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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Table of contents Introduction and Chief Constable’s declaration Page 3 Executive Summary Page 4

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED West Yorkshire With a population of over 2.2 million, West Yorkshire Police is the fourth largest force in the country and is comprised of an economically, socially and culturally diverse population. There are five local authorities, covering urban and rural communities, with coterminous policing districts.

West Yorkshire has a higher than average demand in relation to crime and calls for service. This reflects the challenges faced, as over half of the wards have areas in the top 10% of the deprivation index and unemployment is above the national average.

The black, Asian and minority ethnic population is increasing and is currently 18.2%. Maintaining community confidence is essential and engagement is improving as a result of the Force’s innovative positive action recruitment campaign.

District policing provides local neighbourhood, response, crime investigation and safeguarding functions, supported centrally by specialist operational and crime capabilities and back office services. The force is focused on improving its approach to safeguarding, working in partnership to better identify and support those at risk.

The force hosts the National Police Air Service and the North East Counter Terrorism Unit, which manages locally the threat from Daesh/IS inspired groups and the increasing threat from the extreme right wing. The force collaborates across the Yorkshire and Humber Region around operational and support services and leads on the provision of scientific support.

West Yorkshire Police is operating on a budget that has reduced by £147m since 2010 whilst seeing increasing demand, particularly in the areas of child sexual exploitation and abuse, mental health, missing persons and terrorism.

Our workforce comprises 5129 police officers and 4407 police staff (including 637 police community support officers). Together with universities, we are developing new ways of working through successful funding bids, particularly in relation to cyber enabled offending and our use of technology to meet the changing nature of crime.

Declaration

This is the Force Management Statement for West Yorkshire Police. Except where stated otherwise, the information in this statement is complete and accurate in all material respects.

Dee Collins Chief Constable

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Executive Summary

Overall context and current assessment of West Yorkshire Police

West Yorkshire Police has been recognised by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) as a Good force . We have been graded as Good at tackling serious and organised crime and were found to have effective specialist capabilities. We also have strong capacity and capability in our protective services and have a number of regional and national responsibilities. We are:

• The lead force for the North East Counter Terrorism Unit, an area where risk is growing given the national and international increase in terrorism and extremism. • The lead force within the Yorkshire and Humber Region for the Regional Organised Crime Unit which is delivering the specialist capabilities needed to disrupt organised crime, and the lead force in the North Eastern Region for the Regional Asset Recovery Team. • The lead force for the National Police Air Service, ensuring effective deployment of air support nationally. • Progressing Bluelight collaborations with the fire and ambulance services to enhance interoperability, reduce demand and improve efficiency and effectiveness.

Over the last year we have made improvements within Neighbourhood Policing by reinvesting an additional 100 Police Constables as well as 16 Inspectors and 13 Sergeants into our enhanced Neighbourhood Policing Model. Along with a new Strategy focussing on the three pillars of community engagement, prevention/early intervention and problem solving, we have developed an abstractions policy to maintain dedicated numbers and have equipped those officers with problem solving training and the skills to identify signals of risk so that they can intervene early to reduce harm and demand. As a result, we have recently been graded by HMICFRS as Good at Preventing Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour.

Over the past few years we have realigned our resources to address threat, harm and risk and have significantly invested in safeguarding. The demand in this area (e.g. Child Sexual Exploitation & Abuse, Missing Persons, Mental Health and Domestic Abuse) has increased significantly over the last five years and now accounts for one in five of all incidents recorded. We have strong multi-agency partnerships to address these areas and have developed a number of innovative approaches to tackle increasing demand. As a result, HMICFRS have graded us as Good at Protecting those who are Vulnerable to Harm.

We have also been graded by HMICFRS as Good at Legitimacy in terms of how the force treats its workforce and whether the workforce behaves ethically and lawfully. We have one of the most positive staff survey results in the country and over the last year improvements have been made in all areas surveyed. The Force has consistently been graded by HMICFRS to be Good at understanding demand, using resources and planning for the future. Our Force Management Statement has, using statistical forecasting tools, attempted to predict what future demand will be over the next four years and assessed the current capacity and capability of the workforce to meet that demand.

This Executive Summary identifies the significant challenges we face from demand and workforce perspectives and focuses mainly on Step 4 of the Force Management Statement process, namely the demand we do not expect to be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making.

The four year predictions shown in this Executive Summary utilise statistical forecasting that reflect historical trends. Short term anomalies (e.g. crime recording spikes) have been accounted and adjusted for and professional judgement on key factors has also been taken into used. This is the first time the force has published such predictions and we will be tracking and refining our calculations over the coming year. 5

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Our most significant challenges

1. Calls for service, particularly 999 calls

Total 999 calls projection (12 month rolling total) 600000 497,360 500000 413,733 400000

300000

200000

100000

0 Jul Jul 2016 Jul 2017 Jul 2018 Jul 2019 Jul 2020 Jul 2021 Jan2016 Jan2017 Jan2018 Jan2019 Jan2020 Jan2021 Jan2022 Sep 2016 Sep 2017 Sep 2018 Sep 2019 Sep 2020 Sep 2021 Nov 2016 Nov 2017 Nov 2018 Nov 2019 Nov 2020 Nov 2021 Mar2016 Mar2017 Mar2018 Mar2019 Mar2020 Mar2021 May 2016 May 2017 May 2018 May 2019 May 2020 May 2021

The graph above illustrates a concerning trend in increasing 999 calls; we predict that by 2021 there will be a 20.2% increase in these (83,627 calls) and our Customer Contact Centre will need a significant investment to maintain 999 performance for this forecasted demand.

Although 101 call demand is only predicted to increase slightly (2.5%) the prioritisation of 999 over 101 may have the unintended consequence of making 101 callers instead ring 999, thereby compounding demand issues.

A significant amount of our call demand is repeat demand . A failure to keep people updated regarding police attendance at their reported incident, or informed regarding the investigation of their crime, could be causing as much as 27% of our demand based on recent analysis.

2. Attendance at Emergency Incidents - a Potential Threat to Neighbourhood Policing

Projection (12 month rolling total) 140000 130000 121,765

120000 129,352 110000 100000 90000 80000 70000 60000 50000 Apr2015 Apr2016 Apr2017 Apr2018 Apr2019 Apr2020 Oct2015 Oct2016 Oct2017 Oct2018 Oct2019 Oct2020 Jun2015 Jun2016 Jun2017 Jun2018 Jun2019 Jun2020 Feb 2016 Feb 2017 Feb 2018 Feb 2019 Feb 2020 Feb 2021 Feb Aug Aug 2015 Dec 2015 Aug 2016 Dec 2016 Aug 2017 Dec 2017 Aug 2018 Dec 2018 Aug 2019 Dec 2019 Aug 2020 Dec 2020

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED The increase in 999 calls has implications for emergency attendance which is predicted to increase by a further 6,679 incidents. Although this figure seems low in comparison with the increase of 999 calls listed at point 1 above, it has assumed we continue our current rate of attendance against incoming 999 calls, which has been slowing. A small increase in the need to attend more 999 calls (due to their genuine severity) would have profound implications.

Data also tells us that on average 4.2 officers are deployed to an Emergency incident versus 2.7 officers to a Priority incident, therefore emergencies require 35% more resources. Without an investment of additional resources, it is predicted that the long term worsening trend around attendance time will further deteriorate along with victim satisfaction, which is heavily influenced by the speed of arrival of officers.

This also threatens the Neighbourhood Policing Model because protecting Neighbourhood Policing Team officers from abstractions may not be feasible within the context of increased call demand. Our ambition is for these officers to focus on prevention, early intervention and problem solving to reduce demand in the long term but they may need to be abstracted into short-medium term demands out of necessity.

3. Total crime predictions and investigative demand

In terms of performance, crime has been on an increasing trend for the past few years. For example, overall recorded crime for the 12 month period to September 2018 is 12% higher than in the 12 months to September 2017. This rate is now slowing when compared to increases in 2016/17 (17.8%) and 2015/16 (28.5%) and most of the increases are as a result of compliance with crime data integrity. Recent analysis shows that of the 12% increase, actual risk of increased victimisation is around 5% and mainly associated with violent crime, robbery, acquisitive crime, possession of weapons and criminal damage.

The graph above illustrates the prediction that total crime will increase from around 260,000 in 2017 to almost 310,000 in 2021 - an additional 50,000 crimes for our Force Crime Management Unit (FCMU) to assess. Without additional investment in our FCMU it is predicted that the force will be unable to manage this demand.

Given that we currently provide a further investigation to around 50% of crimes that are recorded, the predicted increases in crime will lead to an additional 25,000 crimes to investigate. In addition, because safeguarding based crimes are predicted to significantly increase and are screened in at a much higher rate due to their complexity, the demands on detectives and safeguarding staff will increase which is an area of concern given current capacity issues already identified in this arena. Cyber-enabled crimes are also predicted to increase which take longer to investigate, require broader skillsets and therefore present even more capacity and capability challenges. 7

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED The Detective / Investigative crisis being experienced both nationally and in our force is a ‘red’ graded risk and the predicted increase in investigative demand is of significant concern. High workloads and a more attractive uniform patrol shift pattern with less stress and overall responsibility is a barrier to the recruitment of detectives. Despite the work we are undertaking to increase this resilience we predict further shortfalls which will leave a less experienced, overworked and demotivated detective workforce in place with the resulting shortfall in investigative performance and quality of service to the public.

4. Vulnerability Demand

Vulnerability demand has significantly increased over the last five years with, for example, a 287% increase in Missing Persons, a 176% increase in Child Sexual Exploitation & Abuse and a 51% increase in Domestic Abuse incidents. On top of this, the predicted increases in demand across the 11 areas of Protecting Vulnerable People are significant and total 56,642 additional transactions (e.g. incidents / crimes / investigations / referrals) for our force.

These increases come at the same time that budgets are not expected to increase in policing and austerity continues to impact on partners such as Social Care and Health whose roles are critical. Demand around vulnerability is increasing for the Force as we deal with the consequences of someone going into crisis and because services available to these people have reduced as a consequence of austerity, we predict ever increasing demand for the Force.

The graph below predicts that demand associated with Domestic Abuse will increase by around 45% by 2021 to over 84,000 incidents. Should this be realised then the Force will not be able to respond to threat in the same way as it does currently and we may need to reassess how officers and staff deal with different levels of risk.

Demand around missing persons has increased significantly over the last few years and is predicted to further increase to 25,260 investigations by 2021, a 16% increase. This is mainly due to the predicted increase in the number of Looked after Children and the related increase in Children’s homes. We are particularly concerned that without the robust and proactive involvement of Social Care we will not be able to manage this demand effectively. High levels of demand have already resulted in a lack of intervention with low and medium risk missing children and predicted increases will worsen this.

Mental health is an underpinning factor associated with vulnerability / offending and incidents involving mental health have significantly increased over the last five years with 43% of all arrestees having an entry on their mental health risk assessment and 43 incidents flagged as being associated with mental health problems every day. Given the lack of services and partnership provision in this area, more people are likely to present in crisis which means more demand for the

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Force at a time when we do not have the capacity and capability to deal with these complex issues.

In terms of Child Sexual Exploitation & Abuse we are particularly concerned about a predicted increase in online Child Sexual Exploitation & Abuse and livestreaming and the threat posed by any organised criminal enterprise in this area. Threats are continually evolving in this area and whilst technology will assist in identifying demand, it will also create capacity and capability issues in addressing that demand.

Whilst we predict that reported non-recent offences are likely to stabilise, there is always the possibility of a new ‘type’ of non-recent offence coming to light which could gain national momentum and lead to additional non-recent demand for us to manage. As previously stated, this could threaten our Neighbourhood Policing resources if we have to align those resources to address threat, harm and risk.

We predict that in the next four years, there will be growth in adult safeguarding demand in the same way as child safeguarding demand has increased over the past five years. Nationally, there has been a lack of focus in this area but as we put structures in place to deal with adult safeguarding, neglect and abuse (and given that the population is aging) this will create more demand for the Force.

All these areas of vulnerability rely on partnership working but increased demand also has significant implications for partners whose resources are continuing to reduce as a result of austerity. Any withdrawal from work which is not ‘statutory’ could result in even more demand for the Force and increased vulnerability for those people who find themselves in crisis.

5. Managing Offenders

Demand involved in managing offenders has increased over the past five years and this is predicted to continue. A predicted increase in sexual crime offences and offenders, coupled with our proactive approach to addressing the risk of harm involved with these, has the consequence of more offenders (in particular complex offenders) to manage.

The graph below shows the predicted increase in Registered Sex Offenders (RSOs), which is increasing by around 10% each year. Unless there is an investment in additional Public Protection Officers it is anticipated that the Force will not be able to meet the predicted demand moving forward and will significantly exceed ratios recommended in national guidance.

Projection (12 month rolling total) 6000 5139 5000 3893 4000

3000

2000

1000

0 Jul Jul 2015 Jul 2016 Jul 2017 Jul 2018 Jul 2019 Jul 2020 Apr2015 Oct2015 Apr2016 Oct2016 Apr2017 Oct2017 Apr2018 Oct2018 Apr2019 Oct2019 Apr2020 Oct2020 Apr2021 Jan Jan 2016 Jan 2017 Jan 2018 Jan 2019 Jan 2020 Jan 2021

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED There has been a consequence of moving Registered Sexual Offender management into Integrated Offender Management (IOM) due to conventional IOM personnel having to be used as resilience for the management of RSOs. This risks not being able to sufficiently manage both the conventional risk of harm and serious acquisitive crime cohorts which are areas where demand is predicted to increase and performance improvement is required.

6. Cyber Crime

The nature and scale of both cyber-enabled and cyber dependent crime is still not fully understood but both are predicted to increase in light of the proliferation of technology and the increasing prevalence of the ‘online world’. There is an increasing use of technology to facilitate a wide range of organised crime including Child Sexual Exploitation & Abuse, Human Trafficking, Fraud, Radicalisation and Cyber enabled/dependent crime and we predict that this will increase, in particular within Child Sexual Exploitation & Abuse and Fraud. The use of the dark web for other elements of organised crime is an increasing threat, as is the increasing number of States posing a cyber threat to the UK which is identified across many agencies on the Local Resilience Forum.

The Force has invested additional resources to mitigate against the predicted increase in both cyber enabled and cyber dependent crime, but in reality the future increase cannot accurately be predicted given the constantly evolving nature of the threat. In addition, as we invest in resources and technology to assist targeted investigations we expect to identify currently unmapped demand that we may not then have the capacity to deal with.

7. Serious Organised Crime and Specialist Capabilities

As West Yorkshire is a large metropolitan county, serious and organised crime will always present a high level of threat with drugs underpinning and financing a great deal of emerging organised crime. Demand is predicted to increase as we better understand the scale and nature of the threat associated with county lines . As Force, partnership and community awareness of organised crime grows we expect to uncover more organised criminality and better understand the relationship between organised crime and vulnerability, such as the criminal exploitation of children and vulnerable adults.

We have strong capability within Protective Services Crime and Operational Support functions, however there is a need to closely examine the Specialist Capabilities Programme which may call upon the Force to take further regional responsibility around niche capabilities as some forces move to a leaner model. Whilst demand around armed policing may grow, continued austerity measures and limited armed uplift funding and allocation periods may mean that the Force may not be able to afford the model we currently have should funding be reduced or cut.

8. Workforce Threats There are a number of workforce threats facing the Force which are inhibiting our ability to tackle demand. Some of these are short to medium term, such as the current high level of inexperience within our frontline service given the high proportion of student officers at Districts. However others are more long term and reflect the need for more comprehensive workforce planning models informed by anticipating future demand rather than being shaped by financial modelling alone.

Critical workforce issues include command resilience and the detective/investigative crisis highlighted above which has resulted in high numbers of vacancies in an area where demand is predicted to increase (e.g. Safeguarding). The grading from HMICFRS of ‘Requires Improvement’ for Investigations, including a Cause for Concern around standards of investigation, requires a significant focus on this critical area of business from a training as well as a cultural perspective. The ongoing training of officers to equip them with the skills, knowledge and ability to tackle and investigate crime is a key issue and, longer term, there is a need to build in protected learning time into officer’s rotas. 10

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There are also a number of wellbeing issues for the Force which include long hours (particularly in detective, Safeguarding, Protective Services Crime and Operational Support functions), dealing with traumatic images (e.g. within Abusive Image Units) or traumatic incidents (e.g. within the Major Collision Enquiry Team / Road Collisions Unit) and Mental Health which is now the biggest cause of sickness for the Force and source of referrals to the Force’s Occupational Health Unit.

9. Financial Threats

The graph below shows that crime and demand (particularly complex demand) have been steadily increasing during a time when both our workforce and financial resources have been reducing.

Since 2010 there has been a 35% reduction in funding, resulting in almost 1,400 fewer staff. On top of the £140m savings we have already delivered, our updated Medium Term Financial Forecast (which includes the Treasury’s recent Pensions Re-evaluation figures) predicts that a further £38.8 million permanent savings will need to be made over the next four years to 2022 / 23 – a figure which is equivalent to the recruitment of 1,232 new police constables.

The Force has responded positively to the increasing pressures we face. We have entered into collaboration to improve capabilities and make efficiencies, rationalised the estate to minimise the impact on the frontline and have significantly transformed the organisation in order to provide the best possible service we can to the diverse communities that we serve in order to keep people safe and feeling safe. We have also invested in digital policing technology and are exploring robotics and analytics in order to ensure that our officers are more accessible and visible in communities as well as being more efficient and productive.

However, given the predicted demand the pressures the Force is facing are becoming increasingly untenable. By 2021 we predict an additional 162,438 calls for service per year (of which 83,627 will be 999 calls), an additional 50,000 crimes per year (of which 25,000 will require secondary investigation), an additional 56,600 safeguarding transactions and an additional 1,346 Registered Sex Offenders. To meet this demand we predict we will need a significant increase in resources.

If we are to balance the need to invest in neighbourhood policing, investigate crime, safeguard vulnerable people and tackle serious and organised crime, all within the context of an increasing terrorism threat, we require funding that reflects the nature of the threat and risk we face. A

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED stand-still position, or indeed any further reductions of funding, will continue to significantly impact on the quality of service we are able to provide. This will lead to a more reactive service that struggles to get ahead of demand, fails to intervene early and is not able to problem solve long term issues in our communities, ultimately leading to potential failures in respect of tackling crime, providing reassurance and protecting the most vulnerable people in our society.

Our next step is to provide HMICFRS and the Home Office with an initial assessment of the additional resources we believe we will need to meet the additional demand we face, having considered the efficiency, productivity and transformational changes we will be making to reduce demand. This is imperative in order for the next Comprehensive Spending Review and policing settlement to be informed by a sound evidence base.

10. Overall complexities of West Yorkshire

As the fourth largest Force in the country, we police an extremely complex and diverse county . Around 10% of our wards (mainly in Leeds and Bradford) account for a quarter of all crime, have high levels of deprivation and are demand generators for a number of agencies. We have large BME populations and in 14 of our wards these communities account for more than 50% of the population. Given the diversity of our county, international political events such as conflicts, migration, terrorism, extremism and even Brexit can have an impact on community cohesion. This can and does lead to tensions, demonstrations and counter protests that we have to police. We have large student populations, particularly in Leeds, which can be vulnerable to crime, and conversely we have many rural areas which can feel isolated and detached.

The challenge is to tackle crime and reduce demand within the context of a place-based multi- agency approach but this is threatened by ongoing austerity. In addition, whilst the only way to reduce all agency demand long term is through an investment in early intervention , this is threatened by the need to reactively respond to the demand of today, rather than the preferred need to implement initiatives which will only bring the benefits in the much longer term.

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This section is about Responding to the Public and will focus on :

• Volume of Demand (requests for service) • Incident Response

The Section will explain each four elements of the Force Management Statement in relation to Responding to the Public:

• Step One –The gap between current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years. • Step Two – The current status of the workforce and other assets (their performance, condition, capacity, capability, serviceability, wellbeing and security of supply) in terms of responding to the demand types. • Step Three – The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating in particular focussing our on threat, harm and risk. • Step Four – The future demand we do not expect to be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making.

Introduction

Responding to the public and effectively managing demand is critical and underpins all priorities for the Force. As an emergency service it is critical that we respond quickly to calls for service (in particular emergency calls). There is a clear link between responding effectively to calls/attending incidents and victim satisfaction.

Executive Summary

• Overall calls for service have been increasing for some time, with sizeable increases in 999 calls. In addition to this, the complexity of calls is increasing with one in five incidents now relating to safeguarding issues. As a consequence of increased volume and complexity, attendance times at emergency and priority calls have been on a reducing trend. It is predicted that calls for service will continue to increase, most significantly around online contacts but also around 999 calls putting significant strain on call handlers, despatchers and frontline resources. • There are a number of capacity issues relating to demand, particularly around the retention of Customer Contact Centre (CCC) staff as this department experiences an approximate 30% staff turnover rate each year. Inexperience in CCC can negatively impact on call handling capacity and also the likelihood of recognising and responding to risk. The increasing demand around vulnerability, means CCC staff are spending longer times on calls and require broad skills sets. Despite the increasing demand, call handling performance in relation to 999 calls is

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED particularly strong due to significant focus in this area. We have a 0% abandonment rate on 999 calls over the last 10 months and the average queue time for 999 calls is 3.7 seconds. • In order to address the issues relating to increased calls, the Force is undertaking work to reduce avoidable demand (which involves work with partners as well as educating the public) and reducing repeat demand (by a focus on problem solving and focusing on the need to keep victims informed) as our research has indicated that as much as 30% of demand in the system is repeat demand. • The table below summarises: o Current demand o The potential 2021 demand based on statistical projections o Our professional judgement of the factors that will influence whether the potential projections will be realised and the resultant risk.

These issues will be explored in more detail, including an assessment of the demand we do not anticipate we will be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making.

Current Predicted Demand Demand Factors influencing demand 2017 2021 1,677,650 • Increased crime predicted Total Calls 1,515,212 (10.7% increase) • Austerity and impact on other services means the 497,360 999 413,733 public will continue to contact the police when (20.2% increase) other services are not available 875,181 101 951,454 • (2.5% increase) The Force will continue to deal the consequence of 136,560 someone in crisis (e.g. missing persons and On-line 86,208 (58.4% increase) mental health). Attendance 123,718 • Prioritisation of 999 over 101 may have the 117,039 (Emergencies) (5.7% increase) unintended consequence of callers dialling 999 to Attendance 151,297 136,915 ensure a response (Priorities) (10.5% increase) • Failure to keep people informed of their crime, incident or attendance is increasing repeat demand by as much as 30% • 4.2 Officers are deployed to an emergency Attendance 115,319 incident versus 2.7 for a priority incident 126,282 (Standards) (8.7% increase) • Online contacts predicted to increase given increasing prevalence of online in everyday life. Overall: Demand anticipated to increase in particular around 101 and 999 calls

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step One : The gap between current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years

The Force CCC handles 999 and 101 calls from the public as well as calls via other routes (direct dial) and online contacts. Long term increases in 999 calls have resulted in a shift in the call profile to more serious calls. This upward trend is forecasted to continue over the next four years with an additional 160,000 calls for service expected.

Volume of Demand

• Overall calls for service have been increasing for some time. In 2016/17 the Force received 1,500,705 calls, a 5.1% increase on the previous year with sizeable (8.3%) increases in 999 calls which now account for 26.8% of all calls, indicating the seriousness of calls is increasing. • CCC has an ethos of resolution at initial contact where possible and the below table highlights the proportion of incidents created from total calls for service that are sent for call handling by districts (999, 101, other and on-line contacts).

2016 2017 % Change Total Calls (999, 101, Other, On-Line) 1484915 1515212 2.0% Total Incidents 511105 535409 4.8% % Incidents Created 34.4% 35.3% 0.9%

• In 2017/18 calls for service have stabilised, however ongoing increases are reported for 999 calls (up 5%) and on-line contacts (up 22%) . The need to focus on rising volumes of 999 calls due to their critical nature may have implications for 101 call handling, although this is unaffected so far. • The volume of calls into the CCC continues to increase, with an additional 29,000 calls and 13,000 online contacts so far this year (2018) placing strain on call takers. • In addition to increasing volume, demand is increasing most significantly around vulnerability (mental health, missing persons, domestic abuse etc.) which are more complex to deal with. One in five incidents now relate to safeguarding , compared to one in six five years ago. Such calls take longer to resolve and affect call handling capacity, especially at peak times. In response to this, increases in demand complexity and unpredictability is a red risk on the Strategic Risk Register. • The table below shows the types of contact in 2017 where vulnerability was a potential factor. • Overall there has been a 5.3% increase in recorded vulnerable incidents (+6,714) and a 7.5% increase in recorded repeat vulnerable incidents (+5,380). • The proportion of vulnerable incidents which meet the repeat criteria (those incidents with an address which was also the location of a previous vulnerable incident in the 365 days previous to the date of the incident) increased by 1.2% from 57.0% to 58.2% in 2017 . • The Forces uses THRIVE (Threat, Harm, Risk, Investigation, Vulnerability and Engagement) not only in initial contact, but also within audit/feedback and review, as well as the National Decision Model where appropriate.

Emergency Priority Standard Total Domestic 27,769 14,276 26,111 68,156 Sexual Offence 489 1,688 4,789 6,966 Hate 981 1,113 4,987 7,081 Modern Slavery 2 20 38 60 HBV/Forced Marriage/FGM 41 83 184 308 Missing Persons 2,958 11,208 14,221 28,387 Mental Health 5,514 3,824 6,637 15,975 Harassment/Bullying 278 882 9,892 11,052 Vulnerable Incidents 36,904 32,008 63,590 132,502

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Measurement 2016 2017 +/- +/- % Vulnerable Incidents 125,788 132,502 6,714 5.3% Repeat Vulnerable Incidents 71,765 77,145 5,380 7.5% Repeat Rate 57.0% 58.2% 1.2%

• A significant amount of demand is not necessarily related to crime and disorder. However many of the demand issues Forces are dealing with (e.g. missing persons and mental health) are a consequence of someone’s vulnerability or the fact that someone is in crisis. • Online contacts continue to grow in terms of usage with a peak of 11,000+ contacts in December 2017 and 9000+ contacts in January 2018. The Force operates online reporting for (some) crime, lost property, anti-social behaviour, hate crime, as well as a web-chat function and a crime tracker, where a member of the public can check the progress of their report. • The volume of Public Enquiry Counters (PEC)/Help Desk calls amounts to 4,227 callers per week across the Force area, or 219,804 per year. This relates to external or public contacts, but there are an additional 193,741 internal police officer/staff contacts per year dealt with by PEC/Help Desk staff. • The chart below illustrates the high and broad level of demand the Force faces on a typical day.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Understanding Demand • Whilst the telephony system in West Yorkshire Police does allow for reporting in relation to volumes of call types (999, 101, online etc.) alongside waiting times, answer times and abandoned calls rates, the system cannot categorise the calls for service received at initial contact. • However a recent dip sample of 6,000 999 and 101 calls has helped understand demand for services. In relation to 999 calls, around 82% were categorised as a Police matter , 8% were categorised as a Non-Police matter and 10% were ‘Abandoned after answering’. • Non-Police matter calls related to nuisance (33%), Council (15%) or other organisations (12%) with all remaining calls relating to a wide variety of topics. • In relation to 101 calls, around nine out of 10 were categorised as a Police Matter • The table below shows the nature of calls categorised as a ‘Police Matter’ for both 999 and 101 calls.

Repeat Demand There is a significant amount of repeat demand in the system. Our own sampling tells us that 9.5% of 101 demand involves victims chasing an investigative update in relation to a previously reported crime. Clearly the role of the ‘Officer in the Case’ (OIC) is key here in keeping victims informed which would prevent the victims calling 101 to chase an update. This is a central principle of force level victim satisfaction work which is ongoing. • A further 17.5% of 101 demand involves callers providing seeking an update on a previously reported incident. Sometimes this will be to provide further information about an incident we have previously attended, but is often callers seeking an update on when we will actually attend an incident they have reported. Managing callers expectations, particularly when attendance is delayed, is vital and something we believe will improve as a result of the forthcoming Contact and Incident Review.

Incident Response • In terms of how the Force responds to incidents, there are over 100 separate incident types, which have been grouped in the table below to highlight key categories. • Overall there has been a 10.8% increase in recorded incidents (+67,285) in 2017; this has in part been ‘artificially’ inflated by new Force Crime Management Unit (FCMU) processes in scenarios where they have to create an incident to re-contact a victim (where CCC would not have done this previously). 17

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • A number of crime related incidents are showing increases and this in part reflects the Forces drive to improve crime recording standards, with an increasing number of calls for service now being finalised as a crime related incident. • Concern for Safety is an incident type in its own right and remains the single highest volume incident type, reflecting the continuing shift in policing to activities associated with safeguarding those who are most vulnerable in the community.

Incident Type 2016 2017 Change % Change Burglary 20372 22472 2100 10.3% Robbery 1955 2301 346 17.7% Violence/Assault/Weapon 45519 50424 4905 10.8% Public Order 9698 12406 2708 27.9% Sexual 4212 5268 1056 25.1% Theft of/from Vehicle 5558 17516 11958 215.1% Theft 13281 24121 10840 81.6% Criminal Damage 14826 26737 11911 80.3% Drugs 1595 1566 -29 -1.8% Fraud/Forgery 5506 5727 221 4.0% Other Crime 10818 15050 4232 39.1% No Crime Recorded 25261 31747 6486 25.7% Misper 19166 21254 2088 10.9% Concern for Safety 77459 79742 2283 2.9% Public Safety & Welfare 140987 146391 5404 3.8% Anti Social Behaviour 57763 59556 1793 3.1% Road Related 74775 74353 -422 -0.6% Alarms 8487 8347 -140 -1.6% Admin/Other 85876 85421 -455 -0.5% Total 623114 690399 67285 10.8% Grade 2016 2017 Change % Change Emergency 111950 117407 5457 4.9% Priority 133763 139000 5237 3.9% Standard 377401 434005 56604 15.0% Total 623114 690412 67298 10.8%

• There has also been a shift in the response profile with a greater proportion of incidents ‘attended’ requiring an emergency response . Whilst the table also reflects an increase in incidents graded as ‘Standard’, a significant proportion of these calls are ‘resolved without deployment’ and local analysis actually indicates that the volume of standard calls attended is falling over time. • The tables below show the proportion of emergency and priority incidents attended within 15 minutes and 60 minutes respectively, as well as the median response time and the time taken to attend 90% of incidents (excluding outliers). • Increased and more complex demand is impacting on the Force’s ability to attend emergency and priority calls in a timely manner and attendance times have been on a reducing trend over the last few years. In 2013/14 the Force attended 90.9% of emergency calls within 15 minutes and 90% of priority calls within 60 minutes. The table below shows that for Emergencies in 2016 this had reduced to 84.1% and further reduced to 80.7% by 2017 and for Priorities this had reduced to 78.6% in 2016, further reducing to 75% by 2017.

Emergency Response 2016 2017 Change % in Target 84.1% 80.7% -3.4% Median Response Time * 0:09:37 0:10:04 0:00:27 90% reached * 0:17:35 0:19:04 0:01:29 * excludes outliers over 10 hours 18

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Priority Response 2016 2017 Change % in Target 78.7% 75.0% -3.7% Median Response Time * 0:33:48 0:35:12 0:01:24 90% reached * 1:52:47 2:12:26 0:19:39 * excludes outliers over 24 hours

Predicted Demand

Calls for Service

• Based on recent trends, and assuming that 999 calls and on-line contacts continue to increase at the same rate over the next four years, the total number of calls for service are projected to increase by around 10.7% (+162,438) by the end of 2021. The biggest increases are predicted to be online contacts (as a result of greater technology to report crime) which is predicted to increase by 58.4% and 999 calls (20.2% increase). This will put significant strain on call handlers, despatchers and frontline resources. • 999 calls and 101 will inevitably increase as a result of the predicted increase in total crime (additional 50,000 crimes per year by 2021), which is assessed in more detail in Section 3. However, 999 calls are also likely to increase due to other factors including our excellent performance in this area (meaning the public may dial 999 instead of 101), our performance in relation to keeping people informed and the lack of service provision from partners when people are in crisis (vulnerability in particular is predicted to increase).

Total 999 calls projection (12 month rolling total) 600000 497,360 500000 413,733 400000

300000

200000

100000

0 Jul Jul 2021 Jul Jul 2020 Jul Jul 2019 Jul Jul 2018 Jul Jul 2017 Jul Jul 2016 Jan2022 Jan2021 Jan2020 Jan2019 Jan2018 Jan2017 Jan2016 Sep 2021 Sep 2020 Sep 2019 Sep 2018 Sep 2017 Sep 2016 Nov2021 Nov2020 Nov2019 Nov2018 Nov2017 Nov2016 Mar2021 Mar2020 Mar2019 Mar2018 Mar2017 Mar2016 May 2021 May 2020 May 2019 May 2018 May 2017 May 2016

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Incident Attendance

Although we resolve increasing numbers of Standard calls without deployment, statistical forecasting indicates a long term continuation of the upward trend in incident attendance for Emergency and Priority calls. Incident demand requiring attendance, at each Grade, is shown in the table below.

Attendances - 12m to Mar Change % Change by Grade 2016 2017 2021 2017-2021 2017-2021 Emergency 111665 117039 123718 6679 5.7% Priority 131961 136915 151297 14382 10.5% Standard 146413 126282 115319 -10963 -8.7% Total 390039 380236 390334 10098 2.7%

Step Two: The current status of the workforce and other assets in terms of responding to the demand types

Step One has shown that the volume and complexity of demand is increasing and is predicted to increase in the future. Whilst this is creating capacity issues for the Force in terms of responding to calls for service, performance within the CCC is generally positive.

Effectiveness

• Despite an increase in demand over the last 12 months, 999 performance has improved mainly due to a focus on this area. A performance manager scans for surges in 999 calls and will instruct call handlers to enter ‘999 only’ mode when required. Whilst focussing on criticality, this will have some impact on 101 performance. The Force currently answers 96% of 999 calls within 10 seconds with a 3.7 second average queue time. • Delays to 999s are within National Police Chief Council (NPCC) aspiration and the Force compares favourably not only with the its’ Most Similar Group of Forces (MSG) but with Forces generally. • The table below shows strong performance relating to 999s and the abandonment rate, with the abandonment rate for 101 being more problematic.

Date 999 abandoned 101 abandoned 999 answered Volume of rate rate within 10 seconds on-line 2016/17– Jan to Jan 0.03% 11.42% 94.22% 68992 2017/18 – Jan to Jan 0.00009% 11.77% 93.88% 86268

• As 999 calls have increased, 101 performance has been impacted by the CCC’s response to protecting the critical 999 service. • Satisfaction with ease of contact for those using the 999 number to report their crime or incident has remained relatively stable over time but there has been a marked decline over the last three years for those who have contacted the police via the non-emergency number (101), linked to increasing call volumes. • Victim satisfaction overall however, has been on a reducing trend for a number of years and is particularly influenced by attendance at calls and being kept informed of progress (see Section 3 - Investigations).

