and Eurasia Programme

Meeting Summary

Security Challenges in the North and South Caucasus

Laurence Broers

Centre of Contemporary Central Asia and Caucasus, SOAS; Caucasus Survey John Russell

University of Bradford Domitilla Sagramoso

King’s College London Dennis Sammut

LINKS Galina Yemelianova

University of Birmingham

10 December 2014

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2 Security Challenges in the North and South Caucasus

This is a summary of an event held at Chatham House on 10 December 2014. At the first session, Galina Yemelianova, Laurence Broers, John Russell and a roundtable of other experts discussed regional actors and the security challenges they pose. At the second session, Dennis Sammut and Domitilla Sagramoso broadened the discussion to include the external challenges, with particular attention being paid to the Russian Federation and the conflict in .

Domestic challenges

Laurence Broers identified issues of conflict and governance in the South Caucasus as the main security threats to the region. He argued that while events in have transformed the way that we frame regional security, those threats have been building over the last 10-15 years.

Sovereignty conflicts

Previously, there was a perception that outside powers would be unable to solve the problem of inter-state tensions and frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, however, an international framework is now being used to resolve those conflicts. But in Nagorno-Karabakh, leaders on all sides have consistently refused to make concessions and in 2014 some skirmishes created a dangerous situation.

In the case of all three regions, poor leadership judgment poses a serious risk that the heads of state may sleepwalk into war. There are no conflict-prevention institutions or mechanisms in place, while external actors have a limited mandate for inspection. Managed instability could all too easily escalate into war.

Governance

Governance is a significant problem in some Caucasian countries. The political systems of those states are defined variously as sovereign, hybrid, reminiscent of façade governments and competitively authoritarian or as examples of ‘democratura’ – that is, a portmanteau of ‘democracy’ and ‘dictatura’. Governments carry out coercion, arrests, violence and intimidation.

With just a few exceptions, South Caucasian elites are unwilling to have popular votes that would secure their legitimacy. For example, in in 2013, the elites reaped domestic dividends from the wider crisis: NGOs were securitized as foreign agents, the opposition challenged and formal channels for voicing popular discontent closed off. Such actions lead to public frustration and thus create a domestic challenge for the South Caucasus.

Chechnya

With regard to the domestic challenges facing , John Russell raised the point that the ‘illiberal peace’ of may, in fact, be the best short-term outcome for Chechnya because it provides stability.

Kadyrov operates as a classic warlord, but post-conflict traumatized states tend to prefer stability to liberty and pluralism. There is (just) enough money being fed into the state-building project to ensure that people feel their lives are improving.

Furthermore, in many parts of the Caucasus there has been a loss of confidence in Western values. Previously, it was thought that liberal democracy provided the answer to all transition questions, but 3 Security Challenges in the North and South Caucasus

turning a failed state into a liberal democracy is very difficult. In those countries where liberal democracy does not seem attainable, the West now prefers stability and predictability to a fraught path.

However, ‘democratura’ is often results from elites being unable to adapt to modernity. While Kadyrov may be investing in building Chechen infrastructure, he was not elected; and this means that the crisis of governance cannot be tackled. The birth rate and economic development of the region are among the worst in the Russian Federation and many young Caucasians have been prompted to find alternatives. Many families are split internally between those for and against the authorities. Levels of discontent are rising and the clan system is breaking down. Economic migration within Chechnya is high as young people are seeking employment in cities outside the republic. Kadyrov’s rule is brutal at times; and among his opponents the idea is spreading that they may as well resist because it is better to be hanged for a sheep than for a lamb.

Kadyrov’s is a unique case. First, he is Chechen, which is highly significant. Second, he inherited the spiritual role of his father at a young age, which has allowed him to combine enjoying reverence from the older generation with leading the lifestyle to which many younger Chechen aspire and which offers them an alternative future. He remains very popular among his supporters.

While Dmitry Medvedev tried to cut the amount of money spent on Chechnya, Vladimir Putin is unwilling to do so. However, the economic situation means that the Russian budget cannot continue to stretch as far as it once did, and this may lead to public discontent with Russia’s policy towards the .

Grozny attacks, 4 December 2014 The outburst of violence in December 2014 was immediately labelled a terrorist attack by the authorities. It was an attempt to target the authorities, rather than civilians, and led to the death of 14 police officers and 10 militants.

