Ó American Sociological Association 2018 DOI: 10.1177/0094306118815497 http://cs.sagepub.com FEATURED ESSAY

Frontlash/Backlash: The Crisis of Solidarity and the Threat to Civil Institutions

JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER Yale University [email protected]

It is fear and loathing time for the left, sociol- The first thing to recognize is that ogists prominently among them. Loathing Trumpism and the alt-right are nothing for President Trump, champion of the alt- new, not here, not anywhere where right forces that, marginalized for decades, civil spheres have been simultaneously are bringing bigotry, patriarchy, nativism, and enabled and constrained. The depredations nationalism back into a visible place in the of Trumpism are not unique, first-time-in- American civil sphere. Fear that these threaten- American-history things. What they con- ing forces may succeed, that democracy will be stitute, instead, are backlash movements destroyed, and that the egalitarian achieve- (Alexander 2013). ments of the last five decades will be lost. Fem- Sociologists have had a bad habit of think- inism, anti-racism, multiculturalism, sexual cit- ing of social change as linear, a secular trend izenship, ecology, and internationalism—all that is broadly progressive, rooted in the these precarious achievements have come enlightening habits of modernity, education, under vicious, persistent attack. economic expansion, and the shared social Fear and loathing can be productive when interests of humankind (Marshall 1965; they are unleashed inside the culture and Parsons 1967; Habermas [1984, 1987] 1981; social structures of a civil sphere that remains Giddens 1990). From such a perspective, con- vigorous and a vital center (Schlesinger 1949; servative movements appear as deviations, Alexander 2016; Kivisto 2019) that, even if reflecting anomie and isolation (Putnam fragile, continues to hold. In such conditions, 2000), unreason (Lipset and Raab 1970), a resistance thrives, blocking the victory of social backwardness and ‘‘empathy walls’’ Trumpism, dark and brooding as it may be. (Hochschild 2016). Trumpism challenges not just the moral and But modern society never has actually political commitments of the left, but the cul- worked in this way. Progress isn’t a secular tural and social structures of the civil sphere; unfolding; it is triggered by ‘‘frontlash’’ and it is these that provide the sociological movements, by avant-gardes whose vision underpinning of political democracy (Alex- is way ahead of their time, whose actions ander 2006, 2018). can be likened to provocative and destabi- No matter how horrifying in normative lizing breaching experiments (Garfinkel terms, we must understand the polarizing 1967; Tognato 2019), and whose victories, and excluding forces of Trumpism as socio- even when they are small and quiet but logically ‘‘normal’’—to the ongoing dynam- especially when they are big and loud, are ics of civil spheres. Only when such an anti- experienced as profoundly threatening to leftist force challenges the cultural premises vested interests, both ideal and material, and the structural foundations of civil soli- not just at the bottom but in the middle and darity does it constitute a truly fundamental even at the very top of society. Frontlash danger to democracy. Trumpism may yet do always produces backlash: movements of so, yet it seems at this point unlikely. To cultural, social, and political un-doing that understand why, we must see the big picture: aim to unwind cosmopolitan widening What are the culture and social structures of and civil incorporation. Backlash does not a civil sphere, and what are the kinds of occur because conservative cadres and social dynamics it involves? followers are anti-modern, irrational, or