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Capacity and Capability

• The CCC has a Full Time Equivalent (FTE) of 185 staff but is permitted to recruit to 10% over this due to the high staff turnover rate it experiences. As a result, it has a current staffing level of 198.08 which is sufficient for current demand. This equates to 6892 calls per FTE for 2017. • There are a number of capacity issues relating to the management of demand. A critical one is approximate 30% turnover rate of staff as the CCC is a recruiting and training ground for other posts within the organisation. This can impact on the Unit in terms of experience, with a consequential impact on call handling capacity; for instance an experienced call handler can deal with up to nine calls per hour whereas an inexperienced handler may only deal with up to five per hour. There is an overall benefit of this to the Force as CCC are in effect providing training of staff that other functions will benefit from. As an example, CCC staff, in the last year, have secured roles as Police Officers and Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) as well as roles within Protective Services Crime, Force Command Hub, National Police Air Service (NPAS) and as Detention Officers. Measures have been put in place to delay releases to other Units, so minimising impacts on initial contact. • Exit interviews indicate that these moves are pay, progression, or geographically driven. However, the high turnover of staff means that the CCC is particularly is affected by a lack of experience in role. • A capability challenge for the CCC is that it conducts all its own recruitment, assessment and training for the new staff required as a result of the turnover described above. Two CCC staff are permanently seconded to Information Technology (IT) Training for this purpose. Refresher training of existing staff is also challenging as there is no protected learning time built into the CCC shift pattern, adopted several years ago to bring greater coverage and efficiencies. • The increase in demand complexity is creating capacity and capability issues as the length of time to deal with such incidents requires new skills and expertise. This in turn requires officers to be allocated for longer periods which reduces those available to meet live-time demand. Officer and PCSOs are being deployed to an increasing number of incidents. In 2014/15 the average number of incidents attended per constable/PCSO was 111, however this has risen to 117 in 2017. • West Yorkshire has led the way nationally in relation to online and alternative contact options, being the first Force to adopt Web-Chat. This shift is essential if the Force is to become easier to contact and can move some peak demand into a channel that we have more control over. • Other technology is also helping to address demand. For example, the CCC utilises a limited function auto-attendant which can field up to 600 calls per day by way of key press options. On this system we can “spin” in real time messages which may relate to incidents on the motorway for example or at peak/busy times, the system can be utilised to advertise our on-line functions.

Step Two: The Wellbeing of the Workforce in meeting the demand

Call handling is becoming increasingly demanding due to the increase in calls relating to mental health issues and the expectation that a call handler can resolve many calls at source in order to make efficiency/resourcing gains for the Organisation as well as potentially offering a better service to the public. Due to this, staff welfare has never been as important as it currently is:

• Current sickness within CCC is 4.4% which is above the Force average but largely due to a flu outbreak at the start of the year which has skewed the figures. This figure has been as low as 2.3% within the last 12 months which is a good wellbeing indicator. By the end of the year the plan is to move CCC onto the Force Standard Duty Rota (FSDR) shift pattern which should further enhance wellbeing. • Within the Unit there is a Wellbeing Team consisting of staff from all three teams, who promote health and wellbeing along with Force wellbeing initiatives. • Staff who leave the Department complete exit interviews to ascertain why they are leaving in order to identify any trends in terms of barriers or hindrances to health and wellbeing. There is

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED also a Staff Forum, where staff can raise issues individually or in a group at the earliest opportunity. • ‘Well Pharmacy’ have been consulted to identify whether what the Force does is industry best practice. There are also inputs from the Force Wellbeing Officer which are shared with staff and circulated not only within CCC but across the Force. • There are regular “deep cleans” of the Unit which not only assists in infection control but is very welcomed by staff despite the inconvenience in having to work from a different location whilst the work is completed. Minor processes such as this can have a significant impact on staff health and wellbeing. • The unit deals with some very difficult callers and circumstances and we provide support after these as well as considering the use of Occupational Health Unit (OHU) where appropriate. This is very much welcomed and utilised on occasion by staff.

Step Three: The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating in particular focussing our on threat, harm and risk

Steps One and Two have illustrated that demand is increasing in volume and complexity and that attendance times are reducing. There is a real need to reduce demand and/or deal with it more efficiently moving forward, otherwise call handling and frontline staff will not be able to meet the demand faced. As a result the Force will:

• Continue to constantly review ways to deal with “avoidable” demand and demand that does not belong to the police. This includes signposting Council based calls to the correct source via our website and liaising with Social Services and partners for repeat callers with mental health issues, which appear more and more significantly in our demand profile and can generate up to 100 calls per day on occasion. We have had some success in assisting Officers and Social Services in determining that these callers get the help they need, even if this means use of secure facilities. • Continue to constantly reduce repeat demand in the system. Better efforts by officers to keep people informed would reduce demand and improve victim satisfaction. District Control Room (DCR) staff also need to contact members of the public where there is an expected delay in attendance in order to prevent the public from calling 101 repeatedly. We also have plans for a pilot with Wakefield Council to better share information on repeat callers (and demand) that if successful it is hoped could be rolled out to other Councils within West Yorkshire. • In terms of the pressures on CCC , we will continue to recruit to 10% over its establishment to build in a ‘buffer’ for the turnover issues it experiences. We are also exploring a concept from Thames Valley Police whereby an online crime report completed by a victim can be directly interfaced to Niche, reducing the amount of ‘double keying’ required by CCC agents. The scope and quality of our online reporting facility could be expanded to better signpost people to advice or reporting methods that do not impact on CCC. To this end, we are exploring how Merseyside Police allow Road Traffic Collisions (RTCs) to be reported. • CCC is a strong user of social media to manage public expectations and raise awareness. Infographs are used to portray demands from certain days and likely 101 delays based on peak times. Regular messaging also occurs about when (and when not) to contact the police. CCC leaders and supervisors regularly attend forums such as Neighbourhood Watch and PACT (Police and Communities Together) meetings across the force to promote awareness about its provision, challenges etc. Community groups frequently visit the CCC for this purpose. However a significant campaign needs to be undertaken to prevent demand coming into the CCC that is not related to policing. Such calls mean that the CCC cannot focus on those people who really need the help of the police. • The force is seeking a new Customer Records Management (CRM) system which would speed up incident recording and provide better information about callers. A new Workforce Management System is also being explored. • The FCMU was instigated in October 2016 to record incoming crime reports and provide a corporate, evidence-based assessment process for such crime. Newly reported serious crime 23

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED is automatically allocated to Crime teams for investigation but all other crime is screened according to THRIVE, solvability and proportionality principles. This screening process establishes whether a crime can be resolved via a primary investigation in the FCMU or needs to be allocated (‘screened-in’) to a district resource for secondary investigation. Prior to the FCMU, 72% of all such crime was screened-in, but this has reduced to approximately 50% of late, representing a significant efficiency improvement for the Force. Recognising recent increased crime demands on the FCMU, an investment of ten further officers has been agreed and these will also be Digital Media Investigators (DMI) to enhance force capability in this regard. • A Force Contact and Incident Review has yielded a business case which was approved in December 2017 and is being implemented now. October 2018 will see the CCC, five DCRs and the district telephone management functions merged into one Contact Management department, working alongside the FCMU. This corporate function will operate across two sites and bring greater opportunities to address demand at the point of source and without deployment. If all business benefits are realised it provide a better service to callers / victims, reduce delays, better manage public expectations and release frontline capacity.

Step Four: The future demand we do not expect to be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making

Step One has predicted that the number of calls for service are predicted to increase by 162,438 calls, of which 83,627 are predicted to be 999 calls. The consequences of this are:

• Without significant investment in CCC the Force will be unable to maintain the strong performance we have around 999 calls. The increase will also put increasing pressure on call handlers, who already have high turnover rates. The net effect of not being able to manage 999 calls as effectively would impact on confidence and satisfaction. • Whilst the Force needs to prioritise and ensure strong performance around 999, a lack of focus on 101 may have the unintended consequence of not only increasing repeat demand, but also diverting that demand pressure to 999. • Incidents requiring emergency attendance are predicted to increase by 6,679 (5.7% increase) and incidents requiring priority attendance by 14,382 (10.5%). Whilst standards are expected to reduce, it is infeasible that the Force with the current resources it has available would be able to respond in a timely way to this demand. As a result and in particular for emergency calls, there is risk to the public and the expectation is that victim satisfaction would deteriorate. • The significant increase in demand in particular the need to respond to emergencies will threaten the new Neighbourhood Policing Model and our commitment to dedicated Neighbourhood Policing Team (NPT) Staff. Given the increasing pressure on response it will also threaten the great strides we have made to ensure that all Officers perceive themselves as problem solvers and investigators, as they simply won’t have the time, potentially leading to the re-emergence of a culture that is about just dealing with the demand we face, rather than resolving it.

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This section is about the Force’s prevention, deterrence and community-based activities and will focus on:

• Neighbourhood Policing and our preventative approach to reducing demand • The demographics of the Force and how this links to demand • How demand is distributed across the Force area • Variation of actual and predicted demand, drawing on London School of Economics (LSE) analysis.

The Section will explain each four elements of the Force Management Statement in relation to prevention and deterrence:

• Step One –The gap between current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years • Step Two – The current status of the workforce and other assets (their performance, condition, capacity, capability, serviceability, wellbeing and security of supply) in terms of responding to the demand types. • Step Three – The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating in particular focussing our on threat, harm and risk. • Step Four – The future demand we do not expect to be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making.

Introduction

Providing Reassurance is one of the five purposes of the Force’s Policing Strategy with a strong focus on Neighbourhood Policing and improving confidence in policing. One of the big drivers of confidence is being visible and tackling the problems that matter to communities; issues which are primarily achieved through Neighbourhood Policing. This is a key priority for the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC), who has a pledge to support frontline policing and PCSOs, and has a priority in the Police and Crime Plan around Tackling Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB). The Force has a Strategic Plan in place to address the threats and risks around Reassurance, which primarily focus on Neighbourhood Policing, Early Intervention, Anti-Social Behaviour and Public Confidence. The Plan also includes any relevant Areas for Improvement (AFIs) from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary Fire and Rescue Service (HMICFRS).

Executive Summary

• Overall demand is predicted to increase. In response to this we are shifting our emphasis to upstream prevention through an investment in neighbourhood policing, early intervention, problem solving and community engagement. This will create long term efficiencies for us as the cost of late intervention is significant and often tends to be police centric as we deal with people in crisis.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • Whilst there has been a significant and long term investment from partners in prevention, anti- social behaviour, neighbourhood management and community safety generally, austerity has had an impact with some services such as youth provision and diversion reducing significantly. There is a real threat that ongoing austerity will lead to further withdrawal, as partners align diminishing resources to address threat, harm and risk. The sheer volume of anti-social behaviour, the complexity of high crime areas and the numbers of troubled families presents capacity issues. • Due to austerity measures and increased threats in safeguarding, our focus on prevention and neighbourhood policing has reduced. However we are now significantly reinvesting in these areas and looking ahead to future generations, through our approach to early intervention. A focus on high crime, high demand wards and ‘at risk’ people is critical if we are to reduce the volume of demand. • The table below summarises: o Current demand o The potential 2021 demand based on statistical projections o Our professional judgement of the factors that will influence whether the potential projections will be realised and the resultant risk. • These issues will be explored in more detail, including an assessment of the demand we do not think we will be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making.

Current Predicted Demand Demand Factors influencing demand 2017 2021 • Focus on preventing crime/ASB upstream through Neighbourhood Policing, Early Intervention and Community Engagement should reduce ASB/Crime in the long term and reduce demand on all agencies. • The increased focus on engagement, accessibility, problem solving and visibility may encourage reporting and increase ASB 61,632 65,533 demand that may previously have been unreported. • Austerity has impacted on partnership work and may lead to further withdrawal of partnership commitment/initiatives. Overall Demand – expect to be stable or increase marginally in the long term due to long term problem solving and early intervention • Confidence expected to improve with increased NPT presence in communities. However, increased volume of demand and complexity threatens delivery of NPT model and Public long term focus on problem solving and Early Intervention. Stable Stable Confidence • Resources dedicated to NPT is still significantly less than pre- austerity and may not be able to deliver the kind of neighbourhood policing the public expect. Overall – confidence expected to remain stable/improve • 36 Partnership Working Areas (PWAs) account for 40% of all crime. • Socio economic factors influence crime demand. Unemployment is reducing, but there are high levels of deprivation in high crime wards and also people experiencing multiple disadvantage. Crime 288,807 309,605 • 300 Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) in top 10% deprivation index (mainly Leeds and Bradford). These are demand generators for the Force. • Focus on repeat locations and high demand areas within a problem solving context will help reduce demand. Overall – slowing down of increases in crime is anticipated. Problem solving should lead to longer term reductions. 26

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step One: The gap between current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years

Distribution of Crime and indices of Deprivation

• The chart below shows how crime is distributed across each District. It shows that a large proportion of crime is committed in a small number of Partnership Working Areas (PWAs) in West Yorkshire. Around four in every ten crimes are committed in seven of the 36 PWAs

o Bradford East o Huddersfield o Leeds Inner East o Bradford South o Bradford West o Leeds City o Leeds Inner South

• The map below shows the distribution and concentration of crime across West Yorkshire .

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • The PWAs vary in size and population and are therefore likely to account for higher proportions of crime. However, there are also socio-economic factors which influence crime rates and these need to be understood in terms of predicting future demand. • Around 10% of wards account for over a quarter of all crime committed . These wards have high levels of deprivation and are demand generators for a number of agencies. • Office for National Statistics (ONS) labour market statistics show that unemployment rates have dropped over the past year and the national average unemployment rate is 4.3% for those aged 16 and over. In West Yorkshire figures are reducing but are higher than the national average ranging from 3.7% in Calderdale up to 6.1% in Bradford. Seven constituencies in West Yorkshire are in the top quintile (3.6% to 9.9%) for the unemployment rate: o Bradford East (5.4%) o Bradford South (3.9%) o Bradford West (6.9%) o Leeds Central (5.3%) o Leeds East (4.6%) o Leeds West (4.1%) o Huddersfield (3.9%). • West Yorkshire continues to have some significant areas of deprivation with nearly 300 Lower Super Output Areas (LSOA) in the top 10% most deprived areas . 56% (70) wards have at least one LSOA in the top 10% deprived index. However there are some wards which have significant deprivation. In Bradford Moor 90% of the LSOAs are deprived, in Little Horton it is 91.7% and in Manningham it is 100%. These wards are therefore particularly complex and face challenges from a multi-agency perspective. In a report from Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Bradford was identified as one of the cities in most decline (9th out of 74). • The Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) population is increasing in West Yorkshire and currently stands at 18.2%, significantly higher than the England and Wales average of 14.0%. The highest rate remains in Bradford where the population is made up of 32.6% BME followed by Kirklees at 20.9%. There are 14 wards in West Yorkshire with a BME population of over 50% (10 in Bradford, two in Kirklees, one in Calderdale and one in Leeds). This contrasts significantly with Wakefield which has a reducing BME population of 4.5% with some wards having less than 2% of the population from a BME background. Net migration brings with it cultural values and norms which add to the complexities of communities. Current methods of policing may not enable effective prevention and deterrence against crimes targeted or coming from new and emerging groups. In addition lower levels of confidence from the BME population poses challenges when trying to recruit a workforce which is representative of the communities we police. • Research shows that children who are exposed to domestic violence, experience abuse or neglect or whose parent’s struggle with mental health or substance misuse problems are more likely to have behavioural/mental health problems later in life or become involved in crime or violence. These Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) can have an inter-generational impact and if left unchecked will continue to create demand for agencies and poor outcomes for children and families. The higher the combination of ACEs, the more likely it is there will be negative outcomes. Identifying and focussing on those families with numerous ACEs through early intervention could have an impact on demand long term. • Children suffering from multiple disadvantages are more likely to be in local authority care, have mental health and substance misuse issues, come from a background of criminal/anti- social behaviour in the family and are more likely to offend. Looked after children make up less than 1% of all children, but have a much higher likelihood of entering custody. Vulnerable children are more likely to have witnessed domestic abuse. In West Yorkshire children are present in 30% of cases and this according to research is the single best predictor of future involvement of domestic abuse.

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• College of Policing research identifies that children who offend before the age of 14 are more likely to become violent offenders when they are older and have a longer criminal career. • West Yorkshire is currently managing 7,889 families as part of the Troubled Family Initiative . Since the inclusion criteria was amended, many more families are eligible for inclusion and this causes capacity issues for providing meaningful intervention. • ONS data shows that the number of looked after children is increasing in West Yorkshire despite a recent decrease in the Yorkshire and the Humber Region. The number of Children with Child Protection Plans and Children in Need Plans are also increasing. These children are particularly vulnerable to going missing, at risk of Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (CSEA) and broader exploitation.

Predicted Demand

• The Force has used LSE analysis to help us make predictions of demand for every output area (OA). The LSE draw on a number of variables including socio-economic data. In order to make a comparison of the predicted demand to actual demand, this data was aggregated up to PWA level. As not all PWA boundaries are coterminous with the OA boundaries, the population-weighted centroid was used to determine which PWA the OA best fit into. • Comparisons were made between the predicted demand and the actual recorded demand during 2017 for recorded crime, incidents, emergency and priority incidents (opening or closing grade), anti-social behaviour and missing person reports. This comparison was based on the PWA profile, i.e. the proportion of total demand in each PWA area. • Using the variation from predicted to actual, it was possible to identify any PWAs which were significantly different to the predicted data (above or below the predicted profile), using the standard deviation of the variation to determine significance. Generally speaking the variations were minor and only significant in a small number of PWAs. • The following charts/maps show the demand profile for recorded crime and anti-social behaviour and for each district and each PWA. Any significant variations at PWA level are highlighted.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Recorded Crime

The red areas on the Map (Bradford South, Bradford East and Leeds Inner East) have crime levels which are a significant variation from the LSE predicted demand and require more focus and understanding.

Anti-Social Behaviour

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• The red areas on the Map (Bradford South, Bradford East and Batley and Spenborough) have anti-social behaviour levels which are a significant variation from the predicted demand of the LSE. Two of these (Bradford South and Bradford East) also had significant variations around crime levels.

Demand associated with Neighbourhood Policing

Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB)

• Over the last year, the force experienced a 5.1% increase in ASB incidents. The Force attends at over half of all incidents (32,000) which presents significant demand. • There are 877 locations across the Force that have reported at least five incidents of ASB in the six months to August 2017. These are high demand generators for the Force and require multi-agency problem solving. • At Force level the biggest increase in ASB is in the category of Youth Related (16%) and Littering/Drugs Paraphernalia (13.3%).

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Predicted Anti-Social Behaviour Demand Statistical forecasting predicts that the numbers of ASB incidents are expected to increase over the next four years. However, there are a number of factors that make this uncertain: • Long term focus on preventing crime/ASB upstream through Neighbourhood Policing, Early Intervention and Community Engagement should reduce ASB/Crime in the long term as we deal with issues more holistically and reduce demand on all agencies. • The increased focus on engagement, accessibility, problem solving and visibility may however encourage previously hidden demand as people become more confident to report to the police. • Whilst there has been a significant investment in NPTs, the numbers of ASB and crime reported present capacity issues. • Austerity has impacted on partnership work and may lead to further withdrawal of partnership commitment/initiatives.

Public Confidence • The two charts below highlight the stable trend in Public Confidence in West Yorkshire based on the latest results from the Crime Survey England and Wales (CSEW) alongside the latest Confidence results obtained through local perception surveys.

• Public confidence has been reducing over the last few years as it is driven by visibility, accessibility and tackling the issues that matter to communities, achieved primarily by NPTs. • A stable trend for public confidence is predicted as whilst the reinvestment in NPTs should help drive up public confidence, the numbers are much less than pre-austerity and is unlikely to deliver the brand of neighbourhood policing the public expect. The NPT model and long term focus on problem solving and early intervention may be threatened if demand and in particular complex demand increases.

Total Crime Demand

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• Based on current trends, the numbers of crimes recorded are expected to increase over the coming years. • We predict that the rate of increase is likely to slow and potentially stabilise, with volumes in 2020/21 being around 19% higher than in 2017 (309,606 offences).

Step Two: The Current Status of the Workforce and other Assets in terms of responding to the demand types

Performance/Effectiveness

• In 2016, the Force was graded by HMICFRS as ‘Requires Improvement’ for Preventing Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour. • Over the last year, the Force has made significant progress and invested in Neighbourhood Policing, Problem Solving and Early Intervention. This shift to a more upstream, preventative approach has been recognised by HMICFRS, and the most recent inspection in October 2017 graded the Force as ‘GOOD’ in this area. • In the most recent Police Efficiency Effectiveness and Legitimacy (PEEL) Inspection, HMICFRS issued a national recommendation identifying a cause for concern that forces are not able to demonstrate that the use of stop and search powers is consistently reasonable and fair. In particular there was concern that there is over representation of BME people and black people in particular in stop and search data. In terms of West Yorkshire we are improving our understanding of the nature of the problem. • The following table shows performance of the Force in relation to areas associated with reassurance/neighbourhood policing:

Anti-Social Behaviour • According to the CSEW, 55.9% of respondents in West Yorkshire agree that the Police and Council are dealing with the anti-social behaviour and crime issues that matter in the local area. This is 5 th highest rating in the MSG and is 29 th nationally. • According to the CSEW, Perceptions of ASB at 8.0% in West Yorkshire are the lowest in the MSG and are 21 st lowest nationally. • Victim Satisfaction in relation to ASB currently stands at 68.8%. Public Confidence • West Yorkshire has the 6th highest confidence rating in the MSG and is 33rd nationally.

District Resource Allocation Formula: Area Index of Demand (AID+)

• The Force utilises a ‘ District Resource Allocation Formula’ to support its decision-making in relation to the level of resource and support provided to local areas. The results of the formula are also then subject to professional assessments as to whether unique operational factors should also impact on the level of resources allocated to each District area. • The resource allocation formula utilised by the Force is termed AID+ . The development of AID (Area Index of demand) has been a joint project by the LSE, HMICFRS and NPCC to understand the drivers of demand. It is premised on analysis that suggests 80% of crime is predictable based on the makeup of an area. Whilst the AID model was in development the Force were sufficiently aware of the model to build a proxy that reflected the demand based on volume and vulnerability but balanced this with existing demand by including weighted crime and non-crime calls for service. This AID+ model therefore reflects the existing and anticipated demand generated according to the level of vulnerability, offending and demographics associated with District. • The AID+ model has been subsequently considered against the LSE AID with the results being similar. AID+ is currently refreshed on a quarterly basis for the Chief Officer Team (COT),

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED however this is essentially to assess current resource allocation against the model and does not generally result in changes in resource allocation across districts in the short term. • The AID+ plus model has been utilised locally to ascertain the level of resource required within each Neighbourhood area, however allocation and distribution of resources within each District is determined by the local Senior Leadership teams rather than by Headquarters or the COT.

Neighbourhood Policing Resources

• West Yorkshire Police has always been committed to Neighbourhood Policing, seeing this as the ‘bedrock’ of service delivery , to prevent crime and anti-social behaviour and be more accessible and visible to our communities in order to improve confidence and secure trust. • However, as a result of austerity , coupled with increasing threats around vulnerability (e.g. missing persons and CSEA) and the need to respond to increasing call volume and complexity, there has been a disinvestment in neighbourhood policing (reflecting a national trend) and a number of structural changes to our Neighbourhood Policing delivery model/functions. • In 2011 Response and NPT functions were different entities with distinct supervision and reporting lines that ensured clear distinction of priorities and team focus. However in responding to austerity and through the introduction of a leaner leadership spine, Neighbourhood Policing and Response were more closely integrated . Between 2011 and February 2016 there was a 22.5% reduction of first and second line managers within Neighbourhood Policing. In addition to changes in supervision, both Constable and PCSO resources in Neighbourhoods have also reduced by 16.17% overall. • The graph below shows the change in budgeted posts within Neighbourhood Policing between August 2011 and March 2017.

Neighbourhood Policing and Response Establishments

FTEs 2011 2015 2016 PCs /Ward Officers 983.18 831.12 237 PCSO 732.42 597.17 565 TOTAL NPT 1716.60 1428.29 802 Response 897.35 971.14 1389.47

• The table above shows the significant reductions in NPT capacity between 2011 and 2016, as a result of austerity, but also investment in safeguarding and response in order to meet growing call complexity/demand (see Sections 1 and 4). • Whilst in 2015 the level of resources working within Neighbourhood Policing had reduced significantly it was still possible to maintain Neighbourhood and Response policing as distinct functions, with separate supervision structures. • By 2016 however, Neighbourhood establishments reduced further along with supervision and new structures ( Neighbourhood Patrol) were put in place . Officer establishments increased

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED as PCs moved to a new five team shift pattern providing 24 hour coverage, seven days a week under each District’s New Operating Model. At the same time Ward Officers and PCSOs adopted a slight variation to the FSDR shift pattern but retained the same rest day pattern, working six shifts followed by four rest days. This change in shift pattern necessitated a move to ‘blended’ supervision arrangements slightly different in each District. • During the same time period the organisation as a whole has faced a period of unprecedented change, which has had an impact on Neighbourhood Policing delivery . For example the removal of Volume Crime Teams, has resulted in Patrol and Neighbourhood Constables now managing higher volumes of criminal investigations. The high level of call demand has also prevented neighbourhood policing resources from working closely with communities to carry out problem solving activity and prevent demand. • As a consequence, the 2016 HMICFRS PEEL Inspection graded the Force as Requires Improvement for Preventing Crime and ASB with a number of AFIs. These included the management of staff abstractions from NPTs, more effective engagement with local communities, adoption of structured and consistent problem solving, evaluation of best practice to tackle crime and ASB and ensuring staff are fully trained in ASB legislation. • In response a Neighbourhood Policing Review was undertaken in 2017 running concurrently with a collaboration with the Early Intervention Foundation around embedding Early Intervention within the Force. The Review identified that the current resourcing model for Neighbourhood Policing was not sustainable, given that incident and crime demand was significantly increasing and our capacity to deal with it was being stretched. • This has led to the creation of a new Neighbourhood Policing Strategy focusing on community engagement, problem solving and prevention and early intervention as the three pillars of Neighbourhood Policing. In March 2018 we launched our enhanced Neighbourhood Policing Model , which has an additional 100 Police Constables, six Inspectors and 13 Sergeants dedicated to NPTs. These additional resources have been equipped with problem solving skills and skills to identify signals of risk so that they can intervene early to reduce harm and reduce demand.

New Neighbourhood Model and Resources

• The significant re-investment in neighbourhood policing in each District is detailed below. • Whilst this is an extremely positive move, the numbers are significantly less than pre-austerity numbers and the Force is unlikely to be able to deliver the kind of neigbourhood policing that the public expect. • In an attempt to protect NPTs an abstractions policy has been agreed to ensure minimal abstraction so that Officers are committed to delivering the three pillars of neighbourhood policing.

District PCs PC Increase Sgts Sgt Increase Insps Insp Increase PCSOs Total

Leeds 107 12 27 0 6 5 240 380 Bradford 80 30 18 8 6 0 147.6 251.6 Kirklees 49 24 12 4 4 0 85.52 150.52 Wakefield 41 17 9 0 3 1 77 130 Calderdale 27 17 6 1 2 0 54 89 Total 304 100 72 13 21 6 604.12 1,001.12

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Partnership Resources to Preventative Work • The role of partners is critical in terms of prevention and deterrence, and our preventative neighbourhood model cannot be successful without an integrated, multi-agency place-based approach. Over the years there has been investment into partnerships and initiatives aimed at reducing crime and anti-social behavior and improving community safety. It has been difficult to ascertain from Local Authorities their current investment in this area and any planned changes. However, what is evident is that as a result of continued austerity, the resources dedicated to community safety have reduced over the last four years. Whilst the situation has slightly improved for the police (flat-cash settlement), Local Authorities face continued austerity measures. This threatens the sustainability of some of the services/initiatives around prevention and neighbourhood policing . • The table below illustrates some of the current partnership work and commitment around community safety, anti-social behavior and preventative approaches. It does not cover the partnership commitment around safeguarding, crime, offender management or serious crime, as these are covered in relevant sections.

ASB Team At this time there are no known or anticipated changes to the core structure. There are plans to build a Street Intervention Team to tackle street based ASB and crime related matters. This may have an impact on the ASB structure as some of the resource may have to support that work

YOT YOS has made savings of £2.3M over the past 5 years. Capacity has

reduced but success in reducing the numbers of First Time Entrants to the criminal justice system has mitigated this impact. The YOS operates 3 area-based teams alongside a specialist citywide Leeds interventions team and a small team based at the Youth Court. Youth Inclusion Targeted intervention programme for young people at risk of offending between the ages of 8 and 13. Funding reduced considerably over the last few years. Youth Work Targeted Youth work previously delivered across all wards. In 2010/11 the budget available for the delivery of work was approximately £4.4m. For 16/17 the budget is £1.65m (37% of 2010/11 budget).

Area Based work Deletion of Area Community Safety Co-ordinators and Neighbourhood Manager posts impacting on partnership preventative work. Specific initiatives around homelessness, public safety and on-street prostitution supported by police and partners potentially at risk. ASB Interventions Support from Local Authority in dissuading individuals from engaging/persisting in ASB. Education Increases awareness of and improved outcomes in relation to Safeguarding Hub Prevent, CSEA, Cyber-crime awareness, Healthy relationships and Behaviours Safer Schools Funded 50% by Education, Police Officers/PCSOs work in all

secondary schools aimed at reducing criminality, improving Bradford confidence/trust in police and investigating school-based and related crime Operation Mineral Partnership initiative with schools providing bespoke training packages around weapons, drugs CSEA, cyber-crime etc. Early Help and Provides referral pathways for early help so that families who do not Early Help Panel meet the threshold for Child Protection Statutory Intervention can be offered support.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Stronger Police-led but co-located with the Local Authority to build relationships Communities with key community contacts and faith leaders and to problem solve Team on-going tensions. Community With partners building social resilience to prevent ASB and crime Alcohol related to youth alcohol intake. Partnership ASB driving Education of parents to improve driving standards using primary education school children in Police uniforms. Supported by the Police, Council Wardens and Schools Youth Four PCs work in this team which has adopted Early Intervention in its Intervention Team most pure form looking at young people exhibiting concerning behaviour that is not yet manifesting on our conventional demand profile Kirklees ASB There are 10 Community and Environmental Support Officer (CESO) posts that conduct patrols to prevent ASB hotspots through environmental management, three Local Authority employed Community Safety Officers and three Safer Neighbourhoods Officers all focussed on ASB. Gang Workers Three gang workers are employed through the Partnership to collect intelligence, deliver inputs to schools and youth groups and arrange diversionary activities. Their scope is fairly limited at this early stage however they will become instrumental in collecting evidence for breaches of gang injunctions and referral to the Multi Agency Gang Strategy which holds a range of prevention and diversionary pathways. Partnership Hub This partnership team consists of police and a wide range of partner staff. Its focus is on a partnership response to reducing crime and ASB in the District with an increasing focus on early intervention. The strength of this partnership problem solving team has been reduced by 20% as a result of austerity cuts.

ASB Team This comprises five ASB Council Case Officers, which is a significant

reduction in resource compared to 2013. The team tackles ASB, and applies for a variety of orders when necessary. The Team works closely with NPT Teams. Neighbourhood Local partnership problem solving groups to tackle crime and ASB Co-ordination issues in local communities. Prior to austerity, representation at these meetings meetings also included Troubled Families, Early Help Hubs, Schools, Mental Health, Health, and Adult Social Care. One of the most notable effects has been the reduction in Youth Services and whilst some work has been picked up by the Voluntary Sector, there has Wakefield been an overall reduction in capacity to deliver partnership prevention work with young people. Integrated Early Hubs provide early support to families who are experiencing difficulties Help Hubs before they become entrenched in crime, truancy, domestic abuse or poverty. However, due to a significant reduction in resources, in recent years, their work has become much more focused on families that already reach the ‘Troubled Families’ threshold rather than supporting families before they reach this threshold. Community There are two CAPs which are predominantly run by local schools and Alcohol Community Health. These groups aim to raise the awareness of Partnerships young people of the dangers of drug and alcohol abuse and the links (CAPs) to crime. Change Grow Live are also a commissioned drug and alcohol service for young people aged 18 and under, working with the

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Youth Offending Team (YOT) to provide specialist substance misuse interventions. YOT/Youth Work YOT has a dedicated family practitioner that works closely with families where children are at potential risk of harm and this person is also a Child Exploitation and Online Protection (CEOP) Ambassador and any learning/updates from this role are shared across the team. The Youth Work Team also undertake detached youth work and can be tasked to meet with a group of children who may frequent a particular area where intelligence indicates they may be at risk. Liaison and Liaison and Diversion manages out of court (voluntary) disposals – the Diversion main aim of the service is to keep young people out of the criminal justice system and from ending up with a criminal record. WIFI This is an early intervention initiative funded by the lottery to provide support individuals who have multiple problems around homelessness, drug/alcohol addiction, reoffending and mental ill- health Community This is a small Local Authority Team covering a breadth of community Safety Team safety issues. The Council has a strong and professional approach to Community Safety but is hampered by limited resources The Authority does fund 15 Community Wardens ASB and Addresses the most vulnerable victims (caused by ASB) and Vulnerability persistent perpetrators. Calderdale Safer, Cleaner, Multi agency partnership meetings, originally set up around eight Greener Partnership Working areas. During austerity this has shrunk to four, however without detriment to partnership arrangements. Early Intervention Four panels mirror the Safer Cleaner Greener localities. Strong Panels partnership attendance but some concerns across the partnership as to the capacity of partnership resources to deliver timely Early Intervention (EI). EI panels have moved to streamline cases due to reduced EI resources under austerity. Partnership is exploring opportunities to relook at EI caseload/panel arrangements alongside Neighbourhood EI Strategy

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Other Capacity and Capability issues

• The HMICFRS inspection in 2016 identified a number of capability issues for the Force, including the lack of problem solving training across the Force and a cultural issue around problem solving not being part of officers’ roles outside of neighbourhood policing. Whilst this is now being addressed there are capacity issues in terms of our ability to roll out problem solving and early intervention training beyond NPTs and adopt the whole force approach that all functions are problem solvers. • The growth within Neighbourhood Policing Teams could leave Patrol Teams with high numbers of Student Officers . Districts are aware of the need to ensure that the balance of officers across Local Policing functions is right to ensure that teams have effective ratios of student officers to experienced officers. However, due to the large recruitment process that is currently underway in the organisation, large numbers now make up the basis of the Patrol Teams. Even though this has the benefit of bringing diversity into the organisation, it leaves Patrol Teams in the position where they are not fully trained/experienced to deal with the requirements of the role. This will need to be continually monitored as we increase our numbers through the rise in the Council Tax precept. • There is a risk in relation to the Voluntary Exit Scheme for Officers with the potential to lose experienced Neighbourhood Ward officers in the process if their specific skill set is not recognised. It is acknowledged that our Neighbourhood Teams have a high percentage of new officers and this could increase with the uplift of resources being allocated to this area of business. It is important that we retain sufficient experience to ensure that our new staff have the necessary support to develop the required skills. The Force will need to consider the skills requirements and demands across the Force in relation to approvals. • If we are to reduce the intergenerational cycle of vulnerability and crime, we need to identify those people who are at risk. Research shows that if we prevent Adverse Childhood Experiences, we could reduce heroin/crack use by 59%, violence victimisation by 52%, incarceration by 53%, cannabis use by 22% and binge drinking by 15%. Whilst we are beginning to deliver training inputs around these areas for example in neighbourhood policing and safeguarding, not all our officers have an understanding around these issues. • West Yorkshire is currently managing 7899 families as part of the Troubled Families Initiative . This causes capacity issues for providing a meaningful intervention. However, it is important in terms of reducing risk and offending that we identify and work with the right families for sustainable reductions in demand and better outcomes for individuals and families. • There is a need for Officers to be aware of the community assets that are available to them in order to divert people away from crime and anti-social behaviour. As part of our work on early intervention with the Early Intervention Foundation (EIF), we identified in excess of 6,000 community based assets which are critical if we are to increase social capital through effective community engagement for long term reductions in crime and ASB. • Understanding new and emerging communities also present challenges for us in terms of understanding how best to engage with groups that may feel isolated or may have a lack of confidence in the police. Our new Community Engagement toolkit and Neighbourhood Alert will help address these capabilities.