The entire incident was shrouded in mystery. Some eyewitnesses claimed to have seen between 200 and 300 militants taking part in the attack, while others said that the group of militants fitted into three taxis. The attack was clearly designed to capture the headlines on the eve of the Russian president’s State of the Union address and embarrass Ramzan Kadyrov.

The most similar previous incident was an attack on government posts in Malchik in 2005, which had been masterminded by Shamil Basayev. By comparison, the 4 December attack was poorly organized and badly executed. The militants involved were young (19–20 years old) and perhaps represent a new generation of fighters. They came from Urus-Martan (rather than Grozny), a region on which the Chechen internal affairs minister had promised to crack down. The stated reason for the attack was the defence of the honour of Muslim women, but in fact such attacks in Chechnya are usually undertaken either to recruit new members or to demonstrate, and usually illustrate, weakness within an organization.

The 4 December attack was the third such incident in 2014 – it followed a suicide bomb attempt on Kadyrov’s birthday and a military vehicle blown up in April. Before these attacks, the situation in Chechnya had been relatively quiet.

Islam in Chechnya While Chechnya may be a secular state, it has Islamic elements, such as the biggest mosque in ; and Kadyrov has introduced strict rules, including requiring women to cover their hair and not to wear trousers. The persistent Islamization of Chechnya is nothing new: until the mid-1920s it was under Sharia law. Moreover, there is a strong tradition of decentralization in the region. 4 Security Challenges in the North and South Caucasus

Doku Umarov’s replacement as the emir of the , Ali Abu Mukhammad, was a theologian whose rise to power somewhat changed the character of the movement – namely, to that of a greater, inner . This has created friction with field commanders but at the same time suggests that the December 2014 Grozny clashes were probably autonomous acts.

Chechen fighters abroad The presence of Chechen fighters on the pro-Russian side in Ukraine is paradoxical. In fact, there are on either side because most of those who belong to the Chechen diaspora in Ukraine support the Ukrainian authorities. There is evidence of Chechens coming from Europe, Chechnya and Russia to fight in Ukraine. They are active in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. On the pro-Kyiv side, some of the Chechens fighting are jihadists left over from the Chechen-Russian wars. There are hundreds fighting (the highest estimate is 1,500) and they have suffered big hits. The former self-proclaimed prime minister of the Donetsk People’s Republic, Aleksandr Borodai, said that sometimes Chechens are more Russian than Russians, which is a comparison that Kadyrov has been known to draw too.

Islam-related security challenges

Influence of Islamic extremism

Galina Yemelianova outlined the reasons for the Caucasus region’s vulnerability to Islamic extremism, highlighting the fact that the Caucasus has a much longer history with Islam – which arrived in the seventh century CE – than it does with Russia.

The region has undergone huge population movements that continue to have an impact on security today, such as the mass resettlement of Armenians, the aim of which was to create a Christian buffer on the edge of the . Meanwhile, the 1928 division of Azerbaijan between Iran and Russia remains problematic for Iran’s security. Circassians and Chechens who moved to the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century helped form a multi-million Caucasian diaspora. During the Soviet era, the Stalinist nation- building project led to the politicization of ethnicity. Mass deportations caused mass trauma. Turkic Muslims, for their part, witnessed a breakdown of literary culture because of the change of alphabet, which, in turn, made them vulnerable to proselytizing. However, the clergy was able to maintain proficiency in Arabic throughout this period; and for this reason, it was highly susceptible to foreign Arabic influence.

Until the mid-1990s, Islam was part of identity politics rather than a security issue. Once consolidation had been achieved in the mid-1990s, the definition of official Islam became a subject for debate in the Caucasus. There was an increase in the level of Islam-related activism – both traditional and non- traditional Islam – across the region, mainly in the northeast Caucasus. Non-traditional Islam has been promoted in the region with the backing of external actors such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and .

At the same time, anti-Western attitudes increase the potential for Islamic extremism to spread within the region, according to one study. It was found, especially in Azerbaijan, that exposure to Salafi Islam was fuelled by criticism of the West, particularly in relation to the Iraq War and Western support for Israel. An influx of foreign mujahideen has exacerbated the security situation, while there is Salafi dominance in cyberspace, especially on social networks. This increased contact with radicalized Muslims abroad has led to the adoption of the concept of martyrdom, which is alien to Caucasian Muslim customs. 5 Security Challenges in the North and South Caucasus

Widespread poverty, combined with the ineffectiveness and corruption of ethno-national ruling elites, has increased the region’s vulnerability to Islam-related security challenges.

