Journal of European Integration History Revue D

REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION

edited by the Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne

2003, Volume 9, Number 2 The Hague Summit of 1969

The Liaison Committee of Historians came into being in 1982 as a result of an important international symposium that the Commission had organized in Luxembourg to launch historical research on Euro- pean integration. The committee is composed of historians of the European Union member countries who work on contemporary history. The Liaison Committee: – gathers and conveys information about work on European history after the Second World War; – advises the European Union on research projects concerning contemporary European history. Thus, the Liaison Committee was commissioned to make publicly available the archives of the Community institutions; – enables researchers to make better use of the archival sources; – promotes research meetings to get an update of work in progress and to stimulate new research: seven research conferences have been organized and their proceedings published. The Journal of European Integration History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration is in line with the preoccupations of the Liaison Committee. Being the ﬁrst history journal to deal exclusively with the history of European Integration, the Journal offers the increasing number of young historians devoting their research to contemporary Europe, a permanent forum. The Liaison Committee is supported by the European Commission, but works completely independ- ently and according to historians’ critical method.

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Le Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission des Communautés européennes s’est constitué en 1982 à la suite d’un grand colloque que la Commis- sion avait organisé à Luxembourg pour lancer la recherche historique sur la construction européenne. Il regroupe des professeurs d’université des pays membres de l’Union européenne, spé- cialistes d’histoire contemporaine. Le Groupe de liaison a pour mission: – de diffuser l’information sur les travaux portant sur l’histoire de l’Europe après la Seconde Guerre mondiale; – de conseiller l’Union européenne sur les actions scientifiques à entreprendre avec son appui; ainsi le Groupe de liaison a assuré une mission concernant la mise à la disposition du public des archives des institutions communautaires; – d’aider à une meilleure utilisation par les chercheurs des moyens de recherche mis à leur disposition (archives, sources orales...); – d’encourager des rencontres scientifiques afin de faire le point sur les connaissances acquises et de susciter de nouvelles recherches: sept grands colloques ont été organisés et leurs actes publiés. L’édition du Journal of European Integration History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration se situe dans le droit fil des préoccupati- ons du Groupe de liaison. Première revue d’histoire à se consacrer exclusivement à l’histoire de la construction européenne, le Journal se propose de fournir un forum permanent au nombre crois- sant de jeunes historiens vouant leurs recherches à l’Europe contemporaine. Le Groupe de liaison bénéficie du soutien de la Commission européenne. Ses colloques et publications se font en toute indépendance et conformément à la méthode critique qui est celle des historiens.

JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORY

REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION

2003, Volume 9, Number 2 Jan VAN DER HARST, coordinator

Jan VAN DER HARST The 1969 Hague Summit: a New Start for Europe?...... 5 N. Piers LUDLOW An Opportunity or a Threat? The European Commission and The Hague Council of December 1969...... 11 Anjo HARRYVAN and Jan VAN DER HARST Swan Song or Cock Crow? The Netherlands and the Hague Conference of December 1969 ...... 27 Jérôme WILSON Négocier la relance européenne: les Belges et le sommet de La Haye...... 41 Claudia HIEPEL In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator. Germany and the Hague Summit Conference 1969...... 62 Marie-Thérèse BITSCH Le sommet de La Haye. L’initiative française, ses finalités et ses limites ...... 83 Maria Eleonora GUASCONI Italy and the Hague Conference of December 1969 ...... 101 Alan S. MILWARD The Hague Conference of 1969 and the United Kingdom’s Accession to the European Economic Community ...... 117 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen ...... 127 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen...... 147 Contributors - Auteurs - Autoren ...... 157 Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher ...... 159

Editorial notice Articles for inclusion in this journal may be submitted at any time. The editorial board will then arrange for the article to be refereed. Articles should not be longer than 6000 words, footnotes included. They may be in English, French or German. Articles submitted to the Journal should be original contributions and not be submitted to any other publication at the same time as to the Journal of European Integration History. Authors should retain a copy of their article. The publisher and editors cannot accept responsibility for loss of or damage to authors’ typescripts or disks. The accuracy of, and views expressed in articles and reviews are the sole responsibility of the authors. Authors should ensure that typescripts conform with the journal style. Prospective contributors should obtain further guidelines from the Editorial Secretariat. Articles, reviews, communications relating to articles and books for review should be sent to the Editorial Secretariat.

Citation The Journal of European Integration History may be cited as follows: JEIH, (Year)/(Number), (Page).

ISSN 0947-9511 © 2003 NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden and the Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne. Printed in Germany. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of the publishers.

5 The 1969 Hague Summit: a New Start for Europe?

by Jan van der Harst

It was only within a stone’s throw from the place where I lived that the Hague summit of December 1969 took place. The event in the nearby Ridderzaal brought together the most distinguished political leaders at a crucial moment in post-war European development. Since then, ‘The Hague’ has been portrayed as a major breakthrough and as the most successful European conference since Messina 1955, heralding UK membership and extending EC responsibilities to foreign and monetary affairs. All this failed to impress the 11-year-old boy who I was at that time. Worse still, the conference totally escaped my attention, as did another remarkable event, which occurred simultaneously, the biggest federalist demonstration ever held. Close to the venue of the European Council – avant la lettre – meeting a group of about one thousand European federalists marched through the centre of The Hague, clashing with the police and shouting for the need to revitalise Europe after years of stagnation. To attract attention to their cause, they carried a cofﬁn with them: Europe was dead and waited for the resurrection which only the government leaders could provide. In this special issue on the 1969 Hague summit an attempt is made towards answering the question to what extent the protagonists Willy Brandt, Piet De Jong, Gaston Eyskens, Georges Pompidou, Mariano Rumor and Pierre Werner have been capable of realising such a far-reaching European re-launch after the ill-fated De Gaulle period. Was The Hague really a ‘watershed’ or ‘turning-point’ in post-war European history, as it has been termed by several authors,1 or is this an overrated conclusion? What is the true signiﬁcance of The Hague, both in the short and in the longer term? In the historical literature so far only scant efforts have been made towards answering these questions.2 In this volume, historians from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands have investigated their respective government’s position concerning The Hague, before, during and immediately after the two-day conference. In addition, the policies of the European Commission and the United Kingdom have been scrutinised, the former as an active participant at the meeting – although only present on the second day – the latter still waiting in the wings. For mainly practical reasons we have not included all member states and applicant countries involved in the process. Luxembourg is excluded here, because on many issues –

1. E.g. H. SIMONIAN, The Privileged Partnership: Franco-German Relations in the European Community, 1969-1984, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985, p.349; D. ARMSTRONG, L. LORNA and J. REDMOND, From Versailles to Maastricht. International Organisation in the Twentieth Century, Macmillan, London, 1996, p.164. 2. One of the rare exceptions is M.-T. BITSCH, Le sommet de la Haye. La mise en route de la relance de 1969, in: W. LOTH (ed.), Crises and Compromises: the European Project, 1963-1969, Nomos, Baden Baden, 2001, pp.539-565. In the conclusions of this article, the author analyses the importance of the summit by making a comparison between Messina 1955 and The Hague 1969.

6 by Jan van der Harst not all – its delegation took a position similar to that of Belgium (see also the contribution by Jérôme Wilson). This is not to say that the Luxembourg position on The Hague is irrelevant, as will be shown later. Of the applicant countries, only Britain bears a part in this volume (Alan S. Milward’s contribution), first and foremost because it was exactly this ‘outsider’ that attracted the bulk of attention during the summit’s deliberations. Talking about EC enlargement basically meant talking about the UK, rather than Denmark, Ireland or Norway. Having said that, the Hague story can never be complete without taking into account also the positions of the other three applicants. We hope that this gauntlet will be taken up soon by those historians working on the period and topic in question. During a small workshop in Groningen held in September 2002,3 the contributors to the present volume convened and discussed the central issues to be dealt with. They agreed that studying The Hague 1969 is useful and relevant for reasons of historical evidence and analytical verification, rather than the trivial personal motive I mentioned in the opening lines of this introduction. Many questions arose. Was The Hague really so significant as has been depicted in most textbooks on European integration?4 And if the conference was successful, how could this be explained? Was its impact visible and tangible at once or only in retrospect? The lifting of the 30-year-embargo for most government archives has certainly helped us in our attempt to answer these questions. The importance of the summit could be analysed with the help of four interpretations, each giving a different assessment of the results booked: 1. The Hague’s significance is overrated because some crucial decisions furthering development in European integration had been taken at an earlier stage, in the course of the period 1958-1968. Especially the year 1968 was important, in that it brought the complete removal of EEC internal customs duties, the establishment of a common external tariff and acceptance of a common agricultural policy. These were exactly the issues and areas dominating the EC during the next decades to come. The definite regulation on the financing of agriculture, concluded soon after the Hague summit, was important but basically an indispensable corollary to decisions taken the year before.5

3. With thanks to prof. L.W. Gormley for making this workshop possible. 4. See e.g. D. DINAN, Ever closer Union. An Introduction to the European Community, Macmillan, London, 1994, p.73; S. GEORGE, Politics and Policy in the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, p.11; P. GERBET, La construction de l’Europe, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1983, pp. 352-356; A.M. EL-AGRAA, The European Union. History, Institutions, Economics and Policies, Prentice Hall Europe, London, 1998, pp.545-546. 5. A similar argument can be found in: A. MORAVCSIK, The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to Maastricht, UCL Press, London, 1998. On p.312 Moravcsik notes: “Agreements on permanent CAP financing and British membership at The Hague are often seen as beginning of a new era, but […] they were, in fact, the final steps in the consolidation of a […] bargain that had taken over a decade to negotiate”. For an apt analysis of the early CAP years (and a critical review of Moravcsik’s interpretation of 1960s European integration developments), see: A.C. LAURING-KNUDSEN, Defining the Policies of a Common Agricultural Policy. A Histori- cal Study, PhD thesis EUI Florence, 2001.

by Jan van der Harst 7

2. The Hague was a failure, both the conference itself and its aftermath, because the government leaders proved unable to reach consensus on a concrete date for enlargement, just as they failed to provide a real stimulus towards political and monetary co-operation. The terms of the final communiqué were distinctly vague, as were also the summit’s institutional outcomes. The EPC, eventually resulting from the preparatory talks carried out by the Davignon committee, turned into a low-key forum for co-ordination of foreign policies and never developed into a credible player in the global arena. The EMU plan, developed by Werner, was even shelved in the course of the 1970s, and was only to be revitalised by Jacques Delors at the end of the 1980s. By then, the renowned ‘spirit of The Hague’ had faded into the twilight zone. Likewise, institutional reforms remained forthcoming: the decision on holding direct elections for the European Parliament was postponed for an ‘indefinite’ period. Finally, British entrance, indirectly resulting from the conference, was to lead to years of stagnation and haggling over this country’s budget contribution. 3. The Hague was a success, although not an instant one, its significance became clear only in the aftermath of the summit. The conclusions of the presidency had indeed appeared vague and evasive, and there was every reason for participants and observers to feel disappointed, but soon afterwards and as an immediate result of the summit, new developments evolved which would change the face of the entire EC. Late in December 1969 already, the Brussels Council meeting managed to break the financial stalemate, which had thwarted Community development for such a long time, even having been co-responsible for the empty-chair crisis of 1965. Also on this occasion, provisions were made for granting budgetary powers to the European Parliament, a real breakthrough after years of dawdling over this issue. The enlargement negotiations with Britain and the other three applicants started in the spring of 1970 and led to an EC of nine members in 1973. And the Davignon and Werner committees soon succeeded in developing blueprints for co-operation in foreign and monetary policies, both ‘virgin territories’ until then. In particular the creation of EPC was – after the Fouchet stalemate of the 1960s – hailed as a major result. 4. The Hague was a success, but only in the short-, not in the longer-run. The definite regulation of CAP financing was welcomed by the six member-countries of that time, but it was also a potential time bomb, seen in the light of future developments. The obtaining of own resources and the fixing of the financial outlay, prepared in The Hague and concluded in Brussels, were costly solutions, putting a heavy strain on the donor countries, particularly on Britain when it entered the Community in 1973. For Edward Heath, eager to join the EC, this was just acceptable, but later, under his successors Harold Wilson and Margaret Thatcher, the issue of the budget contribution became highly contentious and eventually resulted in the latter’s ‘I want my money back’ litanies and a long-running impasse in European integration.

8 by Jan van der Harst

Looking at the seven contributions to this volume, all four of the above interpretations have an element of validity in them. The start of the customs union and the acceptance of CAP in 1968 were necessary precursors for further EC development. Moreover, all the authors emphasise the disappointment among most of the actors concerning the concrete results booked in The Hague. Especially the Dutch and Italian delegations, as well as the Commission, threw doubts upon the immediate relevance and practicability of the summit’s outcomes. France and Belgium seemed more pleased with the wordings used in the final communiqué, while Germany took up a position in between. British observers were understandably puzzled by the lack of a formalised date needed for the start of the enlargement negotiations. But, even if the summit itself left room for doubts, it is also true that the immediate aftermath was promising and the medium-term impact substantial. Three weeks after The Hague, at the Brussels Council meeting of 21 and 22 December, a solution was found for the problems of agricultural financing (by introduction of a system based on 1% of national VAT receipts), the EC’s own resources, as well as the long-debated budgetary powers of the European Parliament. In the spring of 1970, a date was fixed for the start of the enlargement negotiations and the Davignon and Werner committees soon succeeded in producing reports on EPC and EMU. In line with interpretation number three, The Hague’s final communiqué was still a rather shaky construction, but it had the potential of delivering results in the medium term, and this potential was used. Having said that, one should not neglect the longer-range implications, as demonstrated by Milward’s contribution on Britain. The decisions taken at The Hague and Brussels concerning agricultural financing encumbered the EC with a heavy mortgage, which became particularly onerous during the protracted negotiations on the British budget during the Thatcher years. Was there a clear winner in The Hague? Which country got the best out of the results achieved during and after the summit? Even after perusing the various contributions to the volume, these questions are still difficult to answer. It seems that, in line with the best European traditions, each delegation found something to its liking. As said above, France and Belgium could boast that they reached most of their aims, Paris being particularly happy with the ‘completion’ of the Community, in the form of a secure system of guaranteed financing for agricultural production (see the Marie-Thérèse Bitsch article). Paymaster Germany, as highlighted by Claudia Hiepel, had to make a substantial concession on this score, but, on the other hand, cajoled France into offering the long-awaited opening towards Britain. The German delegation also ensured that monetary integration would not take the form of an open-ended commitment to countries with a less solid financial reputation than the FRG itself. To French and Belgian regret, the implementation of a European reserve fund was postponed and economic integration was to take precedence over progress in the monetary area. The new German leader Willy Brandt was universally admired for his forceful début on the European stage, thereby overshadowing president Pompidou, whose performance in The Hague – also as a debutant – was generally considered disappointing. Chairman the

by Jan van der Harst 9

Netherlands largely shared Germany’s ambitions, strongly emphasising the need for British entrance and slowing the urge for monetary union. From Anjo Harryvan and Jan Van der Harst’s contribution, it appears that interpretation number three (above) particularly applied to the Dutch position. At the end of the meeting Piet De Jong and Joseph Luns proved ambivalent and insecure, but their mood soon changed when the positive after-effects of The Hague became visible, including the granting of new powers to the EP. Italy, as shown by Eleonora Guasconi, scored on the issues of British membership and social policy, but made concessions on agricultural financing. Britain became aware that France no longer blocked enlargement but, as said above, the terms on ‘completion’ were, in the longer perspective, unsatisfactory to London. For the Commission, the obtaining of own resources was a substantial result, but president Jean Rey could not prevent the Hague conference from opening a new episode in the development of ‘summitry’, eventually resulting in the creation of the European Council in 1974. Piers Ludlow rightly concludes that the Commission’s future “did not look like being a rapid advance to wide-ranging political power”. All in all, the summit’s outcome was a package deal with gains and losses for all the parties involved. There could be no talk of an evident, undisputed winner. Yet, if we need to mention one, then we might opt for precisely the member-country not dealt with in this volume. Luxembourg was in favour of completion and enlargement, but cautious – at least more ‘economist’ oriented than neighbour Belgium – as far as monetary union was concerned. Hence, the carefully drafted EMU provisions in the final communiqué were fully compatible with Luxembourg’s ambitions on this score. Moreover, Prime minister Werner was appointed chairman of the prestigious committee charged with developing a plan on economic and monetary union. Although only modestly involved in the discussions with his colleagues, the leader of the smallest country had every reason to look back on the meeting with satisfaction. However, as said above, the definite story on Luxembourg and The Hague has yet to be written.

11 An Opportunity or a Threat? The European Commission and the Hague Council of December 1969

N. Piers Ludlow

The Hague Council communiqué signalled that the European Heads of State and Government looked back on the Community’s first decade of operation with a fair degree of pride. Never before, they speculated, had independent states gone so far in cooperation with one another. Paragraphs five to fourteen, meanwhile, set out an ambitious set of future Community targets spanning all three elements of the broad triptych of achèvement, approfondissement and élargissement that president Pom- pidou had invited his colleagues to discuss.1 If these goals were reached, the Com- munity would truly have completed its initial programme, deepened the level of cooperation attained by opening up new areas of EEC activity and widened its geo- graphic scope by admitting several new member states and concluding commercial arrangements with most of the Western European states that were not yet in a position to join. Given that much of the Community’s past advance had been based on proposals put forward by the European Commission, and that its ambitious new targets would once again require similar Commission activism, the Brussels body might have been expected to view these conclusions as a welcome pat on the back for its earlier work and an exciting invitation to press ahead in its endeavours. The Commission should also, logically, have welcomed the new degree of consensus that the Hague meeting appeared to indicate amongst the EEC member states, since its role, its personnel and its scope of action had all been adversely affected by previous discord amongst the Six national governments. But as this article will show, the Com- mission’s pleasure, anticipation and relief, while genuine, coexisted with a degree of discontent. In part this sprang from what the Heads of State and Government chose not to mention in their final communiqué; more fundamentally, it also reflected the forum and manner in which the Hague conclusions had been drafted and what this demonstrated about the European Community’s gradual institutional evolution.

1. The communiqué is reprinted in full as an annex to European Commission, Troisième Rapport Général sur l’activité des Communautés 1969, European Commission, Brussels, 1970, pp. 520-524.

12 N. Piers Ludlow

Accentuating the positive

The Commission’s pleasure in the outcome of the Hague summit sprang from three main sources. The first of these was the reaffirmation of the Community’s political purpose – or to use the language of the communiqué itself, ‘les finalités politiques’ of European integration. These had all too often been forgotten of late, Jean Rey told the European Parliament, referring no doubt to the way in which EEC negotiations had become dominated by references to narrow national interest (often expressed in purely economic and financial terms) rather than the lofty idealism and esprit communautaire which had seemingly characterised the early stages of the EEC’s existence.2 The Commission had always deplored this trend. Although ready to acknowledge that national interests could and should be pursued through the Community system, the Commission had grown apprehensive about the manner in which Community negotiations from the mid-1960s onwards became ever more dominated by the tactics of ultimatums, linkage, threats and even boycotts. A reaffirmation, by the most senior European gathering possible, of the fact that European integration was a fundamentally political process, of greater long-term significance than the financial or economic impact of the latest agreement struck in Brussels, would act as a valuable brake on this tendency. It was also likely to be of value – although for obvious reasons Rey did not say this quite so explicitly – when the Community stood on the verge of an enlargement process which would almost certainly bring into the EEC a number of states, with Great Britain to the fore, that had long been suspected of having a rather cool attitude towards the long-term political aims of European integration and a much greater interest in the short and medium term tangible economic and financial gains. Future Commission representatives wanting to follow Walter Hallstein’s lead and persuade observers, not to mention participants and would-be participants in the Community process, that fundamentally the EEC was about ‘politics’ and not ‘business’, would now be able to refer to the Hague summit conclusions as well as to the more traditional source, namely the Treaty of Rome preamble.3 A second, and still greater source of satisfaction for the Commission, was the way in which the Hague communiqué mapped out a bold set of new challenges for the integration process. Under the heading of ‘completion’, there were several summit conclusions which gave the Commission particular pleasure. One such was the member states’ willingness (paragraph 5) to complete the Community’s transitional period at midnight of December 31, 1969 and to pass into the definitive stage mapped out by the Treaty from 1970 onwards. This decision was seen as a vindica- tion of the way in which the Commission had kept its nerve, earlier in the year, and resisted strong and numerous calls for the transitional phase to be prolonged and

2. Débats du Parlement européen. Session 1969-1970. Séance du jeudi 11 décembre 1969, pp.165-166. 3. Hallstein cites a slightly less snappy version of this claim in, Europe in the Making, Norton, New York, 1972, p.29.

An Opportunity or a Threat? 13 the 1970 deadline allowed to pass by unobserved.4 Such calls had been justified on the grounds that a Community so at odds with itself and so chronically unable to reach agreement on any significant measures as the EEC of 1969, could not possibly hope to complete its transitional phase on time. The summit communiqué, especially when taken in conjunction with the flurry of Council of minister agreements that both preceded and immediately followed the Heads of Government’s meeting, appeared to demonstrate that the Commission had been right to disregard the Cassandras and press on with the Treaty timetable.5 Equally important was the summit’s recognition that agreement would have to be reached, prior to the year’s end, on the financial regulation establishing how the Community’s ever more costly agricultural policy would be paid for, creating the system of Community own-resources the Commission had long awaited and setting up a higher degree of European Parliamentary control over the EEC budgetary process. (Paragraph 5). This package of measures was not just the outcome of a lengthy and delicate preparation process within the European Commission (although scrutiny of the Commission minutes for 1969 demonstrates that the drafting process had been both time-consuming and divisive); it was also a set of provisions of immense intrinsic and symbolic value to Brussels, which, if agreed upon, would consolidate even further the CAP – very much still the Commission’s flagship policy in 1969 -, would give the Commission a much greater degree of financial independence than it had hitherto enjoyed and would at last bring some tangible reward for the Commission’s long-standing campaign to see some increase in the powers of the European Parliament.6 And, perhaps still more important, the package was a virtual re-run of those proposals which, when submitted in March 1965, had pre- cipitated the most serious crisis of the Community’s twelve year history.7 Given that one of the key problems in 1965 had been that several member states – Germa- ny and Italy most obviously – had not been prepared to accept that the deadline for agreeing to the financial regulation was nearly as sacrosanct and as unbreakable as the French maintained, the recognition by all of those present at the summit that

4. The Commission decision to ignore calls for postponement is in ECHA, COM(69) PV 76, 2e partie, 30.04.1969. The institution’s earlier doubts are clear from COM(69) PV 72, 2e partie, 19-20.03.1969. The Commission was very open about its ambivalence on this issue in the Troisième Rapport Général sur l’activité des Communautés 1969, Commission, Brussels-Luxem- bourg, 1970, pp.15-16. 5. The most important of the Council agreements was that on CAP finance, reached on December 22, 1969. 6. Some indication of the internal Commission debate about this can be gained from ECHA, COM (69) PVs 76, 78, 83, 85 & 86. 7. See e.g. M. SCHÖNWALD, Walter Hallstein and the “Empty Chair” Crisis 1965/6 and M. VAÏSSE, La politique européenne de la France en 1965: pourquoi “la chaise vide”? both in: W. LOTH (ed.), Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2001, pp.157-172 & 193-214.

14 N. Piers Ludlow agreement had to be reached by December 31 was of immense importance and ren- dered much less likely a recurrence of the earlier crisis.8 This was all the more significant in view of the fact that Italy had been hinting strongly, both prior to the conference and at The Hague itself, that it did not feel itself bound by the 1969 deadline.9 French success in persuading Mariano Rumor, the Italian Prime minister, to put his signature to a communiqué including a firm date was thus a welcome development for both Paris and the European Commission. With the summit conclusions binding all of those who would feature in the forthcoming Council mara- thon on the subject, the prospects of agreement being reached on the single most important Commission proposal of 1969, were vastly improved. Rey and his colleagues could not but welcome this development. Also highlighted by the Commission’s president in his speech in Strasbourg – indeed described somewhat improbably as the single most important outcome in terms of achèvement – was the Hague pledge to resolve the ongoing crisis of Euratom.10 This reflected the European Commission’s dissatisfaction with the way in which the 1967 fusion process had not brought together three healthy institutions, but instead had merged the thriving EEC Commission with the seriously ailing, if not moribund, High Authority of the ECSC and the Euratom Commission.11 Any promise of new money, attention, and commitment by the member states to the Atomic Energy Community might bring to an end this highly unsatisfactory state of affairs. Perhaps even more enticing for the Commission than the promises of completion were the vistas opened up by those paragraphs of the Hague communiqué dealing with ‘deepening’.12 One of the recurrent themes of both the Commission’s internal deliberations during the latter half of the 1960s, and its public pronounce- ments had been the desire to find new fields of EEC activity now that the original Community agenda – the establishment of a working customs union and the parallel construction of a CAP – was all but complete.13 After all, a future spent merely maintaining and periodically tinkering with, the existing acquis communautaire, would scarcely justify a bureaucracy the size of the European Commission, nor contain much scope for the type of political engrenage that many in Brussels still

8. For the importance of this German and Italian position in 1965, see N.P. LUDLOW, Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Germany, Italy and The Netherlands and the Outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis, in: Contemporary European History, vol.8, no.2(1999), pp.245-247. 9. Archives Nationales (AN), Pompidou papers, 5AG2/1036, Raimond to Pompidou, 27.11.1969; for Rumor’s comments at The Hague itself, stressing the number of issues that had to be settled alongside the financial regulation, see SGCI archives, Fontainebleau (SGCI), versement 900568, article 386, Ministre des Affaires étrangères note, MU/SF No.19 col/CE, 06.12.1969. 10. Débats du Parlement européen. Session 1969-1970. Séance du jeudi 11 décembre 1969, pp.165-167. 11. See the section on ‘la crise de l’Euratom’ in: Deuxième Rapport Général sur l’activité des Communautés 1968, Brussels-Luxembourg, Commission, 1969, pp.15-16. 12. It was certainly on this point that the Commission’s assessment of 1969 chose to dwell. Troisième Rapport Général 1969, pp.17-18. 13. It was for instance an important sub-text throughout the discussions of enlargement in the later 1960s. See e.g. ECHA. COM(67) 750 Annexe 2. Avis de la Commission au Conseil concernant les demandes d'adhésion du Royaume-Uni, de l'Irlande, du Danemark et de la Norvège, 29.09.1967.

An Opportunity or a Threat? 15 hoped would drive the EEC forward towards out and out political unity.14 Hence it was extremely good news for the European Commission that the Heads of State and Government had collectively decided that the Community needed to press forward into a number of challenging and important new areas of activity. Of these the single most exciting was probably monetary cooperation. This was admittedly a field where the European Commission had already taken its first tentative steps.15 Indeed the Hague communiqué explicitly referred to the Barre Plan of February 1969, one of the recent Commission forays into the field of monetary affairs. But the Barre Plan had been more notable for its caution than for its audaci- ty.16 Receiving member state sanction to go much further and faster towards full economic and monetary union was a huge and potentially highly rewarding development. This certainly was an area of European activity which would provide ample scope for Commission activism and for large-scale economic and political spill-over. Only a truly moribund institution could have failed to react with excite- ment to this prospect. Another reason to welcome member state activism on monetary affairs was the way in which discord and inaction in the field of exchange rates might actually threaten the EEC’s existing activities. This danger had already been brought home to the Commission in the course of the preceding year, when first the devaluation of the French Franc and then the re-evaluation of the Deutsche Mark had brought to an end that cocoon of currency stability within which most of the early phase of European integration had occurred, demonstrated the degree to which unilateral member state actions in the monetary field had the potential to aggravate relations amongst the Six, and greatly complicated the operation of the CAP whose centra- lised price system had been posited on the maintenance of exchange rate stability between EEC nations.17 Should the 1969 currency movements prove to be harbin- gers of much more generalised exchange rate instability, then the Community might not merely find forward movement difficult, but could actually discover itself to be moving backwards, with both the CAP and the customs union seriously under threat. Again there were strong reasons for Rey and his fellow Commissioners to be thankful that the summit had not chosen to ignore this issue.18

14. For a good example of ongoing faith that spill-over would in the end prevail, see W. HALLSTEIN, Europe in the Making, op.cit. The influence of ‘neo-functionalist’ theory on the Commission’s own understanding of how the future would evolve is discussed in Jonathan P.J. WHITE, Theory Guiding Practice: the Neofunctionalists and the Hallstein EEC Commission, in: Journal of European Integration History, 1(2003), pp.111-131. 15. For an indication of how lengthy the pre-history of European monetary cooperation was, see B. CURLI, Questioni monetarie e costruzione europea (1955-1962), in: Europa Europe, 10/1(2001), pp.94-119. 16. See ECHA, COM(69)150, Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil sur la coordination des politiques économiques et la coopération monétaire au sein de la Communauté, 12.02.1969. 17. For the anxious Council debates that followed the French and German decisions see Council of Ministers archive, Brussels (CMA), R/2416/69, Procès-verbal de la 78e session du Conseil, 11-12.08.1969 & R2420/69, Procès-verbal de la session extraordinaire du Conseil tenue à Luxembourg, 27.10.1969.

16 N. Piers Ludlow

Also potentially encouraging for the Commission was the member state commitment to expand their cooperation in the field of technology. Like monetary affairs, technological cooperation had long been spoken of in Brussels as a potentially fruitful area for Community expansion. The Commission had for instance reacted to Harold Wilson’s rhetoric about a European technological community with a degree of interest that this vaguest of schemes almost certainly did not de- serve.19 And like monetary affairs, technological cooperation, if realised would both underline the ever greater importance of the European integration process (what field could better be calculated to capture popular imagination than the successful realisation of large-scale joint European high-technology projects?) and offer a terrain in which Commission expertise could rapidly be built up (some of it was already present thanks to Euratom after all) and used to consolidate the institution’s vital role as a mediator, broker and catalyst in member state cooperation. High-tech industrial cooperation had long been spoken of as a field where pan-Eu- ropean action might lessen the continent’s backwardness vis-à-vis the US: ideas for a European armaments pool had for instance been actively discussed during the early and mid-1950s.20 The Hague pledge to act in this field could be taken by an optimist as an indication that some of these ambitions were at last going to be realised. It was very much in the Commission’s interest to see that they were. And even one of the Hague’s less noted conclusions, paragraph 16 which spoke of ensuring that European youth was more closely involved in the integration process offered the Commission scope to suggest new areas of cooperation. In April 1970, for instance, the Commission submitted an aide-mémoire to the Council in which it outlined a number of ideas about how the Community – and therefore the Commission – might be more active in this field.21 The exact substance of these ideas need not detain us; what was more telling was the way in which the Commis- sion’s proposal was studded with references to the Heads of Government’s commu- niqué in much the same way that many more recent Commission initiatives take their cue from the conclusions of the European Council. This demonstrates the extent to which the Commission realised, from the very outset of member state summitry, that proposals carrying with them the imprimatur of the Community’s most senior political leaders would be much harder for the Council of ministers to reject than ideas advanced purely as Commission initiatives.

18. The 1969 activity report was explicit about the link between the currency movements, the dangers they posed, and the forward steps taken at The Hague. Troisième Rapport Général 1969, pp.14-15. 19. On Wilson’s plans see J. YOUNG, Technological Cooperation in Wilson’s Strategy for EEC Entry, in: O. DADDOW (ed.), Harold Wilson and European Integration. Britain’s Second Application to join the EEC, Frank Cass, London, 2003, pp.95-114; for Commission interest see, e.g., the 1967 avis. 20. See E. CALANDRI, The Western European Union Armaments Pool: France’s Quest for Security and European Cooperation in Transition. 1951-1955, in: Journal of European Integration History, 1(1995), pp.37-63. 21. ECHA, SEC(70) 1220, Prise de position de la Commission sur les suites à donner au point 16 du communiqué final de la conférence de La Haye, 14.04.1970

An Opportunity or a Threat? 17

The Commission’s interest was equally strong in the final category of action decided upon at The Hague namely enlargement. By 1969, the days had long gone when the Commission had been sceptical about enlargement, regarding it at best as an annoying distraction at a time when much else needed to be done, and at worst as a threat to the unity and prospects of success of the EEC. That sceptical neutrality, bordering on the hostile and tempered only by an awareness that opposing enlargement overtly would be politically very hazardous, that had been the hallmark of the Brussels institution during the first enlargement talks, was but a distant memory. Instead, most members of the Commission (with a few exceptions, notably Ray- mond Barre) regarded enlargement as a highly positive development which, if properly implemented, would inject new dynamism into the European project, would facilitate the expansion of European integration into new fields, would strengthen the democratic and commercially liberal tendencies within Europe which the Commission wanted to champion and would remove from the EEC’s agenda a highly divisive issue that had demonstrated its capacity to seriously dis- rupt the Community in 1963 and again in 1967-1969.22 The Hague resolution, promising the imminent start of talks with Britain and its fellow applicants (although a date was not mentioned it was generally understood that negotiations would begin within six months) was thus welcomed by the Commission.23 This was all the more true given the way in which the Heads of State and Gov- ernment had stipulated in advance that the negotiations would take place between the Community and the applicants, and not be as had been the case when Britain had first applied, a set of intergovernmental talks between the member states and those countries seeking to join. This distinction was much more important to the Commission than might at first seem obvious. First of all it made it likely that the negotiations would be a more communautaire process than they had been in 1961-63, and correspondingly would pose less of a threat to the Community fabric, something which the Commission, as a guardian of the treaty and the acquis was bound to welcome. And second it all but guaranteed a vital role for the Commis- sion. This again contrasted sharply with 1961-63 when the Commission had strongly feared being marginalised in the negotiations and had seen its role pre- served only thanks to strong advocacy from the Italians and Germans.24 Within a Community rather than an intergovernmental arrangement, a place for the Com- mission at the very heart of the process was much more secure.25

22. For further details on the Commission’s volte-face on this issue see N.P. LUDLOW, A Short-Term Defeat: The Community Institutions and the Second British Application to Join the EEC, in: O. DADDOW (ed.), op.cit., pp.141-143. 23. Débats du Parlement européen. Session 1969-1970. Séance du jeudi 11 décembre 1969, pp.165-167. 24. N.P. LUDLOW, Dealing With Britain: the Six and the First UK Application to the EEC, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp.62-63. 25. Rey’s delight at this aspect of the summit deal was very clear in his European Parliament speech. Débats du Parlement européen. Session 1969-1970. Séance du jeudi 11 décembre 1969, p.167.

18 N. Piers Ludlow

The final reason why the promise to enlarge was always likely to please the Commission, was the way in which it seemed to mark the formal end of the tussle between Gaullist France and its partners – a struggle which had frustrated Commis- sion hopes and which had at times appeared to endanger its very existence. The overt confrontation between France and the Five had after all first erupted over the issue of enlargement, the British veto and the ensuing crisis of January 1963 being the first, painful confrontation between de Gaulle and his Community opponents.26 Enlargement had moreover remained an ongoing problem – even when other issues were subsequently added to the dispute. La question anglaise had always been waiting in the wings throughout the empty chair crisis – with both France and its opponents making tentative overtures to the British at the very height of the dispute.27 It had moved much more clearly centre-stage in 1967 with the second application – a bid the failure of which seemed once more to bring the Community to the brink of total impasse.28 And it had remained a shadowy but disruptive presence throughout the 1968-69 period. Georges Pompidou indeed had resorted to a theatri- cal metaphor himself when complaining to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger that the British were like L’Arlésienne of Daudet’s play – i.e. a character who while never appearing in person on the stage nevertheless succeeded in haunting all the scenes from which she was absent.29 A successful conclusion to the long-running enlargement drama would therefore underline the fact that de Gaulle had gone and that the EEC’s prospects were correspondingly brighter. This argument neatly introduces the third main source of Commission satisfaction at the Hague summit, namely the way in which the summit itself, and its successful conclusion, appeared to disprove all of those who had predicted that the Community experiment had advanced as far as was likely to be possible.30 The Commission itself had of course always denied such predictions.31 To do otherwise would have been to accept impending dissolution. But so halting had progress been at an EEC level during 1968 and 1969, that the doom-sayers had proved ever harder to rebut. Now at last the Commission had something to shout about, a sign of mem-

26. For analyses of the January 1963 crisis see O. BANGE, The EEC Crisis of 1963. Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in conflict, Macmillan, London, 2000; W. HOLSCHER, Krisenmanagement in Sachen EWG. Das Scheitern des Beitritts Grossbritanniens und die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen, in: R. BLASIUS (Hrsg.), Von Adenauer zu Erhard. Studien zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1963, Oldenbourg Verlag, München, 1994; N.P. LUDLOW, Dealing With Britain …, op.cit., pp.200-230. 27. For the French hints, analysed with interest by London, see PRO, T312/1015, Reilly to FO, tel.794, 24.11.1965; for an inept Dutch attempt to threaten the French with the prospect of Britain being drafted in to replace them, Netherlands Foreign Ministry Archives (NLFM), 996.0 EEG, box 176, tel.623, Bentinck to MBZ, 25.11.1865. With thanks to Helen Parr for the PRO reference. 28. See N.P. LUDLOW, A Short-Term Defeat …, op.cit.,pp.135-150. 29. AN, Pompidou papers, 5AG2/1010, Entretien en tête-à-tête entre le Chancelier Kiesinger et le Président Pompidou, 09.09.1969. 30. The most famous of such predictions was S. HOFFMAN, Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe, in: Daedelus, vol.95,3(1966), pp.862-915. 31. See for instance ECHA, speeches collection, Hallstein speech to the Organization of European Journalists, Brussels, 14.04.1967.

An Opportunity or a Threat? 19 ber state dynamism and member state commitment to Europe that had been sorely missed during the preceding couple of years. Furthermore, while Pompidou’s words at The Hague were not all entirely comforting to the Commission, the mere fact that the French president was present at all, talking openly and multilaterally to his European colleagues, rather than launching unilateral thunderbolts from afar, was a considerable relief to any institution eager to see European cooperation pros- per. Again the distance travelled by the new French president to be present in the Dutch administrative capital could be seen as symbolising the distance the Com- munity had travelled from the nadir of its struggle with de Gaulle. It was thus unsurprising that Rey chose to conclude his analysis of the Hague conference to the European Parliament on this note of renewed conﬁdence and unity. Having noted that in 1970 it would be twenty years since Robert Schuman had started the integration process, he went on: ‘… nous pensons maintenant que la Communauté est en train de retrouver ce dynamisme créateur qu’il [Schuman] avait su lui insufﬂer au départ, et qui nous a manqué dans les derniers mois, [et] c’est avec une meilleure conscience que tous ensemble, Parlement, Conseil des ministres et Commission, je le répète ensemble, le 9 mai 1970, nous manifesterons avec une énergie renouvelée notre volonté de hâter la construction du continent européen’.32

The wrong conclusions and the wrong venue

Simply stopping here and concluding that the European Commission was delighted with the Hague summit and excited by the multiple prospects it appeared to open up, would however be profoundly misleading. For both in its public response and still more in its private analysis, the Commission also had reasons to be disappointed about the outcome of the summit, and to be concerned about the way in which the conclusions had been reached. The second half of this article therefore needs to explore the less positive side of the Commission’s reactions to the Hague. The first reason for the Commission’s discontent was the omission from the Hague communiqué of a number of issues that the Brussels institution had hoped would be dealt with. Of these the most important was the Hague’s failure to reach any significant agreement on the issue of institutional reform.33 The need to strengthen the institutions of the Community had been a very prominent theme of the aide-mémoire which the Commission had decided to submit to the member state governments on the eve of the summit.34 In particular, the Commission had highlighted the way in which both the ever-growing number of tasks entrusted to the Community and the prospect of EEC enlargement required an improvement on the current institutional arrangements. According to the Commission, two specific

32. Débats du Parlement européen. Session 1969-1970. Séance du jeudi 11 décembre 1969, p.169 33. Again Rey was quite open about this. Débats du Parlement européen. Session 1969-1970. Séance du jeudi 11 décembre 1969, pp.167-168.

20 N. Piers Ludlow changes were the most urgently needed: ﬁrst the Council of ministers needed to return to ‘leur fonctionnement normal prévu par les traités’ - an oblique reference to several perceived Council abuses, but most importantly a complaint about the ministers’ ongoing reluctance to make much use of the majority voting provisions contained in the Treaty.35 And second the European Parliament needed to be directly elected.36 This would reinforce the democratic character of the Community and blunt charges that the EEC was an unaccountable technocracy. It might also advance the Commission’s long-standing ambition of forging more direct links between the Community institutions and the wider European public, a process which in the long-run would help emancipate the Community institutions from member state control. Unfortunately neither of these changes had been endorsed by the assembled Heads of Government. Both issues had been raised: several leaders, notably Mariano Rumor the Italian Prime minister and Piet de Jong his Dutch counterpart, had called for a change in the manner that the European Parliament was chosen.37 And de Jong had made a comment about Council reform and the need for the Community to use all possible methods that the French at least had taken to be an allusion to majority voting.38 But in neither case had a strong enough push been made for agreement among the Six. As a result, the ﬁnal communiqué contained only a passing reference to the continuing discussions about European Parliamentary elections (and even this was only secured as a result of the last minute insistence of the Italians) and no mention at all of majority voting.39 Therefore the Commission’s hopes for institutional reform were not advanced at all by the summit. Indeed it could even be argued that they were set back, since in the all too obvious absence of enthusiasm for or consensus about either reform at the highest political level, it would be a brave member state or Community institution that pushed too hard for their agreement in the short term. In the light of The Hague the Commission was likely to go on working within the same institutional framework for the next few years at least. The caution demonstrated by the member state leaders on the theme of political union was equally disappointing to Rey and his colleagues.40 The Commission had originally been rather sceptical about the political union process, objecting to the non-communautaire framework within which it was to be conducted and fearing that it might undermine the ability of the Community institutions to discuss an ever expanding range of topics. Sicco Mansholt had for instance told the press in 1962

34. The Commission memorandum of November 19, 1969 was reprinted as an annex to Le Troisième Rapport Général, pp.518-520. A very brief reference to the Commission’s internal discussion of this note is in ECHA, COM(69) PV 97, 2e partie, 05.11.1969. It had been largely drafted by Hans von der Groeben. 35. Troisième Rapport Général, annex, p.520. 36. Ibid. 37. SGCI, versement 900568, article 386, Ministre des Affaires étrangères note, MU/SF No.19 col/ CE, 06.12.1969. 38. Ibid. 39. Troisième Rapport Général, pp.520-524. 40. Débats du Parlement européen. Session 1969-1970. Séance du jeudi 11 décembre 1969, p.167.

An Opportunity or a Threat? 21 that ‘il est dangereux de participer à la soi-disant union politique, qui n’a rien à voir avec une union’.41 By the later 1960s, however, the Commission had ceased to fear the idea and had instead come to believe that any framework that served to co-ordi- nate the foreign policies of the Six would improve relations amongst the member states and facilitate its own external policy activities. Therefore, as with the enlargement issue, the Commission had shifted by 1969 from a position midway between agnosticism and outright hostility, to a position of advocacy. It was for this reason that the Commission’s aide-mémoire of November 19 had specifically called for an advance towards political union.42 Once again, however, this expectation of the Commission had not been fully met. The Hague communiqué did, admittedly, contain a paragraph on political union (paragraph 15). But rather than launching the process outright or at very least affirming the leaders’ determination to see the process succeed, this merely charged the foreign ministers to study the manner in which political union might be realised and to submit proposals by the middle of 1970.43 It was thus a tentative half-step forward, rather than the bold leap that the Commission had hoped to see. Still more serious for the Commission than the Hague’s sins of omission – i.e. those things that the Prime ministers and presidents had chosen not to do – was the way in which the Hague summit could be seen as part of a longer term shift of the EEC’s institutional balance away from the Commission-centred pattern of advance that many in Brussels still clung to, towards a much more clearly member-state led approach. This was of course not an entirely new process. On the contrary it had certainly been underway since the mid-1960s and had arguably been happening ever since the Treaty of Paris in 1951.44 But the success of the Hague summit unde- niably gave it a new dimension that would take some time for the Commission to accept fully. For the Commission the first worrying institutional aspect of The Hague was the way in which the Brussels ‘executive’ was marginalised during the summit itself. As soon as the Commission had heard Pompidou’s plan for a high-level European meeting, Rey had approached Maurice Schumann, the French Foreign minister, re- questing that the Commission be invited to take part. He recognised of course that when the Heads of Government discussed non-Community related matters, the Commission representative should not get involved; whenever Community affairs were discussed, however, it was important for the Commission to be present.45 The French, however had been non-committal and it was only under pressure from their partners that they agreed that Rey (accompanied by one vice-president, Edoardo Martino) should be invited at all, but only for the second of the two days.46 Com- mission protestations about how inappropriate it was for the member states to de-

41. Cited in Le Monde, 27.03.1962. 42. Troisième Rapport Général, p.520. 43. Ibid., p.524. 44. This is a theme that will be explored in much greater depth in the author’s forthcoming monograph on the European Community’s development between 1963 and 1969. 45. AN, Pompidou papers, 5AG2/1036, Gaucher to Pompidou, 18.07.1969.

22 N. Piers Ludlow cide who should represent the nominally independent Brussels institution went un- heeded.47 The Commission was therefore very displeased to discover that the first day of the summit, when it had not been present, had not been devoted to discussing matters outside of the Community’s competence, but had instead been used to talk of enlargement and the financial regulation – in other words issues that were clearly Community affairs.48 Rey made some effort to complain about this when he finally joined the conference on the second day; that he almost certainly harboured much stronger private misgivings about this way of proceeding is extremely likely indeed.49 Equally worrying was the way in which neither the Commission’s aide-mé- moire nor the European Parliament’s resolution about The Hague (November 3, 1969) were referred to in the final communiqué nor, seemingly, during the summit’s deliberations themselves.50 Considered together with the fact that several of the substantive issues that the Commission had identified as most pressing had been ignored, this appeared to suggest that the Heads of State and Government did not feel bound by the rules of Community behaviour or in any way obliged to heed the workings of the Community system. Finally Rey himself seemed to have had little impact on the course of discussions at The Hague. On the basis of the French record at least (and it has to be ac- knowledged that this may well not have been an entirely objective source as far as the Commission role was concerned) Rey made only one significant speech, an intervention that provoked little response from the other conference participants, and left no mark at all on the process of drafting the communiqué.51 The summit seemed therefore to have underlined rather than rebutted the subordinate status of the European Commission within the Community system. The second source of institutional discomfort for the European Commission, was the way in which the summit could be perceived as just the latest in a series of deviations from the normal mechanisms of Community negotiation. In the months prior to The Hague, the Commission had grown increasingly alarmed at a number of unorthodox institutional decisions taken by the member states. First it had been unhappy about the prominence given to an informal meeting of the Community fi-

46. AN, Pompidou papers, 5AG2/1036, Raimond to Jobert, 15.09.1969; for a more detailed discussion of the Commission role, including an unsuccessful attempt to get Rey invited to both days, see SGCI, versement 900568, article 386, Boegner to Quai, tel.1281-94, 11.11.1969. 47. Rey was asked by the Commission to make this point strongly to Luns. ECHA, COM(69) PV94, 2e partie, 15.10.1969. 48. The most complete record of the summit is the French record: SGCI, versement 900568, article 386, Ministre des Affaires étrangères note, MU/SF No.19 col/CE, 06.12.1969. 49. Ibid. 50. The European Parliament’s resolution of November 3, 1969 is also reproduced as an annex to Le Troisième Rapport Général, pp.516-518. 51. SGCI, versement 900568, article 386, Ministre des Affaires étrangères note, MU/SF No.19 col/ CE, 06.12.1969. A French analysis of who contributed what to the drafting process – which again underlined the Commission’s minimal role – is in the same folder, Commentaires succincts sur le communiqué de la Conférence au Sommet, undated. An Opportunity or a Threat? 23 nance ministers, convened at Garmisch-Partenkirchen, and not subject to the usual rules and procedures of Council of ministers meetings. Such gatherings, the Com- mission had stressed in the meeting’s aftermath, should in no sense replace more traditional Council meetings, and should be given much less publicity.52 Then, more seriously, the Commission had felt obliged to protest in April about the manner in which Gaston Thorn, as president of the Council, had organised a working-lunch with his fellow foreign ministers to discuss Community affairs without the Commission being present.53 Even when the Dutch presidency made sure that the representatives of the Brussels body were invited to subsequent working lunch- es, Rey and his colleagues continued to feel uneasy about a type of meeting that es- chewed the standard Council format.54 And finally the Commission disliked the way in which neither France nor Germany had seen fit to consult their Community partners prior to their changes of currency parity.55 Instead the Council had had to be rapidly summoned to ratify what was already a fait accompli. These examples of non-communautaire behaviour came on top of an ongoing series of blows to the Commission’s own prestige and capacity for autonomous action. In December 1968, for instance, the Commission had become embroiled in a lengthy tussle over how far it would be able to negotiate for the Community in the planned talks with the ACP countries about the renewal of the Yaoundé convention.56 The upshot of this procedural battle – resolved only at the end of January 1969 - had been that when talks were conducted at ambassadorial level, the EEC presidency would be held by the Chairman of COREPER and not by the Commis- sion’s representative.57 And then in June, Rey had not been received by president Richard Nixon when on an official visit to the US – a striking contrast to the behaviour of earlier US administrations that had gone out of their way to emphasise the importance and esteem in which they held Commission delegations.58 These multiple incidents added together seemed to demonstrate the slippage in the Commis- sion’s power and prestige since the heady days of the early 1960s. And this made it all the harder for the Commission to look on with total equanimity as the key decisions concerning the Community’s future membership, agenda and direction were taken at an intergovernmental forum where the Commission’s participation was incomplete and largely ineffective. Finally, the very success of The Hague seemed to consecrate the disappearance of the Commission’s agenda setting-power which had been threatened throughout the 1960s. The early European Commission liked to style itself as the motor of the Europe-

52. ECHA, COM(69) PV 63 final, 2e partie, 15.01.1969. 53. ECHA, COM(69) PV74 and 75, 2e partie, 16.04.1969 & 23-24.04.1969. 54. ECHA, COM(69) PV98, 2e partie, 11-12.11.1969. 55. ECHA, COM(69) PV92, 2e partie, 29-30.09.1969. 56. ECHA, COM(68) PV60, 2e partie, 11.12.1968. 57. ECHA, COM(69) PV65, 2e partie, 29.01.1969. 58. The Commission minutes allude only briefly to the episode. It is clear from the text nevertheless that the Commission had been bruised by the incident. ECHA, COM(69) PV 83, 2e partie, 24-25.06.1969. 24 N. Piers Ludlow an Community and believed that one of its key assets in carrying out this dynamic task was its unique capacity to determine the direction into which the Community moved. As Hallstein explained at length in a lecture in London in March 1965 which in many ways represents the high water mark of his institutional ambitions (it was delivered a mere three months before the outbreak of the empty chair crisis), the Commission’s monopoly of the right to propose Community legislation gave it a unique capacity to direct the Community and represented a clear demonstration of the political independence enjoyed by the Brussels body.59 Member states could and did ask for legislative proposals to be made; but the Commission was under no obligation to heed these re- quests.60 Furthermore the Commission had shown in 1962, in 1964 and again in 1969 that it could use this power to set the Community agenda to draw up extensive work programmes, designed to map the EEC’s course over a year or two ahead. Even before Hallstein delivered his London speech, however, this ability to plot the Community’s course had been under threat. In 1963 it had been a member state – West Germany acting through its foreign minister Gerhard Schröder – that had devised the action plan that had pulled the EEC out of the crisis caused by the failure of the ﬁrst enlargement talks.61 And over subsequent years Germany in particular, but latterly other member states also, revealed signs of having acquired a taste for such behaviour, submitting a succession of action programmes and work time- tables.62 The Commission’s own efforts, meanwhile, whether in 1962, 1964 or 1969 had remained largely unimplemented. The success rate of unilateral national attempts to set the Community agenda was sufﬁciently patchy, however, for the Commission still to feel that it retained some claim to be able to set the Community agenda in the short and medium term. It did after all still control the timing of most of the single legislative proposals. Its 1969 effort, moreover, suggested that it perceived a role in bringing together and making more coherent the multiple national suggestions for Community advance that had already been made.63 An agenda set by agreement between all six Heads of State and government was entirely different. It would be very hard for any Council of ministers meeting to ignore such a document. By the same token, however, it was all but impossible for the Commission to disregard it. As a result it could be construed as a serious blow to the Commission’s highly valued autonomy and independence. No longer would Rey and his colleagues be able to decide what targets to work towards or what priorities to identify.

59. ECHA, speeches collection, Hallstein lecture to the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 25.03.1965. 60. Ibid. 61. Schröder’s plan is examined in some depth in O. BANGE, Picking Up the Pieces. Schröder’s Working Programme for the European Communities and the solution of the 1963 crisis, Unpublished Ph.D, London, 1997, pp.158-225. 62. Germany had submitted plans in 1964 and 1967, France one in 1968. See CMA, R/121/64, Procès-verbal de la réunion restreinte de la 121e session du Conseil CEE (03-05.02.1964); R/601/ 67, Procès-verbal de la 212e session de la Conseil CEE (10-12.04.1967); R/2111/68, Procès-verbal de la 51e session du Conseil (04-05.11.1968). 63. Rey’s presentation of the Commission’s latest plan is in CMA, 505/69, Procès-verbal de la 66e session du Conseil (25-26.03.1969). An Opportunity or a Threat? 25

Instead they would be largely bound by the agenda and priorities that had been set by Pompidou, Willy Brandt and their fellow leaders at The Hague. To make matters worse, the very success of the Community’s ﬁrst major summit meant that it was unlikely to remain a once-off event. France’s 1974 suggestion to institutionalise Community summitry and create the European Council still lay some way off, of course. But it was widely known that several of the participants of the Hague Council believed that further meetings between Heads of State and Gov- ernment would be useful, and their initial success was only likely to encourage them to meet again. The Commission was therefore under serious threat of seeing the last vestiges of its power to set the Community’s agenda – and thereby claim in some senses at least to lead Europe – being arrogated by a gathering of Community leaders that was not even subject to the rules and conventions governing the Coun- cil of ministers. For the Commission’s long-term sense of its own mission and purpose, this was a profoundly depressing development.

