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1-1-1989 Creativity or Imitation:Japanese Success in VCR Technology Jeanine M. Kasulis Lehigh University

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Introduction corder (VCR), a popular electronics device found Until the late 1960s, U.S. industry enjoyed in two out of five American homes, was origin­ a preeminent position in technology and com­ ally invented as a broadcasting tool by a Cali­ manded a significant market share in the field fornia-based American firm named Ampex in for industrial and commercial products. Dur­ 1956 (Television and Video Almanac, 1988, p. ing the decades that have followed, however, 433). The invention evolved over the next two competitive strides by the Japanese have made decades into a product that could be used in stunning impacts on world and domestic mar­ the home; but Ampex in particular, and the kets alike. Superior Japanese performance has American electronics industry in general, fell been a growing concern in a wide array of out of competition. Today, the superiority of industrial and commercial fields, including the Japanese in the home VCR field is so over­ home electronics, office automation, semicon­ whelming that no American manufacturer even ductors, robotics, and biotechnology. Once a bothers trying to make such a product; instead, war-tom, poverty-stricken country, Japan has all the major American electronics companies­ taken great leaps towards supplanting the po­ RCA, Zenith, General Electric, and the rest­ sitions of other industrialized nations, such as buy Japanese-made VCRs and add their name­ America, as an innovative leader and replacing plates to them (Verespej, 1986, p. 29). Today Western products with its own technological Japan is the foremost producer and exporter of feats. VCRs with 90 percentoftheworld's production The consumer electronics field is a vivid (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985). example of an area formerly dominated by Much speculation has been made about American ingenuity and subsequently taken Japan's astounding success in segments of the over by cleverly produced, high quality, low U.S. home market. Such speculation includes priced Japanese goods. The videocassette re- the persistent myth that while Americans are

1 naturally inventive and creative, the Japanese will discuss what implications these factors are merely clever copiers and adapters of im­ have with regard to the issue of Japanese crea­ ported foreign technology. Mter all, it is claimed, tivity and technological ability. the importation of advanced technological processes is one of the leading factors in Japan's economic growth since World War II (Shishido, The Emergence.of the VCR Concept 1985). Therefore, according to this view, the Japanese have succeeded by shamelessly bor­ On September 27, 1951, David Sarnoff, rowing technological innovations from the U.S. President of RCA Laboratories, celebrated the and other nations and transforming them into 45th anniversary of his start in the radio busi­ inexpensive household staples. ness. A gala ceremony was held in RCA Labor­ However, if there was ever a time to label atories in Princeton, New Jersey. During the the Japanese as mere imitators, that time has ceremony Mr. Sarnoff gave a speech concern­ certainly passed. Not only have the Japanese ing how to prepare for his 50th anniversary, established a solid record of creativity and in­ just five years away. novation, but there is growing evidence that Sarnoff, who was celebrated for his powers Americans may be losing some of their knack of prognostication as far back as 1916 when he for developing products (Rudolph, 1988). Along envisioned the presence of "radio music boxes" with their appropriation of basic imported tech­ in ordinary homes, suggested three presents nologies, the Japanese have also shown a grow­ that he would be pleased to receive at his 50th ing talent for improving and enhancing anniversary: a true amplifier of light, an all­ consumer goods by translating them into rea­ electronic air conditioner, and a television pic­ sonably-priced, useful products. The Japanese ture recorder that would record the video sig­ also appear to intuitively understand the needs nals of television on an inexpensive tape and desires of the consumer market. (Lardner, p. 55). The third request was one The home VCR market provides an excel­ which was well-understood by the engineers at lent case study of Japanese appropriation and RCA The firm was associated with broadcast­ improvement of American-invented goods. This ing networks through its NBC subsidiary, and innovation, discovered by an American firm the only way to record a television program which enjoyed years of patent protection that back in 1951-the days of live TV-was by should have given it a dominant competitive