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Step Two: The Wellbeing of the Workforce in meeting the demand

The New Neighbourhood Model was launched on 26 March 2018 and this has introduced a number of changes which may impact on the wellbeing of staff:

• The Abstractions Policy has been introduced to minimise any abstractions of staff. This should improve the wellbeing of officers, ensuring that they are dedicated to long term problem solving in communities. • The shift pattern for NPT officers and staff has changed. Although this means that neighbourhood policing better meets demand, it could impact on wellbeing as it means that whilst officers will be working shorter shifts, they will have fewer days off in a row.

Step Three: The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating in particular focussing our on threat, harm and risk

It has been shown in Step One that West Yorkshire has some areas of particularly high crime, which also suffer from a number of other problems such as social deprivation and that these factors are linked. The LSE analysis also shows some variations in terms of actual and predicted demand and some critical areas that we need to focus on. This Force Management Statement also shows that not only is demand currently high and particularly complex, but unless we do something differently, demand will continue to rise and is likely to increase in complexity.

We are conscious that unless we reinvestment in our preventative approach we will continue to have high levels of demand, but it is those high levels of demand that have until now prevented us from the investment we desperately need to reduce demand and reduce vulnerability long term. Our key areas of focus moving forward therefore are:

• Investment in Neighbourhood Policing – we have invested 100 additional officers into NPTs along with supervisory structures. These dedicated Officers will work with local partners and the community in order to prevent crime and anti-social behaviour, intervene early and problem solve issues long term. By engaging with the community we will also build up confidence and trust. In committing additional resources we have created the capacity and capability for NPTs to be proactive, rather than constantly reacting to incidents and crime. Along with the critical role of partners in combining our resources upstream will ultimately help to reduce demand for all agencies. • Problem Solving Culture – we are embedding a problem solving culture into the organisation, ensuring that that it is part of initial training and rolled out to Districts and Department functions such as Detectives, Patrol and Safeguarding. This will ensure Officers whatever their function take more ownership of an issue and look to address the root causes to reduce demand across the board. In addition the mandated position will be that all repeat callers and repeat locations will have a THRIVE assessment completed by the Sergeant with a problem solving occurrence/plan initiated. • Working in partnership to deliver Early Intervention – this long term approach, recognises that if we identify and address problems at the earliest opportunity we can protect people from harm, reduce crime and offending in the long term and reduce the demand on all agencies. The cost of late intervention is significant. The EIF has found that nearly £17 billion is spent each year by local and national agencies on acute and statutory services for children, young people and families in England and Wales; £6.4 billion is spent by local government on child protection and children’s social care and £1.6 billion is spent by the Police. Far too much money is therefore being spent at crisis point, whereas an investment in early intervention can not only stop problems becoming worse but can also deliver cost benefits.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Early intervention is embedded into our new Neighbourhood Policing Model and where it supports the wider partnership approach we will commit Neighbourhood Policing resources to be part of Early Intervention Hubs/Panels. • Our Early Intervention approach is being embedded into our response to rising levels of knife crime. A central principle of our Knife Crime Strategy is to ‘Protect and Educate’ and our Force Education Liaison Officer has designed a knife crime awareness input which is being delivered by officers to secondary school pupils across the force. A similar product is being designed for primary schools. A problem profile for knife crime also tells us that just five PWA’s in the Force account for 40% of all recorded knife crime, so these high harm areas will be a focus for early intervention partnership activity. • To improve our approach to community engagement we have developed a Community Engagement Toolkit and will shortly be launching Neighbourhood Alert . This uses data to identify hard to reach communities, for us to engage with in order to build confidence, increase reporting and intelligence. This will then enable us to undertake long term problem solving to tackle the issues that matter to these communities to reduce problems long term and increase levels of trust. • As a small number of Neighbourhood Areas account for a large proportion of crime and other social problems, it is critical that along with our partners we focus on these areas through an integrated place-based approach. Working with our partners we are improving our understanding of the threat, harm and risk of each of our wards which is then enabling a more effective local tasking process. • Use of technology – Technology is assisting us to increase confidence (through Body Worn Video), spend more time in communities to make us more visible (hand held devices) and is enabling us through the use of analytics to undertake more precision based policing in tackling problematic areas. Our Predictive Policing Project (Patrolwise) , which has been funded by the Home Office, initially focussing on burglary, is now being rolled-out forcewide. The project is testing the use of algorithms to predict demand across a range of crime types across all Districts. This is enabling us to be more efficient and effective in terms of the deployment of resources to tackle the crime and anti-social behaviour problems impacting on local communities and is embedding crime reduction into a neighbourhood policing approach to improve community safety.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Four: The future demand we do not expect to be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making

It is predicted that incident demand and crime will increase significantly over the next four years. An increase of 16.3% in incident demand will mean 41,900 extra incidents and a 19.3% increase in total crime, will lead to 50,131 extra crimes. If left unchecked, West Yorkshire Police would struggle to cope with the increase in demand, which would lead to a reduction in confidence and satisfaction levels, based on its current resource profile.

The investment into Neighbourhood Policing and Early Intervention to proactively deal with incident is critical in order to reduce the demands placed on our services. This approach, however, does come with risks in terms of meeting other demand:

• Call handling performance may reduce in some areas – Whilst there has been an extra investment of 100 officers into the Neighbourhood Policing Model, the remaining 204 constables have come from the pre-existing hybrid teams. In order to create the capacity in order for these resources to concentrate on the three pillars of Neighbourhood Policing, previous experience has shown that they need to be protected. Therefore policies have been created on abstraction, deployment and allocation. This means the remaining patrol resources will need to pick up a larger volume of the current incident demand. The Neighbourhood Review Project Team are cognisant that in order to deliver an enhanced Neighbourhood model, if done in isolation, could detrimentally impact on other change projects. Interdependency meetings are regularly held to ensure that project leads share their findings and proposals, in order to gauge any potential impact. • Victim Satisfaction may reduce – with fewer officers available for response there may be an impact on attendance at emergency and priority incidents. These have been on an already deteriorating trend. As keeping people informed is a key driver of satisfaction and workloads are likely to increase, satisfaction may deteriorate. • Partnership commitment – is critical as part of our approach to neighbourhood policing, early intervention and tackling the issues that matter in communities. However, due to the significant budgetary pressures that have been placed on Local Authorities and the significant investment, which has been required in Child and Adult Social Care, there has been a reduction in funding allocated to community safety particularly around youth diversion but also in terms of commitment to CCTV funding in some areas. Further reductions will place a significant burden on the Police to mitigate the gaps, especially if ASB increases in line with predicted trends (a further 5,000 incidents). • Whilst we are committed to protecting Officers/Staff working within Neighbourhood Policing as it is critical that we get upstream in terms of demand, we are also conscious that demand around vulnerability (e.g. missing persons, mental health, CSEA, Domestic Abuse) is predicted to increase. In the past, to mitigate these threats, resources have been taken from neighbourhood policing given the threat and risk they pose. Our approach to early intervention and trauma informed policing aims to reduce vulnerability, but this is a long term approach and we are conscious that any increases in these threats, will need to be resourced. • Whilst we have invested in an additional 100 PCs into Neighbourhood Policing , this is still significantly less than pre-austerity measures. Given predicted increases in demand it may be that despite our commitments, the numbers may still not be sufficient to deliver the ambition we have set ourselves.

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This section is about Investigative resources and will focus on :

• Investigative demand • Custody • Criminal Justice • Forensic Services

The Section will explain each four elements of the Force Management Statement in relation to Investigations: • Step One –The gap between current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years • Step Two – The current status of the workforce and other assets (their performance, condition, capacity, capability, serviceability, wellbeing and security of supply) in terms of responding to the demand types. • Step Three – The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating in particular focussing our on threat, harm and risk. • Step Four – The future demand we do not expect to be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making.

Introduction Reducing and Investigating Crime is one of the five purposes of the Force’s Policing Strategy and Tackling Crime, Making sure Criminal Justice works for communities and Supporting Victims and Witnesses are priorities in the Police and Crime Plan. The Force has a Strategic Plan in place to address the threats and risks around crime and investigations identified in the Strategic Assessment, as well as the AFIs from HMICFRS, which recently graded the Force as ‘Requires Improvement’ for Investigations. The Plan focuses in particular on burglary, violent crime, knife crime and robbery all of which, using the Management of Risk in Law Enforcement (MoRiLE) matrix, scored in the top 10 threats in the November 2017 Strategic Assessment. The Plan also makes reference to the Investigations Review, which will address the AFIs from the recent inspection.

Executive Summary • Investigative demand is increasing and is predicted to increase with around half of all crimes screened in for further investigation. Whilst custody demand is predicted to decrease due to reducing numbers of children coming into custody, decrease in s136 detainees in custody, an increase in use of Voluntary Attendance and the reduction in the use of bail, the level of risk is increasing with more detainees having significant health concerns, drug and alcohol dependencies, complex mental health issues and learning disabilities. Criminal Justice is currently going through a period of significant transformational change nationally. • There are some significant capacity and capability issues relating investigations. This includes the HMICFRS grading of the Force as ‘Requires Improvement’ for Investigations and the crisis in detective/investigative capacity which is a national problem. 43

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • In response to the increasing demand and the capacity and capability issues the Force has introduced new strategic governance arrangements for investigations and volume crime, is implementing a review of Investigations which covers all of the PEEL AFIs and is putting forward proposals in line with the NPCC Investigative Resilience Programme to address the capacity issues. • The table below summarises: o Current demand o The potential 2021 demand based on statistical projections o Our professional judgement of the factors that will influence whether the potential projections will be realised and the resultant risk. • These issues will be explored in more detail, including an assessment of the demand we do not think we will be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making.

Current Predicted Demand Demand Factors influencing demand 2017 2021 • Crime is predicted to increase in most areas, but in particular in complex areas such as safeguarding and cyber-crime requiring broader and more technical skill sets. 260,000 310,000 • At a 50% screening in rate, there will be an additional crimes crimes 25,000 investigations. Investigative (116,143 (155,000 • HMICFRS have graded the force as Requires Demand screened screened Improvement with standards of investigations as a ‘cause in) in) for concern’.

• Significant gaps in Detective/Investigator numbers. • Training capacity is an ongoing issue. Overall – Demand is expected to increase, putting further strain on investigative resilience and standards. • Legislative changes mean that numbers of children coming into custody are reducing as are s136 detainees. • Increase in use of Voluntary Attendance and the reduction in the use of bail leading to reductions. • 46,206 Level of risk is increasing with more detainees having Custody 48,669 significant health concerns, drug and alcohol dependencies, complex mental health issues and learning disabilities Overall – Demand expected to reduce but with 43% of arrestees with mental health issues (around 2,000 people), capacity/capability is an issue • Tickets/Notices expected to increase with more technology for officers. • Demand is more complex around safeguarding and digital. • Significant changes through Criminal Justice (CJ) Criminal transformation programme and changes to bail and Increasing Justice disclosure present capacity/capability issues. • Potential use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Robotics around intelligence submissions, case files should assist in handling greater volumes with fewer people. Overall – Demand increasing at a time of CJ transformational change • Forensic demand will increase as crime increases. • Digital forensics predicted to increase as technology/equipment is seized during investigations and Forensic Increasing cyber offending increases. Services • Demand around cold cases may increase with advances in technology. Overall – Demand around forensics predicted to increase

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step One: The gap betw een current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years

Current Investigative Demand

• Over the last few years and in common with other forces in our MSG, we have experienced significant rises in all crime types, which has manifested in increased demand for all investigative resources (volume, serious and major crime). • The table below highlights the total number of crimes recorded over the last two years and shows that in 2017 the Force recorded almost 260,000 crimes, around 30,000 more than in the previous calendar year (a 13.1% increase). • Just over half of these offences were ‘screened in’ for further investigation and whilst proportionally this was the same as in 2016, this represents almost 15,000 more offences that require a secondary investigation. It’s clear from our analysis that there is relatively consistent approach, year on year, to whether certain crime types are screened in for further investigation.

2016 2017 Screened Screened Screened Screened Total Total Offence IN IN % IN IN % Arson 1621 731 45.1% 1907 768 40.3% Bicycle theft 2562 586 22.9% 2608 644 24.7% Burglary - business and community 12127 3396 28.0% 8460 2638 31.2% Burglary - residential 13712 5896 43.0% 18570 7059 38.0% Criminal damage 29702 10689 36.0% 30847 10624 34.4% Homicide 33 28 84.8% 24 16 66.7% Miscellaneous crimes against society 5130 3804 74.2% 6631 4658 70.2% Other sexual offences 3702 3060 82.7% 4751 3759 79.1% Other theft 26280 8137 31.0% 26597 8076 30.4% Possession of drugs 3383 2629 77.7% 3491 2860 81.9% Possession of weapons 1387 1074 77.4% 1736 1401 80.7% Public order offences 15781 10344 65.5% 21188 12470 58.9% Rape 1982 1721 86.8% 2856 2447 85.7% Robbery 2323 1737 74.8% 2879 2202 76.5% Shoplifting 17174 10093 58.8% 18660 10279 55.1% Theft from the person 4302 1076 25.0% 4325 988 22.8% TFMV 15323 2368 15.5% 15676 1898 12.1% TOMV 5562 2252 40.5% 5314 2087 39.3% Trafficking in controlled drugs 1619 1378 85.1% 1852 1629 88.0% Vehicle offences 3440 563 16.4% 3945 455 11.5% Violence with injury 21766 16203 74.4% 25635 19020 74.2% Violence without injury 40536 28378 70.0% 51483 35006 68.0% Total Crime 229447 116143 50.6% 259435 130984 50.5%

• The increase in demand around crime and investigations has seen some fluctuations in the amounts of outstanding suspects, a subject that HMICFRS have identifies as an AFI during the previous two PEEL inspections. • The Force has focussed on suspects only being circulated as wanted/BOLO (Be On Look out for) when threat, risk and harm factors dictate this. In appropriate scenarios, officers are encouraged to carry out further investigative enquiries before circulating a suspect, or proceed by other means (e.g. voluntary attendance). As a result, circulations have seen a downward trend since September 2016, as illustrated below.

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FORCE 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 Jul-17 Jul-16 Jan-18 Jan-17 Jan-16 Jun-17 Jun-16 Oct-17 Oct-16 Apr-17 Apr-16 Sep-17 Sep-16 Feb-17 Feb-16 Dec-17 Dec-16 Aug-17 Aug-16 Nov-17 Nov-16 Mar-17 Mar-16 May-17 May-16

• Recently our performance in locating wanted suspects has improved, as shown below where 78% of wanted persons were arrested within two weeks of being circulated in January 2018. This figure has been up to 93% more recently and is mainly attributed to improved tasking processes and resilience provided to districts in the form of additional new constables.

FORCE- percentage closed within 14 days of BOLO creation date 100%

90%

80% 78%

70%

60%

50%

40% Jul-16 Jul-17 Jan-16 Jan-17 Jan-18 Jun-16 Jun-17 Oct-16 Oct-17 Apr-16 Apr-17 Feb-16 Sep-16 Feb-17 Sep-17 Dec-16 Dec-17 Aug-16 Aug-17 Nov-16 Nov-17 Mar-16 Mar-17 May-16 May-17

• The number of persons wanted on warrant remains a concern for the Force. Despite some recent minor reductions, it has been on rising trajectory for the past couple of years and is approximately 1900 at present. We are developing a system to help prioritise the tasking of wanted on warrants based on the severity of the original offence/circumstances for which the suspect has failed to attend court. However the reality of demanding, ‘reactive’ district policing means that the proactive resources are not always available to seek these individuals who have often failed to attend court for relatively minor matters.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Predicted Demand

• Future demand for investigations is largely influenced by the long term trends in recorded crime. Our statistical forecasting using recent trends predicts that total crime will increase to almost 310,000 offences by 2021 (an additional 50,000 crimes). • The Force has invested heavily in the FCMU to resolve many calls at source in order to reduce investigative demand and offer a better service to the public. However, the ‘screened’ in rate for investigations in 2017 remains broadly consistent with previous years at around 50%. Therefore we can predict that if crime increases to 310,000 by 2021, the Force will have an additional 25,000 investigations per year .

• In Section 4 of the Force Management Statement we predict that vulnerability demand is predicted to increase and in these areas, such as domestic abuse, there is a near total rate of screening in, even if just for additional support/signposting for the victim. The graph below shows that by 2021 we predict domestic abuse offences to increase to 84,108. This is an increase of 26,011 offences, all of which require some form of safeguarding intervention and many requiring some form of investigation.

• The increase in cyber-enabled crime is significant and covers the full range of offences from volume acquisitive crime through to more serious offences including rape and homicides. Analysis shows that during 2017 the Force recorded over 4,700 cyber enabled offences, an increase of over 90% compared to the previous year. Almost seven in 10 of these offences were screened-in which represents an additional 1,300 more cyber enabled offences that require a secondary investigation. We predict that both cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crime will continue to rise in light of the proliferation of technology and the increasing prevalence of the ‘online’ world. 47

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Custody Demand

Projection (12 month rolling total) 70000

60000 48669 46,206 50000

40000

30000

20000

10000

0 Jul Jul 2015 Jul 2016 Jul 2017 Jul 2018 Jul 2019 Jul 2020 Jul 2021 Apr 2015 Apr 2015 Oct 2016 Apr 2016 Oct 2017 Apr 2017 Oct 2018 Apr 2018 Oct 2019 Apr 2019 Oct 2020 Apr 2020 Oct 2021 Apr 2021 Oct Jan Jan 2015 Jan 2016 Jan 2017 Jan 2018 Jan 2019 Jan 2020 Jan 2021 Jan 2022

• During 2017, the total number of detainees passing through custody suites was 48,669 with an additional 14,981 Voluntary Attendees. • Of the detainees 25,358 (52%) had mental health or substance misuse problems , which evidences the complexities of people coming into custody. There were 46 detentions in police custody under s136 of the Mental Health Act. • There were 3815 children detained and 5292 detainees requiring an appropriate adult (both children and vulnerable adults). • In total 74 children were charged and denied bail. • In the last three years there have been two deaths in custody and one death following custody. One death in custody and the death following police custody have both been dealt with at Coroner’s Court with no significant areas of concern raised.

Predicted Demand • It is predicted that there will be a slight reduction in throughput due to the reducing number of children coming into custody, decrease in s136 detainees in custody (as a result of the Police and Crime Act), the increase in use of Voluntary Attendance and the reduction in the use of bail (as a result of changes to legislation). • The level of risk however is increasing with more detainees having significant health concerns, drug and alcohol dependencies, complex mental health issues and learning disabilities. This increases the risk, pressure and demand on staff who are having to conduct more frequent visits, including close proximity, more detainees being taken to hospital and greater demands on healthcare provision. The resulting investigation of adverse incidents by the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC), impacts on staffing due to restrictions and/or subsequent sickness and morale across the suites.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Criminal Justice Demand

• In total there were 23,318 cases dealt with at either Magistrates or Crown Court. Whilst the cases dealt with in the Magistrates Court have the files built to full file standard and require little further work, the files for Crown Court generate requests from CPS to build to upgrade then full file . In line with Better Case Management the file is built proportionately and in line with the bespoke request from the reviewing lawyer.

Case Type Volume (Defined by case U nique Reference Number) Standard Guilty Anticipated Plea 5,670 Standard Not Guilty Anticipated Plea 4,099 Domestic Abuse Guilty Anticipated Plea 967 Domestic Abuse Not Guilty Anticipated Plea 1,470 Youth Court (data only available from May 2017) 364 Cases Charged and Remanded for Court (Including Youth) 10,748 Total Cases 23,318 Of these total sent to Crown Court (Crown Prosecution Service data) Crown Court Sent for Plea and Trial Preparation Hearing or 3,881 involving 4,661 defendants Committed for Sentence

The demand around criminal justice notices is shown in the table below. This reflects an increasing trend across most areas.

2017 Endorsable Notices (Traffic) 185,402 Home Office Road Traffic Scheme Notice 1,941 Non Endorsable Notice 10,155 Penalty Notice for Disorder 8 Vehicle Defect Rectification Scheme 2,522 Warning Notice 62 Total 200,090

• Officer generated traffic offence reports and ticketing is predicted to increase as the Force has recently introduced a ticketing application for hand held devices used by operational officers. This is likely to increase the number of tickets issued and consequently demands upon the ‘back office’ functions required to process these. • The extent of camera coverage on the motorway network is increasing and the demand to process camera activations is greater now than at any time. • The number of postal requisitions prepared since the reform of bail legislation has increased dramatically. It is anticipated that this will continue to rise over the next six to 12 months before reaching a plateau. However, the increase in automated camera detections are likely to see a rise in the number of cases proceeding to court which will also likely increase numbers of postal requisitions. • There is a likelihood of the range of cases eligible for Police Led Prosecutions (PLP) increasing in the future. Whilst the detail of ongoing consultation is not known at this stage any increase in case eligibility would increase PLP court presenter demands.

Changes in Demand

There are a number of issues which are having or are likely to have an impact on the nature of the demand within Criminal Justice: • The increase in safeguarding/vulnerability demand means that files are more complex and time consuming and also impact on District Prosecution and Safeguarding Teams. • Digital Charging has increased the workload of the Prosecution Teams, with significantly 49

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED more files being sent across the interface than ever before. • Two Way Interface (TWIF) and other digital changes will greatly increase the work of the District Prosecution Teams, as they will need to triage the thousands of notifications from CPS created as a result of TWIF. In addition, Officers will need to learn new methods of file submission including digital file submission creating demand on officers during training stage and during implementation • The Joint National Disclosure Improvement Plan set outs challenging objectives for all Forces, which will require cultural and process change for the long term. These changes will necessitate an increased workload across the Force from investigation through to file build and the ongoing review of cases, to ensure timeliness and fairness prevails. In addition there will be challenges around our capacity to download phones, with the need to invest in more advanced artificial intelligence tools in digital forensic units. • There is increasing pressure nationally to move to virtual remand courts. In addition to the costs, this will move the onus for the management of prisoners back to the Force. The location of our cells to our court sites, makes virtual remand courts more expensive and labour intensive than simply transporting the detainee to court, and then onto prison as appropriate. • Leeds has been a pilot site, for S16, (under 18s) and will soon become a pilot for section 17(4) – Vulnerable and Intimidated victims , which will see a huge increase in the number of cases heard in this way. There will be an associated increase in the work necessary to progress these cases through the courts in a timely way. Bradford Crown Court is due to roll out with section 16 later this year, and this will increase the work associated with child victims throughout the Force area. • Changes to Bail , introduced in April 2017 have seen an increase in suspects being dealt with under Voluntary Attendance and a shift towards Released under Investigation (RUI). This means an increase in Postal Requisition and Charge (PCR), which has a suspected associated increase in the number of defendants failing to appear (FTA) and the issue of FTA warrants. These suspects then require arresting, lodging and placing back before court, by Police. In addition the move to PCR has shifted demand to our Central Process Bureau and has then brought its own challenges around compliance with PACE (Police and Criminal Evidence Act) in regards to obtaining biometrics, and adherence to statutory time limits for getting cases to court. • There is increased pressure from CPS for the police to provide more and more pre- charge , often amounting to over-build. Changes which are due to the national File standard, and the Directors Guidance, will likely support CPS so that they can ask for more, earlier. Combined with the ongoing digitalization of the charging process, and the removal of any dialogue, between a police officer and the reviewing lawyer, will result in files being ever more strictly triaged for administration and evidential compliance prior to any review. This places an increasing burden on the police to check prior to sending and to address any requests for remedial work in a timely way. • Whilst the Force was a pilot, for Restorative Justice and Out of Court Disposals we are now seeing the results of a lack of appropriate infrastructure around this methodology and an increased burden on the police to ensure that conditions have been adhered to. The national strategy has now been rolled out, however the associated support services need to be commissioned and delivered if this programme of work is to be successful. The management of this will fall to the police.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Forensic Demand

Forensic Services are delivered on a regional basis by the Yorkshire and Humber Regional Scientific Support Service (RSSS). In terms of current demand, the top five demand generators are: • Burglary residential (almost 35%) • Assault (12.5%) • Burglary – Commercial (11.2%) • Theft from Motor Vehicle (5.2%) • Assault – Domestic (5%)

In terms of predicted demand: • Increased demand is predicted around digital forensics given the increase in technology as an enabler for crime. Nationally, demand within digital forensics examinations are increasing by 29% each year and within the next three years it is anticipated that cloud storage will present the largest growth area for digital forensics. The Force has recently invested in significantly more DMIs with a DCI, DI, 3 DSs and 42 DMIs spread across the Force within the FCMU, Specialist Crime and our five Districts (which compares with the current four DMIs in a central Cyber Team). This investment will create more demand around triaging, reviewing and interrogating computers, and devices etc. as part of investigations. This demand will only ever increase and it is anticipated that over time digital examination will overtake the demand for physical examination. • An increased demand can be anticipated in Cold Case Reviews (as forensic science advances) and in some forensic disciplines which have been traditionally in-sourced (such as firearms classification) and now need to be accredited. • Demand may decrease as a result of police in-sourcing forensic tests such as biological search examinations, ‘rapid’ DNA, simple drugs analysis (particularly cannabis plant identification) etc. • There may be a reduction in the allocation of funds to the forensic budget, in which case external submissions will need to be more carefully scrutinised. The forensic services contract is due for renewal in 2020, and it is highly likely that market prices in most areas will be less competitive than they were when the last contract was procured in 2013. The costs of external tests are likely to increase, although costs associated with recent forensic advances (such as new DNA techniques) will reduce over time as they become a commodity.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Two: The Current Status of the Workforce and other Assets in terms of responding to the demand types

Investigations

Effectiveness

• Protective Services Crime is a large and complex department responsible for the oversight of serious and organised crime as well as the investigation of major crime such as murder, kidnap, extortion, serious fraud and deaths from major collisions. Capability within this area of investigations is good and West Yorkshire have investigated some very high profile murders over the last few years such as Jo Cox MP and Anne Maguire. There is good cross pollination of serious crime investigation with the National Crime Agency (NCA) and North East Counter Terrorism Unit (NECTU) and very significant interventions and disruptions in relation to serious and organised crime. Serious and organised crime was not inspected in 2017, as it was found to be Good in 2016. • Crime management within Districts has however been subject to significant criticism from HMICFRS in the PEEL Inspections from 2015, 2016 and, latterly, 2017. The most recent assessment in 2017 has graded West Yorkshire Police’s response to initial investigation, investigation quality and reducing re-offending as ‘ Requires Improvement’ . • HMICFRS have recorded in the draft 2017 Report that “the quality of West Yorkshire Police’s initial enquiries, its’ supervision and its standard of investigation is a cause for concern ”. • Reality testing conducted by the PEEL Inspection into crime management across the five Districts highlighted that once a crime has been allocated to a District Mailbox from FCMU, there is very little corporacy around management processes use by the Districts to ensure that it is allocated, reviewed, progressed and, ultimately, finalised. HMICFRS highlight the lack of Force Policy or guidance to govern the strategic management of crime in the Districts and that disparities between Districts have actually increased since the 2016 Inspection. In addition, HMICFRS point out the lack of quality in basic investigative activity including statement taking, forensic awareness and recovery, handovers, scene preservation and exhibit handling. They found that supervisory involvement in crime management at Districts is sporadic and inconsistent.

HMICFRS AFIs for Investigations

• The Force should provide frontline officers with the training and operational experience to ensure that they are able to retrieve forensic evidence from scenes of crime. • The Force should develop a policy outlining minimum investigative standards and roles and responsibilities of officers and supervisors. • The Force should ensure that all those carrying out investigations are provided with appropriate training and support. • The Force should ensure that there is regular and active supervision of investigations to improve quality and progress. • The Force should improve its process for and supervision of handovers to ensure all relevant information passed to investigators is complete and of sufficient quality. • The Force should ensure that those who are circulated and wanted on the Police National Computer (PNC), those who fail to appear on police bail, named and outstanding suspects and suspects identified through forensic evidence are located and arrested.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Victim Satisfaction

• Victim satisfaction is a strong indicator of effectiveness, but has been decreasing over the last few years, especially in the area around ‘keeping people informed’. This may be as a result of the shortfall in investigative numbers and their investigative capacity and capability. • A new survey programme was introduced in April 2017 which seeks feedback from a wider group of victims than for the previously mandated Home Office programme. The new programme also differentiates between victims whose crimes were attended and those whose crimes weren’t attended. • Satisfaction is higher where we attend a crime . Of the 1758 victims sampled whose crimes weren’t attended, 69.2% were satisfied with the overall service provided. This is significantly lower than seen for attended crime 74.5% (2072 victims between April and January 2018). Initial analysis suggests that of the non-attended crime satisfaction levels were higher for victims who had a telephone investigation through the FCMU (72% or 1173 victims), than for those who weren’t dealt with by the FCMU and therefore likely to have been resolved without deployment after a further triage by the District Control Rooms, (64% or 585 victims).

Non-attended crime Sample size % satisfaction Satisfaction with the telephone investigation 1712 76.10% Crime scene investigators 85 89.40% Overall satisfaction 1758 69.20%

Attended Crime Sample size % satisfaction Actions taken 2058 75.50% Crime scene investigators 529 92.60% Keeping informed of progress 2057 63.80% Treatment 2069 91.50% Overall satisfaction 2072 74.50%

• Victims are generally very satisfied with the crime scene investigators , whether their crime is ultimately attended or not. They are also typically very satisfied with the way officers staff have treated them. However, satisfaction with the actions taken and the way we keep victims informed of progress for burglary, violent crime and vehicle crime victims have steadily deteriorated over the last four years. The way we update victims is consistently the weakest area of service delivery despite the introduction some years ago of a system to flag up with officers when victims should be provided with updates. This area of service delivery has also been incorporated within the user satisfaction action plan as a key area to focus on. • Victims are most satisfied with the actions we have taken when they feel we carried out an appropriate investigation (84%). This falls to 78.2% where victims don’t feel we needed to carry out an investigation and to only 14.9% where victims feel that we didn’t investigate the scene but should have.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • Satisfaction levels do vary by crime types with burglary and robbery victims being most satisfied with the overall service we provide.

Capacity and Capability

• In line with the national trend, the Force is facing a significant capacity issue in terms of Detective and Investigative resilience and this is recognised as a Red Risk on the Strategic Risk Register. The force has significant shortfalls between its budgeted and actual detective numbers. There is a reluctance from newly recruited and officers with less service to enter the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) as a career choice. The reasons for this are many and varied but include high workloads and a more attractive uniform patrol shift pattern with less stress and overall responsibility. • The inability to recruit and retain officers into CID also has an impact on Protective Services Crime Department, as short staffed District CID offices are reluctant to release detectives into specialist roles. • As a result of the national detective crisis, HMICFRS have given all Forces with a shortage of qualified detectives/investigators a national recommendation to develop an action plan which details what they will do in the short, medium and long term. This plan needs to be in line with the Investigative Resilience Programme being led by NPCC which is attempting to address the problem from a national perspective. • All five of our districts are operating with significant shortfalls in Detective Constables. Trainee Investigators and unaccredited Constables are used to complement such staffing but unless there is very significant intervention and recruitment we predict further shortfalls in investigative numbers , given the increasing risk that those recruited in the late 1980s and early 1990s will retire soon. This will leave a less experienced, overworked and demotivated detective workforce in place with the resulting shortfall in investigative performance and quality of service to the public. Current shortfall figures have not been quoted here because workforce planning work is underway to review the budgeted detective positions at districts according to demand and therefore better understand where additionality is needed. • This situation will worsen given the predicted increase in investigative demand of around 25,000 crimes per year by 2021. • The Force provides investigative training at all ranks and across all areas of policing. Officers choosing to specialise in crime investigation receive support and guidance to help them pass the National Investigators Examination before progressing through general Detective Training. The Force offers additional training in specialist areas such as interviewing, Child and Public Protection, as well as being a leading player in delivering covert policing tactics to help us tackle Organised Criminality. • If officers progress through the rank structure they will receive training commensurate with their new role in the Safeguarding and Criminal Investigation Departments. The Force delivers all of the College of Policing’s courses to enable officers to gain the relevant Professionalising the Investigation Process (PIP) accreditation and West Yorkshire is one of only a few Forces in

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED the UK to hold a licence to deliver training to Senior Investigating Officers, attracting senior officers from across the country. • The responsibility for the investigation of serious and major crime lies with the Force`s District CID resources and its Protective Services Crime department. The most serious of offences are overseen by a PIP 3 accredited Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) with a dedicated team of Detectives and Police Staff Investigators (PSIs). In general terms the Force, despite the squeeze on resourcing in both staffing and financial resources have delivered significant success in this area (in the last two years, of the 48 recorded homicide offences, only two remain undetected). The Force also enjoys one of the highest national asset recovery returns at £7.4 million year ending 2017/18, by April 2018 £2.75 million had already been realised for 2018/19. • In response to the 2017 HMICFRS PEEL inspection, the Force will be delivering investigative training of all frontline officers but this brings a number of capacity challenges. The Learning and Development centre has had to focus on training the large number of new student officers recruited over the last 18 months, which means that additional investigative training for existing officers has to be provided in districts. This is difficult to do without any protected learning time in the shift rota, and, as a result, frontline officers have to be abstracted to training during duty time which is often logistically challenging for districts struggling with frontline demands. • The increase in cyber-enabled crime means that new investigative skill sets around digital evidence are required over and above existing capabilities. The Force has invested in an uplift of DMIs which will see a new structure of a DCI, DI, three Detective Sergeants and 42 DMIs spread across the Force within the FCMU, Specialist Crime and our five Districts. Currently we have four DMIs in a central Cyber team. As shown in the forensics section, this is an area of increasing demand and is more complex and lengthy than the traditional types of investigation. • The Force has invested in a Crime Management Unit (FCMU) and has developed a crime allocation framework and Force Crime Management principles. All crime is tasked and reviewed by FCMU, who make a decision as to whether a crime is allocated or finalised and all crime is recorded and managed using Niche and in accordance with National Crime Recording Standards (NCRS). The predicted demand for total crime presents capacity issues for FCMU staff with the requirement potentially absorb an additional 50,000 crimes for assessment by 2021. • With the investment in FCMU, the expectation was that around 350 new crimes would be in a rolling queue to be assessed. However, this has not materialised and numbers are now approaching around 2,000. This plus increased volume in the future suggests a greater need for investment in FCMU.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Custody

Effectiveness • The Force was subject to a HMICFRS inspection in July 2016, receiving two areas of concern around the management and oversight of use of force and the booking in of detainees to be prioritised according to risk rather than the order in which they arrived at the suite. Both of these issues have now been addressed through the introduction of use of force forms and the introduction of an arrest proforma to triage detainees. • Our internal inspection programme monitors compliance with legal requirements and minimum standards. It also identifies areas where improvement is required. Key areas where compliance/improvement is required are; informing detainees they have been subject to a sleeping review, Compliance with Code C Annex M, meeting the needs of vulnerable people (including women, children and those with mental health and drug/drink issues), access to appropriate adults, finding suitable alternative accommodation for children detained post charge and working with HM Courts to prevent extended detentions in police custody. • A national recommendation has also been issued by HMICFRS in regard to bail . This requires all Forces to review how we are implementing changes to pre-charge police bail and how far vulnerable people are being affected by the changes. Forces then need to put into effect any changes necessary to make sure they are using bail effectively and in particular that vulnerable victims get the protection that bail conditions can give them.