Conclusions

The Hague summit was therefore not a wholly positive event for the European Commission. The demonstration provided that the Six were still committed to the Euro- pean cause was of course highly welcome. And the agenda that was set, both in the month that separated the meeting from the end of the Community’s transitional period and over the following few years, offered a very welcome opportunity for the Brussels body. There would be ample scope for Rey and his successors to prove their technical competence and their ability to broker agreement amongst the member states. And it was also important to see the Community move decisively into the direction of enlargement and away from some of the most acrimonious divisions of the recent past. Taken together, the Hague conclusions did seem to indicate that the Commission would have plenty to do in the short and immediate term, and plenty of scope to demonstrate its continuing usefulness within the Community system. But institutionally what happened at The Hague was more of a threat than an opportunity not simply because the Commission’s institutional desiderata were ignored, but also because the very fact that it took a meeting of the Heads of State and Government to get the Community back on track demonstrated that the Euro- pean leadership role once aspired to by Hallstein now belonged ever more clearly to those who ruled Europe’s individual member states. The Commission’s future, while busy and far from marginal, did not look like being a rapid advance to wide-ranging political power. Europe might have been on the move once more after the successful summit, but it was not quite the type of Europe which the European Commission had long hoped to see.

27 Swan Song or Cock Crow? The Netherlands and the Hague Conference of December 1969

Anjo Harryvan and Jan van der Harst

During the 1960s, French-Dutch relations had deteriorated, mainly as a result of EC controversies, such as the French vetoes on British entry, the heated discussions on the Fouchet plans, the empty chair crisis and unwillingness by Paris to confer real powers to the embryonic European Parliament. Nevertheless, by the end of the decade Dutch European policy-makers would have a number of successes to look back upon. Riding the tide of economic prosperity the ‘Original Six’ managed to establish the customs union as agreed on in the Rome Treaty by July 1968, well before it was due, thus realising the Netherlands’ most important European policy goal since the launching of the Beyen plan in 1952. True, the French taste for high external tariffs was still looked upon with scorn, but the GATT’s Kennedy Round had eased part of the pain. Throughout the 1960s, however, fear of remaining ‘locked up’ in a limited and protectionist continental block constituted a major motive for Dutch insistence on enlargement of the Communities, also known as the préalable anglais. The government’s political motive for enlargement was poignantly worded by Prime minister Piet de Jong during a cabinet (Ministerraad) meeting late in 1967: he deemed it “irresponsible to lead the Netherlands towards a European satellite state under French, and after De Gaulle’s death, under German hegemony. History teaches us that French or German hegemony does not leave democratic principles in safe hands. British and Scandinavian accession is of the highest importance for maintaining democracy in Europe”.1 Of equally high importance as British accession was, in the government’s view, the establishment of the Community’s common agricultural policy (CAP). On this issue, France and the Netherlands saw eye to eye, at least to a considerably larger degree than on institutional matters and enlargement. Benelux had taught the government the hard way that under no condition was this sector to be exempted from the general process of economic integration. Like France, the Netherlands needed European outlets for its agricultural surplus production as offered by the EEC’s common agricultural market. The resulting Dutch-French coalition had managed to dominate the Community’s agricultural decision-making process during the CAP’s formative years (1958-1963).2

1. Notulen Ministerraad (MR), 27 October 1967. 2. It is interesting to note that the Dutch-French agricultural coalition reached its peak simultaneously with the clash between Paris and The Hague over De Gaulle’s proposals for a European Political Union, in the framework of the so-called Fouchet-negotiations. J.H. MOLEGRAAF, Boeren in Brussel. Nederland en het Gemeenschappelijk Europees Landbouwbeleid 1958-1971, PhD thesis University of Utrecht, Utrecht, 1999, pp.291-292. For a detailed analysis of the Dutch and French impact on the CAP negotiations in the early years of the EC, see also A.-C. LAURING-KNUDSEN, Defining the Politics of the Common Agri- cultural Policy. A Historical Study, PhD thesis EUI, Florence, 2001.

28 Anjo Harryvan and Jan van der Harst

Such positive results, however, did not conceal the fact, that by the end of the decade disagreement between France and the other ﬁve member states on a number of institutional, ﬁnancial and foreign policy issues had led to a virtual standstill of the Community’s integrative momentum. The Hague summit of heads of state and government of December 1969 is generally regarded as the diplomatic breakthrough that ended this stagnation. This essay analyses Dutch European policy with regard to the Hague summit and the extent to which this summit was deemed instrumental for re-launching European integration.

Signs of hope and reappraisals

Charles de Gaulle’s resignation as French president in April 1969 raised new expectations among advocates of European integration and co-operation, both in the Netherlands and abroad. De Gaulle’s successor Georges Pompidou clarified his intentions to re-launch Europe soon after his inauguration in mid-June. On 29 June, exactly two weeks after Pompidou’s coming to power, the Dutch cabinet referred to the announcement of a French plan for a European summit to be held in the autumn of 1969. Although the plan obviously needed further elaboration and clarification, the Netherlands welcomed it as the first signal of a changing climate in France.3 Apparently, Pompidou realised the importance of keeping the European integration process alive and attractive for West Germany. In this respect, Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik constituted an obvious success for the Federal Republic as well as a challenge for France. Fear of a German Alleingang appeared to make palatable what had been unacceptable for Pompidou’s predecessor. The degree to which France would be willing to commit itself to enlargement and British membership, however, remained to be seen.4 At an earlier stage, at the Rome conference of 1967, Foreign minister Joseph Luns had raised objections to summit conferences in general. In the Dutch political system he and not the Prime minister was to be responsible for the country’s foreign policy. Traditionally, the Dutch Prime minister is a primus inter pares rather than the government’s political boss. Consequently, Luns rather than De Jong represented the country at international conferences. Also, summitry smacked of undermining – à la Fouchet – the communitarian system. Thus, the fact that Luns did eventually acquiesce in the Hague summit is an indication of the value he attached to a breakthrough from the integrative impasse. Institutionalisation of summitry, however, was a phenomenon to be guarded against. Dutch and, for that matter, Benelux agreement necessitated a Council resolution stating that “cette conférence des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement ne doit pas être considérée comme

3. Notulen MR, 27 June 1969. 4. J.H. MOLEGRAAF, op.cit., p.261.

Swan Song or Cock Crow? 29 la première d'une série”.5 In the context of the Hague conference, the joint editing of this text proved one of the few occasions of successful collaboration between Luns and his Benelux colleagues. Personal and political convergences hampered combined action of Belgium and the Netherlands in the framework of the Six. Brussels tended to criticise Luns for self-willed and tactless behaviour, whereas the Netherlands blamed its southern neighbour for being over-sensitive to French views on enlargement and agriculture. On 4 July, during an extensive cabinet discussion on European integration issues, Foreign minister Luns noticed an internal struggle within the new French government – headed by Prime minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas – between the so-called ‘European’ group (represented by minister of Agriculture Jacques Duhamel, minister of Finance Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, minister of Foreign affairs Maurice Schumann and State secretary for Foreign affairs Jean De Lipkovsky), other moderate Gaullists and orthodox Gaullists. On 1 July, the Netherlands had begun its six-month chairmanship of the EC Council of ministers and the government sought to use this period and position to launch new initiatives, particularly regarding the Community’s enlargement. Since the early 1960s, the Netherlands had developed into a fervent advocate of UK membership, but during the entire decade De Gaulle successfully managed to thwart Dutch ambitions by blocking enlargement unilaterally. De Gaulle’s departure opened new avenues. Luns urged the Ministerraad to approach the new French government with caution – in order to spare sensitivities – and suggested developing a carefully worded declaration of intention regarding EC enlargement, including a proposal on starting accession negotiations with the UK as of 1 January 1970. The Cabinet supported Luns in drafting such a declaration, to be presented to the European partners. The Foreign minister further hoped that France would retake – without loss of face – its seat in the West European Union (WEU), after having abandoned this seat in the spring of 1969. To pacify the French government, the WEU Council should draft a list of sensitive issues that should not be raised, Luns suggested. A more controversial topic discussed at the Ministerraad meeting was agriculture. France urged the speeding up of EC talks on finding a definite arrangement for the financing of common agricultural policy, but the Dutch cabinet feared that too much progress in this area would endanger the prospect of British entry, for two reasons. Firstly, there was the risk that the Pompidou government would relapse and revive its resistance against British entry, once the financial arrangement had been agreed upon. Secondly, it was felt that the latter would entail further price-increases for farm products on the continent. This would be

5. “U moet het genuanceerd zien”, vraaggesprek met D.P. Spierenburg, in: A.G. HARRYVAN, J. VAN DER HARST and S. VAN VOORST (eds.), Voor Nederland en Europa. Politici en ambtenaren over het Nederlandse Europabeleid en de Europese integratie, 1945-1975, Boom, Amsterdam, 2001, pp.261-283 (277-279), and M.-T. BITSCH, Le sommet de la Haye. La mise en route de la relance de 1969, in: W. LOTH (ed.), Crises and Compromises: the European Project, 1963-1969, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2001, pp.539-565, 544-547 (quote: 547).

30 Anjo Harryvan and Jan van der Harst disadvantageous for Britain with its tradition of low agricultural prices. Consequently, even though the interests of France and the Netherlands, as two major agricultural producers and exporters which would both profit from a generously financed CAP showed considerable overlap, no EEC agreement could be reached on the matter, due to the differences on British accession. A few Cabinet members suggested some way of British involvement – “in the wings” – in the ongoing discussions on finding a definite solution for CAP financing, but minister of Agriculture Pierre Lardinois disagreed. Rather than having the British involved, he thought it sufficient to “inform” London of progress in the CAP talks. In all circumstances, Lardinois expected a long transitional period for British agriculture to adapt itself to European standards, so there was no need of a special treatment of Britain at this stage. The Cabinet meeting of early July also discussed a monetary integration plan put forward by European commissioner Raymond Barre and supported by the French government. The plan provided for some form of mutual credit support between the six EC member states. The Hague’s view was that integration in this area was only open to discussion after British entry into the Community, in line with the wording of a recent Benelux memorandum on this issue. Likewise, the government made progress in political integration conditional on the results booked at the enlargement negotiations.6 Luns’ declaration of intention regarding EC enlargement met with a striking lack of interest abroad. In particular, France was unwilling to accept the date of 1 January 1970 to open membership negotiations with Britain. It seemed that The Hague’s cautious diplomacy vis-à-vis France had failed to produce the desired effect. Instead, the French government reconfirmed its preference for convening a summit of the heads of state and Prime ministers of the six EC countries, to be held in the month of November. State secretary for Foreign affairs Hans de Koster warned the Cabinet for a further delay of EC enlargement “with at least four months” if the French got what they wanted.7

Towards a European summit: passing the buck and a triptych emerging

Late in July, the government came to realise that there was no credible alternative to dropping the declaration of intention and accepting the plan for holding a European summit. In an attempt to justify this early concession, De Koster said that French Foreign minister Schumann had proved to be much more co-operative than his two predecessors, and that France thus deserved a fair chance to demonstrate its European intentions. As chairman of the Council, the government therefore

6. Notulen MR, 4 July 1969. 7. Notulen MR, 18 July 1969.

Swan Song or Cock Crow? 31 proposed to organise the conference in The Hague. At the Cabinet meeting of 24 July, the discussion centred on the preferred location for the summit: either the historic buildings of the Binnenhof in the centre of town or the more modern and spacious but lesser charming Congresgebouw (Conference hall). For security reasons, the eventual decision turned out in favour of the Ridderzaal (Knights’ Hall) located on the Binnenhof. The government emphasised that the meeting should be held in mid-November at the latest and, that in the meantime the European Commission should not waste time, but continue its work on updating the 1967 advice on enlargement. The government also stipulated a proper and equal Commission representation at the summit meeting. This was another bone of contention with Paris, the latter preferring a much lower Commission profile during the conference. Concerning agriculture, the Cabinet supported minister Lardinois in his resistance to a coupling of agricultural financing and enlargement; a parallel treatment of the two issues was to be preferred. This seemed to confirm both the importance of CAP’s implementation to the national economy and the prominent position the minister of Agriculture held in the Cabinet.8 As Lardinois worded it, linking CAP financing and enlargement “would not constitute a problem for a country like Italy. The Netherlands’ interest in a common agricultural policy, however, [was] way too large for such a course of action”.9 After all, he argued, the country topped the bill of intra-EEC agricultural exports, making a speedy CAP arrangement of vital importance. Issue linkage would, at the very least, lead to adverse effects on the level of national contribution to CAP. In spite of Lardinois’ protestations, it was agreed that for tactical and diplomatic reasons, minister Luns would be allowed to use the word “coupling” during the negotiations with France and the other European partners.10 Lardinois felt uneasy about this, and urged Luns continuously to be very reticent in using the term.11 In August 1969, the ‘honeymoon’ in the Dutch approach of the new French government was suddenly over, when Paris announced a devaluation of the French franc, without prior consultation with the European partners. Apart from irritations about French unilateralism, the Netherlands feared a substantial increase in farm prices, particularly of dairy products as a result of the French decision. In the context of enlargement, this was seen as unpropitious. Eventually, the pain was eased by the introduction of an intricate system of import subsidies and export levies for France during a period of three months (lasting till December) which

8. This had also been the case with Lardinois’ predecessor Biesheuvel, who had a dominant impact on EC discussions within the Cabinet, for example during the Empty Chair crisis of 1965; see A.G. HARRYVAN and J. VAN DER HARST, For once a united front. The Netherlands and the Empty Chair crisis in the mid-1960s, in: LOTH (ed.), Crises and Compromises …, op.cit., pp.173-192. 9. Notulen MR, 4 July 1969. 10. Notulen MR, 4 July 1969 and 24 July 1969. 11. Notulen MR, 24 October 1969.

32 Anjo Harryvan and Jan van der Harst succeeded in keeping prices under control. Despite this quick solution, the government’s suspicions regarding French intentions started to become more evident and contributed to a hardening of tone regarding EC matters. At the same time, the political situation in Italy was a matter of concern. In August, Mariano Rumor was appointed Prime minister of a Christian Democratic minority government, dependent on parliamentary support of the Socialist and Republican parties. The Hague feared political instability in Italy, not so much because of the abundant size of the Rumor government (consisting of 33 ministers and 55 state-secretaries, as Luns could not resist telling his colleagues) but mainly because of the seemingly unstoppable rise of the Communist party. Communist presence in a future government was no longer to be excluded.12 In spite of these misgivings, Italian support for British membership was deemed as important as ever. In September, the government discovered that France was not prepared to co-operate on any European issue (including enlargement), as long as a definite agreement on agricultural financing was not secure. However, Luns thought that the Ministerraad should allow the summit to take place – in mid-November – on the strict condition that, during the meeting, a positive decision would be taken on British entry. It was then still unclear when the negotiations on UK membership would begin. In July, France had rejected the date of 1 January 1970, and March 1970 was also considered as too early. The cabinet deliberated on the minimum conditions to be fulfilled before it could agree on holding the conference. Most members wondered whether a rigid approach was realistic, given that the Netherlands, being the host of the meeting, should “not incur the odium of torpedoing the negotiations”. Luns remarked that Italy’s stance on enlargement was similar to that of the Netherlands and he therefore preferred to “pass the buck” (for criticising the French position and promoting enlargement) to the Italian Foreign minister Aldo Moro.13 This is what eventually happened. New developments broadened the projected summit’s agenda. The cabinet meeting of 3 October centred on the expected revaluation of the German mark, as the fluctuating exchange rate of the Mark caused great anxiety in the Netherlands.14 A couple of weeks later, at the end of October, the cabinet proved apprehensive of rumours concerning a revaluation of the Belgian franc.15 Monetary problems in Europe proved persistent and eventually induced the Belgian government to develop a plan for monetary co-operation to be presented at the conference in The Hague. In mid-October, the Council of ministers convened in Luxembourg and agreed on a common trade policy, implying that after 1 October 1970 bilateral trade arrangements with third countries were no longer to be allowed. Although the Ministerraad was pleased with this important result, it also worried about the exceptional provision accepted in Luxembourg that for a period of three years and

12. Notulen MR, 22 August 1969. 13. Notulen MR, 12 September 1969. 14. Notulen MR, 3 October 1969. 15. Notulen MR, 31 October 1969.

Swan Song or Cock Crow? 33 under certain conditions, bilateral agreements were still possible, particularly with Eastern European countries. Luns said that on this point France, initially claiming an exception for five years, had made a concession, and added that his French colleague wanted to “prevent this issue from becoming contentious” during the summit in The Hague.16 It was clear that, in the short run, Paris had other, more pressing problems that needed to be solved in a European context. Early in November, it was decided to postpone the European summit – originally scheduled for 17 and 18 November – to 1 and 2 December 1969. The official reason given was a serious illness of Italian Foreign minister Moro, but the Ministerraad also pointed to internal political problems in Italy as another important cause for the delay. The cabinet anticipated that the conference would be characterised by general observations, rather than thorough discussions on technical issues. The Ministerraad meeting of 7 November used, for the first time, the terms ‘completion, widening and deepening’ (voltooiing, verbreding en verdieping), the so-called triptych, to describe the objectives of the forthcoming Hague summit. As for enlargement (widening), the Ministerraad was rather pessimistic about the results of preliminary talks with the French government. As has been said above, the fixing of a concrete starting date for the negotiations with Britain was rejected, and the cabinet now felt itself forced to accept “an indication for the start of the negotiations”. This position was far from the original preference to begin the enlargement talks on 1 January 1970. Another point of contention with France concerned the degree of Commission representation at the summit. The Ministerraad noticed that Paris was now prepared to accept Commission attendance at the second day of the conference, but not on the first day. For the government, preferring unrestricted Commission participation, this was at least something, after France’s initial point-blank refusal.17 Concerning political integration (deepening), Luns refused to make concessions. He reiterated his stance of 4 July that the Netherlands was not prepared to allow progress on this issue, unless the other delegations accepted the quid pro quo of British membership.18 However, another aspect of ‘deepening’, monetary integration, gave more room for discussion in the Ministerraad. Belgium had just launched the Snoy plan,19 which advocated further steps in this area, motivated by European exchange rate problems in the autumn. Likewise, in July, Jean Monnet’s Action Committee for the United States of Europe had called for a fully-fledged Economic and Monetary Union.20 The government was confronted with a difficult dilemma. It had always

16. Notulen MR, 24 October 1969. 17. Notulen MR, 7 November 1969. For a more detailed analysis of the Commission’s position and its representation at the summit, see N.P. Ludlow’s contribution to this issue of the journal. 18. Notulen MR, 21 November 1969. 19. The Snoy plan comprised the gradual establishment of a European monetary community and the introduction of a single currency in three stages. 20. ‘Resolutions et déclaration communes adoptées par le Comité. Quinzième Session, 15 et 16 juillet, Bruxelles’, Private collection Max Kohnstamm.

34 Anjo Harryvan and Jan van der Harst regarded monetary integration as a potential coping stone, i.e. final phase, of the economic integration process rather than an issue of immediate political concern. Moreover, Finance minister H.J. Witteveen was anxious not to throw good money after bad and, with some justification, suspected France of attempts to make Germany and the Netherlands foot the bill for its own financial and monetary problems. At the same time, the government realised that a flat refusal of the Snoy plan was tactically inexpedient. It therefore decided to a ‘forward escape’, announcing that the plan was acceptable if accompanied by closer co-operation on economic and financial policies and real parliamentary control; “if this was accepted, one should also add the social and income policies”.21 As we have argued elsewhere,22 the prospect of the Hague summit did have an important impact, in that it brought traditional Dutch reluctance to monetary cooperation outside the Bretton Woods institutions (including the Bank for International Settlements and the Group of Ten) to a close. Monetary co-operation within a European framework was no longer considered an issue for some distant future but from now on a valid topic for present-day political discussion and an acceptable mid-range policy goal. As before, sound economic and fiscal policies by all countries involved were deemed an essential precondition for Dutch co-operation on this issue. Under no circumstances should intra-European solidarity foot the bill resulting from a lack of financial discipline by national governments. Thus, Witteveen viewed mutual credit mechanisms as proposed in the Barre plan with caution. Emphasis on preceding harmonisation of economic and fiscal policies characterised Witteveen’s policy at The Hague, as well as during the subsequent negotiations leading to the Werner report.

Meeting in The Hague: completion, widening and deepening

On 1 and 2 December 1969 the long awaited conference took place on the Binnenhof in The Hague. Although the Foreign ministry had to cope with a number of logistical problems and setbacks, most of them could be solved in time. The efforts of the French embassy to convince the owner of the local pub Chez Pompidou to change the name of his establishment were, however, to no avail.23 While the background noise of demonstrations by ardent federalists and their clashes with the police heightened the spirits, deliberations in the Ridderzaal

21. Notulen MR, 28 November 1968. For a more elaborate discussion of Dutch European policy with regard to the monetary integration issue: J.W. BROUWER and A.G. HARRYVAN, Les Pays-Bas et la coopération monétaire européenne, 1968-1972, in: MINISTÈRE DE L'ÉCONOMIE, DES FINANCES ET DE L'INDUSTRIE, Le rôle des ministères des Finances et de l’Economie dans la construction européenne (1957-1978), Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, Paris, 2002, pp.85-108. 22. Ibid. 23. F. ITALIANER, Terugblik op een ambtelijke loopbaan, in: H.J. LABOHM (ed.), De waterdragers van het Nederlandse Europabeleid. Terugblik op 40 jaar DGES, Sdu uitgevers, Den Haag, 1997, pp.53-81, 66.

Swan Song or Cock Crow? 35 commenced. The Dutch delegation consisted of Prime minister Piet De Jong and Foreign minister Joseph Luns, assisted by the top civil servants Karel Hartogh, Franz Italianer, Jan De Ranitz, Dirk Ringnalda and Dirk Spierenburg. Contrary to Dutch preferences and expectations, the various proposals for monetary co-operation as well as suggestions for revitalising Euratom, in fact attracted considerable attention during the plenary meeting. De Jong had intended to start the conference by discussing the enlargement issue, arguing that the other two subjects were to be dealt with in the presence of the European Commission, i.e. on the second day of the conference. The French delegation, however, supported by Belgium and eventually Germany, successfully argued in favour of prioritising the EC’s ‘completion’, in the form of finding a definitive arrangement for the financing of agriculture first.24 According to some analysts, this order was adhered to so as not to endanger a previously prepared compromise between Pompidou and Brandt.25 It is questionable, however, that such a pre-conference compromise ever saw the light of day. True, an exchange of letters between Brandt and Pompidou and a series of preparatory bilateral talks among all participating governments, cleared the air substantially and – at least with hindsight – foreshadowed possible compromises. Perhaps equally important, these confidence-building interactions led Brandt to the conviction that this time the French veto could indeed be lifted. But agreement had not been reached yet, as the disappointing lack of progress on the first conference day would show. In his memoirs, Brandt indicates that decisive agreement was reached only after the state banquet at the end of the first day.26 All in all, it appears safe to conclude with Marie-Thérèse Bitsch that up to the start of the summit, the governments had “assoupli leurs positions mais rien n’est acquis lorsque la conférence s’ouvre le 1er décembre”.27 With French, German and Dutch support the issue of CAP finances was resolved quickly, providing for a financial regulation by 31 December 1969. On this issue, like many others, the final communiqué was cautiously worded and did not go beyond stating the participants’ intention of arriving at a definitive arrangement before the end of the year. Analysts do point, however, to the positieve geest van Den Haag when explaining how the hoped-for agreement did actually materialise. The debate

24. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 999.0, Europese Gemeenschap, Europese topconferentie ‘s-Graven- hage, 1-2 december 1969, deel II, dec. 1969 t/m 1970, Tekst van communiqué uitgegeven na afloop van Franse Ministerraadsvergadering, 5 December 1969. 25. M.E. GUASCONI, Italy and the Hague Conference of 1969 in this volume; and J.W. BROUWER and J. VAN MERRIËNBOER, Van buitengaats naar Binnenhof, P.J.S. de Jong, een biografie, Sdu uitgevers, Den Haag, 2001, p.199. 26. N.P. LUDLOW, Chronicle of an Enlargement Foretold? Pompidou, The Hague Summit and the lifting of the French Veto [draft paper presented in the context of Breakthrough Project, Barcelona, in November 2002]; Brandt: “Pompidou und ich hatten die Angelegenheit im Schriftwechsel und mit Hilfe tüchtiger Mitarbeiter vorgeklärt. Am Abend des ersten Sitzungstages, nach dem Essen, zu dem die Königin geladen hatte, setzten wir im Zweiergespräch den Punkt aufs i” in: W. BRANDT, Erinnerungen, Propyläen Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1989, p.454. 27. M.-T. BITSCH, op.cit., p.558. On the monetary issue, in particular, the conference outcome would go well beyond the scope of the preparatory communications between Brandt and Pompidou.

36 Anjo Harryvan and Jan van der Harst on how to finance CAP was relieved of the strongly ideological overtones it had carried in 1965, which had hitherto made compromise impossible. Indeed, on 22 December, the Council would reach agreement on CAP finance as well as the own resources issue. No longer burdened by the accession conflict, overlapping interests and converging stances could at last prevail. At least in this respect, the ‘spirit of The Hague’ appears to have been of overriding importance.28 The Belgian plan for monetary union was taken up, somewhat transformed and strongly supported by the West German government. Federal chancellor Brandt considered an Economic and Monetary Union imperative: EMU, as previously proposed by the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, to which Brandt adhered, would meet concerns caused by FRG’s Ostpolitik in linking the country to Western Europe “in such a way it could no longer cut loose”, as Pompidou worded it. Likewise, EMU and the ultimate introduction of a common European currency served as an indication that Germany did not intend to use its economic and financial strength to gain economic and possibly political supremacy in Europe. Lastly, a European monetary agreement would facilitate the establishment of a common monetary policy vis-à-vis the United States.29 Thus, the conference agreed upon designing a plan for creating an Economic and Monetary Union in stages. This did not imply that Brandt’s support for monetary integration was unqualified. On German, Dutch and Luxembourg insistence, the communiqué prioritised the harmonisation of economic to monetary policies and the European Reserve Fund was scheduled to emerge only at the end of the transition to economic and monetary union. Therefore, as Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone observe, the EMU paragraph of the communiqué was by no means a clear victory for Pompidou. The French, strongly supported by the Belgian delegation, did succeed in getting monetary integration on the EEC’s negotiation table, but the issue was to be dealt with along the lines of a German/Dutch agenda.30 Franco-German preparatory talks on this issue had remained limited in scope. Brandt had shown himself willing to go along with the creation of a European reserve fund, as an expression of monetary solidarity among the Six. At the conference, however, he presented this fund in the much broader context of a general development towards EMU, which came as a surprise to Pompidou as well

28. J.H. MOLEGRAAF, op.cit., p.261. 29. A. SZÁSZ, The Road to European Monetary Union, Macmillan, Houndmills, 1999, p.28. 30. K. DYSON and K. FEATHERSTONE, The Road to Maastricht. Negotiating Economic and Mon- etary Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp.106-107. G. EYSKENS, De topconferentie van Den Haag en de Monetaire Unie, in: O. DE RAEYMAKER, Belgisch buitenlands beleid en internationale betrekkingen, liber amicorum, Universitaire Pers, Leuven, 1978, pp.295-307.

Swan Song or Cock Crow? 37 as, presumably, the other delegations.31 Pompidou, however, gave the German proposals his full support. Dutch Finance minister Witteveen was only partly convinced. He deemed the EMU set-up too far-reaching, advocating informal exchanges of opinion among the EEC Finance ministers instead. Luns’ view that France being ‘demandeur’ on the monetary issue was ‘convenient’ and should be put to good bargaining use won the day.32 As late as June 1970 Witteveen complained about the pressure the Foreign ministry had exerted on him to accept the EMU compromise at the Hague summit, six months previously.33 Thus, at The Hague, the EMU decision laid the foundation for the subsequent heated discussions its corollary, the October 1970 Werner report would give rise to. In prescribing communitarisation of economic and fiscal policies, the report would go well beyond what was acceptable for the rank and file Gaullists, led by Michel Debré, necessitating Pompidou and his Finance minister Giscard d’Estaing to distance themselves hastily from its contents. This made The Economist cast doubt on the sagacity of Pompidou’s earlier stance at the Hague summit: “Then, in what can only be regarded as a political fluke, the French president at the now famous summit meeting at The Hague a year ago picked up the ball of monetary union and ran like a bull with it for the line. There is good reason to believe that President Pompidou would not have done what he did if he had realised where it might lead”.34 Further talks on “the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification” were to take place “within the context of enlargement”, as worded in the communiqué. This formula was reassuring for – and indeed insisted upon by – the Dutch government as far as the struggle for British membership and against a continental ‘third way’ was concerned. But its vagueness made this formula utterly unsatisfactory in terms of the hoped-for strengthening of Community institutions, the Commission and European Parliament (EP) in particular. Much like Commission president Jean Rey, the Dutch government regretted that there had been “hardly any mention of political union and no discussion on strengthening the Community institutions”, such strengthening deemed “crucial to the progress of the

31. A. WILKENS, Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the project of the Economic and Monetary Union. Ger- many’s European policy in the Brandt era (1969-1974), in: Journal of European Integration His- tory, 5(1999), pp.80-81. More generally, Wilkens argues (p.80), “[t]he program Brandt finally presented in The Hague […] was much more extensive than his former communication to Pompidou”. The contributions of Cl. Hiepel and M.-T. Bitsch to this volume provide more detailed treatments of the Franco-German bilateral contacts and preparations for the Hague summit. 32. J.W. BROUWER and A.G. HARRYVAN, Les Pays-Bas et la coopération monétaire …, op.cit., p.98. Notulen MR, 7 November 1969 and 5 June 1970. 33. J.W. BROUWER and A.G. HARRYVAN, Les Pays-Bas et la coopération monétaire …, op.cit., p.98. Notulen MR, 7 November 1969 and 5 June 1970. At the first Ministerraad meeting following the Hague summit, Witteveen blamed Luns and De Koster for the allegedly “unbalanced compo- sition” of the national delegation at the conference: Foreign affairs had been over-represented, while the departments with more specialised know-how had not been allowed to attend sufficiently, Notulen MR, 5 December 1969. 34. The Economist, 21 November 1970.

38 Anjo Harryvan and Jan van der Harst

Communities”.35 The subsequent success of the Davignon Committee and its proposal for European Political Co-operation (EPC) were far from evident at the time of the summit. Actually, the lines that were to give birth to EPC were tucked away as the penultimate paragraph in the final communiqué. As Hill and Smith rightly comment: “Even the interested observer might have been forgiven for failing to notice”,36 and Stephen George argues that the paragraph was generally considered a sop for Pompidou’s Gaullist supporters and few observers thought it would amount to anything.37 The clause ‘within the context of enlargement’ was inserted on Dutch insistence, expressing the thought that political co-operation concerned a wider circle than the Six alone.38 Nevertheless, on at least two occasions, Luns had to remind fellow cabinet ministers that European political co-operation, once Britain were to join the Community, was not a bad thing. At first sight the Dutch delegation appeared to have been left short-changed as far as enlargement was concerned. Pompidou refused to commit himself to mentioning a concrete starting date in the final communiqué. Although in a private conversation with Prime minister De Jong, he pledged himself to enlargement – by giving his word of honour39 – an official written statement, even an indication, was considered impossible at that stage. At the suggestion of the Belgian delegation De Jong proposed to use Pompidou’s own wordings on the matter, as registered on tape, to which the latter could scarcely object.40 Thus the conference communiqué stated that the states “agreed that the essential preparatory work for establishing a basis of negotiation [with the applicant countries] could be undertaken as soon as practically possible”.41 Moreover, De Jong secured permission for issuing a press statement, saying that all delegations were of the opinion that “preparations of the Six for negotiations with Great Britain will have to be finished by 30 June 1970 at the latest and the negotiations were to start immediately afterwards”.42 Which is how things turned out eventually. But in December 1969, these ideas still had to take shape. Hence, reviewing the conference a couple of days afterwards, the Ministerraad felt rather uncomfortable about the outcome, not only regarding enlargement, but also in view of its initial desire to reinforce the position of the European Parliament. The Dutch delegation had pleaded

35. W.F.V. VANTHOOR, A chronological history of the European Union 1946-1998, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1999, p.39. 36. Ch. HILL and K.E. Smith, European Foreign Policy. Key Documents, Routledge, London, 2000, p.72. 37. S. GEORGE, Politics and Policy in the European Union (3rd ed.), Oxford University Press, Ox- ford, 1996, p.261. 38. J.K. DE VREE and M. JANSEN, The Ordeal of Unity. Integration and Disintegration in Modern Europe, Prime Press, Bilthoven, 1985, p.291. 39. The articles by Cl. Hiepel and M.E Guasconi in this volume provide evidence that Pompidou’s word of honour was also given to the other prime ministers present at the meeting. 40. Public Record Office (PRO) , Telegram Sir P. Garran no.619 to Foreign and Commonwealth Of- fice London, 2-12-1969 (with thanks to Alan Milward). 41. ‘Final Communiqué of the meeting of heads of state or government of the EC Countries’, in: Bul- letin of the European Communities, 1(1970), pp.11-16. 42. F. ITALIANER, op.cit., p.66; J.K. DE VREE and M. JANSEN, op.cit., p.308. Swan Song or Cock Crow? 39 for both EP control over CAP financing and the Community’s own resources, as well as direct elections for the Parliament, but these desiderata had remained largely unfulfilled. Likewise, the summit had failed to widen the possibilities for majority voting in the Council of ministers, as the government had hoped for. De Jong diagnosed that the conference “had been neither a resounding success, nor a failure”. State secretary De Koster blamed the French president for having shown lack of commitment, deeming the latter’s European debut “disappointing”. On the other hand, he gave high praise to the Federal chancellor, complimenting Brandt for having “saved the meeting”.43 In Albert Kersten’s analysis, “only at the Hague summit of December 1969 did Luns become convinced that Bonn dared to confront Paris. Thus his long-time perception of the Federal Republic as a hesitant supporter of further European integration finally fell apart”.44 In other European capitals Dutch summit diplomacy was looked back upon with equally mixed feelings. The Belgian government felt that Luns had overreacted against the negative attitude of Pompidou, with the lamentable result that on the first evening the conference was in disarray. On the other hand there was general praise for Prime minister De Jong and the way he had presided over the conference.45

Conclusion

“How should the summit be typiﬁed: as a swan song or cock crow”?46 In an effort to assess the results of the meeting, State secretary De Koster brought up this question during a parliamentary debate at the end of December. It was another sign of the government’s initial ambivalence regarding the outcomes. To what extent did the Ridderzaal event constitute a real breakthrough in European integration or “had [it] all been rather more like a normal council meeting than a summit”, as Foreign affairs delegate Karel Hartogh lamented?47 In the immediate aftermath of the conference, this was still far from clear. The Netherlands’ original condition for agreeing to a summit of the Six turned out to be eventually, from the government’s perspective, its most important

43. Notulen MR, 5 December 1969. 44. A. KERSTEN, De langste. Joseph Antoine Marie Hubert Luns (1952-1971), in: D. HELLEMA, B. ZEEMAN and B. VAN DER ZWAN (eds.), De Nederlandse ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken in de twintigste eeuw, Sdu uitgevers, Den Haag, 1999, pp.211-227, 224. 45. PRO, Telegram Sir J. Beith no.408 to Foreign and Commonwealth Office London, 3-12-1969 (with thanks to Alan Milward); J.W. BROUWER and J. VAN MERRIËNBOER, Van buitengaats …, op.cit., pp.199-200. Possibly, some of the Belgian irritation was aggravated by the bleak picture offered by Benelux foreign policy cooperation before and during the summit. Attempts at Bel- gian-Dutch co-operation were scarce and unsuccessful. 46. Handelingen Staten Generaal Tweede Kamer zitting 1969-1970, 36e vergadering, 23 December 1969, p.1751. 47. PRO, Telegram Sir P. Garran no.626 to Foreign and Commonwealth Office London, 3-12-1969 (with thanks to Alan Milward). 40 Anjo Harryvan and Jan van der Harst outcome: the French promise to go along with enlargement negotiations with Britain in the near future. At least, that was what the French president had acceded privately. Otherwise, in the short run, the Hague results were to be considered rather disappointing: little or nothing of substance had been agreed upon in terms of progress towards European economic union on a communitarian footing. The empowerment of the European Parliament fell short of Dutch wishes and further intergovernmentalisation of the decision-making process was looming. In the greater scheme of things, however, ‘The Hague’ would turn out to be the summit that initiated both – the first attempt at – EMU as well as EPC, plus the actual beginning of the first enlargement, all three to become of the greatest importance in the Communities’ development during the 1970s and later decades to come. Moreover, at the Brussels conference of 21 and 22 December, agreement was reached to give some budgetary powers to the European Parliament. Thus, the historical importance of the Hague summit is by large to be attributed to the subsequent implementation and follow-up of the conclusions it arrived at. Had the Brussels conference, the Werner and Davignon committees and the enlargement negotiations been unsuccessful, the by now famous triptych ‘completion, widening and deepening’ would have remained null and void. In this respect the ‘spirit of The Hague’ appears to have been of more importance than the actual wording of the compromises arrived at in the Ridderzaal. What is fundamentally new about the Hague summit was the decisive role played by the West-German government, led by chancellor Brandt. The German contribution went well beyond its advocacy of EMU. As worded by Kersten: “Die Regierung Brandt hatte sich zugunsten der Erweiterung und Vertiefung entschieden und nicht versucht, die Gegensätze innerhalb der EWG durch einen vagen Kompromiss zu vertuschen, der den Anschein eines französischen Sieges gehabt hätte”.48 As such, the German performance heralded a new era in European integration. The Bundesrepublik definitely freed itself of its historically determined reticence in post-war European affairs and, thus emancipated, was ready and willing to lead the Community towards further integration and against future attempts at dominance. It had excellent reasons to embark upon this course since international support for its Ostpolitik was both required and on offer. In this respect, one can agree with Derek Urwin’s statement that with “the exception perhaps of de Gaulle’s dramatic press conference vetoes of British entry, the Hague summit was the most significant event within the Community since its inception”.49 For the Netherlands, now that the préalable anglais was about to be fulfilled, such further European propositions were again open for consideration.

48. A.E. KERSTEN, Das Europäische Gipfeltreffen in Den Haag 1969, in: J.W.F. WIELENGA (ed.), Nachbarn. Niederländer und Deutsche und die Europäische Einigung, Presse- und Kultur- abteilung der Kgl. Niederländischen Botschaft, Bonn, 1997, pp.45-49, 49. 49. D.W. URWIN, The Community of Europe. A History of European Integration since 1945, Long- man, London, 1993, p.138.

41 Négocier la relance européenne: les Belges et le sommet de La Haye

Jérôme Wilson

Le sommet de Rome en 1967 se solde par un échec et le second veto français opposé six mois plus tard à tout élargissement vers la Grande-Bretagne sonne l’hallali. La CEE apparaît très divisée sur toute une série de problèmes. Le refus de 1963 était probablement justiﬁé par des divergences sur les plans politique et militaire. En 1967, le «niet» français s’explique davantage par des raisons économiques et monétaires, qui se manifestent également par la sortie de la France du Pool de l’or.1 Sans parler d’association, il devient difﬁcile de trouver un lieu même où les Six sont susceptibles de pouvoir discuter, entre Européens (y compris les Britanniques), de l’organisation économique du continent.2 Seuls les gouverneurs des banques centrales conservent des liens privilégiés via leurs rencontres à Bâle. En réaction, les pays du Benelux, largement favorables à l’adhésion britannique, vont progressivement se montrer plus déterminés dans leur volonté d’élargissement. Dès janvier 1968, ils font pression sur la France en proposant l’organisation d’échanges de vues entre Européens – c’est-à-dire les Six plus les pays candidats – sur des matières non abordées dans le Traité. Parallèlement, en septembre 1968, Willy Brandt propose une réactivation du processus d’intégration déclinée sous divers thèmes: la coopération technologique, le renforcement des liens commerciaux, la consultation politique entre ministres des Affaires étrangères des Six et des pays candidats sur des sujets où une cohérence européenne serait la bienvenue (Moyen-Orient par exemple). Dans la même veine, la Commission entame des études dans le domaine de l’intégration monétaire (mémorandum de décembre 1968), travail qui se précise avec la publication du plan Barre en février 1969. En octobre 1968, Pierre Harmel reprend une proposition française de 1963, et suggère de recourir à l’UEO pour traiter des questions non seulement politiques et militaires, mais aussi de considérations technologiques et monétaires.3 Après quelques tergiversations – dont l’affaire Soames – la France fait de nouveau barrage. Elle sent cependant que l’initiative d’une relance doit venir d’elle, et les appels hexagonaux les plus divers à une réunion au sommet des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement se multiplient dès le mois de mars 1969. Lorsque Georges Pompidou accède à la présidence, ce projet se concrétise.

1. M. VAÏSSE, La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958-1969, Fayard, Paris, 1998, p.602. Voir aussi A. MORAVCSIK, Le grain et la grandeur : les origines économiques de la politique européenne du Général de Gaulle (2e partie), in: Revue française de Science politique, 1(février 2000), pp.73-124. 2. Le G10 concentre tous les débats. Voir R. ROTHSCHILD, Un Phénix nommé Europe. Mémoires 1945-1995, Racine, Bruxelles, 1997, p.328. 3. M. VAÏSSE, op.cit., p.606.

42 Jérôme Wilson

Robert Rothschild, ambassadeur de Belgique à Paris en 1969, évoque un lien entre Rome et La Haye: «Tandis que le sommet de Rome pour le Xème anniversaire du Traité avait été funèbre, celui de La Haye d’abord et celui de Paris en 1972 devaient être des étapes constructives».4 Quels sont les facteurs qui expliquent cette évolution? Après Rome, tous n’ont pas cédé à la fatalité. Si en 1967 les pionniers ne sont plus sur le devant de la scène, des hommes politiques tels Pierre Werner, Joseph Luns, Willy Brandt et bientôt Maurice Schumann garantissent la pérennité de l’idéal européen. A leurs côtés, les Belges ne sont peut-être pas nombreux,5 mais ils ne sont certainement pas inactifs. Aux Affaires étrangères, Pierre Harmel dirige un petit orchestre brillant qui, des lendemains de Rome qui déchantent aux jours meilleurs de La Haye, a su jouer avec brio la pièce imposée. Au milieu des grandes puissances paralysées, les Belges ont suscité l’imagination institutionnelle (à travers le Benelux et l’UEO), provoquant certains grincements de dents, voire, à leur corps défendant, des casus belli. Mais au ﬁnal, l’approche pragmatique mettant l’accent sur la consultation mutuelle sera plébiscitée avec force à La Haye. Dès que la voie monétaire se dessine sous la pression des événements (non-dévaluation de 1968 et dévaluation de 1969 du franc français) et l’impulsion d’acteurs extra-gouvernementaux (la Commission et le plan Barre, le Comité d’Action pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe, la Ligue européenne de Coopération économique), des propositions belges bien charpentées voient le jour. Le glissement réaliste de préoccupations – pourtant chères aux Belges – du domaine politico-militaire vers des préoccupations technologiques et monétaires, en donnant vie à l’approfondissement auquel les Français souhaitent coupler l’élargissement, contribuera grandement à la «réussite» du sommet. Ce succès n’est possible que parce qu’il y a eu des évolutions dans la pratique diplomatique et les exigences politiques. Du point de vue belge, ce changement se matérialise par un pragmatisme plus grand au détriment de l’orthodoxie. Ainsi, une petite évolution comme la clariﬁcation dans le paragraphe 15 des responsabilités en matière de coopération politique entre les chefs de gouvernement et leurs ministres des Affaires étrangères, favorable à ces derniers, s'avérera décisive pour que des

4. R. ROTHSCHILD, op.cit., p.83. 5. «Faute de débat politique sur l’Europe, la formulation de la politique européenne demeura, comme par le passé, la chasse gardée d’un groupe très restreint de personnes autour du ministre des Affai- res étrangères et dans les administrations concernées», R. COOLSAET, La politique extérieure de la Belgique, au cœur de l’Europe, le poids d’une petite puissance, De Boeck & Larcier, Bruxelles, 2002, p.197. A noter que l’on retrouve cependant des Belges dans les principaux groupes de pression de l’époque, Comité d’Action pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe et Ligue européenne de Coopéra- tion économique en tête.

Négocier la relance européenne: les Belges et le sommet de La Haye 43 progrès informels mais spectaculaires soient accomplis dans les six mois suivants.6 Ceci permettra à Harmel, un peu après La Haye, d’affirmer que «les actions sont plus importantes que les structures».7 La présente contribution tente de rendre compte de cette réactivité. Après l’évocation du contexte politique de l’organisation du sommet de La Haye, elle aborde plus particulièrement les questions monétaires et le rôle qu’ont joué les acteurs belges, tant officiels qu’officieux, dans les différents groupes de pression et comités de réflexion qui tentent d’influencer les Six réunis à La Haye pour mettre concrètement sur pied une relance européenne qui unit étroitement la question de l’élargissement à celle de l’approfondissement.

1. L’Europe en crise: visions belges

A Rome en mai 1967 le général de Gaulle s’obstine à refuser l’adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne, et fait référence au Traité CEE pour recommander que les candidatures soient examinées au Conseil des Communautés et non lors d’un sommet. Les petits Etats, soucieux de faire respecter les textes, emboîtent le pas à la France. Cette absence de cohésion des Européens affecte sérieusement leur crédit sur la scène internationale. Pour y remédier, les pays du Benelux font un premier pas en janvier 1968. Ils s’accordent entre eux pour procéder à des consultations mutuelles sur toutes les matières touchant la politique étrangère. Mais alors que l’URSS met ﬁn au printemps de Prague en août 1968, et que la tension demeure très vive au Moyen-Orient, aucune voix communautaire unanime ne se fait entendre. En octobre 1968, Harmel propose d’utiliser la seule institution qui rassemble les Sept (les Six plus la Grande-Bretagne): l’UEO. Il met l’accent sur la nécessité de consultations politiques, tout en ouvrant la porte également à des échanges de vues dans d’autres domaines. Parallèlement, en novembre 1968, un important congrès réunit à La Haye des parlementaires européens. George Brown, ancien secrétaire au Foreign Ofﬁce, se prononce pour l’organisation d’un sommet (qui pourrait réunir les Sept). Les propositions d’Harmel sont mises à l’ordre du jour à Luxembourg lors d’une réunion du Conseil les 6 et 7 février 1969. Des consultations sont envisagées entre les Six et les pays candidats dans plusieurs domaines où l’effet d’échelle est important: coopération technologique et militaire,

6. Cette précision était particulièrement utile pour des gouvernements (surtout aux Pays-Bas) où le ministre des Affaires étrangères était quasiment indépendant, le Premier ministre n’étant qu’un «primus inter pares». Voir J.W. BROUWER, A.G. HARRYVAN, Les Pays-Bas et la coopération monétaire européenne, in: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France (ed.),Le rôle des ministères des Finances et de l’Economie dans la construction européenne (1957-1978), Actes du colloque tenu à Bercy les 26, 27, 28 mai 1999, Paris, 2002, p.86. 7. Voir Ch. FRANCK, La politique européenne de la Belgique. Les années 1970-1996: entre orthodoxie et pragmatisme, in: Res publica, 2(1998), pp.197-198.

44 Jérôme Wilson politique étrangère. La coopération technologique a déjà fait l’objet de discussions fructueuses. Quant à la coopération militaire, il est proposé de s’abstenir étant donné la visite imminente du nouveau président américain – Richard Nixon – en Europe. L’essentiel de la discussion porte donc sur la politique étrangère. Un débat s’enclenche sur la consultation politique. La question du Moyen-Orient est enfin abordée, mais, faute de temps, elle n’est pas achevée. Au cours de cette réunion, Jean de Lipkowski8 confirme la réticence de la France à toute forme de consultation politique favorisant l’intégration européenne,9 mais, peut-être dans le souci de ménager le Benelux dans le cadre des négociations bilatérales qu’elle envisage avec les Britanniques, la France laisse sous-entendre qu’elle demeure ouverte aux propositions d’Harmel.10 Le 12 février, la France raidit fortement sa position. Elle refuse toute discussion future à Sept sur la politique extérieure, et plus particulièrement sur le Moyen-Orient. Elle recommande à ses partenaires de ne pas tenir de réunions sans sa participation, réunions qu’elle considère illégales au regard de l’article 8 du traité de Bruxelles modifié (1954). Elle estime en effet qu’avant de procéder à des consultations entre la CEE et la Grande-Bretagne, il faudrait d’abord songer à établir des relations entre les pays membres de la CEE. A l’initiative des Britanniques une réunion des Représentants permanents est cependant programmée le 14 février à Londres. Les partenaires de la France acceptent d’y participer, probablement parce qu’ils y voient une manière d’aborder un sujet qui autrement ne serait traité que par les «Grands». Le 17 février, la France lance un ultimatum, et met en œuvre une politique de la chaise vide en cessant toute participation au Conseil permanent de l’UEO. Signe supplémentaire de mécontentement, elle exige la démission du Belge Maurice Iweins d’Eeckhoutte, alors secrétaire général de l’UEO. Enfin, le 21 février, la France annonce des «révélations» sur l’attitude britannique. Au moment où éclate la crise de l’UEO, un autre épisode se joue. En novembre 1968, la France a, contre toute attente, et pour protester contre l’«arrogance germanique»,11 décidé de ne pas dévaluer sa monnaie. S’en est suivi une brouille franco-allemande. Paris, isolé, semble alors favorable à un rapprochement avec Londres, et des contacts sont noués entre De Gaulle, son entourage proche (Michel Debré) et Christopher Soames, conservateur, gendre de Winston Churchill et

8. Jean de Lipkowski, grand résistant, figure parmi les premiers partisans du général de Gaulle. Il fut Secrétaire d’Etat aux Affaires étrangères dans le gouvernement dirigé par Maurice Couve de Murville (de juillet 1968 à juin 1969), puis dans le gouvernement de Jacques Chaban-Delmas (de juin 1969 à juillet 1972). 9. M. VAÏSSE , op.cit., p.606. 10. «Puisque la voie du plan Harmel est fermée, puisque les arrangements commerciaux ne paraissent pas convenir, y a-t-il une voie qui permette de sortir de la querelle actuelle? Bien que le gouvernement britannique préfère le moyen d’entretiens multilatéraux, pourquoi pas des conversations bila- térales? […] Pour emporter l’adhésion, il faut avoir l’air de s’intéresser au plan Harmel». M. VAÏSSE, op.cit., p.608. 11. K. DYSON, K. FEATHERSTONE, The Road to Maastricht. Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p.105.

Négocier la relance européenne: les Belges et le sommet de La Haye 45 ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Paris. Mais ces entretiens sont ébruités: c’est le début de l’affaire Soames. Les réactions ne se font pas attendre. Les Belges et les Luxembourgeois craignent surtout de voir disparaître l’aspect multilatéral de la gestion des affaires européennes (et que garantit l’OTAN). Ils n’apprécient pas d’avoir été informés par les Britanniques; c’est un fameux coup porté à la solidarité entre les Six. Du côté italien et néerlandais, on tente plutôt de minimiser l’incident. La crise qui est née à l’UEO et l’affaire Soames s’enchevêtrent sans que la cause et la conséquence puissent être clairement définies. La version officielle belge privilégie la thèse de l’indépendance des deux événements, mais l’empressement du représentant diplomatique français en Belgique, Etienne de Crouy-Chanel, à rencontrer Harmel fait clairement apparaître que l’affaire Soames n’est pas sans effet sur le climat général.12 Un autre document interne confirme cette vision: «Nous étions profondément troublés par les contradictions existant entre les intentions et les événements tels qu’ils s’étaient produits. Le calendrier en était un témoin éloquent: le 4 février, le Général fait des suggestions à M. Soames; le 7 février, M. de Lipkowski se montre fort réticent à permettre tout développement de la consultation politique susceptible de favoriser la création de l’Europe. Ce même jour, M. Debré plaide pour une coopération particulière entre les Etats européens méditerranéens. Deux jours plus tard, une fois de plus il évoque exclusivement les finalités économiques du Traité de Rome, à l’exclusion de ses finalités politiques. Enfin, une crise disproportionnée naît autour de l’opportunité de tenir des consultations sur le Moyen-Orient dans le cadre de l’UEO huit jours après que celle-ci ait figuré à l’ordre du jour de la conférence de Luxembourg. Un collaborateur de M. Alphand répète à M. Rothschild que la France ne peut accepter l’idée d’une consultation politique constante au sein des sept».13 Harmel regrette que la solution UEO, prudemment esquissée, qui semblait rencontrer l’unanimité pour relancer des contacts nécessaires avec Londres, soit brutalement – et sans fondements – stoppée par les Français. Au total, cette affaire marque non seulement une détérioration des relations franco-britanniques, mais surtout un blocage institutionnel: la méfiance paralyse l’action communautaire. Tout le monde semble déboussolé; plus personne ne sait où l’on va, ni ce qu’il faut faire pour avancer. Comme l’explique Hubert Ansiaux,14 les policy-makers, tant qu’ils n’ont pas «vu» le problème, ne réfléchissent pas à des solutions; mais une fois qu’ils l’ont «vu», ils ne savent pas comment le résoudre:

12. Audience de l’ambassadeur de France par P. Harmel, 17 février 1969, AMAE [Archives du Minis- tère belge des Affaires étrangères], Dossier 18671 II, liasse «Entretien de Gaulle – Soames». 13. Davignon à Harmel, compte rendu d’une rencontre avec l’ambassadeur de France à Bruxelles, 20 février 1969, in AMAE, Dossier 18671 II, liasse «Entretien de Gaulle – Soames». 14. Gouverneur de la Banque nationale de Belgique, Hubert Ansiaux pilotera en 1970 le Comité des Gouverneurs de banques centrales. Ce comité sera chargé de remettre un avis (connu sous le nom de «rapport Ansiaux») sur les aspects techniques de la première phase de l’intégration monétaire européenne telle que prévue par le rapport Werner, notamment en ce qui concerne les modalités du régime de changes et le rôle du Fonds de réserve européen.

46 Jérôme Wilson

«Les responsables directs de la construction européenne semblent bien n’avoir été, jusqu’en 1969-1970, que faiblement motivés par des considérations d’ordre théorique. Parce qu’ils ne savaient pas toujours exactement «où» devait aboutir le processus de l’intégration économique européenne, il n’est pas étonnant que leur conception des moyens de mener à bien l’intégration n’ait pas, elle non plus, toujours été précise».15 Il y a par ailleurs également des dégâts collatéraux: si la Belgique et le Luxembourg sont sur la même longueur d’ondes, il ne semble pas qu’il y ait eu, au sujet de l’affaire Soames, des consultations entre Belges et Néerlandais. On ne peut pas dire que, dans cette affaire, les consultations prévues par le Benelux aient fonctionné pleinement. Le modèle qu’il se veut être pour l’Europe pâlit.