kinescope recording, a process that amounted advantage in the field, has been handed over to to putting a movie camera in front of the TV Japanese companies. The reason for Japan's screen. Not only was this process costly, but it successful appropriation of VCR technology is also produced a less-than-desirable picture not to be found in clever imitation. Rather, the quality and was a time-consuming process as Japanese success can be attributed to such fac­ well. Time was a factor of particular concern to tors as superiority in the manufacture of solid the broadcast field back then since networks state devices, foresight in the consumer field, often faced the task of taking a live transmis­ and a broadminded approach to the VCR target sion of a program airing at one time in the East markets. The intent..of this paper, therefore, is and preparing a recorded version for broadcast to examine the marketing and technological three hours later .in the West. A video tape development of the VCR in the U.S. and its ap­ recorder would provide a quicker, cheaper al- ~ propriation and dramatic improvement by the ternative to TV broadcasters. Japanese. I will begin the analysis by tracing Although there exists no barrier in princi­ the initial development of the VCR and the ple to recording a television signal, the task technological difficulties that were encount­ provides a great deal more complexity than ered by firms determined to produce a success­ recording an audio signal. A TV image is an ful prototype. I will then point out the factors intricate and complicated one that must be that led the Japanese to dominate VCR produc­ changed 30 times a second to simulate motion. tion and the American firms to falter. Finally, I Therefore a TV signal must transmit millions of

2 instructions to the picture tube every second. Invention of the VCR The main difficulty associated with recording a attempted to increase high definition signal lies in the frequency As RCA engineers engineers at Ampex Corporation in involved, which extends to six megahertz (six tape speed, followed a different million cycles a minute), and the range of fre­ Redwood City, California, route. Charles Ginsberg, who was in quencies, which covers about 20 octaves. research videotape recorder project, The mechanics of recording and playback charge of Ampex's to an idea conceived by for audio involves the recording tape, record­ had committed himself a ma­ ing head, microphone, and speaker. The re­ Marvin Camras. Camras had envisioned head, as well as the tape, cording tape used is generally made of a plastic chine in which the was in fact the faster base and contains a binder, or coating, that was a moving part-and Ray Dolby (later of "Dolby holds magnetic powder used to record a signal moving of the two. developed the notion by to the base. This tape is pulled past a recording sound" fame) further using four heads along head which produces fluctuations of intensity implementing a system system that sim­ and polarity in direct response to the electrical with a two-way switching sequenc­ input of a microphone, leaving a trail of magne­ plified circuitry and corrected timing placed along the side of a tism on the tape. During playback the roles are ing. These heads were single lines of magne­ reversed with the magnetized particles on the rotating drum and made process called "transverse tape dictating to the head, which in tum relays tism on the tape-a economized on the fluctuations in magnetism to an amplifier and scanning." Such a process capable of recording much then to a speaker. Similarly, in television re­ use of tape and was in the cording the electronic camera changes the var­ higher frequencies than those achieved Since the prob­ iations in light, which compose a picture, into original recording machines. head-to­ a long train of electrical impulses. The impulses · lem with RCA's prototype involved tape passed representing dark and light parts of the picture tape speed (the speed at which the a low reel-to­ act on videotape as the impulses representing the heads) and maintenance of tape changes in amplitude act on audiotape. Al­ reel speed (to reduce the total length of though this is a relatively straightforward proc­ required), Ampex's idea of moving the tape ess, the intricacies of the TV signal call for heads was an ingenious one (Robinson, 1974). higher frequencies to transmit the signal. In addition to the idea of using moving The solution that first occurred to engi­ heads, Ampex was working on the concept of neers working on a video recording process was using FM (frequency modulation) as opposed to use a modified audiotape recorder and sim­ to AM (amplitude modulation) recording, since ply speed up the recording process. Just as a AM is well-known for its sensitivity to inter­ tape recorder is set at a higher speed