5 Contemporary Sociology 48, 1 6 Featured Essay even unusually bigoted. Backlash is trig- neoliberal, even neoconservative. Not from gered, rather, because ideal and material the point of view of the white and wounded, structures of the status quo have been the status quo masses and elites! Obama ges- abruptly displaced, and those who occupied tured to a post-imperial foreign policy, those structures wish to return to the time a post-white, multicultural American ethnic- before displacement, when they were sitting ity; and he created a massive new social enti- and standing in what was obviously, and not tlement financed by taxation (Alexander and just in retrospect, a better place. Jaworsky 2014). And he was black! The In the United States, frontlash seared the Obama years were experienced as frighten- decade of the 1930s and marked the Second ingly frontlash by the status quo ante. The World War years as well. Backlash against experience of laceration triggered another labor incorporation, challenges to anti-Semi- backlash frenzy, this time in Trumpian tism and ethnic and racial bigotry, and form. Not new, but still dangerous, spread- Randian outrage over Keynesian economic ing fear and loathing on the left. controls exploded with extraordinary force What threatens democracy is not backlash. in the late 1940s and dominated the decade Backlash is inevitable as long as frontlash after: Taft-Hartley, McCarthyism, stay-at- movements destabilize established interests, home mothers, separate-but-equal races, introducing once-inconceivable reforms in cold war conformity, and sexual repression. the name of justice. The question is not Frontlash exploded again in the 1960s whether conservative movements will push (Isserman and Kazin 2000; Kazin 1995:165– back—for they do, and often successfully— 268), terrifying vested interests, mobilizing but whether, when they do, the civil sphere counter-elites and long-standing civil society can survive. groups alike. In 1968, Richard Nixon rode Democracy depends on feelings of mutual a backlash crusade into the White House, regard, on experiencing a shared solidarity vowing not only to lower the gates of the civil despite deep antipathies of interest and sphere but to reverse civil rights, feminism, ideology. There must be some historically ecology, and peace. Facing imminent failure, specific vision of a shared universalism that Nixon tried to effectuate backlash with extra- transcends the particularisms of class, race, constitutional efforts to spy and blackmail gender, sex, region, religion, and nationality. political and electoral opponents—efforts Frontlash and backlash are highly polarizing; that the Watergate crisis eventually exposed their phenomenological effect is to induce and punished. After a brief post-Watergate high anxiety that civil solidarity is breaking period, the backlash movement against civil apart. What once seemed civil—affirmative incorporation resumed, seizing national action, for example—now seems particular- political power for a dozen years, using the istic. Groups and ideas once honored— levers of central government and the soap- Confederate heroes, for example—are now box of the presidency, trying in every which trashed. Can the sense of a vital center sur- way to undermine what frontlash move- vive (Luengo and Ihlebæk 2019)? Only if civil ments had achieved. If Reaganism, too, failed solidarity can regulate ideal and material to block civil progression, conservative para- conflict in such a manner that enemies noia turned ever more cancerous during the become frenemies, that sharp antagonism is eight years of Clinton centrism, and backlash moderated and agonism thrives (Mouffe came roaring back to national power during 2000). Frontlash must be so civil-ized that it the administration of Bush the Second: Affir- eschews revolution for social democracy mative action was sharply challenged, femi- (Marshall 1965). Backlash always unfolds nist policies undermined, environmentalism under an anti-left, conservative ideology, muted, nationalistic patriotism revived; and but such conservatism can take civil or anti- militaristic responses to international rela- civil form. tions flourished. Burke ([1790] 2009) and Oakeshott (1975) The drama of frontlash and backlash are backlash philosophers of civil modera- continues. Critical sociologists have tended tion: don’t hurry so fast, they warn the left; to write off the Obama years as centrist, don’t be so arrogant as to see yourself as

Contemporary Sociology 48, 1 Featured Essay 7 the master of rationality; do be more himself as the ultimate truth-teller. He concerned with maintaining trust and incre- attacks selfishness and brags about his mental ties. When backlash takes more own generosity. He claims to expose secret extreme form, however, conservative shenanigans and portrays his administration ideology becomes not moderately anti- as open for all to see. He attacks elites and radical but revolutionary: from agonism to privilege, setting himself on the people’s antagonism, from persuasion to violence, side and vowing to enlarge the rules of the from civil sphere to civil war, and from game. democracy to authoritarianism. If backlash But there is nothing new here. What we see had boiled over in the 1960s, you would and hear is the tried and true binary have had Malcolm X and the Black Panthers discourse that has, from the beginning, as the decade’s dominant political figures dynamized and polarized, enabled and and organizations, not Martin Luther King constrained actually existing civil spheres and the NAACP. If backlash boils over today, (Kivisto 2017, 2019; Mast 2019a, 2019b; we will have Steve Bannon as the nation’s Enroth 2018). Every powerful democratic dominant public intellectual (Alexander leader, on both right and left (see, e.g., Kazin 2019), Fox as the most influential media 2006), has evoked the same binaries to sug- site, and white racism as the platform of the gest that their opponents are civilly incapa- Republican Party. ble and that only they and their friends are Trump flirted with Bannon but won power willing and able to act on behalf of the civil and continues to wield it not because of his side and to be rational, autonomous, open, rhetorical radicalism but, counterintuitively, cooperative, people-oriented, solidaristic. because he has been willing to represent con- Our clear and present danger does not servative backlash sentiments. Civil conser- emerge from the simplifying, binary rhetoric vatives have sustained Trump because they of civil versus uncivil, however distasteful have been able to use his presidency to such right-wing performances may be. It push back against the frontlash achieve- comes, rather, from how such inveterate ments of decades before. Trump has ‘‘done binarism relates to the civil-sphere institu- more to deregulate than any president in his- tions that sustain democratic life. It is certain- tory,’’ the president of Freedom Works ly a frustrating paradox that civil solidarity explained (Peters 2018:16). The regressive cannot be instantiated in real time and place tax bill, the sleazy whittling down of affirma- without resorting to what the psychoanalyst tive action, the broad attacks on gender Melanie Klein ([1957] 1975) called ‘‘splitting’’ equality, sexual freedom, and voting or what Strong Program cultural sociology rights—each undermines what citizens on calls the sacred-versus-profane discursive the left and in the center have come to under- structures that make meaning in everyday stand as our contemporary American civil social life (Alexander and Smith 2019). sphere. Yet even if such pushbacks under- Even as binarism incorporates and upgrades, mine the progressive version of the Ameri- it also excludes and degrades. The binary can civil sphere, they do not aim at structure of civil discourse means that the destroying the civil sphere as such; they do specification of civil solidarity at any particu- not abrogate the electoral game of agonistic lar historical time, and in any particular conflict, nor do they undermine the legal- social and physical place, is inherently pre- rational principles of civil regulation. carious. But the flexibility of splitting and Trump’s rhetoric is inflammatory in tone the precariousness of specification are pre- and demagogic in style; but are such rhetoric, cisely what allow actually existing civilities tone, and style actually anti-democratic, as to be continuously breached, and actually leading social theories of populism (Arditi existing civil spheres to be continuously 2005; Mouffe 2005; Panizza 2005; Mu¨ ller remade by avant-gardes, sometimes in star- 2017) would suggest? Trump rails against tlingly progressive and emancipatory ways. false news and those who hide the truth, They are also what allow the frontiers of describing his own side as rational and hon- newly expanded civil spheres to be unmade est. He calls his enemies liars and presents by backlash.