2. L’idée d’un sommet

La solution UEO ayant échoué, les Européens les plus convaincus sentent que la seule issue passe par un «grand coup». Le 11 mars 1969, Jean Monnet organise une réunion du Comité d’Action pour les Etats-Unis de l'Europe à Londres, avec la participation de leaders britanniques. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing demande, au nom de la Fédération des Républicains Indépendants qu’il dirige, dans un geste clair d’opposition à l’idéologie gaulliste, l’adhésion de son groupe au Comité d’Action. Le 12 mars 1969, René Pleven, alors porte-parole du groupe libéral à l’Assemblée parlementaire européenne, se prononce pour la convocation d’une conférence au sommet.16 Le 20 mars 1969, Jean Lecanuet17 appelle de ses vœux un nouveau «Messine», proposition qui recueille également le soutien de Giscard d’Estaing. Enﬁn, après le départ du général de Gaulle (27 avril 1969), Willy Brandt lance également un appel à une réunion au sommet des Sept à l’UEO (à Bruxelles), se rapprochant ainsi des Belges, qui continuent à jouer cette carte, et tentent de ramener la France dans le giron de l’institution. Après ces interventions de Giscard d’Estaing, de Pleven et de Lecanuet, il semble assez naturel que Georges Pompidou, lorsqu’il arrive au pouvoir, reprenne cette proposition à son compte. Ce qui est moins clair, c’est la forme que doit prendre ce sommet. S’agit-il d’une relance du projet à Sept tenté au sein de l’UEO? Ou plutôt d’une prise de contact ne devant, dans un premier temps, réunir que les partenaires du Marché commun?

15. H. ANSIAUX, M. DESSART, Dossier pour l’histoire de l’Europe monétaire, Van der Nauwe- laerts, Bruxelles-Paris-Louvain, 1975, p.44. Dans ses «Souvenirs» (document non publié), Hubert Ansiaux évoque le climat de coopération entre les gouverneurs de banques centrales (voir particulièrement pour La Haye les pages 176-177). 16. Agence Europe, éditorial, 12 mars 1969. 17. Secrétaire d’Etat à la présidence du Conseil sous Edgar Faure, Lecanuet est connu pour s’être pré- senté à la première élection présidentielle au suffrage universel en 1965 en tant que «candidat du centre démocrate, social et européen».

Négocier la relance européenne: les Belges et le sommet de La Haye 47

Au lendemain de la conférence de presse de Pompidou du 10 juillet qui ouvre la porte à la possibilité d’une rencontre, Maurice Schumann, qui vient de prendre les rennes du ministère des Affaires étrangères, entreprend, en collaboration avec Jean de Lipkowski, une consultation des membres du Marché commun. Ainsi, de Lipkowski rencontre Gaston Thorn à Luxembourg le 11 juillet. Il conﬁrme au ministre des Affaires étrangères luxembourgeois que les objectifs français sont, dans l’ordre, l’achèvement, l’approfondissement et l’élargissement (les deux premiers volets étant acquis, le troisième devant être discuté). Thorn comprend que la France veut attendre, avant tout début des négociations, un changement de majorité en Grande-Bretagne, et il fait état de ses sentiments aux Belges.18 La nouvelle ligne politique française préconise un renforcement de la coopération, dont la réalisation pourrait rendre possible l’élargissement. Elle se montre favorable à la discussion d’une Europe politique qui ne soit pas un plan Fouchet II, mais quelque chose de plus pratique. Ce 11 juillet également, de Lipkowski informe Thorn que le gouvernement français envisage, pour discuter de ces problèmes, de proposer une rencontre des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement en novembre ou décembre de la même année. Mais il exclut la participation de la Commission Rey ainsi que la préparation de cette rencontre par une réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères (qui avait pourtant eu lieu lors du précédent «sommet» à Rome en 1967). Les Belges sont mis au courant par les Luxembourgeois de certains détails du projet français. Maurice Schumann, qui est en excellents termes avec Pierre Harmel, est cependant soucieux de ne pas donner l’impression aux Belges qu’ils sont mis sur le côté. Il rencontre très vite Robert Rothschild à Paris. Il insiste sur la nécessité de rendre le Marché commun «irréversible». Il aborde par ailleurs un autre terrain sensible: le Marché commun peut être très utile à la France comme à la Belgique pour assurer leur rayonnement en Afrique. Il se montre très ouvert, mais estime, par rapport à l’UEO, qu’il vaut mieux «ne pas trop prononcer ces trois lettres dans le proche avenir». Par rapport au sommet, il donne quelques informations pratiques supplémentaires quant au mode de convocation de la conférence et sa programmation.19 Une proposition concrète est lancée lors du premier Conseil de ministres des Communautés européennes auquel participe Maurice Schumann, le 22 juillet 1969. Il suggère, au nom de la France, que soit convoqué un sommet européen réunissant les Six. La préparation de ce sommet est dévolue aux ministres des Affaires étrangères qui devront se réunir à cet effet en septembre. Schumann précise que la tâche principale consistera en l’examen du problème de l’élargissement et du renforcement de la consultation politique entre partenaires européens. Depuis Rome, où pour des raisons institutionnelles ils avaient emboîté le pas à la France et refusé que l’élargissement soit discuté lors d’un sommet, les Belges

18. Compte rendu d’une rencontre entre de Lipkowski et Thorn, 14 juillet 1969, transmis au Ministère des Affaires étrangères belge, AMAE, Dossier 18671 I, liasse «Union politique». 19. Rothschild à Harmel, 17 juillet 1969, AMAE, Dossier 18671 I, liasse «Union politique».

48 Jérôme Wilson ont changé leur fusil d’épaule, sont devenus pragmatiques. Ils sont maintenant favorables à un tel sommet. Mais certains soulignent encore qu’il serait dangereux de laisser les institutions communautaires sur le bas-côté de la route. Les questions liées à l’élargissement doivent impliquer la Commission tout autant que les chefs d’Etat ou de gouvernement. Par rapport à cette question de l’élargissement, les Belges semblent considérer que la coopération de tous les «Grands» - la France, l’Allemagne, l’Italie et la Grande-Bretagne – est à terme indispensable, mais que dans un esprit pragmatique, si la question de l’élargissement est momentanément suspendue, il ne faut pas pour autant arrêter l’approfondissement. Enfin, à leurs yeux, le «noyau solide» de cette Europe doit être le Traité de Rome. Il n’est pas question de créer de nouvelles institutions. Comme convenu, les ministres des Affaires étrangères se réunissent le 15 septembre à Bruxelles. Chacun a l’intention d’être constructif, mais la tension demeure vive. Les Belges apparaissent à partir de ce moment jouer véritablement un rôle. Ils sont traités avec beaucoup d’égards. D’un côté, Schumann les rassure. La proposition de sommet ne vise pas à créer une nouvelle institution rassemblant les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement. De l’autre, Brandt indique que lui et Schumann se sont mis d’accord pour demander à Harmel une mission de bons offices par rapport à l’UEO. Harmel, Luns et Schumann sont les plus âgés; ils sont tous les trois nés en 1911. Harmel, qui est d’une courte tête l’aîné, inspire davantage confiance tant à Brandt qu’à Schumann que Luns dont le caractère paraît trop tranché. C’est à lui que l’on confie le travail d’«ombudsman». Comme le rappelle Robert Rothschild, «après la disparition du général de Gaulle, grâce à un don naturel de conciliation, il [Harmel] a été un des principaux acteurs de ces négociations, placées, selon la formule de Pompidou sous le signe de l’élargissement, de l’achèvement et de l’approfondissement».20 Le plus difficile paraît d’établir un agenda. D’abord, les Français sont allergiques à toute programmation définitive. Ensuite toute décision est impossible avant les élections en Allemagne, prévues pour le 21 octobre. Enfin, le sommet est destiné à permettre aux plus hautes autorités des Six de trouver un accord, dans tous les domaines, sur la direction que doit prendre l’action communautaire future. Il est donc hasardeux de vouloir d’ores et déjà se limiter. Mais ne pas avoir d’agenda, c’est prendre le risque d’un échec – notamment par rapport à l’élargissement. Les débats du déjeuner se concentrent donc sur ce point. Pour Harmel, le sommet doit offrir l’opportunité aux Six d’affirmer leur volonté de procéder à l’élargissement, et, en concertation avec les candidats, leur permettre de dresser l’inventaire des problèmes que cela pose. Il demande également que la question de l’UEO soit réglée préalablement, et souligne, en accord avec Brandt, que c’est sur le caractère politique qu’il convient d’insister. Les Néerlandais et les Allemands se montrent plus cassants que les Belges au sujet de l’élargissement: pas question de se limiter, à La Haye, à une déclaration d’intention. Il faut un calendrier

20. R. ROTHSCHILD, op.cit., p.83.

Négocier la relance européenne: les Belges et le sommet de La Haye 49

(ce dont la France ne veut pas).21 Harmel se range à leur avis en se montrant favorable à l’introduction au moins d’une indication de temps. Cette intervention suscite une réaction très vive de Schumann: «si l’on ne veut pas de sommet, on n’en fait pas». Ce dernier finit néanmoins par se dire prêt «à envisager une formulation dans le sens de ce que M. Harmel avait dit».22 Schumann ayant dès le départ confirmé que la France acceptait la participation de la Commission, un accord intervient pour organiser le sommet à La Haye les 17-18 novembre. Il est par ailleurs prévu un second rendez-vous des ministres des Affaires étrangères les 17-18 octobre. Début novembre, alors que Willy Brandt a été élu et est devenu chancelier, il est finalement décidé de reporter le sommet de quinze jours. La raison officielle de ce retard est attribuée à la mauvaise santé d’Aldo Moro. Mais en réalité, la discussion sur l’élargissement n’est pas mûre, et les Allemands sont contents de pouvoir bénéficier de délais supplémentaires, notamment pour négocier le contenu de l’agenda de La Haye. A cet effet, Walter Scheel, le nouveau ministre des Affaires étrangères allemand qui vient d’avoir une conversation avec Schumann, rencontre Pierre Harmel le 10 novembre 1969. La politique agricole commune est dangereusement déstabilisée par la réévaluation du mark intervenue le 24 octobre 1969, qui succède à la dévaluation en août du franc français (le financement devient très favorable à la France, et très défavorable à l’Allemagne). Il n’est donc pas étonnant que Scheel insiste très fort sur le problème monétaire, qui devient l’un des enjeux majeurs du sommet. Le ministre allemand s’affirme par ailleurs opposé aux «solutions techniques» assurant une plus grande marge de manœuvre, comme par exemple l’extension des droits de tirage. De tels instruments, s’ils ne sont pas accompagnés d’une coordination des politiques, ne peuvent qu’aboutir à diminuer la pression politique exercée sur les différents pays, naturellement enclins à se préoccuper davantage de leur situation interne que de l’équilibre général communautaire. Il se prononce dès lors pour la mise en place de solutions institutionnelles. Harmel pour sa part estime que la politique monétaire constitue une «priorité aveuglante». Il considère que le plan Barre constitue une base minimum, et qu’il serait bon d’aller plus loin si c’est possible. Il se montre optimiste: «M. Harmel pense que cela se fera progressivement. Une monnaie européenne ne peut être créée tant qu’il n’y a pas de marché industriel commun et que n’est pas résolu le problème de la livre. Mais il croit la réalité européenne plus fatale que notre vocabulaire élastique».23

21. M.-Th. BITSCH, Le sommet de La Haye. La mise en route de la relance de 1969, in: W. LOTH (ed.), Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2001, p.541. 22. Compte rendu du déjeuner du 15 septembre auquel prenaient part MM. Luns, Schumann, Moro, Brandt, Thorn et Harmel – Bruxelles, 16 septembre 1969, AMAE, Dossier 18671 I, liasse «Union politique». 23. Compte rendu de l’entrevue Scheel-Harmel du 10 novembre 1969, 12 novembre 1969, in AMAE, Dossier 6641.

50 Jérôme Wilson

La date du sommet approchant rapidement, tout s’accélère. Le 24 novembre, une délégation ministérielle luxembourgeoise composée de Pierre Werner et Gaston Thorn se rend à Bruxelles. Le but de la réunion consiste en un échange de vue entre Belges et Luxembourgeois sur le sommet de La Haye. On s’accorde à pousser l’effort d’intégration dans le domaine monétaire au-delà du plan Barre. Les moyens à mettre en œuvre pour réaliser un système monétaire européen par étapes sont discutés. Les ministres conviennent de défendre à La Haye les principes. Las disciplinaires du Fonds monétaire international, et de promouvoir l’expérience acquise au sein de l’Union économique belgo-luxembourgeoise.

Les objectifs belges à La Haye

Au lendemain de cette rencontre, un schéma présentant la position belge est rédigé.24 Ce schéma n’est pas signé; l’utilisation qui en a été faite demeure ﬂoue; son impact et sa représentativité sont difﬁciles à estimer. Il n’en demeure pas moins qu’il révèle de façon très claire la vision idéaliste d’Harmel «qui appartient lui aussi à cette aristocratie de l’esprit, pétrie de foi chrétienne, qui trouve dans l’enseignement de l’Eglise romaine l’inspiration d’un humanisme transcendant les idolâtries nationalistes».25

La doctrine Du point de vue général, il s’agit de se mettre d’accord sur une conception commune de la géopolitique. Pour les Belges, le Marché commun est destiné à créer une Europe dotée d’institutions fortes, tirant les leçons de la seconde guerre mondiale: l’apparition de super-puissances et la disparition des empires coloniaux. Il fournit la réponse institutionnelle à l’évolution d’une réalité économique où les échanges s’accélèrent et les distances se raccourcissent, intégrant ainsi de plus en plus les différentes économies européennes. Par ailleurs, le progrès technologique réclame des investissements de plus en plus conséquents qui ne peuvent être réalisés que par un partage des tâches entre les pays membres. Enfin, la sécurité de l’Europe commande une collaboration réelle et efficace au niveau international. En conséquence, il n’y a à terme qu’une issue pour l’Europe, à savoir l’unification politique: «Un processus révolutionnaire a alors commencé: il doit mener à l’unification politique de l’Europe. Quelle Europe? Celle qui regroupe selon leurs affinités idéologiques, l’identité de leurs conceptions démocratiques et la communauté de leurs aspirations, les Etats qui sont liés par l’interdépendance physique et économique, mais aussi par une solidarité fondamentale. La Belgique entend

24. Schéma de la position belge pour le Sommet, Bruxelles, 27 novembre 1969, AMAE, Dossier 18671 I, liasse «Union politique». 25. R. ROTHSCHILD, op.cit., p.83.

Négocier la relance européenne: les Belges et le sommet de La Haye 51

opiniâtrement rester fidèle à cette vocation politique de l’Europe. Les Traités de Rome et de Paris ne devraient être que les premières étapes sur la voie de l’union. Pour un ensemble de circonstances, les événements ne se sont pas déroulés tout à fait comme les auteurs des Traités l’avaient conçu. L’on constate que l’unification n’est pas née de la recherche en commun de la solution des problèmes techniques. Il faut dès lors dire et redire que sans une conception politique commune du but à atteindre, il est difficile de surmonter les oppositions inévitables nées des intérêts parfois contradictoires des Etats membres. En effet, qu’il s’agisse d’accueillir un nouvel Etat ou de conclure un nouveau règlement agricole financier, chaque problème européen se traite soit sur ses mérites propres; en ce cas, chaque Etat analyse la solution proposée uniquement en fonction des avantages qu’il peut y trouver: et alors on ne progresse pas très loin; ou bien on traite ce problème dans le contexte et dans la perspective d’une politique d’ensemble: à ce moment, chaque Etat analysera le compromis proposé non en fonction de ses seuls intérêts, mais également par rapport à l’objectif communautaire. Et voilà ce qu’il faut faire apparaître à nouveau»!26 Dans cette note, il apparaît également fondamental au regard des Belges qu’une doctrine cohérente soit définie par rapport au rôle dévolu à l’Europe dans le monde. Il faut mobiliser l’opinion publique, et surtout les jeunes. Sinon, «l’institution européenne risque d’être contestée au même titre que les institutions nationales».

Les objectifs

En pratique, le principe d’une déclaration commune à la fin du Sommet semble incontournable. Les Belges attendent de La Haye que toute une série de décisions soient prises pour mettre en place des procédures aptes à répondre aux différents objectifs que l’on se donne. Ils sont au nombre de trois. Celui sur lequel toute l’attention se concentre est l’union politique. A cet égard, il est indispensable de réaffirmer la finalité politique de l’action communautaire,27 et de «fixer les éléments fondamentaux du développement de la Communauté». La solidarité entre les membres doit être totale, et comprise comme telle. L’intégration sectorielle n’avait d’autre but que de manifester une volonté globale de collaboration. Dès lors, s’il y a une politique agricole commune, on ne peut hésiter à pratiquer une politique technologique et industrielle commune; si le charbon et l’acier sont gérés collégialement, une politique énergétique commune ne devrait susciter aucune opposition. Mais surtout, si les pays se lient par le Traité de Rome, ils ne peuvent conserver leur indépendance sur le plan de la politique extérieure. Fort de ces arguments, il est envisagé d’obtenir au sommet une remise en route de

26. Schéma de la position belge pour le Sommet, op.cit. 27. Cette finalité sera énoncée comme l’un des piliers, au même titre que l’achèvement, l’approfondissement ou l’élargissement par Pierre Harmel. Voir V. DUJARDIN, La politique étrangère de la Belgique et l’intégration européenne sous l’ère Harmel, 1965-1973, in: La Belgique et l’Europe du XXe au XXIe siècle. Le rôle de la Belgique et des petits Etats dans la construction européenne, Actes du colloque international tenu à Louvain-la-Neuve les 24, 25, 26 avril 2002, Peter Lang, Bruxelles (à paraître).

52 Jérôme Wilson l’union politique à travers la mise en place d’un mécanisme permettant la coordination des politiques étrangères. Concrètement, il n’est pas prévu de préciser davantage le mode de consultations envisagées (UEO, plan Fouchet II, etc.), mais bien de réunir les ministres des Affaires étrangères dans un délai de trois mois après le sommet pour répondre aux questions suivantes: quelles sont les conditions à réunir pour initier activement l’étape finale de l’unification politique; qui doit être invité à participer à cette étude (les Six, les Sept, les Dix); quel timing peut-on prévoir pour régler ces problèmes, et éventuellement convoquer un nouveau sommet. Ensuite, la question de l’élargissement est appelée à être réglée une fois pour toutes. L’article 237 du Traité CEE doit s’appliquer aux quatre candidats, de façon à lancer irrémédiablement le processus. Enfin, les problèmes institutionnels du Marché commun ne peuvent rester en suspens. Il faut régler la question du financement propre de la Communauté, et du contrôle de ses ressources. Le rôle du Parlement européen et le renforcement de ses pouvoirs est à l’ordre du jour; mais comment organiser cette évolution par rapport à l’Assemblée de l’UEO, ou au Conseil parlementaire des Six? L’inflation des compétences – et donc des décisions – force également le Conseil à une plus grande efficacité qui passe par une révision des règles de procédure.

Les options privilégiées au sein du triptyque Par rapport à l’achèvement, il est pris acte de la décision de passer à la période définitive le 31 décembre. Cependant, il est prévu d’obtenir l’assentiment général sur la signification d’un «règlement financier définitif»: dans le cadre de l’élargissement, celui-ci ne peut qu’être «temporairement» (deux ou trois ans) définitif. Par rapport à l’évolution des responsabilités parlementaires, le schéma prévoit deux options. La première est véritablement révolutionnaire. Elle consiste à inverser le rapport de force entre les différents niveaux de représentations. Un «Parlement européen» se verrait confier des compétences actuellement détenues par des «assemblées parlementaires nationales». La seconde est plus souple. Elle ne nécessite pas de réforme du Traité. Il s’agit de renforcer le recours obligatoire à la consultation de l’Assemblée parlementaire européenne, qui serait élue au suffrage universel, et serait appelée à devenir le futur Parlement européen. En ce qui concerne l’approfondissement, l’enjeu essentiel paraît être une véritable union économique, qui ne serait plus limitée au charbon, à l’acier, à l’agriculture ou à l’union douanière, mais s’exercerait dans tous les domaines. Ainsi, cinq secteurs d’action sont envisagés: l’adaptation de la politique agricole, la politique monétaire, la politique technologique, la fusion des exécutifs, les universités. Le troisième pilier du triptyque, l’élargissement, suscite une position claire, conforme à la fidélité aux principes de base de la Communauté. S’il faut examiner les candidatures de nouveaux entrants, ce n’est pas par souci cosmétique. Il faut le faire par respect des obligations inscrites dans le Traité à l’article 237. Prati- quement, cette extension remet en cause la nature de la pratique communautaire,

Négocier la relance européenne: les Belges et le sommet de La Haye 53 mais cela doit constituer un incitant de plus pour renforcer les valeurs fondamentales édictées à Rome. S’il est primordial que le Marché commun s’ouvre, il importe également que les futurs Etats membres acceptent les finalités politiques des Trai- tés, et le droit dérivé (l’acquis communautaire). Sur cette base, les négociations ne peuvent porter que sur la nature et la durée des périodes de transition à prévoir pour faciliter l’intégration de nouvelles nations. Elles doivent mettre en présence la Communauté d’une part, les Etats-candidats d’autre part. Pour ce faire, il est recommandé d’accepter la suggestion de la Commission: celle-ci, en tant que porte-parole du Conseil, entrerait en première ligne dans les discussions, qui seraient ensuite poursuivies par les gouvernements. Enfin, on insiste sur la néces- sité impérieuse de prévoir des échéances fixes pour la conduite de ces discussions.

4. Les questions monétaires

Les premières propositions concrètes en matière monétaire sont remises au goût du jour au moment même de la crise de l’UEO et de l’affaire Soames, en février 1969. La Commission européenne publie une communication qui devient rapidement le «plan Barre» du nom de son inspirateur. Au moment du sommet de La Haye, la Commission est ravie de voir que les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement ont décidé de lui demander de pousser activement à de nouveaux développements dans l’intégration. Sur ce plan, la coopération monétaire constitue le domaine où la réflexion est la plus aboutie, et donc le premier à être mis en avant par la Commission. Le plan Barre explore trois pistes de réformes. Premièrement, il préconise l’adoption d’objectifs communs de politique économique à moyen terme (mesurés en termes de taux de croissance, de taux de productivité, du taux de chômage, des indices des prix, de la balance commerciale, …). Pour le volet court terme, il prévoit la mise en place de consultations préalables à toute décision majeure, au sein des différents comités communautaires permanents (Comité monétaire, Comité de politique conjoncturelle et Comité de la politique budgétaire). Enfin, innovation principale, il propose la mise en œuvre d’un double soutien financier: l’un automatique à court terme pour fournir des crédits de maximum trois mois, l’autre à moyen terme servant de relais au premier, et accordé par le Conseil sur recommandation de la Commission et après avis du Comité monétaire. Ce schéma condamne par contre toute une série de pistes ouvertes notamment par le Comité d’Action pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe. Raymond Barre est en effet sceptique par rapport à la faisabilité immédiate d’une union monétaire, à la mise en place d’un système fédéral de banques centrales, par rapport au Fonds de réserve européen, à la «fusion des quotas des Six au sein du FMI».28

28. Voir R. PERRON, Le discret projet de l’intégration monétaire européenne (1963-1969), in: W. LOTH (ed.), Crises and Compromises …, op.cit., pp.364-365.

54 Jérôme Wilson

Le principe des consultations est adopté par le Conseil le 17 juillet 1969. En ce qui concerne la coopération à court terme, certaines réserves apparaissent, surtout du côté néerlandais et italien. A l’initiative du ministre des Finances belge, le baron Jean-Charles Snoy, il est prévu de confier la conception technique de l’aide à court terme aux banques centrales. A cet effet, une étude préalable est commandée au Comité des Gouverneurs des Banques centrales qui s’est engagé à présenter un rapport au cours de l’automne suivant. Il est également prévu que le Comité monétaire se penche sur ces questions, notamment par rapport aux modalités pratiques d’exécution d’un soutien monétaire à moyen terme, et que la Commission poursuive ses travaux dans le domaine de la coordination des politiques économiques à moyen terme. Dès la publication du plan Barre, le Comité d’Action pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe ressort de ses cartons le projet Triffin de Fonds de réserve européen déjà mis sur la table à plusieurs reprises entre 1957 et 1965. Ce plan, qui prévoit la mise en commun d’une partie des réserves des Etats participants, rencontre l’assentiment de Valéry Giscard d’Estaing en juin 1969 qui estime que «la coordination des politiques économiques et monétaires est indispensable et qu’elle doit être complétée à terme d’une union monétaire».29 Parallèlement, la Ligue européenne de Coopération économique réunit, les 25 juin et 23 octobre à Bruxelles un panel chargé de «procéder à certaines études et de faire des propositions en matière d’intégration monétaire des Six».30 Ce panel, présidé par Luc Wauters, président du Comité de Direction de la Kredietbank, examine trois notes: l’une allemande qui propose une méthode d’action pour mettre en action le plan Barre; une autre belgo-néerlandaise sur la fixité des taux de change, et une troisième française qui traite du recours à une unité de compte semblable à celle développée au sein de l’Union Européenne des Paiements (UEP).31 Sur base de ces travaux, une déclaration de la Ligue appelant résolument à l’intégration monétaire de l’Europe est adoptée à Kronberg (Francfort) le 29 novembre 1969 et transmise aux gouvernements des Six «en vue de la Conférence au Sommet de La Haye».32 Le baron Snoy salue le travail accompli:

29. Agence Europe, éditorial, 24 juin 1969. Sur l’action du Comité et le plan Triffin dans le cadre de La Haye, voir G. BOSSUAT, Monnet et l’identité monétaire européenne”, in: G. BOSSUAT et A. WILKENS (dir.), Jean Monnet, l’Europe et les chemins de la Paix, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, 1999, pp.375-382. 30. LIGUE EUROPÉENNE DE COOPÉRATION ÉCONOMIQUE (LECE), Un programme d’inté- gration monétaire pour la C.E.E. Etude des possibilités et propositions quant aux mesures à prendre, Bruxelles, février 1970, p.3. 31. L’UEP, prévoyant la substitution des accords bilatéraux de paiements par la mise en place d’un système de compensations multilatérales, représente la première tentative, après 1945, de mettre en place une concertation monétaire européenne. A noter que le concepteur principal de cette unité de compte est Robert Triffin. Marie-Thérèse Bitsch et Gérard Bossuat soulignent également les si- militudes entre les programmes du Comité d’Action pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe et de la Ligue européenne de Coopération économique. Voir M.-Th. BITSCH, Le sommet de La Haye …, op.cit. pp.554 et G. BOSSUAT, Monnet et l’identité monétaire européenne, op.cit., pp.369-382. 32. LECE, Un programme d’intégration monétaire …, op.cit., p.71.

Négocier la relance européenne: les Belges et le sommet de La Haye 55

«Je voudrais saisir cette occasion pour remercier la Ligue européenne de Coopération économique d’avoir étudié le problème monétaire de l’Europe d’une façon approfondie. […] Beaucoup des solutions qu’elle a trouvées, qu’elle a arrêtées, qu’elle a proposées, sont celles qui sont en partie acceptées par les gouvernements et viendront sur la table au moment où les Ministres des Finances auront à exécuter le mandat qui leur a été donné à La Haye».33 Du côté gouvernemental, les esprits sont occupés par leurs décisions de dévaluation et de réévaluation. La question monétaire est très sensible, et de nombreux clivages apparaissent. En France, Pompidou est favorable à un approfondissement, mais il ne croit pas à une monnaie unique, alors que Valéry Giscard d’Estaing est beaucoup plus enthousiaste.34 En Allemagne, il faudra attendre les élections d’octobre 1969 pour que Willy Brandt définisse (et impose) une position claire, inspirée du plan de Robert Triffin. Aux Pays-Bas, la doctrine change énormément. Alors que traditionnellement on défendait l’idée qu’il fallait une convergence des économies avant toute intégration monétaire, «le gouvernement était disposé, à l’époque de la conférence au sommet de La Haye en décembre 1969, à hâter le processus d’évolution vers une Union économique et monétaire complète et à l’accepter comme un point concret à l’ordre du jour et un objectif politique à moyen terme».35 En Italie, la politique dans ce domaine est soumise à Guido Carli, supporter des taux de change flottants organisés, du moins dans un premier temps. La priorité des Italiens consiste à ne rien faire qui puisse faire obstacle à l’adhésion britannique. Ils se montrent donc prudents sur le plan de l’intégration monétaire.36 Quant à la Belgique, les propositions de coopération monétaire dans le cadre du plan Barre semblent, jusqu’en juillet 1969, avoir fait l’objet d’un moratoire conclu en accord avec ses partenaires du Benelux.37 Mais l’évolution de la situation (dévaluation française puis réévaluation allemande) sont suivies par une remise en cause de cette attitude. Les Belges ayant un moment songé (fin octobre) à accompagner les Allemands dans leur mouvement de réévaluation,38 abandonnent ce projet mais s’impliquent plus dans la mise au point de projets dans ce domaine. Les positions du Comité d’Action sont reprises par les démocrates-chrétiens belges. Le 26 novembre, Robert Houben, président du CVP (Christelijke Volkspartij), au nom du CVP et du PSC (Parti social chrétien) adresse une lettre à J. Van der Meulen, le représentant permanent de la Belgique auprès des Communautés européennes, reprenant une motion commune aux deux partis, qui

33. LECE, Extraits d’un discours prononcé à la Ligue Européenne de Coopération Economique par le Baron Snoy d’Oppuers, Ministre des Finances de Belgique le 4 décembre 1969 à Bruxelles, p.3. 34. Voir G. BOSSUAT, Monnet et l’identité monétaire européenne, op.cit., pp.379-381 et M.-Th. BITSCH, Le sommet de La Haye …, op.cit., p.548. 35. W. BROUWER et A.G. HARRYVAN, op.cit., p.107. 36. Voir L. SEGRETO, L’Italie et le plan Werner, in: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France (ed.),Le rôle des ministères des Finances …, op.cit., pp.43-44 et G. BOSSUAT, Mon- net et l’identité monétaire européenne, op.cit., p.377. 37. J.W. BROUWER et A.G. HARRYVAN, op.cit., p.92. 38. Voir la contribution de A.G. HARRYVAN et J. VAN DER HARST dans le présent numéro.

56 Jérôme Wilson considèrent que la création d’un Fonds de réserve européen représente un stricte minimum à atteindre au sommet de La Haye: La création d’un Fonds de réserve européen semble devoir être considéré comme un objectif minimum dans un avenir proche. S’ajoutant aux mesures prises dans le cadre d’une orientation vers une économie coordonnée, ce Fonds rendrait possible la suppression définitive des modifications et fluctuations des cours de change. En conséquence, les suggestions contenues dans le rapport du professeur Triffin exposé lors de la dernière réunion du Comité Monnet devraient être prises en considération.39 Ces préoccupations monétaires ne rentrent cependant en force dans les discussions politiques qu’après les remous monétaires et le dénouement des élections allemandes. Deux enseignements sont alors tirés de ces événements. Tout d’abord on reçoit une confirmation éclatante de ce que l’on avait commencé à craindre en 1968: la politique agricole commune ne suffit pas à assurer la convergence des politiques économiques, et à empêcher les différents pays de procéder à des ajustements de parités significatifs. Cet échec fragilise la PAC, fortement perturbée par ces mouvements, et génère des troubles intérieurs en provenance du secteur agricole dans les pays à monnaie forte (Allemagne). Le cénacle du Groupe des Dix, (qui compte également parmi ses membres la Grande-Bretagne et les Etats-Unis) où le débat était enfermé jusque-là, n’a pas été suffisamment efficace. Plus grave, le Conseil a été ridiculisé. A peine un mois après sa décision de procéder à des consultations dans le domaine de la politique monétaire, la France dévalue sans crier gare. L’Allemagne fait de même le 24 octobre. Il est évident que l’action communautaire ne va pas assez loin dans ce domaine. Après la visite de Walter Scheel à Pierre Harmel, le 10 novembre 1969, on voit la Belgique construire véritablement une position sur les questions monétaires. On ressort le mémorandum présenté par la Commission en février (le plan Barre) qui n’avait probablement pas fait l’objet d’un examen attentif au moment de sa publication.40 Les documents préparés lors du Conseil qui a adopté ce plan en juillet 1969 réapparaissent, et l’on en fait un commentaire détaillé. Le 21 novembre, un «plan de solidarité monétaire européenne en trois étapes – 1971-1977»,41 préparé par le baron Snoy, est communiqué à Harmel. Si ce plan va plus loin que les propositions Barre, il ne s’oppose pas à ces dernières. Au contraire, il y a eu des contacts entre Snoy et Barre à ce sujet,42 et Jean Rey affirme lors d’une conférence fin octobre 1969 que «la crise monétaire est aussi politique. Le plan Barre qui existe, pourra améliorer la situation mais ce ne sera pas suffisant.

39. Houben à Van der Meulen, Bruxelles, 26 novembre 1969, AMAE, Dossier 18671.II. 40. De la même façon que le gouvernement néerlandais n’étudie le plan Barre qu’à l’été 1969. Voir J.W. BROUWER et A.G. HARRYVAN, op.cit., p.92. 41. La Libre Belgique, 5 décembre 1969. 42. I. MAES, J. SMETS, J. MICHIELSEN, L’approche de l’UEM en Belgique, in: Comité d’histoire économique et financière de la France, Milieux économiques et intégration européenne au XXe siè- cle, op.cit., Communications des intervenants de la première année 2001-2002, p.177.

Négocier la relance européenne: les Belges et le sommet de La Haye 57

Il faudra aller plus loin».43 Ce plan belge sera présenté à La Haye par le Premier ministre, Gaston Eyskens. Son parcours se poursuivra ensuite devant la Ligue européenne de Coopération économique (présenté par le baron Snoy le 4 décembre), et enfin diffusé par La Libre Belgique le 5 décembre, avant de servir de base à la proposition officielle (27 janvier 1970). Ce plan prévoit trois phases. La phase initiale, dont la réalisation est prévue entre 1971 et 1973, reprend trois propositions du plan Barre. La première concerne la coordination des politiques économiques à court et moyen termes. Elle insiste sur l’harmonisation des présentations des budgets nationaux et sur la norme déjà mise en œuvre par le Benelux. La deuxième propose l’application du concours mutuel automatique. La troisième assure un relais au crédit à court terme via une décision à la majorité qualifiée par le Conseil de ministres. Parallèlement, trois mesures complémentaires viennent s’ajouter à ces trois redites du mémorandum de février 1969. D’une part les Belges envisagent la mise en vigueur d’une autre règle Benelux: celle qui n’admet un réajustement de parité qu’après accord des autres membres de la Communauté. D’autre part, les marges de fluctuations entre deux monnaies communautaires sont réduites à 0,5%. Enfin, il est suggéré que le Conseil définisse, à la majorité qualifiée, chaque fois que besoin est, une position communautaire unique dans le cadre de discussions au sein des organismes monétaires internationaux (notamment le Fonds Monétaire International). L’étape suivante, entre 1973 et 1975, doit manifester une convergence continue (dont l’observation est confiée à la Commission) des politiques économiques suivies à court et moyen terme par les partenaires du Marché commun. Les marges de fluctuations de 0,5% sont supprimées. Il est également prévu que toutes les monnaies nationales puissent s’exprimer en une unité de compte européenne selon des parités définitivement fixées. La dernière phase consiste en la mise en place d’une «union monétaire européenne». La politique économique commune à court et moyen terme serait définie par le Conseil. Plus aucun ajustement de parités ne serait alors possible; le risque de change est donc éliminé pour les transactions intra-communautaires. Enfin, la politique d’octroi de crédits aux pouvoirs publics, et la gestion des taux d’intérêts seraient confiées à un système fédéral de réserve regroupant les banques centrales des pays membres, agissant sous le contrôle du Conseil de ministres décidant à la majorité qualifiée. Cette dernière proposition va clairement beaucoup plus loin que le plan Barre (qui rejette cette idée de système fédéral). Selon Snoy, il s’inspire des travaux de la LECE (Ligue Européenne de Coopération Economique): «Sur ces bases, nous pourrions un jour arriver alors à la troisième étape où nous n’aurions plus qu’une politique unique et un «Federal Reserve Board» comme celui qui existe aux Etats-Unis. Cette idée a été acceptée pour le dossier des Ministres des Finances; vous y retrouvez le pillage de quelques-unes de vos propres idées, Mon- sieur le Président, et de celles qui ont été élaborées par la Ligue».44

43. Clôture de la quinzaine européenne de Mons, in: La Libre Belgique, 28 octobre 1969. 44. LECE, Extraits d’un discours…, op.cit., p.6. 58 Jérôme Wilson

5. Le rôle des Belges à La Haye

Les Britanniques semblent juger le rôle joué par les Belges comme très mineur, et certainement pas comme celui de champion de la défense des petits pays contre l’ogre français. Un représentant officiel rapporte que «The Belgian Prime Minister’s statement makes no mention of Belgian interests in relation to the agricultural finance agreement nor in respect of discussions by the Six on political unification despite the fact the Communiqué itself did so. The Belgian role at the Summit appears to have been weaker than that of any other community government, even weaker than that of Luxembourg».45 On remarque à l’inverse que les Néerlandais soulignent combien le plan Snoy a mobilisé les débats, notamment durant les sessions plénières.46 La presse belge, bien informée, livre une juste interprétation des faits. La Libre Belgique affirme que dans son intervention inaugurale, Gaston Eyskens a mis en exergue la finalité politique de l’Europe. Selon le quotidien, le Premier ministre s’est montré favorable au règlement du volet financier de la politique agricole préalable à l’examen de la candidature britannique, et a affirmé que cette candidature devrait être précédée de «quelques rencontres entre ministères des Affaires étrangères des Six». Par rapport à l’approfondissement, il est reporté que le chef de gouvernement a insisté sur «l’absolue nécessité de ne jamais diluer le Marché commun dans une zone de libre-échange».47 Les archives françaises confirment cette version des faits: «M. Eyskens a plutôt mis l’accent sur le développement intérieur de la Commu- nauté. Il a souligné le bilan positif de son action. Il convenait de réaffirmer sa finalité politique, de régler en priorité les problèmes en suspens […]. Tout cela devait confir- mer la volonté d’unification politique et d’intégration économique et écarter le ‘spectre de la zone de libre-échange’. Le Premier Ministre belge a souligné l’importance de la coordination des politiques économiques et monétaires, déclarant que son Gouvernement voulait aller au-delà du Plan Barre, limiter les fluctuations des parités entre les monnaies des Etats membres et ensuite créer une sorte de banque centrale de réserve». Quant à l’élargissement, il s’en est déclaré «honnêtement partisan», dans le respect de l’article 237, insistant sur la nécessité pour les candidats d’accepter le Traité, ses finalités politiques et les décisions prises. Les négociations qui devraient commencer le plus tôt possible porteraient sur la durée et les modalités des périodes de transition. Pour ces négociations, le Conseil serait responsable et la Commission serait son porte-parole.48

45. Commentaire de J.A. Robinson, 5 décembre 1969 in FCO, 30/272 – document transmis par le Prof. Alan Milward. 46. Voir la contribution de A.G. HARRYVAN et J. VAN DER HARST dans le présent numéro. 47. La Libre Belgique, 2 décembre 1969, p.4. 48. Note «Conférence au Sommet, 1-2 décembre 1969» de la Direction des Affaires économiques et financières, Ministère (français) des Affaires étrangères, 6 décembre 1969, pp.4-5, in: Archives Nationales Contemporaines, SGCI, versement 900568, article 386 (documents communiqués par P. Ludlow). Négocier la relance européenne: les Belges et le sommet de La Haye 59

Gaston Eyskens se montrera en réalité durant toute la conférence particulièrement favorable aux thèses françaises,49 et ses propos seront systématiquement amplifiés par ceux de Pierre Werner, montrant que Belges et Luxembourgeois sont sur la même longueur d’ondes (et quasiment à l’opposé des Néerlandais). Ils souligneront tous les deux l’absolue nécessité de l’achèvement et du renforcement des Communautés, pour ensuite mieux rebondir sur le thème de l’intégration monétaire. Dans une partie de discours où l’on devine la plume de Snoy, le Premier ministre se déclare: «D’accord avec les suggestions du Président de la République dans le domaine de la coopération économique et monétaire indiquant qu’il fallait envisager pour la prochaine décennie la réalisation d’une union monétaire avec unité commune et Banque d’émission communautaire. Si les perspectives étaient ainsi clairement définies, les disciplines que devront s’imposer les Gouvernements, les Parlements et les partenaires sociaux seraient plus aisément respectées».50 Les Belges s’attirent ainsi la bienveillance française, et inscrivent leurs propositions monétaires dans la lignée de celles de Pompidou.51 La raideur néerlandaise qui voulait imposer coûte que coûte une date pour l’élargissement semble paradoxalement avoir facilité la mise au point d’un compromis sur la coopération monétaire dont la rédaction de la résolution finale (paragraphe 8) sera confiée aux Allemands,52 qui y associeront les objectifs du plan Barre à l’institution d’un Fonds de réserve européen. L’axe Eyskens-Werner semble avoir été décisif à cet égard.

Conclusions

A La Haye, les pays du Marché commun se mettront d’accord sur les trois branches du triptyque. L’achèvement de la Communauté est définitivement acquis; la porte est ouverte à l’élargissement (aucune date n’est fixée dans le communiqué final pour le début des négociations, mais le gouvernement français a donné son accord pour que celles-ci commencent avant le 1er juillet 1970);53 l’approfondissement devient plus concret avec la mise sur l’établi de plans pour l’union économique et monétaire. Selon l’expression employée par Emanuele Gazzo,54 les Six ont atteint un consensus sur une «série d’objectifs raisonnables mais révolutionnaires». Ce mot résume bien l’attitude belge, et l’on retrouve des interprétations similaires dans

49. Pour une analyse des autres motivations potentielles des Belges pour soutenir les Français, voir V. DUJARDIN, op.cit. 50. Direction des Affaires économiques et financières, Ministère (français) des Affaires étrangères, op.cit., pp.13-14. 51. A noter que d’après le Financial Times, le Fonds de réserve européen constitue une proposition de Pompidou. Voir European Political Union plan, in: The Financial Times, 12 décembre 1969. 52. Ibid., p.3. 53. Voir J.W. BROUWER et A.G. HARRYVAN, op.cit., p.97 et M.-Th. BITSCH, Le sommet de La Haye …, op.cit., p.558. 54. Bulletin quotidien de l’Agence Europe, n.463, 3 décembre 1969. 60 Jérôme Wilson la presse belge. La Libre Belgique juge «qu’avec un réalisme habile, M. Rey a constaté qu’il était vraiment inutile de s’énerver en ce qui concerne le parallélisme entre l’élargissement et l’approfondissement».55 Le même journal salue l’action de la délégation belge qui «a joué un rôle d’autant plus efficace qu’il fut réalistement modeste». Au cours des premiers mois de 1970, le nouvel étage de la «fusée» européenne est commandé par la Belgique qui assure la présidence en ces premiers mois de l’année 1970. On y retrouvera une action axée avant tout sur une traditionnelle vocation conciliatrice, plus soucieuse de dégager le meilleur des positions allemande et française que de «piquer un sprint» à la façon hollandaise.56 Au nom de la Commission, Jean Rey assure la présidence d’une Commission dont la signification politique s’est affirmée à La Haye. Au sommet, Rey est arrivé seul, en voiture, et n’a bénéficié d’aucune réception officielle. La Commission ne bénéficie d’aucune place dans le protocole, mais il est acquis qu’elle a son mot à dire à la table des grands. Au niveau des gouvernements, le baron Snoy préside le Conseil des ministres des Finances. C’est à lui qu’incombera la responsabilité de trouver un Luxem- bourgeois susceptible d’assurer l’équilibre des nationalités dans le groupe ad hoc sur la politique monétaire. Il fera coup double en proposant Pierre Werner comme président de ce groupe. Quant à Pierre Harmel, il mène le jeu aux Affaires étrangères, et à ce titre est investi de la rude tâche de rendre effective l’union politique. L’accent mis sur la finalité politique de la Communauté, sur laquelle Brandt insiste dans son discours d’ouverture,57 contente particulièrement les Belges. Ils s’engouffreront dans cette voie, et le paragraphe 15 du communiqué final de la Conférence servira de point de départ pour les travaux d’un groupe longtemps présidé par Etienne Davignon.58 A défaut d’accord sur un plan par étapes comme pour l’union économique et monétaire, Harmel et Davignon lanceront des consultations régulières des ministères des Affaires étrangères qui s’avéreront être un suc- cédané utile. Les déclarations d’intentions sont nombreuses. Les résolutions concrètes sont cependant encore vagues, comme en témoigne l’épisode monétaire. L’image proposée ici reflète plutôt une profusion désorganisée d’initiatives, tant de la part des gouvernements (trois plans nationaux majeurs d’intégration monétaire sont discutés) que des groupes de pression (Comité d’Action pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe, Ligue européenne de Coopération économique, …). La réalité est sans doute différente. La cohérence de toutes ces propositions se fait par l’entremise des contacts interpersonnels (entre Pompidou et Brandt; entre Scheel, Schumann et Harmel; entre Snoy et Barre). Les Belges n’ont certes pas eu la volonté ni l’ambition d’être les moteurs du succès à La Haye. Mais, comme le montre La Libre Belgique, entre les géants

55. La Libre Belgique, 3 décembre 1969, p.6. 56. Ibid. 57. Voir A. WILKENS, Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monetary Union, in: Journal of European Integration History, 1(1999), p.80. 58. V. DUJARDIN, op.cit. Négocier la relance européenne: les Belges et le sommet de La Haye 61 allemand et français, ils ont su se tailler un rôle de «poisson-pilote» à leur mesure. La Belgique se distingue de son voisin hollandais auquel Pompidou reproche de se «gargarise[r] avec le vocabulaire européen à la manière démo-chrétienne» pour ensuite faire «tout autre chose, [agir] tout autrement»59 et joue davantage la carte luxembourgeoise (l’information circule bien entre les deux chancelleries, et la nomination de Werner sur proposition de Snoy est significative à cet égard). Humbles mais ambitieux, cherchant résolument à rétablir un équilibre en soutenant la France mise en minorité, peut-être aux dépens de leurs intérêts propres et de leur puissance de négociation, les Belges ont su gagner la confiance de leurs partenaires (et perdu un peu de crédibilité aux yeux des Britanniques). Ils ont contribué maintes fois à maintenir le navire à flots, en servant d’intermédiaire, voire d’arbitre, et permis ainsi le développement d’une démarche d’intégration résolue mais coopérative qui fut l’une des clés nécessaires du succès en demi-teinte et laborieux mais réel de La Haye.

59. «En Hollande, on se gargarise avec le vocabulaire européen à la manière démo-chrétienne, puis on fait tout autre chose, on agit tout autrement”. Voir Déjeuner Elysée – 15.12.1970 – Discours de Georges Pompidou, in: Archives Robert Marjolin, Fondation Jean Monnet (Lausanne), ARM 25/ 1/28. Voir également O. MAUNOURY, La conférence de La Haye et les relations entre la France et les Pays-Bas, in: M. DUMOULIN et G. DUCHENNE (Textes réunis par), Les petits Etats et la construction européenne. Actes de la VIIe Chaire Glaverbel d'études européennes, P.I.E.-Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2002.

63 In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator. Germany and the Hague Summit Conference 1969

Claudia Hiepel

The adept diplomacy of Willy Brandt and, in particular, his ability to readjust the Franco-German axis are widely held to have paved the way for the success of the Heads of State and Government conference in The Hague on 1 and 2 December 1969. Brandt used a skilful mixture of demands and concessions to help persuade the French president Georges Pompidou to yield on the all-decisive issue of the enlargement of the European Community (EC), a question that had poisoned the atmosphere of European cooperation in 1969. Brandt is regarded as having been responsible for the success of a conference that broke the impasse on enlargement and opened the door for re-launching Europe. Although this view has been generally accepted, the change of government in Germany in October 1969 nonetheless had an impact on the European policy of the Federal Republic in general and on the preparations for the conference in particular. Though initially having been a strong and self-conﬁdent Foreign minister, Willy Brandt was ultimately bound by the German Chancellor’s policy ‘guidelines’ in the ‘Grand Coalition’, in which the Social Democrats served as junior partners. The disputes about responsibilities between Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, the Christian-Democratic Chancellor, and Brandt, most of which took place behind the scenes, arose from their different views on German foreign policy towards the East. Although they were able to discuss the issue of European integration in a relatively harmonious manner, they had different views on how far France should be “pushed” to solve Europe’s problems and on whether Germany should adopt a conciliatory stance. Even more forcefully than Kiesinger, Brandt pleaded for German “independence and impartiality” towards Paris in European policy.1 The establishment of the ‘Small Coalition’ of Social Democrats and Liberal Democrats permitted the new elected Chancellor Willy Brandt to realise his foreign policy ideals. European policy and the coming Hague summit became the top priority for the short-term political agenda. In his ﬁrst government statement in the German Bundestag on 28 October 1969, Brandt announced: “At the conference in The Hague, the federal government will work towards introducing effective measures for deepening and enlarging the Community and strengthening political cooperation”.2

1. Willy-Brandt-Archiv [WBA] im Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Bonn [AsD], Bestand Bundesminister des Auswärtigen und Vizekanzler 18, Notizen und Stich- worte für Erklärung über deutsche Außenpolitik vor Botschafterkonferenz in Viña del Mar, 13.10.1968. 2. Bundeskanzler Brandt. Reden und Interviews, Hoffmann und Campe, Hamburg, 1971, pp.11-35, here: p.34.

64 Claudia Hiepel

On this occasion, Brandt claimed that the “Franco-German agreement can be decisive”,3 as far as European questions were concerned. This article will closely examine the role of the Federal Republic’s diplomacy. It will focus on Brandt’s balancing act in which he sought, on the one hand, to maintain the special relationship between Germany and France (which has often been described as the driving force behind European integration) and, on the other hand, to consult regularly with the four other member states. This essay will also underscore the central role played by Brandt in the European policy and will examine his own ideas concerning the project of European integration.

Reactions to the French initiative

Kurt-Georg Kiesinger ﬁrst claimed that he initially had proposed a summit conference. In a conversation with Nixon in August 1969, he somewhat dubiously asserted: “France has now accepted the proposal of a summit of the Six that I myself had pushed through after a hard struggle with the Dutch in 1967 [at the Rome summit conference, C.H.]”.4 Regardless of the truth of this assertion, the German government’s initial response to Pompidou’s suggestion to hold regular consultations of the Heads of State and Government, established in an electoral speech in Mülhausen on 6 June,5 was quite positive. Just two days after Pompidou’s speech, Kiesinger publicly agreed to a summit of the Six.6 One month later, on July 4th, in his ﬁrst face-to-face conversation with president Pompidou, Brandt – who called such a conference in cautious diplomatic terms “useful” – underlined Kiesinger’s attitude to welcome the conference initiative “in an especially strong way”.7 Presumably, the differences in opinion between Kiesinger and Brandt remained unknown to Pompidou. What is certain however, is that the Chancellor’s immediate and unreserved agreement to the French initiative left Brandt vulnerable in certain respects. It was after all the German Foreign minister who had suggested an “ad-hoc-summit” of the Seven on the occasion of the Western European Union (WEU) Council in Brussels on 5 June, only one day before Pompidou’s speech.8 Brandt’s proposal was one in a number of attempts to bring Great Britain closer to European cooperation outside the EC institutions. Surely, Pompidou’s

3. Ibid., p.33. 4. Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [AAPD], 1969, vol.II, Olden- bourg, München, 2000, document no.257, pp.887-898, here: p.888. 5. The wording of the paragraph concerning the summit proposal, in: AAPD 1969, vol.II, document no.221, footnote 10, citing a report of the German ambassador in Paris, Freiherr von Braun, 10 June 1969. 6. M.-T. BITSCH, Le sommet de la Haye. La mise en route de la relance en 1969, in: W. LOTH (ed.), Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-69, Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp.539-65, here: p.541. 7. AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.221, pp.774-780, here: p.776.

In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator 65 proposal was aiming at impeding this Brandt initiative. Although he still supported a summit of the Seven, Brandt hinted to the French president that it would help to improve the atmosphere of cooperation within the EC if he were to make a suggestion concerning the procedure of the proposed conference of the Six. Furthermore, the German government was interested in learning about the positions of the recently inaugurated French government. Willy Brandt’s first visit to Paris after the French elections had been arranged for this purpose. It was expected that the French would insist on renewing the existing ruling on financing the agricultural market for the definite period of the Common Market which was to be established in the beginning of 1970.9 Brandt thus not only alluded to the summit proposal, but also openly discussed the delicate problem of justifying the costs of the Community’s surplus production to the German public. Although he reassured the French president that the German government would in any case refrain from discussing pecuniary arguments in public, Brandt insisted on a more equitable and long-term solution to agricultural problems. Thus, a more extensive reform of the agricultural market was, according to the German position, necessary and unavoidable. Pompidou implied vaguely that he was ready for a “moderate attitude” but at the same time reiterated that it was France that, despite prior pressure from the French agricultural sector, had pleaded for lower prices in the Common Market.10 Referring to the establishment of the first common agricultural market regime in 1962, he openly alluded to Germany’s inability to argue against a ruling that Germany itself had helped to introduce. As far as the enlargement issue was concerned, Pompidou outlined that the completion of the Common Market would be a French préalable before working on a “doctrine of the methodology of enlargement”11 that would allow the EC to enter into negotiations with Great Britain and other applicant states. When France presented the idea of a summit à Six - at Pompidou’s press conference on 10 July and subsequently on the occasion of the Brussels Council of ministers meeting of 22 July - Willy Brandt was the only Foreign minister who gave his consent to this initiative without hesitation. The other four opted to consult their respective governments or hinted at their reservations concerning the suggested procedure that did not foresee an agenda or specific preparations for the summit meeting. They were all disturbed to find out that the French wished to hold regular meetings of the Heads of State and Government in the future.12

8. Fernschreiben Botschafter, Den Haag, an das Auswärtige Amt, 09.06.1969, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.I, document no.194, pp.693-695. 9. AsD, Depositum Helmut Schmidt 5523, Der innere Ausbau der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, undated note of the Auswärtiges Amt; ibid., Vorschlag zur Gesprächsführung für Außenminister Brandt anlässlich der Gespräche in Paris am 4. Juli, undated note of the Auswärtiges Amt. 10. For the establishment of the CAP see for instance: A.-C. LAURING KNUDSEN, Creating the Common Agricultural Policy. Story of Cereals Prices, in: W. LOTH (ed.), Crises and Compromi- ses …, op.cit., pp.131-154. 11. Brandt to Pompidou in the conversation on 4 July, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, p.777. 12. According to the ,Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten von Staden, 01.08.1969’, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.253, pp.873-876.