for music ference. FM had never been used before in con­ than for speech, the recorder would have to be junction with magnetic tape because its signal set at a still higher speed for TV. This idea set took up a great deal of space. With a four-minute engineers at RCA to work in 1951 on increasing recording already requiring one mile of tape, the speed of a basic modified audiotape record­ engineers shied away from complicating the er and resulted in a prototype in which the tape problem by adding FM recording. However, hurtled past the recording head at a speed of Charles Anderson, an Ampex engineer familiar thirty feet per second (20 miles an hour)-so with the field of FM broadcasting, reasoned fast that the engineers charged with stopping that it was the rate of change in the frequency and rewinding the machine had to wear heavy and not the frequency itself that coveyed pic­ leather gloves (Lardner, p. 57). This prototype ture information and argued that the use of FM took over a mile of tape to hold a four-minute recording would suffice. long recording and had a picture suffering from In February of 1956 Ampex produced a poor resolution, flicker, diagonal disturbance, prototype that showed a promising picture. and occasional ghosts. With the aid of transverse scanning and FM

3 recording, the Ampex machine had the tape such as Sony, Toshiba, Matsushita, and NC moving at the pace of 15 inches a second and continued to toy with the VCR technology, as had the capability to record a ninety-minute they had been doing since 1953. The Japanese program on a fourteen-and-one-half inch reel firms did not shy away from producing a VCR as opposed to a four-minute program on a because of Ampex's patents; rather the very seventeen-inch reel in the RCA prototype. idea that Ampex had proved that television Although Ampex gained a significant ad­ recording could be done attracted them to the vantage as the first company to discover a via­ market. The Japanese government industrial ble recording process among the many firms planning agency, MITI, played an important competing to do so, Ampex had only the dim­ role in stimulating Japanese corporate interest mest notion of what it had accomplished. In its in the VCR. When NHK and other Japanese potential demand forecast for the product, broadcasters applied to the government for managers at Ampex concluded that an expec­ permission to buy Ampex VCRs at a cost of tation of approximately 30 machines in four more than eighty thousand dollars each, the years would be reasonable. Mter all, as Joseph thought of so much money flowing overseas Roizen, an Ampex development engineer and provoked MITI to make a pool of money avail­ product manager, reasoned, "It was just going able for a crash effort to produce a domestic to be used for time delay, and how many people altemativ_e. MITI's answer was to prompt Japa­ needed to do that?" (Lardner, p. 59). Never did nese firms to develop a way to produce VCRs Ampex anticipate the phenomenal effect that that would be independent of Ampex's patented video recording capabilities would have either technology. on the broadcast market, ending the age of live As a result of their research, the Japanese TV, or on the consumer market, as a popular companies developed a new technology in time-saving mechanism. which the recording head produced a magnetic To say that Ampex's forecasts were conser­ trail that ran diagonally across the tape. This vative would be an understatement. Within new technology was developed in the research four days after its product demonstration, laboratories of Toshiba Massuda, one of Japan's Ampex had contracted to sell some 80 machines largest electrical equipment and electronics at fifty thousand dollars each. firms, by Dr. Norikazu Sawazaki. The new proc­ ess involved only one revolving head and was The Japanese Takeover capable of continuously recording the whole Ampex's discovery in 1956 was a unique TV picture field on a slant track (Sawazaki; one; for it not only established the best method 1960). The process made each "swipe" across available at that time for recording a TV signal, the tape longer than in transverse scanning, but in developing this method used very clear­ which in tum reduced the number of times the cut and well-defined technologies-namely, signal had to switch from one head to the other transverse scanning and FM recording. This head and allowed for simpler circuitry. Because allowed Ampex to secure strong, clearly-defined the path of the tape resembled a helix, or coil, patents-a factor which led RCA and many the technology became known as "helical scan­ other American firms to scrap their own efforts ning." Unfortunately, the systems developed in and designs and to try to effect an arrangement Japan still depended largely on the FM record­ with Ampex instead. The lack of competitive ing method patented by Ampex, and this pro­ threats by other American firms and the over­ vided an insurmountable barrier to any Japanese whelming thrill of discovery left Ampex with a firm with hopes of an early entrance into the ·false sense of security, and led the firm to believe field. that its discovery would mean the control of the VCR business at home and abroad for years Adopting New Technology to come. Japan's breakthrough into the field came However, as Ampex sat back and reaped when Ampex made the decision to transis­ the benefits of its discovery, Japanese firms torize its recorders to make them smaller and