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The making and unmaking of civil solidar- arbiter of where and to whom the discourse ity, its upgrading and downgrading, depend of civil society is applied; You are the on specifying its idealistic discourse in cock of the walk; You are the king’s mystical relation to ongoing events and struggles in and his administrative body; You are not particular times and places. This is the a civil conservative wimp but an anti-civil work of civil institutions. The communica- revolutionary. tive and regulative institutions of the civil Trump-whispering can move backlash sphere mediate between broad and abstract from civil conservative to populist. When binary discourses and here and now. Public the representational process comes to be cen- opinion polls, civil associations, and, most tered in a single man rather than in relatively importantly, journalism are media of com- independent communicative institutions, munication. They specify democratic values you have Caesarism (Weber 1978). Symbolic and discourses on behalf of civil solidarity, power suddenly seems merely plebisci- issuing highly public judgments about the tarian, and it is the modern Prince (Gramsci civil and uncivil character of interests, 1959) who crystallizes the voice of the peo- groups, movements, and events, judgments ple, via his media, his associations, his own that are independent of popular leaders constructions of polls, his judges and courts, and parties, whether frontlash or backlash, his party. Buoyed by such presumption of who claim to speak for the people directly, people power, the populist demagogue not in unmediated fashion, in and of and for only monopolizes the power of symbolic rep- themselves. The other filtering mechanisms resentation (Moffitt 2016) but also destroys of civil spheres are regulative: the institu- the organizational autonomy of regulative tions of voting and electoral competition, institutions. Populists cannot tolerate inde- the impersonal structure of office, and, pendent courts interpreting and applying most of all, the precedent-bound and civil discourse. They cannot allow other rights-based rule of law. powerful media elites to decide who and The elites who organize and represent what is more rational, more honest, more these communicative and regulative institu- true, more secretive, more hidden, or more tions are civil sphere agents (Alexander dangerous and threatening. As the regula- 2018). Their ideal and material interests are tion of impersonal office is destroyed, power at one with the defense of the civil sphere’s becomes personal and familial, and corrup- autonomy. Civil sphere agents mediate the tion reigns. Patrimonialism, deference, and charismatic claims of demagogues, inter- the king’s mystical body are the alternatives twining interpretation and coercion, produc- to civil power, to constitutionally regulated ing universalizing, quasi-factual evidence office and critical, independent mediation. that allows them to pollute, arrest, and some- With office and journalism destroyed, elec- times even incarcerate the civil sphere’s ene- tions become empty showcases for staging mies. Investigative journalists and crusading dramaturgic demagoguery instead of occa- attorneys are ambitious for glory. Their sions for engaging in contingent, agonistic, hopes to become civil heroes can be stymied aesthetic-cum-moral deployments of binary by populist demagogues, on right and left, discourse. who believe that only they themselves can Under such conditions of discursive con- speak for the people—in immediate rather striction and institutional fusion, the presup- than mediate ways, as vessels rather than positions of a universalizing solidarity instruments of civil power, as the only true become severely constrained. Civil spheres representative of the people’s will. shrink, reflecting primordial qualities of the What is dangerous about Trumpism is not leader and party who have grabbed repre- that it speaks the polarizing and binary lan- sentational power, the ethnicity, gender, guage of civil backlash, but that it often race, sexuality, and national identity of the seems hell-bent on destroying the autonomy new presidential king. Backlash and fron- of civil-sphere institutions along the way. tlash then cease to be dynamic processes. Bannon ideology whispers in the right- Instead of moments in the pendulum swing wing businessman’s ear: You are the sole of social and cultural history, they become