Response of the authorities and outcomes

Until the early 2000s, Islam was perceived to be a religious issue, but militarization led to the monitoring of jihadist movements and aggressive state secularism combined with the promotion of traditional Islam.

In Azerbaijan, the authorities downplayed the difference between Shia and . But at the same time Caucasian states adopted harsher religious laws, such as the ‘1997 law’ passed by the Russian Federation and the 2009 ban on foreign books and closure of certain mosques in Azerbaijan. Aggressive securitization measures in the public sphere were introduced – for example, Russia banned the hijab in some universities.

Unofficial Islam has now been securitized; and the heavy-handed government crackdown on all unofficial types of Islam has been not only an unpopular measure but one that has had limited results, as shown by the December 2014 Grozny attacks.

The Orthodox Church plays a role within Russia as a non-state actor and undertakes recruitment and conversion in the North Caucasus. Its role has changed over the years: in the 1990s the patriarch was very prominent, while in the 2000s there was an attempt to balance Orthodoxy and Islam. This meant that in Muslim regions of Russia there was more investment in state-controlled Islamic infrastructure. Projects funded by so-called foreign agents were closed down, but more was spent on Islamic education (mainly in Kazan and Moscow). Attempts were made to do away with all Saudi Arabia-sponsored projects. In Chechnya, the removal of non-traditional mosques has succeeded, at least to some extent, in undermining the recruitment of potential terrorists, while the Russian army’s recent drive to increase conscription from the North Caucasus is a sign of trust in the region.

Caucasian fighters in Syria

Who is fighting in Syria? Domitilla Sagramoso argued that estimates of the number of Chechens in Syria – which range from 100 to 1,000 – are often inflated because many such individuals are, in fact, from the Pankisi Gorge and thus may be one of many nationalities. Equally, many Chechens in Syria are European Chechens, especially from the Chechen diaspora in . There are also fighters from Azerbaijan, and other Central Asian republics as well as Crimean Tatars in Syria.

We hear mostly about Pankisi Gorge fighters such as Umar al-Shishani, who allegedly was trained directly by the US, fought in the 2008 war and then went to Syria, where he swore allegiance to an IS leader. In June 2014 the declaration of an Islamic caliphate prompted many Chechens fighting in other groups to support IS. Previously, Al-Shishani had been loyal to the Caucasus caliphate but later swore allegiance to the Islamic Front. In September 2014 IS leaders announced that the North Caucasus would be their next arena for waging jihad.

Changing allegiances There are different allegiances among those from the Caucasus who are fighting in Syria, and in late 2013/early 2014 an intensive debate took place over just what the right path in Syria was. 6 Security Challenges in the North and South Caucasus

Sunni communities in the Caucasus have a strong tradition of fighting. In the past they fought in the Caucasus, Iraq and Afghanistan and now some have gone to fight in Syria. Shia communities, however, tend to be pro-Assad. In Azerbaijan there is a Shia/Sunni divide in terms of the impact that Middle East fighters are having the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Meanwhile, within the North Caucasus, the Islamic alliance among insurgents has broken up. Some have sworn allegiance to IS, which challenges the existing leadership of Muslim fighters in the Caucasus Emirate; and other splits may follow. Abu Mukhammad put pressure on various groups to reconcile, but no common ground has yet been found.

Abu Mukhammad called for following the line of Al-Zawahira of Al-Qaeda. Indeed, there is ideological congruence between Al-Qaeda and the Caucasus Emirate: they share a Salafi-Jihadist ideology, which increasing numbers of Chechen fighters have been following since 2007/08, although financial connections are not strong. While no allegiance between the parties has been sworn, there is a sense that they are following the same line. Others, however, prefer to swear allegiance to the leaders of IS. Clearly, there is no unity of allegiance.