4 less expensive. At the time (1960), Ampex en­ ·simple consumer goods. This philosophy is one gineers were accustomed to using vacuum which is sometimes overlooked by many Amer­ tubes rather than solid state devices. Therefore, icans who seem so often overwhelmed by the they were at a decided disadvantage due to "impossibility" which they assign to tasks. their lack of expertise in this field. To compen­ Masaru Ibuka, founder of Sony, often tells the sate, Phil Gundy, vice president of marketing, story of his visit to Western Electric to learn solicited the help of a Japanese firm-Sony­ about transistor technology: whose transistorized devices had impressed They asked me, "What do you intend him during his travels in Japan. Gundy pro­ to use transistors for?" When I an­ ceeded to make a proposal to Sony that would swered, "I am considering using them involve Sony in the design and supply of tran­ for radios," they kindly advised me, sistorized circuits for use in a "portable" "Don't waste your time and money" ver­ (lbuka, 1975, p. 16). sion of the Ampex VCR; in return, Sony would receive the right to make VCRs for non-broad­ It was also Sony which, when the large American cast customers. In 1960 a letter of agreement companies decided against putting compact was signed, and Sony started on its path towards discs (CDs) in production because of the huge domination of the VCR consumer market. capital outlay required, was the first to go into The ready adaption of new technology by CD production along with Philips of Holland. the Japanese soon gave them a strong advan­ American firms, like Ampex, had a more tage over American firms and opened the doors hesitant attitude towards the adoption of new to production of the VCR- a product they technology-a factor that hurt Ampex in the helped make more affordable and portable final reckoning. It was not until 1960, four through the use of transistors. Developing the years after the first Ampex VCR demonstration­ transistor radio and, years before, the tape re­ a long time in the ever-changing electronics corder had been formative experiences for Sony. field- that the vice president of marketing, Sony had had its start in a leaking, war-tom Phil Gundy, realized that Ampex had better factory where its engineers worked with um­ transistorize its recorders to make them cheaper brellas overtheirdesks to keep out rain and the and more reliable. However, Ampex's deficiency other elements. Its first two products, a rice in the area of solid state devices was a hin­ cooker and a heated cushion, had failed com­ drance to the firm. Ampex product manager, mercially and had led the company to the pro­ Joseph Roizen, related during an interview: duction of tape recorders. In 1948 no plastic We knew how to design circuits with (which was used as recording tape) could be vacuum tubes backwards. We didn't understand found in war-tom Japan, and solid state devices. Most Sony first mar­ of the guys were in their late 'twenties keted a tape recorder using plain paper and or 'thirties, and all of a sudden every­ magnetic powder as its tape. thing they learned in college was ob­ With the later development of the transis­ solete, and young guys were coming tor, Sony not only established a technological out of college with this transistor tech­ nology. So nobody superiority in the field of solid state at Ampex was very devices, enthusiastic. In fact, there were some but it also established a pattern which it would engineers with little signs on their follow in later years: "the determination to do desks that said, "Help stamp out tran­ something other companies had not done; the sistors!" (Lardner, p. 63). struggle to improve the yield; and the maniacal Resistance to the introduction of new embrace of a goal" (Lardner, p. 51). The Japa­ technology is, in fact, a long tradition in the nese learned to embrace rather than resist tech­ West, symbolized by the Luddite movement nology and visualized the adoption of new against textile machines in early nineteenth techniques and the eradication of old methods century Britain. Labor relations problems in­ as a competitive weapon rather than a threat. tensify this technological resistance, for in · Hard work and insight are important ingredi­ Western companies new technology is often ents in turning sophisticated technology into viewed as a threat to employment and income