Contemporary Sociology 48, 1 Featured Essay 9 puncta: points that halt the movement and and states (Putnam 2000; Skocpol 2003), threaten to break the marvelously subtle, to public action against private greed powerful but flexible, finely tuned but pre- (Habermas [1963] 1989). Such misunder- carious democratic ‘‘machine.’’ standings have the unintended effect of con- Yet, if civil spheres can be populized into flating democracy and populism (e.g., Laclau anti-democracies, such destruction does not 2005), thus ceding the intellectual if not the usually happen in the blink of an eye. As con- moral ground to democracy’s enemies. Soci- servative forces push backward to dema- ology becomes part of the polarization goguery, the cultural and institutional bases between frontlash and backlash rather than of civil spheres react sharply. Protecting their standing back from both with critical under- ideal and material interests, civil elites standing. The heart of democracy is not serv- defend the autonomy of critical discourse, ing this or that particular interest but having the right of independent journalism to a sense of a broader interest. It is to cherish make interpretations regardless of personal a faith that solidarity can be defined in a civil power, the claim for such judgments to be rather than a primordial manner, as that practically applied only by judges who are manner is defined, and delimited, in any par- independent and by courts that rest on legal ticular historical time and place. rights. Trying to make things more civil always Substantively, the contemporary resis- involves defining some others as less, thus tance is a fight to maintain what frontlash evoking the binary discourse over which has gained, allowing more humane and soli- Trump is a rhetorical master. The challenge daristic representations of gender, sex, eth- is this: The imaginative and inspiring rheto- nicity, and race to become more widely dis- ric that exposes the putative lack of civility tributed and more fully institutionalized. of those on the right and left cannot be Formally, however, resistance proceeds by allowed to become concentrated in the repre- defending the structure and culture of the sentational capacities of a leader and party. civil sphere, the independence of civil associ- The representation of civil capacity must be ations, the objective measurement of public disbursed among the communicative and opinion, the professionalism of journalism, regulative institutions that filter, pluralize, the authority of judges, fair voting rules, and agonistically specify the principles that and impersonal standards of justice. It is allow incorporation and exclusion. As John not (contra Laclau 2005) rhetorical represen- Dewey argued a century ago, ‘‘more than tatives of ‘‘the people’’ who lead the resis- a form of government,’’ democracy is ‘‘pri- tance, much less the people themselves, but marily a mode of associational living, of con- civil sphere elites and their supporters, joint communicated experience’’ (Dewey groups whose ideal and material interests [1916] 1966:87). are bound to the civil and mediated con- struction of national solidarity. It is not just unfortunate but potentially References dangerous that sociologists have so rarely Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2006. The Civil Sphere. New been interested in theorizing democracy, York: Oxford University Press. and that when they have done so they have Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2013. ‘‘Struggling over the failed to comprehend the cultural and insti- Mode of Incorporation: Backlash against Mul- tutional complexities that sustain it (e.g., ticulturalism in Europe.’’ Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(4):531–56. Bourdieu 1996). Like the populists who are Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2016. ‘‘Progress and Disillu- the civil sphere’s enemies, sociologists too sion: Civil Repair and Its Discontents.’’ Thesis often have reduced democracy to material Eleven 137(1):72–82. interests (Lipset [1960] 1981), to the masses Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2018. ‘‘The Societalization of against the power elites (Michels [1911] Social Problems: Church Pedophilia, Phone 1962; Schumpeter 1942; Mills 1956; Moore Hacking, and Financial Crisis.’’ American Socio- logical Review 83(6):1–30. 1966), to the triumph of privileged over Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2019. ‘‘Raging against the more privileged classes (Wright 2015), to Enlightenment: The Ideology of Steven grassroots civic activism against institutions Bannon.’’ Pp. 137–48 in Politics of Meaning/

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