact of EU- sponsored minority-rights policies: do they lead to shifts in Editorial Assistant attitudes regarding religious difference, national belonging, and Adam Bilinski received a B.A. in International minority rights? Relations at the University of Warsaw (Poland) and M.A. in Social Sciences from the University of Philip Williams is the director of the Center for Latin Chicago. Currently he is a PhD student in Political American Studies and a professor of political science and Science at the University of Florida with specialization in Latin American Studies at the University of Florida. He comparative politics. His research interests include the problems of also co-directs the Latin American Immigrants in the survival of democracy, electoral revolutions and democracy New South project. His research interests include religion and promotion. He is currently working on his dissertation, which politics, transnational migration, democratization, social evaluates how pre-democratization historical legacies (in the form movements, and civil-military relations. His latest book, A Place to of pre-democratization regime discontinuities and regime type Be: Brazilian, Guatemalan, and Mexican Immigrants in Florida’s both in independent states and colonies) conditioned the New Destinations, was published by Rutgers University Press in probability of survival of once-established democracies. 2009 and his articles have appeared in numerous academic journals, including Comparative Politics, Latin American Perspectives, Latin Studies, and the Journal of Latin American Studies.

Leonardo A. Villalón is and associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research has focused on Islam and politics and on democratization in West Africa, particularly Senegal, Mali, and Niger. He is the author of Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal (Cambridge University Press, 1995) and co- editor of The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration (Lynne Rienner, 1998) and The Fate of Africa’s Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions (Indiana University Press, 2005), as well as of numerous articles and book chapters on politics and religion in West Africa.

APSA

The International Forum for Democratic Studies 1025 F Street, NW, 8th Floor Washington, DC 20004

30