Capacity and Capability • Overall capacity and capability is assessed as good. • The Force has five permanent custody suites with a total of 146 cells (with an additional five cells being available when the courts are closed). In addition, we have two resilience suites providing 72 cells should they be required and plans for the new District HQ at Huddersfield will have a larger capacity custody suite. • Each permanent suite has at least one custody trained inspector, with the largest suite having three (seven Inspectors in total). Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) responsibilities are fulfilled by other functional inspectors when the dedicated custody inspectors are not on duty. • There are 59 permanent Custody Officers and 162 Detention Officers covering the five full time suites (a ratio of 1 sergeant to 2.7 detention officers). There are additional trained staff who are available to provide resilience when required. The staff work a five team shift pattern covering the 24 hour period. • The Force has two new suites and three older suites (plus the resilience suites) but all comply with the Home Office Design Guide requirements. The suites have varying numbers of camera cells, two have high level alarms fitted, and all suites have some dry cells and some with observation doors. All are fitted with in cell communication systems, some of which allow telephone calls to be taken in the cell. All suites have embedded healthcare to assist custody staff and detainees and there are central custody services and training teams who support the suites in policy, compliance and live time issues and enquiries. • The force also have a Custody Online Knowledge Area which allows staff to ask questions from colleagues or force experts and raise issues to enhance learning, continuous improvement and increase confidence and standard of care. • With an average of 4055 detainees passing through our suites per month, this gives 27 detainees per cell per month. Force Cell capacity has not been reached in the last 12 months. • Healthcare provision in custody is provided by Leeds Community Health. The Force currently has a 24/7 embedded model with the ability to flex staff to meet fluctuating demand if necessary. The healthcare professionals are a mixture of nurse and paramedics providing a broad range of knowledge and experience. In addition, we have access to doctors (Force Medical Examiner) on an on call basis at all times.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • Mental Health assessments can take place in custody when necessary but since the recent changes in legislation, the majority of detainees are removed to a health based place of safety for such assessments. All districts have good access to assessments especially where they have been detained under S.136. • Overall, handover to health staff is timely and usually within the hour. However, if not detained s136 or waiting in Hospital Emergency Department, there can still be significant waiting times of several hours for officers. • In terms of children detained , Local Authorities have limited availability of non-secure beds for children detained post charge and more often than not, are unable to accommodate such children. The availability of secure beds is even more challenging with only one such facility with limited availability situated in the county and the others being a significant distance away. Joint working between police and the Youth Offending Team Managers continues in order to improve the provision • Court capacity due to court closures and their ability to accept remand prisoners, warrants, breach of bails at short notice or in larger than normal volumes has an impact on custody capacity. This already results in detainees remaining in police custody longer than necessary.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Criminal Justice

Effectiveness • The outcome rates across a range of offences are shown in the table below. The rates are based on outcomes 1-8 which relate to offences that are finalised by means of a charge, caution, Taken into Consideration (TIC), community resolutions, penalty notices and cannabis warnings. The figures indicate that the percentage of crimes that are dealt with via these specific outcomes are generally close to but lower than our MSG.

Outcome rates for selected crime types based on outcomes 1-8

Violence Most Total Violence Sexual Area without Serious Rape Robbery Crime with Injury Offence Injury Violence England & Wales 15.0% 21.5% 13.9% 28.9% 11.1% 7.9% 11.0% Yorkshire & Humber Region 13.8% 19.4% 12.9% 26.6% 10.2% 9.1% 15.5% MSG 14.8% 22.7% 13.8% 32.0% 11.7% 9.0% 17.0% West Yorkshire 12.5% 17.2% 12.1% 24.8% 9.0% 7.3% 13.4% South Yorkshire 12.7% 20.4% 10.0% 27.8% 11.2% 10.6% 15.3% Northumbria 14.7% 20.8% 12.9% 38.5% 12.2% 8.5% 19.7% Lancashire 15.4% 19.1% 14.0% 39.5% 12.2% 9.6% 20.8% South Wales 22.5% 40.9% 17.5% 41.5% 15.3% 11.8% 27.7% Greater Manchester 9.3% 16.0% 11.4% 19.4% 10.3% 7.7% 7.6% Nottinghamshire 16.6% 26.0% 14.1% 40.8% 11.2% 7.8% 19.3% West Midlands 14.4% 21.1% 18.4% 23.8% 12.3% 9.1% 12.4% • Outcome rates are in part impacted by the volume of crime offences recorded and the Force has reported some significant increases in crime over the past two years, primarily as a result of improvements in crime recording practice. • Whilst the increase in crime has contributed to the lower outcome rates, the actual volume of offences dealt with via a charge/summons has increased in the last 12 months. In 2017, 23,475 offences were dealt with via a charge/summons compared to 22,603 in the previous year.

Capacity and Capability • The strategic governance for criminal justice and custody sits within a Headquarters Department led by a Superintendent and with two Chief Inspectors, Inspector and Police Staff support. This team liaises at a strategic level with our partner agencies, mainly CPS and Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunal Service (HMCTS) and with Regional Criminal Justice partners. • At each of the five districts there are Prosecution Teams, consisting of Prosecution Team Administrators, Officers and Team leaders. They deliver Criminal Justice at a local level, responsible for delivery of and quality of case files. The Prosecution Team Officers also have the responsibility for Disclosure Officers. • The Prosecution Teams are a district resource and are line manager by a Detective Chief Inspector. The numbers allocated to each district is based on workloads:

FTEs Bradford Leeds Kirklees Wakefield Calderdale Team Leaders 3.6 5.5 2.5 2 1.4 Officers 24.16 34.25 15.6 13.01 9.66 Administrators 9.54 13.39 6.5 5.26 3.46 Total 37.3 53.14 24.6 20.27 14.52 • All Prosecution Team Leaders have attained the Ilex qualification in Criminal Justice Administration, and all the Officers have to complete this within one year of appointment, unless they possess a Law Degree, or equivalent. • A recent change to the Role Profile has also introduced the Ilex qualification in Advanced Disclosure which all the Prosecution Team Leaders have to complete within two years of appointment. We are also looking to introduce this qualification to Prosecution Team Officers.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Forensic Services

Capacity and Capability

• Regional Scientific Support provides capabilities around forensic services, crime scene investigation, identification, imaging and accreditation and performance • Other services such as Toxicology, Biology Body Fluid analysis and Drug analysis are provided by a Forensic Service Provider delivering to the seven forces of the North East under a sole service provider arrangement procured on behalf of the NE region. Some specialist capabilities are contracted to service provides as required. • Shift patterns of operational resources are aligned wherever possible to demand profiles, as such all critical business areas are covered either by shift arrangements or when routine shift working is prohibitively expensive standby arrangements are in place to ensure service delivery 24/7 . • RSSS YatH holds assets which enable them to deliver service affectively across the Region. Assets range from specialist lasers, laboratory equipment, Livescan Unit to cameras, wireless flash cards and scene tents. • The current structure of Yorkshire and the Humber Regional Scientific Support Services is suitable to meet current demands. However there are a number of challenges over the next four years including: o ISO 17025 implementation and maintenance – maintaining this standard in compliance with the Forensic Regulators is process and resource intensive, operational staff are being diverted to deliver the requirement. o Austerity – it is anticipated that year on year cuts will affect our ability to maintain delivery of service to the four police forces of the Yorkshire and Humber o Transformational Business Change – a project to review Forensic service delivery is being undertaken and initial proposals will fundamentally change the landscape in respect of Forensic Service delivery

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Step Two: The Wellbeing of the Workforce in meeting the demand

In terms of District CID , the biggest issue in relation to wellbeing is the significant shortfall between the budgeted and actual detective numbers. This is creating: • High workloads meaning that Officers and Staff are under severe pressure and have less ability to undertake quality investigations • Low supervisory ratios, which means staff are not supported as much as the Force would like • Less opportunities for training and personal development • Low morale as the work environment is creating a poor work/life balance and more stress and overall responsibility.

The Staff survey supports the above as it shows that staff in CID have lower levels of engagement, more hindrance stressors and lower emotional energy (i.e. they are more likely to feel burnt out).

In terms of staff in Protective Services Crime, whilst detective numbers are still an issue, they are not as severe as Districts and unlike Districts, officers are able to take more time to undertake quality investigations around serious or major crime. Sickness levels are relatively low, however, the key issues around wellbeing are: • Staff exposed to distressing images (such as the Force Abusive Images Unit) or very traumatic incidents (such as the Major Collision Enquiry Team) or sensitive roles (Family Liaison Officers). Psychological assessments for staff involved in Safeguarding and other roles which involve distressing work have now been introduced • Due to the nature of the Department, Officers may work long hours. Any breaches of the working time directive are highlighted in weekly Senior Leadership Team meetings and welfare conversations/management is undertaken by line management.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Three: The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating in particular focussing our on threat, harm and risk

Steps One and Two have shown that investigative demand is increasing and will continue to increase given the predicted increase in crime. The increases are also predicted to be in more complex areas such as safeguarding and cyber-crime. At the same time, detective and investigative resilience is a significant threat and the last PEEL Inspection found that our response to initial investigation, requires improvement and the standard of investigation was a cause for concern. These are the biggest issues facing investigative demand and will be addressed by the following key actions:

• Implementation of the Investigations Review – The Force has responded to the findings of the PEEL Inspection by establishing an Investigations Review under Local Policing governance. This Review will assess the Force’s response to crime management in the light of the HMICFRS recommendations. The Project Mandate’s objectives are, consequently, directly linked to those recommendations and will: o Positively influence organisational culture, promoting the concept of the ‘ Investigative Mind-set’ and ensuring that this concept is at the heart of all internal activity. o Establish a central strategic governance and ownership of volume crime investigation through the Local Policing Governance Board and the drafting of a Force volume crime policy. o Establish a corporate and consistent approach to volume crime management across the Districts, acknowledging the impact of individual partnership arrangements, in order to provide victims with the best possible service and outcomes . o Establish a corporate and consistent policy for the timely management and tasking of those circulated as wanted on the PNC and those named as suspects on volume crimes. o Understand in forensic detail the ‘journey of a crime’ from initial contact and ethical recording to appropriate and ethical finalisation and engage with subject expert stakeholders and a wider cross spectrum of staff to ascertain blockages in that journey and establish solutions. o Ensure that staff within West Yorkshire are trained in accordance with Authorised Professional Practice (APP) and are competent at investigating volume crime in order to improve the overall standard of volume crime investigation taking place in Districts. o Evaluate how current, emerging and future technology may enable improvements in the investigation process. o Establish and evaluate National best practice through benchmarking with other Forces and close liaison with the College of Policing.

The Review has a number of current workstreams, the principle ones being: o Force Training – work is underway to refresh a number of key, Force delivered, training products to better reflect the ‘Investigative Mind-set’ concept. The Tutor constable course has already been refreshed and amended and the new product will begin it’s delivery in March 2018. The Post-Foundation courses for student officers will incorporate a new investigative theme alongside the investigative training being rolled out across the Districts to front line staff. The various Sergeant courses will be amalgamated into one three week delivery which will follow a ‘rolling’ scenario which will be investigative based in general terms. Finally, a generic 5-6 day course has already been designed and planned for all front line staff over seven years’ service which will incorporate the investigative theme. The longer term ambition should be to build protected learning time into rotas for all officers to receive refresher investigative training. o District Training – a training product has been designed and planned for roll out across Districts aimed at student officers and front line staff beginning April 2018. This is a one day refresher course aimed at basic primary investigation skills. A second day is planned aimed at secondary investigation skills.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED o Crime policy – following the engagement and reality testing stage recently completed, a Force Policy will be drafted incorporating allocation, review, finalisation, staff roles and expectations. o Technology – work is underway to source an external investigative support product capable of being cached into front line staff hand held devices o Communication – briefings, workshops and consultation exercises have been, and will continue to be, completed across Districts and at Force forums. A Communications Plan is being designed through Corporate Communications.

• Addressing the Detective Investigative Crisis – An initial review in December 2017 showed the force had a higher percentage of qualified Detective vacancies than that seen as an average (20%) for the country. This was in the main due to a large number of posts being occupied by Trainee Investigators (TI’s) not yet qualified to PIP2. The force has put in place a number of work streams in a bid to counter this trend, which includes: o A review of the current pre-TI process and TI process which will involve a streamlining of the application and selection process, a comprehensive wrap around package of support for TIs to ensure the current pass rate of over 75% is further improved. The Chief Officer Team are also considering the introduction of PSI Mentors to further support TIs in the future. o Development of a Specialist Entry process for new recruits to PIP2 qualified DC in two years. This has been developed cognisant of similar schemes in other forces. However the proposed West Yorkshire process will still produce a qualified PC under the Initial Police Learning and Development Programme (IPLDP) prior to candidates commencing Detective training. The idea is this scheme will run as a cohort alongside the existing force uniform IPLDP training which is the healthiest in the country in terms of new officer recruitment. The proposal is still undergoing consultation and is subject to final COT approval. o Development of PSI routes into investigator roles . Emphasis here will be on providing a career pathway which has been historically lacking, and ensuring some benchmarking with candidates working towards the National Investigation Exam and completion of the Initial Crime Investigators Development Programme (ICIDP). o Consideration of appropriate remuneration for investigators. This is likely to focus on remuneration of those involved in the training/ tutoring and mentoring of TIs rather than TIs and Detectives as a whole.

• Investment in ICT and Technology – To address the increasing threats of cyber the Force is currently recruiting specialist DMI’s. These are a mixture of Police Staff Investigators recruited directly from private industry, universities and other centres of learning as well as apprenticeships. This will enable the force to concentrate dedicated resources in the fight of cyber dependent and enabled crime. The force has invested heavily in its digital forensic unit, is ISO 17025 accredited and will continue to be a National lead for cyber investigation in the UK. In addition, the rollout of BWV to all overt operational staff was completed last year and is assisting in the investigation of crime.

• A force review into Intelligence , led by a Detective Chief Inspector, is currently underway and will report its initial findings to the Chief Officer Team soon. Wide-ranging consultative work has taken place in force, along with research into other forces’ practices. The review will ultimately seek to bring both corporacy and creativity to analytics and tasking - in particular to better exploit cross-border opportunities and ground level ward tasking. Further work is also required to mainstream intelligence activity in relation to Organised Crime Groups (OCGs). The capacity and capability of district and force intelligence units has also been incorporated, especially in light of additional demands upon these units from subjects such as Organised Crime Group Mapping (OCGM), County Lines, Knife Crime and CSEA. The review will also recommend than technological advances are better utilised, along with the opportunities presented from partnership intelligence sources.

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Step Four: The future demand we do not expect to be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making

The picture for investigations shows increasing demand, a capacity gap for detectives/investigators and improvements required in the standard of investigations. Whilst our Investigations Review will ensure we are on course for addressing HMICFRS AFIs/causes for concern, there are some real threats emerging for investigative demand:

• An additional 50,000 crimes will need to be absorbed by the FCMU staff if total crime increases as predicted. • An additional 25,000 crimes ‘screened in’ for secondary investigation , per year by 2021 is of significant concern in terms of having the capacity to undertake the increase in investigations. Workloads are already high and creating pressure on staff, which is one of the key barriers to recruitment in District CID. • As complex demand such as safeguarding is screened in at a higher rate, then the demands on detectives/safeguarding staff will increase. These crimes take much longer to investigate and require broader skillsets and therefore present even more capacity challenges. • Work is ongoing to address the Detective/Investigative crisis and is showing some promise. However, there are fundamental issues to be resolved around finance, shifts and culture which are not easy to address. There is the real risk that unless such issues are addressed, the problem will worsen. • The ongoing training of officers and equipping them with the skills, knowledge and ability to tackle and investigate crime is a key issue and longer term, there is a need to build in protected learning time into officer’s rotas. • Overall, the predicted increase in investigative demand without the capacity to meet it effectively, will not only impact on performance, but will also impact on the quality of service we provide to the public which may have an adverse impact on confidence and satisfaction.

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This section is about Protecting Vulnerable People and will focus on :

• Domestic abuse • Child and adult safeguarding • Sexual offences • Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse • Honour Based Abuse (HBA), Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and Forced Marriage (FM) • Human Trafficking • Missing Persons • Mental health • Harassment, stalking and cyber bullying

The Section will explain each four elements of the Force Management Statement in relation to Protecting Vulnerable People

• Step One –The gap between current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years • Step Two – The current status of the workforce and other assets (their performance, condition, capacity, capability, serviceability, wellbeing and security of supply) in terms of responding to the demand types. • Step Three – The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating in particular focussing our on threat, harm and risk. • Step Four – The future demand we do not expect to be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making.

Introduction

Protecting Vulnerable People is one of the five purposes of the Force’s Policing Strategy and one of the outcomes in the Police and Crime Plan. The Force has a Strategic Plan in place to address the threats and risks around vulnerability identified in the Strategic Assessment as well as the AFIs from HMICFRS. The Plan focuses in particular on CSEA, Missing Persons, Domestic Abuse and Serious Sexual Offences all of which, using the MoRiLE matrix, scored in the top 10 threats in the November 2017 Strategic Assessment and all of which are identified as priorities in the Police and Crime Plan.

Executive Summary

• The demand around all elements of safeguarding has increased over the last five years and is predicted to continue to increase. This is due to a number of factors including increased focus of police and partners in these areas, willingness and confidence of victims to report (e.g. sexual offences and hate crime), technological advances which both facilitate offending and detection (e.g. CSEA), Inquiries which encourage reporting (Independent Inquiry into Child

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Sexual Abuse), greater understanding/focus on organised criminality around vulnerability (CSEA/Human Trafficking) and socio-economic factors such as an increase in looked after children, child protection plans, the numbers of people experiencing mental health and a greater understanding and focus on multiple disadvantage which can lead to crime and vulnerability. • There are a number of issues in terms of the capacity and capability of the workforce in meeting this demand. Primarily this includes safeguarding demand outstripping and putting considerable strain on available resources, with workloads in this area being higher than average, the difficulty in attracting/retaining specialist skills in Safeguarding, detective/investigative resilience, wellbeing of Safeguarding staff and pressure on OHU and the capacity and capability of partners (as well as the Force) in meeting current as well as future safeguarding demand (e.g. capacity issues around mental health facilities/services). • Over the last few years the Force has aligned resources to meet the increasing threats around safeguarding and has been graded by HMICFRS as ‘Good’ for the positive and ambitious work we have done in this area. However, there are a number of actions we need to take to meet future demand moving forward, many of which are innovative, will improve the protection of vulnerable people and will also lead to more holistic/efficient integrated partnership working which is entirely in line with the National Policing Vision 2025. • The table below summarises: o Current demand o The potential 2021 demand based on statistical projections o Our professional judgement of the factors that will influence whether the potential projections will be realised and the resultant risk. • These issues will be explored in more detail, including an assessment of the demand we do not think we will be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making.

Current Predicted Demand Demand Factors influencing demand in 2017 In 2021 • Widening definitions and awareness around new forms of Domestic Abuse (coercive and control, financial etc.) and increased confidence will encourage previously unreported crimes to be reported. • Changes to Domestic Abuse Harassment recording will increase crime figures. • Strong partnership arrangements such as Multi

Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACs), 58,097 84,107 Domestic focussing on high risk, should reduce serious incidents incidents Abuse cases and the resultant demands, particularly

repeat cases. However partnerships/posts are (+44.8%) under funding strain. • More positive approach to arrest should reduce repeats and numbers of Outcome 16

Overall: Mixed factors mean demand is hard to predict but quite possible that demand will increase to predicted levels with all the resultant issues for the Force . • High levels of deprivation in West Yorkshire that can make children vulnerable to neglect 4,550 4,780 • Local Authorities have different thresholds for Child Neglect offences offences neglect. • Public Protection Notice (PPN) system to be (+5.1%) implemented in June 2018 will bring increase 65

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED demand as all referrals will be auditable and visible. • PPN Training for officers to be professionally curious and make a referral • Work with other agencies to encourage reporting and be professionally curious when working with partners. Overall: Demand likely to increase at predicted levels but not high levels of volume. This is business as usual for the Force, but will increase demand for Social Services . • Biggest increase in demand expected to be online rather than on street, which creates capacity/capability issues • Proactivity in this area should slow offending • New technology to identify offenders could

potentially bring significant demand, so there is a

Child Sexual need to prioritise offenders. 5,828 11,322 Exploitation • offences offences Online CSE activist groups expected to rise. and Abuse • Uncertainty around non-recent offences, but (+94.3%) expectation that this should stabilise. However, there is unpredictability of the next type of non- recent demand Overall: Demand not expected to continue to stated levels due to our prioritisation and proactivity, but concerns around online offending. • Volumes of children’s homes (especially private homes) are increasing which will continue to increase reported mispers. • Numbers of Looked After Children are increasing. • Mental health is a significant factor and this is increasing. • Risk levels increasing creating a higher level of response required.

• Missing 21,717 25,260 Workforce modernisation has occurred to ensure Persons investigations investigations clear role profiles and lines of responsibility for (+16.3%) Misper Co-ordinators and Misper Investigators, which should bring efficiencies. • Neighbourhood model should, via problem solving, focus on repeat mispers/locations and reduce demand. Overall: Demand is likely to increase at the predicted levels. We are better at identifying risk and conducting misper investigations but the role of Social Care is critical. • We experience the highest rates of sexual offices, serious sexual offences and rape offences in our

MSG.

• Some of this crime is recorded out of necessity but 7,690 12,457 Sexual is not concerning (e.g. children exploring sexuality) offences offences Offences and we would not want to victimise children.

Overall: Demand will plateau somewhat so not (+62%) overly concerning, although this is complex police-

centric demand so any increase in demand has an impact. • Aging population and more vulnerable adults 1,331 creates opportunities for crime or neglect of those Adult Adult at Risk 8655 who need care Safeguarding referrals Adult at Risk • Elder abuse is currently an unknown as there has referrals been a lack of focus nationally in this area

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• Development of Adult Multi Agency Safeguarding (+550%) Hub (MASH) will increase referrals and demand • Thresholds in need of development as otherwise demand could be significant. Overall: Demand is likely to increase at predicted levels as currently there is hidden demand. Role of partners (Adult Social Care) is critical. • Mental health prevalence and incidents increasing. • Linked to other aspects of vulnerability and offending • Reduction in Mental Health beds and provision is inconsistent. • 15,797 17,195 Police better at identifying Mental Health. Mental Health • incidents Incidents Mental Health nurses will continue to be based in district hubs and more aligned to problem solving. Overall: Demand is likely to increase at predicted levels due to mental health issues rising in society and lack of funding in this area. When people go into crisis it is more work for police – less acute cases will go to partners via PPN . • The recent increases are predominantly associated with administrative change in relation to Force crime recording processes which have resulted in an increased likelihood of a crime being recorded following an incident report to the Police. • Recent publicity may also have encouraged 6250 9290 Hate Crime victims of hate incidents and crimes to come incidents incidents forward and report their experience to the police. (+48.6%) West Yorkshire Police have had an active communication strategy over the last 12-24 months to raise awareness and ensure we have appropriate communication and reporting options available Overall: Demand is likely to continue to increase • Nationally, it is acknowledged that the true scale Modern 734 and nature of MSHT is still not understood and Slavery/Human 300 offences that it remains a highly under reported crime Trafficking offences (+145%) • Overall: Demand is likely to continue to (MSHT) increase • Steady increase because whilst we are becoming better at identifying new cases, some of them will have already have come to our attention via HBA, FGM, 233 FM 286 FM Domestic Abuse (so this would not be ‘new’ Forced 144 HBA 157 HBA demand). Marriage 86 FGM 32 FGM • Cultural factors very difficult to overcome/Hidden crime Overall: Demand is likely to increase but by small amounts . • Proliferation of technology likely to increase all types of offending. • Labour intensive and very police centric to investigate. Harassment, 18,272 (All 22,621 (All • Legislative changes introduced in April will lead to Stalking and Harassment Harassment an increase in the recording of harassment as an Cyber Bullying Offences) Offences) initial report of malicious communication will also require a recording of harassment, in effect doubling the offences recorded. Very police centric to investigate. Overall: Demand is likely to increase as predicted

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step One: The gap between current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years

Overall Vulnerability Demand

Recent Trends The table below shows that demand around all elements of vulnerability has increased over the last five years and is predicted to continue to increase. One in five of all incidents recorded in West Yorkshire now relate to safeguarding compared to one in six in 2013. These areas of demand are complex and costly, with the Force often dealing with the consequences of vulnerability or the fact that someone is in crisis. Unless there is a partnership approach to address these issues holistically, the demand is predicted to increase putting a continued and significant strain on Force and partners resources.

Demand Change in Safeguarding Demand

Child Sexual West Yorkshire Police has seen a 176% increase in reported CSEA offences Exploitation and since 2013, with 4,347 offences recorded in 2017 Abuse

Missing People Over 21,000 Missing People investigations were recorded in 2017 and these have increased by 287% since 2013 when just 5,600 investigations were recorded. This equates to over 16,000 additional investigations

Repeat Missing Over 2,200 people were reported as being missing on more than one People occasion in 2017/18 (25%). The repeat rate for children is higher at 37%

Modern Day West Yorkshire Police is one of the highest referrers of Potential Victims of Slavery Trafficking to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) with significant increases over the last few years. These offences result in particularly complex investigations and numbers are increasing year on year, from just 19 offences in 2013 to 325 in 2017 (178 of which were in the Force area).

Sexual Offences Increased victim confidence in reporting sexual offence allegations to the police has contributed to a huge rise in offences (to 7,690) since 2013, an increase of 173%. Domestic Abuse Improved recording, increased victim confidence in reporting incidents and Incidents better identification of vulnerability by Officers has resulted in a 51% increase in incidents since 2013 (to over 57,000 in 2017)

Non -Recent Non -recent CSE crimes are increasing and account for almost 40% of Child Sexual those reported (from 24% in 2014/15), which means we have less capacity Exploitation and to be proactive or deal with live-time demand. Abuse

Honour Based Offences are increasing but we do not yet fully understand the nature and Abuse and extent of these hidden crimes . Forced Marriage

Mental Health Almost 16,000 incidents were reported in 2017 where mental health was identified as being a factor. This is a 23% increase compared to 2013, resulting an additional 3,000 mental health incidents being reported.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Domestic Abuse – Current and Predicted Demand

Since 2013 there has been a 51% increase in Domestic Abuse incidents, driven largely by improved crime recording, increased victim confidence in reporting incidents, reporting by third parties and better identification of vulnerability and risk by Officers.

Current Demand • Over the last year, domestic abuse has increased by almost 12% from 51,901incidents to 58,097 . The largest increase has been in violence against the person , which increased by 26.6% (to 26,867 offences) and accounts for 46.24% of domestic abuse incidents (the largest category of domestic abuse). This increase, is in line with an increasing trend around violent crime in general over the last two years. • Non-crime verbal disputes , account for the second largest category of domestic abuse incidents (30.5%) but are on a reducing trend as the Force is increasingly reporting incidents as an actual crime in line with CDI. This shift is a key contributor to an increase in violence without injury. • In terms of risk, whilst most domestic abuse incidents are graded as medium or standard risk, the level of high risk has increased over the last year due to additional training around Domestic Abuse Stalking and Harassment (DASH) assessments and now accounts for 10.3% of incidents. As a consequence of this, the volume of MARAC referrals has also increased by 30% (to 3,699 in 2017). • The repeat rate for both victims and suspects is an increasing trend with 45.1% of all incidents involving a repeat victim in 2017, compared to 35.4% in 2015. Similarly the proportion of domestic abuse incidents involving repeat suspects has increased to 31.8%, compared to 21.4% in 2015. Repeat rates will undoubtedly have been impacted by improved recording practices which have increased the likelihood of the Force recording a domestic incident and subsequently recording a domestic crime. • As volume of domestic abuse has increased so too have arrests. However, despite a positive arrest policy the proportion of domestic incidents which involve an arrest is on a reducing trend and now stands at 33.1%. This then has a potential impact on repeat demand and also leads to more cases of ‘Complainant declines to prosecute’ and more Outcome 16s (suspect known but victim withdrew). In 2017 this accounted for the most outcomes for domestic abuse (45.9%). In part the decline can be explained by the unsuitability of making an arrest for a S4 offence, which would previously been recorded as a verbal dispute and not crime. However, the sheer volume of demand could be another reason. It is critical however, that in terms of preventing repeat demand a robust and positive approach is taken around domestic abuse. • In terms of performance , the ONS place West Yorkshire 5 th in the MSG for domestic abuse with 21.1 incidents per 1000 population as at March 2017 but 2 nd highest nationally in relation to domestic crimes at 12.1 crimes per 1000 population. In 2017, 15.7% of all domestic abuse incidents resulted in a charge/summons and 26.1% of incidents resulted in a positive outcome. Comparative charge/summons rates with other Forces are also available from the ONS (but 69

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED only as at March 2017) and the charge/summons rate for West Yorkshire at 16.4% is just below the average (18.4%) of the 23 Forces who are able to provide this detail. • Domestic abuse demand is high volume, risk levels are increasing as is the level of repeat victimisation and offending. Our focus on this area of demand and our appetite to maximise available powers has led to the volume of Domestic Violence Protection Orders (DVPOs) increasing by 243% in 2017 (an additional 141). In addition to this, the number of Domestic Violence Disclosure requests are increasing (from 147 in 2016 to 303 in 2017; a 106.1% increase) and MARAC referrals are increasing, which all create more demand and workload for the Force in this area.

Predicted Demand Our statistical forecasting using recent trends and assuming domestic incidents continue to increase at the same rate, predicts that there will be an increase of 44.8% (or an additional 26,010 offences) to 84,107 offences by the end of 2021. Key factors influencing demand are as follows:

• We predict a continuing increase in lower level domestic incidents and non-injury violence, and a continuing reduction in non-crime verbal disputes as a consequence of compliance with CDI. However as our compliance with CDI is good and will further improve over the next four years, we do predict a slowing down of the rate of increase linked to CDI. This may then result in less demand than is predicted for 2021 • Changes to harassment recording will lead to increased offences being recorded. CDI also leads us to recording crimes for minor matters which are not suitable for arrest (i.e. Section 4). We therefore predict an increase in demand which may previously have been finalised as a verbal dispute . • Legislation clearly has an impact on demand in providing police with more powers or criminalising behaviours. As knowledge and awareness of ‘Controlling and Coercive Behaviour’ has improved, usage is increasing, however there is still further scope to maximise these powers. • New legislation; the (Draft) Domestic Abuse Bill 2018/19 is also likely to increase demand for the Force and partners as it aims to transform the approach to domestic abuse and ensure victims have confidence to come forward and report their experiences. The establishment of a Domestic Violence and Abuse Commissioner will raise the profile of domestic abuse and the creation of a statutory definition of domestic abuse, along with a consolidated domestic abuse civil prevention and protection order, is likely to provide more opportunities for the police and partners to tackle domestic abuse more effectively, but will also increase demand and scrutiny in this area. • As our risk assessments are improving, the numbers of high risk are likely to increase in the future. Strong partnership arrangements through MARACs , focussing on high risk, should reduce serious cases and the resultant demands, particularly repeat cases. However given austerity measures, partnerships posts in MARACs or Independent Domestic Violence Advocates (IDVAs) are vulnerable which is of concern should demand increase as predicted. • A more positive approach to arrests should reduce repeat incidents and more serious incidents and improve out positive outcome rate. • Ongoing austerity across all public services may lead to increased demand in this area, with a link between financial pressures and domestic abuse. The ONS suggest that austerity impacts disproportionately on women and in particular victims of domestic violence. In addition, continued austerity threatens the provision of services to support victims of domestic abuse, which could lead either lead to increased repeat rates of domestic abuse or a reduction in demand as victims feel less supported to come forward for help. • The presence of children at domestic abuse incidents is a key predictor for future involvement in domestic abuse and is a recognised Adverse Childhood Experience. This is important for future demand and over the last year there were 17,679 domestic abuse incidents where children were present (30.5% of all incidents). Addressing this issue is critical to safeguard vulnerable people and long term demand reduction. 70

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Child Safeguarding and Child Abuse – Current and Predicted Demand

Current Demand • In 2017, there were 20,843 crimes across a range of crime types where a child was linked to the offence as a victim (8.0% of all crime). The figures indicate that children are frequently victims of crime across a range of offences (in particular violence with and without injury, public order, sexual offences and rape). This highlights the potential safeguarding demand in this area. • In terms of Violent Crime , young people are more likely to be victims of this type of offending and both violence against the person and familial violent crime have increased over the last year (22.4% and 34.1% respectively). • In terms of Familial Serious Sexual Offences , offences increased by 17.3% last year (to 638) crimes. The increase in these offences is lower than the overall increase in sexual offences as a whole (28.7%). • In terms of Child Neglect 361 crimes were recorded in 2017 compared to 429 in 2016. We predict that numbers will steadily rise to over 500 offences by 2021 as a result of the introduction of a new referral process. • The volume of Child Sexual Offences Disclosure Scheme (CSDS) requests has increased over the last six years from two in 2011 to 47 in 2017. This is in part due to increased awareness of the Scheme, but also as a result of the increasing number of Registered Sex Offenders (RSOs). • The number of children on Child Protection Plans rose last year to 2,589, after a few years in decline, which is in direct contrast to the increases seen nationally. The number of Plans in West Yorkshire is still however lower than the national average. In direct contrast, the number of children on Children in Need Plans has increased in West Yorkshire (to 17,008) and is above the national average, whereas there has been a decline in numbers across the rest of the country. • In contrast the number of times that a child was taken into Police Protection has fallen from 254 in 2016 to 210 in 2017. This is currently being scrutinised through audits, but it is possible that these have fallen given the numbers increasing on Child Protection and Children in Need Plans (i.e. earlier intervention). • There are currently 3,715 Children in Local Authority Care, which is a steady increase from 3,235 in 2013. Although the numbers in Local Authority Care (71 per 10,000 children) are now similar to the rest of the country, the smaller number of Child Protection Plans means that there is potentially a gap widening in the degree of care given to children at risk in the area and therefore potentially more demand on the police as a consequence of this vulnerability (e.g. missing persons, CSEA etc.).

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Predicted Demand Our statistical forecasting using recent trends predicts that all areas of child safeguarding demand will increase over the next four years . Key factors influencing demand are as follows:

• Different Local Authorities across West Yorkshire have different threshold levels for neglect. We predict that child neglect will increase as a result of the introduction of the Public Protection Notice (PPN) which will be a more auditable and visible process for child neglect referrals. • The National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) report ‘How Safe are our Children’ (2017) notes increasing numbers of contacts with the NSPCC and increasing reports around various aspects of safeguarding including child sexual exploitation and abuse, child cruelty and neglect, indecent images of children and the numbers of children on Child Protection Plans and in Local Authority Care. • West Yorkshire has some of the highest levels of deprivation in the country, with 300 Lower Super Output Areas in the top 10% most deprived areas. Children living in problematic socio- economic conditions and experiencing multiple disadvantage can be vulnerable to neglect and other elements of safeguarding. • We predict an increase in the number of child protection plans to reflect the number of children in Local Authority Care and address the risk that this gap can present. • Research shows that children who are exposed to domestic violence, experience abuse or neglect or whose parent’s struggle with mental health or substance misuse problems are more likely to have behavioural/mental health problems later in life or become involved in crime or violence. These Adverse Childhood Experiences (or ACEs) can have an inter-generational impact and if left unchecked will continue to create demand for agencies and poor outcomes for children and families. The higher the combination of ACEs, the more likely it is there will be negative outcomes. Identifying and focussing on those families with numerous ACEs through early intervention could have an impact on demand but in the much longer term. • It is possible that austerity measures may impact on those services that are responsible for protecting children, such as Social Care. Where there are gaps, it is likely that demand will be picked up by the police. However, with an increasing focus on early intervention and vulnerability it is also possible that demand may be reduced in the much longer term.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse – Current and Predicted Demand

Since 2013 there has been a 176% increase in reported CSEA offences as the Force has invested significantly in addressing the threat, victims’ confidence to report both current and non-recent crimes has increased and the Force has improved its’ recording in line with Crime Data Integrity. The true scale and nature of CSEA is still unknown, but our assessment has found that there are strong connections between those who go missing, those who are in care and those who are at risk of CSE. These individuals are vulnerable and experience Multiple Disadvantage or have Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs). They are more likely to be in local authority care, have mental health and substance misuse issues, come from a background of criminal/anti-social behaviour in the family and are more likely to offend. Dealing with Multiple Disadvantage/ACEs is critical as it has a strong intergenerational component. Breaking the vulnerability cycle is therefore critical as is the involvement of partners especially in prevention and early intervention.