66 Claudia Hiepel

While the German Foreign minister did agree to the French initiative, he and his administration nonetheless continued to analyse it critically. First of all, they saw the French proposal as a means to integrate the French president into the Community’s decision-making process at a time they were about to begin planning for the future.13 They also asked why it did not provide a special agenda. Why were preparations not clearly outlined in the Council and by the Foreign ministers? And why did the French government want regular summits at this stage? All those items were regarded as “vehicles of a tactic” to prevent a possible summit of the Seven and to play for time until the British elections had taken place in early summer. The proposal to hold regular meetings on a senior level was reminiscent of the Fouchet plans of the early Sixties and would thus be unacceptable to the small member states of the EC in particular. Brandt’s senior official in charge of European affairs, Berndt von Staden, thus recommended that he should react “carefully but positively”. By protecting both German interests and those of the small states, Brandt should insist on the preparation by the Foreign ministers and not assent to any institutionalisation of summit conferences or at best, connect the possible repetition of a summit with the success of the one envisaged. The European Commission should in any case be included in the preparation process for the conference as far as Community matters were concerned.14 Until the next Council of ministers meeting on 15 September, Willy Brandt embarked on a tour to the member states’ capitals to get a feel for the attitude of the others and to make up his mind about a German vision for European integration.15 He was firmly convinced that, although it was absolutely necessary for the European unification process to progress, he should under no circumstances give the impression that Germany wanted to take the lead in the EC. German initiatives should “not attack the prestige or the sensitivity of others”16 – which meant both France as well as the small member states. Brandt’s European policy concepts, in the first place, aimed at enlarging the Community as soon as possible and at defining the relations to the other European Free Trade Association (EFTA) member states. On the institutional level the strengthening of the competence of the EC’s parliament and its direct elections were of high priority. Political cooperation and the establishment of the Economic Union rounded off the list of urgent activities.177 With regard to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) the German administration still had no ideas ready. Willy Brandt only planned to make

13. Ibid. The French president was, for technical reasons, not a member of the French government. A conference with Georges Pompidou as participant could hence not be described as a Council meeting but only as a Summit meeting of the EC member states. This procedure tended to undermine the Community institutions as argued a paper of the German Foreign Minister: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes [PAAA], Ref. I A 1, 736, Vermerk über institutionelle Fragen der Sechser-Gipfelkonferenz, 24.07.1969. 14. Ibid. 15. PAAA, B 150, vol.160, pp.4782 ff., Fernschreiben aus dem Auswärtigen Amt an die Vertretungen in den europäischen Hauptstädten, 02.09.1969. 16. WBA, Bestand Publizistische Äußerungen 313, Konferenz der westeuropäischen Botschafter der Bundesrepublik, 30.06.1969.

In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator 67 concessions and claimed that Germany was willing to make sacrifices once their purpose was clear. As a guideline to the German ambassadors in Western European capitals Willy Brandt claimed: “We must have our proposals ready and constantly be in search of the greatest common denominator in order to prove that we are ready and able to take the next possible step”.18 On 8 July, Willy Brandt first stopped at The Hague to meet Dutch Foreign minister Joseph Luns. Only four days after his Paris visit, Brandt was not entirely optimistic. What struck him most, was the less ideological attitude of the new French president and a “more harmonised presentation” of Pompidou and Maurice Schumann.19 A new aspect of the discussion seemed to be that the French realised that they could not get around the resumption of enlargement negotiations if they sought to break the current impasse. Brandt now took on the role of conciliator between France and the other four EC member states, striving to foster understanding and patience. Schumann’s warning not to exercise any pressure on France, was not explicitly directed at Germany but at “minor governments and less important countries”.20 Consequently, Brandt advised Luns not to push the French too much. He thus tried to prevent him from discussing direct elections and the question of responsibilities of the European Parliament (EP) at his forthcoming visit in Paris. On the other hand, sharing the goals of the Dutch ‘declaration of intent’ that proposed 1 January 1970 as the date of opening enlargement negotiations,21 Brandt agreed that Luns submit this proposal to Pompidou. At the same time, he made it clear that he would not comment on this point in public, to avoid duping the French so briefly after his own conversations in Paris. Brandt clearly saw that France feared that its own negotiating position would be weakened unless the ruling of the Common Market was definitely fixed before entering into negotiations with the applicant states.22 Late August/early September, Brandt met the Italian Foreign minister Aldo Moro in Rome,23 and subsequently discussed the matter in Brussels with the Belgian Foreign minister Pierre Harmel.24 As expected, Moro rejected “an exclusive political cooperation of the Six that was expressed in summit

17. Ibid. See also the earlier pro-European statements of Willy Brandt in the Foreign Policy Association in New York (1964), in Rome (1965) and on the Congress of European Socialist Parties (1966): WBA, Bestand Publizistische Äußerungen 180, 211, 243. 18. Ibid. 19. Botschafter Arnold, Den Haag, an das Auswärtige Amt, betr.: Gespräch Außenministers mit niederländischem Außenminister Luns, 08.07.1969, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.229, pp.802-805. 20. As Schumann said to Brandt in their conversation on 4 July in Paris, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.220, p.773. 21. See the article of Harryvan and Van der Harst in this volume. 22. Brandt to Luns, op. cit., pp.803 ff. 23. Reported in: PAAA, B 150, vol.160, pp.4782 ff., Fernschreiben aus dem Auswärtigen Amt an die Vertretungen in den europäischen Hauptstädten, 02.09.1969. 24. A copy of the records, in: WBA, Bestand Außenminister und Vizekanzler 29.

68 Claudia Hiepel conferences”. The Belgian government at this stage also shared the opinion that the applicants should join the summit negotiations. The muted enthusiasm in the EC member states about a conference on the one hand and the compelling demand for enlargement on the other was threatening to reinforce the French position on agricultural questions, in particular, for which Germany urged a solution. As a result, the regularly held Franco-German summit conference on 8 and 9 September dealt to a large extent with European questions.25 The outcome of this conference was clear: Pompidou would, under no circumstances, relent on the French position of insisting on completion as a prerequisite for opening enlargement negotiations. Should Great Britain fail to enter into negotiations, the Six could, at least, fall back on the Common Market, as Pompidou argued. This perspective was specifically aimed at clearing the Dutch position, as he was not sure if the Dutch would be ready for completion and deepening in the case of a British retreat. On this occasion Willy Brandt was warned against carrying his seesaw policy too far. Pompidou had taken note of the fact that during his conversation in Paris on 4 July the German Foreign minister had avoided mentioning a connection between completion and enlargement whereas he had given a completely different impression in Rome.26 In answering Kiesinger’s question whether the enlargement question would be an issue at the conference, Pompidou stressed that this was precisely the reason for convening the summit.27 Perhaps encouraged by this statement, after the series of bilateral conversations,28 Brandt made a final attempt to push the enlargement issue. He sent a message via his senior official, Paul Frank, to suggest to the French ambassador François Seydoux that they should promise the applicant states, even before the coming Council of ministers meeting, that the negotiations would begin in February/March 1970. Seydoux suspected that this was more of an Italian and Dutch suggestion than a German one, but he promised to pass it on directly to the Quai d’Orsay.29 As expected, this démarche was a failure. The French made no such promise.

Preparations for the Conference

The decisive agreements on a summit conference and the guidelines for it were arrived at during informal working lunch meetings of the Foreign ministers – a

25. AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.279, pp.962-973. 26. Ibid., Pompidou to Kiesinger, p.971. 27. „Staatspräsident Pompidou erwiderte, wenn er sagen wolle, dass dies nicht möglich sei, müsse man sich fragen, wozu eine solche Konferenz überhaupt einberufen werde“. In: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.282, pp.981-989, quotation: p.888. 28. A meeting with the Luxembourg government is not bequeathed. A further meeting with Luns must have taken place in Bonn on 11 and 12 September. 29. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Frank, 12.09.1969, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.285, pp.994 ff.

In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator 69 procedure harshly criticised by the Commission and its president Jean Rey.30 The first encounter in such a setting took place on 15 September during the Council of ministers meeting in Brussels. There, Brandt was equipped with a paper that made the enlargement issue the most prominent on the agenda. As this paper made clear, the German government was eager to decide on a starting date for enlargement negotiations in order to achieve the first successes. The paper partially attracted the French, by suggesting an agreement between the Six on this issue before starting negotiations with the potential applicants. It clearly stipulated that all other issues should be subordinate to the question of enlargement. Completion, which dealt with linking the financing of agriculture to the reform of agricultural policy, was to occupy second place, while deepening, which according to German terminology referred to the establishment of an economic union in particular, took third place.31 The enlargement question did not appear on the agenda of the official Council meeting since the Commission had not yet submitted a formal statement. But during an informal meeting of the Foreign ministers, the issue of British entry was discussed.32 As opposed to his Benelux colleagues, Willy Brandt proceeded very carefully. Whereas those, Joseph Luns in particular, clearly insisted on fixing a date for starting negotiations with the applicants, only the German Foreign minister was pleased to point out the readiness of the French to discuss the British entry after all. He mentioned the importance of a timetable that would indicate how many months the EC member states would need “to make contact with the applicants”.33 Furthermore, he obviously supported finding a solution to the WEU crisis, but at the same time suggested that discussing political questions should go beyond a possible “regularisation” of the WEU.34 The enlargement question was not the only highly controversial issue up for discussion. The Benelux member states, in particular, expressed their scepticism towards the French refusal to accept a linkage between completion and enlargement. Brandt did not mention this sensitive issue at all, but he left Luns’ assumption unchallenged that the Five would accept “a sort of parallelism”. The meeting finally resulted in a date and place of the summit conference being fixed as well as the topics for discussion: the famous triptych of completion, deepening and enlargement. The Commission was designated to participate in the conference and the sensitive issue of enlargement postponed until the publication of the Commission report on this issue. This was quite a disappointing result compared to the maximum demand of linkage and a fixed date for entering into negotiations. But it was at the same time a good result for a

30. See the complaints of Rey on the occasion of the third meeting, AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.356, p.1258. 31. WBA, Bestand Publizistische Äußerungen 322, Vorschläge zu Verfahren und Themen der ge- planten EWG-Gipfelkonferenz in Den Haag, 15.09.1969, draft of 1 September 1969. 32. Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs Harkort, 18.09.1969, betr. Arbeitsessen der EWG-Außenmini- ster in Brüssel am 15.09.1969, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.294, pp.1025-1030. 33. Ibid. 34. „Mögl[iche] Au[ßenpolitische] Zus[ammen]arbeit + Konsultation, Mehr als Normalisierung WEU“, WBA, Bestand Außenminister und Vizekanzler 18, Handschriftliche Notizen anl. Sitzung EWG-Ministerrat in Brüssel am 15.09.1969.

70 Claudia Hiepel meeting that had obviously started in a strained atmosphere, when Schumann complained about the ingratitude towards a suggestion that he regarded as a French concession. The September Council of ministers meeting thus served to clarify the various points of view without coming to a real agreement. A stocktaking of German foreign policies, written by Brandt’s close staff member and confidant Egon Bahr, clearly demonstrated the dilemma of German European policy.35 It presumed that the French would not hinder enlargement à la longue but that the applicants’ entry might not be expected before the end of the next German legislative period, which would then take place at the end of 1973. The Federal Republic could therefore choose between two alternatives. Firstly, it could continue its existing policies of flexibility: acting in consensus with all six members and in so doing trying to progress step-by-step in the process of European integration. The advantages of this alternative were seen in Germany’s partnership, demonstrating its esprit communautaire. This option implied a refusal of power politics and was regarded as a proof for the credibility of German foreign policy. The disadvantages were reflected in the emergence of a seesaw policy, with France ultimately setting the pace. Secondly, the Germans could put their national interests in the foreground by insisting on a linkage between completion and enlargement. It seemed absurd, and not only to Bahr, that the basic and ultimate goals of the Common Market would be established only to be modified again in the enlargement negotiations. It was however clear, that such an attitude put Germany in danger of becoming alienated from its French ally and, should the enlargement negotiations fail, from its British ally as well, on whose good will it depended for the success of the Ostpolitik envisaged by Brandt and Bahr. In addition, this course of confrontation would not have promoted the European integration process at all.36 The devaluation of the French Franc in August only exacerbated these already complicated matters. The definite regulation of the CAP seemed unattainable. Consequently, the enlargement negotiations were jeopardised which could finally lead into disintegrating Europe. This was a scenario that was seriously expected in the German Foreign Office in the following 12 or 18 months. Once more, France seemed to be blocking the European Community, not politically as under Charles de Gaulle but economically.37 The second working lunch meeting that took place on 17 October in Luxembourg, with the absence of the German Foreign minister, did not lead to a way out of the European impasse. Schumann rejected a linkage between enlargement and completion, the other five member states insisted that the summit conference should give a date for the start of negotiations.388 When the new government took over its official duties in October 1969, the German attitude towards the European integration process in general and towards

35. Überlegungen zur Außenpolitik einer künftigen Bundesregierung. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Bahr, 21.09.1969, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.296, pp.1047-1057. 36. Ibid., pp.1056 ff. 37. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Frank, 26.08.1969, betr.: Europäische Politik, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.267, pp.929 ff.

In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator 71

France in particular changed remarkably. Brandt now held an office that allowed him to set the guidelines for European policy. He no longer restricted himself to a policy of reconciliation, but tried to play a more active role to move the European integration process forward. When Brandt assumed the chancellor’s position, several officials of the Foreign Office moved into the Kanzleramt.39 Among them was the head of the Planning Department Egon Bahr, who became state secretary. At the same time, Brandt appointed Katharina Focke as parliamentary secretary responsible for European affairs. This newly established office demonstrated the importance the Chancellor attached to European policy, which became ‘a matter for the boss’. This was more than a tactical shift, but a signal for a new approach in foreign and European affairs which Brandt wanted to realise on his own initiative and that can be characterised as the attempt to renew the Federal Republic’s international role. The former émigré and antifascist Brandt considered himself as the representative not of a conquered but of a liberated Germany, as he often stated in public.40 This justified a more self-confident attitude towards the Allies. The French government likewise expected Brandt to pursue a more active European policy than his predecessor Kiesinger and tried to prepare for it. “We will take that into account” - mentioned the French ambassador Seydoux in a conversation with Egon Bahr on 8 October.41 After that, Bahr had the impression that a German government under Willy Brandt would assume a stronger position towards France, which expected greater pressure on the main issue of British entry into the EC. Bahr described the French present attitude as “unsure, observant and open for compromises”.42 He advised the German government to grasp this opportunity, bearing in mind that it would probably only last for a short time. Several concepts were established in the German administration that modified the German policy towards France.43 France and Germany alone could solve the array of challenges that were bedevilling the Community. The Federal Republic would need to temper the “egoistic interests” of France with a full-fledged conception of European unity. Interestingly enough, these German concepts would be based on France’s weaknesses. They argued that France had become uncertain about its central role as world power and its standing in European affairs, having seen its economic power in the industrial sector fall behind that of Germany. Until the industrial reforms planned by Pompidou achieved some degree of success, the French intended to maintain an economic balance with Germany in the agricultural

38. PAAA, B 150, vol.163, Arbeitsfrühstück der EWG-Außenminister zur Vorbereitung der Gipfelkonferenz, Luxemburg, 17.10.1969. The German Foreign Minister was represented by his states secretary Harkort. 39. See J. LODGE, The Organization and Control of European Integration in the Federal Republic of Germany, in: Parliamentary Affairs, 28(1974/75), pp.416-430. 40. For instance on a press conference for American journalists in October 1969, cited in: D. BINDER, The other German. Willy Brandt’s life and times, New Republic Book, Washington, 1975, p.256. 41. AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.310, pp.1103-1106. 42. Ibid., p.1104. 43. Notes of the head of ministry department Frank from 21 and 22 October 1969, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.319, pp.1127-1143 and document no.320, pp.1143-1147.

72 Claudia Hiepel sector. And so the Brandt administration argued that the Germans were well advised to treat the French with care. The degree of German esprit communautaire would serve as a model for French commitment to the EC. Consequently, Germany would be ready to renounce sovereignty especially in the area of monetary policy and to give France the impression that she held a major political position in spite of its limited economic power. Bilateral deals between France and Germany were already being considered by Kiesinger who, on the occasion of the Franco-German summit in early September 1969, had proposed the establishment of a bilateral working group to deal with technical problems of the CAP, such as “surplus production” and “units of account”. Pompidou hesitated a bit, but finally agreed under the condition that the working group should work discretely, so as not to irritate the other EC members.44 Apparently, this idea of dealing with the question within the framework of the Franco-German treaty of friendship had been put aside in the final phase of the election campaign and during the change of government in the Federal Republic.45 It was then up to the French to make the first move towards closer bilateral co-operation. Seydoux, in his conversation with Bahr on 8 October proposed the establishment of a Franco-German contact on a “high but discrete level” before the summit.46 Seydoux repeated his idea in early November after having reasserted his position at the French ministry of Foreign affairs. The Quai d’Orsay and the Elysée had no objections to a personal correspondence – personal in the sense that even the existence of an exchange of letters would not be made known to a third party. Brandt as the ‘younger in government’ was expected to initiate the exchange.47 From November the preparation for the conference was then in full swing. On 7 November Carlo Schmid, the recently inaugurated coordinator for the Franco-German relationship, went to Paris to meet the president. Pompidou expressed his changed attitude in no uncertain terms to Schmid. He felt that he and Brandt were destined to succeed: “Il faut aller à La Haye avec la volonté de réussir. Nous sommes condamnés à réussir. Le désir profond du Gouvernement allemand, c’est que la possibilité soit donnée d’ouvrir des négociations avec la Grande-Bretagne. Je dis tout de suite que nous n’y ferons pas obstacle. Après avoir obtenu ce que nous souhaitons, nous ne créerons pas de nouvelles difficultés. Vous pouvez le dire au Chancelier: nous serons ouverts, coopératifs, mais nous voulons l'achèvement du Marché Commun et le règlement financier”.48 Schmid answered lapidary: “Le Chancelier le sait et est d’accord”.49

44. Ibid., document no.279, p.971. 45. See the note of state secretary Harkort, 31 October, alluding to the difficulties of such a bilateral work group in view of the fact that Germany did not have a conception yet, PAAA, Büro Staatssekretäre 168. 46. AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.310, pp.1103-1106. 47. Note from 13 November 1969, AsD, Depositum Bahr, 343. 48. Archives Nationales [AN] 5 AG 2, 104. 49. Ibid.

In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator 73

Only two days later, in a conversation with the new German Foreign minister Walter Scheel, Schumann substantiated the French view and even offered Germany a solution to the problem of surplus production.500 Two incidents may have been responsible for this change of mind on the part of France. Firstly, the revaluation of the German Mark on 24 October coming on the heels of the French devaluation in August posed another threat to the CAP, showing a lack of esprit communautaire. Secondly, Scheel, in a provocative remark in the German Bundestag on 6 November, had claimed that the Common Market had dispersed. As a result of the unilateral monetary decisions of the French and German governments, France hence was strictly speaking no longer a member of the Common Market, whereas Germany remained a member by virtue of its complicated system of monetary compensation for German farmers. The Common Market as the core of European integration was only kept alive by “technical manipulations”.51 Whether or not it was a calculated attack to bring France out of her shell, the fact remains that Schumann reacted immediately. Deeply worried, he initially consulted Carlo Schmid52 and then referred to the Scheel speech in his conversation with the German Foreign minister. Schumann denied Scheel’s interpretation and stressed firmly that to him and the French, the CAP would mark “the most unifying element” of the Community.53 Scheel and Brandt did not hesitate to make the French reorientation known to the other partners.54 The third foreign ministers’ preparatory working lunch meeting on 10 November thus took place in a more harmonious and constructive manner. According to German records it was Schumann who seemed to dominate the discussions. He insisted on realising completion as the absolute French préalable, the fulfilment of which would determine France’s future membership in the Common Market. Modifications should only be accepted unanimously and if necessary, later on in the course of enlargement negotiations. These terms were generally well received. Only Luns and Scheel insisted on a sort of linkage, adding that the summit should avoid giving the impression that the negotiations on completion would have to be finished before other problems such as agrarian policy and enlargement could be discussed.55

50. AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.352, pp.1237-1246. 51. Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages. Stenographische Berichte, vol.71, Bonn 1969, p.281. 52. See the note of German ambassador Freiherr von Braun, 7 November 1969, mentioned in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.352, p.1240. 53. Ibid. 54. Scheel to Harmel in Brussels on 10 November, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.353, pp.1247-1250 and one day later Brandt to the Italian ambassador Luciolli, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.358, p.1263-1268. 55. AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.356, pp.1258-1260. 74 Claudia Hiepel

In search of an agenda

The active diplomatic exchange after Pompidou’s summit proposal had been made public stood in sharp contrast to the lack of ideas about the detailed technical arrangements. While a common denominator had been found in the form of the triptych, it was not absolutely clear how to bring it to life. It was inconceivable to all persons involved in the preparation that a Heads of State and Government conference should deal with technical details about completion, for instance. It should rather give a political guideline for the future of the EC. But even the reforms of the Common Market or the envisaged establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) notwithstanding, the German administrations had no clear concept on hand. Certainly, the change of government had disrupted the administration’s working routine.56 Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the German government did not have any alternative suggestions that went beyond the sceptically judged Mansholt plan.57 Should they be asked by their partners, the German delegates would not even be in a position to contribute any ideas to the issue of the agricultural reforms.58 Indeed, the German ministry of Agriculture seemed to be the one most lagging behind. In early November, though the conference was to take place on 17 and 18 November, it confessed that it could only discuss some incomplete ideas which were still at the stage of clearly being defined. The federal ministry of Economic affairs announced that it would present a note, as soon as possible, regarding the EMU. It should go beyond the plan of the Commission’s vice-president, Raymond Barre, a plan that was regarded as insufficient.59 The Italian request to postpone the summit conference to early December60 thus fit in with the German plans. It allowed the work on the ultimate preparation to be pushed ahead.

56. As Harkort argued in a conversation with the high French official Brunet, PAAA, Referat I A 2, 1438. 57. S. MANSHOLT, Memorandum zur Reform der Landwirtschaft in der Europäischen Wirtschafts- gemeinschaft, in: Bulletin der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 1/1969, Sonderbeilage. See for crit- icism of the Mansholt plan: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.306, pp.1093 ff. 58. PAAA, B 150, vol.163, pp.591 ff., Aufzeichnung, betr. Regelung der Agrarfinanzierung in der Endphase, Vorbereitung der Gipfelkonferenz. 59. Bundesarchiv Koblenz [BAK], Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 61710, Niederschrift über die Sitzung der Staatssekretäre für Europafragen am 6. November 1969, im Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Sekretariat des Staatssekretärausschusses für Europafragen, 09.12.1969; see R. BAR- RE, Memorandum über die Koordinierung der Wirtschaftspolitik und die Zusammenarbeit in Währungsfragen innerhalb der Gemeinschaft, in: Bulletin der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 1/ 1969, Sonderbeilage. According to the German minister of Economics, this so-called Barre plan focused too much on the monetary cooperation instead of short- and long-term means for harmonisation of a common economic policy. 60. First indication in a note from 6 November, mentioning a conflict that became apparent in a conversation between French Foreign minister Schumann and the Italian ambassador, which had intensified the Italian wish to postpone the summit, PAAA, Referat I A 1, 1438, Leiter der Abteilung I, Vermerk. In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator 75

At this stage, Willy Brandt included the European father figure Jean Monnet in the preparations for the Conference. Monnet exerted a rather strong influence on the German Chancellor on the eve of the Hague Summit.61 As head of the ‘Action Committee for the United States of Europe’, which was joined by Willy Brandt in the mid-sixties, Monnet tried to use his close contact with the now Head of government to intervene directly in the preparations for the conference. Just prior to the summit, he wrote two letters to Brandt, encouraging him to promote the old Action Committee’s demands, which included the enlargement issue and the establishment of the EMU. For that end, he proposed the installation of a European Reserve Fund in which Germany would contribute a part of its currency reserves as an “instrument de la solidarité monétaire des pays de la Communauté”.62 In a personal meeting on 7 November, Monnet outlined his views, to which Brandt showed a certain reserve due to the fact that the German minister of Economic affairs, Karl Schiller, had rejected these ideas. Schiller insisted on an ‘economic’ approach of monetary matters, requiring the harmonisation of the European economies as a first and most important step.63 However, Brandt did not give up on his plan. It seems as if he was convinced of having found a means of expressing Germany’s solidarity within the union. More interested in the political implications of such a project, he did not really consider the underlying economic concept. Therefore, he gave the task to Focke and Bahr in the Kanzleramt, to examine the Monnet proposals with the aim of presenting them as his own ideas on the Summit Conference.64 Already on 13 November, during an inter-ministerial meeting at the Kanzleramt, the German positions for the summit conference had begun to take shape.65 The German agreement on completion became linked to certain conditions in other areas, such as fixing a limit of costs for the Common Market, passing a declaration of intent concerning the regulation of surplus production, full financing of the Community from its own resources in close connection with strengthening EP’s competencies and, last but not least, a French concession on starting enlargement negotiations. With some flexibility, the German starting point would be 1 April. All those present at the meeting welcomed a Foreign Office’s proposal that was seen as a means of arriving at a solution on the sensitive enlargement issue and the reform of agricultural market rules. According to this proposal, the granting

61. See G. BOSSUAT, Drei Wege nach dem Gipfel von Den Haag. Monnet, Brandt, Pompidou und das Europa der 70er Jahre, in: A. WILKENS (ed.), Interessen verbinden. Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bouvier, Bonn, 1999, pp.353-386. K. FOCKE, Erinnerungen an Jean Monnet, ibid., pp.23-30. 62. Jean Monnet to Chancellor Willy Brandt, 21 and 31 October 1969, German translation, in: WBA, Bestand Bundeskanzler und Bundesregierung 14. 63. BAK, Bundeskanzleramt 6417, Vermerk über ein Gespräch des Herrn Bundeskanzlers mit dem Präsidenten des Aktionskomitees Jean Monnet am 07.10.1969. 64. WBA, Bestand Bundeskanzler und Bundesregierung 91, Vermerk betr. EWG-Gipfelkonferenz am 02.12.1969, handwritten note of Brandt from 9 November 1969. 65. PAAA, Referat I A 1, 1439, Interministerielle Besprechung unter Vorsitz Sts Bahr, Bundeskan- zleramt, am 13.11.1969. 76 Claudia Hiepel of own resources to the EC as a way of financing the agricultural market, made ratification by the German Bundestag necessary, which could only be expected if enlargement were to take place and a reduction of surplus production were guaranteed.66 The minister of Economic affairs’ memorandum was regarded as a good basis on which Germany could make a decisive contribution on deepening – the third element of the triptych.67 At this stage, European Political Cooperation (EPC) did not play any role in the discussion. The last bilateral conversation before the Conference took place between Brandt and Luns on 25 November.68 Furthermore, the German ambassadors had the task of informing the member states about the stance Germany was expected to take.69 Concerning the pivotal agreement on the enlargement issue, the Federal Republic introduced the idea of not mentioning a fixed date in the communiqué if that would help the French to yield. It promised to draft proposals concerning the harmonisation of economic and monetary policies and even made known its intent to use the necessary ratification in the Bundestag to reach an agreement on CAP reforms and enlargement negotiations. At the same time, the ambassadors would present this proposal as Germany’s last concession to France.70 The hierarchy of the German triptych hence became clear: enlargement, deepening, completion. Finally, on 27 November, Brandt sent a letter to the French president confirming that he had understood the Seydoux message mentioned above, and underlining once more the pivotal role of a Franco-German agreement. Brandt signalled his consent to the French préalable and the German willingness to make financial sacrifices. At the same time, by giving a vivid account of the possible effects of an overly costly CAP on German internal politics, such as a feared “nationalist explosion”, he strove to clarify why he would have to insist on reforms of the CAP. The much-needed decision on enlargement was only mentioned in one paragraph. Brandt then came to the presentation of his favourite idea of a European Reserve Fund that should be established after having agreed upon some convergence criteria of economic policies – the latter an additional idea, which may have been instigated by his minister of Economic affairs. Brandt lauded this Fund for making a contribution to the solidarity and stability of the Community and thereby hoped to convince the French president of the German esprit communautaire.71 On the eve

66. Ibid. This idea had been considered carefully and had been discussed controversially in the Ger- man Foreign Office already in the beginning of October. See the notes from 30 and 31 October 1969, PAAA, B 150, 163, pp.5918 ff. and 5954 ff. 67. BAK, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 93456, Deutsches Memorandum zur Frage der Wirt- schafts- und Währungsunion auf der Konferenz der Staats- und Regierungschefs der EWG. Von Herrn Minister gebilligte Fassung. 68. PAAA, Referat I A 1, 1439, Gespräch des Herrn Bundesminister des Auswärtigen mit dem nied- erländischen Außenminister Luns in Den Haag am 25.11.1969, hier: Deutsche Vorstellungen zur Behandlung der Gemeinschaftsfragen auf der bevorstehenden Gipfelkonferenz. 69. See the telegrams to the ambassadors in the member states’ capitals from 25 November, PAAA, Referat I A 1, 1440. 70. Ibid. 71. Brandt to Pompidou, 27 November 1969, in: AN 5 AG 2, 103. In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator 77 of the summit, Germany had put its cards on the table. Pompidou did not hesitate to answer, only one day later, in a more informal note in which he did not only stress the importance of the Franco-German relationship but also referred to the necessity of good personal relations between him and Brandt which could help to solve Europe’s problems. Concerning the enlargement question he asserted to be open for a solution but he refused to ﬁx a date for starting negotiations. He welcomed a closer economic and monetary cooperation and promised to think about the project of a European Reserve Fund.72 The last bilateral contact between Brandt and Pompidou before the conference conﬁrmed the recently discovered compromises and served to improve the climate between the two partners. Both were spared to experience any real surprise on the summit in The Hague.

The Conference

Dutch Prime minister Piet de Jong started the conference off by discussing the enlargement issue, which also stood at the centre of Willy Brandt’s speech in the first session.73 Brandt presented an ambitious European action program, whereas Pompidou, as previous speaker, delivered more of a summary of the status of European integration and avoided referring to the enlargement issue. Brandt and de Jong succeeded in circumventing Pompidou’s obvious tactic of marginalizing the enlargement issue at the Conference. Referring to German public opinion and the Bundestag, Brandt clearly stated that he was expected not to leave the conference without a concrete outcome on the enlargement issue. In addition, he surprisingly openly cited Germany’s dominant economic position: “Whoever fears that the economic power of the Federal Republic would be disadvantageous for the balance within the Community, should for that reason be in favour of the enlargement”.74 This argument alluded to France’s fear of German economy and, indeed, the French took note of it.75 Brandt also mentioned the European Political Cooperation, which he did not consider the most important topic of the Conference, but at least the Foreign ministers would be instructed to discuss it “in the hypothesis” of enlargement.76 Only in the afternoon, did Brandt speak about completion. He underscored the German consent to a definite financing of

72. Unsigned note of Pompidou from 28 November, in: AsD, Depositum Egon Bahr 441/1. A “projet de réponse” from 29 November mentioned in: M.-T. BITSCH, Le sommet …, op.cit., p.558. 73. The German records of the Summit Conference, in: PAAA, Ministerbüro 334. The Brandt text was published on the whole, in: Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung 146, 2 December 1969, pp.1241-1243. 74. Ibid., p.1241. 75. «Il a même évoqué le contre-poids qu’offriraient les Britanniques a ceux qui pouvaient craindre la puissance économique allemande!». Quotation from the French records of the Conference in the SGCI archive, 900568, Art. 386, pp. 250 ff. (kindly made available by Piers Ludlow). 76. Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, op.cit., p.1242. 78 Claudia Hiepel agriculture under the well-known conditions of surplus regulation and enlargement. “Only in so doing, would the Federal Government be in a position to recommend the legislative power to give their consent to the financing rulings”.77 The Foreign Office’s suggestion to use the Bundestag as a means of exerting pressure was presented in a more diplomatic and cautious manner. On the second day, Brandt presented his idea of a reserve fund in connection with the suggestion to establish the EMU step-by-step. More importantly, however, may have been his introductory statement, not mentioned in the published text, that the German delegation would put its trust in Pompidou’s explanation about the French desire to start enlargement negotiations and on a fixed schedule.78 Behind these somewhat cryptic utterances lay the all-decisive agreement on enlargement, which is said to have been achieved by Pompidou and Brandt during the dinner hosted by Queen Juliana in the evening.79 According to Brandt, it was there that he pushed Pompidou to agree finally on initiating the enlargement negotiations “during the course of the next year”, a deal which was confirmed by Pompidou’s word of honour to the Belgian and Luxembourg Prime ministers Gaston Eyskens and Pierre Werner who had followed the discussion quite closely.80 Even if the informal agreement between Brandt and Pompidou at this evening had played a pivotal role and Brandt was therefore praised in some German press reports,81 the origins of the idea were to be found within the Italian government. In a conversation with the Italian ambassador Mario Luciolli on 11 November Willy Brandt spoke highly of an idea that had obviously been put forward in an Italian note to which Brandt referred on this occasion. This note mentioned the possibility of coming to an internal agreement on the starting date for the summit, which would not necessarily have to appear in the official communiqué. Brandt adopted this formulation, in addition to his idea of relying on a personal statement from Pompidou.82 With that, the enlargement issue came to a close. As promised, Pompidou suggested a solution to the issue of agricultural surplus production. In return, the German concessions were, as previously arranged, a definite regulation on financing agriculture and the transition to the final period on 1 January 1970. However, France rejected Brandt’s persistent demand for “drastic reforms of agricultural market rules”.83

77. Ibid., p.1243. 78. See the German records, op.cit., p.21. 79. This is according to the memories of the German Chancellor. See W. BRANDT, Begegnungen und Einsichten. Die Jahre 1960-1975, Hoffmann und Campe, Hamburg, 1976, pp.321 ff. 80. Ibid. 81. See for instance DER SPIEGEL, EWG-Gipfel. Datum genannt, 50(1969), pp.28 ff. The author was surprisingly well informed about the events in The Hague’s palace Huis ten Bosch. 82. AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.358, pp.1263-1268. 83. See the French records, op.cit., pp.265 ff. In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator 79

Results of the Conference

In comparison to the German draft communiqué, the final communiqué of the conference was, on some crucial points, based on German proposals. However, the German delegation had intended to prioritise issues differently. In the German view, the enlargement issue should have taken a more prominent role, followed by EPC, EMU and then finally the issue of financing the agricultural market.844 Despite that, a detailed first analysis of the outcomes of the conference written by the Foreign Office and the ministry of Economic affairs was generally positive. The French position was regarded as having been constructive on the whole. The main German goals had been accepted. Hard negotiations on the details were expected to take place in the future Council of ministers meetings, but the problems would no longer be insurmountable, owing to the results of the summit.85 Paragraph 5 of the final communiqué concerning the completion of the Community was, according to the same analysis, based on proposals made by Germany. One little detail appeared decisive: the plural of financing regulations, meaning the regulations for financing agriculture as well as the overall financing of the Community by its own resources in the final phase of the Common Market. The German delegation had used a ‘back door’ route to establish the linkage between completion and reform issues, which had been so harshly contested by France. It was considered an important step that for the first time the French had agreed on a widening of the budgetary competencies of the EP. Under the given circumstances, now that the French had rejected direct elections, it was considered a real increase in EP’s authority.86 The ministry of Economic affairs was certainly very enthusiastic about paragraph 8 concerning the EMU, which was based precisely on its own draft. It was considered essential to build a Community of stability and economic growth and to give priority to the harmonisation of the economic policies before moving to monetary cooperation. It was also quite clear that only the Dutch delegation shared this position, whereas the other governments focussed on a parallel development or even adopted a more ‘monetary approach’.87 The wording of paragraph 15 concerning political cooperation was seen as a simple means of arriving at a formulation that would break through the ‘vicious circle’ of the dispute concerning the participants of such cooperation. It was a welcome relief that the Foreign ministers would be in charge of establishing the guidelines. Owing to the linkage of political co-operation to the enlargement issue it was anticipated that the new members would be included.88

84. PAAA, Ministerbüro, 334, Entwurf eines Kommuniqués für die Gipfelkonferenz, 27.11.1969. 85. BAK, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 93456, Note from 3 January 1970; PAAA, Referat I A 1, 1441, Aufzeichnung betr. Sitzung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses. Kommentar zu operativen Punkten (5-15) des Kommuniqués. 86. Ibid., Note of the ministry of Economic affairs. 87. Ibid. 88. Note of the Foreign Office, op.cit. 80 Claudia Hiepel

The Federal Government enthusiastically hailed the Summit as a decisive step towards a common European future. For Willy Brandt, it marked the most important event of his recently inaugurated government.89 The reactions of the German public to this first political action of the Brandt government in the area of foreign policy were on the whole positive and even enthusiastic. Most of the press reports pointed out Brandt’s significant role in helping to break down the French resistance to enlargement.90 What was striking to the majority of observers at the conference was the very positive atmosphere, in which it, however, took place.91 This ‘spirit of The Hague’ seems to have been durable and it also characterised the following Council of ministers negotiations that had the summit’s decisions to realise. The atmosphere and the tone had improved tremendously. According to telegrams from members of the German delegation, the meetings were characterised by matter-of-factness, an open attitude towards the positions of others, mutual consideration and even amicability.92 As the detailed reconstruction of the preparations has shown, most of the negotiation positions had been clarified before the conference and the agreements on the sensitive issues had been outlined. A summit would be the ideal occasion to confirm and reinforce the recent solutions at the highest possible level. The Hague conference thus served to forge commitments, which were required by Pompidou, on the one hand, to justify his European policy towards the French Gaullists, and by the other member states’ governments on the other, to make the French president hold true to his promises. In fact, the Conference had broken the European impasse by opening the door to the applicant states. There was no reason to doubt Pompidou’s word of honour. The Hague summit itself did not deliver any real surprise. It served to stage the compromise for the public. Brandt’s role in this scenario was to offer Pompidou a face-saving solution to the enlargement issue. The decisive change, however, happened in the French administration before the conference. First indications for Pompidou’s willingness to give up the negative Gaullist position regarding British entry turned out during the election campaign. Further evidence for Pompidou’s change of mind will be provided by French files.93 But it is true, that the French president’s attitude towards European integration policy finally appeared in the Franco-German bilateral contacts.

89. See the exposé for a lecture of parliamentary secretary Focke, in: AsD, Depositum Katharina Focke 191, Die europäische Situation nach Den Haag in der Sicht der deutschen Regierung; M.-T. BITSCH, Le sommet …, op.cit., p.562. 90. According to the carefully reported German press reactions in the archives of the British Foreign Office (kindly made available by Alan S. Milward). See also DER SPIEGEL, op.cit. 91. See, for instance, the interim report of Focke about the second day of the conference, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.385, pp.1357-1359. 92. AsD, Depositum Katharina Focke 199, Fernschreiben aus Brüssel, 09.02.1970, betr.: 102. Tagung des Rates der Europäischen Gemeinschaften am 05/06/07. Februar 1970. 93. M.-T. Bitsch mentions two ‘Conseils des ministres restreints’ on 21 October and on 17 November, in which Pompidou admitted that the French position had become “intenable” and - in case of maintaining the French position - the Common Market would disappear (M.-T. BITSCH, Le sommet …, op.cit., p.548). In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator 81

Undoubtedly, it was the clear stance of Brandt in favour of the enlargement issue that encouraged Pompidou to yield at that point in time. The chancellor clearly exerted greater pressure on France than his predecessor Kiesinger had done. Since the beginning of July the still Foreign minister openly discussed the sensitive issue of surplus production and – in doing so – subtly left Pompidou in doubt as to the German assent to the definite ruling of financing the agricultural market. Furthermore, acting as a conciliator between the extreme attitudes of France on the one hand and the Benelux on the other, Brandt clearly demonstrated his esprit communautaire and thus gave his policy high credibility. In doing so, he succeeded in taking German national interests into consideration without jeopardising the relationship to the French and British allies. If there were any conceptions about the long-term effects of the conference, they certainly were not completely outlined at this stage. Though the EMU had played a prominent role in the German drafts, its future development and failure in the early Seventies were not foreseeable. It is true of course, that the German administration was a bit naive in assuming that Germany would follow through on its ‘economist’ approach as opposed to the ‘monetary’ approach which Pompidou and several other member states had adopted. The European Political Cooperation, however, would emerge with a promising future, although it took a marginal position on decisions regarding the preparations for the conference. It was “a few lines tucked away” in the final communiqué.94 However, the Davignon report of October 1970 established the framework for a common foreign policy with the European Political Cooperation (EPC). It was a sort of alternative route (“zweiten Gleises”) outside of the Rome Treaties that, together with the entry of Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland, helped in setting the decisive course for further development of Western European co-operation in the Seventies.95 Finally, the Hague summit had set a precedent for the European Council, which would convene regularly from 1975, in helping to institutionalise the summit conferences which had initially been rejected. But obviously, the Hague summit was a success worth repeating. It facilitated the work of EC institutions such as the Committee of Permanent Representatives, which had been blocked in 1969 for lack of political guidelines by their governments.96 In the case of the Hague summit, Brandt’s search for the greatest common denominator had resulted in a decisive step forward in the European integration process, a procedure which normally moves at a snail’s pace.

94. C. HILL, K.E. SMITH, European Foreign Policy: key documents, Routledge, London/New York, 2000, p.72. 95. K. D. BRACHER, W. JÄGER, W. LINK, Republik im Wandel 1969-1974. Die Ära Brandt, DVA/ Brockhaus, Stuttgart/Mannheim, 1986, p.243. 96. PAAA, Referat I A 1, 1440, Bericht des Ausschusses der Ständigen Vertreter, 24.11.1969 and the commentary statement of the German Foreign Office from 26 November.

83 Le sommet de La Haye. L’initiative française, ses ﬁnalités et ses limites

Marie-Thérèse Bitsch

Seule la France qui s’était opposée dans les années 1960 à l’entrée du Royaume Uni dans la CEE pouvait mettre ﬁn au blocage qui frappait la Communauté depuis le deuxième veto du général de Gaulle, en novembre 1967. Après la démission de ce dernier, en avril 1969, il revient à Georges Pompidou, son successeur à la présidence de la République, de prendre une initiative pour sortir la construction européenne de l’impasse. Il le fait rapidement, dès juin-juillet 1969, en proposant une méthode (une tactique): la réunion d’une conférence au sommet des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement des Six et un objectif (une stratégie) précisé par le célèbre triptyque: achèvement, approfondissement, élargissement. Mais sa marge de manœuvre est étroite en raison de la situation intérieure française et du climat international, notamment des relations sérieusement détériorées entre la France et ses partenaires européens. En s’appuyant sur des archives françaises et européennes,1 cette étude cherche à analyser le processus qui conduit les autorités françaises, de l’élection présidentielle en juin 1969 au sommet de La Haye en décembre 1969, à initier une relance dont l’importance est souvent comparée à celle de Messine en 1955, même si ses modalités et ses conséquences sont sensiblement différentes.2 Cet article essaie de répondre à quelques questions en se plaçant d’un point de vue français. Pourquoi la France veut-elle une relance (I)? Pourquoi la faire au moyen d’un sommet (II)? Comment – sur la base de quelles priorités – la réaliser (III)?

1. Sources consultées: dossiers du Fonds Pompidou, Archives nationales, Paris, série 5AG2 (désignés désormais, en abrégé, 5AG2); Archives du Quai d’Orsay, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris (par la suite, MAE) notamment la série Questions internationales européennes, 1966-1970, dossiers n˚ 2724 et 2725 ainsi que la série Secrétariat général, entretiens et messages, dossiers n˚ 37, 39 et 40; les Archives des Communautés européennes à Bruxelles, celles de la Commission et du Conseil. Le Bulletin quotidien de l’Agence Europe (ci-dessous, Europe) fournit également beaucoup d’informations. 2. Sur la relance de 1969 et une esquisse de comparaison entre La Haye et Messine, voir M.-Th. BITSCH, Le sommet de La Haye. La mise en route de la relance de 1969, in: W. LOTH (dir.), Crises and Compromises: The European Project, 1963-1969, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, 2001, pp.539-565. A la différence de ce premier article qui analysait la préparation du sommet de La Haye en montrant le rôle de l’ensemble des acteurs (gouvernements des Six, institutions européennes, organisations de la société civile), la présente étude se focalise sur l’attitude de Paris, en essayant de voir dans quelle mesure le gouvernement français tient plus ou moins compte des positions de ses interlocuteurs. Ce deuxième article prend en compte les archives du Quai d’Orsay qui n’étaient pas encore accessibles en 1969, lors du colloque organisé par Wilfried Loth.

84 Marie-Thérèse Bitsch

I. La relance: une nécessité pour la politique française?

Pour les historiens, de même que pour les observateurs contemporains, la ﬁn des années 1960 apparaît comme une phase de stagnation de la construction européenne, en dépit de certains succès de l’intégration économique, tels que la mise en route de la politique agricole commune avec l’organisation du marché des céréales en 1966-1967, l’achèvement de l’union douanière réalisée dès le 1er juillet 1968 avec dix-huit mois d’avance sur le calendrier initialement prévu, ou encore la mise en application des décisions du Kennedy Round concernant les réductions des droits du tarif extérieur commun aux Six. Mais des tensions entre la France et les Cinq, déjà sensibles au sujet de l’Europe politique en 1962 et de la première candidature britannique en 1963, sont aiguisées par la crise de la chaise vide en 1965 et sérieusement aggravées en 1967 par le second veto du général de Gaulle.3 Désormais la France est condamnée à un certain isolement encore accentué avec les remous politiques et sociaux de l’année 1968, le boycott du conseil de l’UEO par le gouvernement français qui provoque une autre crise de la chaise vide et l’affaire Soames qui éclate en février 1969, lorsque l’initiative de Paris en faveur d’un rapprochement franco-britannique ravive la méﬁance de l’ensemble de ses partenaires.4 Au moment de la démission de Charles de Gaulle, pour des raisons de politiques intérieures, suite à la victoire du «non» au referendum du 27 avril 1969, la politique européenne de la France est dans l’impasse et la Communauté plus ou moins paralysée, malgré diverses initiatives, notamment belges et allemandes, pour réactiver les coopérations entre les Six et entre l’Angleterre et les Six.

Les attentes des partenaires de la France

Le départ du général de Gaulle suscite aussitôt certaines attentes chez les partenaires de la France qui parient sur un assouplissement de sa position, un réexamen de la candidature britannique et une relance de l’idée européenne.5 Ainsi, le Corriere della Sera souhaite, dès ﬁn avril, que «la France reprenne sa grande mission historique et retrouve en Europe occidentale le leadership qui lui revient de

3. Sur la politique européenne du général de Gaulle, voir Institut Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle en son siècle, t.5, L’Europe, La Documentation française, Paris, 1992. Sur la crise de la chaise vide, voir les travaux de W. LOTH, notamment Les implications du conflit Hallstein - de Gaulle en 1965, in: M.-Th. BITSCH, W. LOTH, R. POIDEVIN (dir.), Institutions européennes et Identités européennes, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1998, pp.401-418; du même auteur, Français et Allemands dans la crise institutionnelle de 1965, in: M.-Th. BITSCH (dir.), Le couple France-Allemagne et les institutions européennes, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2001, pp.229-243. 4. Sur les tensions de la fin de l’ère de Gaulle, voir G. BOSSUAT, De Gaulle et la seconde candidature britannique aux Communautés européennes (1966-1969), in: W. LOTH (dir.), Crises and Compromises …, op.cit., pp.511-538. 5. Voir par exemple, les télégrammes envoyés à Paris, de Londres, 30 avril 1969, ou de Bonn, 12 juin 1969, MAE, 2725.

Le sommet de La Haye 85 droit».6 Certains considèrent alors que la France pouvait mettre ses partenaires au pied du mur, que l’heure de vérité était arrivée pour les Six qui devront prendre des décisions et ne plus s’abriter derrière la rhétorique du général.7 Mais dans un premier temps, les espoirs restent modérés: on veut se garder de toute illusion, on s’attend à beaucoup de réserves sur l’élargissement, on estime que le prochain gouvernement maintiendra certaines positions qui correspondent aux intérêts de la France.8 Et d’ailleurs, Michel Debré, le ministre des Affaires étrangères du gouvernement qui reste en place jusqu’à l’élection du nouveau président, met en garde contre des attentes excessives. Selon lui, le futur gouvernement français, quel qu’il soit, sera attaché à la politique agricole commune et, n’ayant pas au départ l’autorité du général de Gaulle, il sera plus dur dans ce domaine; or, aucun gouvernement britannique n’ayant jamais accepté la PAC, parler d’adhésion dans ces conditions lui paraît théorique.9 Les Cinq ont-ils envisagé de faire pression plus ou moins discrètement sur la France pendant la campagne électorale? Dans une interview publiée par le Spiegel, Willy Brandt, alors ministre des Affaires étrangères du gouvernement de grande coalition,10 déclare qu’il serait intéressant que la France donne un signe sur ce qui semble possible mais que «l’Allemagne doit éviter de donner le sentiment d’une pression, ou d’une immixtion ou d’une humiliation du partenaire français».11 Les groupes politiques du Parlement européen s’expriment également. Les socialistes, par exemple, estiment que les événements en France devraient permettre un nouveau développement de l’intégration. Ils souhaitent une ouverture, dès que possible, de nouvelles négociations en vue de l’élargissement et une décision rapide sur l’élection directe du Parlement européen et sur le renforcement de ses pouvoirs.12 Au lendemain du premier tour des élections présidentielles,13 le 5 juin, un conseil de l’UEO se tient à La Haye, toujours sans la France qui prolonge la politique de la chaise vide. A cette occasion, Joseph Luns, le ministre néerlandais des Affaires étrangères, suggère que les Six de la CEE adoptent prochainement une déclaration d’intention au sujet de l’élargissement.14 Celle-ci pourrait avoir valeur de test sur les dispositions du nouveau gouvernement français. Le même jour, Willy

6. Rome à Paris, 30 avril 1969, MAE, 2725. 7. Ibid., et Bonn à Paris, 12 juin, ainsi que La Haye à Paris, 11 juin 1969, MAE, 2725. 8. Voir Rome à Paris, 30 avril, Bonn à Paris , 13 mai et 12 juin, MAE, 2725. 9. Procès-verbal (PV) de la réunion du Conseil Affaires générales tenue à Bruxelles le 12 mai 1969, MAE, 39. 10. Cette coalition CDU/CSU-SPD, dirigée par le chancelier Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (1966-1969) sera remplacée par un gouvernement SPD-FDP dirigé par Willy Brandt en octobre 1969. 11. Bonn à Paris, 13 mai 1969, MAE, 2725. 12. Europe, 2 juin 1969 (Une réunion du groupe socialiste du Parlement européen s’est tenue à Ham- bourg, les 29 et 30 mai 1969). 13. Le premier tour a lieu le 1er juin, le second le 15 juin. Restent en lice pour le second tour, Alain Poher et Georges Pompidou qui est le mieux placé avec 44,5% des suffrages exprimés. 14. La Haye à Paris, 11 juin 1969, MAE, 2725. Joseph Luns renouvelle sa demande le 17 juin, devant l’Assemblée de l’UEO, à Paris (Europe, 18 juin 1969).

86 Marie-Thérèse Bitsch

Brandt, tout en rappelant son souci de ménager l’opinion française, préconise l’organisation, à l’automne, d’une réunion des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement des sept pays de l’UEO pour définir un «programme européen de travail», faire l’inventaire des problèmes posés par l’adhésion de l’Angleterre au Marché commun et déterminer la procédure, le calendrier ainsi que les points-clés de la négociation d’élargissement.15 L’une et l’autre de ces propositions sont accueillies avec d’importantes réserves. La France est opposée à une «déclaration d’intention» qu’elle perçoit comme un «procès d’intention», juste au moment où elle annonce sa volonté d’ouverture.16 Plusieurs gouvernements s’efforcent d’écarter ce sujet d’irritation potentielle entre la France et les Cinq. La Belgique fait savoir qu’elle ne s’associe pas à l’initiative de Joseph Luns qui ne parle pas dans cette affaire au nom du Benelux et elle propose d’user de son influence pour que le gouvernement néerlandais renonce à son projet.17 De son coté, Willy Brandt désavoue également les «initiatives verbales».18 Luns revient encore à la charge, le 17 juillet, lors d’un entretien à Paris avec le nouveau premier ministre français, Jacques Chaban-Delmas,19 mais le gouvernement néerlandais finit par renoncer à son idée.20 Quant à la proposition de Willy Brandt, elle est considérée comme répondant, dans une certaine mesure, à des préoccupations électorales du leader du SPD.21 Elle est jugée assez sévèrement par les ministres du Benelux qui trouvent que l’UEO doit s’en tenir à la coopération politique et que la question de l’élargissement doit être traitée à Bruxelles, dans le cadre communautaire et avec la participation de la Commission.22 Willy Brandt, qui ne semble pas vraiment soutenu sur ce point par le chancelier, insiste d’autant moins que la France lance le lendemain une initiative concurrente.

Les raisons du revirement français

En effet, déjà pendant la campagne électorale, Georges Pompidou annonce certaines orientations de sa future politique européenne. Dès le 14 mai, il déclare que la Communauté doit s’élargir et le 20 mai, à Orléans, il se dit prêt à reprendre les discussions avec l’Angleterre, pourvu que celle-ci fasse preuve d’une ambition

15. Europe, 5 juin 1969, et La Haye à Paris, 11 juin 1969, MAE, 2725. 16. Entretien entre Maurice Schumann et l’ambassadeur de Belgique, 16 juillet, MAE, 2725 et entretien entre Jacques Chaban-Delmas et Joseph Luns, 17 juillet, MAE, 37. 17. Entretien entre Maurice Schumann et l’ambassadeur de Belgique, 16 juillet 1969, MAE, 2725. 18. Entretiens de Willy Brandt avec les nouveaux dirigeants français, à Paris, le 4 juillet, 5AG2, 104. 19. Compte rendu de l’entretien, MAE, 37. 20. Il semble qu’il y ait renoncé dès le Conseil du 22 juillet qu’il préside et où la question n’est plus abordée. Voir La Haye à Paris, 23 juillet et Bruxelles (Jean-Marc Boegner, représentant permanent de la France auprès des Communautés européennes) à Paris, 23 juillet, MAE, 2724. 21. Les élections pour le renouvellement du Bundestag doivent avoir lieu le 28 septembre 1969. 22. Europe, 5 et 9 juin 1969.