Syria’s appeal While very few Chechens fought in Afghanistan or Iraq, the numbers involved in Syria have increased owing to various religious and political motives:

• There is strong belief in the need for a caliphate in the Levant, which has widespread appeal among Chechens (and that belief is shared by many Muslims in Europe). Fighting in Syria is comparable to the Spanish Civil War, as Muslim solidarity and jihad have created a very powerful modern-day myth that draws Muslims from many regions.

• Fighters believe that they are defending Muslims from the tyranny of Bashar al-Assad.

• Syria has huge symbolic relevance as an Islamic religious and cultural centre.

• While many in the West are concerned about Western policies in the Middle East, the negative effects of Russian policies are also relevant for Muslims from Russia.

• It is relatively easy to go to Syria to fight: a visa is not required to enter Turkey from the Russian Federation, and Istanbul has networks in place to facilitate movement to Syria.

• Remuneration is substantial for Chechens – reportedly the equivalent of US$300 per day.

Implications of fighting in Syria The challenge for many countries will be how to deal with the return of those who have fought in Syria. Many Arabs who returned to the Middle East after having fought in Afghanistan in 1979 were not wanted back; as a result, many had no alternative but to join other fights. We should draw lessons from this and examine the chances for de-radicalization. However, the fear of fallout from return of fighters may be overplayed. Many will stay in Syria, and relatively few are from the Caucasus in any case.

In Russia the authorities’ reaction towards returnees is likely to be tough. However, there are no verified data on the number of returnees to date. Control of Russia’s borders is tight, and returnee fighters will probably be dealt with harshly and imprisoned; however, as yet no information is available on this topic. One expert noted that the authorities in claim to have a de-radicalization programme in place. Four returnee fighters have carried out violent acts since their return. 7 Security Challenges in the North and South Caucasus

Another security challenge is that Syria may provide opportunities for the establishment of new international jihadi networks, as fighters will forge new ties with jihadis from Europe and elsewhere. Russia needs to increase its cooperation with the West and the authorities in the South Caucasus in order to prevent terrorism. Since 9/11 security cooperation along these lines has been on the table owing to the shared desire to address global jihadis and exchange information on the Afghanistan campaign. Such cooperation has been discussed by John Kerry and Sergey Lavrov. Russia has a clear stance on the issue, but the Western position is arguably confused, since individual countries are taking different lines.

External actors in the Caucasus

Russia’s neighbourhood policy

Dennis Sammut argued that the Russian Federation clearly has a purpose and a master plan for the Caucasus, which poses security challenges for regional elites. This master plan is underpinned by the conviction that Russia will never relinquish its dominant role in the region. While Putin does not want to resurrect the Soviet Union, he will not allow elites in emerging countries to make their own decisions. The template for Russia’s Caucasus project is the treaty signed with Abkhazia in November 2014: that document signalled greater integration of Abkhazia’s policy and infrastructure with Russia’s, thereby allowing Moscow to manage relations with nominally independent states.

This project has been resisted over the years, as demonstrated by the war with in 2008 and the current crisis in Ukraine. For their part, the EU and the US have not yet decided how to deal with the issue; their response has become more robust only in the past year. This was a surprise to the Russian leadership, which had calculated that the West would allow Crimea to be ‘lost’. Indeed, such might have been the outcome without Russia’s overextension in eastern Ukraine.

Russia remains a key player in the South Caucasus, where the EU’s regional agenda is seen as a threat. Owing to their alliances with Russia, the political elites in Armenia and Abkhazia have had bitter pills to swallow over the last year or so. The geopolitical projects being spearheaded by the Russian Federation could involve the imposition of new dividing lines in the Caucasus.

Armenia has been trying to create a win-win situation out of its alliance with Russia and become a hinge state that has Russia as a security partner but a Western-facing culture and values. However, calling off Armenia’s EU association agreement in September 2013 under Russian pressure was embarrassing for that country’s leadership.

In Abkhazia morale is low over the signing of a treaty (in November 2014) with Russia that conceded many rights to the Russian Federation. At the same time, there was a sense of achievement because the autonomous republic managed to water down a document produced by the Russian government.

While European and Western partners seem unable to match the Russian Federation’s influence in the South Caucasus, domestic society can resist it.

How should the West engage with Russia?