Chart includes all offence types ‘flagged’ as involving Child Sexual Exploitation along with sexual offences where the specific offence type states the victim is aged under 16. All other sexual offences involving a victim aged under the age of 18 are also included. Current Demand • The ongoing upward trend saw an increase in 1267 offences (28.7%) from 2016-17 and we anticipate that this trend will continue. • CSE is complex and costly and is linked to other areas of demand, in particular missing persons. Around 64% of Misper occurrences involve children, and over a third (37%) of these involve a child at risk of CSE (which increases to 45% for girls). • 855 children and 444 suspects were flagged and managed in 2017 in relation to CSE risk. Volumes of these had risen sharply increased from 2015 to 2016 (+27% for children and +77% for suspects) but appear to have stabilised from 2016 to 2017. Regionally, out force consistently records the highest volumes of these. • 11% of CSEA is familial, however, the main threat comes from groups of individuals. The over representation of Asian males as suspects in CSEA brings about broader policing challenges including the policing of right wing extremist demonstrations and protests, impacting on community tensions and cohesion. • In addition to the significant increases in the volume of CSEA investigations, victims and suspects, the number of non-recent investigations have also increased and now account for just over a third of all sexual offences recorded. • Offences involving Indecent Images of Children (IIOC) have increased with 1,059 crimes being recorded during the last 12 months, a 19% increase from 889 in the previous 12 months. 73

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Many of these increases can be attributed to increased proactive work ongoing to identify individuals who share such images, as well as referrals from NCA, CEOP and other Forces, which have increased from 153 in 2010 to 500 in 2017 (226.7% increase). There are no signs that this demand will reduce, in fact with the new ICACCOPS (Internet Crimes against Children – Child Online Protection System) we predict further increases in demand. • As well as proactive work by law enforcement agencies, nationally there is a growing number of offenders being identified by ‘Online CSE Activist Groups’ who pose online as children in order to engage with and entrap adults they believe are attempting to groom children via the internet. The meetings they then arrange have a huge impact on District resources and Digital forensic backlogs. There has been a national increase in these types of offences and of the 125 incidents recorded, 44 (33%) occurred in West Yorkshire.

Predicted Demand Our statistical forecasting using recent trends indicates that CSEA offences could reach almost 10,000 incidents per annum by 2021. Whilst we do expect demand to increase we believe that there are some indications that demand is now stabilising, particularly around on-street grooming where the Force has significantly invested in campaigns to improve awareness and the confidence of victims to report both current and non-recent offences. There are some areas however where we do anticipate that demand will increase: • On-line CSE and Live Streaming is predicted to increase. The pervasive nature of internet capable devices and their ease of use for criminal purposes ensure that future threats around online CSE continue to evolve. The internet has significantly widened IIOC offending beyond the force and UK border and the NCA predict that the numbers of IIOC/live streaming offences will continue to increase. Offenders who live-stream pose a greater threat than online offenders because they directly instigate the immediate physical abuse of the victim. Sexually motivated cyber-enabled blackmail cases are also likely to increase as a result of the increase in livestreaming. • The technology available to law enforcement will also lead to increased demand for the Force. ICACCOPs is an online web interface and will enable Forces to further respond to and tackle, online child sexual abuse. Due to volume there will be a clear need to prioritise workload to higher risk. • We anticipate increased Online CSE activists in this area resulting in increased immediate demand. • The numbers of Looked After Children are continuing to increase and academic studies have shown that such children are more at risk of becoming sexually exploited. As residential care provision is increasing in West Yorkshire (with a gap in terms of Child Protection Plans), it can be expected that children at risk of sexual exploitation will also increase. • It is difficult to predict future trends in the recording of non-recent offences as one enquiry can potentially result in high numbers of offences being recorded. However, the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) is continuing to see increases in non-recent offences. Academia indicate that on average a male can take 20 to 25 years to disclose their victimisation. The Truth Project is giving survivors of abuse an opportunity to tell the Inquiry about their experiences which can then lead to referrals onto the Force.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Missing Persons – Current and Predicted Demand

Since 2013 there has been a 287% increase in the number of Missing People investigations. With over 21,000 missing person occurrences in 2017, this is an additional 16,000 investigations over the last five years.

Current Demand • There has been a 7% increase in missing persons over the last year (from 9400 to 10072) as well as an 8.4% increase in missing person occurrences (from 19,821 to 21,639). This shows that not only are more people going missing, but they are also going missing on more occasions. • Around 66% of Misper occurrences involve children and over a third (37%) are at risk of CSEA. The table below shows that the number going missing is continuing to increase (by 7.46%) as is the number who go missing more than once (by 9.5%). The number of Looked After Children that have gone missing has increased by 5.3%, however the proportion of children going missing that are looked after has decreased slightly.

Missing Children Figures 2016 2017 Change % Change Missing/Absent Children 4290 4636 346 7.46% Occurrences of Missing/Absent Children 12844 14250 1406 9.87% Children with 2 or More Missing Occurrences 1542 1704 162 9.51% Missing/Absent Looked After Children 785 829 44 5.31% Occurrences of Missing/Absent Looked After Children 6828 7322 494 6.75% Proportion of Missing/Absent Children Looked After 18.30% 17.88% -0.42% Proportion of Occurrences of Missing/Absent Children Looked After 53.16% 51.38% -1.78%

• The number of adults going missing has increased by 6% year on year, with similar increases in the number of occurrences. The number of adults who go missing more than once is lower than that of children with a smaller increase (2.5%).

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Missing Adult Figures 2016 2017 Change % Change Missing Adults 5054 5381 327 6.08% Occurrences of Missing Adults 6907 7313 406 5.55% Adults with 2 or More Missing Occurrences 898 921 23 2.50% Missing Adults with a Mental Health Flag 1896 2403 507 21.10% Occurrences of Missing Adults with a Mental Health Flag 3419 4122 703 17.05% Proportion of Missing Adults with a Mental Health Flag 37.51% 44.66% 7.14% Proportion of Occurrences of Missing Adults with a Mental Health Flag 49.50% 56.37% 6.86%

• The repeat rate for all missing occurrences in 2017 was 36.6%. The repeat rate for children is much higher at 50%, whereas for adults the repeat rate was just over 10%. • There are strong associations between missing adults and mental health , with around 22% of occurrences involving people with mental health issues, which increases to 60% for those over 65 (an indicator of dementia). • So far this year 88% of mispers with a Risk Level were Medium or High Risk, compared to 68% last year, indicating risk levels are intensifying, creating a higher level of response required from officers. The risk is not necessarily increasing, more that officers are now better at identifying risk.

Predicted Demand Our statistical forecasting, predicts an increase of 14.5% for missing and absent occurrences by 2021 (additional 3216 occurrences). Key factors influencing demand are as follows: • Given the predominance of children who go missing, the high level of repeat rate and the increasing number of children in Local Authority Care, we predict that demand around Missing Children in a care setting is likely to increase. • There are currently 107 children’s homes in West Yorkshire (62% privately owned) and numbers are continuing to increase. New, private emerging children’s homes with less stringent policies and sometimes a lack of information sharing means that there will still be an increase of children in care reported as Missing if these businesses don’t take true “parental responsibility”. The relatively low cost of housing means West Yorkshire is an attractive location for more private homes. This is a threat for the Force as these often house particularly vulnerable people who are at risk of going missing, CSEA and other vulnerabilities. • LSE analysis shows that there are three areas (Bradford East, Bradford West and Dewsbury) where missing person levels are a significant variation from predicted demand. This reflects the growing number of children’s homes in these areas. • We are starting to understand in more detail the criminal exploitation threats associated with county lines and vulnerable people, with children who go missing and in particular those in a care setting being particularly at risk. National research has found that boys are particularly vulnerable to drugs running and crime and girls for CSE. It is likely that as we start to focus more on this area demands around vulnerability as well as organised crime will increase. • We predict that the numbers of people with a mental health flag who go missing will continue to increase and with a current lack of provision for mental health, those reaching crisis point are predicted to increase. These are particularly high risk individuals for the Force. • With increased demand and risk levels increasing, there is a threat that we do not invest in medium or low risk mispers , which could then escalate. However, with excessive demand there is a clear need to focus on threat. • Long term we predict that our new Neighbourhood Model and it focus on signals of risk and early intervention will have an impact on missing persons demand as we attempt to problem solve key factors around vulnerability. • Increased migration flows including arrivals of economic migrants/asylum seekers UK is leading to those who claim to be under 18 going missing before they can be properly registered or have their age assessed by authorities. Coupled with significant demands on local policing and partner agencies in dealing with other missing person cases, there is potential for pressures caused by missing persons to remain high or increase further. 76

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Sexual Offences – Current and Predicted Demand

Since 2013 there has been a 173% increase in sexual offences to 7,690 offences recorded in 2017. This is primarily due to compliance with Crime Data Integrity, more effective processing of data on Force systems and increased confidence of victims to report both current and non-recent offences.

Current Demand

• West Yorkshire has the highest rate for all Sexual offences in the MSG, with 3.35 offences per 1000 population compared with an MSG average of 2.82. The Force also has the highest rate for rape offences in the MSG at 1.25 per 1000 population compared to an MSG average of 1.01 . • As the number of sexual offences has increased, so too has the repeat victimisation rate, increasing from 13.3% in 2016 to 16% in 2017. • Between 2016 and 2017 serious sexual offences increased by 1688 (36.8%). With the largest increases being seen in offence categories of ‘rape of a female’ and ‘sexual assault of a female’ • The outcome rate for all sexual offences in 2017 (including charge/summons, cautions, PNDs and community resolution) is the lowest in the MSG at 10.6%. The outcome rate for rape offences is also the lowest in the MSG at 8.7%, (MSG average is 10.3%). The outcome rates in West Yorkshire have been particularly impacted by the significant increases in crimes being recorded as highlighted above however reassuringly the number of offences (all sexual offences and rape offences) resulting in a charge or summons remains relatively unchanged ensuring that the Force is still prosecuting as many sexual offenders as we were 12 months ago.

Predicted Demand

• Statistical projections indicate that over 12,000 sexual offences will be recorded each year by 2021. • This increase is being driven by serious sexual offences, with both rape and sexual assault predicted to increase. Part of this projected increase will continue to be as a result of improvements in crime recording and the confidence of victims to report such offences. It is difficult to assess how much of the increase is as a result of an increased risk in becoming a victim.

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Adult Safeguarding – Current and Predicted Demand

• Safeguarding occurrences for adults at risk have doubled in the last 12 months. Whilst it is not expected that the rate of increase will be as great as seen during 2017 it is predicted that occurrences will continue to increase as we understand more and put more effective processes in place for adult safeguarding.

• It is also predicted that the trend around incidents of concern for safety , which involve a vulnerable adult/dementia will increase and approach 100,000 annually .

Projection (12 month rolling total) 120000 96,837 100000 80502 80000

60000

40000

20000

0 Jul 2015 Jul 2016 Jul 2017 Jul 2018 Jul 2019 Jul 2020 Jul 2021 Jul Apr Apr 2015 Oct 2015 Apr 2016 Oct 2016 Apr 2017 Oct 2017 Apr 2018 Oct 2018 Apr 2019 Oct 2019 Apr 2020 Oct 2020 Apr 2021 Oct 2021 Jan 2016 Jan 2017 Jan 2018 Jan 2019 Jan 2020 Jan 2021 Jan 2022 Jan

Current Demand • In relation to ‘ Adult at Risk’ occurrences, there were 1661 incidents in 2017 compared to 828 in 2016 (100% increase). • In the last year there have been 22 offences recorded which relate to care workers neglecting, ill-treating or breaching their duty of care . However, only one offence has resulted in a charge and it is therefore difficult to predict future demand. However, with an increasing elderly

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED population and an increasing number in care, coupled with increasing ‘professional curiosity’ around adult safeguarding, it is anticipated that such incidents will increase. • Between the two years of 2016 and 2017 there has been a 9.7% increase in offences committed against victims over the age of 65 , from 10,765 offences to 11,805. However analysis indicates that the majority of this increase is due to improvements in crime recording with around 5% relating to actual risk. It is predicted that this trend will continue and that in four years’ time the total will be approaching 14,000 annually • Incidents with a concern for safety or have a qualifier for Vulnerable Adult/Dementia have increased to 2,319 incidents (3%) increase.

Predicted Demand Our statistical forecasting predict significant increases in adult safeguarding demand. Key factors influencing demand are as follows:

• The population is expected to increase by 9.7 million over the next 25 years and the elderly population is growing at the fastest rate . Research suggests a 25% increase in people who will need care between 2015 and 2025. This equates to an estimated 2.8 million over 65 needing nursing and social care. The research also suggests that cases of disability related to dementia will increase by 40% among people aged over 65. This has significant issues for police and partners in terms of adult safeguarding demand around crime, neglect, abuse and exploitation. An increasing focus on the need for ‘professional curiosity’ of police and partners in adult safeguarding will also lead to increased demand and referrals. • Although Child MASH partnerships are now well established in West Yorkshire, Vulnerable Adult Partnerships are not as advanced as they are not required by statute. However Bradford District does have an Adult MASH and as a result accounts for the majority of safeguarding occurrences reported. We predict that as we develop more closer partnership working in this area and improve Officer’s identification of risk, adult safeguarding incidents, which may previously have been hidden demand will increase significantly in the same way that child safeguarding did. Of great importance however will be the need to develop thresholds for referrals to ensure we are focused on risk. There is the danger of vulnerable adults contacting the police for support when other support mechanism are in short supply. • There is increased opportunity for online exploitation of elderly people (e.g. financial scams) in the digital age. However, as with other crimes, this is perhaps more about committing crimes against the elderly differently as in the past this may have been bogus officials.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Mental Health – Current and Predicted Demand

Demand around mental health is difficult to quantify. However from the data that is collected it is clear that incidents involving mental health have significantly increased over the last five years from 12,962 in 2013 to 15,975 in 2017 (23% increase).

Projection (12 month rolling total) 20000 17,195 18000 15975 16000 14000 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 Jul 2015 Jul 2016 Jul 2017 Jul 2018 Jul 2019 Jul 2020 Jul 2021 Apr Apr 2015 Oct 2015 Apr 2016 Oct 2016 Apr 2017 Oct 2017 Apr 2018 Oct 2018 Apr 2019 Oct 2019 Apr 2020 Oct 2020 Apr 2021 Oct 2021 Jan 2016 Jan 2017 Jan 2018 Jan 2019 Jan 2020 Jan 2021 Jan 2022 Jan

Current Demand

• Demand around mental health is complex as it is an underpinning cause of many crime/vulnerability issues. Around 22% of missing person occurrences involve mental health (which increases to 60% for those over 65) and there are also strong correlations with substance misuse and crime. Research by University College London and Kings College suggests that 40% of women and 20% of men with a serious mental illness who are a victim of serious sexual assault or domestic abuse will go on to inflict self-harm, attempt or commit suicide. • In 2017 around 43% of all arrestees had an entry on their mental health risk assessment, with approximately 43 incidents flagged as being associated with mental health problems every day. Research suggest that 90% of prisoners have one or more mental health issues which clearly has implications for Integrated Offender Management (IOM). • The chart below shows the proportion of arrests where mental health is a factor is (43% in 2017).

The chart above represents the total number of primary arrests during the period - With the number of which where the risk assessment indicates mental health issues from the following question; 80

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- “If you are suffering from mental health problems, depression or considered mentally vulnerable we must put specific support in place. Do you need this support?”

• In terms of s136 occurrences , there has been an increase over the last three years in the number of non-custody s136 (from 959 in 2015 to 1166 in 2017) and a significant reduction in s136 custody (from 111 in 2016 to 47 in 2017). This is positive and reflects significant progress made with Health Partners around the Crisis Care Concordat and more recent changes introduced in the Policing and Crime Act, which states that adults can only be taken to custody suites (rather than a place of safety) under exceptional circumstances.

Predicted Demand

Our statistical forecasting predicts and increase in mental health incidents. Key factors influencing demand are as follows: • Mental health is an underpinning factor associated with vulnerability and offending . Based on recent trends and the numbers of arrestees flagged for mental health, we predict that incidents relating to mental health are likely to continue to increase. • Despite progress made on the Crisis Care Concordat , more people are going into crisis without support mechanisms in place. The intention of the Concordat was to ensure early intervention to avoid such crisis. • Funding for mental health services remains problematic with a shortage of beds and mental health provision. This means that the police will continue to see significant demand around mental health. • As we are better identifying mental health, demand is clearly going to increase. • Given the aging population and the high proportion of elderly people who go missing with a mental health issue (60%) we predict, these will continue to increase. • Mental Health detentions are likely to continue to increase, but this will be driven by those detainees who are taken directly to a Place of Safety as opposed to a police station. We anticipate further reductions in s136 custody detentions . A potential threat however is that partners do not fulfil their obligations for sufficient places of safety with sufficient staff to cope with demand. • Mental Health Triage Nurses have been effective in terms of advising on mental health incidents in DCRs. However the longer term benefit would be to embed them into a wider problem solving approach, which reduce demand longer term.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Hate Crime and incidents – Current and Predicted Demand

Since 2013 there has been a 199% increase in hate incidents, largely as a result of proactive campaigns to improve reporting, but also as a result of improved crime recording in line with Crime Data Integrity.

Current Demand

• Over the last 12 months there has been a 15% increase in hate incidents from 5,435 offences in 2016 to 6,250 in 2017, with all strands of hate crime increasing. Hate crime is however assessed as stable as the increase is primarily associated with compliance with CDI. • Race hate accounts for 75% of all hate crime (4,652 offences), followed by Sexual Orientation (10%) and Disability (8.6%). • In terms of Faith hate , of the 335 offences in 2017, almost 65% were Anti-Islamic hate crime. This is significantly higher than the next largest faith which was Anti-Semitic hate crimes which accounted for 11.2%. • There has been a 33.8% increase in hate incidents involving a repeat victim , however, the repeat victimisation rate has only increased marginally and stands at 17.9%. • There has been a 112% increase in cyber-enabled hate crime in the last 12 month from 82 in 2016 to 174 in 2017. However, the proportion of hate crimes that are cyber-enabled remains low at 3%. • Overall satisfaction of hate incident victims stands at 72.9%, which is a reduction of 6.2 percentage points on the previous year. The decline has been driven primarily by a reduction in satisfaction of being kept informed of progress. This reflects a general reducing trend around victim satisfaction. • The volume of hate incidents which involved an arrest have reduced by 10%, leading to a reduction of 4% in the proportion of hate incidents which involved an arrest. • In terms of positive outcomes, overall 9.5% of all hate crimes resulted in a charge/summons in 2017.

Predicted Demand

Based on recent trends, and assuming that hate incidents continue to increase at the same rate over the next three years, we predict that hate crime incidents will increase by around 48% by 2021. Key factors influencing demand are as follows: • National and local Hate Crime campaigns aim to promote awareness of hate crimes and also encourage victims to come forward and report when they have been a victim of crime. These media and engagement activities are also likely to have contributed, in part to the recent increases in hate crimes and will continue to do so in the future. • Whilst still small in number it is anticipated that cyber-enabled hate crime will increase over the next four years in line with the increasing use of technology to facilitate a wide range of 82

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED crimes and the general increase in the cyber threat. This increase may be further affected by the Law Commission review of offensive online communications, including the Malicious Communications Act 1998 and Communications Act 2003 to address issues of online trolling. • It is unclear how Brexit will impact on hate crime over the next few years. There was an increase in hate crime in the immediate aftermath of the EU referendum. With ongoing negotiations over Brexit and the uncertainty over the eventual deal, it is possible hate crime may increase if those who voted for Brexit around immigration issues become increasingly frustrated that what they thought would happen doesn’t materialise. This could also lead to broader threats around community cohesion. Of note, the Cabinet Office work around the Race Disparity Audit, launched in 2017, cites Bradford as a key hot spot area to consider ways of informing policy in three areas: employment opportunities, challenges for education and integration of communities, meaning the residents within Bradford district may become more of a national focus. • National and international issues such as terrorism, extremism, conflicts and migration can also have an impact on community cohesion, public order and hate crime. It has been predicted that the terrorist/jihadist activity will continue to increase for as long as the activists, recruited in the early 2010s are politically active (i.e. 15-20 years) which may well have an impact on hate crime, particularly in West Yorkshire with its diverse and complex communities. • NPCC are developing a new national online hate crime hub which is planned to be operational by the end of 2017. It will aim to ensure all cases of hate crime reported online are properly investigated and managed in an effective and efficient manner . Cases are to be referred to the national hub via the existing Truevision website which is used by victims to report hate crime. The Home Office expects the hub will lead to an increase in prosecutions of online hate crimes and could also lead to the development of best practice through a network of hate crime leads at force level. • Currently West Yorkshire Police record against the five Home Office monitored Hate strands (namely disability, race, religion, sexual orientation and transgender identity). Further national NPCC work may mandate an additional strand of misogynistic or gender based hate crime, meaning the total volume of hate crime may increase.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Modern Slavery/Human Trafficking (MSHT) – Current and Predicted Demand

West Yorkshire Police is one of the highest referrers of Potential Victims of Trafficking (PVoT) to the National Referral Mechanism with significant increases over the last few years. These offences result in particularly complex investigations and numbers are increasing year on year, from just 19 offences in 2013 to 300 in 2017 (178 of which were in the Force area).

Current Demand • In 2017 the Force recorded 300 offences of modern day slavery. This is an increase of 121 (68%) when compared with 2016. We currently have 153 operations and investigations ongoing. Of these 78 people were arrested and 17 charged with offences. The arrests and charges were predominantly around domestic CSE. • This increase is in line with the average increase seen across the MSG over the last year (recorded crimes across the MSG have increased by 99.8%). • The Force ranks 7th in the MSG (based on MSHT crimes per 1,000 population for the year to July 2017). This should be seen as a positive and reflects the efforts of the Force to improve understanding and recognition of MSHT. • Bradford District accounts for over half of all crimes, with Kirklees and Leeds accounting for 20% each. • West Yorkshire is currently the leading force nationally for MSHT OCG disruptions, accounting for 61% of all disruptions. • The Force remains one of the highest referrers of PVoTs to the NRM. Around 75% of PVoTs are from countries within the EU. Aside from UK nationals, countries with the most victims are; Hungary, Poland and Vietnam. This is a changing trend away from PVoTs being from within the EU. • There is also a strong correlation between the nationality of the suspect and victim in that they come from the same countries . The top nationalities of suspects in West Yorkshire are United Kingdom, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. • Our most recent intelligence assessment has highlighted an increase in Pakistani victims predominantly female who through marriage have been victims of domestic servitude and other exploitation in the UK.

Predicted Demand • Nationally, it is acknowledged that the true scale and nature of MSHT is still not understood and that it remains a highly under reported crime. The NCA estimate that there are 13,000 victims of MSHT. • Based on current trends, the volume of reported MSHT offences is expected to increase to 734 by 2021. This increase is likely to be driven by a developing intelligence picture, increased willingness to report and a greater awareness with improved officer training, partnership working and more co-ordinated processes. • Ongoing uncertainty as a result of Brexit may limit the pool of victims from EU countries, driving traffickers and exploiters to seek out vulnerable UK nationals and oversees nationals from outside the EU, most frequently illegal immigrants. The exploitation of illegal immigrants in its nature is more likely to be in a hidden form, such as drug cultivation or domestic servitude. • It is anticipated that there will be an increase in the utilisation of Modern Slavery legislation in the sexual exploitation of vulnerable adults. As with CSE this use of the legislation is deemed a positive measure in combatting all forms of trafficking and exploitation. • Through the Anti-Trafficking Network and District forums, processes for partnership working have and continue to improve. These improvements will drive up the volumes of crimes and intelligence. • Global uncertainty caused by conflict has continued in 2017 and this can be a factor influencing both MSHT and illegal immigration. It is conceivable that displaced diaspora are being 84

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED exploited within the area within hidden forms of exploitation and therefore there is a possibility over the next few years that there will be an emergence of victims from countries such as Syria and Libya. • Ongoing work to uncover hidden exploitation types such as domestic servitude will continue to increase recorded offences and victims. This links to Forced Marriage (Immigration Crime), recent intelligence regarding the travelling community and intelligence from operational activity relating to domestic servitude and sexual exploitation.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Honour Based Abuse, Female Genital Mutilation and Forced Marriage – Current and Predicted Demand

Whilst the number of incidents of Honour Based Abuse (HBA), Forced Marriage (FM) and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) have increased over the last few years, we acknowledge that these are largely hidden crimes and consequently under reported and current demand therefore is unlikely to reflect the scale of the problem. Intelligence submissions across all three areas are low. However, we predict that as with other areas of vulnerability, as we improve our understanding in these areas and improve the confidence of victims to report these crimes, then demand in these areas will increase. It is important to note that HBA is intrinsically linked to FM. The majority of HBA intelligence relates to abuse following an arranged marriage or abuse following the discovery of a relationship that is not approved by the victim’s family.

Current Demand

• Honour Based Abuse (HBA) has increased by 9.0% from 144 crimes in 2016 to 157 in 2017. Just under half of incidents occur in Bradford which has a high Asian population (with 93% of victims being Asian). Almost 85% of victims are female and 20% under 18. Suspects tend to be partners or family members related to the victim (parents, siblings, uncles etc.). • All crimes require investigations and may require additional safeguarding measures to be put in place. Occurrences include both crime and non-crimes, some of the more serious being rape/sexual, false imprisonment, harassment, domestic abuse, threats to kill, and assaults. • Forced Marriage (FM) crimes and incidents have increased by 22.7% from 233 crimes in 2016 to 286 in 2017. Non-crimes remain stable but there have been 16 more Court Orders to protect people against Forced Marriage (an increase of 48.5%) but 14 fewer referrals (32.6% reduction). • Due to the intrinsic link with HBA, almost half of incidents (42%) occurred in Bradford, with 88.5% of victims being Asian, 90% female and almost a third (32.3%) under 18. • Low numbers of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) are recorded with a fall in offences being recorded in 2017 with victims originating from African countries. • No recorded crimes relate to children having undergone FGM in the UK or being removed from the UK and subjected to FGM. The crimes almost exclusively relate to FGM having been identified on an adult female who underwent the procedure in their country of origin as a child. • FGM is often discovered by medical staff (e.g. doctors, midwives), social services (e.g. where children are taken into care) and schools (e.g. student complaints). NHS data for 2016-17 shows that 87% of NHS discoveries were via midwifery or obstetrics, the average age of women being 31 at the time of discovery, and 95% having undergone FGM as children aged under 18. Their data supports the notion that FGM is a ‘hidden’ crime which goes unreported and undiscovered until a professional becomes involved in one of the ways above. ‘Historic’ crimes are notoriously more difficult for police to investigate. • Third parties are a major source of reporting to the Police for FGM, with 18 third party referrals and disclosures recorded all of which were ‘Child Protection’ occurrences. Several of the crimes were also reported via third parties. As FGM is almost exclusively carried out on children and often involves suspects who are close family members (such as parents), victims are often unwilling to co-operate with criminal investigations. This, along with their age at the

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED time the offence was committed, are some reasons for not reporting, as is feeling ashamed of having had an FGM procedure.

Predicted Demand Based on our forecasting tool we predict a small increase in demand around HBA and FM and that the levels of FGM will remain static:

• It is predicted that HBA and FM incidents will continue to increase as we undertake more campaigns, awareness training is delivered and a greater understanding and identification of crime types improves. However, due to the hidden nature of the crimes, and that most victims do not wish to pursue an investigation or prosecution, it is not anticipated that the rises will be excessive. HBA in particular is likely to be a much bigger issue than police data suggests; the controlling nature of the offences, including the removal of the victim’s liberty and finances are factors in this remaining a hidden crime. • We predict a greater increase in HBA as it has wider scope across different crime types. It is likely that there will be more volume but not necessarily a lot more demand as some domestic abuse incidents might also be identified as HBA. • It is likely that HBA will increase both in the number of crimes reported to police and actual occurrences as the factors which lead to abuse are less accepted by potential victims e.g. arranged/forced marriage and individuals choosing their own partners. • Instances of FM is likely to increase , as although the cultural practise of arranged marriage is now less accepted by young men and women, as a result it is likely coercion and threats will be used to ensure this practise continues. • Themes within intelligence relate to Arranged/Forced Marriages taking place to facilitate the entry of non EU citizens in to the UK. Britain’s withdrawal from the EU may lead to an increase in sham marriage to facilitate entry into the UK. This has already been identified as an emerging threat by the NCA in the National Strategic Assessment. • FGM is predicted to remain static . The high number of disclosures and referrals in 2016 reflected changes in legislation. However, analysis of the figures show that many of the reports came from the NHS and were concerning adult women who had given birth and attended gynaecological appointments but do not constitute crimes. Any rises are largely dependent on Health and whether they have accurate and proactive reporting of risk. However, of the top 10 countries for immigration into the UK, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nigeria have groups who practice FGM and consequently there is still the potential for this ‘hidden’ demand to be taking place in the UK.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Harassment, stalking and cyber bullying – Current and Predicted Demand

Current Demand

• Whilst a small reduction in harassment offences has been reported in the past 12 months, the number of stalking offences have increased considerably and offences of malicious communications have also increased significantly by 35%, equating to an additional 4,000 offences. • The Force does not currently have an accurate understanding of online/cyber offences as currently the application of a cyber flag is a manual process. A fix has recently been implemented and will within the next three months mean the Force will have a near 100% accurate picture of demand. • A reduction has been seen in the number of cyber related harassment offences of 14%, which is a reflection of the reduction in harassment offences overall. Cyber related stalking and malicious communications offences both saw an increase in line with the increases seen in the overall offences. • The proportion of harassment offences that are cyber related (283) is stable over time and whilst stalker related offences (that are cyber related) have increased, the numbers remain relatively low (23). Malicious communication offences and those that are cyber related have increased more significantly and over one quarter of malicious communication offences in 2017 were cyber related (3088). • Domestic Abuse was a factor in 50% of harassment offences in 2017 and this compares to 59% of stalking offences and 29% of malicious communication offences. Race was a factor in just 3% of harassment offences, 1% of stalking offences and 2.3% of malicious communications offences. • The use of Harassment notices have decreased significantly by 492.3% in 2017 compared to 2016 in line with a change in Force policy in February 2017.

Predicted Demand

Based on recent trends, harassment, stalking and malicious communication offences as a whole are predicted to increase by 24% by 2021. Key factors include:

• Legislative changes introduced on 1 st April 2018 will lead to an increase in the recording due to the need record harassment / stalking as well as any principal offence. This increase however will reflect CDI compliance rather than increased risk. • Both stalking and malicious communications have increased at a high rate over the last 12 months due to increased recording which is most likely a result of improved CDI combined with the impact of technology growth and changing public attitudes.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • The cyber element across all three areas is predicted to increase. Capturing the evidence and the investigations that follow are complex and lengthy.

Step Two: The current status of the workforce and other assets in terms of responding to the demand types

Effectiveness

• The most recent HMICFRS PEEL Inspection graded the Force as ‘Good’ in relation to Vulnerability, indicating the Force has good capability in this area. • Other measures of capability include performance measures, outcomes and satisfaction and these outline our need for improvement is some areas:

Position in MSG Outcome Rate Other issues Domestic Abuse 5th in MSG in relation to West Yorkshire reports the Satisfaction – 85% which Incidents (to March 2017) highest % of domestic is improving and much Highest in MSG and 2 nd abuse-related police referrals higher than for acquisitive highest Nationally in relation to the CPS that resulted in a crime offences. to Domestic Crimes (to charge compared to all other March 2017) Forces (March 2017), Sexual Offences 8th in MSG 7th in MSG (8.4% Charge Rate) Outcome Rates are Serious Sexual 8th in MSG 8th in MSG (8.1% Charge impacted by the high Offences rate) volume of offences Rape 8th in MSG 6th in MSG (7.4% Charge recorded by the Force Rate) Human 7th in MSG (indicates No comparative data Trafficking proactive approach) available Hate Crime 7th in MSG 9.5% Satisfaction rates (Racially/Religiously reducing. Aggravated offences)

Capacity and Capability The Force has invested in dedicated resources at Districts and specialist resources in Protective Service Crime to deal with this growing and complex area of demand and has strong partnership arrangements in place. As Step One has identified, all aspects of safeguarding demand are predicted to grow, some fairly significantly and such demand is outstripping and putting considerable strain on resources particularly within the context of inexperienced officers and investigative capacity/capability. In specialist areas such as safeguarding, workloads are high, investigations complex, demand for specialist training is increasing and we continue to struggle to attract and retain experienced staff, reflecting a national shortage and competing demand for the required skillset.

Domestic Abuse, Sexual Offences and Adult Safeguarding

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED *These districts have a wider responsibility of all adult safeguarding and not solely domestic abuse

• All Districts have Safeguarding Units and a dedicated Domestic Abuse Team or deal with Domestic Abuse within their adult safeguarding portfolio. The above table shows the actual versus full-time equivalent posts in adult safeguarding (domestic abuse, stalking and harassment). As can be seen there is currently a gap in most Districts around full-time equivalent posts. Increasing demand and vacancies across Safeguarding Units has the potential to prevent quality investigations. • Workloads in Safeguarding Units are higher than in most other roles and average 10-15 crimes per officer, with heavier workloads in the larger Districts. The OIC has personal responsibility for safety planning with the victim throughout the investigation and at key times in the process such as bail, charge or court. • Whilst current systems make it difficult to confirm the certainty, the district average for supervisor ratios for domestic abuse/adult safeguarding is 1:7. • Domestic abuse third sector agencies are available in all five Districts and victims are signposted to the relevant agency for ongoing support. IDVAs work in all the areas but there are capacity issues and they are often only able to assist the high risk cases. Predicted increases in demand coupled with uncertainty of funding threatens future capacity of IDVAs to respond in the future. • There are strong partnership arrangements with daily MARAC or Daily Risk Assessment Meetings (DRAMs) in each District to safeguard victims and provide early intervention. MARAC referrals have increased by 30% over the last year, which corresponds with improved capability to identify high risk cases (responding to a previous HMIC AFI), but also presents challenges around capacity to manage the demand. In addition, ongoing austerity measures threaten funded domestic abuse posts, when there is likely to be increased need for them with not only increasing demand and repeat victimisation, but also increased focus and scrutiny through the draft Domestic Abuse Bill. • Only one District (Bradford) has a dedicated Adult MASH which is co-located with Adult Social Care. This consists of one Sergeant, one constable and a Police Staff Vulnerable Adult’s Co-ordinator. If demand increases as anticipated around adult safeguarding, the Force may not have sufficient capacity to deal with the threat. Of crucial importance therefore is the need for partners to be considering the threshold at which cases should be referred to the police. • The College of Policing are introducing the ‘ Licence to Practice’ in order to improve skills and professionalism, but this may be an inhibitor to the recruitment and retention of officers as currently there is no recognised specialist course for adult safeguarding. • Whilst the Force has around 600 Specially Trained Officers (STOs ) who are responsible for the initial response to rape and serious sexual offences, the actual number of STOs who are in deployable roles is low. The Force has therefore delivered training courses over the last year as well as a refresher day to improve capability in this area and has further courses planned for 2018/19. • The force has a dedicated Sexual Assault Referral Centre (SARC) which runs both adult and paediatric services. The Adult and Paediatric SARC’s are delivered from the same building and work is ongoing to re-locate to larger premises, where there will be an opportunity to increase the number of video interview suites available, as well as introducing live court links. • West Yorkshire has a number of Independent Sexual Violence Advisor (ISVA) services, some Rape Crisis Centres based locally within districts and a service which is commissioned to provide the support across West Yorkshire. Referral pathways are embedded and there is good communication between the ISVA teams, the SARC and the Force through quarterly operational meetings. • The Force is also represented on the CPS Rape Scrutiny Panel which also has members from the 3 rd sector organisations. Learning from these panels is disseminated force wide to ensure that continuous improvements are made. Senior Leaders have received additional training from CPS regarding coercive and controlling behaviour to better understand how this fits within domestic rapes and sexual offences.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Forced Marriage, Honour Based Abuse and Female Genital Mutilation

• Given the relatively low volume, capacity to address Forced Marriage, Honour Based Abuse and FGM is sufficient. There are currently no dedicated teams to address these crimes, other than in Bradford which accounts for over half of the demand around HBA and FM and therefore has a dedicated HB/FM Co-ordinator. • Whilst volume is low and not anticipated to increase significantly, a Forced Marriage investigation and potential prosecution may take over 12 months and involve travel to foreign countries and significant interagency work on a national scale. This crime type would also fall into a type of Honour Based Abuse and likely to be led by an SIO. Such cases may require additional safeguarding measures to be put in place to support the victim. We do recognise capability issues associated with these hidden crimes and that there are limited staff trained to investigative standards. • We acknowledge that FM, HBA and FGM are hidden crimes and often victims do not want to or have the confidence to report to the police. We are working closely with Karma Nirvana a third sector charity, which has driven three day training to Safeguarding SPOCs and awareness to CCC supervisors to highlight the indicators of HBA/FM. A recent research proposal has also been supported by the N8 Steering Group to work with Karma Nirvana to better understand HBA demand. • A process and information sharing for Forced Marriage Protection Orders is lacking nationally. However Partnership steering groups have been established with the police, CPS, Local Authorities and Third Sector to improve capabilities and share good practice.

