British Aerospace Face of Adversity

Up Front By Antoine Gelain Contributing columnist Antoine Gelain is the managing director of Paragon European Partners. He is based in London. COMMENTARY war effort—“Work until it hurts!” exhorted the company’s chief execu- tive to its workers—it became the symbol of British resilience in the British Aerospace face of adversity. Thus, Rolls-Royce’s current troubles feel like the British A proud past but an uncertain future aerospace industry being wounded in its heart. n less than a month, Meanwhile, the part of the industry British, Irish and that does work well is the one that I builds aircraft parts but does not de- Commonwealth citizens sign them: Tens of small- and medi- living in the U.K. will vote um-size manufacturers of “build-to- to decide whether the U.K. Rolls-Royce workers assembling should remain in the cylinder blocks on the Hillington European Union or not. Merlin production line in 1942. While the stakes are high, print” aerostructure and detail parts this is really business as are today the industrial backbone of usual for the British, as this U.K. aerospace. But very few of them, June 23 “Brexit” referendum if any, design their own products. As an illustration, only one British is just the latest episode in company today—GKN—is qualified by the country’s longstanding WIKIMEDIA/FROM THE COLLECTIONS OF THE IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUMS Airbus as a tier-1 supplier of “design ambivalence toward Europe. and build” aerostructures. through a merger with EADS, which Without strong domestic design In many ways, the recent history ultimately fell through. and system engineering capabilities, of the U.K. aerospace sector reflects Partly because of all these mis- the industry must compete with an such uncertainty: After being involved takes by the firm that was formerly increasing number of nations for in the very early stages of what regarded as the national champion, the award of work packages and for became Airbus in the 1960s, the Brit- the U.K. aerospace industry is in a foreign investment. And while the ish government withdrew from the much weaker strategic position today British have always displayed a smug project in 1969, leaving Germany and than 30 years ago. Essentially, it has optimism about their ability to at- France to proceed on their own. Ten lost its “head” —that is, an organiza- tract foreign investors, such reliance years later, in 1979, it returned—via tion capable of designing a complete is as dangerous today as it was 100 state-owned British Aerospace—by aircraft. This capability is gone, and years ago when a popular commen- acquiring a 20% share of Airbus. BAE Systems is the shadow of its for- tator, E.E. Williams, said that “we Twenty years later, in 1999, Brit- mer self in terms of industry leader- live as a nation under an enormous ish Aerospace passed up an almost ship and aerospace design engineer- danger, for we are at the mercy of sealed deal with DaimlerChrysler’s ing capabilities. foreign nations, not only for our food aerospace division, which would have While British Aerospace was and for our clothes, but also for our created Europe’s largest aerospace historically the “head,” Rolls-Royce huge invested capital.” conglomerate, and instead merged has always been the “heart” of the Like the country as a whole, the with fellow British company GEC- country’s aerospace sector. Going British aerospace industry is at a Marconi, which itself eschewed back to the company’s early days, crossroads: in search of its true a potential tie-up with France’s when talented engineer Henry Royce identity, torn between the pragmatic Thomson-CSF (now Thales). From and flamboyant race car driver recognition that its future is inextri- that point on, the newly formed BAE Charles Rolls joined forces to create cably tied to the future of Europe as Systems directed most of its re- what would quickly become an iconic a whole and the deep-rooted belief sources toward penetrating the U.S. brand, the company’s mystique took that it is destined for greater achieve- defense market. root in the national psyche. Royce in ments on the world stage, for which This U.S.-centric strategy, shared particular was described by a journal- its European membership may be by most U.K. A&D companies at the ist as an “engineering artist” who perceived as a drawback. time, culminated in the sale of BAE’s “cares more about getting the best out Having already been deprived of its Airbus stake in 2006. This turned out of an article than he does about get- head, now struggling with its heart, to be a strategic mistake, and in 2012 ting the most money out of it.” let us just hope that the British aero- BAE was willing to pay a big pre- During World War II, as the firm space industry will not end up losing mium to buy its way back into Airbus channeled all its energy into the its soul. c AviationWeek.com/awst AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY/JUNE 6-19, 2016 11.

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