There are many ways in which we can engage with Russia in the Caucasus. Sammut recommended combining the following tactics: 8 Security Challenges in the North and South Caucasus

Confrontation through the court of public opinion In recent years Russia has conducted a PR campaign targeting the EU domestic audience, domestic audiences in Eastern Partnership countries (particularly those of the South Caucasus) and its own national audience. This campaign has been met with a weak and confused response from the West, which is using outdated Cold War-era tools to combat it.

Containment It is important to deal with the situation in the South Caucasus, and the Ukraine crisis should not be allowed to eclipse this. A piecemeal approach is dangerous; the West requires a holistic approach if the problem is to be contained. The three countries of the South Caucasus have different trajectories: Armenia is in the Eurasian Economic Union, Azerbaijan is non-aligned and Georgia has an EU association agreement. Furthermore, there are debates over alignment within the countries themselves.

Failure in Georgia, with which we currently engage quite superficially, would have very significant consequences. Georgia’s transition to a new government has gone as well as it could have done, and the country has passed a number of tests and has been reasonably successful in holding free and fair elections. However, structural problems must not be underestimated. The EU needs to increase its involvement in order to nurture the seeds already sown.

In Armenia the vote on joining the Eurasian Economic Union was supported by all parties except one. Such support was strongest among the political elite. Despite being an Eastern Partnership country, Armenia is now willing to engage with Europe only in the broadest possible terms. Attempts have been made in the domestic and international media to project the image of interaction with Brussels, but there is no basis for tangible dialogue.

Azerbaijan’s message to the West is one of indifference. It is dealing with its own domestic problems.

Europe is currently reviewing its neighbourhood policy. Three countries have signed EU association agreements; but the political aspect of those agreements has, so far, been underestimated, and there may be problems with these countries moving closer to the EU. Engagement with the political class in these countries is essential.

Engagement The approach from Washington in recent years has been that it is the responsibility of the South Caucasus countries to deal with the problem of regional security. This approach tends to understate the issues at stake and find reassurance in the belief that time will solve everything.

However, there is a clear need to engage Russia in serious discussion. Moscow has been calling for such a debate since the CSCE Budapest Summit in 1994. The idea of engaging Russia triggers concerns, but in a situation where Russia is already refusing to respect the rules of the post-Cold War order, a dose of realism is needed. South Caucasus security and conflicts cannot be discussed without the Russian Federation.

Yemelianova argued that before engaging in discussion with Russia, the West needs to take a more self- critical approach and to have a better understanding of Putin’s mindset. 9 Security Challenges in the North and South Caucasus

Future developments

At the OSCE Basel Summit in December 2014, it was clear that attempts were being made to push forward a reform agenda within the OSCE. Trust in the European security architecture has been eroded.

Nevertheless, Sammut argued that under the chairmanship of Switzerland in 2014, the OSCE has done a lot to contain the problem of lack of trust. In 2015 the chairmanship is passing to Serbia, which will change the dynamics within the OSCE. The organization itself needs to seize any opportunities to move forward. A big problem requires a big solution, such as the Helsinki Act of 1975.

It was countered that the signing of a similar agreement would be impossible today. Putin has lost credibility; and there is the sense that it is impossible to negotiate with him, as he has no respect for treaties. One could argue that Russia recently broke most of the 10 principles of the Helsinki Act. Clearly, the act does not need to be replaced but it must be observed.

Sammut’s argument was that if the situation is not dealt with, it will deteriorate further. A new framework may be needed, because without a mechanism for engagement there can be no resolution of the problem. Working on a case-by-case basis to resolve the issues has not worked so far. Furthermore, of the six Eastern Partnership countries, five have internal problems that cannot be ignored.

There is no prospect of quick conflict resolution in the South Caucasus over the next year or so. The Armenian and Azerbaijani heads of state have no meetings scheduled until summer 2015, while Georgia- Russia-Abkhazia tensions remain and efforts will be focused on trying to prevent them from worsening. In Ukraine, the situation is different. The international mechanisms put in place in late 2014 are having some impact. While Russia alone could not resolve the frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus even if it had the political will, it does have the power to stop others from finding resolutions. Any approach taken will therefore have to involve Russia.

Turkey, too, has significant influence in the Caucasus. Both Russia and the EU are trying to keep Turkey on its side – Putin visited Ankara in December 2014. At the same time, Turkey has a large stake in regional infrastructure projects, which could be vulnerable to disruption by non-state actors, such as terrorists, and owing to inter-state tensions.