Child Safeguarding and Child Sexual Exploitation

The following staffing levels for Child Safeguarding and CSE show a healthier picture in relation to capacity, although as can be seen below the position in Bradford is more of a risk, especially as a significant amount of demand comes from Bradford.

Established Actual FTE Established Actual FTE District FTE post posts FTE posts posts (Sgts) (Sgts) (Officers) (Officers) Bradford 3 3 33.82 40.92 Calderdale 3 3 11 12 Kirklees 3 3 11 12 Leeds 3 3 22 22 Wakefield 3 2 24.23 24 TOTAL 18 17 102.05 110.92

• Each District has a dedicated Child Sexual Exploitation Investigation Team . They are resourced to enable them to spend time with victims supporting them to make disclosures, often over a protracted period of time. The table below shows the staffing figures for dedicated CSE teams, with additional support from clerical staff. Each of the CSE Teams are co-located to a varying degree with partners which is critical in managing this threat.

District Actual FTE Established FTE Actual FTE Established FTE posts (Sgts) post (Sgts) posts (Officers) posts (Officers) Bradford 4 4 22.56 24.56 Calderdale 3 3 6 6 Kirklees 1 11 16.03 16.03 Leeds 1 1 17.65 17.65 Wakefield 1 1 7.4 7.4 TOTAL 11 11 69.64 71.64

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • The complexity of CSE investigations and the capacity and capability required can be illustrated most effectively by outlining just one example of a policing operation in 2016 which implicated three suspects: o Dedicated staffing for the operation included a Detective Sergeant, four Detective constables, two Investigative Officers and an Analyst. o A second victim was identified. In excess of 11 Achieving Best Evidence (ABE) interviews were conducted since the initial disclosure, this process is not yet complete nearly two years later. o Eight further victims have been identified. o In excess of 3500 different social media message exchanges have been reviewed to look at a victimless prosecution, this has taken five months so far and is still ongoing. o 11 suspects have been arrested which involved 50 officers over a three day period. o 58 witnesses have been identified and are currently being spoken to. o 25 communication devices have been seized and have required reviewing . • There are currently 23 separate policing operations focussed on non-recent CSE allegations , which by their nature present significant capacity and capability challenges. This include the need for dedicated officers given that most investigations involve multiple victims and suspects, evidential and third party material being harder to locate and the need to centrally co-ordinate complex arrests operations. The abstraction of officers dedicated to non-recent offences also places pressure on the capacity to respond to ‘live’ cases and young people who are potentially in immediate threat. • There have been a number of Serious Case Reviews in Bradford, Kirklees and Wakefield. This along with the ‘Inadequate’ grading of Social Care in Kirklees and the ongoing pressure for a public inquiry in Bradford, puts strain on all agencies involved. In particular, Local Authorities are struggling to retain staff in Social Care. • An audit has been carried out to review the number of SCAIDP (Serious Child Abuse Investigators Programme) trained officers within the Safeguarding Units and has revealed insufficient numbers of SCAIDP trained officers. There is a need for further training to ensure that all officers are adequately trained or working towards accreditation and additional courses have been scheduled. • The recruitment and retention of Detectives and Specialist Officers remains a risk for the Force and is reflected as a Red Risk on the Strategic Risk Register. Whilst it is an aspiration that all staff in Safeguarding will complete the Trainee Investigator (TI) programme and become accredited Detectives, it is not realistic at present with the current lack of Detectives However, there are currently some staff who are Trainee Investigators and working towards accreditation. • Due to demand in this area, some Districts are allocating officers to non-accredited officers, which may potentially impact on the quality of investigations . • An AFI from the latest PEEL Inspection is that the Force should ensure officers and staff have appropriate and professional skills and experience to investigate complex cases involving vulnerable victims and that these investigations are supervised effectively. • Awareness around ACEs, signals of risk and trauma informed policing is being rolled out to both Neighbourhood and Safeguarding Staff as this will both help predict demand and reduce vulnerability long term.

Missing Persons • The high level of demand and predicted demand around missing persons is creating capacity issues for the Force. Given the volume of demand and the increasing number of high risk, there are capacity issues to deal with lower graded cases . • Whilst there are no dedicated Missing Person Teams, all Districts have Missing Co- ordinators who focus on partnership work, mainly around Social Care given that Children’s Homes present the biggest area of demand for the Force. For high risk cases a Special Operations Room (SOR) will usually be opened with dedicated staff and SIO led.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • Given the connections between missing and other areas of vulnerability such as CSE and Mental Health, the role of partners is critical . However, there are also capacity issues for other agencies such as Social Care (in relation to young people in a care setting) and Health (in relation to mental health). Staffing of children’s homes is often minimal, which can lead to sometimes unnecessary and repeat demand created for the police when a child fails to return after a curfew time and staff not having capacity to undertake their initial duties. • Local Authorities are now however starting to commit to attendance in SOR for high risk missing in daytime hours to hold joint risk and assist speedy return of child. Local Authorities need to take on the “responsible parent” role and progress is being made in some areas. • The quality of Misper 7 returns is a concern as is the quality of enquiries undertaken. It is critical that quality is improved in order to improve understanding of why people go missing in order to prevent repeats or escalation of risk. The new Misper Module on Niche is currently under development, and a new list of Misper Occurrence types will be implemented in the future. It should also give us the ability to extract Misper 7 information in a data format, improving our ability to analyse specific problems for specific individuals.

Mental Health • West Yorkshire has made significant progress around mental health, with the PCC providing joint funding for mental health nurses co-located in District Control Rooms. This enables the Force to intervene early and address mental health needs more effectively. • Progress around the Crisis Care Concordat and recent changes in legislation have improved capacity issues in custody, as police stations are no longer designated as a place of safety unless in exceptional circumstances. This has led to a significant reduction in the numbers of people coming into custody. However, there still remain challenges for the force in relation to mental health, given the capacity issues of other agencies, with the consequential impact that officers are sometimes either waiting for ambulances to arrive, or waiting with individuals in a hospital setting. There still remains insufficient health based places of safety and staffing across West Yorkshire to meet demand, which continues to impact on policing. • NHS funding, including for mental health services , continues to be stretched. For example, there are six psychiatrists per 100,000 population, compared to a national average of eight and 13 in London. With the numbers of people with mental health issues growing, this creates significant issues for all agencies. • Whilst the Force has invested in training around mental health, ultimately the Force does not have the skills to address mental health issues and is reliant on partners.

Human Trafficking • The Force has a dedicated Human Trafficking Team which provides both an investigative and partnership role. There are currently 19 FTE working in Modern Slavery with the DCI, who leads the unit being PIP 3 trained at homicide and major enquiries and also serious organised crime. The supervisory ratio is 1-5 and the force team are currently running eight investigations, equating to one investigation per officer. • The complexity of MSHT investigations can result in them becoming long and convoluted if not managed effectively. The offences can cover movement and criminality over many counties. The Force Human Trafficking Team have developed an excellent working knowledge and a wealth of experience in conducting these investigations working within the realms of Joint investigation teams, European investigation orders and the use of European arrest warrants. The experience gained from this needs to be transferred to districts to give them the confidence to investigate OCGs effectively. If greater measures are taken to fully identify the OCGs operating within the area and for thorough investigations to be undertaken current capacity is unlikely to be sufficient. • Due to the vulnerabilities of victims and language barriers, investigations and trials have proven to be more time consuming for MSHT investigations . The West Yorkshire Anti-Trafficking and Modern Slavery network (WYATMSN) and the local forums are working to address gaps in accommodation for PVOT’s that still exist. The quality of interpreters has raised issues at trial and the standard of this needs to be higher to support MSHT investigations. 93

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • Within Districts the role of the SPOC (DI) has not always been consistently maintained or sufficient handovers taken place. This has not allowed a depth of intelligence and investigation knowledge in the districts to develop and has hindered good working relationships with their designated MSHT analyst, forum members and the Force Trafficking Team. The individuals in these roles should be experts in MSHT in the area, the national processes and investigating MSHT offences. • The WYATMSN and District Forums have greatly improved partnership working. The Modern Slavery helpline has been launched in West Yorkshire as a clear process for “soft” intelligence sharing however this requires to be continually reinforced as the process through the WYATMSN and District Forums to continually educate staff members . • Knowledge locally and nationally around MSHT continues to need improvement. There are significant intelligence gaps surrounding money flow and recruitment. The national team is currently working to bridge some of these gaps through the Insight and ‘what works team’. Training is required to improve the quality of the intelligence data we receive. The regional threat reduction group also reviews investigations and shares best practice and working principles. • The HMICFRS report in to Modern Slavery which was published in 2017 recommended that all Forces needed to improve the awareness of front line police staff identifying modern slavery. As well as improving district managed investigations. The recruitment of a partnership and training officer for Modern Slavery is allowing West Yorkshire to dedicate the time to improving frontline knowledge and producing Toolkits and I-learn packages to aid the investigation processes. • The recruitment of a Partnership and Training officer purely for Modern Slavery has allowed the Force to focus on improving the quality of our training packages and to be able to reach more frontline staff and partner agencies. Since August 2017 a total of 30 sessions have led to 840 police staff receiving a three hours training input . 340 partner agency staff member have also received an input. We are also targeting the private sector to train their staff members on their responsibilities to their employees. • In addition, we have produced an I-Learn package and toolkit for front line staff which compliments the mandatory national e-learning package. West Yorkshire has obtained the license to teach the 4 day MDS College of policing course so that we will be able to train up additional investigators over the coming year. We have also hosted several events and workshops in West Yorkshire to raise awareness and emphasis partnership working and intend to hold more of these over the coming year. • Regional knowledge and capacity is still limited and the post of Regional Co-ordinator is continuing to try and educate all Forces including the work through the Threat Reduction Group. The very nature of most OCGs that commit this crime are the higher level and regional if not national in their operating areas . • There has been a continued decline in intelligence so the full scale and extent of the problem is unknown. Victims often fail to see themselves as such, or live in fear of the exploiter which leads to under reporting.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Two: The Wellbeing of the Workforce in meeting the demand

The following issues are of importance when assessing the wellbeing of staff dedicated to Protecting Vulnerable People:

• High levels of demand around safeguarding mean that workloads are particularly high for Safeguarding staff. An AFI from the latest HMICFRS PEEL assessment requires the Force to review its capacity and capability within Safeguarding Units and ensure that workloads are manageable and adequate welfare and support is available for staff working within them. • The stress caused by workloads can vary due to less experienced officers in Safeguarding teams overall. More experienced officers are not only feeling the burden of managing the complex cases, but are also required to guide and support less experienced officers. With increasing demand, there is the potential that inexperienced officers will need to deal with more complex cases. • Prior to the recent recruitment, it was decided that adult and child safeguarding should merge to provide resilience but this requires a wider skill base that cannot be achieved immediately. The domestic abuse teams are also struggling with the excessive volume of investigations and the desire to provide a good service to victims against what can seem like a production line of new investigations. Despite these pressures, both HMICFRS and local audit teams have found that staff are positive a want to make a difference despite the challenging environment. • In addition to high workloads, the nature of offences, means that Safeguarding staff are often dealing with distressing and complex issues. Psychological assessments for Safeguarding staff were introduced in January 2017 which include a six monthly offer of an appointment with a nurse at OHU to identify levels of compassion satisfaction, burnout and secondary trauma. 36% attendance was achieved in the first six months. • In terms of the Assessments, the main reasons cited as affecting the health of staff were workloads, lack of training and lack of support (one to ones). This suggests that the main issues are not the nature of the role but the circumstances and working environment . The current process has been evaluated and rather than offering appointments to all staff, the line manager should instead refer where necessary, for those showing signs of being affected by a particular incident or series of investigations. • A number of support measures are already in place including Personal Development Reviews (PDRs) and Individual Accountability Meetings (IAMs), a peer support programme, a trauma resilience ilearn and the piloting of a six week mindfulness course. The Force is in the process of looking at introducing TRiM (Trauma Risk Management). • The Safeguarding Central Governance Unit have completed Structured Learning Forums with staff as a reality check/audit. Welfare of staff, the impact of certain investigations and workloads are key to these discussion. This allows staff to discuss what the OHU had generally found about workloads and an opportunity to suggest change and improvement. • An internal Domestic Abuse policy and campaign was launched in November 2016 and offers staff an opportunity to confidentially contact the Safeguarding Governance Unit via a mailbox to ask for assistance and be signposted for support. If a disclosure of a crime is made then it allows the victim the opportunity to have the case investigated by a neighbouring force in North or South Yorkshire for extra confidentiality. We are conscious that our staff are no different to the public and will feel more valued if they know that they can seek help. • All Districts are addressing their vacancy issues locally but there are now limited officers who are eligible to work in Safeguarding due to the high volume of student officers on patrol teams. However, Districts are ensuring student officers are receiving attachments and actively talent spotting in order to provide early development into Safeguarding.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Three: The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating in particular focussing our on threat, harm and risk

Demand has increased considerably over the last five years in all areas of safeguarding and is predicted to continue to increase. The Force has already realigned resources into safeguarding to address the threat and has a Protecting Vulnerable People Plan in place. With demand anticipated to increase considerably, the Force will need to focus on reducing the demand by:

• Increasing our focus on Early Intervention and prevention as a long term strategy with our partners to protect vulnerable people and reduce demand long term. A critical part of this is improving our knowledge of Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs), signals of risk and adopting Trauma Informed Policing. Long term this will have an impact on both child and adult safeguarding, however in the short to medium term it may also increase the demand placed on safeguarding to engage with young people at risk. • Focusing on risk to both reduce repeat perpetrators and repeat victims . This requires a much smarter focus on the identification of risk, but intensive work with such individuals could reduce demand (e.g. 45% of domestic incidents in 2017 involved a repeat victim and 33% involved a repeat suspect). A current gap is however the lack of properly evaluated and funded preventative perpetrator projects. This focus also needs to be supported by a positive approach to arrests again, to reduce repeats and to improve attrition rates. Body Worn Video is critical to this in order to provide the evidence in court to improve outcomes. • Maximising the opportunities presented through the Children and Social Work Act and reforms to Safeguarding arrangements by introducing an integrated multi-agency approach to both Adult and Child Safeguarding, with high level/key decision makers on each of the Boards. This would enable greater accountability and problem solving to address long term issues and barriers and reduce demand and vulnerability. It would remove pre-existing structures and create efficiencies for all agencies. For the Force, having structures to deal separately with Adult and Child Safeguarding would enable a more specialist approach to Child Safeguarding , including working at the same time as partners, which will create efficiencies and may also encourage more detectives into these areas with the prospect of better shift patterns, which are more aligned to that of our partner agencies. • Alongside this, exploring with partners the development of a single Vulnerability Governance MASH operating as a pan-West Yorkshire Joint Target Area Inspection Team that Local Authorities could commission to review areas of vulnerability that Local Authorities and the Force could commission. This has the potential for huge savings as well as a more co- ordinated approach to protecting children and allows for the freeing up of some resources to respond to demand. • Delivering a whole systems approach to domestic abuse. An initial project is being implemented in collaboration with the seven other North East Forces and this is showing promise. A key success has been the DA car with an IDVA and officer jointly deploying after the incident has been made safe, providing the best possible service to the victim and improving attrition rates. Continued funding of IDVAs and aligning them to risk is critical for longer term embedding of this project. • The Force has been successful in securing funding under VAWG for a DVPO Team to increase the use and success rate of DVPO and to better support victims. This is helping to reduce repeats and we need to learn from this approach to apply to other areas of vulnerability. • As demand around missing persons increases we must focus particularly on addressing the small number of high frequency locations, which we know account for a large proportion of incidents as well as the small number of repeat missing people (mainly children). This requires a holistic and integrated partnership approach, but by resolving issues associated with vulnerable people and locations, we will make an impact on demand as well as reducing vulnerability. We have recently improved the Misper 7 form to glean more information from the missing people and why in particular they go missing. Identifying the root causes will then help partners put in place interventions to prevent the person going missing again. This is critical in 96

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED order to get ahead of demand, but there needs to be much greater accountability of partners to ensure they are meeting their obligations. • Missing persons demand is a considerable strain on resources and in particular children in a care setting. There is a need for the Local Authority to sit in partnership with the police upon a high risk report to share information effectively, recover the child rapidly and agree future intervention. This also involves partnership work at an operational level outside of office hours. In addition, a growing risk area is private children’s homes as these are even more difficult to engage with (sometimes we are unaware of their establishment) and have less adherence with the standards expected of a local authority home. • Mental Health Nurses have proven invaluable, but we now need to better involve them as part of our early intervention and problem solving work to address mental health needs earlier in order to reduce demand long term. • In terms of on-line CSE , in order to reduce demand, prevention is critical and the Force will continue to undertake education through safer schools around being safe online. In addition, the NCA Webcrawlers are taking websites down and the ICACCOPs platform will require us to prioritise our focus on high risk individuals to better disrupt of offenders. • Our Audit Regime, Peer Reviews and Structured Learning Forums will enable us to identify key issues, reflect on current practice in tackling vulnerability and identify good practice to be shared forcewide.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Four: The future demand we do not expect to be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making

The predicted increases in demand across the 11 areas of Protecting Vulnerable People are significant and total 56,642 additional transactions (e.g. incidents / crimes / investigations / referrals) for our force. This is at the same time, that budgets are not expected to increase in policing.

Whilst we will prioritise to ensure that we focus on risk, work in partnership where possible for a more holistic approach and develop the skills we need to address new threats, there are some areas of demand that we do not expect to meet, if they increase as predicted:

• CSEA – We are particularly concerned about the predicted increase in online CSEA and Livestreaming. The sheer volume and types of threat continually evolve, and technology will assist but will also create significant demand leading to capacity and capability issues in addressing the threat. Whilst currently we predict that non-recent offences are likely to stabilise, there is always the possibility of the next ‘type’ of non-recent offence, which could gain national momentum and then lead to more non-recent demand for us to manage. • Domestic Abuse – Should demand increase to the predicted 84,107 then it is infeasible for the Force to be able to respond to the threat in the same way as it does currently and we may need to reassess how staff deal with different levels of risk. • Missing Persons – The predicted increase in missing persons demand are concerning as there is already a lack of intervention with medium and low risk and predicted increases will worsen this. • Mental Health – Research shows that 1 in 4 people will experience mental health issues, so as the population increases so too will demand in this area. The Force does not have the capacity and capability to deal with these issues and partnership provision is patchy and inconsistent. • Adult Safeguarding – Nationally there has been a lack of focus in this area, and we predict Adult Safeguarding/Elder abuse to be ‘the next CSEA’. If demand increases as predicted in the three types of areas, we will not have the resources to respond. • Criminal Exploitation – We are starting to unpick issues around the criminal exploitation of children and vulnerable adults, and this area is likely to grow as we better understand for example county lines. In addition, we know that unless we address key areas of child vulnerability then there is a greater chance that these children will end up as offenders and the intergenerational cycle will continue.

All the above areas rely on partnership working, but the increased demand also has significant implications for partners whose resources are continuing to reduce as a result of continued austerity. Any withdrawal from work which is not ‘statutory’ could result in even more demand for the Force and increased vulnerability for those people who find themselves in crisis.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

This section is about Managing Offenders and will focus on :

• Registered Sex Offenders (RSOs) • Integrated Offender Management (IOM) • Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA)

The Section will explain each four elements of the Force Management Statement in relation to Managing Offenders

• Step One –The gap between current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years • Step Two – The current status of the workforce and other assets (their performance, condition, capacity, capability, serviceability, wellbeing and security of supply) in terms of responding to the demand types. • Step Three – The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating in particular focussing our on threat, harm and risk. • Step Four – The future demand we do not expect to be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making.

Introduction

Managing Offenders is embedded into a number of elements of the Policing Strategy including Protecting Vulnerable People (in terms of Registered Sex Offenders and MAPPA) and Reducing Crime/Improving Investigations and Attacking Criminality (in terms of Integrated Offender Management). It is also embedded into the Police and Crime Plan, particularly around Safeguarding Vulnerable People and the Plan’s strong focus on partnership work. The threats around Registered Sex Offenders (increasing demand and capacity) in particular are addressed in the Protecting Vulnerable People Plan and a significant amount of work has also been undertaken around Integrated Offender Management.

Executive Summary

• The demand around managing offenders has increased over the last five years and is predicted to continue to increase. In particular the predicted increase in offences and offenders relating to sexual crime and risk of harm coupled with our proactive approach to addressing these crimes, has the consequence of more offenders and in particular complex offenders to manage. • There are a number of issues in terms of the capacity and capability of the workforce in meeting this demand. Primarily this relates to the supervision of RSOs, which is exceeded in most Districts. • Over the last few years the Force has undertaken a range of proactive initiatives to address the threats posed by offenders and has been recognised by HMICFRS for our approach to IOM. However to address the growing number of offenders and in particular RSOs we need to utilise

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED technology better, maximise civil orders, be more proactive in our approach to reactive management and apply the principles of early intervention to reducing the risk of RSOs and offenders generally in the longer term. • The table below summarises: o Current demand o The potential 2021 demand based on statistical projections o Our professional judgement of the factors that will influence whether the potential projections will be realised and the resultant risk. • These issues will be explored in more detail, including an assessment of the demand we do not think we will be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making.

Current Predicted Factors Influencing Demand Demand 2017 Demand 2021 • Increase in sexual offences, CSEA, IIOC and on-line CSEA activists means there are more offenders to manage with more complex issues. Registered 5139 • There are capacity issues in relation to 50/20 ratio. 3549 Sex Offenders (+44%) • Joint Management of Offenders with National Probation Service and Reactive Management may lead to less demand for Public Protection Units (PPUs). Overall – Demand is predicted to increase . • Expectation that there will be an increase in the risk of harm and statutory managed cohorts. Integrated *see note • Increased focus on Risk of Harm Cohort is more Offender 4045 below Management complex Overall – Demand is expected to increase, in particular high harm • Expectation that MAPPA nominals will increase MAPPA *see note 4452 • All categories of MAPPA nominals are increasing below Overall – Demand is expected to increase

*Volumes of IOM and MAPPA subjects have been rising steadily over time. However, because decisions to manage subjects can be policy based (rather than dictated by statute in the case of RSOs) it is not felt we can provide an accurate predictions in this regard as to the scale of future cohorts.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step One: The gap between current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years

The Force approach to managing offenders uses a three cohort model: • Risk of reoffending – covering the traditional serious acquisitive crime offenders • Risk of harm – covering domestic abuse, CSE, OCGs and Firearms • Statutory managed – covering RSO and MAPPA.

Registered Sex Offenders (RSO) – Current and Predicted Demand

The number of Registered Sex Offenders has increased by 91% from 1859 in 2013 to 3549 in 2017 and we predict that this increase will continue over the next few years, particularly as we continue our focus on vulnerability and sexual offences.

Projection (12 month rolling total) 6000 5139 5000 3893 4000

3000

2000

1000

0 Jul Jul 2015 Jul 2016 Jul 2017 Jul 2018 Jul 2019 Jul 2020 Apr2015 Oct2015 Apr2016 Oct2016 Apr2017 Oct2017 Apr2018 Oct2018 Apr2019 Oct2019 Apr2020 Oct2020 Apr2021 Jan Jan 2016 Jan 2017 Jan 2018 Jan 2019 Jan 2020 Jan 2021

Current Demand

• The table below shows that there are currently 2,781 RSOs currently living in the community . The numbers of RSOs are increasing year on year at a time when overall numbers of Officers are reducing. • Medium and low risk account for the majority of RSOs (38% and 45% respectively), with very high risk accounting for 4% and high risk accounting for 11.5%. The rest (1.5%) are reactively managed. • In addition to the above figures the current number of RSOs in custody is 1127 . These do not however appear on Public Protection Officers workload, but are managed administratively by the ViSOR Unit (Violent and Sexual Offenders Register) co-ordinators

District Very High High Medium Low Reactive Total

Leeds 28 142 404 363 17 954 Wakefield 22 25 131 245 8 431 Kirklees 5 42 182 286 3 528 Calderdale 2 16 105 109 3 235 Bradford 57 99 236 241 0 633 Total 114 324 1058 1244 41 2781

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • There has been a progressive increase in the number of RSOs charged with Serious Further Offences from 14 in 2015 to 18 in 2016 and 19 in 2017. This could be due to the fact that as we are managing more offenders, we are also more likely to see more recidivism, but there may also be the need to be more robust and proactive in managing risk. • In terms of RSO visits , in January 2018 a total of 1028 visits were undertaken, of which 70% were positive. • In 2017 the average number of attempted home visits was 845 whilst the average number of positive visits was 568. Although only 67% of visits were positive, the Force adheres to National guidance that RSO home visits should be unannounced where possible. • It is important to note that whilst ViSOR records the volume of visits, it makes no distinction regarding the nature of these visits. Some may be for a full ARMS (Active Risk Management System) assessment, some simply to verify the address and some as a result of an existing ARMS action, for example a devices check. Since ARMS was introduced there is no longer a ‘Standard Review’ as all visits are carried out in accordance to the specific Risk Management Plan (RMP) ascribed to that particular offender. The schedule for review of the ARMS assessment and subsequent RMP is also dictated by the current RMP .

Predicted Demand Our statistical forecasting using recent trends predicts that there will be 5,139 RSOs by April 2021, equating to a 32% increase compared to April 2018. Key factors influencing this demand are as follows: • Both the volume and rate of RSOs is increasing year on year . In 2015 the rate of increase was 8.4%, which increased to 9.1% by 2016 and 9.7% 2017. Even if we assume that the rate of increase remains the same at 9.7% this means we would be seeing numbers increase by 1,246 offenders by April 2021 . This will create significant further demand and capacity issues for the Force in managing high levels of risk. • We can reasonably expect that 25-30% of those offenders will be in custody at any given point. However, this would still mean the Force has an additional 795 offenders to be managed in the community. • The Section on Protecting Vulnerable People predicts that sexual offences, including CSEA are likely to increase by 62% (4,767 additional offences). This is as a result of increased proactivity and scrutiny in this area, the current high level of non-recent offences and predicted increases in offending around Indecent Images of Children and online CSEA. This clearly has a consequence for the management of Registered Sex Offenders. • Large numbers of offenders previously convicted of CSE are now coming to the end of their sentences resulting in significant increases in RSOs, which will impact on police and partners meeting statutory requirements. • The Parole Board is increasingly under pressure due to prison numbers, to release people early on Home Detention Curfews for management in the community, which clearly creates more demand. • A new process for managing Potentially Dangerous Persons (PDP) was introduced on 20 October 2017 to manage those people who are not eligible for management under the MAPPA process but whose behaviour gives reasonable grounds for believing there is a present likelihood of them committing an offence that will cause serious harm. It is anticipated through benchmarking that whilst numbers will be low, any PDPs identified will require complex management strategies and it is possible that partners will now start to rely on the Force to manage high risk individuals that they are aware of.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Integrated Offender Management – Current and Predicted Demand

Current Demand

• The Force has identified 4,045 offenders as part of its IOM programme, 2829 of which are at liberty. With such high numbers and limited capacity there is a need to prioritise those offenders we proactively manage. • Currently 916 offenders are actively managed due to the risk they pose as per the table below. Of these, 582 offenders are from the risk of reoffending cohort (serious acquisitive crime offenders) which is a stable position. The remainder (334) are risk of harm offenders. • The remaining lower risk offenders are monitored and reactively managed . • In regards to the figures: o The number of CSE perpetrators managed by staff will be higher as Bradford District has a specific CSE Perpetrator Team as opposed to management through IOM. o The number of RSOs does not include those currently in prison.

Cohort Risk of Domestic CSE Violent offender Total Managed Reoffending Abuse offenders (SAC) offenders Violent Offenders are not separated our from the Total 582 286 48 916 Domestic Abuse and Risk of re-Offending cohorts

Predicted Demand

It is difficult to predict the volumes of future managed offenders over the next five years. The selection of offenders is based on the threat, harm and risk posed and with increasing crime and additions to those who are managed it is believed cohort volumes will increase requiring investment in IOM resources. Key factors influencing this demand are as follows:

• Following a Review of IOM, in January 2016 the three cohort model was introduced recognising the threat, harm and risk posed by Domestic Abuse, CSEA, OCG and Firearms offenders and raising volumes to be managed. We predict increased demand in all these areas which has an impact on IOM. • The IOM hubs are expecting an increase in the risk of harm and statutorily managed cohorts. This is due to o Future introduction of firearms nominals – lower risk firearms nominals may be referred to IOM for intervention o Greater use of DVPOs and the requirement for active management of those on such orders. o Growth of around 10% a year in RSOs. o The large number of offenders previously convicted of CSE are now coming to the end of their sentences. o Increasing focus on risk and harm and the introduction of Potentially Dangerous Person • There is a national drive to increase the use of home detention curfews as well as the introduction in 2019 of the new Electronic Monitoring Service. With more offenders in the community, there will be potentially more offenders for IOM to manage. • As the Force aims to increase its use of civil orders, there is an implication for IOM in terms of lifetime management of offenders. The Domestic Abuse Bill will introduce new civil orders, which are outside the control of the police, but will be for the police and partners to manage. • In terms of Foreign National Offenders , there has been a slight rise in volume and it unknown how this will manifest in the future.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • Section 3 identifies that there will be an increase in serious acquisitive crime which suggests that the number of serious acquisitive crime offenders for IOM will increase. However, the new Reducing Reoffending Strategy which is being led by the Prison Service/OPCC aims to reduce reoffending rates over the longer term. • With greater emphasis on a full wrap- around family intervention to reduce offending, work with families could increase as part of our wider approach to Early Intervention. Although such support and assistance is already in place and may be more pertinent to third sector organisations, any increase in demand will have an impact on IOM staff.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED MAPPA – Current and Predicted Demand

Over the last three years, the number of MAPPA cases has increased from 3437 in 2014 to 4452 in 2017. We predict that this will continue to increase.

TOTAL MAPPA CASES 5000 4500 4450 4452 4249 4362 4368 4423 4000 3975 4111 3662 3749 3841 3500 3437 3523 3597 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 2014 - 2014 - 2014 - 2014 - 2015 - 2015 - 2015 - 2015 - 2016 - 2016 - 2016 - 2016 - 2017 - 2017 - 2015 2015 2015 2015 2016 2016 2016 2016 2017 2017 2017 2017 2018 2018 TOTAL MAPPA CASES

Current Demand

Snapshot of MAPPA Nominals as of December 2017

Category 1 2781 Level 1 4277 Registered Sex Offenders Ordinary Agency Management Category 2 1723 Level 2 212 Violent Offenders and other Sexual Multi-Agency Management Offenders Category 3 10 Level 3 15 Other Dangerous Offenders Multi-Agency Management with Senior representation.

• In terms of Category 1 Offenders, 64% are the responsibility of the Police. Generally the remainder will be under the supervision of the National Probation Service following sentence or release from custody. By definition, all Category 2s are managed by the National Probation Service as they are on licence following 12 months plus custodial sentence for a violent offence. • Offenders at Level’s two and three are managed via the MAPPA Meetings as they require the active involvement and co-ordination to manage the presenting risk. • The increase in Registered Sex Offenders in itself will place further demand upon the police to fulfil its obligations in addition to the general increase of MAPPA eligible offenders.

Predicted Demand

It is difficult to predict the volumes of future MAPPA subjects over the next five years. The selection of offenders is based on the threat, harm and risk posed and with increasing crime and additions to those who are managed it is believed cohort volumes will increase requiring investment in associated resources. Key factors influencing this demand are as follows:

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • There has been an increase of MAPPA eligible offender’s year on year with this fluctuating between 4% and 13% year on year. Category one RSOs show a steady year on year increase of around 9%. • There has been a steady increase of Category two violent offenders. Although these are primarily managed by NPS, there is still an impact upon police as part of the Risk Assessment and initial screening. • Category three cases have also shown an increase, which is assessed as being in relation to an increase in the number of referrals from Mental Health. • A quality assurance process is being put in place for Level 1 Management, given concerns highlighted that offenders may not be receiving the right level of management. This could potentially increase the numbers at levels 2 requiring multi-agency management. • Forensic Mental Health Services will no longer be commissioning services outside of the West Yorkshire area, which means there will be an increase in the numbers of people treated and managed within West Yorkshire. Forensic Services are looking at adapting a less risk averse approach in terms of the discharge of patients into the community and redistributing the financial savings back in to community management of mental health patients. • Whilst it is acknowledged that Probation are the lead agency in relation to MAPPA Category 2 offenders, the Police do have a responsibility to share information which may relate to risk. The Force has already been adhering to a voluntary process to facilitate this however a recent Memorandum of Understanding has been signed to agree that a mandatory process will now be in place nationally and utilise ViSOR. We currently have 896 Category 2 offenders created and flagged on Niche but Probation have provided a figure of 1723 cases, which means that under the current regime nearly half the offenders have not been notified to police. This will result in a doubling of the workload placed on the ViSOR unit in terms of dealing with the number of niche tasks as well as the shorter term impact of creating 900 more records on Niche.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Two: The current status of the workforce and other assets in terms of responding to the demand types

Effectiveness

In the latest HMICFRS Inspection, the Force was recognised for its approach in reducing reoffending through IOM and was graded as Good for protecting those who are vulnerable from harm and supporting victims. The following provides evidence in terms of the effectiveness in managing offenders:

• West Yorkshire was one of the first forces to achieve full implementation of ARMS and has been constantly showing completion rates of approximately 95% for the last two years. Currently of the 2790 RSOs managed in the community only 128 of those offenders are not yet ARMS assessed and of those only five offenders are police led cases. • ViSOR shows 51 convictions for breach of registration requirements in 2017 and there are nine offenders currently circulated as wanted for breach of registration requirements. • The Force aims to maximise all the powers it has available and in 2017 obtained 276 Sexual Harm Prevention Orders (SHPOs) , three of which were obtained following civil application. In the same period there were 46 arrests for breach of SHPO and 24 convictions. • There is also currently no central auditing of RSO management except in the case where an offender has been charged with committing a Serious Further Offence (SFO). In these cases the Initial Police Internal Management Review (PIMR) is completed by the ViSOR Unit. This was introduced in 2017 and has resulting in a considerable number of full PIMRs being commenced • There is strong partnership work with the National Probation Service (NPS), Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC) and other partner agencies to identify those nominals most at risk of re-offending. However, austerity has had an impact on IOM and partnership work. • MOJ re-offending data indicates a reoffending rate of 26.5% (2014 Cohort) which is slightly above the England and Wales average. However in an attempt to provide a more recent measure of reoffending the Force has tracked a cohort of individuals subject to IOM comparing their average number of offences before and after IOM intervention. Figures as at the 31 March 2017 reported that ‘Risk of Reoffending Cohort’ committed, on average, 3.1 offences last year and in the latest 12 monthly period (to December 2017) the same cohort of offenders has committed, on average, 2.7 offences representing a reduction in offending behaviour . For the ‘Risk of Harm Cohort’. 2.8 offences were committed last year reducing to 2.3 offences in the following year 12 month period . • The MAPPA Key Performance Indicators (KPI’s) are set out in the MAPPA Guidance 2012. There are 9 KPIs which are electronically monitored by an existing National Offender Management Service procedure. The KPIs focus on the areas which are the most important in ensuring that the MAPPA works ensuring that the right people at the appropriate level of seniority are in attendance. West Yorkshire MAPPA meet or exceed the required level in all performance areas.

