Amending America Exhibit Shows How Changes in the Constitution Affect the Way Our Democracy Works
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Lyman Trumbull: Author of the Thirteenth Amendment, Author of the Civil Rights Act, and the First Second Amendment Lawyer
KOPEL (1117–1192).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/16 4:20 PM Lyman Trumbull: Author of the Thirteenth Amendment, Author of the Civil Rights Act, and the First Second Amendment Lawyer David B. Kopel* This Article provides the first legal biography of lawyer and Senator Lyman Trumbull, one of the most important lawyers and politicians of the nineteenth century. Early in his career, as the leading anti-slavery lawyer in Illinois in the 1830s, he won the cases constricting and then abolishing slavery in that state; six decades later, Trumbull represented imprisoned labor leader Eugene Debs in the Supreme Court, and wrote the Populist Party platform. In between, Trumbull helped found the Republican Party, and served three U.S. Senate terms, chairing the judiciary committee. One of the greatest leaders of America’s “Second Founding,” Trumbull wrote the Thirteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act, and the Freedmen’s Bureau Act. The latter two were expressly intended to protect the Second Amendment rights of former slaves. Another Trumbull law, the Second Confiscation Act, was the first federal statute to providing for arming freedmen. After leaving the Senate, Trumbull continued his fight for arms rights for workingmen, bringing Presser v. Illinois to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1886, and Dunne v. Illinois to the Illinois Supreme Court in 1879. His 1894 Populist Party platform was a fiery affirmation of Second Amendment principles. In the decades following the end of President James Madison’s Administration in 1817, no American lawyer or legislator did as much as Trumbull in defense of Second Amendment. -
Hearing on the Equal Rights Amendment
Written Statement of Elizabeth Price Foley Professor of Law Florida International University College of Law Hearing on the Equal Rights Amendment Committee on the Judiciary U.S. House of Representatives April 30, 2019 Chairman Nadler, Ranking Member Collins, and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the procedures for ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA"). I am a tenured, full Professor of Law at Florida International University College of Law, a public law school located in Miami, where I teach constitutional law. I also serve Of Counsel with the Washington, D.C. office of BakerHostetler, LLP, where I practice constitutional and appellate law. I. Background on Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment An Equal Rights Amendment was first proposed in 1921 but did not receive approval of the requisite two-thirds supermajority of the House and Senate until March 22, 1972. The text of the proposed amendment reads as follows: Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.1 The Joint Resolution proposing the ERA contained a preamble limiting the allowed period of ratification to seven years: Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress.2 The seven-year ratification period expired on March 22, 1979. -
Thirteenth Amendment A
University of Cincinnati College of Law University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications Faculty Articles and Other Publications College of Law Faculty Scholarship 2003 Stopping Time: The rP o-Slavery and 'Irrevocable' Thirteenth Amendment A. Christopher Bryant University of Cincinnati College of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Legal History, Theory and Process Commons Recommended Citation Bryant, A. Christopher, "Stopping Time: The rP o-Slavery and 'Irrevocable' Thirteenth Amendment" (2003). Faculty Articles and Other Publications. Paper 63. http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs/63 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law Faculty Scholarship at University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles and Other Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact [email protected]. STOPPING TIME: THE PRO-SLAVERY AND "IRREVOCABLE" THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT • A. CHRISTOPHER BRYANT I. EXTRALEGAL AUTHORITY AND THE CREATION OF ARTICLE V ...................................... 505 II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE CORWIN AMENDMENT .......................................................... 512 III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CORWIN AMENDMENT ......................................................... 520 A. Debate in -
Kyvig on Vorenberg, 'Final Freedom: the Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment'
H-Law Kyvig on Vorenberg, 'Final Freedom: The Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment' Review published on Thursday, August 1, 2002 Michael Vorenberg. Final Freedom: The Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. xviii + 305 pp. $25.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-521-65267-4. Reviewed by David E. Kyvig (Department of History, Northern Illinois University) Published on H- Law (August, 2002) Freeing the Constitution from Slavery Freeing the Constitution from Slavery The most significant departure from the original design of the 1787 United States Constitution occurred in 1865 with the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery. This most transformative of all constitutional amendments has, nevertheless, received far less attention than it deserves. Civil War historians preoccupied with the ongoing struggle between North and South have tended to focus on the earlier and strategically vital, if more limited and legally less important, Emancipation Proclamations. Constitutional historians concerned with grasping the full measure of the long-term implications and wide-ranging consequences of the 1860s upheaval have been drawn to the more complex Fourteenth Amendment, ratified three years later at the peak of Radical Reconstruction. Michael Vorenberg's fine and valuable book,Final Freedom, redresses these oversights by restoring attention to the Thirteenth Amendment, providing a careful and thorough accounting of its adoption, and offering valuable insight into why it marked a pivotal moment in formal constitutional development. Vorenberg, an assistant professor of history at Brown University, begins with the obvious but essential fact that the Emancipation Proclamations did not free a single slave. -