5 levels. On the other hand, the Japanese welcome turned out, RCA made several mistakes by un­ new technology in terms of the potential it derestimating its competitors. For example, it creates for increased profits and for the addi­ chose to develop videodisc technology rather tional job security provided by the improved than VCR technology because it believed that performance of the companies for which they the machinery needed to mass produce pick-up work. heads on tape could not be improved. It also underestimated the ability of its competitors to Strategic Planning cope with these manufacturing difficulties. The When engineers at Ampex and in Japan same problem was faced by the Japanese, but combined the technologies of helical scanning they solved it in the laboratories of Sony and with transistorization in 1960, they paved a Matsushita (Business Week, 1984, p.89). Simi­ clear path for the development of the VCR for larly, RCA did not think VCR prices could come the mass market. It then became the duty of down significantly because it underestimated each firm involved in VCR development to es­ the ability of Japanese firms to cut manufactur­ tablish a lucrative market and to develop a ing costs. Finally, RCA did not anticipate that long-term commitment to cultivating its chosen the market for rented movie tapes would be markets. While engineers at RCA (who worked very large, driving down software costs for VCRs under cross-licenses with Ampex) and Ampex to levels far below costs of the videodisc. saw the potential for developing the technol­ At Ampex, after the first successful VfR ogy, the top managers in both firms decided to (videotape· recorder) design was developed, a focus their video efforts on the broadcast market transistorized VCR was marketed for closed­ -a decidedly limited field. The opportunity circuit use in 1962. Ampex ignored the com­ inherent in the new design synthesis was most petitive efforts of Japanese firms in the field clearly perceived by the Japanese firms- Sony, since Ampex then accounted for 80 percent of NC, and Matsushita. It is these three com­ all television recorders in use throughout the panies that have dominated the home video world and felt well-positioned to extend its market since 1957. dominant share into the consumer market Mter the failure of RCA to be the first to (Business Week, 1967, p. 167). Ampex felt no develop a videotape recorder, it scrapped its threat in 1962 when Sony demonstrated the VCR designs and worked under cross-licensing first fully-transistorized VCR with a two-head with Ampex. However, RCA's attention to the helical scan system, for it thought the Sony VCR field was sporadic; senior corporate execu­ design would never succeed commercially tives were instead preoccupied with challenges (Lyons, 1976, p. 203). However, Sony's design by Zenith and other firms in the area of televi­ was successful. Later, when Sony Corporation sion receiver manufacture. At the same time, Vice President Shigemi Nakaro claimed in 1970 electronic computers were becoming a big in­ that Sony would soon be marketing a video sys­ dustry and caught RCA by surprise. Conse­ tem at $350 per player, a price much lower than quently, RCA's management terminated work that of Ampex's model, managers of American on applications of videorecording in 1958. It companies (including Ampex) charged Sony was not until the early 1970s that RCA again with making idle claims (Forbes, 1970, p. 13). attempted, abortively, to innovate VCR design So rather than responding to foreign threats, with its SelectaVision, a product which became Ampex made an effort to reduce dependence on a commercial failure (Cusumano and VfR revenues, and top priority was given to Rosenbloom, 1987, p. 55). RCA's decision to assuring continued dominance in the studio market videodiscs with SelectaVision not only equipment market rather than the video broad­ turned out to be a $1 billion dollar mistake­ casting field. including R&D costs, operating losses, and the Leadership provided by general managers eventual writeoff- but forfeited any chance for is essential to a corporation's achieving consis­ RCA to cash in on manufacturing profits from tent direction over a lengthy period of develop­ the VCR boom (Verespej, 1986, p. 32). As it ment. In America, top management direction