Capacity

• In response to increased demand and austerity, in 2016 the three cohort model was introduced and RSO management moved under IOM. Whilst this has created some resilience for the Force, a consequence has been a lack of specialism and diversity in regards to how the management of RSO and IOM is implemented in Districts. Some Districts have a fully integrated approach with officers carrying a joint IOM and PPU workload, some have trained IOM for resilience only and some have maintained the roles as separate. • There are 44 PPOs dedicated to RSO management (2781 in the community) and 29 to cohorts 1 and 2 of IOM (582 Serious Acquisitive Crime and Risk of Harm). However, some of the 29 provide resilience to the growing number of RSOs, which impacts on the management of

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Serious Acquisitive Crime. This is of concern given the level of acquisitive crime in West Yorkshire compared to our MSGs.

Post / Role FTE staffing Actual Staffing Vacancy IOM Inspector 6 6 0 IOM Sergeant 13 13 0 IOM Police Constable 31 29 2 IOM Civilian Support 12 11 1 Public Protection Officers 47 44 3 Total 109 103 6

• The Force has good capability around ARMS assessment. Excluding supervision, 76.5% of staff are trained to perform statutorily required risk assessments of RSOs. Those that aren’t trained are the six PCs in the Prison Hub who are not required to complete such assessments. • The training of all IOM staff in ARMS assessments, is required because the model adopted has brought all cohorts under IOM with staff providing resilience for RSOs. This is potentially more costly to the Force than if cohorts were dealt with by separate teams. • On average an IOM PC manages 38 offenders . However, some of these Constables also provide resilience for the management of RSOs and will have additional nominals to oversee. • Focus of IOM has moved to Risk of Harm meaning a move away from the typical acquisitive crime offender to more complex offenders, where service provision to reduce reoffending is lacking. However, the Reducing Reoffending Strategy is looking at the potential for joint commissioning of services in these areas. • The supervision to staff ratio is 1:6, which appears sufficient. All sergeants who oversee the risk of harm cohort are trained in ARMS, RM2000 and ViSOR, • In support of IOM, information is shared between police and partners to ensure efficient and effective offender management. The Force is currently reviewing and updating its Information Sharing Agreements and Data processing Contracts. • GPS tagging is used as a tactic to reduce reoffending and the Force has recently completed a procurement exercise to maintain this capability whilst reducing costs. The IOM hubs are widening the scope of offenders that can be the subject of a GPS tag and are always looking to be creative and innovative. The Force has used tags on traditional acquisitive crime offenders, domestic abuse, CSE and RSOs. Maximising the technology to manage offenders will to some extent address some of the capacity issues for policing as well as improving effectiveness.

Registered Sex Offenders • The increase in RSO poses a threat if they are not managed properly. The latest research commissioned by NPCC comments that the often referred to 50:20 rule for managing RSOs (50 offenders per officer with no more than 20 being high or very high) was “about right”. • It is difficult to give an accurate picture as to the numbers of RSOs per officer/staff in West Yorkshire as due to the increasing year on year numbers of RSOs and following the IOM Review, some cohorts of RSOs are dealt with by IOM Offender Managers. However staffing profile shows that if we measure the workloads per officer against the 50:20 “standard”, only Wakefield and Bradford fall below that benchmark ; Bradford because all its officers are dual role, carrying an RSO and an IOM workload and Wakefield because it has four IOM officers who carry less than 15 offenders each in addition to their IOM workload. Leeds and Kirklees, both of whom have an average of 53 offenders per officer, have IOM staff trained for resilience and Kirklees also allocate some IOM staff a small workload, again leading to a misleadingly low overall figure. Calderdale, who do not utilise IOM staff can be seen to be carrying the highest workload per officer with 59. • This indicates that a capacity gap already exists to varying degrees across the force. In terms of predicted demand, the Force would need to recruit and additional 16 Public Protection Officers to manage the predicted increased demand to meet the 50:20 criteria. • There are however, potentially two groups of offenders who will require less management by Public Protection Officers, firstly joint management of RSOs who are under Probation

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Supervision (where Probation are responsible for completing and reviewing ARMS assessments which currently account for 36% of cases) and reactively managed offenders . As of the end of 2017 there were only 45 offenders under reactive management, however when ARMS was introduced in 2015 there was a sharp increase in the number of low risk offenders. One of the criteria for reactive management is that offenders must have been managed at low risk for three years. As we approach the three year anniversary we can expect that number to increase. • This should result in PPUs being able to focus their resources on proactive policing, investigating offenders who are of concern or very high/high risk and managing offenders who have expired from their probationary supervision but who are not eligible for reactive management. • Currently Offenders subject to a Sexual Harm Prevention Order are not eligible for reactive management and this would preclude nearly half of our 1277 low risk offenders from being reactively managed. However there is discussion nationally as to whether this requirement should be removed. If it were then we could potentially see 1277 offenders on reactive management , which again would improve the capacity of the workforce. Increased clerical support has already been put in place at each district to assist in the anticipated intelligence demand reactive management will place on Districts. • Complex CSE investigations can lead to spikes in the workload of both Districts and the ViSOR Unit in that there are potentially a large number of offenders becoming liable to register in a short space of time. For example one District currently has two CSE investigations ongoing with a total of 90 suspects attached to the just those two investigations. This clearly creates capacity issues. • The rise in ‘ online CSE Activist Groups’ is creating capacity issues for Districts as they ‘publicise the capture’ of suspected offenders on social media. The management of these offenders can be very time consuming and resource intensive.

Capability and Assets

• Changes in RSO management have training implications for the Force. For example Female and Juvenile ARMS will be implemented during 2018/19 and there are also plans to replace the Risk Matrix tool and introduce mandatory training as part of the MOSOVO (Management of Sexual Offenders and Violent Offenders) Course. • A positive is that all staff should have some support in maintaining their professional knowledge as well as good solid training upon taking up a role within PPU. However, since the introduction of mandatory MOSOVO and ARMS training in 2015, on the job training appears to have diminished . This means that whilst new staff may be aware of the psychology of offending and what emotional congruence with children means, they are less familiar with the basics of making a child social care referral, complete a registration form or obtain a notification order for a foreign offender for example. In addition, the MOSOVO and ARMS training is outsourced and so there is no mechanism in Force to keep officers up to date with any subsequent changes in these areas. • Legislative and procedural change means that officers are dealing with more ‘non-routine’ tasks. For example more offenders are making applications for variations or dismissals of their SOPOs due to recent rulings. Changes in custody practice mean we are obtaining foreign conviction data for all foreign nationals who go through custody leading to an increase in possible Notification Orders. Increased numbers of offenders will become eligible to make applications for a review of their indefinite registration requirements which have to be processed and reviewed by a Public Protection officer. All increase the workload of officers in a way that is difficult to quantify and all require specialist skills and up to date legislative and procedural knowledge. • There has been an increase in Internet based offenders , which require specialist skills to monitor. It is usual practice that these types of offenders would have a Sexual Harm Prevention Order (SHPO) to enable officers to check their internet use. These offenders are very technically aware, developing their IT skills in an attempt to conceal their offending. PPU Officers currently have no tools or training to assist them in trying to manage these offenders. 109

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • As a result of devolving RSO management to districts the assets available to support the officers also varies. For example, Wakefield district have recently purchased a digital forensic compass which will assist them when checking SHPO compliance, they have also bid for, and obtained, PCC funding to pay overtime for Internet devices checks. Calderdale have built a good relationship with their Abusive Image Unit (AIU) who assist them in such work but have no formal assets. • The only centralised asset which all districts have access to is the ViSOR Unit , which consists of seven Police Staff, including the ViSOR Registrar and assists with the recording and dissemination of all statutory RSO information and intelligence and provides a National SPOC resource for all RSO intelligence and information facilitating the transfer of offenders in and out of the county. • There is a high demand on training and also the administrative support provided by the ViSOR Unit. There are now nearly 150 ViSOR users in Force, 51 of which have been trained over the last 12 months. All these accounts must be created, administered and the users supported. IT training have almost doubled the number of courses they have scheduled, which are also supported by the ViSOR Registrar.

Step Two: The Wellbeing of the Workforce in meeting the demand

For this section, please refer to Step Two Wellbeing for Protecting Vulnerable People.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Three: The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating in particular focussing our on threat, harm and risk

A significant amount of work and initiatives are already in place to manage the threats around offenders and in particular dangerous offenders, including campaigns to reduce IIOC offending, improving the quality and consistency of Serious Harm Prevention Orders and being more proactive in applications for civil orders.

However, in response to the anticipated increased demand in all aspects of Offender Management, the Force will:

• Need to reinvest additional resources into Public Protection given the increasing demand and the capacity issues identified. This additional capacity in specialist PPU resources will then allow the Force to reconsider the separating out of the cohorts under IOM to meet the different needs of sex offenders and serious acquisitive crime offenders. Moving to this model, will also enable the Force to focus the specialist training on those PPU Officers who need it, rather than all IOM staff. • Ensure the key principles of the Early Intervention Strategy are applied to offender management, by identifying and working with those people who are at risk of offending and in particular at risk of sexual offending. This includes developing a suite of tactical measures to prevent potential offenders from offending in the first place. • As part of the approach to long term prevention, early intervention and problem solving, ensure that the identification and management of offenders is not seen as the sole responsibility of PPU/IOM Staff. NPTs have a critical role in understanding the communities they police, having the ‘professional curiosity’ to identify risk early and then to problem solve issues long term. • Through the new Quality Assurance process, manage risk better and within an effective multi- agency approach. • Given the volume of demand, exploit more opportunities to be proactive around the reactive management cases, to allow PPU staff to focus on high risk/high harm cases and continue to build upon partnership working with Probation, whilst ensuring our key partners do not retreat to minimise or manage their own demand. • Introduce equipment to allow officers to manage Internet offenders . Currently PPU Officers have little or no access to digital investigation tools such as on site computer triage tools, remove internet monitoring software, equipment to search for hidden devices in the premises nor any training to improve their own skills to manually examine devices including mobile phones and other internet related devices. The few resources that are available are subject to district variation. Consideration could be given to centrally procuring such tools and to funding a centralised post or posts, perhaps to sit in the Digital Forensic Unit, which district PPU staff can “book out” to provide technical support when conducting these visits and investigations . • Increase the suite of tactical proactive options such as civils orders and making better use of technology, undercover online officers (UCOL) and devices that can be remotely used to detect indecent images/material held on RSOs computers. • A structured and nationally agreed funding arrangement for MAPPA is required which clearly specifies the duties of all Responsible Authorities and those with a duty to co-operate. This should take account of differences in regional structures and costs for staff deployed.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Managing Offenders – Step Four: The future demand we do not expect to be a ble to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making

The picture for offender management continues to show rising activity with no signs of this diminishing. The Force is investigating more offences, convicting more offenders for serious sexual offences and the inevitable impact is the increase in offender management. Of particular concern is:

• Registered Sex Offenders – unless there is an investment in additional Public Protection Officers it is anticipated that the Force will not be able to meet the predicted demand moving forward and will significantly exceed the 50/20 management ratio as identified in the NPCC document for RSO management. • Cohorts 2 and 3 – as ‘traditional’ IOM Staff are already being used as resilience for the management of RSOs, the Force is at risk of not being able to sufficiently manage both the risk of harm and serious acquisitive crime cohorts. These are also areas where demand is predicted to increase and for serious acquisitive crime in particular where performance improvement is required. • Partnership – the role of Probation in particular is critical for offender management, however resourcing within the context of continued austerity is a concern and has an impact in particular on policing.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

This section is about Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) and will focus on organised crime associated with:

• Prosperity (cyber-crime and economic crime) • Commodity (drugs and firearms) • Vulnerability (child sexual exploitation, human trafficking and immigration crime).

The Section will explain each four elements of the Force Management Statement in relation to Serious and Organised Crime

• Step One –The gap between current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years • Step Two – The current status of the workforce and other assets (their performance, condition, capacity, capability, serviceability, wellbeing and security of supply) in terms of responding to the demand types. • Step Three – The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating in particular focussing our on threat, harm and risk. • Step Four – The future demand we do not expect to be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making.

Introduction

Attacking Criminality/Tackling Serious and Organised Crime is one of the five purposes of the Policing Strategy and is included in the Police and Crime Plan in terms of the focus on Major Threats, Cyber Crime and Strategic Policing Requirement. The Force has a Strategic Plan in place to address the threats around serious and organised crime, in particular focussing on OCGs, drugs, firearms, fraud and cyber-crime, all of which scored highly in the Strategic Assessment using the MoRiLE matrix.

Executive Summary

• Recorded crime, intelligence and our better understanding of Organised Crime Groups shows that organised crime is a key issue in West Yorkshire. The number of firearms discharges has been on an increasing trend for the last two years. Fraud and cyber-enabled crime are predicted to increase as is Vulnerability organised crime, in particular IIOC/live streaming and human trafficking which we know is significantly under reported. • The Force has strong capability in terms of tackling serious and organised crime and HMICFRS have graded us as Good in this area. There are a number of dedicated units responsible for tackling different elements of organised crime and the Force has lead responsibility for the Regional Organised Crime Unit (ROCU) and a Yorkshire and Humber level and the Regional Asset Recovery Team (RART) at a North East level. Partnership is also strong in this area, with Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) local profiles in each District informing the SOC Partnerships and development of initiatives structured around the 4Ps (Prevention, Protection, Prepare and Pursue).

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • There are a number of areas the Force will be focusing on in order to address emerging/increasing threats or gaps, including a focus on Foreign National Offenders (FNO), cyber-crime, drugs (in particular related to firearms, knives and county lines) and Vulnerability (IIOC). • The table below summarises: o Current demand and the potential 2021 demand based on statistical projections o Our professional judgement of the factors that will influence whether the potential projections will be realised and the resultant risk. • These issues will be explored in more detail, including an assessment of the demand we do not think we will be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making.

Predicted Demand Factors influencing demand 2021 • Proxy indicators for organised crime (modern slavery, commercial robbery, CSEA etc.) are increasing. • The numbers of OCGs are increasing. OCGs Increasing • Increased understanding of county lines will identify more organised crime. Overall – OCGs predicted to increase • Fraud is assessed locally and nationally as an increasing threat and reported by the ONS to be the most frequently experienced crime. • Money laundering is a cross cutting threat which facilitates all SOC • Prosperity Technology is an enabler of a wide range of SOC including CSEA, Increasing SOC MSHT, Fraud and Cyber Crime. Use of the dark web for drugs and firearms is also a threat. • Cyber-crime assessed as an increasing threat with significant hidden demand. Overall – Prosperity Organised Crime predicted to increase • Drugs enables/finances organised crime. • There is an inextricable link between drugs and firearms to control local drugs markets. • Commodity Firearms and offences have significantly increased over the last two Increasing OCG years. • In terms of Organised Acquisitive Crime (OAC), 2 in 1 offences are increasing as an overall proportion of burglary and commercial robbery is also increasing. Overall – Commodity Organised Crime predicted to increase • CSEA predicted to increase, particularly around IIOC/Livestreaming. • Focus on county lines will identify vulnerable adults and children vulnerable to criminal exploitation. Vulnerability • Increasing There is significant under-reporting of MSHT SOC • Conflicts and war zones are likely to increase opportunities for human trafficking and illegal immigration. Overall – Vulnerability Organised Crime predicted to increase

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step One: The gap between current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years

Current Demand

This section will focus on the volume of organised crime and how we identify demand, as well as the nature of organised crime threats in terms of the three key categories of Prosperity, Commodity and Vulnerability.

Volume of Serious and Organised Crime (SOC)

• The Force measures demand in relation to SOC in a number of ways. The most obvious is levels of recorded crime. • The volume of these crimes has increased in the last year by 21%, with marked increases in modern slavery (109.8%) commercial robbery (63.3%), CSE (30.8%) and IIOC (33.7%). Some of these increases may be as a result of proactive investigation and in many cases such offences may be committed without any links to organised criminality, however it provides a proxy for the level of potential organised criminality. • Recorded crime does not give the full picture in relation to SOC. The Force also takes into account levels of intelligence relating to specific SOC areas and will deploy its resources accordingly. • There are clearly defined strategic and tactical processes for identifying threat and levels of demand at every level from local to regional to national, through the yearly cyclic assessment process. Force and Regional threats are identified using the strategic MoRiLE tool ensuring all factors are considered by those subject matter experts in both the crime thematic and also organisational capability. • Tactical MoRiLE is utilised to identify threats to be then targeted through the Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination Group. The Force utilises a ‘ threat matrix’ that has been designed specifically to measure threat and risk and can be used to compare OCG activity, against lone offender behaviour, community issues and crime specific issues and provides an accountable decision making criteria for senior leaders when making tasking decisions regarding the deployment of resources. • Latent threats are identified through the Serious and Organised Crime Partnerships that operate at force and local level. Partnership data is utilised to identify factors such as poverty, teenage pregnancy rate, geographical demographics, education results and attendance etc. to try and identify what some of the socio-economic pathways to SOC are. • A strong prevent agenda in terms of Cyber, gang and OCG activity and MS/HT also identify some of the hidden demands of SOC and allow us to prepare targeted responses to combat it.

Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) and Organised Crime Group Mapping (OCGM)

• Numbers of OCGs have increased throughout 2017. • Protective Services Crime, Bradford and Leeds manage the most OCGs. • In terms of Foreign National OCGs, the large scale volume offending in terms of low level shop thefts, violent crime and public order criminality perpetrated by FNOs is hampering the ability to adequately assess the SOC threat posed by these groups.

The Nature of Organised Crime

To understand demand, it is necessary to understand the levels, trends and patterns in organised crime group activity.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Prosperity Organised Crime Prosperity SOC includes cyber-crime and fraud, both of which are assessed as increasing threats and are predicted to increase. Money laundering is a cross-cutting threat to facilitate and enable all areas of SOC and is therefore an ongoing threat.

Fraud • Fraud is assessed as an increasing threat , with offences increasing and the outcome rate reducing. • The ONS report that fraud is now the commonly most experienced crime in England and Wales. The top three crimes reported on NICHE are conspiracy to defraud, cheque and non- cheque and fraud by abuse of position. Around 11% of fraud is cyber-enabled and estimated losses to fraud are estimated at £193 billion annually. • The most sophisticated OCGs launder their own money, although they also employ financial specialists; the majority of which are individuals rather than members of independent OCGs. • Lower level OCGs tend to rely on more established OCGs to launder money. The use of malware and phishing emails to obtain customer details is a key driver of fraud.

Cyber Crime • Cyber-crime is a cross cutting threat across the broad spectrum of policing including organised crime, vulnerability and traditional crimes which have taken on a cyber element. • Cyber-crime is assessed as an increasing threat ; both cyber dependent and cyber enabled crime have increased, although the scale and extent of the problem is still not fully understood. • Virtual currency has grown to be a key enabler of many cyber-crimes. It is the primary vehicle for the transfer of funds from victims of such cyber-crimes as ransomware and extortion demands. IIOC/livestreaming are assessed as an increasing risk.

Commodity Organised Crime Commodity SOC includes drugs, firearms and organised acquisitive crime.

Drugs • Most OCGs are involved in more than one area of criminality. . • Much criminal activity is underpinned by the supply and demand brought about by the misuse of drugs and the Force has the highest rate for trafficking in the MSG, which is indicative of the proactivity undertaken around drugs. • Heroin and Crack Cocaine remain the most prevalent class A drugs associated with organised crime. • Drug supply is highly organised, with extensive interconnected networks of OCGs within West Yorkshire. There is an inextricable link between firearms and drugs . • Nationally, Fentanyl has been identified as an increasing threat, particularly in the Yorkshire region and NPS remains an issue in our Force`s prison establishments.

Firearms • Over the last two years, the Force has experienced a significant rise in terms of firearms discharges, with 64 recorded offences recorded in 2017, compared to 25 in 2015. • The large urban areas of Leeds, Bradford and Huddersfield are the main centres for firearms related offending. Injury discharge incidents have increased by 78% and indicate an increased willingness by OCGs to use firearms against people rather than property. The use of shotguns is the common means of offending reflecting the national experience, however, our Force recently experienced a discharge from an AK47 machine gun. • There has been a decrease in OCGs with a primary threat of Firearms following a reclassification to ensure consistency with the national approach. The threat area of Firearms refers to supply and/or importation rather than criminal use, and on review most OCGs, were involved in criminal use of Firearms, linked to a primary criminality of Drugs or Organised Acquisitive Crime rather than supply/importation of firearms. As a result, both these threat areas saw an increase in OCGs as firearms OCGs decreased.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Organised Acquisitive Crime (OAC) • There has been an increase in the number of OAC OCGs . • In common with other Forces in our MSG, West Yorkshire Police is currently experiencing high levels of burglary, commercial robbery (particularly the organised and sometimes violent thefts of ATMs and Cash in Transit offences). • Disposable vehicles for use in crime are a significant commodity traded between West Yorkshire`s OCGs and some OCGs exist primarily to provide this service to other groups. The activities of these OCG`s is believed to increase vehicle theft, including car key burglary as well as facilitating drug dealing, robbery and violence, including use of firearms. • The majority of OAC OCGs also have some involvement in drugs typically cannabis cultivation.

Vulnerability Organised Crime Vulnerability organised crime includes CSE and Modern Slavery/Human Trafficking, both of which are increasing, partly as the Force becomes more proactive in these areas. The scale and nature of such crimes are still not known ( for more details see Section 4 on Protecting Vulnerable People ).

CSE • The Force is seeing a rise in reported CSE offences with an associated rise in recorded IIOC offending, largely as a result of increased levels of trust and confidence in the police to effectively investigate such offending and improvements in our technical capabilities in terms of investigation. • Bradford continues to account for the highest proportion of offences and rate per 1000 population. • Organised CSE offending is relatively uncommon , however many members of drugs OCGs engage in CSE offending, using their status and access to drugs to facilitate the grooming of vulnerable individuals. This is particularly common amongst urban street gangs and those OCGs which emerge from them.

Modern Slavery/Human Trafficking (MSHT) • The true scale and extent of MSHT is still not known, with much offending being a latent threat. • The threat is however assessed as increasing (offences have increased by 92% this year). This is positive given the recognised under reporting of these crimes. • Human trafficking is associated with Foreign National OCGs resident within the UK, but also requires links to corrupt local businesses looking for cheap labour and corrupt landlords willing to allow their properties to be used to house PVoT or as brothels or cannabis farms. Some OCGs also have links to overseas OCGs involved in recruiting and supplying PVoT. • Theft from shop is one of the top areas of criminality for Foreign National Offenders and this is known to be associated with the criminal exploitation of PVoTs. There are also connections with drug offences in particular the involvement of Vietnamese nationals in cannabis cultivation.

Prioritisation of Organised Crime Demand and allocation of resources to demand

• The table below shows the regional prioritisation of organised crime. The Regional Organised Crime Unit operate a threat desk model that service strategic threat reduction groups across all SOC types. Each group operates to a 4P Plan, meeting quarterly to review actions and performance against that plan and have a three way reporting (from local, to regional and then to national) to make sure current threats are properly assessed and emerging threats identified.

Priority MS/HT High Priority Themes CSEA Priority Themes Prisons & Lifetime Management

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Economic Crime & Money Laundering

Cyber Crime Firearms Significant Themes Drugs Organised Acquisitive Crime

• In terms of West Yorkshire’s Strategic Assessment , the MoRiLE matrix scored the top 10 threats as follows. Most of the threats will have an element of organised crime and the Strategic Plans put in place to address the threats cover the OCG element approach. Whilst fraud and cyber-crime did not score in the top 10 threats, there are actions in the Attack Criminality Plan to address them and the Protect Vulnerable People plan includes actions to address IIOC.

Force Priorities Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Human Trafficking / Modern Slavery Domestic Abuse Drugs Firearms Sexual Offences Missing Persons Commercial Robbery Burglary Dwelling Serious Violent Crime

• MoRiLE has been implemented in a way that complements the existing OCGM scoring and allows officers to better understand the impact that an OCG has on local communities and individuals. It examines the capacity and capability available to manage evident risks and reduce impact. As a result it gives decision makers and tasking groups a quantifiable indicator of the risk posed by each group, allowing them to better focus their resources where they will have the greatest impact. This method has been enthusiastically embraced by the Districts and Departments and is already driving tasking and decision making. • Supporting each OCG threat assessment is a thematic area 4P Plan aimed at managing, diverting and disrupting that OCG and its members. These Plans have an identified action owners who are responsible for managing that specific threat area, with interventions structured around the 4Ps proportionate to the nature of the threat.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Predicted Demand

We predict that organised crime will continue to be a significant threat for the Force with most areas of demand increasing:

Organised Crime Groups • Overall we predict that the numbers of OCGs will increase. • Our understanding of county lines is increasing and as we undertake education campaigns/awareness within the Force, with partners and within communities, we will undoubtedly identify more OCGs/Gangs, as well increasing our understanding around the criminal exploitation of children and vulnerable adults

Prosperity SOC • Fraud is predicted to increase and whilst it is now reported to be the most frequently experienced crime it is still significantly under reported. The National Audit Office predict that online fraud could increase to 2.9m incidents by 2021. • In particular we predict that the cyber element of fraud will increase and that the 11% we record does not reflect the true scale of the problem. • The nature and scale of both cyber-enabled and cyber dependent crime is still not fully understood and as such both are predicted to increase in light of the proliferation of technology and the increasing prevalence of the ‘online world’. There is an increasing use of technology to facilitate a wide range of organised crime including CSEA, Human Trafficking, Fraud, Radicalisation and Cyber enabled/dependent crime and we predict that this will increase, in particular around CSEA (IIOC/Live streaming) and Fraud. The use of the dark web for other elements of organised crime is an increasing threat as is the increasing number of States posing a cyber threat to UK, a threat which is identified across many agencies on the Local Resilience Forum. • Money laundering remains a cross cutting threat area relied upon to facilitate all serious and organised crime and is therefore an ongoing threat.

Commodity SOC • Given the profitability of drugs we predict this will continue to increase. Almost half of our OCGs have this as their primary activity. • The NCA predict the wider availability of cocaine at a lower cost within the UK and the increasing purity of Heroin, suggesting rising Heroin purities available at street level. It is predicted the use of Fentanyl will continue to grow across West Yorkshire. • Given the inextricable link between drugs and firearms and the increased willingness of OCGs to target people rather than property, we predict the increase in firearms related OCGs. • Acquisitive crime is predicted to increase over the next four years, which will include an increase in the organised element of it. For example our last Strategic Assessment (November 2017) showed that 2 in1 offences were increasing as a proportion of all burglaries. Approximately 11% of residential burglaries had resulted in the theft of a vehicle but one in five offences were also committed with a car as the primary target. Bradford remains the focal point for stolen vehicles and also has a large element of organised crime.

Vulnerability SOC • The full scale and extent of vulnerability SOC is still unknown as intelligence is particularly low in this area. However our processes are becoming more established and our investigative and intelligence gathering methods are improving. We therefore predict that demand will increase in this area as we better understand the scale of the problem. • In particular we predict that demand around indecent images, on-line abuse and livestreaming will increase as a result of criminals moving away from traditional platforms into the cyber arena on an ever increasing basis.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • The NCA identify that the growing access to high speed internet and accessible digital technology will see an increased risk of overseas OCGs live streaming CSEA to UK offenders and/or UK offenders using social media to arrange offending in other countries. Coercion of children to abuse other children or produce explicit material is predicted to remain a preferred MO. • In terms of MSHT, the NCA identify that the scale of MSHT is continually increasing on a gradual rate of growth and that a higher proportion of potential victims from overseas are claiming to have been exploited prior to arrival in the UK. The Assessment predicts that this this will continue to grow over the next 3-5 years. It also predicts that continued significant levels of legal and illegal migration, with numbers increasing due to conflicts and other tensions. • The impact of Brexit on human trafficking/illegal immigration is uncertain. Brexit may limit the pool of victims from the EU countries, driving traffickers and exploiters to seek out nationals from outside the EU, most frequently illegal immigrants. The most recent JSTAC Intelligence Assessment assesses that both China and India are highly likely to represent a significant modern slavery threat to the UK due to the level of victim vulnerability to recruitment in the source country and risk of exploitation taking place in the UK (prevalence of nationality, demand for exploitation etc.).

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Two: The current status of the workforce and other assets in terms of responding to the demand types

Effectiveness

• HMICFRS did not inspect West Yorkshire Police around serious and organised crime in the last PEEL inspection, but in 2016 graded the Force as Good . • PS Crime are responsible for the oversight of SOC as well as the investigation of major crime such as murder, kidnap and extortion, serious fraud, and deaths emanating from major collisions. The table below provides a snapshot of SOC disruption activity throughout 2017.

Criminal Justice Outcomes Period Threat Area Years Arrests Charge Convictions sentenced CSEA 1 Drugs 28 20 2 7 Economic Crime 3 Jan - Mar Firearms 28 32 16 127 2017 Money Laundering 26 2 MS & HT 2 1 4 OAC 44 23 10 8 CSEA 7 1 Drugs 44 24 4 14 Economic Crime Apr - Jun Firearms 28 26 4 14 2017 Money Laundering 1 MS & HT 5 1 9 OAC 17 19 3 6 CSEA Drugs 49 13 9 10 Economic Crime Jul - Sep 2017 Firearms 1 Money Laundering 9 5 MS & HT 3 2 1 OAC 14 4 1 CSEA 2 Drugs 139 41 11 66 Economic Crime Oct - Dec Firearms 2017 Money Laundering 8 8 3 3.8 MS & HT 8 2 1 3 OAC 105 39 10 42.9 TOTAL 2017 572 256 82 314.7

Capacity

• PS Crime provides the response to serious and organised crime at a Force level, Regional level (through the Yorkshire and Humber ROCU) and to the seven Forces of the North East through the Regional Asset Recovery Team (RART). • The Department is made of numerous specialist units, each with a clear and distinct identity. This allows investigators the opportunity to provide a bespoke and expert service to victims of crime. • Overall, capacity is assessed as sufficient in most areas.

The breakdown of the Department is shown overleaf:

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FTE Posts Personnel Type Team Officer Staff Grand Total Abusive Images Unit 6 6 Compliance and Planning 2 2 Coroner`s Officers 28 28 Cyber Crime 5 2 7 Digital Forensic Unit 22 22 Economic Crime Unit 11 40 51 Family Liaison Co-ordinator 1 1 Force Technical Support Unit 1 16 17 Homicide & Major Enquiry Team 67 34 101 Major Collision Enquiry Team 13 2 15 Major Investigation Review Team 6 16 22 Protective Services Crime SLT 15 15 Training 3 3

Capability

Capability is assessed as strong with PS Crime, with a number of dedicated teams, functions and resources:

Economic Crime Unit (ECU) • ECU is a dedicated team which disrupt and dismantle criminal networks involved in serious and organised crime by the innovative use of financial investigation. This includes seizing the assets of criminals through effective use of POCA legislation. • The ECU are the Force SPOC for all disseminations of Fraud and Cyber-crime received from Action Fraud and operate Fraud Allocation, Investigation and Recording policy which determines the nature of any investigation within force. In addition the ECU has responsibility for the provision of Forensic Accountancy Services, Victim Care and Crime Prevention. Volume Fraud investigation is a local policing responsibility although the ECU do provide professional support, advice and guidance to Districts. • Following structural changes within the ECU, the unit now has a mixed workforce of investigators both Detective Constables and Police Staff Investigative Officers, all of whom are PIP2 accredited or working towards this accreditation. The revision of the workforce to include a large percentage of Police Staff Investigative Officers (IOs) has presented a significant challenge in terms of training and the ability of the IOs to work independently without the assistance of police officers with warranted powers especially outside of the Force boundary when designated powers provided to IOs by the West Yorkshire Chief Constable are not valid. • Since the new structure has been introduced the department has lost over 30% of its trained investigators all of whom have left exclusively to join the private sector where their skills are high demand and salary scales are significantly higher. Options for the retention of police staff have been considered but are challenging given the current lack of medium to long term development opportunities in supervisory posts and the financial benefits in the private sector. The continued loss of IOs places significant pressure on the remaining officers and staff and also impacts on the ability of the department to manage existing caseloads and new investigations. The current lack of suitable training for IOs at the required PIP2 standard is further hampering the recruitment of new staff.

North East ROCU • As the largest strategic Force in the Yorkshire and Humber Region (YaTH), West Yorkshire Police are co-located with and have responsibility for the YaTH ROCU. The Force`s Head of Crime has responsibility for the oversight and management of these operational teams. • The citing of these resources within one building has forged strong operational relationships between the ROCU and West Yorkshire`s SOCU. The recent recruitment of a

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED D/Superintendent to be seconded to have daily responsibility for the ROCU has strengthened these bonds further.

Digital Forensics Unit/Cyber Team • The Digital Forensic Unit (DFU) triage and examine all of the “computerised” exhibits seized by during investigations into Cyber enabled and dependent crime. • The DFU have recently acquired accreditation for all of its activities under ISO 17025. This has been a time consuming and financially expensive process with DFU investigators and examiners servicing the demands of UKAS at the expense of investigative work. Maintaining that accreditation will place increasing burdens on existing staff and will require high levels of expenditure to keep pace with an ever evolving digital world. • The operational demand upon the DFU often outstrips its capacity and the Force regularly finds itself outsourcing demand to external accredited companies. This is financially expensive and demotivating for the staff involved. • The Force commits a significant financial outlay in terms of training for its Cyber Crime investigators and whilst expertise is high, so is turnover. This is due to higher wages and perceived improvement in working conditions within the private sector. Investigative resources • Capability within PS Crime is good. The most serious of offences are overseen by a PIP 3 accredited SIO with a dedicated team of Detectives and Police Staff Investigators. The Force provides investigative training at all ranks and across all areas of policing. Officers choosing to specialise in crime investigation receive support and guidance to help them pass the National Investigators Examination before progressing through general Detective Training. The Force offers additional training in specialist areas such as interviewing, Child and Public Protection, as well as being a leading player in delivering covert policing tactics to help us tackle Organised Criminality. • However, as outlined in Section 3, in common with other Forces across the UK, West Yorkshire is experiencing an inability to recruit and retain officers into its Criminal Investigation. An internal review in December 2017 identified that the force had a higher percentage of qualified Detective vacancies than that seen as an average (20%) for the country. This was in the main due to a large number of posts being occupied by TIs not yet qualified to PIP2. • PS Crime are addressing the issue and putting into place measures which will gradually relieve the pressures on existing staff. The force is actively involved in the NPCC’s Investigative Resilience workstream in response to the issues raised by HMICFRS.