The Transformative Significance of the School Prayer Decisions
Pepperdine Law Review Volume 38 Issue 4 Article 1 4-20-2011 Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the School Prayer Decisions Steven D. Smith Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr Part of the First Amendment Commons Recommended Citation Steven D. Smith Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the School Prayer Decisions, 38 Pepp. L. Rev. Iss. 4 (2011) Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol38/iss4/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]. Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the School Prayer Decisions Steven D. Smith* I. INTRODUCTION II. CONTINGENCIES AND UNCERTAINTIES A. The Conclusion: Engel B. The Explanation: Schempp C. Unanswered Questions III. A CRAZY-QUILT, QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION A. The PerennialContenders B. Incompatible but (Sometimes) Indistinguishable C. Patterns ofDominance? D. The Conceptions as Quasi-Constitutional E. The Virtues of Quasi-Constitutionalism 1. Quasi-Constitutionalism as the Default Position 2. The Positive Advantages of Quasi-Constitutionalism F. On the Eve of the School PrayerDecisions IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS A. How the Decisions Transformed ConstitutionalDoctrine 1. Secularism as the Doctrinal "Test" 2. The Significance of the Public Schools 3. The Importance of Prayer B. Why the Significance of the School PrayerDecisions Went Largely Unnoticed (by Their Supporters) V. TRANSFORMATIONS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS A. -
The Role of Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making
Indiana Law Journal Volume 68 Issue 2 Article 3 Spring 1993 The Role of Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making Scott C. Idleman Indiana University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the Religion Law Commons Recommended Citation Idleman, Scott C. (1993) "The Role of Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 68 : Iss. 2 , Article 3. Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol68/iss2/3 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Role of Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making SCOTT C. IDLEMAN* [U]nless people believe in the law, unless they attach a universal and ultimate meaning to it, unless they see it and judge it in terms of a transcendent truth, nothing will happen. The law will not work-it will be dead.' INTRODUCTION It is virtually axiomatic today that judges should not advert to religious values when deciding cases,2 unless those cases explicitly involve religion.' In part because of historical and constitutional concerns and in * J.DJM.P.A. Candidate, 1993, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.S., 1989, Cornell University. 1. HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 74 (1974). 2. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 239 (1988); Stephen L. -
From John F. Kennedy's 1960 Campaign Speech to Christian
NYLS Law Review Vols. 22-63 (1976-2019) Volume 53 Issue 4 Faculty Presentation Day Article 1 January 2008 From John F. Kennedy’s 1960 Campaign Speech to Christian Supremacy: Religion in Modern Presidential Politics Stephen A. Newman New York Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Legal History Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Religion Law Commons Recommended Citation Stephen A. Newman, From John F. Kennedy’s 1960 Campaign Speech to Christian Supremacy: Religion in Modern Presidential Politics, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 691 (2008-2009). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. VOLUME 53 | 2008/09 STEPHEN A. NEWMAN From John F. Kennedy’s 1960 Campaign Speech to Christian Supremacy: Religion in Modern Presidential Politics ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Stephen A. Newman is a professor of law at New York Law School. The author would like to thank Joseph Molinari of the New York Law School library for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article. 691 At a time when we see around the world the violent consequences of the assumption of religious authority by government, Americans may count themselves fortunate: Our regard for constitutional boundaries has protected us from similar travails, while allowing private religious exercise to flourish. The well-known statement that “[w]e are a religious people,” has proved true. -
Nonestablishment, Standing, and the Soft Constitution
St. John's Law Review Volume 85 Number 2 Volume 85, Spring 2011, Number 2 Article 2 April 2014 Nonestablishment, Standing, and the Soft Constitution Steven D. Smith Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview Recommended Citation Smith, Steven D. (2011) "Nonestablishment, Standing, and the Soft Constitution," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 85 : No. 2 , Article 2. Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol85/iss2/2 This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NONESTABLISHMENT, STANDING, AND THE SOFT CONSTITUTION STEVEN D. SMITHt It is not usual for legal scholars working in establishment clause jurisprudence-and it is especially not usual for me-to say nice things about what the Supreme Court has done to the subject. But that is what I mean to do today. I don't want to be too agreeable or cheerful, though, so this time, although commending the Court, I am going to take issue with the commentators. More specifically, I want to praise a recent development that most commentators seem to deplore-namely, the Court's recent practice of using the slightly disreputable doctrine of standing as a device to avoid deciding Establishment Clause cases on the merits. Thus, in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,' the Court used a dubious "prudential" standing doctrine to avoid deciding whether the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance were unconstitutional. -
The Border South and the Secession Crisis, 1859-1861 Michael Dudley Robinson Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College
Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 2013 Fulcrum of the Union: The Border South and the Secession Crisis, 1859-1861 Michael Dudley Robinson Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Robinson, Michael Dudley, "Fulcrum of the Union: The Border South and the Secession Crisis, 1859-1861" (2013). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 894. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/894 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please [email protected]. FULCRUM OF THE UNION: THE BORDER SOUTH AND THE SECESSION CRISIS, 1859- 1861 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College In partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of History by Michael Dudley Robinson B.S. North Carolina State University, 2001 M.A. University of North Carolina – Wilmington, 2007 May 2013 For Katherine ii Acknowledgements Throughout the long process of turning a few preliminary thoughts about the secession crisis and the Border South into a finished product, many people have provided assistance, encouragement, and inspiration. The staffs at several libraries and archives helped me to locate items and offered suggestions about collections that otherwise would have gone unnoticed. I would especially like to thank Lucas R. -
Secular State, Religious People— the American Model
THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE UNIVERSITY SECULAR STATE, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE— THE AMERICAN MODEL BY WILLIAM MARTIN HARRY AND HAZEL CHAVANNE SENIOR FELLOW IN RELIGION AND PUBLIC POLICY JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE UNIVERSITY APRIL 2006 Secular State, Religious People—The American Model THIS PAPER WAS ADAPTED FROM PRESENTATIONS MADE BY THE AUTHOR AT THE INAUGURAL CONFERENCE OF THE BONIUK CENTER FOR THE STUDY AND ADVANCEMENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AT RICE UNIVERSITY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2005, AND AS THE HOWARD MAHAN LECTURE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH ALABAMA, MOBILE, FEBRUARY 9, 2006. THE RESEARCH AND VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THESE PAPERS ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL RESEARCHER, AND DOES NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, © 2006 BY THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY OF RICE UNIVERSITY THIS MATERIAL MAY BE QUOTED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION, PROVIDED APPROPRIATE CREDIT IS GIVEN TO THE AUTHOR AND THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY. 2 Secular State, Religious People—The American Model Introduction Almost everywhere in the world where people are at war, religion plays a role, usually a negative one. In this country, religion contributes to a growing and disturbing polarization. Still, though not perfect in its record of religious tolerance, America has been remarkable in its success at avoiding faith-flavored wars and, overall, at granting freedom to a wide variety of religious expressions and practices over the past two centuries and a little more. That is a notable achievement in human history. -
The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: a Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 Case W
Notre Dame Law School NDLScholarship Journal Articles Publications 1987 The oN Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself Gerard V. Bradley Notre Dame Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship Recommended Citation Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 674 (1986-1987). Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/67 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE NO RELIGIOUS TEST CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTION OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: A MACHINE THAT HAS GONE OF ITSELF* Gerard V. Bradley** The article VI ban on religious tests for federal offices is the sole provision on the topic of religion in the original Constitution. Since the seminal Everson decision in 1947 the courts and commentators have labored mightily to craft a thoroughgoing constitutionalphilosophy of church and state, in recognition of the profoundly prob- lematic relationship between religion and law in our society. Yet none has looked carefully at the test clause for guidance. This Article does just that. Professor Bradley argues that notwithstanding the complete absence of attention to article VI, its story tells us all we need to know about the appropriateconstitutional philosophy of religion: there is none. -
The Counter Revolution of 1861 and the Cause of Conflict
The counter revolution of 1861 and the cause of conflict By: Haneen Amer Lincoln’s Election ● 1860; Lincoln elected as first republican president ● Southern states immediately began to secede from union ● Lincoln strongly supported in North and Midwest ● Won majority of electoral votes but only 40% overall vote ● Stated that he didn’t plan to interfere with existing slavery in the US ● Supported Corwin Amendment Southern Succession ❏ South convinced that Lincoln would abolish slavery ● The South was rural, agricultural society - needed people to work fields on farms and plantations - used slaves as labor since seventeenth century; considered them essential to economy economy ● North more industrialized - Didn’t have as much farmland - Relied on immigrant-based factory labor ❏ Seven states seceded from Union before Lincoln’s inauguration, and four others later joined them as well First states to secede: 1. South Carolina 2. Mississippi 3. Florida 4. Alabama 5. Georgia 6. Louissianna 7. Texas Southern Succession Formed Confederacy in 1861 Reasons for succession: ● To preserve and keep slavery ● Establish Southern autonomy (wanted to govern itself) from the U.S. federal government ● Ensure sovereignty of individual Southern states before a central government 1. Southern Succession Drafted provisional constitution (took four days) that: ● strengthened position of individual states in respect to federal government ● Guaranteed protection of slavery and interstate slave trade (no foreign slave trade) States that seceded later: 1. Virginia 2. Arkansas 3. North Carolina 4. Tennessee Holding on to the border states ❏ The border states were slave states that did not join confederacy ❏ These states aided Union via the advantage in troops, factories, and money ● These states were: 1.