Le sommet de La Haye 87 sincèrement européenne.23 Le 6 juin, entre les deux tours, le lendemain du jour où Willy Brandt a proposé un sommet à Sept, il lance l’idée d’une conférence des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement des Six. L’ensemble de ses propositions sont explicitées, peu après son élection, le 10 juillet, à l’occasion de sa première conférence de presse. Georges Pompidou renouvelle alors sa proposition de sommet et précise les problèmes qui devraient y être abordés. Il rappelle qu’il n’a pas d’objection de principe à l’entrée de la Grande-Bretagne mais que les Six doivent d’abord se mettre d’accord sur les conditions d’adhésion. Ils doivent aussi achever la phase transitoire et approfondir l’action communautaire dans les domaines, notamment, de la technologie, des transports, de la politique monétaire ….24 Le projet de Georges Pompidou implique, par conséquent, un inﬂéchissement important de la politique européenne de la France, puisqu’il se dit prêt, non seulement à achever la phase transitoire et à approfondir la coopération entre les Six, mais aussi à envisager l’élargissement à l’Angleterre qui attend depuis huit ans aux portes de la Communauté. Comment expliquer ce revirement de la politique européenne de la France? Quelles sont les motivations profondes du nouveau président de la République? Cette réorientation s’impose d’abord pour d’urgentes raisons de politique intérieure française et, en particulier, des préoccupations électorales. Face à son principal concurrent dans la course à l’Elysée, le très européiste président du Sénat et président de la République par intérim, Alain Poher, le gaulliste Georges Pompidou n’est assuré de l’emporter qu’en élargissant sa base électorale aux républicains indépendants regroupés derrière Valéry Giscard d’Estaing et à une fraction des centristes autour de Jacques Duhamel. Il importe donc de donner des gages à ces deux forces d’appoint attachées à l’intégration communautaire et soucieuses de relance européenne.25 Mais cette relance exige une reprise de la coopération avec les Cinq, conditionnée elle-même par une ouverture vers l’Angleterre. Pompidou déclare lui-même que le refus de discuter avec l’Angleterre est devenu «intenable» et que, «si la France maintenait son refus systématique, on irait vers la mort du Marché commun».26 D’après le témoignage d’Alain Peyreﬁtte, le président avait conscience, de manière aiguë, de l’impossibilité de continuer à s’opposer aux Cinq, comme l’avait fait de Gaulle, à la fois sur le problème de l’adhésion de l’Angleterre et sur la question des institutions communautaires.27 Comme il était attaché à «l’Europe des Etats», c’est-à-dire à un fonctionnement intergouvernemental des

23. D. JOHNSON, La politique européenne de Georges Pompidou, vue de Grande-Bretagne, in: As- sociation Georges Pompidou, Georges Pompidou et l’Europe, Complexe, Bruxelles, 1995, p.221. 24. Texte de la conférence de presse dans 5AG2, 632. 25. J.-R. BERNARD, L’élargissement de la Communauté, vu de Paris, in: Association Georges Pom- pidou, op.cit., p.238. 26. PV du conseil restreint, Paris, 21 octobre 1969, 5AG2, 52. 27. A. PEYREFITTE, témoignage, in: Association Georges Pompidou, op.cit., pp.253-255.

88 Marie-Thérèse Bitsch institutions,28 il devait lâcher du lest sur l’élargissement, ce qui pouvait en fin de compte s’avérer doublement avantageux, car, une fois entrée dans la CEE, l’Angleterre aurait à cœur, comme la France, de s’opposer à une évolution supranationale de la Communauté. S’engager vers l’élargissement devait débloquer la coopération entre les Six en attendant les nouveaux membres et permettre non seulement une sortie de crise mais un renforcement du Marché commun sincèrement souhaité par Pompidou.29 Féru d’économie et soucieux d’efficacité, ce saint-simonien passé par la banque Rothschild et par Matignon (premier ministre de 1962 à 1968) sait que la puissance de la France passe par une modernisation possible dans le cadre de la CEE et indispensable à un moment où il faut éviter de se laisser distancer par le voisin allemand devenu un géant économique. Un argument supplémentaire est parfois invoqué: Pompidou aurait voulu l’élargissement pour faire de l’Angleterre un contrepoids à l’Allemagne au sein de la Communauté. Force est de constater que cette thèse n’apparaît pas dans le discours des Français. Ni, bien sûr, dans les déclarations publiques ou officielles, ce qui se comprend aisément, les Français souhaitant préserver l’image d’une «relation exemplaire» avec l’Allemagne.30 Ni dans les discussions internes et confidentielles où certaines motivations sont pourtant exposées de manière assez directe.31 Par ailleurs, Willy Brandt cherche à démonter cette argumentation qu’il présente comme inutile et peu percutante. Selon lui, la notion de contrepoids n’est plus de mise puisque l’Allemagne ne veut pas dominer le continent et que tout le monde sait bien qu’en Europe occidentale aucun problème ne peut avoir de solution sans l’Allemagne.32 Enfin, à contre-courant d’une légende tenace, les documents d’archives33 et les travaux récents des historiens34 montrent que l’absence d’affinités personnelles n’empêche pas une étroite coopération politique entre Pompidou et Brandt, notamment en faveur de la relance en 1969.

28. Voir P. GERBET, Georges Pompidou et les institutions européennes, op.cit., pp.55-83, et Le président Georges Pompidou et les institutions européennes, in: M.-Th. BITSCH (dir.), Le couple France-Allemagne … op.cit., pp.355-375. 29. M. VAISSE, Changement et continuité dans la politique européenne de la France, in: Association Georges Pompidou, op.cit., pp.29-43. 30. Formule utilisée d’abord par Pompidou et répétée par Brandt qui déclare la prendre très volontiers à son compte. Voir PV de l’entretien du 4 juillet 1969, 5AG2, 104. 31. Voir par exemple les PV des conseils restreints, 5 AG2, 52 et 53. 32. Bonn à Paris, 13 mai et 22 mai 1969, MAE, 2725. 33. Voir notamment, dans 5AG2, les PV des sommets bilatéraux franco-allemands et la correspondance entre Pompidou et Brandt. 34. Notamment, G.-H. SOUTOU, L’attitude de Georges Pompidou face à l’Allemagne, in: Association Georges Pompidou, op.cit., pp.267-313; A. WILKENS, Relance et réalités. Willy Brandt, la politique européenne et les institutions européennes, in: M.-Th. BITSCH (dir.), Le couple France-Allemagne …, op.cit., pp.377-418; et Mémoire (non encore publié) présenté en vue de l’Habilitation à diriger des recherches et soutenu le 15 décembre 2001, Université de Paris III.

Le sommet de La Haye 89

II. Le sommet: une dérive intergouvernementale de la Communauté?

Si les motivations pour la relance sont multiples, la méthode envisagée, une rencontre au sommet, s’inscrit dans la plus pure tradition gaulliste. Avant 1969, les sommets des Six étaient restés exceptionnels. L’idée en avait été avancée par le président de Gaulle, dans sa conférence de presse du 5 septembre 1960 où il préconisait la mise en route d’une Europe politique sur la base de décisions prises par le «concert» européen, au niveau des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement. Puis, dans la phase d’élaboration du projet, deux sommets s’étaient effectivement tenus, l’un à Paris en février, l’autre à Bonn en juillet 1961. Après l’échec de ce plan Fouchet, la notion de sommet est restée entachée d’une double connotation gaullienne et anticommunautaire. Par la suite, une seule conférence des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement a encore été organisée, en 1967, dans la capitale italienne, à l’occasion du dixième anniversaire des traités de Rome. Cette manifestation solennelle, essentiellement commémorative et sans réelle portée politique, avait cependant retenu, malgré les réticences des Néerlandais, l’idée d’un autre sommet qui pourrait se réunir à La Haye.

La proposition française

C’est cette pratique du sommet que Georges Pompidou veut remettre à l’honneur pour promouvoir la relance. Dans sa conférence de presse du 10 juillet, il estime «qu’il serait utile que dans un terme pas trop lointain et de préférence à intervalles relativement rapprochés, les principaux responsables, chefs d’Etat ou de gouvernement, se rencontrent, sans ordre du jour, très librement, pour faire le tour des questions et pour faire avancer à la fois, dans l’immédiat, l’achèvement de la Communauté telle qu’elle existe, et ensuite réaliser des progrès dans les autres domaines».35 Cette proposition rappelée aussi par le premier ministre, Jacques Chaban-Delmas,36 dans son discours d’investiture, le 29 juin, est présentée formellement aux partenaires de la France, par le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Maurice Schumann,37 lors du Conseil tenu à Bruxelles, le 22 juillet. Il suggère d’organiser une réunion, «à une date aussi proche que possible, selon des modalités qui conviennent à tous et qui pourront être ﬁxées selon la voie appropriée» aﬁn que les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement «échangent leurs vues, sans limitation ni ordre

35. Texte de la conférence de presse dans 5AG2, 632. 36. Europe, 30 juin 1969. La personnalité du premier ministre et ses prises de position semblent accueillies assez favorablement chez les Cinq. 37. Maurice Schumann a une image de gaulliste favorable à la Communauté européenne. Il a été la «voix» de la France libre, à Londres, pendant la seconde guerre mondiale. Membre du MRP (Parti démocrate-chrétien) sous la IVe République, il s’est rallié à de Gaulle en 1958, mais a démissionné du gouvernement, avec 4 autres ministres, en mai 1962, après l’échec du plan Fouchet et la conférence de presse où le général de Gaulle s’en prenait à l’Europe supranationale.

90 Marie-Thérèse Bitsch du jour préétabli». Cette conférence pourrait se tenir à La Haye, comme envisagé lors du sommet de Rome, et avant la fin de la présidence néerlandaise de la Communauté qui vient de commencer le 1er juillet.38 Paris souhaite donc la tenue d’un sommet à échéance de quelques mois, avant la fin de l’année 1969 - qui correspond à la fin de la période transitoire de douze ans prévue par le traité CEE - peut-être en novembre, en tout cas après les élections qui doivent avoir lieu en RFA, à l’automne.39 Cette conférence pourrait être la première d’une série de rencontres périodiques organisées au plus haut niveau pour faire avancer l’Europe.40 Elle devrait permettre de «frapper un grand coup» et de sortir d’un processus routinier «pour aller vers le haut».41 Elle serait indépendante des organismes communautaires42 tout en se préoccupant de l’avenir de la Communauté. Il s’agirait d’une réunion informelle, relativement «intime», en «petit comité» pour une conversation «au coin du feu»,43 sans ordre du jour précis, mais qui, sans entrer dans les détails, devrait évoquer la coopération entre les Six ainsi que les problèmes posés par l’élargissement.44

La solution de compromis

La perspective d’un sommet est accueillie fraîchement par les partenaires de la France, notamment en Italie et au Benelux. Par contre, à Bonn, le chancelier Kurt-Georg Kiesinger apporte son soutien à l’idée, dès le 8 juin, avant même le deuxième tour de l’élection présidentielle45 et Willy Brandt s’y rallie assez rapidement – c’est fait lors de sa visite à Paris le 4 juillet – tout en insistant pour que le sommet soit préparé soigneusement et qu’il ne devienne pas un prétexte pour différer les décisions susceptibles d’être prises par le Conseil, dès septembre.46 Dans la pratique, le principe d’un sommet avant la ﬁn de l’année est implicitement accepté dès le Conseil du 22 juillet, malgré les réticences surtout italiennes et bien que la décision ofﬁcielle soit différée jusqu’en septembre.47 Selon la formule

38. PV du Conseil Affaires générales du 22 juillet, Archives du Conseil, Bruxelles. 39. Note sur un entretien entre Hervé Alphand, secrétaire général du Quai d’Orsay et deux personnalités américaines, 8 juillet 1969, AME, 2725. 40. Cette proposition de sommets périodiques, sans ordre du jour précis, sera reprise par Pompidou en 1973, à la demande également de Jean Monnet. Elle finira par aboutir en 1974 à l’institutionnalisation des sommets sous le nom de Conseil européen. Voir M.-Th. BITSCH, Jean Monnet et la création du Conseil européen, in: G. BOSSUAT et A. WILKENS, Jean Monnet, l’Europe et les chemins de la paix, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, 1999, pp.399-410. 41. PV de l’entretien entre Jacques Chaban-Delmas et Joseph Luns, 17 juillet 1969, MAE, 37. 42. Voir document cité en note 39. 43. Selon des formulations souvent utilisées. 44. Voir document cité en note 17. 45. Europe, 9 juin 1969. 46. Bruxelles à Paris, 23 juillet 1969, MAE, 2724. 47. PV du Conseil du 22 juillet, Archives du Conseil, Bruxelles. Voir aussi Bruxelles à Paris et Londres à Paris, 23 juillet 1969 ainsi que Rome à Paris, 30 juillet 1969, MAE, 2724.

Le sommet de La Haye 91 souvent répétée, le projet de sommet bénéﬁcie d’un «préjugé favorable». Mais la France doit faire face aux assauts de ses partenaires et à ceux de la Commission qui redoutent la mise en place d’un nouvel organe qui viendrait affaiblir les institutions existantes et ferait dériver le système communautaire vers une «Europe des Patries».48 Pour écarter ce danger, deux parades sont imaginées. Il s’agit d’abord de limiter le rôle du sommet, en refusant l’idée de rencontres régulières qui impliquerait une institutionnalisation déguisée et en lui déniant la possibilité de devenir un organe de la CEE, voire une instance d’appel susceptible de mettre en cause les décisions du Conseil.49 Sur ces points, Paris se montre volontiers rassurant.50 L’autre parade consiste à associer la Commission de Bruxelles aux travaux du sommet. Le président de la Commission, Jean Rey, monte au créneau pour manifester sa volonté d’y participer. Il s’exprime en ce sens au sein du Conseil dès le 22 juillet et obtient immédiatement le soutien des Cinq.51 Il intervient aussi, quelques jours plus tard, à Paris, auprès de Maurice Schumann. Mais le gouvernement français se montre très réticent, rappelle que la Commission n’avait pas été admise à Rome en 1967 et qu’il ne voit aucune raison de procéder autrement.52 Il cherche à trouver une solution permettant de donner une satisfaction partielle aux champions des institutions communautaires tout en reléguant la Commission à l’arrière-plan. Selon le président Pompidou, il convient de donner l’impression que la Commission est traitée avec égard mais qu’elle est «un instrument des gouvernements et non un organe indépendant».53 Après avoir envisagé pour elle un statut d’observateur,54 Paris propose de l’inviter à l’une des trois séances du sommet, en fait à la deuxième, qui doit s’occuper des dossiers communautaires, tandis que la première séance sera consacrée à un échange de vues général et la dernière à l’établissement des conclusions.55 De fait, Jean Rey participera à la séance du mardi 2 décembre au matin, accompagné d’un autre membre de la Commission, Edoardo Martino, et de quatre fonctionnaires mais non de l’ensemble des vice-présidents comme il avait été proposé. Cependant, même si la Commission n’obtient qu’un strapontin au sommet de La Haye, elle est associée indirectement à la préparation de la conférence. Le Conseil lui demande, en effet, une mise à jour de l’avis formulé en 1967 sur les demandes d’adhésion des candidats et, en venant présenter le nouvel avis devant le Conseil le 17 octobre, Jean Rey ne se prive pas d’exposer son point de vue sur l’élargissement et, du coup, sur les modalités d’une relance dans son ensemble.56

48. La Haye à Paris, 23 juillet 1969, MAE, 2724. 49. La Haye à Paris, 23 juillet, Bruxelles à Paris, 23 juillet, Rome à Paris, 30 juillet et 16 septembre 1969, MAE, 2724. 50. Note du 31 juillet 1969 (réponse à un questionnaire allemand), MAE, 2724. 51. PV du Conseil du 22 juillet, Archives du Conseil, Bruxelles. 52. Note de la sous-direction Europe occidentale, 28 août 1969, MAE, 2724. 53. Note de Pompidou, sans date, 5AG2, 1006. 54. Note pour le président, 1er août, 5AG2, 1010. 55. Bruxelles à Paris, 16 septembre et 11 novembre 1969, MAE, 2724. 56. PV du Conseil du 17 octobre, Archives du Conseil, Bruxelles.

92 Marie-Thérèse Bitsch

Par ailleurs, peu avant le sommet, la Commission décide d’adresser un aide-mémoire aux chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement pour exposer sa propre vision sur le triptyque «achèvement, approfondissement, élargissement»57 ce qui permet de souligner que le débat essentiel ne porte pas sur la procédure mais sur les objectifs de la relance.

III. Des objectifs réalistes: achèvement, (approfondissement), élargissement?

Au cours de l’été et de l’automne 1969, la France précise son programme d’action immédiate. Au-delà des déclarations du président Georges Pompidou le 10 juillet et de son ministre des Affaires étrangères, le 22 juillet, Paris indique ses intentions à l’occasion de nombreuses rencontres bilatérales avec les dirigeants des Cinq, notamment avec les dirigeants allemands (visite de Willy Brandt à Paris dès le 4 juillet, quelques jours avant la conférence de presse de Pompidou; sommet bilatéral franco-allemand à Bonn, dans le cadre des rencontres régulières prévues par le traité de l’Elysée, les 8 et 9 septembre). Surtout, le gouvernement français met au point sa stratégie, lors de deux conseils restreints tenus, le 21 octobre et le 17 novembre, sous la présidence de Pompidou, avec la participation des proches conseillers du président et des principaux ministres concernés: Jacques Chaban-Delmas accompagné de Jean-René Bernard, secrétaire général du SGCI, Maurice Schumann (Affaires étrangères), Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (Economie et Finances), Jacques Duhamel (Agriculture), François-Xavier Ortoli (Développement industriel et recherche scientiﬁque).58 La tonalité générale du programme est donnée par Georges Pompidou. Selon lui, «l’image de marque de la France, dans les années à venir, doit être celle d’un pays réaliste et qui ne se paie pas de mots. Cela signiﬁe que nous ne devons proposer et accepter que ce qui peut être réalisé rapidement».59 Il convient de ne «pas donner l’impression que l’absence de veto contre l’Angleterre est de pure forme et que la France veut soulever d’énormes obstacles en se frottant les mains».60 De son coté, le premier ministre, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, insiste pour que la France fasse des propositions «dynamiques», «communautaires», «concrètes», comme elle l’a fait par le passé.61

57. Archives de la Commission, Bac 79/1982, 221. Sur les positions de la Commission, voir l’article cité en note 2 ainsi que l’article de N. P. LUDLOW, dans le présent volume. 58. Ce dernier est absent le 17 novembre. 59. PV conseil restreint du 17 novembre 1969, 5AG2, 53. 60. Ibid. 61. Ibid.

Le sommet de La Haye 93

Achèvement

L’achèvement est pour Paris une priorité et un préalable. Achever le Marché commun signifie achever le marché commun agricole et donc adopter avant la fin de la phase transitoire, c’est-à-dire avant la fin de l’année 1969, un règlement financier pour la période définitive, fondé sur des ressources propres. Il s’agit de faire en sorte que la politique agricole commune, considérée comme vitale, soit irréversible. Du point de vue du gouvernement français, cette décision n’exigeait pas un sommet. C’est une obligation inscrite dans le traité. C’est un «test de l’Europe voulue et vécue»62 qui s’impose avant l’élargissement. C’est «une condition préalable à l’ouverture des négociations» avec l’Angleterre.63 Sur ce point, Paris ne veut accepter aucune concession. Pompidou donne lui-même la consigne: il faut éviter de se mettre en position de demandeur mais laisser entendre que nous sommes absolument de roc sur la question de l’achèvement «dût-on aller à l’échec de la conférence au sommet».64 Dans un premier temps, cet objectif semble inaccessible tant la réticence des partenaires est grande et le délai très court.65 Mais à partir d’octobre, le principe du règlement financier, qui paraissait d’abord hors de portée, est accepté par tous,66 sans mettre fin pour autant aux discussions concernant les modalités et les contreparties. Joseph Luns, demande de mener parallèlement les travaux sur l’achèvement et les études sur l’élargissement.67 L’Italie souhaite l’organisation des marchés pour les vins, les tabacs, les fruits.68 L’Allemagne, tout en soulignant qu’elle n’a pas d’objections au règlement financier, pose la question de la maîtrise des productions agricoles.69 Willy Brandt se défend de vouloir reprendre à son compte les critiques apparues dans la presse allemande contre la PAC trop coûteuse mais il estime qu’il faut éviter les surproductions déraisonnables et se garder la possibilité d’importer des produits agricoles d’Amérique latine, d’Asie, d’Afrique.70 La demande allemande en faveur de la maîtrise de certaines productions, constamment renouvelée, tend même à se durcir à la veille du sommet - d’autant plus que la RFA est contrainte, fin novembre, à une réévaluation du deutschemark qui désorganise le marché agricole71 - et le chancelier Willy Brandt revient encore sur cette question dans une lettre adressée au président Pompidou, le 27 novembre.72

62. Entretien entre Maurice Schumann et Aldo Moro, 26 novembre 1969, MAE, 40. 63. Bruxelles à Paris, 11 novembre 1969, MAE, 2724. 64. PV du conseil restreint du 21 octobre 1969, 5AG2, 52. 65. Voir par exemple, Bonn à Paris, 11 septembre 1969, MAE, 2724. 66. Voir document cité en note 64. 67. Entretien entre Chaban-Delmas et Luns, 17 juillet 1969, MAE, 37. 68. Voir document cité en note 62. 69. Bonn (note pour l’ambassadeur), 3 juillet 1969, 5AG2, 104. 70. PV des entretiens de Willy Brandt avec les dirigeants français, Paris, 4 juillet 1969, 5AG2, 104. 71. Bonn à Paris 22 novembre et 29 novembre 1969, MAE, 2724. 72. Brandt à Pompidou, 27 novembre 1969, 5AG2, 1009. 94 Marie-Thérèse Bitsch

Si la France se dit d’accord pour modérer les prix et éviter les surproductions, mais sans fixer des plafonnements, elle estime que «la mise au point du règlement financier est indépendante de la solution du problème des excédents».73 Elle a d’ailleurs beau jeu de rappeler que ce n’est pas elle qui a poussé à des prix aussi élevés74 et Pompidou laisse entendre qu’une politique agricole plus libérale aurait été plus bénéfique pour la France.75 Le débat porte aussi sur la nature des ressources propres. L’Italie insiste pour un partage équitable des charges. Les Pays-Bas et la Belgique hésitent à y intégrer les droits de douane alors que la France se montre satisfaite des propositions de la Commission. Le Quai d’Orsay va jusqu’à déclarer:

«Nous sommes d’accord avec la Commission pour créer des ressources propres et affecter à la Communauté, outre les prélèvements agricoles, les droits de douane. Quand des progrès auront été réalisés en matière d’harmonisation fiscale – et les récentes décisions des gouvernements belge et italien de retarder l’application de la TVA ne les favoriseront pas – nous pourrons examiner si d’autres ressources propres, d’origine fiscale, doivent être décidées».76 Enfin, se pose la question de savoir dans quelle mesure le règlement financier «définitif» sera révisable après l’élargissement de la Communauté. Si la France récuse l’idée d’un règlement «provisoire», elle accepte qu’il pourra faire l’objet d’adaptations qui devront être décidées à l’unanimité et ne pas remettre en cause les principes essentiels de la PAC.77 Les discussions budgétaires ne manquent pas de soulever aussi des questions sur l’évolution des institutions, le rôle budgétaire du Parlement européen et son élection au suffrage universel direct. L’Italie, en particulier, voudrait faire du renforcement du Parlement un préalable à l’adoption du règlement financier.78 Certains ministres français (Schumann et Duhamel) comprennent la nécessité d’aménagements limités, au moins après 1974, lorsque les ressources propres auront remplacé les contributions nationales, mais Pompidou souhaite préserver l’équilibre des pouvoirs et ne pas se laisser entraîner dans des discussions sur les institutions.79 Il lance, par contre, l’idée qu’une Cour des Comptes devrait contrôler le budget de la Communauté mais sans en faire une exigence dans l’immédiat.80

73. Télégramme adressé aux ambassades auprès des gouvernements des Cinq, 25 novembre 1969, MAE, 2724. 74. PV de l’entretien Pompidou-Brandt, 4 juillet 1969, 5AG2, 104 (allusion aux négociations de 1964 où le chancelier Ludwig Erhard a demandé des prix plus élevés que ceux proposés initialement par la Commission). 75. PV des entretiens au sommet franco-allemand de Bonn, 8-9 septembre 1969, 5AG2, 104 et PV du conseil restreint du 21 octobre 1969, 5AG2, 52. 76. Voir document cité en note 73. 77. Ibid. 78. Document cité en note 59. 79. Document cité en note 64. 80. Document cité en note 59. Le sommet de La Haye 95

Approfondissement/élargissement

Si l’achèvement est la première exigence du président Pompidou, la question de l’élargissement est de toute évidence la priorité des Cinq, alors qu’elle n’est citée qu’en troisième position, après l’achèvement et, aussi, après l’approfondissement, dans le triptyque français. Cependant, il apparaît très vite, pour la France comme pour ses partenaires, que les deux derniers volets doivent être liés. C’est Willy Brandt qui, le premier, exprime très nettement sa détermination à mener de front les progrès dans ces deux domaines. Le 22 juillet, à Bruxelles, au Conseil Affaires générales, il intervient, immédiatement après Maurice Schumann qui vient de présenter la proposition du gouvernement français, pour souligner qu’il y a une interdépendance entre le renforcement et l’élargissement de la Communauté, qu’à défaut de lien juridique il existe une relation politique et qu’il convient donc d’obtenir des progrès parallèles dans ces deux domaines.81 Cette thèse du lien politique entre les deux objectifs à poursuivre simultanément est, par la suite, constamment appuyée et développée par les ministres des Affaires étrangères, par la Commission et par Pompidou lui-même qui ne fait pas de l’approfondissement un préalable à l’élargissement.82 C’est le mot d’ordre qu’il donne à ses collaborateurs lors du conseil restreint du 21 octobre où il déclare qu’il n’est pas raisonnable de demander que l’ouverture des négociations soit subordonnée à l’approfondissement et qu’il faut accepter le parallélisme entre approfondissement et élargissement.83 Dans la pratique, l’approfondissement passe à l’arrière plan. Il est symptomatique que le triptyque allemand présenté à la presse le 2 juillet «achèvement, élargissement, Europe politique»84 ne retienne pas cette expression. Les dirigeants et les diplomates français doivent se rendre à l’évidence: leurs partenaires ont peu d’intérêt pour l’approfondissement.85 A Paris, on envisage un certain nombre de coopérations souhaitables dans les domaines comme la monnaie, la technologie, les transports, l’énergie, le pétrole, etc.86 Mais seul le dossier monétaire est évoqué assez longuement dans l’un des deux conseils restreints, le 17 novembre, par Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, sans d’ailleurs qu’une position française unanime parvienne à se dégager.87 Cette question monétaire n’est pas non plus

81. PV du Conseil du 22 juillet 1969, Archives du Conseil, Bruxelles. 82. Formule reprise par Maurice Schumann. Voir PV de l’entretien entre le ministre français des Affaires étrangères et Sigismund von Braun, ambassadeur de la RFA à Paris, 16 octobre 1969, 5AG2, 104. 83. Document cité en note 64. 84. Note de l’Ambassade de France à Bonn, 3 juillet 1969, 5AG2, 104. 85. Document cité en note 64. 86. Il y a aussi des projets plus ponctuels. Par exemple, Pompidou parle de la société de droit européen dont la réalisation représenterait un grand progrès pour le développement de l’Europe. PV de l’entretien entre Georges Pompidou et le président Gustav Heinemann, lors du sommet franco-allemand de Bonn, 8 septembre 1969, 5AG2, 104. 87. Document cité en note 59. 96 Marie-Thérèse Bitsch creusée, avant le sommet, entre les Six et c’est très tardivement que Willy Brandt propose la création d’un Fonds de réserve.88 Sur le terrain de l’approfondissement, la question la plus discutée – avec le partenaire allemand et à sa demande – est celle de l’Europe politique. C’est le chancelier Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, beaucoup plus que Willy Brandt, qui y attache alors une grande importance. Il aborde le problème lors du sommet bilatéral, à Bonn, avec le premier ministre, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, et surtout avec le président Pompidou, dans les deux entretiens du 8 et du 9 septembre. Le chancelier demande avec insistance le renforcement de la coopération politique indispensable pour assurer la sécurité de l’Europe si les Etats-Unis venaient un jour à retirer leurs troupes du vieux continent. Il voudrait au moins poser des jalons et, en évitant ce qui rappelle le plan Fouchet, demander au comité des directeurs politiques de commencer à réfléchir à la question. Mais Pompidou ne se montre guère enthousiaste. S’il reconnaît la nécessité de «faire naître une conscience politique européenne», il déclare que la priorité, dans l’immédiat, c’est la phase définitive du Marché commun, qu’il n’est pas possible d’aller à l’union politique sans base économique solide et qu’il a «l’impression que c’est par l’Europe économique que l’on débouchera forcément sur l’Europe politique».89 Quant à Willy Brandt, assez réservé sur ce projet à ce moment-là, il le reprendra à son compte une fois devenu chancelier. Pour la France, la deuxième priorité après l’achèvement – et avant l’approfondissement – est donc bien l’élargissement de la Communauté à l’Angleterre et aux autres candidats. Mais cet élargissement ne doit pas provoquer un affaiblissement de la Communauté. L’Angleterre doit accepter l’acquis communautaire. Elle devra dire «si elle peut adhérer sans tout briser».90 La France veut des garanties: l’élargissement doit être subordonné à deux conditions. Elle n’exige pas seulement l’adoption par les Six d’un règlement financier définitif avant fin 1969, elle veut aussi une entente préalable, à Six, sur les conditions d’admission qui doivent donc être définies avant l’ouverture de toute négociation avec l’Angleterre. Le dossier est donc délicat à gérer. Les dirigeants français (Pompidou lui-même, Schumann, Chaban-Delmas) doivent convaincre leurs partenaires de la sincérité de leur volonté d’ouverture, ce qui est d’autant plus difficile que le projet de sommet est souvent perçu comme une procédure dilatoire, chez les Cinq et en Angleterre.91 Ils doivent répéter inlassablement que la France ne met plus de veto, qu’elle veut éliminer l’irritation née du problème anglais, qu’elle ne veut pas pratiquer la fuite en avant, qu’elle est de bonne foi, qu’elle accepte de faire de l’élargissement un sujet de discussion au futur sommet. Au chancelier Kiesinger qui lui demande si la question pourra être

88. Lettre de Willy Brandt à Georges Pompidou, 27 novembre 1969, 5AG2, 1009. 89. PV des entretiens, 5AG2, 104. 90. Ibid. Entretien du 9 septembre entre Pompidou et le chancelier Kiesinger. 91. Londres à Paris, 23 juillet 1969, MAE, 2724. Le sommet de La Haye 97 abordée à La Haye, Pompidou répond: «si je disais qu’il ne faut pas en parler, je ne vois pas comment on pourrait réunir les Six».92 Mais les partenaires de la France qui ne rejettent pas l’idée d’une préentente à Six sur les conditions d’adhésion - le principe en est accepté par Willy Brandt dès le 4 juillet - mènent une offensive afin d’arracher à la France une date, la plus rapprochée possible, pour l’ouverture des négociations avec l’Angleterre. Cette question du calendrier est au centre de la discussion entre les six ministres des Affaires étrangères, lors de la réunion du 15 septembre qui doit décider de la tenue effective du sommet. Les Cinq voudraient au moins la promesse qu’une date sera fixée par la conférence de La Haye et le président en exercice, Joseph Luns, se montre très incisif.93 Quant à l’Italie, elle n’hésite pas à brandir la menace de boycotter le sommet si aucun engagement n’est pris à ce sujet.94 Mais sur ce point aussi les Français restent très fermes. Ils affirment qu’ils n’ont pas l’intention de faire traîner mais qu’ils ne veulent pas être prisonniers d’une échéance. Ils prétendent que la fixation d’une date pour l’ouverture des négociations est un faux problème, la vraie question étant de savoir à quel moment les Six seront prêts à négocier, ce qui suppose un accord sur les préalables, c’est-à-dire l’adoption du règlement financier définitif et l’entente entre les Six sur les conditions d’admission.95 La position française consiste à dire que, si la volonté d’aboutir existe, les travaux préparatoires seront relativement rapides et l’ouverture des négociations assez rapprochée. Fin novembre les Cinq renoncent à une date précise moyennant un accord sur une «déclaration interprétative» qui laisse entrevoir des négociations à l’issue du premier semestre 1970. Le communiqué final du sommet de La Haye ne fixe pas de date. Mais le premier ministre néerlandais, Piet de Jong, qui a présidé la conférence, est autorisé à faire une déclaration orale pour dire que les six délégations estiment que les travaux préparatoires seront réglés au cours du premier semestre de l’année 1970 et que les négociations avec les candidats s’ouvriront aussitôt après.96 Un autre élément, encourageant pour tous dans la préparation de l’élargissement, vient du rôle joué par la Commission. Son avis sur la demande d’adhésion de l’Angleterre, remis au Conseil et aux gouvernements à la mi-octobre, est bien accueilli à Paris. Bien qu’il soit perçu comme plus favorable à la cause britannique que l’avis de 1967, il est considéré comme une base indispensable et bien documentée sur les problèmes posés aux Communautés par l’élargissement. Les Français savent gré à la Commission de reconnaître que l’élargissement pourrait présenter des risques d’affaiblissement et de recommander la vigilance afin de faire accepter, pour l’essentiel, la Communauté telle qu’elle existe.97 De plus, Paris est d’accord pour que la Communauté s’exprime d’une

92. Document cité en note 90. 93. Bruxelles à Paris, 16 septembre 1969, MAE, 2724. 94. Paris à Bruxelles, 11 septembre 1969, MAE, 2724. 95. Document cité en note 73. 96. Rapport du gouvernement néerlandais, Cahiers de la documentation européenne, pp.46-50. 97. Note sur l’avis de la Commission, relatif à l’élargissement, 5AG2, 52. 98 Marie-Thérèse Bitsch seule voix pendant la négociation et envisage par conséquent que soit adopté un mandat comparable à celui qui avait été décidé pour le Kennedy Round où Jean Rey, commissaire chargé des relations commerciales extérieures, a négocié au nom de la Communauté sur la base d’un mandat donné par le Conseil.

En conclusion

A la veille de la conférence entre les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement, plusieurs points d’accord entre les Six sont donc déjà acquis, même si le succès de la rencontre n’est pas garanti d’avance. Mais le terrain semble déblayé après le Conseil Affaires générales du 11 novembre.98 Le gouvernement italien, le plus intransigeant dans la dernière ligne droite, renonce lui-aussi à certaines revendications, sur les questions budgétaires et institutionnelles, après la rencontre entre Maurice Schumann et Aldo Moro, à Rome, fin novembre.99 La conviction que les Six sont «condamnés à réussir»100 a incité les gouvernements, y compris les dirigeants français, à faire preuve d’une relative souplesse. Ainsi, Paris a renoncé – en tout cas officiellement et pour le moment – à faire du sommet de la Haye la première étape vers une institutionnalisation de ces conférences qui pouvait renforcer la coopération intergouvernementale au détriment des institutions communautaires. Le président Pompidou a aussi accepté la perspective d’une ouverture des négociations avec l’Angleterre, à relativement brève échéance, même s’il continue de refuser catégoriquement une date-butoir précise clairement annoncée. Il a évité également de multiplier les préalables, pour s’en tenir aux deux exigences essentielles, considérées comme vitales et absolument incontournables. Il n’a pas cherché à multiplier les coopérations économiques qui pouvaient alourdir l’acquis communautaire à la veille des négociations avec l’Angleterre et faire douter de sa bonne foi et de sa bonne volonté sur le dossier de l’élargissement. Moyennant ces quelques concessions, la France parvient à faire de la conférence de La Haye un réel succès pour sa politique, même si elle se garde de tout triomphalisme.101 La tenue effective d’un sommet, dont elle a pris l’initiative, est en elle-même une grande satisfaction et illustre l’influence que la France peut encore exercer sur le développement de la Communauté pour peu qu’elle ne la paralyse pas complètement. En l’occurrence, le sommet de La Haye, qui permet la reprise des activités des Six, devient le point de départ et le symbole d’une relance certes indispensable en raison du blocage français mais rendue possible grâce à

98. Bruxelles (Boegner) à Paris, 11 novembre 1969, MAE, 2724. 99. Rome à Paris, 27 novembre 1969, MAE, 2724. 100. Selon la déclaration de Pompidou à Carlo Schmid, le coordinateur des relations franco-allemandes, nommé par Willy Brandt après son arrivée à la chancellerie et venu rencontrer le président français. Voir le PV de l’entretien, 7 novembre 1969, 5AG2, 104. 101. Télégramme-circulaire du ministère des Affaires étrangères à tous les postes diplomatiques, 3 décembre 1969, MAE, 2724. Le sommet de La Haye 99 l’impulsion de Pompidou qui en détermine aussi les modalités. Sur la base d’un programme d’action qu’il voulait réaliste, il oriente la Communauté dans une direction qui lui paraît conforme aux intérêts de la France. Il obtient des garanties pour la politique agricole commune qui lui tient à cœur mais, en même temps, le passage à la phase définitive rend la Communauté juridiquement irréversible et l’adoption des ressources propres lui confère une certaine autonomie par rapport aux Etats membres. Il accepte l’élargissement à certaines conditions – entente préalable à Six et maintien de l’essentiel de l’acquis communautaire – qui en définitive ne freinent pas tellement les négociations avec l’Angleterre. Sans faire le forcing en faveur de l’approfondissement, le sommet pose des jalons vers la coopération monétaire rendue nécessaire par l’instabilité internationale et vers la coopération politique, vieux rêve de beaucoup d’Européens, notamment des gaullistes. Il annonce, enfin, une évolution institutionnelle en douceur. Alors que l’élection du Parlement européen au suffrage universel direct n’est pas encore mis à l’ordre du jour, que la Commission est autorisée à jouer un rôle tout en demi-teintes, cette première réunion des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement vraiment efficace plaide en faveur des sommets, acceptés par la suite avec des réserves de moins en moins fortes, jusqu’à leur institutionnalisation en décembre 1974. Au total, le sommet de La Haye permet à la France de désembourber la politique européenne, de restaurer au moins partiellement la confiance entre les Six, de redresser son image de marque à l’intérieur de la Communauté et chez les candidats, y compris auprès de la société civile qui, dans les derniers jours avant la rencontre, s’est assez largement mobilisée en faveur de la relance européenne, comme le montrent de nombreuses lettres, déclarations et autres mémorandums adressées aux différentes institutions européennes.102

102. Voir article cité en note 2.

101 Italy and the Hague Conference of December 1969

Maria Eleonora Guasconi

In spite of an idealistic reference to Europeanism, the Italian position in post-war European integration may be stereotyped as the somewhat passive witness of initiatives taken by other countries.1 Apart from such renowned names as Alcide de Gasperi, Altiero Spinelli, Emilio Colombo, Ugo La Malfa and Aldo Moro, Italian participation has been characterised by long delays in implementing EC regulations in national law and the lack of interest shown towards the Brussels institutions by political leaders, as is illustrated best by Franco Maria Malfatti's decision to resign from the presidency of the Commission, in order to take part in the domestic political elections held in 1972.2 This stereotype persisted also among the other European countries, where Italy, due to its instability, was seen as the weak link of the Western chain.3 «The Italians in Brussels generally are not good at chairing meetings; and at ministerial level there is a continual risk of changes», wrote John Robinson, sir Con O'Neill's assistant, in a minute, which explained the reasons why Great Britain should end the enlargement negotiations before July 1971, when Italy assumed the presidency of the Council of ministers.4 The negative image of Italy as a ‘weak negotiator’, unable to defend its national interests, was exempliﬁed by the country's inability to pursue its interest in the ﬁeld of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), where Italian political leaders agreed to set up a mechanism which was disadvantageous to their agriculture;5 by the

1. The author would like to thank Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza for his help and advice during the research, Alan S. Milward, Piers Ludlow and Jan van der Harst for sending some interesting documents related to the Hague Conference, Jean Marie Palayret and Andrea Becherucci for their kind co-operation at the Historical Archives of the European Communities (HAEC) in Florence and An- nabelle Leach for English corrections. 2. See: M. NERI GUALDESI, L'Italia e il processo di integrazione europea, and A. VARSORI, L'europeismo nella politica estera italiana, in: L. TOSI (ed.), L'Italia e le organizzazioni internazionali, CEDAM, Padova, 1999, pp.341-389 and 391-415; A. VARSORI, L'Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1998; Idem. (ed.), L'Italia e il processo di integrazione europea: prospettive di ricerca e revisione storiografica, in: Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, XIII(1998), XIV(1999); Idem., La questione europea nella politica italiana, in: Studi Storici, IV(2002), pp.955-971. 3. A. VARSORI, L'allargamento della Cee, in E. DI NOLFO (ed.), La politica estera italiana negli anni Ottanta, Piero Lacaita Editore, Manduria, 2003, p.189. 4. The document is quoted by C. O'NEILL, Britain's Entry into the European Community. Report by Sir Con O'Neill, Whitehall History Publishing, London, 2000, pp.373-378. 5. In 1962, when the decisions related to the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) were taken, Italy exported its agricultural products, two years later it imported the same products, especially those which were coming from non-EC countries. On this question see: R. GALLI and S. TORCASIO, La partecipazione italiana alla politica agricola comunitaria, Il Mulino, Bologna 1976, and G. LASCHI, L'agricoltura italiana e l'integrazione europea, Peter Lang, Brussels 1999.

102 Maria Eleonora Guasconi backwardness and inadequacy of its bureaucratic administration; and by the country's domestic political instability, which seriously affected its capability to develop a long-term policy towards the Community. An interesting document drawn up in 1970 for the president of the Commission, Franco Maria Malfatti, stated that the gap existing between Italy’s European stance and the difficulty of applying the rules and regulations of European institutions in everyday life was a typical Italian characteristic. The real difficulty lay in Italy’s bureaucracy, which was highly disrespectful of the European Community and in the obstacles posed by the administrative establishment towards any change of administrative procedure.6 In spite of this stereotype, we argue here that, although not comparable to France and Germany, Italy did not play a secondary role in the integration process. The EC represented a useful tool, through which the country could pursue national goals, such as developing a modern industry, providing new employment opportunities for migrants, creating a large market for low-cost exports, expanding capital investments in the underdeveloped Mezzogiorno and, from the Seventies on, realising a monetary and fiscal check on a political system which was clearly tending towards deficit and inflation.7 The policies pursued by Italy during and after the Hague conference of 1-2 December 1969 are an interesting example of its Europeanism, which puts in a right perspective its presumed ‘anomaly’, illustrating the political interests underlying its initiatives. This paper aims at answering the question of whether the image of a ‘weak negotiator’ can also be applied to the policy pursued by Italy during and after the Hague conference of 1969. The documents demonstrate how the Italian government, despite serious domestic instability and the emerging threat of terrorism, tried to find a space among its European partners, in particular France and Germany, by supporting Great Britain's admission in the EC, promoting a common policy on the question of employment and re-launching the project for European political co-operation. These goals were intended as countermeasures, meant to soften the negative consequences of the completion of the CAP and the introduction of the Value Added Tax (VAT) for the Italian economy.8

Italy and Pompidou's triplet

At the end of the Sixties, the political instability, represented by the fall of three consecutive governments led by the Christian Democrat Mariano Rumor, from

6. See HAEC, Emile Noël Papers (EN), Folder 1509, Unione monetaria, Note worked out for the visit of Malfatti in Italy, November 13-14th 1970. 7. Federico Romero has stressed that Italian participation to the EEC had influenced the nation-building process. See F. ROMERO, L'Europa come strumento di nation-building: storia e storici dell'Italia repubblicana, in: Passato e Presente, XIII, 36(1995), pp.19-32; Idem., Emigrazione e integrazione europea 1945-1973, Edizioni Lavoro, Roma, 1991. 8. See A. VARSORI, La questione europea nella politica italiana, op.cit., pp.957-961.

Italy and the Hague Conference of December 1969 103

December 1968 to July 1970,9 the strong opposition from the left-wing parties as well as the troubled economic and social situation strongly affected Italian participation in the EC. Italian political instability caused serious worries among other European governments, which feared the unstoppable rise of the Communist Party, whose presence in the government could no longer be excluded.10 From an economic point of view, if until 1969 Italy was the European country with the lowest inflation, the 'hot autumn'11 and the strengthening of the trade unions' political leverage, marked the end of the Italian economic miracle and the beginning of the industrial salaries increase of 18,3% in 1970, 9,8% in 1971, 9% in 1972, with serious consequences for inflation.12 The violent uprisings after 1969, which took place in various towns of the South, such as Avola, Battipaglia and, more important, Reggio Calabria, where the decision to move the regional administrative centre to Catanzaro was followed by an impressive series of social protests, the Piazza Fontana tragedy of December 1969, which paved the way to a serious terrorist threat, during the so-called anni di piombo - all these events forced the government to give priority to domestic problems, leaving only a ‘low profile’ approach for foreign policy affairs. Despite the priority given to the domestic situation, Italy did not wait long in reacting to the French-inspired triplet ‘completion, deepening and enlargement’,13 outlining a clear-cut policy, under the guidance of its Foreign minister, Aldo Moro, who, since August 1969, was in charge of the Ministero degli Esteri. Although lukeworm Italy supported the European re-launch, considering the three goals of the triplet, as strictly linked together.14 From a diplomatic viewpoint, the European relaunch represented an occasion to exploit for Italy. Since the Czech crisis of 1968, most Italian diplomats, as for example the ambassador in Bonn, Mario Luciolli, called for a relaunch of the process of

9. Rumor I Government: December 12th 1968 - July 5th 1969; Rumor II Government August 5th 1969 - February 17th 1970; Rumor III Government March 27th 1970 - July 6th 1970. On the difficult Italian domestic situation see: P. IGNAZI, I partiti e la politica dal 1963 al 1992, in: G. SABBATUCCI and V. VIDOTTO (eds.), Storia d'Italia. L'Italia contemporanea, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1999, pp.101-232; N. TRANFAGLIA, La modernità squilibrata. Dalla crisi del centrismo al «compromesso storico», in: F. BARBAGALLO (ed.), Storia dell'Italia repubblicana. La trasformazione dell'Italia: sviluppo e equilibri,Giulio Einaudi Editore, Torino, 1995, pp.7-150. 10. See: B. OLIVI, L'Italia nella CEE degli anni '70: problemi e prospettive, in: N. RONZITTI (ed.), La politica estera italiana. Autonomia, interdipendenza, integrazione e sicurezza, Edizioni Comunità, Roma, 1977, pp.202-222; M. REVELLI, Movimento sociali e spazio politico, in: F. BARBAGALLO (ed.), Storia dell'Italia repubblicana, op.cit., p.458. 11. The term 'hot autumn' was used for the first time by Indro Montanelli in a famous article titled I timori dell'autunno in: Corriere della Sera, August 29th 1969. 12. L. MECHI, L'Europa di Ugo La Malfa. La via italiana alla modernizzazione (1942-1979), Franco Angeli, Roma, 2003, p.158. 13. On Pompidou' s triplet see: E. ROUSSEL, Georges Pompidou, Lattés, Paris, 1994 and Pompidou et l'Europe, Editions Complexe, Paris, 1995. 14. European Council of Ministers Archives (ECMA), Brussels, Folder 9826-9833, Extrait du projet de procès-verbal de la réunion restreinte à l'occasion de la 76ème session du Conseil des 22-23 juillet 1969, p.26.

104 Maria Eleonora Guasconi

European integration, in order to obtain a better balance between US and Europe and to play a role in the international arena after a series of events, which had left the country a narrow space of manoeuvre.15 De Gaulle's foreign policy, based upon close ties which Germany, had reserved only a junior role to Italy, German Ostpolitik, was by no means an Italian affair, détente, in general, left Europe outside the big stream of Soviet-American relations and stressed the US diminishing interest towards Europe and, last but not least, the Non Proliferation Treaty put an end to the Italian not so well hidden hopes to accede to nuclear power. As to the question of enlargement, the Italian government had been an enthusiastic supporter of the United Kingdom's admission to the EC, ever since the ﬁrst application in 1961.16 Although Community enlargement would cause some economic problems to the country, Italy supported British entry mainly for political reasons, either for the special relationship between London and Washington, and because enlargement would help to counterbalance the preponderant French-German hegemony in the Community. At a meeting in London held a few days after the resignation of the French president de Gaulle, the Italian president, Giuseppe Saragat, explained to the British Prime minister Harold Wilson, that «the presence of the UK with her democratic political traditions would help to defend the democratic tradition in Italy». The United Kingdom's interest in joining Europe was «said to be economic, but Italy found the general political reasons more weighty».17 Although the political reasons were overwhelming, Italian support to Great Britain's admission hid also other, more subtle, domestic goals. On several occasions, during the enlargement negotiations, Italian political leaders proposed the British to accept the CAP with a gradual period of transition and with the aim of striving for modiﬁcations after their entry. From inside the Community and with the Italian support, they should ask for changes in the sense of a fairer distribution of burdens.18 «This was one of the unsaid reasons for Italian support of the British entry into the Community, which would lead to dynamic possibilities for the Community as well as for Britain», said the then Prime minister Emilio Colombo to the chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Geoffrey Rippon, during a series of conversations, which took place at

15. Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Esteri (ASMAE), Rome, Letter by Luciolli to the Foreign minister Medici, September 17th, 1968, secret. The author thanks Ennio Di Nolfo for the document. 16. See P. LUDLOW, Dealing with Britain. The Six and the First United Kingdom Application to the European Economic Community, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997; U. KITZ- INGER, Diplomacy and Persuasion. How Britain Joined the Common Market, Thames & Hudson, London, 1973; A. MILWARD, The Rise and the Fall of a National Strategy: the UK and the EEC, Cass, London, 2002; C. O'NEILL, op.cit. 17. Public Record Office (PRO), Kew Gardens, PREM 13/2738, Record of a meeting held at the Italian embassy on Thursday 24th April 1969 at 7.00 p.m. 18. See for example PRO, PREM 13/3542, Record of a conversation between the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Italian minister of the Treasury, present: G. Thomson, C. O'Neill, C. Tickell, J. A. Stern, E. Colombo, A. Manzini, V.G. Stammati, May, 18th 1970 at 5.00 p.m., confidential.

Italy and the Hague Conference of December 1969 105

Palazzo Chigi, in Rome, at the end of March 1971, explaining that Italy hoped that the UK, once in the EC, would support a revision of the CAP system that would thus become more advantageous to Italian and British interests.19 Furthermore, Italy hoped that Great Britain would promote the shaping of a European regional policy, with particular attention to underdeveloped areas, as the Mezzogiorno, and the implementation of Community institutions, as the European Investment Bank, the European Social Fund and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) in sustaining the development of these regions.20 Italy’s reaction to the other two goals of the triplet was not so enthusiastic. The adoption of a definite regulation for financing agriculture in Europe, envisaged by France as the preliminary condition before starting negotiations with the United Kingdom, posed a series of problems to Italian agriculture: a) Italy’s CAP contribution was particularly high, the country having the highest level of agricultural imports within the Community; b) Italian products faced strong competition from Mediterranean countries, such as Greece, which had signed an association agreement with the EC in 1961; c) the EC had failed to proceed to a structural development of Italian agriculture, which still employed the highest percentage of labour in Europe;21 d) the introduction of the Value Added Tax, as a first step in co-ordinating the fiscal systems of the ‘Six’, would be particularly troublesome for Italy, both for political reasons and because of the country’s administrative inefficiency. It was anticipated that the introduction of VAT in Italy would meet with long delays causing severe strains with the other European countries, particularly France.22 As to the question of the EEC’s deepening, the Italian government approved the establishment of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), although it appeared lukewarm towards the creation of a system of fixed parities proposed by the Plan Barre of February 1969.23 Repeatedly, the governor of the Bank of Italy, Guido Carli, and his close collaborator, Rinaldo Ossola, criticised the project of a

19. PRO, PREM 15/370, Record of a conversation between the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Italian Prime Minister, Palazzo Chigi, March 29th 1971, at 10.00 a.m., confidential. 20. These proposals were made by Emilio Colombo at the eve of the Italian presidency of the Council of ministers in June 1971. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the British Foreign secretary, agreed and said: “He thought that regional policy would be very important for the future development of the Com- munity, and hoped that it would be possible to arrange informal talks between the British and Ital- ian governments on this subject, because their problems had much in common”, PRO, PREM 15/ 500, Record of a Meeting between the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secre- tary and Colombo and Moro, held at Chequers on monday June 28th 1971, at 10.00 a.m., secret. 21. HAEC, EN, Folder 1509, Note of November 4th 1970 on Italian Agriculture. 22. See HAEC, Franco M. Malfatti Papers (FMM), Folder 18, Visit to Paris, September 23-24th 1970. 23. See G. BOSSUAT, Le président Georges Pompidou et les tentatives d'Union économique et monétaire and R. FRANK, Pompidou le franc et l’Europe, in: Georges Pompidou et l'Europe, op.cit. pp.407-408 and 339-369; P. WERNER, Union économique et monétaire. Les avatars du rapport Werner, Editions Saint Paul, Luxembourg, 1991 and H. ZIMMERMANN, The Fall of Bretton Woods and the first Attempt to Construct a European Monetary Order, in: B. STRATH (ed.), From the Werner Plan to the EMU, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2001, pp.49-72.