6 has all too often been lacking or inconsistent it decided to show its machine to two of its over time. Clarity of the commitment by Japa­ Japanese competitors-Matsushita and NC­ nese firms to pursue the potential consumer in the hope that they would adopt it as a com­ market, however, shaped critical choices among mon standard for the market. Both competitors uncertain technical alternatives. Because of studied the machine, made recommendations this commitment the Japanese did not pursue for improvement or change, and eventually random "breakthrough" technology as did some agreed to adopt the format. The Oriental wis­ of their American counterparts. Sony, in par­ dom involved in consolidating the marketplace ticular, rapidly became the leader in the develop­ by standardizing the equipment to make it ment of VCR technology for the mass market, interchangeable meant that the in-fighting for Sony had always thought of the VCR as a among manufacturers would not result in con­ ·potential consumer product. It was not only a fusion about what they were selling. This is a simple time-saving device for people "on the lesson which American manufacturers have yet go" but represented "defiance against [pro-­ to learn: winner-take-all fights have left the gramming] tyranny." In other words, Sony consumer with much outdated equipment over thought that the customer should be able to the years. On the other hand, the Japanese have watch what he'd like to, when he'd like to. learned that aggressive coexistence can make Sony's efforts in the manufacture of the VCR everybody better off (Robinson, 1974, p. 259). were consistent with its strategic planning: to Collaborative efforts among the Japanese have attract the consumer market the VCR had to be resulted in many other technological improve­ made as reliable as possible, compact in size, ments, including the development of azimuth and less expensive. Thus, in contrast to the on­ recording, color advances in tape making, inte­ again, off-again efforts in VCR development by grated circuits, and servo-mechanisms. Sony's the Americans, the Japanese's progress was next generation of video machines was the steady and incremental. product of long, collaborative efforts guided by patience until each specification was met. Marketing The VCR Efforts by Matsushita and NC to cultivate the consumer field have also been substantial. As Sony strived to seek the "ultimate" Matsushita, known for its lines under such machine for the consumer market, technologi­ names as Panasonic, Quasar, and Technics, has cal improvements continued. Iron oxide gave a company stategy of making product innova­ way to a finer, more sensitive magnetic powder tions cheaper and more affordable for the home on the tape. Micromanufacturing processes market. NC made its impact on the market by allowed for a smaller recording head. A new producing the VHS, or video home system, in tape loading system called U-loading also was response to the consumer's need for a longer developed. recording time on the tape than the one hour In 1969, all these advances helped pro­ provided by Sony's Betamax. Consumer re­ duce the Sony U-matic, which was the first sponse to the longer playing time was extremely videocasette recorder to reach the mass market. favorable. Within a few years after the VHS However, before the U-matic was formally in­ introduction, it had become the standard for troduced, Sony took an unprecedented step. over 80 percent of all VCR installations world­ Sony realized that success depended largely on wide, outselling Betamax by three to one familiarizing the consumer with the VCR and (Much, 1984, p. 51). emphasizing its easy use so as not to "intimidate" Ampex, in the meantime, had concen­ those who were technologically unsophis­ trated its efforts solely on the broadcast field­ ticated. But at this time, other Japanese com­ a strategy which led to problems. As a profes­ panies were also working hard at different VCR sional company used to dealing with highly models. Sony feared that if all companies were knowledgeable buyers, Ampex was unaccus­ to come up with incompatible formats, the tomed to marketing a product to a technologi­ consumer would recoil in confusion. Therefore, cally unsophisticated consumer base. When

7 Ampex tried to target the education market, it specific markets and the conviction as to what found a market unfamiliar with the new video­ will sell, rather than what existing markets tape technology. In addition, in the business­ already demand. As a result, Japanese firms are to-business sales market, product specifications less likely to suffer from "marketing myopia" or are often tailored to an account's specific needs. to become late market entries, because the As a result, in the professional broadcast field, focus of their efforts is on creating demand, Ampex had often dealt with customers who rather than responding to it. were not afraid to voice their ideas on what The Japanese also have a system of "learn­ features should be changed or added to exist­ ing by trying." Whereas American firms worry ing systems they were buying. Consequently, about marketing the "perfect" product and the addition of extra