Russia and Eurasia Programme Meeting Summary Security Challenges in the North and South Caucasus Laurence Broers Centre of Contemporary Central Asia and Caucasus, SOAS; Caucasus Survey John Russell University of Bradford Domitilla Sagramoso King’s College London Dennis Sammut LINKS Galina Yemelianova University of Birmingham 10 December 2014 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the speaker(s) and participants and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event, every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions. The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery. 10 St James’s Square, London SW1Y 4LE T +44 (0)20 7957 5700 F +44 (0)20 7957 5710 www.chathamhouse.org Patron: Her Majesty The Queen Chairman: Stuart Popham QC Director: Dr Robin Niblett Charity Registration Number: 208223 2 Security Challenges in the North and South Caucasus This is a summary of an event held at Chatham House on 10 December 2014. At the first session, Galina Yemelianova, Laurence Broers, John Russell and a roundtable of other experts discussed regional actors and the security challenges they pose. At the second session, Dennis Sammut and Domitilla Sagramoso broadened the discussion to include the external challenges, with particular attention being paid to the Russian Federation and the conflict in Syria. Domestic challenges Laurence Broers identified issues of conflict and governance in the South Caucasus as the main security threats to the region. He argued that while events in Ukraine have transformed the way that we frame regional security, those threats have been building over the last 10-15 years. Sovereignty conflicts Previously, there was a perception that outside powers would be unable to solve the problem of inter-state tensions and frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, however, an international framework is now being used to resolve those conflicts. But in Nagorno-Karabakh, leaders on all sides have consistently refused to make concessions and in 2014 some skirmishes created a dangerous situation. In the case of all three regions, poor leadership judgment poses a serious risk that the heads of state may sleepwalk into war. There are no conflict-prevention institutions or mechanisms in place, while external actors have a limited mandate for inspection. Managed instability could all too easily escalate into war. Governance Governance is a significant problem in some Caucasian countries. The political systems of those states are defined variously as sovereign, hybrid, reminiscent of façade governments and competitively authoritarian or as examples of ‘democratura’ – that is, a portmanteau of ‘democracy’ and ‘dictatura’. Governments carry out coercion, arrests, violence and intimidation. With just a few exceptions, South Caucasian elites are unwilling to have popular votes that would secure their legitimacy. For example, in Azerbaijan in 2013, the elites reaped domestic dividends from the wider crisis: NGOs were securitized as foreign agents, the opposition challenged and formal channels for voicing popular discontent closed off. Such actions lead to public frustration and thus create a domestic challenge for the South Caucasus. Chechnya With regard to the domestic challenges facing Chechnya, John Russell raised the point that the ‘illiberal peace’ of Ramzan Kadyrov may, in fact, be the best short-term outcome for Chechnya because it provides stability. Kadyrov operates as a classic warlord, but post-conflict traumatized states tend to prefer stability to liberty and pluralism. There is (just) enough money being fed into the state-building project to ensure that people feel their lives are improving. Furthermore, in many parts of the Caucasus there has been a loss of confidence in Western values. Previously, it was thought that liberal democracy provided the answer to all transition questions, but 3 Security Challenges in the North and South Caucasus turning a failed state into a liberal democracy is very difficult. In those countries where liberal democracy does not seem attainable, the West now prefers stability and predictability to a fraught path. However, ‘democratura’ is often results from elites being unable to adapt to modernity. While Kadyrov may be investing in building Chechen infrastructure, he was not elected; and this means that the crisis of governance cannot be tackled. The birth rate and economic development of the region are among the worst in the Russian Federation and many young Caucasians have been prompted to find alternatives. Many families are split internally between those for and against the authorities. Levels of discontent are rising and the clan system is breaking down. Economic migration within Chechnya is high as young people are seeking employment in cities outside the republic. Kadyrov’s rule is brutal at times; and among his opponents the idea is spreading that they may as well resist because it is better to be hanged for a sheep than for a lamb. Kadyrov’s is a unique case. First, he is Chechen, which is highly significant. Second, he inherited the spiritual role of his father at a young age, which has allowed him to combine enjoying reverence from the older generation with leading the lifestyle to which many younger Chechen aspire and which offers them an alternative future. He remains very popular among his supporters. While Dmitry Medvedev tried to cut the amount of money spent on Chechnya, Vladimir Putin is unwilling to do so. However, the economic situation means that the Russian budget cannot continue to stretch as far as it once did, and this may lead to public discontent with Russia’s policy towards the North Caucasus. Grozny attacks, 4 December 2014 The outburst of violence in December 2014 was immediately labelled a terrorist attack by the authorities. It was an attempt to target the authorities, rather than civilians, and led to the death of 14 police officers and 10 militants. The entire incident was shrouded in mystery. Some eyewitnesses claimed to have seen between 200 and 300 militants taking part in the attack, while others said that the group of militants fitted into three taxis. The attack was clearly designed to capture the headlines on the eve of the Russian president’s State of the Union address and embarrass Ramzan Kadyrov. The most similar previous incident was an attack on government posts in Malchik in 2005, which had been masterminded by Shamil Basayev. By comparison, the 4 December attack was poorly organized and badly executed. The militants involved were young (19–20 years old) and perhaps represent a new generation of fighters. They came from Urus-Martan (rather than Grozny), a region on which the Chechen internal affairs minister had promised to crack down. The stated reason for the attack was the defence of the honour of Muslim women, but in fact such attacks in Chechnya are usually undertaken either to recruit new members or to demonstrate, and usually illustrate, weakness within an organization. The 4 December attack was the third such incident in 2014 – it followed a suicide bomb attempt on Kadyrov’s birthday and a military vehicle blown up in April. Before these attacks, the situation in Chechnya had been relatively quiet. Islam in Chechnya While Chechnya may be a secular state, it has Islamic elements, such as the biggest mosque in Europe; and Kadyrov has introduced strict rules, including requiring women to cover their hair and not to wear trousers. The persistent Islamization of Chechnya is nothing new: until the mid-1920s it was under Sharia law. Moreover, there is a strong tradition of decentralization in the region. 4 Security Challenges in the North and South Caucasus Doku Umarov’s replacement as the emir of the Caucasus Emirate, Ali Abu Mukhammad, was a theologian whose rise to power somewhat changed the character of the movement – namely, to that of a greater, inner jihad. This has created friction with field commanders but at the same time suggests that the December 2014 Grozny clashes were probably autonomous acts. Chechen fighters abroad The presence of Chechen fighters on the pro-Russian side in Ukraine is paradoxical. In fact, there are Chechens on either side because most of those who belong to the Chechen diaspora in Ukraine support the Ukrainian authorities. There is evidence of Chechens coming from Europe, Chechnya and Russia to fight in Ukraine. They are active in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. On the pro-Kyiv side, some of the Chechens fighting are jihadists left over from the Chechen-Russian wars. There are hundreds fighting (the highest estimate is 1,500) and they have suffered big hits. The former self-proclaimed prime minister of the Donetsk People’s Republic, Aleksandr Borodai, said that sometimes Chechens are more Russian than Russians, which is a comparison that Kadyrov has been known to draw too. Islam-related security challenges Influence of Islamic extremism Galina Yemelianova outlined the reasons for the Caucasus region’s vulnerability to Islamic extremism, highlighting the fact that the Caucasus has a much longer history with Islam – which arrived in the seventh century CE – than it does with Russia. The region has undergone huge population movements that continue to have an impact on security today, such as the mass resettlement of Armenians, the aim of which was to create a Christian buffer on the edge of the Russian Empire.