106 Maria Eleonora Guasconi monetary union with fixed exchange rates, whose aim was to make Europe independent from the dollar's instability, for its negative consequences in the relations with the United States and for the weakness of the Italian structural system.24 Carli did not oppose the EMU project, but the attempt to use it as an instrument of European «monetary self-sufficiency», as for him «Europe's strengthening should be realised without breaking the ties with the United States».25 In 1968, Jean Monnet asked Carli to work out a blueprint of the future EMU. His project, outlining a transitory evolution towards a system of fixed parities, proposed to link the European currencies through a series of ‘crawling pegs’ in order to facilitate the admission of the pound sterling into the EC. The project was carefully analysed and then rejected by Monnet, who preferred the establishment of a European Reserve Fund, according to a plan worked out by Robert Triffin and supported by the German chancellor Willy Brandt.26 The Italian monetary approach would gradually change in 1969, as a consequence of the pressures on the lira provoked by international monetary disturbances, the strengthening of the Italian trade unions' political leverage after the violent protests which had taken place in autumn, the industrial salaries' growth and a continuous capital drain.27 Emilio Colombo, minister of the Treasury, adopted a softer approach than the Bank of Italy, which he defined «pragmatic, seeking a gradual solution for problems affecting the member countries' economies».28 He supported the establishment of a fixed parities system, proposed by the Plan Barre, but expressed the government’s fears of the regional and international consequences of the EMU and stressed the need for the Six to coordinate their economies before achieving the

24. See E. APEL, European Monetary Integration 1958-2002, Routledge, London-New York, 1998; H. JAMES, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods, Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford, 1996; L. SEGRETO, L'Italie et le Plan Werner, in: COMITÉ POUR L’HIS- TOIRE ÉCONOMIQUE ET FINANCIÈRE DE LA FRANCE, Le rôle des ministères des Financ- es et de l'Economie dans la construction européenne (1957-1978), Ministère de l’Économie des Finances et de l’Industrie, Paris, 2002, pp.27-51. 25. G. CARLI, Cinquant'anni di vita italiana, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1993, p.230. 26. Ibid., pp.226-230. 27. See S. ROSSI, La politica economica italiana 1968-1998, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1998, p.14; M. SALVATI, Dal miracolo economico alla moneta unica europea, in: G. SABBATUCCI and V. VI- DOTTO (eds.), Storia d'Italia, op.cit., pp.358-359; S. TURONE, Storia del sindacato in Italia dal 1943 al crollo del comunismo, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1998, pp.403-405. 28. PRO, PREM 13/3542, Notes of talks between the Italian minister of the Treasury, Colombo and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, London, May 18th 1970, confidential. The difference between the Treasury and the Bank of Italy's approaches is well described in a document of the Commission: HAEC, EN, Folder 1509, Note on Monetary Issues, withouth a date and in a letter sent from Jacques van Helmont, secretary of Jean Monnet, to Robert Triffin on the Wern- er Committee: «Il semble que» -wrote van Helmont- «la possibilité d'un accord entre les tendances opposées se trouve dans la direction esquissée à Venise par M. Colombo. M. Ossola, sur instruc- tion de M. Carli avait critiqué la création d'un Fonds de stabilisation; M. Colombo a été plus nu- ancé», in: HAEC, Robert Triffin Papers (RT), Microfiche 18, Letter by J. Van Helmont to R. Trif- fin, Paris, June 5th 1970.

Italy and the Hague Conference of December 1969 107 monetary union.29 The Treasury feared that the EMU could result in a capital outflow towards the more developed European countries and accentuate the already existing regional disparities, in less developed areas of the Community, as the Mezzogiorno. Rome stressed the need to link the EMU project to the promotion either of a common regional policy or of a concerted employment policy, both intended as countermeasures to the negative consequences of the economic and monetary union. Since the creation of the ECSC, in fact, Italy had come to see the European market as a tool to solve the problem of unemployment, which was particularly high in the South, and sought to use the right of free access to the labour markets of the other five countries as a means to alleviate its domestic problems. In the mid-term Italy's policy had proved completely unrealistic, as the other five countries managed to keep full sovereignty over recruitment policies, preferring to sign bilateral agreement instead of initiating a common policy on employment.

Italian Diplomatic Games before the Hague Summit

Italian diplomacy was particularly active before the Hague conference, trying to exploit the European relaunch and to build an alliance with the other European partners, in order to exit from the peripheral role, in which it was banished at the end of the Sixties, and to offset French proposals related to the CAP. In October and November 1969, the ambassador in Bonn, Mario Luciolli, met several times with German officials, among whom the Foreign minister Walter Scheel, with the purpose of outlining a common Italian-German strategy for the conference. The Italian goals aimed at postponing the CAP’s financial settlement until the end of the negotiations with the UK. In particular, the ambassador asked the German Foreign minister to focus the debate on the questions of Euratom, the European Social Fund's reorganisation, the development of a common policy in social and commercial fields and, last but not the least, the development of political co-operation, considered by Rome as «the backbone of economic unification».30 This initiative, which reminded of De Gasperi's proposal to develop a European Political Community during the negotiations on the European Defence Community (EDC), was an attempt to reconcile Italy’s Europeanism stance with the negative consequences of the integration process for the country’s domestic policy. As to the question of the United Kingdom’s admission to the EC, Italy urged to start the negotiations in the first months of 1970 and to mention the date explicitly in the Hague’s final communiqué.

29. Ibid. 30. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PA-AA), Bonn/Berlin, IA2, Vol.1438, Meeting between Luciolli and the State Secretary Harcort, November 7th 1969 and Meeting between Luciolli and Scheel, November 5th 1969. The author thanks Hubert Zimmermann for the document.

108 Maria Eleonora Guasconi

The German government too considered the three goals ‘completion, deepening, enlargement’ strictly linked together and, from a political point of view, had a particular interest in the success of the summit, as Brandt’s Ostpolitik needed a strong alliance between the Federal Republic and its European partners, in order to soften the fears raised by its new freedom of manoeuvre towards Eastern Europe.31 Although the Federal Government shared most of the Italian goals, such as support to the UK’s admission, and the necessity of CAP reform, with particular attention to the surplus problem, Bonn considered the request to postpone CAP's completion until the end of the negotiations with Great Britain as illusory. Germany was more interested in the development of an economic and monetary union as a necessary tool to resolve the monetary crisis threatening the German Mark and the Bretton Woods system. The revaluation of the Deutschmark decided by Brandt a few days after his election in October 1969, as well as the devaluation of the French Franc in August, led only, however, to a temporary settlement of the monetary system. A central issue for Brandt was the creation of a European Monetary Union, capable of maintaining exchange rate stability and of coping with crisis which might threaten the international monetary system as a whole. At the same time, the project to establish an EMU was also highly important to France, since it would help Georges Pompidou to secure the feasibility of the CAP.32 French inflexibility in defending its own position thwarted the unrealistic Italian hopes of building a ‘special relationship’ with the FRG. Despite numerous Italian manoeuvres, there was little room for diplomacy and the European re-launch promoted by Pompidou turned out to be mainly dependent upon an ‘entente’ with Brandt.33 Three days before the summit, the chancellor sent a letter to Pompidou in which he proposed one concession, one condition and one proposition: the FRG was to accept the adoption of a definite financial agreement concerning agriculture and, in return, obtain concessions on the entry of the UK as well as on the establishment of a European Reserve Fund. As Andreas Wilkens pointed out:

31. On the question of German Ostpolitik see: T. BANCHOFF, The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics and Foreign Policy 1945-1995, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1999; W. BRANDT, Erinnerungen, Propyläen, Zürich, 1989; W. GRIFFITH, The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany, Cambridge MIT Press, Cambridge, 1978; G. NIEDHART, Ostpoli- tik: the Role of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Process of Détente, in: C. FINK, P. GAS- SERT and D. JUNKER (eds.), 1968: the World Transformed, Cambridge University Press, Cam- bridge, 1998; Idem., The Federal Republic’s Ostpolitik and the United States: Initiatives and Constraints, in: K. BURK and M. STOKES, The United States and the European Alliance since 1945, pp.289-311; A. WILKENS, L’Europe en suspens. Willy Brandt et l’orientation de la politique européenne de l’Allemagne fédérale 1966-1969, in W. LOTH (ed.), Crises and Compromis- es: the European Project 1963-1969, Nomos, Baden Baden-Bruxelles, 2001, pp.323-343. 32. See A. MORAVCSIK, A Choice for Europe. Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Cornell University Press, New York, 1998; A. WILKENS, Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monetary Union Germany’s European Policy in the Brandt Era, in: Journal of European Integration History, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1(1999), pp.73-102. 33. See M.-T. BITSCH, Le sommet de la Haye. La mise en route de la relance de 1969, in: W. LOTH (ed.), Crises and Compromises…, op.cit. pp.539-565. Italy and the Hague Conference of December 1969 109

«The latter was meant to be an important factor of solidarity and stability in the framework of the European Community which had experienced unfavourable movements in economic and monetary matters since the November crisis of 1968».34 The failure of the Italian strategy forced the government to change its position on the CAP. On 17 November, during a meeting at the Elysée, the French Foreign minister Maurice Schumann informed Georges Pompidou that Italy would probably soften its opposition to a definite financial regulation and renounce to its request of inserting the opening date of negotiations in the final communiqué.35 This decision to change position over CAP was indeed taken after a long and tough debate in the Italian cabinet. The Italian ambassador in Paris, Francesco Malfatti, informed the German ambassador, that: «the decision to accept the CAP's completion had not been an easy one. His only ally had been Moro. Rumor had appeared uncertain, and Colombo, although a convinced European, was against, as well as all the General Secretaries and Directors at the Foreign Ministry».36 During an animated meeting the Italian ambassador, Malfatti, stressed that, by opposing French goals, Italy was running the risk of loosing its industrial exports to France. The government hoped that Moro would find a solution, as the CAP was thoroughly unpopular in Italy and the left-wing parties were expected to criticise strongly the government’s change of position.

The Hague Summit

Italy’s strategy to build an ‘entente’ with Germany before the Hague summit proved to be unrealistic and failed. This was the outcome of the way France had strongly defended its main policy goal by securing a definite regulation for financing agriculture in Europe before starting negotiations with the UK. As a result of their limited diplomatic leverage, Italian officials were not only forced to accept both the completion of CAP and the introduction of VAT but also the controversial monetary union. The summit, originally scheduled for 17 and 18 November was postponed due, at least officially, to an illness of Aldo Moro, but more probably because of the general political situation in Italy. It finally took place in The Hague on 1 and 2

34. Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1969, pp.1346-1347; the Brandt letter is quoted in M.-T. BITSCH, op.cit., p.557, and A. WILKENS, Westpolitik …, op.cit., p.80. 35. Archives Nationales (AN), Paris, Georges Pompidou Papers (GP), Dossier 5 AG/127, Folder 1042, Projet du compte rendu du conseil restreint du lundi 17 novembre à 15 heures et 30 sur la prépara- tion de la Conférence de la Haye, and Folder 5 AG/ 1036, Note written by Schumann to Pompidou, Ouverture des négociations sur l'élargissement, November 25th 1969. 36. PA-AA, BI50/1969, Telegram n.3028 from Paris to Bonn, November 26th 1969, Secret. It seems worth stressing that Francesco Malfatti, Italian ambassador in Paris, and the president of the Com- mission, Franco Maria Malfatti, were not the same person. 110 Maria Eleonora Guasconi

December 1969. The Italian delegation was composed of Prime minister Mariano Rumor, Foreign minister Aldo Moro and the undersecretary of Foreign affairs, Mario Pedini. On the eve of the conference, Moro outlined some of his government's goals: the need to emphasise the link between the deepening and the enlargement of the EC; the strengthening of Euratom and other European institutions, in particular the European Parliament, through the direct election of its members; and the creation of a European University Institute in Italy.37 The Italian Foreign minister thought that the Six had: «reached the limit of their economic integration; beyond that limit a simple economic co-ordination was not sufficient, as it was necessary to reach a real common economic policy. Only a radical shift in the distribution of EC decision power and the consequent strengthening of the European institution can reconcile the demand of strong expansion with a planned European development».38 Although the freedom of manoeuvre for ‘minor’ partners, such as Italy, was narrow, it seems restrictive to affirm that the only outcome of the Hague summit was the French-German deal. Considered «rather vague and confused»39 by the French Foreign minister, Maurice Schumann, Rumor’s speech at the conference, did however, elicit Italian objectives. Stressing the need to consider the triplet as a unique political goal, the Italian Prime minister continued by saying that Italy was ready to accept a financial regulation for agriculture, «provided that it made for an equitable distribution of burdens, weighing on the economies of member states, with common prices and market systems for sectors like wine and tobacco which did not have them at present».40 Rumor added that the solution for the financial regulation of the CAP could only be considered as temporary and the distribution of burdens between national economies should be «reasonable». He requested that the Italian contribution to the EAGGF be fixed at a maximum of 23 %.41 On the second day, Rumor agreed with the French and German proposals, suggesting an intensification of monetary and economic co-operation and also with the proposal for regular meetings of the economic and financial ministers. The Italian Prime minister strongly supported both the idea of harmonising existing

37. HAEC, Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza Papers (CSM), Letter by Moro to Scarascia Mugnozza, Rome December 1st 1969. Since 1958 the Italian government had proposed to establish the European University in Florence. See J. M. PALAYRET, Un'università per l'Europa. Le origini dell'Istituto Universitario Europeo, Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, Roma, 1996. 38. HAEC, CSM, Letter by Moro to Scarascia Mugnozza, Rome December 1st 1969; see also: A. MORO, Discorsi Parlamentari (1963-1977), Camera dei Deputati, Roma, 1996 pp.1411-1429. 39. AN, GP, Note by Schumann on the Hague Conference, December 6th 1969. 40. PRO, FCO30/272, Telegram n.607 from The Hague to London, European Summit Conference, December 1st 1969, unclassified. Kindly made available by Alan S. Milward. 41. PRO, FCO30/272, Telegram n.609 from The Hague to London, European Summit Conference, December 1st 1969, confidential, and European Commission Archives (ECA), Brussels, Folder 1888, Conférence au Sommet de La Haye, European Community Bulletin, pp.50-55. Italy and the Hague Conference of December 1969 111 methods which, through the reform of the European Social Fund, dealt with social policy and with the introduction of direct elections of the European Parliament.42 After the first day it was still uncertain if the summit would be successful or not and it was only after the meeting between Brandt and Pompidou that the atmosphere changed completely. The chancellor reassured the French president that the financing of the CAP was not in danger and, subsequently, the French-German ‘entente’ was able to work out a satisfying agreement on an economic and monetary union. Pompidou gave his word of honour that negotiations for Great Britain’s entry would start in 1970 and Brandt reassured the president that the Bundestag would ratify the French proposals concerning agricultural financial regulation, on condition that the negotiations would start in July.43 In spite of that French-German deal, Italy tried right up to the end of the conference to postpone the completion of CAP after 1969 and also to introduce the notion of an 'equal share of burdens' among EC member states in the final communiqué. Unfortunately, the final draft communiqué reflected France's «nitpicking attitude»:44 the French delegation argued minutely over the detailed wording of the communiqué itself, clearly evincing the domestic leverage exerted on Pompidou's foreign policy by the farmers on one side and the Gaullists on the other. The French government firmly rejected Italian suggestions concerning the CAP and decided to replace them with a vague formula, capable of «taking account of all the interests at stake».45 Rumor presented a text for the establishment of a European social policy, which was subsequently diluted by France. Paragraph 12 of the final communiqué only agreed to hint at the possibility of reforming the European Social Fund. As to the question of enlargement, notwithstanding Italian, Dutch and German pressure, Pompidou refused, in the final communiqué, to commit himself to an opening date for the negotiations. He accepted only a press statement, made by the Dutch Prime minister Piet De Jong, declaring that the preparatory work for opening negotiations with Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway should be finished by 30 June 1970 and the negotiations themselves would start immediately afterwards. The question of foreign policy co-operation, another Italian goal, did not receive much attention either and the final communiqué dedicated only a few words to this issue. It charged European foreign ministers to study first the best way to promote

42. PRO, FCO30/272, Telegram n.624 from The Hague to London, European Summit Conference Second Day, December 3rd 1969. 43. W. BRANDT, op.cit., p.369 and PRO, PREM 13/ 2671, Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister and Dr. Frank of the German Foreign office, December 3rd 1969, confidential and PREM 15/397, Record of the Prime Minister’s private meeting with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic, April 5th 1971, 10.00 a.m., confidential. On this occasion Brandt explained to Heath that, during the private discussion with Pompidou at the Hague, he had played the agricultural card. 44. PRO, FCO30/272, Telegram n.626 from The Hague to London, European Summit Conference, December 3rd 1969, Confidential. 45. PRO, FCO30/272, Telegram n.625 from The Hague to London, European Summit Conference, December 3rd 1969, Confidential. 112 Maria Eleonora Guasconi political co-operation in the context of enlargement and then to present their proposals during the month of July 1970.

After the Conference

The comments of the European leaders who took part in the summit were, although not enthusiastic, characterised by a cautious optimism. The summit had not given life to a spectacular re-launching of European construction, but had generated a new climate among the European partners. The impasse which the Community had reached in the Sixties was overcome and the final communiqué indicated the ways to follow on the road of integration. The binomial deepening-enlargement announced for the first time in the French triplet, would become the railroad line along which the Euro- pean integration process would run forward. Even if during the Seventies some radical changes in the international system would inevitably influence the life of the Community, and would alternate between periods of serious crisis and static moments in the integration process (such as the end of the Bretton Woods System in August 1971 or the oil crisis following the Yom Kippur War of October 1973), some of the projects launched at The Hague were to become more important only in the mid or long term. All this is demonstrated by, for example, the first enlargement of the EC, the similarities between the Werner Plan and the Delors Reports of 1989,46 the strengthening of European institutions through the autonomous determination of budget resources and the first reform of the Social Fund. Georges Pompidou had paid great attention not to damage his country’s own interests when determining the position to be taken in the process of integration both before and during the conference. In this complex game of do ut des Willy Brandt also played a central role. In fact, he carried out a difficult mediation between German objectives on one hand, and the French goal of defining the financing of the CAP before the entry of the UK, on the other. The chancellor had measured with extreme attention the requirements and the concessions to make. He developed an independent political action in the more general picture of the Ostpolitik towards Eastern Europe and had been careful not to arouse alarm among European countries. In this context the space for manoeuvre left for other 'minor partners', such as Italy, was narrowed down and the Italian delegation was obliged to accept French conditions. Prime minister Rumor appeared cautious and went not further than defining as «positive» the outcome of the summit. An article published in the Sole 24 Ore on 4 December pointed out that the deal which had emerged during the summit was not particularly advantageous for Italian agriculture. Important sectors such as wine,

46. See A. VERDUN, The Political Economy of the Werner and Delors Reports: Continuity amidst Change or Change amidst Continuity, in P. MAGNUSSON and B. STRATH (eds.), From the Werner Plan to the EMU. In Search of a Political Economy for Europe, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2001, pp.73-82. Italy and the Hague Conference of December 1969 113 tobacco, fruit and vegetables were still waiting for European regulations. The Italian Communist Party strongly criticised the outcome of the conference. A Communist spokesman, Silvio Leonardi, made a negative speech in the debate held in the European Parliament on 11 December 1969 in which he stressed that the EC lacked democratic control. In spite of these negative remarks Italy did try, after the Hague summit, to tone down the negative consequences of the completion of CAP, as well as the fears generated for its economy in relation to the establishment of the EMU. It was not an easy task, as it was well described by the general director at the Farnesina, Roberto Ducci, in a note addressed to Moro: «we do not have the instruments to limit or change French foreign policy. […] All our efforts should be focused on Great Britain's negotiations and as to the question of the Community deepening we should pursue a strategy aimed at do ut des».47 The do ut des strategy led Rome to condition its definitive agreement on the completion of the CAP concerning the question of wine and tobacco in the common market system. This request, accepted by the Community in June 1970, was to cause severe strains with France, especially over wine. Moreover, during the work of the Werner Committee, Italian delegates put great pressure on the other partners in order to convince them of the seriousness of the problem of regional disparities within the EC, particularly evident in the area of the Mezzogiorno. In a conversation, which took place in Rome in November 1970, between Aldo Moro and the president of the Commission, Franco Maria Malfatti, the Italian Foreign minister expressed the opinion that the EMU project should be linked with other sectoral policies, such as regional, agricultural and social ones, because «various common policies are conditioned by the decisions taken in the monetary field, which is such a binding goal».48 In this context, Italy exerted strong pressure on the other partners, so as to promote a concerted policy on employment. Rome was one of the promoters of the first tripartite conference on employment, which took place in Luxembourg in April 1970.49 During the conference the six Labour ministers, the Commission and the representatives of the trade unions and employers discussed the pending issue of unemployment. The Italian Labour minister, Carlo Donat Cattin, played a central role in the proceedings of the conference, by trying to promote the development of a concerted policy on employment through the establishment of a standing Committee on Employment and the reorganisation of the European Social Fund. It seems worth stressing that on this occasion Italy closely co-operated with other European trade unions, sharing both their objectives and projects.50 This

47. HAEC, CSM, Note by Ducci to Moro, June 17th 1970. 48. HAEC, FMM, Folder 17, Visit to Rome, Meeting between Malfatti and Moro, November 13th 1970. 49. ECMA, Folder 30566, Tripartite Conference on Employment, Minutes of the Conference proceedings, Luxembourg April 27-28, 1970. 50. See A. CIAMPANI, La CISL tra integrazione europea e mondializzazione, Ed. Lavoro, Roma, 2000; J.E. DØLVIK, An Emerging Island? ETUC, Social Dialogue and the Europeanization of the Trade Unions in the 1990s, ETUI, Brussels, 1999. 114 Maria Eleonora Guasconi co-operation was not only instrumental to the development of a concerted policy on employment, but reﬂected, on one hand, the greater role played by the trade unions in the Italian political system. On the other hand, a more sustained dialogue between some sections of the Christian Democrat Party with the Labour movement was intended as a countermeasure against the serious social and economic problems of the country. A consolidated Italian network was emerging inside the European Labour movement, illustrated by the appointment of Carlo Savoini,51 a CISL (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori) unionist, as general secretary of the European Confederation of Free Trade Unions from 1969 to 1972 and Bruno Storti, general secretary of the CISL, as president of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), from 1965 to 1972. In June 1971 the Italian government presented the Council of ministers with an important memorandum entitled La politica dell'impiego nella Comunità,52 which paved the way to a widespread debate in the EC institutions on the need to develop a common social policy favouring free circulation of manpower and dealing with the less developed areas such as the South of Italy.53 As a consequence, in 1972 the Council decided to establish a Fund for regional development and to use the resources allocated to the EAGGF in order to ﬁnance initiatives for the development of the Mezzogiorno. In spite of Italian and German efforts, the Davignon Report,54 drawn up in October 1970, concerning the question of political co-operation, was disappointing. The mechanism set up was extremely simple: the Foreign ministers would meet twice a year, under the chairmanship of the Foreign minister of the country holding the Community presidency. Ministerial meetings would be prepared by a committee composed by the directors of political affairs, who were to meet four times a year. Any references to defence or security issues were excluded; the Italian request to strengthen the role of European institutions was rejected; there were no new institutions at all and the Commission was given only a «foot in the door», given that it had been invited to render views public should the work of the ministers have any effect on the activities of the EC.55 Aldo Moro seemed critical:

51. Carlo Savoini would later become Director of the DG V office for social dialogue. 52. ECMA, Folder 30541, Memorandum of the Italian government on Community employment policy. 53. See M.E. GUASCONI, Paving the Way for a European Social Dialogue. Italy, the Trade Unions and the Shaping of a European Social Policy after the Hague Conference of 1969, in: Journal of European Integration History, 1(2003), pp.87-111. 54. On the Davignon report see: D. ALLEN, R. RUMMEL and W. WESSELS, European Political Cooperation: towards a Foreign Policy for Western Europe, Butterworth Scientific, London, 1982; C. HILL (ed.), National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation, George Al- len & Unwin, London, 1983; P. IFESTOS, European Political Cooperation. Towards a Frame- work of Supranational Diplomacy?, Aldershot, Avebury, 1987, p.148; S.J. NUTTAL, European Political Co-operation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, pp.46-47. 55. PRO, PREM, 15/62, Memorandum, Political Unification, The Davignon Report, without date Confidential. Italy and the Hague Conference of December 1969 115

«The report is extremely disappointing, especially on the question of European political consultation, if compared to the Hague outcome. It will disappoint our public opinion. There is nothing which points to political decision making: only two meetings of political talks»,56 and Altiero Spinelli wrote that the Committee of the Political Directors had produced the «mouses» of the political concertation.57 In the mid term, Italian attempts to play a role in European re-launching would be most affected by its serious domestic economic, political and social situation. Since 1972, the government had to face growing opposition from the left wing parties, a difficult economic situation and a social crisis which forced Italy to adopt a 'low profile' approach in the Community. This was demonstrated by the fact that the reference to the development of a European social policy made in the final declaration of the Paris summit of October 1972, was a German initiative, and by the decision to leave the “snake” in February 1973.

Conclusions

The Hague conference of 1969 certainly represented an important turning point in the integration process at the end of the Sixties.58 Although the French-German deal played a central role during the conference, it seems restrictive to affirm that the outcome of the Hague summit was only a compromise answering to French and German conditions. The so-called minor partners, like Holland and Italy, also played an active role; they exerted pressure for negotiations on Great Britain's entry to begin at the earliest possible date and tried to pursue specific national interests; among these were the reform of the European Social Fund, the development of an embryonic European social policy or the re-launching of the project of political co-operation, in the Italian case. Italy was forced to accept Pompidou's triplet, in particular the CAP completion à la française, the introduction of VAT and the EMU, through a system of fixed parities, fearing the negative consequences for its economy. Italy’s diplomatic games before the summit, in particular its unrealistic attempt to build an entente with Germany to offset French goals, clearly showed the limits of its diplomatic leverage, and confirmed the image of a weak negotiator. Furthermore, in the long term Italian domestic political instability seriously affected its capability to pursue the goals developed at The Hague, forced the country to adopt a 'low profile'

56. HAEC, CSM, Minutes of the Bagnaia Meeting, May 29th 1970, secret. 57. HAEC, CSM, Letter by Spinelli to Scarascia Mugnozza, September 22nd 1970. 58. Derek Urwin’s statement that “with the exception perhaps of de Gaulle's dramatic press conference vetoes of British entry, the Hague summit was the most significant event within the Community since its inception” is acceptable, only if taking account of the long term consequences of the Hague Conference. See D. URWIN, The Community of Europe. A History of European Integration since 1945, Longman, London, 1995, p.128. 116 Maria Eleonora Guasconi approach in the Community. Nonetheless, Italy was not a passive witness of other countries' initiatives. The European choice continued to be an important facet of Italian foreign policy, a useful instrument which allowed the peninsula to maintain a strong link with its neighbouring European countries during a troublesome domestic period. Italy was able to achieve some of its national goals, as shown by the effort to alleviate the negative consequences of CAP regulations, the introduction of VAT and the troublesome monetary union, through both the promotion of a common policy on employment and by focusing the other partners’ attention on European regional disparities. The inability of Italy to influence the French-German deal explains Rome's favouring the first enlargement: Great Britain's entry in the EC was considered necessary to counterbalance the overwhelming relationship between Paris and Bonn. As Willy Brandt said realistically to Mariano Rumor in a private conversation in Rome: «It is of Italian and German interest to support Pompidou and Chaban Delmas, as the French president will achieve the enlargement goal».59 In spite of Italian efforts the hope to find a counterbalance in London to the French-German hegemony in the Community proved to be illusory, as Great Britain turned out to be a weak actor on the European scene and, ever since its admission, developed a critical attitude towards the EC. Paradoxically, during the troublesome 1970s, the European pillar of Italian policy would be strengthened more by domestic factors than by foreign policy decisions. In June 1969, during the Moscow conference of the Communist parties, Enrico Berlinguer, then deputy secretary general of the party, openly supported the theory of 'national ways' to Socialism, which implied potential dissent from Moscow; this could be considered as the first step toward the development of Eurocommunism. The radical change of the Italian Communist Party and the communist trade union's (CGIL) approach towards the Community, which passed from the very critical attitude of considering the EC as a tool of American imperialism, towards a more positive stance, represented a real turning point in Italian post-war domestic policy, for the influence they exerted on the Italian public opinion.60

59. Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Doc. n.307, Note of the Talks between Brandt and Rumor, Rome, July 14th 1970. 60. On the PCI and European integration see: M. MAGGIORANI, L'Europa degli altri. Comunisti italiani e integrazione europea, Carocci, Roma, 1998.

117 The Hague Conference of 1969 and the United Kingdom’s Accession to the European Economic Community

Alan S. Milward

One purpose dominated the British government’s attitude to the conference of the political leaders of the six EEC member-states at The Hague in December 1969, that it should set a date for the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom on its application for membership. That application, made in 1967, had not been withdrawn nor had its terms been altered in the face of French resistance to it. While the Netherlands, Germany and Italy asserted their support for British membership more strongly after France’s refusal to open negotiations than they had before, their interests lay as much in the ‘deepening’ and ‘completion’ of the Community as in its expansion. Their experience of the Fifth French Republic’s attitude to the Community had shown them how limited and entirely instrumental was the role which France allocated to it. The tendency in Paris after the signing of the Treaty of Rome to be attracted to the idea of some larger economic association, better suited to the more global scope of French trade, investment and foreign policy, had grown stronger under de Gaulle’s regime and France’s attitude to its fellow Community member-states more masterful, more wayward and more disdainful. ‘Widening’ of the Community to include the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Scandinavian applicants might prove one avenue of escape from the constraints which France exercised over it, but only if at the same time the financial and administrative basis of the Community was permanently established and some programme for future integrative developments was agreed. The new applicant-states did not seem inspired by visions of an ever-closer political union, nor by visions of a federal structure for the continent. Rather, the language they spoke was more that of the market-place. This increased the anxiety of the existing states to find some integrative policy, such as monetary union, which would hold more firmly in place the structure they had built and which France had threatened to reduce in importance. The other five member-states, in bringing such strong pressure on France for ‘widening’ the Community, were at the same time writing a role for Britain to play in ‘completing’ and ‘deepening’ the Community as part of the terms of its accession. If France could not resist the pressure for British accession, it would have to join in writing such a role as a way of safeguarding its own prime place in the Community structure. In negotiating and implementing the Treaty of Rome France had devised a method of linking the provision of the Community’s ‘own resources’, the financial provision which had to be made for the administration by the independent executive of the Community of common Community policies, to the protection and subsidisation of French agriculture within the common market. This link was made through Financial Regulation No.25, drafted and imposed during the United

118 Alan S. Milward

Kingdom’s first unsuccessful negotiations for membership in 1961-3. An additional purpose of that Regulation was, indeed, at the time, to deter Britain from pursuing its application. Financial Regulation No.25 foresaw the main body of ‘own resources’ being drawn from the frontier levies which were to be used for the purpose of gradually equalising the prices of agricultural products moving within the common market. The clear implication of this policy was that once prices were equalised ‘own resources’ would then be derived by transferring to the European Commission the income from the Common External Tariff of the Community. Those member-states which were the greatest food importers once the levies were in place would pay the greatest part of the Community’s expenses. Within the Six the biggest volume importer was Germany, although had the British application for membership not failed the United Kingdom would have run Germany close as chief paymaster. The exact circumstances in which Germany accepted this Regulation after summer 1962 have never been fully explained.1 However, it was accepted in the first place only for three years and there followed a prolonged struggle through the1960s by France to make this system of financing the Community permanent.2 Since by far the greatest part of Community expenditure was on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and since the United Kingdom was certain to receive a proportionately smaller share of the benefits from that policy than Germany, Financial Regulation No.25 might well have led to Britain breaking off its negotiations for entry in 1963 had de Gaulle not pronounced his veto. Germany, with its large agricultural sector, was guaranteed a large return from the Common Agricultural Policy, although by no means one commensurate with its outlays. The Financial Regulation remained a subject of persistent inter-ministerial controversy in Germany with the result that it was accepted only as a temporary regulation. At the time of Britain’s second application for membership in 1967 it was scheduled for final consideration, in December 1969 in what France treated as an ultimatum. As far as France was concerned, ‘completion’ meant that Germany must permanently accept as a permanent solution what it had signed in 1963. After that, and only after that, if ‘widening’ was to follow, the United Kingdom must do the same. What had been set out in Financial Regulation No.25 in 1962 was an acquis français to be cemented into place as an acquis communautaire. The problem which this posed for British membership went deeper than the disproportionate cost of the Community budget which Britain must meet. A large volume of food imports from Commonwealth countries at prices much lower than those prevailing in Europe would have to be partly substituted, to conform with the principle of European preferences and the gradual alignment with the Common External Tariff of the Community, by more expensive imports from the Community. The impact of this change on reducing the outflow of transfers from Britain to ‘own resources’ was not easily calculable. The immediate impact of

1. A.S. MILWARD, The United Kingdom and the European Community, vol.1: The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy 1945-1963, Whitehall History Publishing, London, 2002, p.386. 2. A.-C. LAURING KNUDSEN, Defining the Policies of the Common Agricultural Policy. A His- torical Study, PhD thesis, European University Institute, 2001.

The Hague Conference of 1969 and the United Kingdom’s Accession 119 more expensive food imports on the cost-of-living was more predictable. Some estimates foresaw it to be between 12 and 15 per cent over the first two to three years of membership. That something of this order of magnitude would occur was largely expected by the public and the inflationary impulse which it would give to the economy was an undisguiseable political problem when inflationary trends were once again becoming a matter of domestic political concern. The Common Agricultural Policy thus posed a two-pronged threat. One prong was the ammunition which its inflationary consequences would give to Labour Party opponents of entry. The other, which disturbed Harold Wilson and his ministers more, was its consequences for the balance of payments. From the moment early in 1966 that serious thought was given to making a second application for Community membership officials were adamant that it could not succeed if Britain questioned in any fundamental way the principle of the method by which the Community’s ‘own resources’ were to be provided, for that would be to question also the principle of the CAP itself. The question the government had to answer therefore was not whether it was ready to pay the excessive share of the Community’s running-costs which would be demanded, but the more realistic one in the circumstances of whether it could do so. This may seem paradoxical in view of the elimination of alternative possible international frameworks by ministerial committees between 1963 and 1966. Persisting with EFTA; enlarging EFTA; developing the Commonwealth trade preferences into a programme more specifically aimed at stimulating an improvement in the overall export performance of British manufacturing; a North American Free Trade Area (which might eventually embrace EFTA); all these were ruled out as substitutes for EEC membership or even for persevering with the status quo after de Gaulle’s veto. But the conclusion that Britain had to try to join had no validity if joining would make its economic situation still weaker. The decision to apply a second time in May 1967 for membership, followed logically by the decision not to withdraw that application in the event of its rejection, has to be seen in the context that the strength, thought to be declining, of the economy could only be restored by increases in sales and an improvement in total factor productivity by the manufacturing sector and that this in turn could only be achieved by an increase in exports from that sector. The ultimate purpose was to reverse what the governments of the 1960s saw as a decline in British political influence in Europe, largely attributable to exclusion from the Community, whose consequence would surely be also a decline in British influence in Washington. But the restoration of British influence was very closely linked in the collective mind of the Labour Party, which governed for most of the decade, with restoring the fortunes of the manufacturing sector. It was from that sector that their main source of political support was drawn. They had before their eyes the clear evidence of the way in which the common market was promoting the growth of manufactured exports from all of its member-states through the mechanism of the European preference system and believed that it would exercise a similarly dynamic effect on British industries. It was, already, the most rapidly growing market for them.

120 Alan S. Milward

This conclusion was not reached in comfortable circumstances, but against the background of a weakening balance of payments position and repeated speculative attacks on the sterling exchange rate, leading to devaluation in November 1967 and to heavy borrowing from the International Monetary Fund. ‘Rescuing’ the balance of payments was thought to depend primarily on ‘rescuing’ the manufacturing sector and thus on entry into the Common Market. Neither the complex nature of the interactions between the service sector and manufacturing were foreseen, nor that so high a share of employment in the service sector would in effect be in and for the manufacturing sector itself, in the sense that the volume and value of sales of manufactures and perhaps their competitive advantage would depend on the services provided by that share. Indeed, service sector employment was discriminated against fiscally. The model was Germany with its dominant and successful manufacturing sector. Entry into the Community was intended to replicate the German experience. It was ironic that what stood in the way of these hopes from accession was the Community’s agricultural sector with its need for heavy subsidisation. In Britain itself agriculture employed no more than 3.5 per cent of the active labour force and contributed a smaller percentage of GNP. The dynamic effects to be expected of accession on manufacturing would be delayed until British industry had adjusted to its new opportunities. Meanwhile the United Kingdom would have immediately to pay its entry charges to the Community and immediately have to face the problem of paying ‘own resources’ to subsidise agriculture in France, Germany and Italy which would become its main industrial competitors. Worse, a substantial share of the subsidies that went to French agriculture would be to exports, an increasing total volume of which would be to the United Kingdom at inflationary prices. This might also lead to the loss of preferences for British manufactured exports in Commonwealth countries. For several years after entry into the Community the effect on the United Kingdom’s balance of payments must therefore be to worsen its problem. Would the balance of payments survive the cure? When at the start of 1966 prime minister Harold Wilson began his energetic push to organise a second application for membership while holding his party together, it had become the prevailing view inside the Foreign Office that Britain’s persistence in trying to negotiate special terms in 1961-2 for the entry of Commonwealth foodstuffs into the United Kingdom for some time after entry into the common market had played into the hands of the French government by allowing it to spin out the entry negotiations until de Gaulle had felt sufficiently safely in power to impose his unilateral veto. Officials were keen to avoid anything which would again imply that the United Kingdom was still calling into question the principles of the Common Agricultural Policy and Financial Regulation No.25. They wished to modify the effect of these principles on the British economy by a pragmatic negotiation rather than a prior statement of disagreement with them. Their hope was, that by not raising issues of principle the United Kingdom could obtain membership in time to be present at the attempt to negotiate the permanent rules for the provision of ‘own resources’ by December 1969. It was the existence

The Hague Conference of 1969 and the United Kingdom’s Accession 121 of that deadline which was the main reason why the Hague summit was eventually held in that month. Foreign Office hopes strayed even further however. They envisaged that even if Britain had not become a member-state by then it would have travelled sufficiently far towards that goal that it would be allowed some say in what the final settlement of the Community’s dispute over own resources would be. Sir Con O’Neill, who had served for three years as ambassador to the Community and had made several reasoned criticisms of the United Kingdom’s earlier negotiating tactics told a Benelux committee luncheon at The Hague in January 1966, “I hold that the Common Market agricultural policy is difficult to be adopted by Britain, but I do not say that it could never be adopted. In fact, we accepted it in principle three or four years ago”.3 His remark brought a speedy rebuke from Thomas Balogh, Wilson’s economic adviser, and an opponent of Britain’s attempted entry into the Community. In a hand-written note Wilson commented, “I think this is very unfortunate esp[ecially] the reference to ‘accepting’ agricultural policy. I never have: we attacked it, on import not farm grounds. There would be no more speeches now”.4 There seems to be no evidence that Wilson changed his mind about this. Rather it appears to be the case that he persisted in thinking that to enter the Community with no modification of Britain’s expected contribution to the Community budget might be a risky venture, was certainly not to be undertaken without very careful thought, and that every effort should be made to plot a negotiating procedure through which that contribution could be modified. When he initiated on 21 March 1967 what was in reality a series of Cabinet meetings on the subject of a second application and its nature and objectives, although the cabinet secretary did not keep written notes of them as was the normal practice, the first meeting called for a list of further submissions on the likely position of British agriculture in the Community, including one which should attempt to show the probable impact on the balance of payments of the CAP, its probable impact on agricultural production, and its probable impact on Commonwealth agriculture. These were to allow some determination of how far the CAP could be modified if all these “impacts” were to be made “tolerable”.5 A parliamentary Select Committee on Agriculture sought the same information. “It was”, so the officials servicing the unscripted Cabinet meetings recorded, “fully recognized that we could not hope to abolish the C.A.P., but, if we had entered the EEC by 1968, we might be in a position to modify its operation when it came to be renegotiated in 1969”.6

3. PRO, PREM 13/893, Note of Sir Con O’Neill’s remarks. 4. Ibid., Note by Wilson, 19 January 1966. 5. PRO, CAB 130/316, MISC 143(67) 1st meeting. ‘Cabinet. Europe.’ Minutes of a Meeting of Offi- cials held 2 March 1967. 6. PRO, CAB 130/316, MISC 143(67) 2nd meeting. ‘Cabinet. Europe’, 3 April 1967.

122 Alan S. Milward

An interdepartmentally agreed memorandum on agriculture inside the Common Market was produced by early April, but a statement made by the president of the Board of Trade, Douglas Jay, a strong opponent of entry into the Community, met with attempts by the prime minister to delay its presentation. Richard Crossman, the leader of the House of Commons, did keep notes and tells us, “Before very long the P.M. [prime minister] made a very important intervention which no doubt shortened the discussion. It had been suggested, he said, that we should seek for transitional arrangements only but it was clear that if we accepted the C.A.P. as it stands we should be compelled to pay an outrageously big proportion of the levies. So we couldn’t just discuss transitional arrangements in any negotiation. We had to get some firm understanding about the long-term policy. As stated in the Cabinet minutes, this is a very important reservation which runs, ‘We should reserve our freedom to seek adjustments in agriculture going beyond transitional arrangements’”.7 As for the report on the balance of payments, officials had to agree with one of Douglas Jay’s criticisms of it; it had quantified the disadvantageous effects of entry into the Community with reasonable precision but its statement about the countervailing advantages relied very heavily on unquantified and perhaps unquantifiable dynamic gains. Its assumptions about those gains were heavily influenced by the dynamic gains from intra-trade within the Common Market over the twenty previous years. A substantial proportion of those gains was thought, partly on a basis of fact but more on a basis of economic reasoning, to have arisen from trade-induced improvements in total factor productivity in manufacturing and concomitant reductions in costs. On the assumption that Britain, after entry, would have the same experience, and under another assumption that Britain’s entry would begin with a transitional period starting with the year 1970, it would not be until 1972 or 1973 that an annual balance of payments surplus greater than the one envisaged by the current economic policies would be required. No-one, including the critics of these assumptions, assumed instead that the high growth rates of trade and GNP which had prevailed since 1945 would end and that 1972 would be, as it was in reality to prove, a year of fundamental adjustment to lower long-term growth rates both of trade and income. Nevertheless, in view of the risky vagueness inherent in quantifying the future, the Treasury under-secretary for Finance, Sir Robert Armstrong, gave it as his view that it would be imprudent to join the Community under terms which would have a practical effect on the economy before 1970.8 This, of course, could only emphasise more clearly the importance of the link between ‘own resources’ and the CAP. “It would”, officials recommended, “for example, be in our interest to play a part in the negotiations regarding the financial arrangements for the CAP due to take place in 1969”.9

7. R. CROSSMAN, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol.2, Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, London, 1976, p.318. Crossman records this meeting as taking place on 18 April 1967. 8. PRO, CAB 130/316, MISC (67) 4, ‘The Effect of Entry into the EEC on the Economy and Balance of Payments of the United Kingdom’, 27 April 1967. 9. PRO, CAB 130/316, MISC 143 (67) 5th Meeting, 21 April 1967.

The Hague Conference of 1969 and the United Kingdom’s Accession 123

The excessively ambitious nature of that comment, although it was at once adopted by the Foreign secretary as the desirable timetable and policy, needs no comment here, for the application was soon to be vetoed by de Gaulle’s rejection of any negotiations. Even without that veto, French policy would not have veered from its course of reaching agreement directly with Germany on the long-term provision of ‘own resources’ based on the preservation of France’s already won acquis. After de Gaulle’s departure this was for Georges Pompidou a pre-requisite to any agreement on Community expansion at the Hague summit. He said so in his opening address to the summit.10 The position as far as Britain was concerned, remained that the potential financial impact of that acquis on the United Kingdom’s balance of payments must be adjusted in the entry negotiations on which they were insisting and for which a date must be set at the Hague summit. Any idea that Britain could itself be represented at the summit was swept aside by France. If the desired date was to be accorded, it would have to be won through the agency of the Netherlands or Germany, with Italian support. During the first morning of the conference, so Gaston Thorn the Luxembourg prime minister reported, the Dutch foreign minister, Joseph Luns, who had been explicit in earlier talks with the British that his position was the reverse of Pompidou’s and that he would demand a date for negotiations in return for his agreement to ‘completion’, engaged in a vehement quarrel with the French foreign minister, Maurice Schumann; “ils s’engeulaient comme des poissons pourris”.11 In the ensuing break, Luns who had been explicit in earlier talks with the French that a date was essential to any agreement, wanted, according to Thorn, to break off the summit. He was, so Thorn thought, demanding a capitulation from Pompidou, when what was needed was to find a way in which the new French president did not lose too much face in front of his officials. After the summit was over, another British official found himself sitting next to Luns on the TEE train from The Hague to Brussels. Luns said that he had told the French that ratification of the agricultural financial regulation had to be linked to starting the negotiations with Britain and that this had forced Pompidou to accept that outcome.12 This may have been too self-satisfied a view. The deputy under-secretary for European affairs of the German Foreign ministry, Dr. Frank, whom Foreign minister Willy Brandt sent to London immediately after the summit to reinforce his own letter about what had happened there, agreed that the summit had been near to breakdown by the end of the first day. He thought that it was the Germans in two private conversations between Willy Brandt and Pompidou who had rescued it from Luns’s intemperate behaviour. While refusing to accept Pompidou’s word of honour that negotiations with Britain would begin during 1970, because, as he claimed, he could not go back to Bonn without a definite date, Brandt offered him the way out by accepting the French proposals for the financial regulation of ‘own

10. PRO, FCO 30/272, Telegramme 614, The Hague embassy to FCO, 1 December 1969. 11. PRO, FCO 30/272, D.A. Malcolm to J.A. Robinson, 10 December 1969. 12. Ibid., D. Cook to C. O’Neill, 3 December 1969.

124 Alan S. Milward resources’ on condition that the Bundestag would ratify them only if the date for negotiations, which could be named by the French after the summit, allowed those negotiations to start within six months after its close.13 The same six months were thus the maximum time allowed for agreement on ‘completion’. But in return for this agreement, Germany had been forced to accept that France should have a veto on any subsequent alteration of the financial regulation of the Common Agricultural Policy. It was, Frank said, the price that had to be paid for satisfactory results on other points, namely the opening of negotiations with Britain within that time limit for its accession to the Community. Brandt, he added, had made it clear that the Bundestag would not ratify the financial agreement unless developments on other points agreed at the summit were satisfactory.14 There had been discussion between Pompidou and Brandt over the defects of the Common Agricultural Policy. The British view of what had happened was that Brandt had been swayed by the idea that France was finding its acquis less satisfactory in terms of the whole economy than it had originally hoped. The CAP was creating rigidities in French agriculture through maldistribution of its rewards. The ‘thank-you’ letter to Brandt, composed by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office was delayed for more than a week by Wilson, who wanted to write into it as far as was possible the ways in which the CAP might be changed. He also altered the Foreign Office phrase that the outcome of the summit was “encouraging” to “reasonably encouraging”. The discussions in the official sessions of the summit were indefatigably reported to London in numerous telegrams each day by the embassy in The Hague and British officials, Wilson as well, knew that the Dutch had argued throughout that the financial regulation for agriculture should be changeable if the Community was enlarged. Brandt’s pressure for change had evidently been less strong. Little or nothing emerged in terms of domestic policy in France from Pompidou’s own musings on the CAP’s defects. To what extent any early or substantial change in the operations of the CAP was realistic in French or German politics is not a question which has received much analysis up to the present. The disgruntled view of the Brandt-Pompidou deal taken by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and by Wilson himself is probably better testimony to their anxieties about what for the most part were political realities which it had never been within British power or influence to alter than to any duplicity on Brandt’s part. It was Brandt who had won for them what they had most wanted from the start of 1966, negotiations for entry. Frank saw Wilson after his meeting with the Foreign secretary and was treated to the prime minister’s own critical views on the CAP followed by a plea for more financial returns from it for

13. Ibid., Record of a Conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the deputy under-secretary for European affairs of the Foreign ministry of the FRG at No.1 Carlton Gardens at 9.15 a.m., 3 December 1969. 14. Ibid.

The Hague Conference of 1969 and the United Kingdom’s Accession 125

Britain.15 The day after, John Robinson of the European Integration Department of the Foreign Office wrote to the embassy in Bonn that he had asked Frank directly about the precise nature of Germany’s threat not to ratify the Financial Regulation and that Frank’s answer was “disappointing”, because it seemed to indicate that ratification could be well under way in the Bundestag by the middle of the year and could go through so long as the negotiations with Britain had been started.166 It would not be related to the outcome of these negotiations. The response to the decisions taken at The Hague was not to change the British government’s objections to what it saw as the economically dangerous injustice of the way ‘own resources’ would be financed, but only to shape its negotiating tactics in such a fashion as to avoid until the last possible moment any reproach that it had entered those negotiations with objections of principle to what had been reaffirmed at The Hague. Meeting on 5 May 1970 the Official Committee on the Approach to Europe, whose task was to guide ministers in drawing up a negotiating brief, listened to the argument that the arrangements for financing Community expenditure would account for the largest part of the estimate of the possible cost of entry to the balance of payments, as well as to the argument that agricultural surpluses in the Community were the result of mistakes in operating the CAP and that Britain therefore would be in a strong position in arguing that it should not pay for those mistakes.17 The draft negotiating brief on those issues which the Committee drew up was described as “extremely sensitive” and “only to be disclosed in the course of the forthcoming negotiations”. By 8 June, when the revision of that brief in the light of that discussion was complete, the brief read,

“but the ﬁgures in the preceding paragraphs are so large, and this element in the balance of payments picture is so much the most important, that we shall clearly have to say to the Six that such a potential contribution is neither supportable nor equitable”.18 The May meeting had in fact listened to suggestions that the word “equitable” should not be used to make a case in the negotiations and that it should be replaced by “tolerable”, but it had evidently not accepted that suggestion.

“No country” – the brief stated – “can be expected to carry a regular burden on its balance of payments of the order of £430 million per annum for the purpose of ﬁnancing Community activities. Certainly none of the Six would have countenanced it for themselves when the Community was being set up, nor would any of them now be prepared for a moment to accept Community measures which could affect them in this way”.

15. Ibid., Record of Conversation between the prime minister and Dr. Frank of the German Foreign ministry at 12.30 p.m. on 3 December 1969. 16. Ibid., J.A. Robinson (FCO) to F. Brooks Richards (Bonn embassy), 4 December 1969. 17. PRO, CAB 134/2826, EURO (70), (3rd Meeting), 25 May 1970. 18. Ibid., EURO (70) 9 Revise, Negotiating Brief on Community Finance, 8 June 1970.

126 Alan S. Milward

To accept the cost burden and adapt the economy to meet it, the brief argued, would in fact increase the cost in resources above the amount of the transfer itself and would “greatly minimise the prospect of securing the ‘dynamic’ advantages hoped for from entry”.19 What could be done? Britain was likely to be asked at an early stage in the negotiations whether it accepted the Financial Regulation which the Community had adopted. To succeed in gaining entry it would have to go as far as possible in its reply to indicate its acceptance of it. After that, in the course of the negotiation, the tactics should be, the brief suggested, to insist that Britain’s contribution would be limited for “a very long period”. This was envisaged as a transitional period of five to six years followed by a further period of seven years over which Britain’s contribution from levies, duties, and taxes would be governed by a ‘corrective’. The corrective would be a stated limit to the amount by which Britain’s proportionate contribution could rise above its basic key contribution. After those twelve to thirteen years there would have to be a review of the system of financing ‘own resources’.20 The implication of these negotiating tactics was that the United Kingdom would permanently escape from paying the burden which France had sought to impose on it and which it would not, up to that point, have paid. This tactical approach to the negotiation was inherited by Edward Heath and the Conservative Party after their narrow and unpredicted victory in the general election of 18 June 1970. The tone of Heath’s first serious cabinet discussion of negotiating procedures, held on 10 December 1970, reveals a government which, whatever the difference of personal attitude of its leader towards the Community, was by that date still basing its tactics on the official negotiating briefs drawn up for the Wilson government. New Zealand’s export position and the provision of markets for colonial sugar producers were clouds of anxiety bigger than a man’s hand, but the central and dominating issue remained the link between the CAP and ‘own resources’. Heath’s ministers came to the same conclusions as Wilson’s about the unreliableness of calculations of future advantage based on dynamic gains. Geoffrey Ripon, the chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who was to be the head of the negotiating team, emphasised the need to insist on the right “at every point” to a review of Britain’s payments to the Community. Others thought a review at any point was an insufficient safeguard. The costs of entry, unless ameliorated, were variously described as requiring “drastic” or “severe” measures.21 Twelve months after the Hague summit the United Kingdom’s road to accession to the European Community, although the initial barrier to it had been opened, was strewn with as many obstacles as in 1966.

19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Cabinet secretary’s notebooks [Sir Burke Trend], 10 December 1970.

127 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Alexandre WATTIN - Die deutsch-französischen Gipfeltreffen im Zeitraum 1991–2002, Europa-Union Verlag, Bonn, 2003, 224 p. – ISBN 3-7713-0615-9 – 23,50 €.