features and mod­ focus too much on product features rather than ifications was making Ampex's VCR price rise, product reliability, Japanese firms focus on rather than fall, thelongeritwason the market­ quality manufacturing and add features sug­ which put it at a competitive disadvantage. gested by market feedback. The Japanese firms Furthermore, although Ampex's machines had flooded the market with a series ofVCRs, learn­ the extra features, their quality suffered from ing from each error or success. At Sony the first poor manufacturing. For example, Ampex's machine developed was the SV-100, which · VCRs were heavier than the Japanese models turned out to be too large and costly for its cus­ and their tape guide system was erratic, so that tomers. Next, Sony developed a series of smaller programs recorded on one machine couldn't and I_ess expensive models: first, the PV-100, a necessarily be played back on another. What is transistorized, helical scanning machine; next more, the Ampex machines developed a reputa­ the EV (educational video) series that used tion for breaking down often (Lardner, p. 70). In one-inch-wide rather than two-inch-wide tape; the end, although the Sony VCRs didn't have and finally in 1965 the CV-2000, celebrated as all the "bells and whistles" offered on the Ampex the world's first "home videocorder." machines, consumers felt the Sony machines were more reliable and convenient. Conclusion Professor Harvey Brooks of Harvard Uni­ Learning By Trying versity has offered an interesting perspective Whereas many American firms tend to re­ on Japanese creativity: spond to demand forces through a strategy Although Japanese success in recent years has been based on adaptation of based on forecasts and demand analysis, Japa­ Western, mainly American, technol­ nese firms set out a clear strategy of creating ogy, and on the capacity to commer­ demand. This practice stems partially from a cialize it more rapidly than its com­ Japanese mistrust of market research. Before petitors, it would be wrong to the Sony Walkman emerged on the scene, mar­ conclude from this that the Japanese are mere imitators who, once they ket research had shown that consumers would have attained to the world state-of­ not be interested in buying a tape cassette the-art in a field, will not continue to player that could not record (Johansson and move forward the frontiers of technol­ Nonaka, 1987, p. 16). The stunning success of ogy. On the contrary, successful imi­ the Walkman has since shown this research to tation, far from being symptomatic of lack of originality as used to be be mistaken. As Akio Morita, one of Sony's thought, is the first step of learning to founders, proclaimed in a 1980 interview, "You be creative. It may be only those who can't research a market for a product that try continually to reinvent the wheel doesn't exist" (Cusumano and Rosenbloom, that will lose out in the innovative 1987, p. 56). This mistrust of marketing research race (Brooks, 1983, p.17). has led Japanese firms to apply "high technol­ In other words, the process of creation tends to ogy" to the consumer market by developing include a large element of"copying." The auto­ innovative products based on ambitious but mobile was not called a horseless carriage for

8 nothing. The automobile incorporates some try holds the decided superiority in the manu­ basic principles of the horseless carriage; yet facture of consumer goods looms on the horizon. no one would classify or denigrate the inven­ New innovations such as ACTV (an interactive tors of the automobile as" copiers." In the same television system), high resolution television, manner the current VCR has as much in com­ freeze frame options, and digital transmission mon with the VCR created in the '50s as a 747 are just a few of the new concepts currently jet has with Wilbur and Orville Wright's air­ being refined and developed. One thing remains plane. Both share a common purpose, enter­ clear. The Japanese have managed to do quite tainment or transportation, but both are foreign well for themselves in closing the supposed to their ancestors in terms of appearance and "creativity gap," and the United States will no technological sophistication. longer be able to take refuge in its claim of crea­ The time to berate the Japanese as mere tive superiority. In the decades to come, the copiers may have existed in the past. But any United States will have to muster every ounce current speculation that the Japanese will be of its entrepreneurial spirit, risk-taking ability, unable to hold on to their competitive edge in and technological know-how in order to remain the field of manufacture is misguided and un­ competitive- because the Japanese are just founded. The day of determining which coun- getting started.

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