Les fonctions d’Alexandre Wattin, président de l’Observatoire des relations franco-allemandes pour la construction européenne, donnent déjà une indication sur la perspective de son livre. Sans négliger et oublier la dimension bilatérale, la relation franco-allemande constitue pour lui, et à juste titre, un laboratoire de la construction européenne. C’est dans ce cadre que le livre de Wattin s’intéresse aux sommets franco-allemands ayant eu lieu après la réunification allemande, le 3 octobre 1990. Après la préface de Karl-Heinz Bender (Université de Trèves) et l’introduction, retraçant – parfois de façon hasardeuse – presque dix siècles de relations franco-allemandes, un premier chapitre est consacré au traité de l’Elysée de 1963. Ce dernier comprend le texte du traité et un commentaire de celui-ci. Dans un deuxième chapitre, l’auteur propose quelques lignes intéressantes sur le déroulement concret des sommets franco-allemands, après avoir tenté quelques considérations générales sur les sommets. On ne saurait toutefois le suivre dans son cheminement qui conclue à l’absence de «concurrence» des sommets franco-britanniques ou franco-espagnols pour les sommets franco-allemands. Les rapports franco-allemands, pour privilégiés qu’ils doivent être, ne sauraient prétendre au monopole et à une pratique concurrentielle des rapports diplomatiques. Les chapitres suivants nous font entrer dans le vif du sujet. Cependant, ils ne parviennent pas à se dégager d’une analyse linéaire et fastidieuse, sommet par sommet. Le cœur du livre - moins de cent pages - consiste en effet à présenter pour chaque sommet de la période considérée une courte analyse (rarement plus de deux ou trois pages). Celle-ci se fait selon des rubriques définies et identiques: contexte, questions d’actualités, questions européennes, thèmes bilatéraux et résumé. Pour éviter des paragraphes trop maigres, les questions d’actualités sont parfois regroupées avec les questions européennes. Ce découpage, pour commode qu’il paraisse, n’évite cependant pas les redites et donne souvent au propos une certaine confusion. Cette méthode a certes l’avantage de procurer au lecteur une sorte de brève fiche sur chaque sommet et fait en quelque sorte de ce livre un outil de travail. Mais trop souvent son intérêt s’arrête à cette fonction. On recherche en vain l’analyse transversale des sommets de cette période ou encore une hiérarchisation de ceux-ci. Quels ont-été, sur la période 1991 - 2002, les sommets ou les thèmes marquants? Le lecteur doit lui-même puiser dans sa mémoire et dans les quelques indications factuelles surgissant au fil de la lecture pour reconstruire cette histoire immédiate. Le détail des résolutions, des avancées ou des explications sur un élément important d’un sommet se retrouvent de surcroît très souvent dans de longues notes regroupées en fin d’ouvrage – ce qui en rend la lecture difficile. On est ainsi étonné de retrouver développé dans une note, un élément aussi important que la décision de fonder l’Eurocorps, prise au sommet de La Rochelle en mai 1992! Par ailleurs, certains points auraient mérité que l’on s’y attarde d’avantage. C’est par exemple le cas pour la modernisation de l’organisation des sommets décidée au sommet de Toulouse en mai 1999. L’assouplissement de l’ordre du jour présente-t-elle l’unique mesure de modernisation? Plus important pour la dimension européenne, le sommet de Vittel, en novembre 2000, reste lui aussi sans relief particulier dans l’analyse. Sa présentation ici ne permet que trop peu de comprendre l’échec et les divergences franco-allemandes lors du sommet européen de Nice. Plus globalement, si cet ensemble de fiches permet de suivre sommet par sommet la température des relations franco-allemandes et d’en recenser les points discordants (la réforme de la PAC et plus largement du budget de l’Union, le

128 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen fédéralisme et les problèmes liés à l’élargissement), le livre n’essaye que trop peu de les expliquer ou de les ordonner en divergences conjoncturelles ou fondamentales. Ainsi, la rupture de la fin 1995 dont l’auteur se sert pour organiser cet ensemble en deux chapitres est insuffisamment justifiée et paraît quelque peu artificielle. Certes, l’Allemagne a après le milieu des années 1990 pris de l’assurance et la spécificité de la relation franco-allemande est peut-être posée. Mais cette date est-elle vraiment opératoire? Est-ce une rupture à long terme? A-t-on aujourd’hui déjà les clés pour l’affirmer? Enfin, approximation de traduction ou formulation maladroite, on regrettera, à la page 75, la phrase: «Pour la première fois depuis 50 ans des soldats allemands défilèrent sur les Champs-Elysées» à propos de l’invitation des troupes allemandes de l’Eurocorps à participer au défilé du 14 juillet 1994. Hormis ces faiblesses, le livre de Wattin permet cependant de revenir sur un peu plus d’une décennie de relations franco-allemandes. Que la culture, la jeunesse et l’éducation aient souvent été des moteurs importants du couple se trouve ici attesté une nouvelle fois. Néanmoins, la progression sommet par sommet montre combien ces acquis, qui paraissent simples et consensuels, sont parfois longs et difficiles à obtenir, comme par exemple l’obtention du baccalauréat français couplée à celle de l’Abitur allemand. Mais ici aussi cette lenteur n’est que trop peu expliquée. Certainement, l’opposition des systèmes d’organisation administratifs (centralisme jacobin contre fédéralisme) explique-t-il ici beaucoup de choses. Comment finaliser rapidement des accords dans les domaines de l’éducation et de la culture alors que l’on doit faire face à une compétence des Etats fédérés? L’élément important de ces sommets depuis 1991 réside cependant non seulement dans le fait qu’on a poursuivi le rapprochement des décideurs politiques, mais également que l’on a entamé un rapprochement des diplomaties dans leur ensemble, c’est-à-dire aussi des administrations diplomatiques. Les programmes d’échanges de fonctionnaires, d’apprentis- sage renforcé des deux langues dans les administrations diplomatiques, la délégation au partenaire de compétences en matière de représentation ou de délivrance de visas dans certains pays: tout cela symbolise, au delà du franco-allemand, l’union de vue qu’il existe entre les deux pays sur le renforcement nécessaire de la PESC. Le livre permet enfin de rappeler que les sommets de cette dernière décennie ont aussi tenté d’ouvrir de nouvelles voies du rapprochement, moins connues mais essentielles au rapprochement des sociétés: la lutte contre le racisme et la xénophobie, la possibilité de faire son service civil dans l’un des deux pays ou la réflexion sur une coordination du droit pénal. Somme toute, il s’agit ici d’un livre posant les jalons d’une histoire immédiate encore à écrire. Celle-ci est fondamentale pour apporter aux décideurs le recul nécessaire qui leur permettrait d’aller encore plus loin. Les lecteurs non germanophones devraient trouver dans 10 ans de sommets franco-allemands 1990-2000 édité à Nice en 2002 aux éditions Alandis un ouvrage comparable sinon identique.

Bernard Ludwig Universités de Paris I et de Cergy-Pontoise

Julien JORDA, Le pouvoir exécutif de l’Union européenne, Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, Aix-Marseille, 2001, 687 p. – ISBN 2-7314-0231-8 – 220,00 Frs. français.

Does a genuine executive power of the European Union exist? And if it exists, does it evolve in a democratic context in the sense of Montesquieu’s theory? It is this issue that Julien Jorda sets out to explore. The book has been submitted in 2001 to the faculty of law and political science at the University of Aix-Marseille as a doctoral thesis. The preface is written by Professor Philippe Manin of University of Paris I.

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 129

The author begins with an historical overview of the notion of executive power. He focuses on Montesquieu’s theory and especially on the idea of “check and balance”. This is followed by an attempt to find a definition of “executive power” through the observation of the executives of the Member States of the Union. Jorda argues that it is possible to identify an executive function stricto sensu, which corresponds to administrative activity, and a wider function, which would be more normative and governmental. He therefore poses the question whether such an executive power exists at the European level. He divides his analysis in two parts. In the first part, the author highlights that the first characteristic of the Union’s executive power is its double split-up among European institutions on one hand (section I) and between European institutions and Member States on the other (section II). Chapter I of section I provides an in-depth analysis of comitology and particularly of the new comitology decision of 1999, while chapter II deals with the administrative execution, making a distinction between “external” and “internal” community administration, the former consisting namely of EC competition law, the latter mostly concerning staff matters. Jorda argues that the essence of the Union’s executive power can only be understood through comitology. Not only does it show the variable character of this power, but it also highlights its transnational quality. Section II puts the accent on this particular issue. In the first chapter of this section the author focuses on the nature of national authorities’ executive power in the context of EC law. Particular attention is paid to the principle of co-operation between Member States and the EC established in article 10 ECT. Chapter II of section II highlights the difficulties which Member States encounter in executing European law. Jorda’s analysis shows that Member States’ executive powers are residual, depend, however, on the legislative instruments made by the European institutions. He concludes the first part of the book arguing that the executive power of the Union varies greatly and can belong to the European institutions, the national authorities and, in certain cases, also to some local authorities. The second part of the book is based on the view that the tasks which are assigned to the Union at present are not sufficient to create a genuine Union’s executive power, neither stricto senso nor in its broader definition. Jorda bases his analysis on two main arguments. First, he argues that the Union has an insufficient monitoring on its powers (section I). Chapter I concentrates on the imperfections of the political monitoring, focusing on the roles played by the European and national parliaments. Chapter II discusses the juridical monitoring, which the author considers to be incomplete. Jorda’s second argument refers to the pillar structure of the Union. He argues that the Union’s executive function is still unachieved because of its heterogeneity. He identifies three main areas where this phenomenon is particularly clear: the economical and monetary field, the second and third pillars and the external action of the Union. A detailed analysis of the role played by each institution and the Member States in those areas follows. In the third chapter Jorda claims that the difficulties connected to the delimitation of competencies between Union and Member States and the absence of a clear distinction in the Treaty between legislative and executive instruments are a clear deficiency of executive power. He concludes his analysis by restating his underlying theme, namely that the executive power of the Union is unachieved, and by suggesting that if this is due to the specific nature of the Union the development of this concept will depend on the European evolution. On the whole this book constitutes a valuable reference for readers interested in this quite complicated topic. The law practitioners should not be too intimidated by the long theoretical introduction. The core part of the book is well-structured and the author analyses in detail many aspects of European institutional law. His analysis is interesting and intelligent but the speed at which European law evolves make some arguments sound already obsolete. The work of the Convention will perhaps bring more precision to the

130 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen distribution of executive functions between the Union and its members (see articles 10 II and 36 of Part I of the Draft Constitution). Nevertheless, on the whole, the book has the merit of making a contribution to the better understanding of the interaction between European institutions and Member States at the European level.

Roland Bieber and Micaela Vaerini University of Lausanne

Mark KLEINMAN – A European Welfare State? European Union social policy in context, Palgrave, Hampshire, 2002, 346 p. – ISBN 0-333-69892-4 – 15,99 £.

Professeur de politique sociale comparée à l’Université de Bristol nommé en février dernier à la tête de la nouvelle Housing and Homelessness Unit auprès du Maire de Londres, Mark Kleinman est un théoricien autant qu’un praticien des politiques publiques. Autant dire que la question d’un Etat Providence européen ne relève pas à ses yeux d’une quelconque métaphysique, mais bien du «contexte» économique et institutionnel de l’Union européenne telle qu’elle s’intègre et qu’on la construit. La double interrogation au cœur de son ouvrage – le «modèle social européen» existe-t-il? Un Etat Providence européen peut-il l’incarner? – est ainsi, naturellement, à la croisée des analyses positive et normative. Le grand mérite de celui-ci est précisément de ne jamais renoncer à son ambition didactique tout en acceptant de prendre le risque de la critique et de la proposition. A l’heure où le caractère réel, possible et souhaitable d’un «modèle social européen» est mis au centre des travaux de la Commission européenne, le débat ouvert et nourri par Kleinman peut être synthétisé sous la forme d’un triangle des compatibilités ou d’incompatibilité – selon que l’on souscrive ou non aux vues de l’auteur – dont les sommets seraient formés par les politiques sociales nationales, la politique sociale communautaire et l’intégration économique et institutionnelle de l’UE. C’est dans ce cadre que, selon lui, se jouera l’avenir des politiques sociales européennes. Mark Kleinman commence par faire justice de la vogue académique du reflux, voire du déclin, de l’Etat Providence, désormais sommé de rendre les armes devant une «mondialisation» qui paralyserait autant qu’elle uniformiserait. Préalable obligé et réducteur à tant de travaux actuels sur l’avenir du «modèle social européen», il obscurcit plus qu’il n’en éclaire les enjeux. Car autant qu’à la supposée mécanique de convergence à l’œuvre pendant les Trente Glorieuses, les Etats Providence européens ont résisté à celle qu’induirait la mondialisation. L’argument, repris et développé plus loin dans l’ouvrage, mérité d’être ici approfondi: l’idée selon laquelle l’intensification des échanges de biens, de services, de travail et de capital conduirait inexorablement au nivellement par le bas («race to the bottom») des protections sociales en général et de celles dispensées par les Etats Providence européens en particulier est de même nature que le sophisme protectionniste de la «guerre économique mondiale». C’est de la diversité, qui se prolonge en spécialisations mutuellement avantageuses, que naît l’échange librement consenti. Il serait donc curieux que l’intensification de l’échange aboutisse à l’uniformité contrainte. Le constat empirique est à cet égard d’une singulière netteté en Europe: alors que la mondialisation des économies n’a cessé de monter en régime depuis deux décennies, les modèles sociaux les plus développés s’y sont maintenus et les plus embryonnaires s’y sont densifiés. Et pour cause: si la diversité des modèles sociaux a la vie dure sur notre continent, c’est qu’elle résulte de la diversité des préférences collectives de ses habitants.

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 131

Une fois cette «diversité légitime» – pour reprendre l’expression de Fritz. W. Scharpf – mise en lumière, l’auteur s’efforce de l’étayer en se pliant à la figure imposée de la revue typologique des différents «produits» ce qu’il nomme, non sans malice, le «welfare modelling business». Le souci pédagogique, une fois n’est pas coutume, l’emporte alors sur le tranchant de l’analyse: l’auteur détaille longuement les critères des quatre modèles sociaux européens repérés dans une littérature abondante tout en résistant vertueusement, il est vrai, à la tentation d’apporter sa propre contribution à l’édifice. La démonstration reprend par cette affirmation éclairante: compte tenu de la diversité des Etats Providence européens, toute politique sociale intégrée ne peut avoir pour ambition de faire advenir un monolithique «modèle social européen» (dont on aura compris que l’auteur ne l’a pas rencontré au cours de ses recherches). Comment, dès lors, dans le contexte de la phase actuelle de mondialisation, concevoir la coexistence pacifique et féconde d’une politique sociale communautaire émergente et de politiques sociales nationales vivaces? Ce qui confère véritablement à l’ouvrage un avantage comparatif sur ses concurrents, c’est que, pour répondre à cette question, il s’attache en ses derniers chapitres à replacer la politique sociale au cœur du «triangle européen». Symptomatique, dans sa laborieuse élaboration, d’une Europe qui hésite toujours à franchir le pas du politique, cette dernière en est également tributaire dans sa mise en œuvre, qui relève du système inédit de gouvernement éclaté de l’Union européenne. L’auteur rappelle ainsi que si la non-construction de l’Europe sociale, conçue comme un produit dérivé de l’intégration économique dans le Traité de Rome, était inspirée par le pari néo-fonctionnaliste, cette stratégie est aujourd’hui en échec: la convergence économique s’est accompagnée de la divergence sociale. C’est donc plus que jamais le souci de coordination, plutôt que d’harmonisation, qui doit guider l’action des responsables européens. Si Mark Kleinman a raison d’insister sur l’ambiguïté originelle de l’Europe sociale – qui n’est, à dire vrai, qu’une déclinaison de celle du projet européen tout entier – prétendant réconcilier, comme par enchantement, les exigences de compétitivité, d’équité et de solidarité, il en omet bizarrement les développements les plus récents. Le sommet de Lisbonne (23 et 24 mars 2000), à l’issue duquel l’UE a défini son «nouvel objectif stratégique» («devenir l’économie de la connaissance la plus compétitive et la plus dynamique du monde, capable d’une croissance économique durable accompagnée d’une amélioration quantitative et qualitative de l’emploi et d’une plus grande cohésion sociale»), affirmé pour l’atteindre son ambition de «moderniser le modèle social européen» et proposé pour ce faire «une nouvelle méthode ouverte de coordination», passe ainsi totalement à la trappe de son argumentation (l’ouvrage ayant pourtant été achevé en février 2001). Il s’y intégrerait parfaitement: c’est l’acte de naissance de la doctrine, au demeurant discutable, des instances communautaires visant à «réconcilier l’économique et le social». Cette ambition ne doit d’ailleurs rien au hasard: la monnaie unique portait en germe une nouvelle exigence sociale. L’auteur a en effet raison d’insister sur ce point: avec ou sans projet explicite, l’Europe sociale est en marche, dès lors que les Etats membres ont décidé d’adopter l’euro. Mais c’est pour lui, pour l’heure, une Europe sociale par défaut, en creux, qui se construit à la remorque d’une intégration économique dont elle ne fait que subir et répercuter le contrecoup. Or, l’UE, durablement marquée par le chômage de masse et l’exclusion comme le montre le chapitre consacré à ces deux fléaux contemporains, ne peut pas se contenter de faire, pour ainsi dire, l’économie du social. Ici, sans doute, les risques que fait peser la concurrence fiscalo-sociale – et non, seulement, de «dumping social» – sur les moyens et les finalités des modèles européens et, du même coup, leur pluralisme, auraient pu être davantage exposés (les travaux de Tiébout ont par exemple été laissés de côté). De même, les références classiques aux travaux de Balassa et Mundell, dont le contenu est à juste titre développé à partir de sources de seconde

132 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen main, sont curieusement absentes de la bibliographie. Le constat d’ensemble demeure: l’Europe sociale, contingente dans ses modalités, est nécessaire dans son principe. Comment alors envisager ses contours futurs? Aux yeux de Mark Kleinman, si elle se manifeste aujourd’hui principalement par son pouvoir régulateur, elle devra impérativement renouer avec l’objectif de plein-emploi, périlleusement subordonné aux objectifs intermédiaires d’équilibre des finances publiques et de stabilité monétaire depuis le Traité de Maastricht, en tirant le meilleur parti de la gouvernance décentralisée («multilevel governance») qui la caractérise. Elle pourrait alors devenir le support, en même temps que le vecteur, d’une véritable citoyenneté européenne, dont les traits demeurent bien flous. C’est dans le cadre plus large de l’abandon de l’utopie néo-fonctionnaliste que l’Europe sociale pourrait devenir le socle – le cheval de Troie? – de l’Europe politique. Les questions de responsabilité démocratique, de transparence et de légitimité deviendraient alors naturellement de première importance. On se contentera de déplorer que les travaux de la Convention européenne n’aient permis que peu d’avancées sur ce long et sinueux chemin. L’enjeu de l’Europe sociale, finement problématisé par Kleinman, n’en devient que plus crucial: il conditionne à la fois la nature du projet commun des Etats membres de l’Union et sa valeur distinctive dans un monde ouvert et pressant. A condition d’être activé, il constituerait, en somme, une amorce de réponse concrète à la question fuyante de l’identité européenne.

Éloi Laurent Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques Institut d’études politiques de Paris

Ben ROSAMUND - Theories of European Integration, Palgrave, Houndsmills, New York 2000, 232 p. – ISBN 0-333-64717-3. – 15,99 £.

Die theoretische Reﬂektion über die europäische Integration ist so alt wie diese selbst. Die Theorien der Integration verdanken ihre Anstöße veränderten historischen Kontexten, zum guten Teil folgen sie jedoch innerakademischen Gesetzmäßigkeiten. Ben Rosamund hat sich mit seiner Übersicht eine wissenssoziologische Aufgabe gestellt. Die Theorien werden in vier Dimensionen vorgestellt – immanent als Diskurs um die Stichhaltigkeit von Grundannahmen und Argumentationsmustern, als Reﬂex genereller intellektueller Kontexte, als Verarbeitung beobachtbarer Wirklichkeit und schließlich als normativ aufgeladene Vorstellungen um die Finalität des europäischen Integrationsprozesses. Lässt man die 50 Jahre Integrationstheorien Revue passieren, dann fällt die Dominanz ameri- kanischer und britischer Autoren auf, seit gut einem Jahrzehnt ergänzt durch deutsche Beiträge. Die Theorien haben sich, ähnlich der Europäischen Gemeinschaft bzw. Union, inkrementalis- tisch entwickelt, wobei der Anspruch auf „Großtheorien“ umso mehr zurückwich, je komplexer die EU selbst wurde. Alle Theorien haben sich, wenn auch mit unterschiedlichen Gewichtungen, drei Fragen gewidmet – den Triebkräften der Integration, der Verallgemeinerbarkeit der Integra- tionsmodi (also der Theoriefähigkeit der EU) sowie den Merkmalen, Dynamiken und Folgen politischer Prozesse innerhalb der Union. Während die Anfänge der Integrationstheorien (Neo- funktionalismus und Transaktionstheorie) nach den Voraussetzungen für Frieden durch Integra- tion fragten haben sich nachfolgende Beiträge auf beobachtbare Prozesse und Akteure kapriziert, weniger auf anonyme Systemeigenschaften oder erstrebte bzw. erwartbare Ergebnisse. Verein- facht gesprochen lässt sich eine spiralförmige Entwicklung der Integrationstheorien beobachten. Beginnend mit dem ökonomischen und zugleich staatskritischen (Neo-)Funktionalismus (Mitrany, Haas, Lindberg) folgt – in Reaktion auf de Gaulle – eine Wende zum Inter-

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 133 gouvernementalismus. Eine der Grundfragen der europäischen Integration wird spätestens seit Mitte der sechziger Jahre nur noch variiert, ob nämlich die Integration den Intergouvernemental- ismus bewahrt oder vielmehr zu einem autonomen supranationalen Regierungssystem führt. Beide Ansätze differenzierten sich erheblich aus und reagierten auf Einwände bis eine neue Gen- eration gleichsam „ausstieg“ und das politische System der EU als Phänomen sui generis bzw. im Vergleich zu nationalstaatlichen Politikmodi zu studieren begann – z.B. als „Mehrebenensys- tem“, „Netzwerk“ oder Konkordanzdemokratie. Jüngste Theorieanstrengungen wiederum refle- ktieren die konstruktivistische Herausforderung klassischer Denkschulen (vor allem des Neore- alismus und Institutionalismus). Die neuen Reflektionsweisen spiegeln die Ergänzung, wenn nicht gar Verdrängung der Disziplin „Internationale Beziehungen“ (samt ihrer alten Grabenkäm- pfe) durch die „Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft“. Einige Theorien werden von Rosamund reichlich knapp behandelt, so etwa die Föderalismustheorien oder die Kritik des Neorealismus am Institutionenglauben. Andere, so z.B. Karl Deutsch’s „Sicherheitsgemeinschaften“, die Interdependenztheorien und marxis- tische Interpretationen, werden indessen zu recht als kontextnahe Beiträge ohne dauerhafte Organisationskraft vorgestellt. Rosamund neigt einer supranationalen Sicht bzw. dem libe- ralen Intergouvernementalismus (A. Moravcsik) zu, hält sich jedoch mit wertenden Urteilen bzw. einer eigenen Position zurück. Er präsentiert Theorien, diskutiert sie immanent und stellt sie in ihren jeweiligen historisch-akademischen Kontext. Aus der Diskussion wird freilich keine eigene Interpretation oder ein Fazit entwickelt – bis auf die Absage an eine einzige Integrationstheorie. EU-Studien sollten sich als Teil allgemeiner sozialwissen- schaftlicher Fragestellungen und Methoden begreifen, nicht als Disziplin an und für sich. Im Unterschied zu mancher politikwissenschaftlichen Simplifizierung konkurrierender Ansätze bietet Rosamund eine detaillierte, auf gewissenhafter Lektüre basierende und vor allem faire Zusammenschau. Gegenüber Jungakademikern, die Pauschalkritik an konkur- rierenden Ansätzen bisweilen schon für einen Ausweis der Originalität halten, plädiert Rosamund für eine Hinwendung zu den Quellen, und zwar sowohl den theoretischen wie den archivalischen. Grundideen des viel geschmähten Neofunktionalismus finden sich so (laut Rotermund) selbst in jüngsten Ansätzen wieder, etwa bei der Betonung autonomer innergesellschaftlicher Akteure, der sektoralen Integration und der Grundidee des „spill-over“. Der Band ergänzt vortrefflich jene zahllosen Darstellungen, die sich auf das politische System der EU konzentrieren. Besonders für Studenten im Grund- und Hauptstudium, Praktiker, die nicht nur Bäume, sondern den Wald sehen wollen, und Journalisten ist der Band geeignet, sich mit Argumentationsmustern und deren wechselseitigen Bezug zuverlässig vertraut zu machen.

PD Dr. Andreas Heinemann-Grüder Lehrbeauftragter an der Universität Köln Senior Researcher am International Center for Conversation, Bonn

Albert LEDENT et Philippe BURNY – La politique agricole commune des origines au 3ème millénaire, Les Presses Agronomiques de Gembloux (Belgique), Gembloux, 2002, 600 p. – ISBN 2-87016-066-6 – 30 €.

The ambition of the authors of this 600-page volume is to give an overall view of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), its mechanisms and its evolution. They offer an assessment of the CAP at the dawn of the 3d millennium. Their presentation is based on a chronological and thematic approach, which has allowed them to realize a chieﬂy economic and technical work intended for informed readers. Information given on the developments

134 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen of the CAP doesn’t rest on a real historical analysis of the main European economic policy, but is most often restricted to observations or to general considerations, as is demonstrated by the short summary of the history of the CAP (pp.19-24). The relevance of their summary reﬂects their training background as rural economists, but from a point of view of political science, their study, despite their actual experience acquired within ofﬁcial institutions in Belgium, is not very thorough. In short, the content is rich by the volume of information provided, but remains mainly descriptive. A fundamental analysis of the evolution of the CAP, of its working, its achievements and failures, its reforms, the successive historical choices and the prospects for the future, shows up only occasionally and at the end of the work (chapter 9 and conclusions). A more detailed study reveals that nearly a third of this book is devoted to GATT and to the repercussions on the CAP of the agreement reached with a view to liberalizing agriculture, following the Uruguay round (chapter 5 and 6). Given the disproportionate importance attached to the external dimension of the CAP, it seems as if this European policy were in fact only an appendage of a world policy for the marketing of agricultural produce and foodstuffs. The study of this question however is very interesting and well developed. The emphasis is rightly put on the consequences of the liberalization of agricultural trade that have led at European level, to adjustments of the common organization of the markets (COMs). The authors insist on the episodes of the discussion for a growing integration of the CAP into global trade, an integration, which the World Organization of Trade (WTO) has to attend to. They give many details on the process of globalization that varies according to the sectors of agricultural produce. But they merely present the evolution of Community support and the protection system towards third countries without assessing its consequences for the European agriculture in the long run. It should be noted that they do absolutely not refer to Pierre Baudin’s1 work relating to the COMs and to the works of Claude Blumann2 and Valérie Adam, who have dissected the mechanisms of Community protection and support from the origins of the CAP up to the present day. Blumann has analyzed in detail the period of 1958-1990 and Adam the period following the break of 1992, trying to investigate the repercussions of the decisions reached for the future of the CAP. One of the major weaknesses of this work, considering its historical ambition, is therefore to have neglected the basic works on the CAP, as is shown by the bibliography. And the authors take care not to take a stand as committed economists on the scope of the measures scheduled for the coming years. In chapter 7, the prospect for the 3d millennium is touched upon, but the approach remains general and technical and is based on the Commission’s proposal of 1997: Agenda 2000, that is given a disproportionate attention compared with the decisions reached in Berlin in spring 1999, decisions that will serve as reference for the period 2000-2006 and for the mid-term review in 2003. It is particularly regrettable that the authors didn’t consider it relevant to put the emphasis more clearly on a new deal of the CAP, following the break of 1992 (Mac Sharry reform): the decision of the council of ministers for Agriculture to take an interest in the second pillar of the CAP: the socio-structural pillar, as planned at the intergovernmental agricultural conference of Stresa, in July 1958. This completes the commercial pillar which is made up of two sections, namely an internal section: the common agricultural market materialized by the COMs, and an external section based on the working of the Community preference rules and of a system of import levies and export

1. P. BAUDIN, L’Europe face à ses marchés agricoles; de la naissance de la politique agricole commune à sa réforme, Economica, Paris, 1993. 2. Cl. BLUMANN, Politique agricole commune; Droit communautaire agricole et agro-alimentaire, LITEC, Paris, 1996. V. ADAM, La réforme de la politique agricole commune de l’Union eu- ropéenne ou l’évolutionnisme permanent du droit communautaire, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2001, 2 vol.

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 135 refunds. Their analysis of this question (pp.390–408) is too summary and chapter 8 merely deals with “measures closely related to the market and price policies”, while the objective of the reform for the 3d millennium is, on the basis of the principles of globalization, transversality and rural socio-structural policy, to replace the CAP by a rural policy of which the agricultural policy would only be one element. This book must be considered above all as a dossier, that allows to see whether the evolution of the first pillar of the CAP in terms of results and inadequacy of economic objectives is consistent with the sociopolitical realities. The factual, economic approach minimizes a permanent intergovernmental debate on the choices to make. Especially, the part of the protagonists: decision-makers, i.e. government circles, and pressure groups, i.e. professional circles, are passed over in silence. The lack of boldness in the writers’ comments is regrettable insofar they have lived through the reported events and could have shown a more critical attitude, which would have increased the value of their work on a historical level. The problem is perhaps the title chosen for this work considering its content. If A. Ledent and P. Burny tried to give their work a historical dimension, one can’t help but notice its deficiencies, as it ignores existing studies carried out on the CAP, its origins and its developments.3 Obviously, they haven’t read the studies of historians on the project of the “Green Pool”. As to its developments, they ignore a great number of reference works. Under these conditions, they remain prisoners of technical and economic interpretations and make many mistakes over dates or over content and chronology, in particular when speaking about the Green Pool (chapter 1). This first chapter, in which moreover the protagonists are not correctly identified: J. M. Charpentier instead of René Charpentier, J. C. Eccles instead of David Eccles, and which doesn’t keep to the chronological order of the Green Pool, must not hold our attention. Chapter 2 presents in a classical manner the finalities and the sections of the CAP at the beginning of the sixties: marketing and pricing policies, foreign trade policy, structure policy and social policy, without emphasizing the fact that these sections had to be developed concomitantly, and without showing the “political” evolution: choices and priorities that between 1958 and December 1968 (Mansholt memorandum: “Agriculture 1980”) have restricted the field of the CAP. Like all good economists, the authors insist on the other hand on the evolution of the principles of Community preference and financial solidarity and on the evolution of the objectives of the CAP. And, in chapter 3, starting from the principle that the CAP and the Common Agricultural Market have to be merged, i.e. that the CAP has to be reduced, despite the stipulations of article 38 of the Treaty of Rome and the Stresa resolution, to an organization of agricultural markets for the main agricultural produce, they emphasize the commercial approach of common prices. On this point, their presentation is pertinent, the way they present the terms of internal organization and the protection and support mechanisms, emphasizing the regulation mechanisms set up gradually according to the evolution of the economic situation. But they remain very reserved on the finalities of the CAP that was implemented first out of concern over the level of income, income parity and preservation of family holdings. They merely mention (p.21): “there is a transition from traditional farming to industrial farming”. Chapter 4 is revealing Ledent’s and Burny’s difficulty where to place themselves in the field of history. They prevaricate between “the redirecting or the reform of the CAP” (p.74), putting on the same level the adaptations of the CAP, the adjustments of the COMs and the reforms. According to them, the reform of 1992 does not represent a historical break. This

3. The absence of reference to the study of the Belgians F. DEHOUSSE and Ph. VINCENT, L’éter- nelle réforme de la politique agricole commune et les limites d’Agenda 2000, published in Studia Diplomatica (Belgium), No5(1998), is surprising. The same is true for the work of G. OLMI, Poli- tique agricole commune, Commentaire Mégret, Brussels, 1991.

136 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen view is to be understood in connection with their technical approach of the management plan for the agricultural common market and its accompanying measures (pp.136-152) that minimize the study of further finalities. From the beginning of the 90ies, such finalities are already consistent with the concept of economic and social cohesion and are materialized by agro-environmental considerations and the introduction of new principles, in this case food quality and safety. Ledent and Burny mention them but are interested above all in the instruments of agricultural production and expenditure control. Only from page 441 onwards, they think it necessary to put the evolution of the CAP into context with the general economic evolution and analyze the CAP’s integration into market economy considering the expectations of society. They then draw up a table that provides elements to consider for a debate, in particular on the concept of “viable and durable family holdings”. But they don’t give their view on the “European model of agriculture” which is central to the preoccupations of the Union of the Fifteen at the time of the discussions opened at WTO level. Moreover, emphasis is put too briefly on an internal view of the constitution of a “green Europe”, merely speaking of “the rural development and/or agricultural development”. Thus this book is an interesting contribution to a better knowledge of the CAP, above all of its commercial pillar. From a scientific point of view, it doesn’t replace the work of the economist Rosemary Fennell, which is based on a more substantiar literature and refers to official documents of the European institutions, particularly of the Commission, aiming for a more historical approach of the creation of the CAP.4 Burny’s and Ledent’s approach doesn’t allow to consider their publication as a reference work for understanding the history of the constitution of a European agricultural and rural community. However it is an excellent, well-documented dossier, with boxes and interesting summaries, which presents the “standard” evolution of the CAP without really tackling the basic problems. It is particularly symptomatic to note that according to its authors, the CAP is not the result either of compromise decisions reached in Brussels by a Council of ministers, or of a power struggle with national and European pressure groups. And, for the historian as well as for the political scientist identifying the CAP with the constitution of a common agricultural market is greatly outdated insofar as, for the 3d millennium, the objective is to create a green Europe, i.e. an agricultural and rural Europe, not a commercial Europe but a Europe of economic and social cohesion. The authors neglect the fact that the future prospects consider no longer an agricultural Europe but the development of rural territories for the benefit of the whole society and not for agricultural producers alone.

Gilbert Noël University of Artois (Arras) Institute for European studies (Louvain-la-Neuve)

Daniela PREDA, Guido LEVI (eds.), L’europeismo in Liguria. Dal Risorgimento alla nascita dell’Europa comunitaria, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2002, 474 p. - ISBN 88-15-08980-2 – 32,59 €.

This collection of essays, edited from pp.7-237 by Daniela Preda, and from pp.239-473 by Guido Levi, constitutes an account of the proceedings of a convention of studies on Europeanism, organised at Genoa in October 2001 by the Department of European Research of the University of Genoa in collaboration with the European Pole Jean Monnet, which was sponsored by the Municipality and Provinces of Genoa and Liguria and the Centro

4. R. FENNELL, The Common Agricultural Policy: Continuity and Change, Clarendon Press, Ox- ford, 1997.

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Regionale Ligure of the European Federalist Movement. Starting with the nineteenth century origins of Ligurian Federalism, it goes on to analyse the contribution of the region to the construction of the Community, both in its governmental and non-governmental aspects, extending the investigation to some sectors which have hitherto been neglected by historiography, such as the attitude of the local economic administrations and organisations. Since the first half of the nineteenth century Genoa and the Ligurian territory have played an important role in the spread of Europeanism. A city of traffic and commerce, a crossroads of men and ideas, Genoa could not long remain untouched by that national and international turmoil which Europe had been plunged into from the early years of the nineteenth century, and which in a short time was to result in an arrangement of the civil world according to the principle of nations, as stated by Daniela Preda in her lengthy and well documented introduction to this volume. The first essay is by Bianca Montale and is dedicated to a concept or idea of Europe proposed by a famous Genoese from the nineteenth century, Giuseppe Mazzini, who, rather than being a Federalist, could better be described as being a forerunner of Federalism. Although there are constant references to European cultural unity in his writings, Mazzini, does not actually mention Federalism, but rather Friendship, identifying Italy’s mission as that of promoting the moral unity of Europe. His Europeanism shuns the juridical ties in favour of a supranational character, worried that the former could damage the absolute independence and sovereignty of the newly-formed nations. Notwithstanding this, his ideas are still relevant today, claims Montale, when he makes precise references to the necessity of a close interdependence between political unification and economic integration. Danilo Veneruso, in his essay entitled “Giuseppe Garibaldi, le nazionalità, la dimensione europea e l’internazionalismo”, studies the often forgotten internationalistic aspects of another famous Genoan, Giuseppe Garibaldi. Veneruso, in fact, shows how in the figure of Garibaldi the national and international aspects which characterised the popular liberation movement of the mid-nineteenth century were strictly connected, and resulted in a sort of structure of ever-widening concentric circles which were to culminate in “the reform of society”. In the period between the two world wars Genoa had an active role in the attempt to create a new international order based on Wilsonian principles. In particular the city played host to one of the three so-called “Great Diplomatic Conferences” of 1922: the Economic Conference, which is dealt with in this volume by Adele Maiello, tried, along with those of Cannes and The Hague, to overcome and remediate the deep fractures of the system resulting from the Treaty of Versailles. If, on the one hand, the conference proved to be a total failure, it was on the other, as Adele Maiello claims, the occasion when an important and innovative experiment in international co-habitation was carried out, in the conviction that the crises of those years could be resolved using politico-diplomatic “weapons”, adopting a system of agreements among the great powers. It is precisely in that inter-war period, when it seemed evident that the power of Europe as the political and economic centre of the world was on the wane, that Europeanism abandons many of those utopian ideals and attitudes which had up to now formed part of its character, in order to prepare itself as a political solution to the crisis of the continent. During that period Genoa, in particular, welcomed several important figures who would prove to be profoundly significant for the hamiltonian federalist form of Europeanism in Italy, which would now be distinguished by its more general attitude in favour of the unity of the continent in order to propose precise institutional solutions and clear cultural and theoretic models of reference. Pietro Graglia in his interesting essay “L’europeismo a Genova nel periodo tra le due guerre” draws attention to the early writings of Luigi Einaudi, to those of his collaborator Attilio Cabiati and of Giovanni Agnelli, and also to the birth of the journal “Pietre” which would count, amongst others, Eugenio Colorni, future companion-in-exile of Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi at Ventotene, as its collaborators.

138 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Cinzia Rognoni Vercelli, in her essay “Luciano Bolis, eroe della resistenza e patriota europeo”, gives us an engaging picture of one of the leading figures of the European Federalist movement; Milanese by birth but Genoese by adoption, Bolis, who shared many ideas with Altiero Spinelli, was a very charismatic figure, thanks to his brilliant exploits in the Genoese resistance movement. Guido Levi’s essay “Il movimento federalista europeo a Genova e in Liguria (1945-1954)” provides us with a fascinating account of the evolution which the Federalist Movement underwent in the first ten years of its activity, the choice it had to make regarding adhesion or non-adhesion to the Marshall Plan - which would involve the launching of the reconstruction of Europe - which faced the countries of Europe, and consequently the divisions which would be created inside the movement itself. He dwells in particular on the divisions in Genoa, and more generally on those in Liguria, where the majority of the Federalists had been members of the resistance movement. Danila Preda is the author of a long and well-informed article entitled “L’Europa di Paolo Emilio Taviani. Dalla resistenza ai trattati di Roma (1944-1957)”. In this work she presents us with the story of another famous Genoese who, in the 1950s, was a protagonist in the activities of governmental Europeanism when this was experiencing a period of particular fervour under the guidance of the president of the council, Alcide De Gasperi. Taviani, first as president of the Italian delegation at the conference of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), then at the conference of European Defence Community (EDC), and later as under-secretary for Foreign affairs for De Gasperi’s seventh government, carried out an important part in setting up the two community organisations. It was Taviani who organised the Italo-French summit meeting at Santa Margherita Ligure of February 1951 which led to an agreement between those two countries regarding the EDC and its political implications. And it was at Genoa, in June 1952, where alongside Taviani, Paul-Henri Spaak, the president of the European movement, appeared and that on the eve of his journey to Rome, where he would seal his agreement with De Gasperi, anticipating their discussions regarding the issues raised by article 38 of the EDC. The local Genoan press, even though little has been written about it - as Daniela Preda notes in her aforementioned introduction - did contribute in some way to divulge information about Europeanism. Giovanni B. Varnier’s essay gives us a richly detailed picture of the Europeanist efforts of the editor-in-chief of the “Corriere del Pomeriggio”, Lazzaro Maria de Bernardis, in the years 1948-1961. Giorgio Grimaldi, in his interesting essay entitled “Europeismo ed economia: Manzitti, Minoletti e la camera di Commercio di Genova (1945-1958)” notes how the Genoese Chamber of commerce, through its president and various enlightened collaborators, assumed an important role in the 1950s as an instigator in favour of European unity around which the local Europeanism revolved. In her essay “Giancarlo Piombino, sindaco di Genova e presidente dell’AICCE”, Lara Piccardo describes the man who was mayor of Genoa from 1971 to 1975 and president of the Italian Association for the Council of the Municipalities of Europe (AICCE) from 1969 to 1981 and since 1972 also president of the European Conference of Local Powers, one of the first forms of institutionalised representation and participation of the local and territorial bodies in the process of continental integration created by the Council of Europe. The last section of the book gathers together the testimonies of some sixteen people who were either Genoese or who were connected in some way to the economic, political or cultural world of Genoa or Liguria at the end of the 1940s or in the early 1950s, who carried out roles of varying importance in the European Federalist movement and who, in their own way, contributed to the history of the European Union.

Anna Bedeschi Università di Padova

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Edouard BONNEFOUS, La construction de l’Europe par l’un de ses initiateurs, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2002, 205 p. – ISBN 2-13-052467-2 – 15,00 €.

Moins connu que les «pères fondateurs» de l’Europe qui illustrent la couverture de son livre, Edouard Bonnefous est l’un des derniers témoins de la fondation de l’Europe (p.5). Cette Europe, l’auteur l’a non seulement rêvée mais il s’est efforcé de la façonner selon ses convictions. Dans ce livre d’entretiens avec Pascal Binczak, Professeur à l’université de Paris VIII, Edouard Bonnefous ne nous livre pas des mémoires au sens classique, mais plutôt son témoignage et ses impressions sur les succès, les échecs, les lacunes et les espoirs de la construction européenne. Néanmoins, l’exercice n’exclut pas un certain didactisme, car la narration chronologique des grandes étapes de l’intégration communautaire de 1945 à nos jours se joint à la réflexion personnelle d’un homme de conviction et profondément européen. L’essentiel du livre est consacré aux vingt-cinq premières années de la construction européenne qui sont également celles où Edouard Bonnefous, tour à tour parlementaire et président de la Commission des Affaires étrangères de l’Assemblée nationale puis ministre et sénateur, peut au mieux influer sur le devenir européen. Il est ainsi l’un des premiers à appuyer la proposition faite par Winston Churchill en 1946 de constituer les Etats-Unis d’Europe. En vue de la réunion du Congrès européen de La Haye au printemps 1949, il dépose avec succès à l’Assemblée nationale un projet de résolution invitant le gouvernement français à demander la réunion d’une Assemblée constituante européenne ayant pour mission de fonder des institutions européennes (p.20-21). Pour Bonnefous, le Congrès de la Haye est d’ailleurs l’évènement le plus symbolique de la construction européenne dont il jette les bases concrètes (p.182). Cette Europe, Bonnefous en a une certaine idée. Dès l’origine, il la veut ouverte, notamment à la Grande-Bretagne (p.18), et est, de ce fait, hostile à un face-à-face strictement franco-allemand (p.20). Devant les faibles résultats de la coopération européenne dans le cadre du Conseil de l’Europe et de l’Organisation Européenne de Coopération Economique (OECE), Bonnefous se convertit peu à peu à l’idée défendue par Jean Monnet et Robert Schuman d’une intégration européenne sectorielle, supranationale et fonctionnelle. A ses yeux, celle-ci doit en outre être graduelle, c’est-à-dire dans un premier temps économique, car l’unification économique lui paraît indispensable à la création d’un grand marché européen (p.38), politique puis, en dernier lieu, militaire. Il estime ainsi le projet de Communauté Européenne de Défense (CED) prématuré mais reste un partisan déterminé de l’Europe politique (p.77). Pour la période gaullienne, les réflexions de Bonnefous se fondent principalement sur des mémoires, à l’instar de celles d’Alain Peyrefitte1 ou de Pierre Messmer, et d’ouvrages historiques. Les conceptions européennes du général de Gaulle ne correspondent guère à celles de Bonnefous. Lors de la première candidature britannique aux Communautés européennes, celui-ci se prononce en effet en faveur de l’adhésion britannique, car il espère ainsi ancrer plus fermement la relation euro-atlantique et contrebalancer le poids de l’Allemagne dans le Marché commun (p.120). De même le dessein gaullien d’une Europe de l’Atlantique à l’Oural ne le convainc guère car il tient cette Europe géographique pour utopique (p.121). Enfin, Bonnefous admet certes que de Gaulle a su conférer à l’entente franco-allemande une dimension nouvelle, mais que celle-ci ne saurait remplacer une politique véritablement européenne (p.110). Au sujet du retrait de la France de l’Organisation militaire atlantique en mars 1966, Bonnefous cite in extenso une lettre de Pierre Messmer, datée de 2001, qui illustre les raisons pour lesquelles, selon l’ancien

1. A. PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle, Ed. du Fallois, Paris, tome I, 1994; tome II, 1997; tome III, 2001.

140 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen ministre des Armées, de Gaulle décida, en mars 1966, de mettre fin à la participation de la France à l’OTAN. La dernière partie du livre, qui englobe la période pompidolienne à nos jours, est structurée de façon plus thématique que la précédente. Elle traite plus spécifiquement de l’achèvement et de l’approfondissement de la construction européenne, notamment grâce à l’élection du Parlement européen au suffrage universel direct et à la signature des Traités de Maastricht (1992), d’Amsterdam (1997) et de Nice (2000), puis de ses élargissements successifs qui représentent, selon lui, «un gage unique de stabilité pour le continent européen» (p.178). Dans ces entretiens, et sans prétendre à l’exhaustivité, c’est un observateur passionné mais lucide qui s’exprime et fait toucher du doigt la complexité et les difficultés de la construction européenne. Cependant, ce livre ne retrace pas uniquement l’itinéraire personnel d’un homme, il relate aussi l’histoire collective d’une aventure et d’une espérance, celle surtout d’un projet encore en devenir qui, selon Edouard Bonnefous, «reste le grand dessein politique du siècle qui commence» (p.10).

Carine Germond Université Robert Schuman, Strasbourg III Universität Duisburg-Essen, Standort Essen

Yvonne KIPP, Eden, Adenauer und die deutsche Frage. Britische Deutschlandpolitik im internationalen Spannungsfeld 1951-1957, Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, Paderborn, 2002, 439 p. – 3-506-77525-1 - 51,60 €.

La réunification de l’Allemagne était-elle un but prioritaire de la Grande-Bretagne ou bien était-elle subordonnée à d’autres priorités politiques (p.9)? En posant cette question, qui sert également de problématique générale à sa thèse de doctorat, Yvonne Kipp présente une analyse de la politique britannique vis-à-vis de l’Allemagne qui ne s’inscrit pas seulement dans une perspective bilatérale, mais aussi dans le contexte international des années cinquante. Si la figure de Churchill a jusqu’alors largement dominé la recherche historique, Kipp se concentre au contraire sur Antony Eden qui, de 1951 à 1957, occupa successivement les postes de ministres des Affaires étrangères et de Premier ministre. En particulier, elle expose les motivations et les buts de la politique allemande d’Eden. Selon l’auteur, celle-ci est détermi- née en fonction de deux principes cardinaux: d’une part, le maintien de l’équilibre des puissances sur le continent européen et d’autre part, la préservation des intérêts britanniques et des possibilités de contrôle sur l’Allemagne. Partant de ce postulat, l’auteur cherche en outre à mettre en évidence les éventuelles continuités et ruptures dans la politique allemande d’Eden. Kipp fonde son étude sur un grand nombre d’archives, en majorité britanniques, complétées par des recherches dans les archives diplomatiques allemandes ainsi que par quelques interviews de diplomates allemands et anglais. Ses nombreuses recherches archivistiques et bibliographiques assurent à son travail une base extrêmement sérieuse. Bien que la perspective anglaise soit très nettement privilégiée, les accords et les divergences politiques entre Bonn et Londres sont également examinés, notamment au travers de la relation personnelle entre Konrad Adenauer et son homologue britannique. Comme le souligne justement l’auteur, l’Allemagne représente au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale pour le Royaume-Uni un double défi, car il s’agit pour la puissance britannique de contrôler le potentiel militaire et économique allemand tout en garantissant la sécurité des zones d’occupations puis plus tard de la jeune République fédérale (p.16). Au contraire de Churchill dont les grands projets de réunions au sommet

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 141

étaient majoritairement rejetés par les diplomates anglais, la politique allemande d’Eden rencontrait très largement l’assentiment du Foreign Office qui, de fait, relaya avec efficacité les conceptions de son ministre. Si les contemporains d’Eden comme les historiens lui ont parfois reproché son manque de «grand dessein» politique, celui-ci avait néanmoins une conscience très aiguë de l’importance stratégique que l’Allemagne, champs de bataille européen par excellence, pouvait représenter pour la sécurité britannique. Partant de ce postulat fondamental, Eden détermina les fondements de la politique à tenir vis-à-vis de la RFA selon deux options principales. Il entendait en effet lier et ancrer la RFA à l’Ouest, notamment au travers de son intégration dans les institutions européennes tout en nouant parallèlement des contacts avec l’Union soviétique, il espérait que la détente du climat international qui devait en résulter favoriserait la résolution de la question allemande. Kipp relève que seule la combinaison de ces deux options offraient, aux yeux d’Eden, la garantie du maintien de l’influence britannique en Allemagne ainsi que son contrôle (p.393). A cet égard, l’étude distincte de chacune de ces options dans deux parties thématiques distinctes apparaît regrettable, car elle en occulte en partie la complémentarité, donc la spécificité et l’originalité de la politique allemande du ministre britannique. Alors même que l’Angleterre se distance très rapidement des efforts d’intégration européenne et refuse de participer à la Communauté du charbon et de l’acier (CECA) puis la Communauté européenne de défense (CED), Eden appuie la participation de l’Allemagne à la construction de l’Europe. Kipp montre cependant que les motivations profondes d’Eden tiennent moins au respect des obligations incombant au Royaume-Uni en tant que puissance alliée, qu’à la volonté de protéger les intérêts de son pays en Europe. Néanmoins, Eden a également rapidement compris que la coopération active et volontaire de l’Allemagne constitue une condition essentielle à la réussite de sa politique (p.67). C’est d’ailleurs pour cette raison que le gouvernement britannique, conscient de la signification politique plus que militaire du réarmement allemand, accepte que celui-ci s’effectue dans un cadre, sinon européen, suite à l’échec de la CED à laquelle il était favorable, du moins atlantique. Selon Kipp, l’adhésion de la RFA à l’Union de l’Europe occidentale (UEO) puis à l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN) doit d’ailleurs beaucoup aux efforts du ministre britannique. Kipp met également en évidence l’importance considérable que Eden et, avec lui, le Foreign Office, accordaient à la question de la neutralité allemande. A leurs yeux, une Allemagne neutralisée, démilitarisée ou non, représentait une menace directe pour la sécurité britannique. La position anglaise vis-à-vis des initiatives soviétiques des années 52-54 découle pour beaucoup de ces réflexions. Selon l’auteur, le Foreign Office, bien que sceptique quant à la sincérité et par voie de conséquence, à la possible réalisation des offres staliniennes, suit une double stratégie visant à poursuivre les négociations avec l’Union soviétique sans pour autant remettre en cause le principe de l’intégration allemande à l’Ouest. Cependant, Eden échoue à résoudre le dilemme inhérent à la question allemande, à savoir comment résoudre le problème de la division de l’Allemagne sans mettre en danger la sécurité européenne et dans le cas présent, les intérêts anglais, tout en sachant que la perduration du statu quo recelait tout autant de dangers (p.228). Dans son étude, Kipp démontre que la politique d’Eden vis-à-vis de l’Allemagne se fonde en majeure partie sur des considérations sécuritaires dont la mise en œuvre s’inspire très largement de la vielle tradition britannique du «balance of power». Eden, qui par expérience nourrissait une certaine méfiance à l’égard des Allemands, redoutait en effet que le maintien indéterminé du statu quo ne pousse les Allemands à s’entendre avec l’Union soviétique, comme ils l’avaient déjà fait à plusieurs reprises dans le passé, et il espérait mettre en échec toute tentative en ce sens en nouant des contacts étroits avec les Soviétiques. Ce «complexe de Rapallo» explique également l’attachement d’Eden à l’intégration

142 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen allemande en Europe occidentale qu’il concevait comme le meilleur antidote à une éventuelle dérive allemande à l’Est. Cette politique de louvoiement n’était pas sans éveiller un «complexe de Versailles» chez le chancelier Adenauer qui imaginait déjà un accord des quatre alliées sur la question allemande au détriment de la RFA. En outre, dès le début des années cinquante, Eden était convaincu que l’élaboration et la réalisation d’un système garantissant la sécurité européenne requérait le dialogue avec l’Union soviétique. L’un des objectifs de la double tactique d’Eden vis-à-vis de l’Allemagne visait également à valoriser la position internationale du Royaume-Uni en lui conférant un rôle d’intermédiaire entre les deux blocs (p.280). Kipp relève cependant que les efforts britanniques en faveur de la détente des relations avec les Soviétiques se heurtèrent à chaque fois aux réticences allemandes. Eden lui-même était loin de négliger l’influence de l’opinion publique allemande, dont il suivait avec attention l’évolution et dont dépendait en partie le succès ou l’échec de sa politique allemande. Ses efforts en faveur de la détente pesèrent malgré tout fortement sur les relations anglo-allemandes. En effet, au fil des années cinquante, les doutes d’Adenauer sur la volonté britannique de réaliser la réunification se trouvèrent renforcés par le glissement progressif de la politique allemande du gouvernement britannique pour qui la question de la réunification allemande passait peu à peu au second plan au profit de la détente des relations Est-Ouest, et qui, nolens volens, s’arrangeait ainsi du statu quo. La thèse de doctorat d’Yvonne Kipp met en lumière nombre de nouveaux aspects de la politique allemande de la Grande-Bretagne. Elle analyse les prémisses historiques et les motivations politiques, stratégiques et sécuritaires de la politique d’Antony Eden. Elle démontre que le subtil balancement politique entre intégration de l’Allemagne à l’Ouest et politique de détente à l’Est avait un triple but: éviter un retournement des alliances, garder l’Allemagne sous contrôle et enfin, éviter que la question allemande ne devienne un jour un casus belli entre les deux blocs. A cet égard, Kipp estime que les nombreuses déclarations du ministre anglais sur les dangers que pouvaient représenter à terme un sentiment national allemand inassouvi, tendent à prouver qu’Eden n’envisageait une solution à la question allemande que dans le cadre d’une Allemagne réunifiée, intégrée à l’Europe de l’Ouest et qu’il considérait le statu quo européen comme provisoire (p.356). Malgré un bilan contrasté de la politique allemande d’Eden, les décennies suivantes montrent la justesse de ce postulat.

Carine Germond Université Robert Schuman, Strasbourg III Universität Duisburg-Essen, Standort Essen

Bertrand VAYSSIÈRE, Groupes de pression en Europe. Europe des citoyens ou des inté- rêts?, Éditions Privat, Toulouse, 2002, 125 p. – ISBN 2-7089-0637-2 – 11,40 €.

Rinus van SCHENDELEN, Machiavelli in Brussels. The Art of Lobbying the EU, Amsterdam University Press 2002, Amsterdam, 344 p. – ISBN 90-5356-573-6 (paperback) – 37,60 €.

Justin GREENWOOD (ed.), The Effectiveness of EU Business Associations, Palgrave, Houndmills/Basingstoke/New York, 2002, XV+263 p. – ISBN 0-333-96412-8 – 55 €.

Die Rolle nationaler und transnationaler Interessenverbände im europäischen „Mehrebenen- system“ ist schon seit geraumer Zeit Gegenstand politik- und geschichtswissenschaftlicher Forschung. Insofern ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass gleich drei neue sozialwissenschaftli-

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 143 che Publikationen über den „state of the art“ aus unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln und mit unterschiedlichen Ansprüchen Auskunft geben. Was haben sie für eine stärker historisch interessierte Integrationsforschung zu bieten? Bertrand Vayssière, Geschichtsdozent an der Universität von Pau, liefert einen ebenso knappen wie soliden Überblick über das europäische Verbandswesen und geht dabei insbesondere der Frage nach, ob die Aktivitäten der verschiedenen Interessengruppen eher als Ausdruck bürgerschaftlichen Engagements oder als klassisches Lobbying zu deuten seien. Die Themen, die er streift, reichen von einer Begriffsbestimmung und Anmerkungen zur „logique communautaire […] basée sur la recherche permanente du compromis“ (S.29) – die, verbunden mit einer gewissen Abhängigkeit der Kommission von der Expertise der Verbände, das interessenpolitische patchwork in Brüssel geradezu zwangsläufig hervorgebracht habe – über eine Charakteristik des Brüsseler Institutionengefüges und die Schilderung der Beziehungen zwischen Kommission und Parlament auf der einen und Interessenverbänden auf der anderen Seite bis zu einer Übersicht über die verschiedenen Formen der Interessenvertretung. Seine 6seitige Skizze zur Entwicklung des Verbandssystems seit 1945 und seine Typologie, unterschieden nach Unternehmensverbänden, Gewerkschaften und Berufsverbänden, Vertretungen der Regionen, non-governmental organizations zivilgesellschaftlicher Provenienz und Consulting-Gesellschaften, bieten erwartungsgemäß keine neuen Erkenntnisse, ermöglichen aber eine rasche Orientierung. Vayssières Antwort auf die Leitfrage fällt zwiespältig aus: Während er das bisherige, von den großen Unternehmens-, Agrar- und Gewerkschaftsverbänden repräsentierte europäische Verbandssystem eindeutig dem „lobbyistischen“ Pol zuordnet, erblickt er in den neuen, zivilgesellschaftlich verankerten und orientierten Organisationen Geburtshelfer eines künftigen „Europas der Bürger“. Rinus van Schendelen verfolgt mit seiner mittlerweile in dritter Auflage vorliegenden Studie ein anderes, stärker praxisorientiertes Anliegen. Der Professor für Politische Wissenschaft an der Universität Rotterdam trainiert nämlich nebenberuflich Lobbyisten – eine Tätigkeit, die dem Buch, das sich über weite Strecken wie ein Ratgeber für erfolgreiches Lobbying liest, deutlich anzumerken ist. Zunächst rekapituliert van Schendelen die „Europäisierung der öffentlichen Ange- legenheiten“, wobei er zwischen alten und neuen Techniken der Interessenwahrnehmung unterscheidet: Zu ersteren zählt er „coercion“, „encapsulation“, „advocacy“ und „argumentation“ (S.40-41). Die neue, erfolgversprechendere Technik umschreibt er mit dem Begriff „public affairs management“: PAM zeichnet sich zum einen durch eine intensive interne Vorbereitung („homework“) der externen Aktivitäten aus, zum anderen durch wesentlich subtilere Methoden der Einflussnahme („public marketing“). Auf der europäischen Ebene praktiziert, wirke PAM zwar keineswegs wie ein Allheilmittel: „If applied professionally, by careful homework and fieldwork, it provides only better chances to win or, at least, not to lose an EU game” (S.49) – aber größere Erfolgsaussichten verspreche dieses Konzept allemal. Nach dieser Einführung skizziert van Schendelen das Brüsseler „Spielfeld“ und die verschiedenen Möglichkeiten der Einflussnahme, ehe er Ratschläge für die einzelnen Arenen – EU, „home front“, „fieldwork“ – erteilt und dabei auch auf die Grenzen des Konzepts aufmerksam macht. Den Abschluss bildet eine Erörterung des Verhältnisses zwischen Lobbying und Demokratie in der EU, die in der bemerkenswerten These gipfelt, „that the most professional lobby groups make the largest contributions to EU democracy“ (S.316). Die Studie besticht durch eine Reihe von interessanten Beobachtungen und Thesen, beispielsweise zu den zehn populären Mythen über die EU, zu den Unterschieden zwischen „lobbying“ und „influencing“ oder zu den verschiedenen Lobbying-Stilen, die zweifelsohne auch für historiographische Arbeiten über die Rolle von Interessengruppen von großem Wert sein können. Mitunter verlieren sich seine analytischen Kategorialisierungen aber auch

144 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen in einem schematischen Entweder-Oder, das kaum geeignet erscheint zur Erfassung einer differenzierten und sich stetig wandelnden Realität. Mit einem besonderen Verbandstypus befasst sich das dritte Buch. Justin Greenwood, der an der Robert Gordon Universität in Aberdeen European Public Policy lehrende Herausgeber, hat darin die Beiträge für eine von der EU gesponserten Konferenz über europäische Unternehmerverbände versammelt. Diese Konferenz führte Wissenschaftler und Praktiker zusammen – ein sinnvolles, aber keineswegs so einzigartiges Unterfangen, wie der Herausgeber glauben machen möchte. Der Band ist in vier Kapitel untergliedert: Zu Beginn werden die Rahmenbedingungen verbandlicher Aktivitäten erläutert, darunter die jeweilige Wirtschaftsstruktur, die Rolle des Staates, die Bedeutung von Großunternehmen oder bestimmte Governance-Arrangements. Das zweite Kapitel befasst sich mit den verschiedenen Faktoren des Wandels europäischer Unternehmerverbände und den Möglichkeiten, diesen Wandel zu steuern. Im dritten Teil werden einige Beispiele für branchenübergreifende und sozialpolitische Interessenorganisation auf EU-Ebene vorgestellt, den Schluss bildet eine Diskussion der Probleme und Perspektiven der „associational governance“. Greenwood ist es gelungen, mit Maria Green Cowles, Wyn Grant, Franz Traxler und Frans van Waarden renommierte Verbandsforscher als Autoren zu gewinnen. Entsprechend anregend und pointiert sind viele Beiträge ausgefallen. Das gilt auch für die Zusammenfassung des Herausgebers, in der er die Erträge des Bandes bündelt und insbesondere auf die Unterschiede zwischen nationalen und europäischen Interessenorganisationen eingeht und nach Möglichkeiten fragt, wie letztere ihre, verglichen mit den nationelen Verbänden geringere Schlagkraft steigern und damit ihre Attraktivität erhöhen könnten. Ein Deﬁzit der sozialwissenschaftlichen Verbändeforschung, das in Greenwoods Sammelband besonders auffällt, bleibt indes zu erwähnen: Die Ergebnisse der einschlägigen geschichtswissenschaftlichen Forschung werden unverständlicherweise meist völlig ignoriert. Das gilt selbst für Maria Green Cowles, obwohl sie im Untertitel ihres Aufsatzes eine „historische Perspektive“ ankündigt: Ihre Aussagen zur Entstehung europäischer Unternehmerverbände sind zumindest schief, indem sie sowohl den bereits 1949 auf Initiative der OEEC gegründeten „Rat der europäischen Industrieverbände“ als auch die 1952 aus der Taufe gehobene Dachorganisation der Industrieverbände der Mitgliedsländer der EGKS übergeht und den Widerstand der Großindustrie gegen die europäische Einigung überzeichnet. Und ihre schematische Periodisierung der europäischen Verbandsentwicklung erscheint im Lichte historiographischer Arbeiten ebenfalls wenig überzeugend. Vielleicht wäre es an der Zeit, nicht nur den Dialog zwischen Wissenschaft und Praxis, sondern endlich auch den innerwissenschaftlichen Dialog zwischen Politologen und Historikern, die über Verbände und Europa arbeiten, zu intensivieren: Beide Seiten würden nämlich davon proﬁtieren.

Priv.Doz. Dr. Werner Bührer Technische Universität München

DECKER Claudia – Handelskonﬂikte der USA mit der EU seit 1985. Eine Studie des Reziprozitätsprinzips in der U.S.-Aussenpolitik, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2002, 277 S. – ISBN 3-428-10663-6 – 74,00 €.

Die gegenseitigen Handelsbeziehungen der EU-Staaten und der USA sind fast täglich Gegenstand der Wirtschaftspresse. Kaum ein Tag vergeht, ohne dass auf Meinungsverschie- denheiten und Probleme Bezug genommen wird. Vieles bleibt punktuell und tritt auch rasch in den Hintergrund. Die längerfristige Perspektive bleibt verborgen. Es ist das ausserordent- liche Verdienst der vorliegenden Untersuchung, diese gegenseitigen Beziehungen gründlich

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 145 und über eine längere Zeitdauer nachzuzeichnen und zu verfolgen. Der Autorin gelingt dies in hohem Masse und das Buch verdient, nicht nur zum besseren Verständnis von Grundla- gen und Verfahren, sondern auch als eigentliches Handbuch und Chronik der zahlreichen Auseinandersetzungen von 1985 bis 2000 Verwendung zu finden. Ausgangspunkt der Untersuchung bildet die Frage nach dem Reziprozitätsprinzip in der Handelspolitik der USA. Darunter ist allgemein eine Politik gegenseitiger Marktöffnung zu verstehen, welche bilateral, aber auch multilateral von Gegenleistungen abhängig gemacht wird. Reziprozität kann spezifisch und strikt sein und durch bedingte Meistbegünstigung ausgedrückt werden. Sie kann aber auch als unspezifisch als eine allgemeine Handlungsmaxime verstanden werden, deren Ziel in einem allgemeinen Gleichgewicht besteht. Hinter der ersten Auffassung steht die merkantilistische, hinter der zweiten die freihändlerische Tradition. Die Arbeit zeigt vorerst die geschichtliche Entwicklung hin von einer spezifischen zur unspezifischen Reziprozität, wie sie nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg und dem Aufbau des weltwirtschaftlichen Systems Ausdruck im GATT 47 fand, zurück zu spezifischen Rezprozitätsforderungen in der Handelsgesetzgebung der USA der jüngeren Geschichte. Diese Epoche wird im einzelnen untersucht mit ihren Spannungen zur unbedingten Meistbegünstigung, dem Multilateralismus und damit auch zum Recht der WTO 94. Die Darstellung geht indessen weit über diesen Ausgangspunkt hinaus. Sie beschränkt sich nicht auf die Darstellung der durch diese Entwicklung erzeugten Spannungen mit der EG. Vielmehr bietet die Arbeit eine ebenso ausführliche Darstellung der transatlantischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit reichhaltigem Datenmaterial. Der Leser erfährt fast ebensoviel über die Handelspolitik der EG wie diejenige der USA. Claudia Decker gliedert ihre Untersuchung in sechs Kapitel. Nach dem einleitenden Kapitel geht sie im zweiten auf die Definition und die unterschiedliche Ausrichtung der Reziprozität sowie auf ihr Verhältnis zur Meistbegünstigung in der amerikanischen Handelspolitik ein. Die Entwicklung der Reziprozitätsgedanken in den USA vor und nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg wird in einem historischen Überblick verdeutlicht. Hierzu kommen auch die wichtigsten amerikanischen Handelsgesetze aus den 70er und 80er Jahren (wie Sektion 301, „Super 301“, „Special 301“), deren Anwendung und Reaktionen seitens der EG zur Sprache. Decker stellt fest, dass die strikte Reziprozität kein neuer Gedanke ist, sondern gängige Praxis der US-amerikanischen Aussenhandelspolitik bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg war. Im dritten Kapitel untersucht Decker eingehend die wirtschaftliche Verflechtung im Waren-, Agrar- und Dienstleistungsbereich zwischen den USA und der EG und liefert eine Fülle von Daten, einschliesslich der Direktinvestitionen (S.88-122), um in der Folge die Bedeutung der transatlantischen Handelsbeziehungen – auch im Vergleich zu anderen Handelspartnern – und das von Konflikten betroffene Handelsvolumen (1% des gesamten US-EG-Handels) besser einschätzen zu können. Das vierte Kapitel untersucht die US-amerikanische Europapolitik insbesondere in Bezug auf die Verwirklichung des Binnenmarktes nach dem Weissbuch von Delors (1985) und der Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte (1986). Wir finden hier einschlägige Belege für die strategische US-amerikanische Unterstützung der europäischen Integration, welche jedenfalls bis zum Ende des Kalten Krieges durch operative Konflikte nicht geschmälert wurde. Das fünfte Kapitel bietet eine eingehende Chronik und systematische Analyse der Handelskonflikte zwischen den USA und der EG von Januar 1985 bis Dezember 1999. Die Untersuchung wird unterteilt in den Agrar-, Industriegüter- und Dienstleistungsbereich und nach dem Gegenstand des Konflikts (Subventionen, Normen und andere Anforderungen wie technische und tarifäre Handelshemmnisse bzw. Quoten). Nachzutragen wären die Interessen und Konflikte im Bereiche des geistigen Eigentums, welche die Autorin leider nicht berücksichtigt hat. Sie dokumentiert eingehend insgesamt 25 grössere Konflikte, von denen zwei Drittel auf die Landwirtschaft entfallen, obgleich diese lediglich einen Anteil von 2% am BIP der USA und 1.5% des BIP der EG ausmachen (S.215) und am gesamten

146 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Exportvolumen der USA von 13.6% (1985) und 6.7% (2000) aufweist (S.98, S.212). Nicht einbezogen sind dabei Klagen seitens der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Im letzten Kapitel finden wir eine Beurteilung dieser Konflikte unter dem Gesichtspunkt der strikten Reziprozität (S.220 ff.). Die Autorin kommt zum Ergebnis, dass sich die USA trotz einer Hinwendung zur strikten Reziprozität in ihrer Gesetzgebung und einem grossen unilateralen Retorsionspotential den multilateralen Streitbeilegungsmechanismen der WTO bedient. Ihre Klagen sind nicht in erster Linie durch Reziprozitätsüberlegungen geprägt, sondern vielmehr Reaktionen auf handelsbeschränkende Massnahmen der EG zurück- zuführen. Den USA geht es in erster Linie darum, sich günstige Zugangsbedingungen zum EG-Binnenmarkt zu verschaffen und von dessen Vorteilen der economies of scale zu profitieren. Damit widerlegt Decker die in der Literatur verbreitete Meinung, dass die USA eine strikte Reziprozität in ihren Handelsbeziehungen mit der EG durchsetzen wollen (S.244). Besonders hervorzuheben und innovativ sind die Untersuchungen zur Frage, inwieweit die Aktionen der USA durch deren chronisch negativen Handelsbilanz motiviert sind (S.234-243). Den Korrelationen lassen sich kein klares Muster entnehmen, was auch damit erklärt wird, dass die Durchführung von Verhandlungen und Streitschlichtungsverfahren immer mit einem gewissen Zeitverzug erfolgt und so sich nur Tendenzen ausmachen lassen. Aufschlussreich ist auch der Vergleich zwischen Direktinvestitionen und Handel. Diese übertreffen den Handelsverkehr um ein Vielfaches (S.110-115) und stehen gewissermassen in umgekehrt proportionalem Verhältnis zur Aufmerksamkeit, welche die causes celèbres, wie Bananen- und Hormonstreit in der Presse und öffentlichen Wahrnehmung erfahren haben. Das Werk ist ein eindrückliches Zeugnis, dass Perzeption und Realitäten nicht übereinstimmen. Die multilaterale Handelspolitik ist auf einer längeren Zeitachse betrachtet besser als ihr Ruf. Die Beziehungen der USA und der EG sind trotz einer Vielzahl von Streitigkeiten gesund und verlaufen dank der WTO-Regeln in geordneten, völkerrechtlichen Bahnen. Gemessen am Umfang der gegenseitigen Investitionen und Handelsströmen nehmen sich die Konflikte letztlich bescheiden aus und müssen in ihren Proportionen gesehen werden. Das Alltagsbild der Wirtschaftspresse täuscht in diesem Sinne. Man ist an die Aussage Louis Henkin erinnert, dass „almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost of their obligations almost all of the time“ (How Nations Behave, 2. Aufl. 1979, S.47). Man tut gut daran, dies gerade heute zu betonen. Die Arbeit von Claudia Decker leistet dazu einen hervorragenden Beitrag.

Prof. Thomas Cottier und Dr. Erik Evtimov World Trade Institute, Bern

147 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

N. Piers Ludlow An Opportunity or a Threat? The European Commission and The Hague Council of December 1969

The Commission had very mixed feelings about The Hague summit. On the positive side, Jean Rey and his colleagues could not fail to welcome the agreement reached on completion, deepening and widening. The deal on completion would greatly help the Commission’s efforts to steer the Six towards an agreement on the Community’s ﬁnances after January 1970. That on deepening gave the Commission an exciting new agenda on which to focus. The settlement of the enlargement question would heal a long-standing sore that had seriously disrupted the EEC’s advance. And the Commission was also pleased to see the leaders of the Six reafﬁrm the long term political aims of the integration process. But amid these reasons for satisfaction, there were also causes for concern. For not only had the Six chosen largely to ignore the Commission’s own efforts to shape The Hague’s conclusions and marginalised Rey during the summit debate. But the very success of the Heads of Government gathering looked likely to accelerate the gradual slippage of power from the Commission and to the member states that had been underway for much of the 1960s.

Opportunité ou menace? La Commission européenne et le sommet de La Haye de décembre 1969

L’attitude de la Commission européenne à l’égard du sommet de La Haye est pour le moins mitigée. Certes, Jean Rey et ses collègues ne peuvent que se féliciter des accords atteints sur les trois principaux sujets de l’achèvement, de l’approfondissement et de l’élargissement. Le premier facilite beaucoup les efforts de la Commission en vue d’obtenir un arrangement définitif sur le financement de la CEE. Le deuxième ouvre des perspectives tout à fait intéressantes à la matérialisation desquelles la Commission peut consacrer ses efforts. Le troisième met fin à la longue querelle sur l’élargissement qui, au cours des années précédentes, avait tant retardé les travaux de la CEE. En outre, la Commission est également ravie de voir les chefs de gouvernement réaffirmer les finalités politiques de la construction européenne. Toujours est-il qu’à côté de tous ces indéniables atouts, il y a aussi des aspects moins positifs. Ainsi les Six ont fait la sourde oreille aux idées défendues par la Commission au cours du sommet, de sorte que Rey n’a finalement guère pu contribuer aux débats. Pire encore, le succès de la réunion à La Haye fait entrevoir l’accélération d’un phénomène à l’œuvre depuis le début des années soixante: le glissement progressif du pouvoir de la Commission vers les Etats membres.

Gute Aussichten oder Bedrohung? Die europäische Kommission und die Konferenz von Den Haag (Dezember 1969)

Die europäische Kommission legte nach dem Haager Gipfeltreffen eher gemischte Gefühle an den Tag. Zweifelsfrei positiv beurteilten Jean Rey und seine Kollegen den allgemeinen Konsens über den Ausbau, die Vertiefung und die Erweiterung der Gemeinschaft. Die Abmachung über den Ausbau würde es ihnen wesentlich leichter machen die Finan- zierung der EWG nach dem 1. Januar 1970 abzusichern. Die Beschlüsse über die Vertiefung stellten die Kommission vor eine ganze Reihe neue, interessante Herausforderungen,

148 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen während die Erweiterung versprach jene endlosen Querelen zu beseitigen, die den Fort- schritt in der Gemeinschaft während den vorangegangenen Jahren stets gehemmt hatten. Darüber hinaus freute sich die Kommission über den bekundeten Willen der Staats- und Regierungschefs, den politischen Zielen der europäischen Konstruktion wieder mehr Beach- tung zu schenken. Trotzdem gab es für Rey und seine Kollegen nicht nur Positives zu ver- buchen. Immerhin hatten die Sechs den Ideen der Kommission kaum Beachtung geschenkt, so dass ihr Präsident in Den Haag nur sehr unwesentlich zu den Debatten beitragen konnte. Viel schlimmer aber gestaltete sich der Umstand, dass der Erfolg des Gipfels bereits deutlich die Beschleunigung eines allgemeinen Phänomens der Sechzigerjahre erkennen ließ: der progressive Machtverfall der Kommission zugunsten der Mitgliedsstaaten.

Anjo Harryvan and Jan van der Harst Swan Song or Cock Crow? The Netherlands and the Hague Conference of December 1969

Swan Song or Cock Crow analyses the Dutch government’s policy with regard to the Hague summit and the extent to which this summit was deemed instrumental for re-launching European integration after the De Gaulle era. The authors conclude that The Hague’s historical importance is by and large to be attributed to the subsequent implementation and follow-up of the summit’s ﬁnal communiqué. Had the Brussels conference (late December 1969), the Werner and Davignon committees and the enlargement negotiations been unsuccessful, the by now famous triptych ‘completion, widening and deepening’ would have remained null and void. Hence, in the authors’ view, the ‘spirit of The Hague’ was of more importance than the actual wording of the compromises arrived at in the Ridderzaal (the conference room). As a matter of fact, the government’s immediate reaction after the conference was one of misgivings, particularly concerning the lack of a formal agreement on British entry. The authors further point to the crucial role played by the West-German government, headed by the recently appointed chancellor Willy Brandt. They argue that the German performance heralded a new era in European integration, in that in and after The Hague the Bundesrepublik freed itself of its historically determined reticence in post-war European affairs. Given the convergence of German and Dutch EC priorities, the Dutch government hailed the new German assertiveness as an important outcome of the summit. Thus The Hague did constitute a break-through, ﬁrst and foremost of a psychological nature.

Chant du cygne ou cri du coq? Les Pays-Bas et la conférence de La Haye de décembre 1969

Chant du cygne ou cri du coq analyse à la fois la politique du gouvernement néerlandais au regard du sommet de La Haye et la manière dont la conférence a été jugée apte de servir d’instrument à la relance de l’intégration européenne au lendemain du départ de Charles De Gaulle. L’importance «historique» de La Haye doit être attribuée dans une très large mesure à l’exécution subséquente, avec succès, des termes du communiqué final du sommet. Autrement dit: si la rencontre de Bruxelles organisée vers la fin du mois de décembre 1969, ou les comités Werner et Davignon, ou encore les négociations sur l’élargissement s’étaient soldées par un échec, alors le slogan du triptyque «achèvement, approfondissement, élargissement» devenu entre-temps fameux, serait tout simplement resté lettre morte. Toujours est-il – de l’avis des auteurs – que l’«esprit de La Haye» importe en définitive bien davantage que le détail des compromis négociés au Ridderzaal, la salle de réunion du sommet. La réaction immédiate des gouvernements après la rencontre fut en effet inspirée

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 149 par des appréhensions, notamment en ce qui concerne l’absence d’un accord formel au sujet de l’entrée des Britanniques. Il convient ﬁnalement de souligner le rôle crucial joué par le gouvernement de Bonn, en l’occurrence le chancelier Willy Brandt récemment sorti vainqueur des élections fédérales. Sa performance annonce une ère nouvelle en ce sens qu’au cours, et surtout après la conférence de La Haye, les Allemands s’affranchissent de la retenue «historique» qu’ils s’étaient jusque-là imposée en matière des affaires européennes de l’après-guerre. Vu la convergence des priorités allemandes et néerlandaises, le gouvernement des Pays-Bas saluait le nouvel aplomb de Bonn comme un succès important du sommet. De ce point de vue, La Haye représente incontestablement une percée de nature avant tout psychologique.

Schwanengesang oder Hahnenschrei? Die Niederlande und der Haager Gipfel (Dezember 1969)

Schwanengesang oder Hahnenschrei analysiert sowohl die Politik der niederländischen Regierung mit Blick auf den Haager Gipfel, als auch die Art und Weise wie die Konferenz, nach der De Gaulle Ära, als Instrument zur europäischen Relance bewertet wurde. Die historische Dimension des Gipfeltreffens liegt wohl weniger im eigentlichen Haager Kompromiss, sondern viel mehr in der darauffolgenden, erfolgreichen Implementierung der im Abschusskommuniqué festgehaltenen Beschlüsse. Wären die Brüsseler Konferenz vom Ende Dezember 1969, die Werner- bzw. die Davignonkommission oder die Verhandlung über die Erweiterung der Gemeinschaft erfolglos geblieben, dann hätte der sogenannte Triptik «Ausbau, Vertiefung, Erweiterung» wohl nie jene Berühmtheit erlangt, die er heute mittlerweile besitzt. Wichtig war allen voran der «Geist von Den Haag» der die Konferenz im Ridderzaal, dem Tagungsort, beseelte. Die ersten Reaktionen unmittelbar nach dem Treffen waren in der Tat eher von Skepsis geprägt, besonders was das Fehlen einer formalen Zusage über den Beitritt der Briten betrifft. Schließlich bleibt die überaus wichtige Rolle der Bonner Regierung, insbesondere des kürzlich gewählten Kanzlers Willy Brandt, zu erwähnen. Sein Auftritt läutet bereits während des Gipfeltreffens eine neue Ära deutscher Europapolitik ein, die sich fortan von der «historischen» Zurückhaltung der Nachkriegszeit befreit. Die niederländische Regierung begrüßte diese neue deutsche Haltung sehr, waren doch ihre Prioritäten gleichlautend mit denjenigen der Bundesrepublik. So gesehen bildet der Haager Gipfel unbestreitbar einen Durchbruch hauptsächlich psychologischer Natur.

Jérôme Wilson Negotiating European Renewal? Belgium and the Hague Conference

A little over ten years after it was set up, the European Community of 1969 has come to a halt. Enlargement towards the United Kingdom gives rise to distrust and suspicion among the Six. Benelux itself hints at divisions between the Belgians and the Dutch. But De Gaulle´s departure offers an opportunity for France to restart the engine. Belgian diplomatic troops, few in number but well trained, set the train in motion. Harmel, Eyskens and Snoy rely on a perfect collaboration with their Luxemburg counterparts. They also take advantage of the presence of Rey at the head of the European Commission, whose positions coincidence with all the ofﬁcial steps taken by the Belgians. Impressive conciliatory work is achieved behind the stage. A decisive move takes place in Brussels when a preparatory meeting brings together Foreign Affairs ministers in September 1969. Besides political and military preoccupations, the Belgians also favour addressing objectives of technological and monetary cooperation. The question of a common European currency, which will lead to the Werner plan, has its roots in proposals coming from Snoy

150 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen and in technical solutions developed by an American expert of Belgian origin, Robert Trifﬁn, passed on to Willy Brandt by Monnet. The Belgians are here revealed as trying endlessly to build up the most workable mechanisms for European integration, and set up a culture of "compromise" of their own which turns out to be a determining factor in making European progress, particularly within the ﬁelds of enlargement or monetary union.

Négocier la relance européenne: les Belges et le sommet de La Haye

Un peu plus de dix ans après son lancement, la Communauté européenne est en panne. La question de l’élargissement vers le Royaume-Uni divise les Six; une méfiance malsaine s’est installée entre les partenaires. Le Benelux lui-même laisse entrevoir des dissensions belgo-néerlandaises. Le départ de De Gaulle offre à la France l’opportunité de relancer le moteur. Les troupes diplomatiques belges, peu nombreuses mais bien entraînées, embraient le pas. Harmel, Eyskens et Snoy s’appuient sur une collaboration parfaite avec leurs homologues luxembourgeois. Ils bénéficient également de la présence de Rey à la tête de la Commission, qui affiche des points de vue en harmonie avec les démarches officielles belges. Les Belges s’agitent beaucoup dans les coulisses, et un tournant décisif s’opère à Bruxelles lors d’une réunion préparatoire réunissant les ministres des Affaires étrangères en septembre 1969. A côté des préoccupations politiques et militaires, les Belges favorisent également la prise en compte d’objectifs de coopération sur les plans technologique et monétaire. La question de la mise en place d’une devise commune pour l’Europe, qui débouchera par après sur le plan Werner, s’inspire largement de propositions émises par Snoy et de solutions techniques développées par un expert américain d’origine belge, Robert Triffin, transmises à Willy Brandt par l’intermédiaire de Jean Monnet. Fidèles à leur foi européenne, les Belges mettent en pratique à La Haye leur culture pragmatique du «compromis» qui marquera de sa griffe tous les progrès européens, de l’élargissement à la monnaie unique.

Die Verhandlungen zur europäischen Relance: die Belgier und der Gipfel von Den Haag

Etwa zehn Jahre nach ihrer Gründung drohte die Europäische Gemeinschaft endgültig in der Sackgasse zu stecken. Die Frage der Aufnahme Großbritanniens spaltete die Sechs; ein unheilsames Misstrauen machte sich unter den Partnern breit. Selbst innerhalb der Benelux-Staatengruppe gab es belgisch-niederländische Meinungsverschiedenheiten. Der Abgang De Gaulles’ gab Frankreich jedoch die Gelegenheit den europäischen Motor wieder in Gang zu bringen. Belgiens kleine, aber wohltrainierte diplomatische Truppe war sofort bereit auf dem neuen Weg mitzumarschieren. Harmel, Eyskens und Snoy konnten sich dabei nicht nur auf eine enge Zusammenarbeit mit ihren luxemburgischen Kollegen verlassen; sie wurden zusätzlich vom Kommissionspräsidenten Jean Rey unterstützt, dessen Haltung völlig mit den offiziellen belgischen Vorstößen übereinstimmte. Letztere spielten sich hauptsächlich hinter den Kulissen ab, so dass bereits im September 1969 anlässlich einer Außenministerkonferenz in Brüssel ein wichtiger Durchbruch gelang. Neben politischen und militärischen Überlegungen verfolgten die Belgier auch die Weiterführung der technologischen und monetären Kooperation. Die Idee zur Einführung einer gemeinsamen europäischen Währung, die später zum Werner Plan führen sollte, ist weitgehend beeinflusst durch Snoys Vorschläge und die technischen Lösungen die der amerikanische Experte belgischer Herkunft, Robert Triffin, dem deutschen Kanzler Willy Brandt über den Mittelsmann Jean Monnet zukommen ließ. Getreu ihres europäischen Glaubens, spielten die Belgier in Den Haag die Trumpfkarte ihrer pragmatisch orientierten

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 151

Kompromisskultur und drückten damit dem Fortschritt der europäischen Sache, von der Erweiterung bis zur Einheitswährung, mehr als einmal ihren Stempel auf.

Claudia Hiepel In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator: Germany and the Hague Summit Conference, 1969

The European public widely attributed the success of the Hague Summit Conference in December 1969 to the diplomacy and commitment of German chancellor Willy Brandt. Indeed, it was Brandt who decisively contributed to the successful realisation of the French President’s idea to solve European problems at a conference of the heads of state and government. Despite his own reservations about a summit conference that excluded Great Britain, Brandt defended this initiative against sceptics within the Community. As Foreign Minister of the Grand Coalition which was composed of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, Brandt pursued an active diplomacy but this tactic merely brought the differing views into line with each other. After being elected Chancellor in October 1969, he intensified the pressure on the French government, which finally agreed to start negotiations with the applicant states and, in return, received a satisfactory solution for financing the Common Market. This contribution reconstructs the road from the Pompidou initiative in June 1969 to the conference at the beginning of December 1969 by examining the files from the appropriate French and German ministries. It brings out more clearly a German policy that was based on pursuing German national interests by reconciling the interests of all of the member states. By searching the greatest common denominator, Brandt made a clear case for the success of the new federal government’s esprit communautaire. The Hague Summit also marked the first success of the Brandt government’s foreign policy towards Europe before the implementation of the new Ostpolitik.

En quête du plus grand dénominateur commun: la République Fédérale d’Allemagne et le sommet de La Haye. 1969

L’opinion publique européenne est largement acquise à l’idée que le succès du sommet de La Haye en 1969 aurait été le mérite de la diplomatie allemande en général, et de l’engagement personnel du chancelier Willy Brandt en particulier. Celui-ci est en effet pour beaucoup dans la transposition pratique du concept français qui consiste à se servir d’une conférence au sommet des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement pour résoudre les problèmes européens. En dépit de ses propres hésitations originales quant à une rencontre organisée à l’exclusion de la Grande-Bretagne, Brandt soutint finalement l’initiative du président Pompidou contre les sceptiques de la Communauté. Au titre de ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Grande Coalition du SPD et du CSU, il se contenta d’abord de pratiquer une active «diplomatie des voyages» dont le but était de rapprocher les points de vue souvent fort opposés. Ensuite, dès son avènement à la chancellerie au lendemain des élections d’octobre 1969, il augmenta les pressions, notamment sur la France afin de l’obliger à donner son aval aux négociations avec les pays candidats en contrepartie d’une solution acceptable en matière du financement de la PAC. La présente contribution retrace le cheminement de l’initiative de Pompidou depuis le mois de juin 1969 jusqu’à le conférence en décembre de la même année. Le dépouillement des archives de différents ministères jadis concernés dégage ainsi, du côté allemand, une ébauche de politique soucieuse de conserver les intérêts nationaux grâce à un juste équilibre des intérêts de tous les pays membres. Avec sa quête pour un plus grand dénominateur commun, Brand a non seulement fait preuve de l’esprit communautaire du nouveau

152 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen gouvernement fédéral. Le sommet de La Haye a également marqué son premier succès sur le plan de la politique européenne et ce, bien avant la mise en route de la nouvelle Ostpolitik.

Auf der Suche nach dem größten gemeinsamen Nenner. Deutschland und die Haager Gipfelkonferenz 1969

Der Erfolg der Haager Gipfelkonferenz im Dezember 1969 wurde von weiten Teilen der europäischen Öffentlichkeit der deutschen Gipfeldiplomatie und vor allem dem Engagement des deutschen Bundeskanzlers Willy Brandt zugeschrieben. In der Tat hatte Brandt entscheidenden Anteil an der erfolgreichen Umsetzung der Idee des französischen Staatspräsidenten, die europäischen Probleme auf einer Konferenz der Staats- und Regierungschefs zu lösen. Trotz anfänglicher eigener Vorbehalte gegen einen Gipfel unter Ausschluss Großbritanniens unterstützte er die Initiative gegenüber Skeptikern in der Gemeinschaft. Als Außenminister der Großen Koalition von SPD und CDU erschöpfte sich seine Aufgabe in einer regen Reisediplomatie, die lediglich eine Annäherung der unterschiedlichen Positionen bewirkte. Nach seiner Wahl zum Bundeskanzler im Oktober 1969 verstärkte er den Druck auf die französische Regierung, die sich zur Aufnahme von Verhandlungen mit den Beitrittsländern bereit erklärte, um im Gegenzug eine zufriedenstellende Lösung für die Agrarﬁnanzierung der Gemeinschaft zu erhalten. Der Beitrag rekonstruiert anhand der Akten der beteiligten Ministerien den Weg von Pompidous Initiative im Juni 1969 bis zur Konferenz Anfang Dezember 1969. Dabei kristallisiert sich auf deutscher Seite ein Politikansatz heraus, der auf der Wahrnehmung nationaler Interessen im Rahmen eines Interessenausgleichs aller Mitgliedstaaten basierte. Mit seiner Suche nach dem größten gemeinsamen Nenner stellte Brandt den europäischen Partnern nicht nur den esprit communautaire der neuen Bundesregierung unter Beweis. Der Haager Gipfel markierte auch den ersten außenpolitischen Erfolg der Regierung Brandt, den sie noch vor der Implementierung der ,Neuen Ostpolitik’ auf europapolitischem Gebiet zu verzeichnen hatte.

Marie-Thérèse Bitsch The summit of Den Haag. The French Initiative, its Finalities and its Limits

Only France, that had opposed the United Kingdom’s accession to the EEC, could break the deadlock that had been reached within the Community after General de Gaulle’s second veto, at the end of the 1960s. It was up to Georges Pompidou, elected president of the Republic in June 1969, to take the initiative for breaking this stalemate and relaunching the European construction. The new President followed this line rapidly and resolutely, both for domestic (election) reasons, and to meet the requirements of the Europeans but above all in order to speed up again cooperation within the EEC, imperative for the modernization of the French economy. Thus he accepted enlargement with the accession of Great Britain and the other candidate countries, on two preconditions: the completion, i.e. the adoption of the principle of an own resources system before passing on to the deﬁnitive stage on 1st January 1970 and the preliminary agreement between the Six on the conditions of accession to be imposed on the future member countries. By suggesting a summit meeting, in those days an exceptional practice, with strong Gaullist and intergovernmental connotations, Pompidou sought to keep control over the process, but ran the risk of annoying and worrying his partners. But, sincere in his will to relaunch the European construction, he was ready to yield some ground in order to make of the Den Haag conference a cause of satisfaction for the French diplomacy and a not inconsiderable success for European integration.

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 153

Le sommet de La Haye. L’initiative française, ses ﬁnalités et ses limites

Seule la France, qui s’était opposée à l’entrée du Royaume-Uni dans la CEE, pouvait mettre fin au blocage qui frappe la Communauté après le deuxième veto du général de Gaulle, à la fin des années 1960. Il revient à Georges Pompidou, élu président de la République en juin 1969, de prendre les initiatives pour sortir de l’impasse et relancer la construction européenne. Le nouveau président s’engage dans cette voie, rapidement et résolument, à la fois pour des raisons de politique intérieure (électorale) française, pour répondre aux attentes des Européens et, surtout, pour redynamiser la coopération au sein de la CEE, indispensable à la modernisation de l’économie française. Il accepte alors l’élargissement à l’Angleterre et aux autres candidats, moyennant deux préalables: l’achèvement, c’est-à-dire l’adoption du principe des ressources financières propres avant le passage à la phase définitive le 1er janvier 1970 et l’entente préliminaire entre les Six sur les conditions d’adhésion à imposer aux futurs Etats membres. En suggérant la réunion d’un sommet, qui est à l’époque une pratique exceptionnelle, ayant une forte connotation gaulliste et intergouvernementale, Pompidou cherche à garder la maîtrise de l’opération mais prend le risque d’irriter et d’inquiéter ses partenaires. Mais, sincère dans sa volonté de relance, il sait lâcher suffisamment de lest pour faire de la conférence de La Haye un sujet de satisfaction pour la diplomatie française et un succès non négligeable pour l’intégration européenne.

Das Gipfeltreffen von Den Haag. Finalität und Grenzen der französischen Initiative.

Nur Frankreich, das sich dem Beitritt des Vereinigten Königreichs in die EWG widersetzt hatte, konnte die Pattsituation, in der sich die Gemeinschaft nach General de Gaulles zweitem Veto befand, gegen Ende der 60er Jahre beenden. Georges Pompidou, der im Juni 1969 zum Präsidenten der Republik gewählt worden war, kam es zu, die Initiative zu ergreifen, um das europäische Einigungswerk aus der Sackgasse zu führen und neu zu beleben. Schnell und entschlossen begab er sich auf diesen Weg, sowohl aus innen- und wahlpolitischen Gründen, als auch, um den Erwartungen der Europäer entgegen zu kommen, und besonders um der Zusammenarbeit innerhalb der EWG eine neue Dynamik zu verleihen. Letzteres war unerlässlich für die Modernisierung der französischen Wirtschaft. Pompidou stimmte also der Erweiterung, und damit dem Beitritt Englands und der übrigen Kandidaten zu, unter zwei Bedingungen: die endgültige Verabschiedung des Prinzips der ﬁnanziellen Eigenmittel vor dem Übergang zur deﬁnitiven Phase am 1. Januar 1970 und die vorausgehende Einigung der Sechs über die Beitrittsbedingungen für die zukünftigen Mitgliedsstaaten. Mit dem Vorschlag zu diesem Gipfeltreffen - zur damaligen Zeit eine eher ungewöhnliche Angelegenheit, mit stark gaullistischem Einschlag - versuchte der neue französische Präsident die Kontrolle über diesen Prozess zu behalten. Er ging dabei aber das Risiko ein, seine Partner zu verärgern und zu beunruhigen. Aber in seinem aufrichtigen Wunsch nach einer Wiederbelebung der Gemeinschaft, war er zu den erforderlichen Konzessionen bereit, so dass die Konferenz von Den Haag der französischen Diplomatie Anlass zur Zufriedenheit geben konnte und einen nicht zu unterschätzenden Erfolg für die europäische Integration bildete.

Maria Eleonora Guasconi Italy and the Hague Conference of 1969

The policies pursued by Italy during and after the Hague Conference of 1-2 December 1969 are an interesting example of its Europeanism, which put in a right perspective the stereotype of 'weak negotiator', illustrating the political interests underlying its initiatives.

154 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

The documents demonstrate how the Italian government, despite a serious domestic instability and the emerging threat of terrorism, tried to ﬁnd a space among its European partners, in particular France and Germany, by supporting Great Britain's admission in the EC, promoting a common policy on the question of employment and re-launching the project for European political co-operation. These goals were intended as countermeasures, meant to soften the negative consequences of the completion of the CAP, the introduction of the Value Added Tax (VAT) and the development of the European Monetary Union (EMU) for the Italian economy.

L’Italie et la Conférence de La Haye de 1969

Les positions défendues par les Italiens à l’occasion de la conférence de La Haye du 1er au 2 décembre 1969 sont un bon exemple de leur européisme qui se distingue à la fois par le stéréotype du «faible négociateur» et par les intérêts politiques sous-jacents à leurs initiatives. Les sources nous révèlent en effet un gouvernement qui, en dépit de la sérieuse instabilité politique et de la menace naissante du terrorisme en Italie, cherche à trouver sa place dans le concert européen, notamment parmi les deux grands, la France et l’Allemagne. Son action porte sur trois points essentiels: le soutien de la candidature britannique, le promotion d’une politique commune concernant le marché de l’emploi et la relance du projet de coopération politique. Chacun de ces objectifs se comprend comme une contre-mesure destinée à atténuer les répercussions négatives provoquées par l’achèvement de la PAC, de l’introduction de la Taxe sur la Valeur Ajoutée (TVA) et le développement de l’Union Monétaire Européenne (UME) sur l’économie italienne.

Italien und die Haager Konferenz von 1969

Italiens Position anlässlich des Haager Gipfels vom 1.-2. Dezember 1969 bildet ein typisches Beispiel des „Europäismus“ eines „schwachen Verhandlungspartners“ dessen Initiativen durch die unterschwellige Verfolgung politischer Interessen gekennzeichnet sind. Die Quellen verdeutlichen in der Tat wie, trotz der innenpolitisch angespannten Lage und der wachsenden Bedrohung durch den Terrorismus, die italienische Regierung sich insbesondere zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland auf dem europäischen Parkett zu positionieren sucht, indem sie die britische Beitrittskandidatur unterstützt und sich gleichzeitig für eine Neuauﬂage der politischen Kooperationspläne und die Einführung einer gemeinsamen Arbeitsmarktpolitik stark macht. Alle drei Anliegen verstehen sich gleichsam als „Gegenmaßnahmen“, um die negativen Auswirkungen der europäischen Agrarpolitik, der Einführung der Mehrwertssteuer und der Währungsunion auf die italienische Wirtschaft abzufedern.

Alan S. Milward The Hague Conference of 1969 and the United Kingdom’s Accession to the European Economic Community

The United Kingdom's approach to the summit meeting at The Hague was dominated by the necessity to obtain from the Six a deﬁnite date for the start of negotiations on its 1967 application for membership of the Communities. This objective was supported strongly by Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. All of these states, however, also supported the strengthening of the Communities' common policies, the 'deepening' of the Communities. This situation enabled France to insist on The United Kingdom accepting in

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 155 full the financial regulations of the Common Agricultural Policy. For the country with the biggest net food import surplus in the EEC and with an agricultural sector that was not geared for export, this was a massive financial burden, about which the prime minister at the time of the summit, Harold Wilson, had grave reservations. After he had lost the election, the Heath government, determined though it was to enter the EEC, came increasingly to the conclusion that the terms of entry might be economically crippling and accepted membership with the intention of renegotiating the financial terms. Their electoral defeat ,in turn, meant that financial renegotiation became a plank of the policy of both political parties, later to be brought to a conclusion by Margaret Thatcher. While, therefore, The Hague Summit made negotiations possible it can not be said that they guaranteed a successful, much less a lasting, conclusion to them.

La conférence de La Haye de 1969 et l’accession du Royaume-Uni à la Communauté Economique Européenne

Le Royaume-Uni aborda le ‘sommet’ de décembre 1969 à La Haye en poursuivant un but prédominant, à savoir de forcer l’annonce d’une date pour l’ouverture des négociations sur sa candidature posée en 1967 en vue d’une adhésion aux Communautés européennes. Grâce à l’aide des Pays-Bas et de l’Allemagne ce but fut atteint, mais au prix d’entériner un acquis communautaire, déﬁni par le gouvernement français, et dont le prix semblait dangereusement élevé, même pour un gouvernement conservateur et un premier ministre convaincus de la nécessité de se joindre aux Six. Edward Heath et son cabinet se sont donc trouvés obligés de solliciter sur chaque point des négociations une révision, en l’occurrence des paiements britanniques et des frais essuyés par plein de détails de la Politique Agricole Commune. Les origines de la requête pour une ‘renégociation’ formulée en 1973 par leurs successeurs socialistes remontent ainsi à l’acceptation par le gouvernement conservateur tant des décisions prises au sommet de La Haye que de celles adoptées au cours des négociations qui s’ensuivirent, sauf à y ajouter un plan pour une réévaluation des coûts ﬁnanciers dès que le Royaume-Uni serait entré dans la Communauté. Sous cet angle, Margaret Thatcher a simplement poursuivi plus tard une politique héritée du sommet de La Haye.

Die Haager Konferenz und Großbritanniens Beitritt in die EWG

Im Rahmen der Haager Gipfelkonferenz verfolgte Großbritannien ein alles andere überragendes Ziel: die Ankündigung eines genauen Datums zur Eröffnung der Verhandlungen über die bereits 1967 gestellte Kandidatur zum Beitritt in die europäische Gemeinschaft. Dank der niederländischen und deutschen Hilfe, gelang es denn auch dieses Ziel zu erreichen, allerdings zu einem gefährlich hohen, von der französischen Regierung festgelegten Preis der, zusammen mit der Übernahme des „acquis communautaire“, auch für eine konservative Regierung und ihren von der Notwendigkeit eines britischen Beitritts überzeugten Premier nicht ohne weiteres annehmbar war. Edward Heath und sein Kabinett sahen sich also gezwungen jeden Punkt der Verhandlungen einer Revision zu unterziehen, besonders die britischen Beitragszahlungen und jede Menge von Detailfragen im Bereich der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik. Der Ursprung des 1973 von der nachfolgenden Labour-Regierung gestellten Revisionsverfahrens geht also auf jene Entscheidungen zurück, die das konservative Kabinett sowohl in Den Haag als auch während den darauffolgenden Verhandlungsrunden getroffen hatte, allerdings unter dem Vorbehalt der Aufstellung eines Planes über die Neubemessung der ﬁnanziellen Lasten sobald Großbritannien der Gemeinschaft beigetreten sei. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt bildet die später von Margaret Thatcher verfolgte Politik nichts anderes als die Weiterführung des Erbes von Den Haag.

157 Contributors - Auteurs - Autoren

BITSCH Marie-Thérèse, Professeur à l’Université Robert Schuman de Stras- bourg, Chaire Jean Monnet d’histoire de la construction européenne Adresse personnelle: 10, rue Schiller, F.67081 Strasbourg Cedex Tél.: (+) 33 388 25 61 20 e-mail: [email protected]

GUASCONI Maria Eleonora, Lecturer in History of International Relations at the University of Urbino (Piazza Gherardi 4, 61029 Urbino). Personal address: Via di Città, 43 53100 SIENA, Italy Tel.: (+) 39 339 74 30 285 E-Mail: [email protected]

HARRYVAN Anjo G., Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Groningen, P.O. Box 716, NL-9700 AS Groningen, Netherlands Tel.: (+) 31 50 3636033 E-mail: [email protected]

HIEPEL Claudia, Hochschulassistentin at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Department of History, D – 45117 Essen. Tel.: (+) 49 201 1833582 E-mail: [email protected]

LUDLOW N. Piers, Lecturer in International History, London School of Econom- ics, Houghton St., London WC2A 2AE Tel. (+) 44 20 79557099 E-mail: [email protected]

MILWARD Alan S., Official Historian, United Kingdom Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office Historical and Records Division, Admirality Arch, North Entrance, The Mall, London, SW1A 2WH

VAN DER HARST Jan, Jean Monnet Chair holder at the Department of Interna- tional Relations, University of Groningen, P.O. Box 716, NL-9700 AS Netherlands Tel.: (+) 31 50 3636015 E-mail: [email protected]

WILSON Jérôme, Research Fellow in European Integration History, Institute for European Studies, University of Louvain. Personal address: rue de la Limite 207, 1950 Kraainem, Belgium Tel: (+) 32 2 7310757 E-mail: [email protected]

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159 Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher BONO Giovanna – Nato’s ‘Peace-Enforcement’ Tasks and ‘Policy Communities’: 1990 – 1999, Ashgate, Hampshire, 2003, 198 p. – ISBN 0-7546-0944-8 – 40,00 € BRANDT Willy – Die Entspannung unzerstörbar machen.Internationale Bezie- hungen und deutsche Frage, 1974-1982, Dietz Verlag, Bonn, 2003, 500 S. – ISBN 3-8012-0309-3 – 27,60 € BRUCK Elke – François Mitterrands Deutschlandbild, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2003, 355 S. – ISBN 3-631-50202-8 – 46,80 € COSTA PINTO Antonio, TEIXEIRA SEVERIANO Nuno – Southern Europe and the Making of the European Union. Social Science Monographs, 2002, Columbia University Press, New York, 2002, 273 p. – ISBN 0-88033-991-8. – 35 $ DELCOURT Barbara – Droit et Souverainetés. Analyse critique du discours européen sur la Yougoslavie, Bruxelles, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2003, 490 p. – ISBN 90-5201-179-6 – 43,50 € FLEURY Antoine, FINK Carole, JILEK Lubor – Les droits de l’homme en Europe depuis 1945. Human Rights in Europe since 1945, Peter Lang, Bern, 2003. 364 p. – ISBN 3-906770-51-6 – 54.80 € FREIRE Maria Raquel. – Conﬂict and Security in the Former Soviet Union. The Role of the OSCE, Ashgate, Hampshire, 2003, 288 p. – ISBN 0-7546-3526-0 – 47,50 £ GILLINGHAM John – European Integration 1950 – 2003. Superstate or New Mar- ket Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, 488 p. – ISBN 0-521-01262-7 – (paperback)17,95 £ – ISBN 0-521-81317-4 – 47,50 £ GEHLER Michael, PELINKA Anton, BISCHOF Günter (Hrsg.) – Österreich in der europäischen Union.Bilanz seiner Mitgliedschaft, Böhlau, Wien/ Köln/Weimar, 2003, 655 S. – ISBN 3-205-77116-8 – 69 € GREBING Helga, SCHÖLLGEN Gregor, WINKLER Heinz-August – Willy Brand. Die Entspannung unzerstörbar machen. Internationale Beziehun- gen und die deutsche Frage 1974 – 1982, Dietz Verlag, Bonn, 2003. 498 S. – ISBN 3-8012-0309-3 – 27,60 € GÖZTEPE-ÇELEPI Ece – Die Unionsbürgerschaft und ihre Fortentwicklung im Hinblick auf die politischen Rechte, LIT-Verlag, Münster, 2003, 457 S. – ISBN 3-8258-6466-9 - ? HOBSBAWM Eric – Interesting Times. A Twentieth-Century Life, Penguin Books, London, 2002, 447 p. – ISBN 0-713-99581-5 – 20,00 £ KELLER Berndt, PLATZER Hans-Wolfgang – Industrial Relations and Euro- pean Integration. Trans- and Supranational Developments and Prospects, Ashgate, Hampshire, 2003, 192 p. – ISBN 0-7546-3336-5 – 45,00 £

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KRAUSE Joachim, WENGER Andreas, WATANABE Lisa – Unraveling the Europian Security and Defense Policy Conundrum, Peter Lang, Bern, 2003, 246 p. – ISBN 3-906770-86-9 – 25,10 €

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PASSERINI Luisa (ed.) – Figures d’Europe. Images and Myths of Europe, P.I.E. Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2003, 183 p. – ISBN 90-5201-189-3 – 27,00 €

PETER Hartmut Rüdiger, TIKHONOV Natalia (Hrsg.) – Universitäten als Brücken in Europa. Les universités: des ponts de l’Europe, Peter Lang, Pieterlen, 2003, 339 p. – ISBN 3-631-39890-5 – 46,80 €

SCHALENBERG Marc – Humboldt auf Reisen? Die Rezeption des deutschen Universitätsmodells´ in den französischen und britischen Reformdis- kursen (1810 – 1870), Schwabe & Co AG, Basel, 2003, 520 S. – ISBN 3-7965-1930-X. – 50,50 €

TAYFUR Fatih M – Semiperipheral Development and Foreign Policy. The case of Greece and Spain, Ashgate, Hampshire, 2003, 270 p. – ISBN 0-7546-1964-8 – 49,95 £

TIMMERMANN Heiner, JAKIR Aleksander (Hrsg.) – Europas Tragik. Ex-Jugos- lawien zwischen Hoffnung und Resignation, LIT Verlag, Münster, 2002, 160 S. – ISBN 3-8258-6527-4 – 24,90 €

VITZTHUM Wolfgang Graf, WINKELMANN Ingo – Bosnien-Herzegowina im Horizont Europas. Demokratische und föderale Elemente der Staats- werdung in Südeuropa, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2003, 232 S. – ISBN 3-428-11068-4 – 58,80 €

WARLEIGH Alex – Democracy in the European Union. Theory, Practice and Reform, Sage Publications, London, 2003, 156 p. – ISBN 0-7619-7280-3 – 60,00 £ (Cloth) – ISBN 0-7619-7281-1 – 17,99 £ (Paper)

WESSELS Wolfgang, MAURER Andreas, MITTAG Jürgen – Fifteen into one? The European Union and its member states, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2003, 472 p. – ISBN 0-7190-5849-X – 17,99 £

Journal of International Affairs. Perceptions. Volume VII, Number 4, December 2002 – February 2003, Intermedia, Istanbul, 224 p. ISSN 1300-8641