Partnership Working • The Force has worked very closely with the SOC Team at the Home Office to help design and implement its strategic and local arrangements. As a result, there are strong partnership approach in tacking organised crime across the five Districts. • To support this Information Sharing is currently taking place at a strategic level under the Inter Agencies Information Sharing Protocol. Beneath this as the strategic groups develop local Information Sharing Agreements are being established. Draft agreements are being developed for all Districts and Local Authorities. • Each of the five District Partnerships have Serious and Organised Crime Local Profiles in order to understand organised crime threats and have developed a range of partnership work under the 4Ps. • Current community engagement work focuses on: o Identifying those who are vulnerable to becoming a victim or a coerced/unwitting perpetrator of Serious and Organised Crime o Co-ordinating and improving existing strategic partnership work in the public and third sector, e.g. bringing together resources, assets and knowledge o Producing toolkit guidance for local communities and partners with an emphasis on Prevent, Protect and Prepare.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Work with other agencies • There is a healthy relationship in place with the NCA including an embedded NCA presence within Protective Service Crime for effective disruption of serious crime. In addition there are strong partnership arrangements in place with the Border Force (where we have embedded Detectives), the Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN) Network, Trading Standards and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC).

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Two: The Wellbeing of th e Workforce in meeting the demand

PS Crime enjoys a relatively low sickness level in comparison with other Districts and Departments within the Force. Sickness and staff welfare issues are addressed fully at a bi-weekly resourcing meeting chaired jointly by the Deputy Head of Crime and a Senior HR representative. Bespoke Action Plans are devised for those already reporting sick and welfare/development plans are devised for those individuals who may be suffering from work related sickness issues but not yet reporting sick. Some key wellbeing issues are:

• There are some roles where staff are exposed to extremely distressing material (such as the Force`s Abusive Images Unit), very traumatic incidents (such as the Major Collision Enquiry Team) or sensitive roles such as Family Liaison Officer. PSC SLT members have ensured that all staff have a regular “Time Out” session with their Line Manager or Supervisor of their choice as well as a quarterly Individual Accountability Meeting where both performance and welfare issues can be discussed in privacy. Within the last financial year the department hosted a Mental health awareness day at the Force`s training school with speakers from within and out with our organisation. • There are some staff which work very long hours. Demand for example on Officers in covert surveillance is high and this manifests itself in long working hours. Officers often breach working time directives in order to service the threat and risk from the intelligence received. Any breaches in terms of working time directives are highlighted at the department`s weekly Senior Leadership meetings and those officers who regularly feature are approached by their Line Manager for a welfare conversation. • To improve morale and motivation PS Crime understand the importance of Reward and recognition and holds quarterly awards ceremonies. The SLT give out an “employee of the month” award and ensure that its distribution is evenly spread throughout the department recognising the many and varied outputs from our staff. The department has enjoyed a great deal of success at the West Yorkshire Police gala evening where the very best of performance is celebrated. The department also ensures that its most talented officers and staff are supported for promotion and development and are allowed to progress laterally by taking on Force projects, reviews and initiatives. • PS Crime has undertaken a range of initiatives to improve the workforce mix within the Department, with particular focus on attracting females and BME officers/staff into the Department. In relation to LGBT (Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender) issues there are strong relationships with Stonewall. This focus on inclusivity is important in terms of the wellbeing of the Workforce.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Three: The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating in particular focussing our on threat, harm and risk

In such a large metropolitan county, serious and organised crime will always present a high level of threat. In addition to the significant amount of work ongoing we will undertake the following to address particular concerns around Foreign National Offending, Cyber Crime, Drugs and OCGs generally. In terms of vulnerability, this remains a high priority but has been covered in Section 4 of the Force Management Statement (FMS):

• Foreign National Offending (FNO) – this threat will be mitigated by an enhanced intelligence footprint with increased co-operation with the Criminal Records Office. The Force will continue to work closely with Border Force colleagues and embedded NCA colleagues within the Force`s SOCU. Further investment is being made in the expansion of the FNO Unit resulting in an uplift in staff which will give the team a proactive and enforcement capability and mean that dedicated staff can build up expertise and form meaningful partnerships with the third sector and other agencies. The Force`s Overseas Registration Office has also seen recent investment to streamline its functionality and move to an IT based payment and recording database. This will increase productivity and ensure greater interoperability with the FNO team. The Force has enjoyed a degree of success as one of the first Force`s to build a Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery team. As confidence in the team increases so we will see demand rise. The Force will need to maintain its commitment in this area and undoubtedly up its commitment in terms of finance and staffing footprint. Greater partnership work in this area will be absolutely vital to its continued success. • Cyber enabled and dependant crime – the Force is embracing a regionally managed and locally delivered model and will ensure that it collaborates nationally to maintain its position as one of the lead Forces in the fight against Cyber Crime. Maintaining ISO accreditation will remain a priority as doing so motivates the Force to invest in the latest ICT as well as train and accredit our workforce in this ever evolving and demanding area of law enforcement. The Force has invested heavily in financial terms recently spending several million pounds in a data retention programme that will ensure that we are fit for purpose in terms of our Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act (CPIA) duties. The Force has agreed an uplift in DMI posts who will be deployed jointly within divisional investigation teams and within the Force`s Central Crime Management Unit where they can provide bespoke Cyber advice at the first point of contact with victims of crime. • Drugs underpin a significant amount of criminality and finances a great deal of emerging organised crime. The Force will need to enhance its oversight of its mapped Organised Crime Groups and continue to creatively counter their threat to the communities we serve. Greater understanding of their activities is required and the Force will need to change the culture within its workforce to make OCG management everyone`s business. A review of the Force`s intelligence functions is presently ongoing, the outcome of this review needs to be an increased impetus from all officers and staff to provide timely, quality intelligence relating to our OCGs and a potential re-alignment of intelligence staff to manage the extra demand that this may present. A new neighbourhood policing model has been brought in for the Force, those frontline staff working within our community wards will need to be continually reminded of their duties to service this intelligence function and to take an appropriate policing response if they become personally engaged with OCG members and suspect that ongoing criminality is taking place. • Drug related violence linked to County lines , sometimes involving very young people who are vulnerable to exploitation is an emerging priority. Any intelligence involving the criminal use of firearms will be prioritised and where SOC resources can be appropriately deployed to counter this threat then they will continue to do so. The Force will continue with its program to engage with Children of primary school age in areas where the very young are susceptible to exploitation from street gangs and OCGs. The Force will continue to utilise “gangbo” legislation to enforce restrictions on the movement and association between known gang members. This will involve police officers and staff working with partners in the judiciary and our own Legal 126

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Services department. It involves an increased investment in officer time but ultimately leads to a reduction in financial expenditure in terms of criminal justice activity but also reduces the misery inflicted upon communities by these, often, highly dangerous individuals equipped and armed with firearms and knives. • Urban Street Gangs – We are improving our understanding of urban street gangs by adopting the same process and structure for OCGs in order that we are in a better position to be able to assess the threats posed and put in place suitable early intervention and management plans to disrupt and divert them from further criminality and becoming OCGs. • The Force has invested heavily in its IT and communications systems with officers equipped with digital handheld devices and Body worn video. This is all replicated within the world of SOC to ensure the very best in digital technology, providing the judiciary with the highest levels of evidential corroboration that we can provide. It will also facilitate the speedier retrieval of high risk missing people.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Four: The future demand we do not expect to be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making

As has been articulated in Step 1, the anticipated demand around serious and organised crime is incredibly complex and challenging and is predicted to grow. The key issue for the Force will be the scale of problem emerging from the threats we face and how we prioritise that demand.

The one area of demand which may increase to the extent that the Force struggles to manage it is cyber-crime . The Force has invested additional resources to mitigate against the predicted increase in both cyber enabled and cyber dependent crime, but in reality the future increase cannot be accurately predicted given the constantly evolving nature of the threat. In addition as we invest in resources and the opportunities for targeted investigation of for example online abuse and technology such as ICACCOPS to identify offenders, we will identify unmapped demand that we may then not have the capacity to deal with.

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This section is about Major Events and will focus on : • Public Order • Civil Emergencies • Terrorism • Armed Policing • Roads Policing

The Section will explain each four elements of the Force Management Statement in relation to Major Events • Step One –The gap between current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years • Step Two – The current status of the workforce and other assets (their performance, condition, capacity, capability, serviceability, wellbeing and security of supply) in terms of responding to the demand types. • Step Three – The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating in particular focussing our on threat, harm and risk. • Step Four – The future demand we do not expect to be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making.

Introduction

The Force needs to comply with the Strategic Policing Requirement, which covers four of the areas above. The Force has a Strategic Plan, which addresses threats around firearms and terrorism which scored in the top 10 using the MoRiLE matrix. In addition, major threats and roads safety are priorities in the Police and Crime Plan, with road safety captured in the Provide Reassurance Plan.

Executive Summary

• In relation to road safety the numbers of Killed or Seriously Injured incidents (KSIs) are reducing in all areas with the exception of Bradford and we predict this reducing trend to continue. In terms of public order, the position is stable, although we do predict that environmental protest may increase in the future and whilst the threat from the Extreme Right Wing (XRW) are currently assessed as moderate, the situation can become volatile given the complexity and diversity of the county. Local, National and International events can impact on community tensions, public protest and counter protest and community cohesion. In terms of terrorism the threat level from international terrorism is currently at SEVERE, although in the last 12 months has increased twice to CRITICAL. In terms of armed policing, demand has increased in response to terrorism, serious and organised crime and the firearms threat. • Capacity and capability is strong in relation to major events. The Specialist Capabilities Programme presents some challenge as it may call upon the force to take further regional responsibility around niche capabilities as some forces move to a leaner model. In terms of public order, command resilience is identified as an issue with the retirement of a number of experienced silver commanders. • The main actions to be delivered are focussed on addressing capacity and capability issues rather than demand itself, for example command resilience and delivery of Police Support Unit (PSU) courses to inexperienced frontline officers. 129

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • The table below summarises: o Current demand and the potential 2021 demand based on statistical projections o Our professional judgement of the factors that will influence whether the potential projections will be realised and the resultant risk. • These issues will be explored in more detail, including an assessment of the demand we do not think we will be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making.

Predicted Factors influencing demand Demand 2021 Public Order Stable • Potential increase in environmental protest • Command resilience is an issue • Issues such as Brexit may lead to increased community tensions and public protest from XRW and counter protests Overall – Demand assessed as stable Civil Stable • Local Resilience Forum (LRF) threats around severe weather, pandemic flu, Emergencies community tensions/protest/terrorism and cyber tend to be static Overall – Demand assessed as stable Terrorism Increasing • Threat level from International Terrorism is SEVERE but has been at CRITICAL. • National indications suggest threat level will increase again • Volume of intelligence and investigations is increasing Overall – Demand assessed as increasing Armed Increasing • Demand increasing primarily around Counter Terrorism (CT) and Organised Policing Crime Overall – Demand assessed as increasing Roads Stable • Numbers of KSIs are reducing and on a long term reducing trend. Policing • Enduring risk of KSIs requires ongoing focus around Education, Enforcement and Engineering (partners are critical). Overall – Demand assessed as Stable

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Step One: The gap between current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years

Public Order

Current Demand The Force captures all of its Public Order/Public Safety (POPS) demands within the POPS Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (STRA) process which is conducted every six months. This document then informs the North East Regional STRA and National STRA. The main public order demands/threats are:

Protests • There are risks from the Extreme Right Wing, English Defence League and Left Wing . • The Force dealt with one high profile protest in 2017 which was the English Defence League (EDL) National Demonstration in Keighley, Bradford on the 2nd September. The event attracted 100 EDL supporters and 150 Counter Protestors. The numbers for the EDL are indicative of an organisation whose support is in decline. • The Force has just received notification of a planned demonstration on the 7th July 2018 in Wakefield by the National Front . Planning is in its early stages. West Yorkshire Police can assume for two Extreme Right Wing (XRW) protests per calendar year with an assumed counter protest by the Extreme Left Wing (XLW)

Football – West Yorkshire has three football league clubs, each of which has a risk element amongst its fans around spontaneous confrontation and disorder and sometimes pre-planning violence or disorder. The risk is assessed as Moderate. • Huddersfield Town play in the FA Premier League and all of the planned league games are policed. Currently there are 11 football banning orders in place and there have been 28 arrests so far this season which is an increase of 11 compared to this time last year. • Leeds United play in the Championship and all of the planned league games are policed. Currently there are 37 banning orders in place and there have been 37 arrests so far this season which is an increase of 5 compared to last year. • Bradford City play in League one. Currently there are 10 banning orders in place and there have been six arrests this season which is a decrease of 13 compared to this time last year.

Other Sporting Events • In June 2018 Headingly Cricket Ground (Leeds) will see England play Pakistan in a five day test match followed by a one day International against India on the 17 July. Both of these fixtures will attract both duty time and Special Police Service (SPS) Policing. Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs) will also be deployed as per the threat to crowded places. • The Tour De Yorkshire Cycling event takes place on the 3-6th May 2018. This event continues to grow in stature and attendance on day 4 is likely to see over one million spectators at the roadside in the county. Both days will see policing from duty staffing and the Special Constabulary.

Music/Community Events • There are a number of carnival and music festivals, primarily in Leeds. Whilst the risk level is assessed as low, there is the potential for serious violence, crime and disorder due to the large number of people attending. • Leeds Festival can see up to 70,000 attendees and is policed by mainly duty staff with some SPS Roads Policing support. The event does involve arrests mainly for drugs supply offences • The Chapeltown Carnival is the largest West Indian Carnival outside of London and sees up to 150,000 people attend. Criminality does feature often in the form of violent crime between feuding Organised Crime Groups. The event is policed by duty staffing which also covers the night time economy in the city centre. 131

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Mutual Aid • The Force provides a regular supply of Police Officers on mutual aid to other forces. There were 44 requests for mutual aid in 2017 (covering football, protests, demonstrations and VIP requests). This can be seen as a reasonable benchmark for 2018, with five requests already received in 2018 (all around football).

Predicted Demand • We predict the same levels of demand around public order given that the events which we are required to police are not reducing. • Whilst the EDL has seen diminishing support and activity, Brexit may re-ignite the activity of the Right Wing and lead to protests if the deal is not perceived to address issues such as immigration. This is likely to lead to counter protests. • Situations can become volatile and in addition to Brexit, other factors such as CSEA, terrorism and other national/international factors can lead to community tension and protests and have a wider impact on community cohesion. • We predict that environmental protest is likely to increase as a result of fracking and therefore presents an emerging threat. There are a number of dedicated anti-fracking groups within West Yorkshire and local anti-fracking groups/national activists are willing to travel throughout the UK to protest at specific onshore oil and gas operation sites and the companies who supply them.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Civil Emergencies

Current Demand • All Local Resilience Forum (LRF) partners produce their top three risks and refresh these on a quarterly basis. • The risks themselves tend to be reasonably consistent and are generally community tensions/protest/terrorism, pandemic influenza, cyber threats, severe weather/floods and various issues that are unique to that particular agency. • Risks managed through the LRF originate in the National Risk Assessment and all those identified in that document have a current management or response plan managed through the various subgroups. High risk locations are managed in a manner dependent on the nature of the risk posed. For example, crowded places are dealt with for their terrorist risk. • Demand experienced in West Yorkshire is difficult to ascertain using a measure such as Strategic Co-ordination Centre activation. West Yorkshire is the largest area without either a unitary authority or an elected mayor and, as such, many issues are dealt with at the local level that would result in a full activation in other areas. The five local authorities are, however, active and enthusiastic participants in the LRF and are closely linked with their local District management.

Predicted Demand • The most significant issues relating to civil contingencies (severe weather, terrorism, pandemic flu, cyber-crime/terrorism) show no signs of abating and, indeed, appear to be increasing in both severity and frequency. It would seem reasonable therefore to predict that these demands will remain or rise further. • One such threat which is likely to increase and evolve, is a cyber-attack , in particular a denial of service attack . This has been identified as an issue in Section 6 (Serious and Organised Crime) and Section 9 (IT and Information Management).

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Terrorism

Current Demand • The threat to the UK from international terrorism is SEVERE , meaning an attack is highly likely. • The terror threat in the UK comes principally from Daesh (ISIL, ISIS and IS) and al Qaida and groups and individuals who are directed, encouraged or inspired by them. • The online radicalisation of lone actors , who may then progress into action very quickly, remains a key concern which is both difficult to predict and prepare for. • We remain committed to tackling extremism in all its forms and any ideologies which pose a threat to public safety. The threat from the extreme right wing is also a concern, with groups like National Action seeing an increase in their following and activities, resulting in their proscription as a recognised terrorist organisation in December 2016. • The level of threat is complex and multi-dimensional and ranges from lone actors intent on carrying out crude attacks to sophisticated networks pursuing ambitious and coordinated plots. • Investigations focus on a range of activities, including fundraising, radicalising and preparing acts of terrorism. • The threat posed by UK nationals seeking to return from Syria or Iraq is something UK policing has planned for and a wide range of measures and powers are being used to manage and mitigate that threat. • Last year the threat level in the UK was increased from SUBSTANTIAL to CRITICAL on two occasions, following the attacks in Manchester and Parsons Green. For West Yorkshire, as the lead force for Counter Terrorism Policing North East (CTP NE), the capacity and capability of the force to respond to the increased threat was tested. Since the attacks, we have seen a direct significant increase in the demand for investigative resources.

Predicted Demand • The UK continues to face an increasing threat from terrorism. The threat is International in scope and involves a variety of networks, groups and individuals who seek to advance their aims through acts of violent extremism. • The demand experienced in the last 12 months has been unprecedented and continues to rise . National indications suggest that further increases in the national threat level are likely in the future and that the volume of CT investigations and demand for resources will remain high. • Since March 2017, and following the attacks in London and Manchester, we have seen a recent upshift in terrorist activity. • This has resulted in an increased demand being placed on CT policing, to stop attacks, bring offenders to justice, protect crowded places, mitigate against attacks and prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. Our security measures and activities are constantly reviewed to reflect where the threats exist and the level of threat we are facing. • The issues of online radicalisation and lone actors remain key concerns, but the manifestation of these threats is hard to predict. • In addition to acts of terrorism and violent extremism, issues like CSEA, national and international events and conflicts, all have potential implications for the force with regard to community cohesion, tensions and public order. These matters and the subsequent increase in hate crime, demonstrations and counter protests all require a comprehensive and effective policing response to protect public safety and manage any spontaneous or pre-planned disorder. As such they continue to present potential challenges from a resourcing perspective in the current policing climate

Armed Policing

Current Demand • Data on our pre-planned and spontaneous firearms deployments represents a slightly increasing demand alongside the need for increased protective security measures. The increase is due to a number of factors: o There has been an increase in Counter Terrorism operations , which required armed policing support as well as an increased threat from both national and domestic 134

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED extremism. There has also been increased requirement for armed venue security, linked to the terrorism threat. o There has been an increase in the requirement to support crime operations against OCG activity. o The Firearms threat has increased over the last two years with an increase in the number of firearms discharges and the subsequent investment in Armed Response Vehicle (ARV) tasking. There has also been an increase in The National Ballistics Intelligence Service (NABIS) recovery of firearms. o There has been an increase in complex deployments as part of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles programme (JESIP). For example in response to the increased distribution of fentanyl amongst OCGs extra steps and precautions are needed to deal with the subjects and environment. • In 2017 the Force saw a total of 289 Taser uses of which, on only 44 occasions, taser was discharged.

Predicted Demand We predict that demand around armed policing will increase over the next four years. Key reasons for this are:

• Protective security patrols at venues – following the number of CT related incidents in the UK and abroad, we have seen an increase in deployments of AFOs to venues for public events. With the ongoing CT picture these will remain and are likely to increase. • CT operations and serious and organised crime – will continue to require armed policing support. • Specialist capability – As a large force, the Specialist Capability Programme may call upon the force to take further regional responsibility around niche capabilities. • Increase in training and exercising at venues – With both National and international attacks there is increased demand from partners and venues to participate in simulated attack training events focused around the CT threat. These take a number of months to prepare and deliver and impact on other areas .

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Current Demand

Over the last five years the numbers of road casualties who have been killed or seriously injured has fallen by 10.4%1

All Casualties (January-December) West 2005~09 Trend pattern 2017 vs last 2017 vs 2017 vs Avg of last Yorkshire Severities 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 avg 2012-2017 year Baseline 3 years KSI 1084.2 934 863 926 920 887 836 -5.7% ⇓ -22.9% ⇓ 911.0 -8.2% ⇓ All All severities 10008 7847 6799 6940 7223 6798 5,729 -15.7% ⇓ -42.8% ⇓ 6,987 -18.0% ⇓ KSI 151.6 131 98 104 134 120 111 -7.5% ⇓ -26.8% ⇓ 119.3 -7.0% ⇓ Child All severities 1115.8 865 769 772 826 791 684 -13.5% ⇓ -38.7% ⇓ 796.3 -14.1% ⇓ KSI 325.6 300 225 279 278 246 249 1.2% ⇑ -23.5% ⇓ 267.7 -7.0% ⇓ Pedestrian All severities 1344.4 1136 974 1074 1174 1058 900 -14.9% ⇓ -33.1% ⇓ 1102.0 -18.3% ⇓ KSI 88.4 125 122 128 126 122 120 -1.6% ⇓ 35.7% ⇑ 125.3 -4.3% ⇓ Cyclist All severities 480 596 635 682 628 637 558 -12.4% ⇓ 16.3% ⇑ 649.0 -14.0% ⇓ KSI 207 187 180 184 177 178 166 -6.7% ⇓ -19.8% ⇓ 179.7 -7.6% ⇓ PTW All severities 653.4 559 558 552 558 502 431 -14.1% ⇓ -34.0% ⇓ 537.3 -19.8% ⇓ Car KSI 420.6 286 282 302 276 310 269 -13.2% ⇓ -36.0% ⇓ 296.0 -9.1% ⇓ Occupant All severities 6771.6 4942 4177 4176 4349 4195 3,509 -16.4% ⇓ -48.2% ⇓ 4,240 -17.2% ⇓ • In 2017 all road casualties fell by 16% to 5,729. This reflects a continued positive reduction in road traffic casualties across West Yorkshire over recent years. • Fatal and serious injury collisions have reduced marginally over the last 12 months with a greater reduction in slight injuries. • The reactive demand placed upon roads policing as a result of injury collisions has continued to fall, however analysis of the demand shows continued areas of concerns around the ongoing risk to vulnerable road users with 64% falling into this category (representing a 2% increase on 2016). In order to reduce this demand it will be necessary to balance co-ordinated communication and education through the existing partnership arrangements, with enforcement of key legislation to address high risk driver behavior (speeding, illegal mobile phone use, drink or drug driving). • All Local Authorities have seen a reduction in KSI apart from Bradford , which has seen an overall increase and increases across most types. In addition to KSI, the anti-social behavior associated with road safety is reflected as a top priority in community concerns and as such is a priority in the Police and Crime Plan.

• There has been a 30% increase in vehicle tickets issued which has increased from 152,697 to 198,061 (30% increase). The greatest increase has been in relation to speeding.

1 KSI statistics provided by West Yorkshire Casualty Reduction Partnership 136

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Predicted Demand

Our statistical forecasting based on recent trends suggests that whilst a reduction in KSIs has been reported over recent years the overall number of road traffic collisions, including those involving damage only will increase by 10.6% by 2021. There are a number of factors influencing the demand:

• The continued positive partnership work in this area, particularly around camera enforcement to improve road safety. • Demand could significantly increase as a result of Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR ) and the millions of activations it can manage. The investment in IT to interpret and task accordingly is critical otherwise the demand would be overwhelming to manage. • The popularity of cycling continues to grow with a commensurate increase in risk of collision. This will require further investment in initiatives such as ‘Close Pass’ already piloted in 2017 • There is an emerging issue in West Yorkshire associated with the ‘hiring’ of high-end, hi- powered vehicles by individuals (predominantly young males) purely for recreational or status purposes. There is evidence of those vehicles being driven at excessive and dangerous speeds in an anti-social and often dangerous manner presenting increased risk of collision to the driver, occupants and road using public alike. There is also intelligence to indicate such commercial activity may be associated with organised criminal activity. • West Yorkshire has also experienced a number of ‘ ride-out/cruise’ events. One such event involved in excess of 100 motorcycles taking to the streets of Leeds. The Force has developed a strategy for policing such events in conjunction with Leeds City Council and groundbreaking investigation work in the aftermath of the Leeds event resulted in notable convictions and sentences for several participants which has provided a significant deterrent effect. However, there is a risk that such events may be repeated in the future.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Two: The current status of the workforce and other assets in terms of responding to the demand types (performance, condition, capacity, capability and serviceability)

Effectiveness • HMICFRS PEEL Assessments have regularly graded the Force as GOOD in relation to the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR). • The last HMICFRS Inspection did not grade Specialist Capabilities.

Capacity and Capability

Public Order and Specialisms The Force has the following Public Order Public Safety Assets which evidence good capacity and capability to manage demand. • PSU level 2 Officers, which meet our National commitments. These uniform officers are situated across the five Policing Districts and Protective Services Operations. A proportionate requirement in relation to district strength is used to ensure a balance across the force. West Yorkshire Police are able to meet national obligations with regards to mutual aid and the national mobilisation plan. • There are Gold Commanders who are a mixture of Assistant Chief Constables (ACCs) and Chief Superintendents. The Force has good capability in this regard. • There are Silver Commanders who are a blend of Chief Superintendents, Superintendents and Chief Inspectors. • Bronze Commanders are a blend of Chief Inspectors and Inspectors. The Force has good capability in this regard. • There are Public Order Tactical Advisors ( POTACs ) who are a blend of Sergeants and Constables. The Force has good capability in this regard.

• In terms of Specialisms the Force has the following which can be regarded as good capability: o Police Liaison Team Officers (PLT) with an established PLT Lead Co Coordinator who is also a substantive Bronze Commander. o Forward Intelligence Team Officers (FIT) with an established FIT lead who is part of the Public Order Training Team o Evidence Gatherers (EG) o Protestor Removal Team (PRT) • The Force hosts the NPAS dispatch centre at Wakefield and has a helicopter physically based at the Carr Gate site. The demand for the aircraft is high throughout the force and region and assists in firearms operations, suspect and missing person searches and fail to stop road traffic matters amongst others, again with significant success. • Training and exercising with partners is a constant focus to ensure effective multi-agency responses are maintained. • Police Search advisors and search officers are experiencing ever increasing demand following increases in missing person reports and firearms discharges in particular. VIP visits to the force area are reasonably frequent and also bring considerable demand in terms of venue search requirements. • West Yorkshire Police mounted section is a specialist capability utilised on a daily basis across the force area as well as assisting other forces through mutual aid. Whilst assisting greatly at sporting fixtures and protests this small team also deploy across the force to assist with visibility, preventative patrols and arrest enquiries with notable success. • The Force has a team of Close Protection Officers and the demand on them is ever present with regular VIP visitors to the area and mutual aid requests. This demand relates not only to the deployment of the officers but also to the planning and training required.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Civil Contingencies • The West Yorkshire LRF is managed from within West Yorkshire Police by an Inspector and supported by and a full time administrator. Contingency plans are managed and monitored by one Police Sergeant and a full time Police Staff equivalent. These staff sit within the Force Planning Unit and contribute to Gold activations on a call out basis. • All staff within the Force complete the e-learning JESIP programme and staff attend West Yorkshire Fire & Rescue Service (WYFRS) in order to become familiar with that organisation’s capabilities and working practices. The latest round of JESIP command training has just started and will continue for the next three years. The Force provides a trainer for each session and the LRF manager attends to deliver the input in relation to civil contingencies. • As far as specialist assets is concerned, all those available within the Force are available in the response to civil contingencies, as are those of our partner agencies. All individual Force plans accord with the multi-agency plans. • Learning from incidents and exercising of plans allows the LRF to continually review its fitness for purpose.

Terrorism • CT policing in the UK is serviced by the national CT network made up of Counter Terrorism Units, Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units and Intelligence partners. This network is supported by local police forces and partner agencies. • In West Yorkshire, the force liaises closely with CTP NE to ensure it is better equipped to prevent or respond to incidents of terrorism and domestic extremism to investigate and prosecute those involved. Through CTP NE the force can access specialist expertise including; skilled detectives, financial investigators, community contact teams, intelligence analysts, forensic specialists and high-tech investigators. It can also ensure the effective co-ordination and management of enquiries and operations, without compromising the force’s commitment to day to day policing. • All CT officers undertake regular specialist training , regionally and nationally, in relation to their roles. Wider CT advice and awareness products are regularly delivered to front line officers and staff. These may take the form of threat briefings, vigilance and awareness videos, and messaging around personal and operational security. • Liaising closely with CTP NE, the force works in support of the National Counter Terrorism & Domestic Extremism (CT/DE) Policing strategy and the Government’s overarching CONTEST strategy . • Threat and risk management and safeguarding activity is delivered locally with CTP NE in line with key stakeholders within districts, local authorities and partnerships. This approach is co- ordinated through established tasking and coordination processes and also partnership forums, which work to agreed priorities as identified in the Counter Terrorism Local Profiles (CTLPs). • This national process aims to help both police and partners understand and prioritise threat and vulnerability, with suggested recommendations to address any risk. The CTLP is a key tool for driving the two way sharing of information. • Alongside partners, the force also fulfils its statutory duties under the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015, to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism (Prevent Duty). • Through the national CT network and CTP NE the force keeps up to date with national strategy, recommendations and developments in relation to the threat level, protective security measures and threat and risk management. Working alongside CTP NE West Yorkshire Police constantly reviews its counter terrorism measures to provide the best possible protection for people living in West Yorkshire. As a precaution, activities and intelligence are also reviewed in response to a range of attacks, risks and threats, including those seen in the UK and overseas in the 12 months. • Nationally the threat assessment is influenced by a range of factors including current intelligence, recent events and what is known about terrorist intentions, methodology and capabilities. Any decisions regarding appropriate security responses in West Yorkshire are made with this in mind and are supported by detailed analysis. Threat assessments are also produced (as necessary) for individuals and events.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • Under the Home Office National Exercise Programme, work is continually ongoing to ensure readiness to respond to major incidents in West Yorkshire. This work is supported by CTP NE and local exercising plans. These routine counter terrorism training exercises are organised to test contingency plans and the co-ordinated response of the emergency services and partner agencies in the event of a terrorist attack. Such exercises provide valuable opportunities for West Yorkshire Police and its blue light partners to work together to develop, test and strengthen our combined response, should a major incident occur. • West Yorkshire has dedicated Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs) who are co- ordinated, trained and tasked by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office. • The CTSAs carry out daily activities to help increase the protection and security of our communities, public institutions, critical national infrastructure sites, businesses and crowded places. Our measures and activities are constantly reviewed to reflect where the threats exist and the level of threat the country is facing. The CTSAs also promote awareness of the threat from terrorism and develop positive ongoing relationships with the local business community, partner agencies and site owners to encourage a co-ordinated approach. They work closely with representatives of trade organisations and professional bodies to ensure counter terrorism protective security advice is incorporated in general crime prevention regimes.

Armed Policing • The Force has good capacity and capability around armed policing, as well as strong governance arrangements such as Strategic Threat Assessments at a Regional and Force level, Firearms Steering Group and weekly meetings chaired by a Strategic Firearms Commander (SFC) • Plans are in place to train a number of district staff to AFO level to assist with venue security and develop staff towards armed policing roles and succession planning for roles. • The Force has a 24(7) Tactical Firearms Commander (TFC) covering for all assessments and planned deployments, supported by the duty Force Supervisor (FSUP) Initial Tactical Firearms Commander (ITFC). This is supported by a 24(7) intelligence structure so that every piece of firearms intelligence is processed and assessed in the 24 hour period. This is also supported by a high risk cadre who pick up more complex deployments, crime and CT requirements and work on a rota and are on call 24(7). • Under the JESIP Programme , a number of exercises are run with partners on both a national and regional level, allowing learning and best practice to be undertaken. • The ARV shift pattern has built in training days to ensure refresher training can be achieved and we maintain our ARV uplift profile on the streets to protect the public. Succession planning in place around AFO/ARV roles • The Force delivers a number of national courses such as Close protection, rifle etc. Collaboration arrangements are also in place within the YaTH around firearms training and the Force has a set of modern firearms ranges giving 100m, 50m and live fire skills ranges. The training requirement also takes staff to other venues in the region and the public order complex is also used for Taser delivery.

Roads Policing • There is strong partnership work around road safety driven through the West Yorkshire Safer Roads Partnership and the Casualty Reduction Partnership, which is responsible for the delivery of automated speed enforcement through the deployment of static and mobile speed enforcement cameras across the county. In addition, Safer Roads Delivery Groups exist in each of the five local authority areas to task and co-ordinate the delivery of proactive and reactive work across member agencies focussing on Engineering, Education and Enforcement . • The Camera Enforcement Unit deploy to a total of 414 fixed sites using 118 cameras. In addition the Force has a mobile deployment capability utilising three fully liveried vans. Camera enforcement has seen a significant increase in detected offences with the introduction of Managed Motorway enforcement in 2017 also contributing to the rise in offences detected. • The Roads Policing Unit within West Yorkshire Police operates on a 24/7 basis from two operating bases (Eastern and Western) to maximise operational coverage. The team comprises five sergeant led teams with 24 advanced roads policing officers per team four of 140

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED whom are also advanced motorcyclists (including two current vacancies). There are a further five qualified motorcyclists posted to driver training and all motorcyclists are VIP escort trained (VIPEX). Roads Policing Officers respond to all serious and injury accidents. • The Major Collision Enquiry Team provides a specialist capability within the Homicide and Major Enquiry Unit and is responsible for investigating all road deaths in West Yorkshire in conjunction with the newly formed Regional Collision Investigation Unit . This Team consists of one Detective Inspector, three Detective Sergeants and 10 constables. All the supervisors are accredited Roads Death SIOs and can call upon the services of the Force cadre of FLOs to support their work with the families of collision casualties. • The Force has created a Proactive Intercept Team capability which will focus on OCG disruption and denying criminals use of the roads. This Team will provides an intelligence-led capability delivering both overt and semi covert tactics and supports the disruption and dismantling of organised criminality across the county. • Each district also has a number of neighbourhood officers who are trained and equipped in the use of off-road motorcycles as a tactic in the disruption and detection of the anti-social use of motorcycles/quad bikes in local communities . • An increasingly inexperienced ‘front line’ workforce at District presents capacity issues for Roads Policing as the level of support required in dealing with anything except the more straightforward of damage only collision will continue to grow. This requires day to day support and a programme of coaching and mentoring to ensure that the knowledge-base at District is developed over time.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Two: The Wellbeing of the Workforce in meeting the demand

In terms of those conducting the roles and responsibilities within this section the Force has a number of measures in place to ensure the wellbeing of staff as below:

• Sickness is tracked and monitored by line management and reviewed by the Senior Leadership Team (SLT) weekly with individuals/circumstances of concern tasked for further action. A Force Health and Wellbeing lead has recently been appointed and has visited the district on a number of occasions to work on longer term wellness strategies. In addition, the force chaplain visits the district on a regular basis. • In terms of physical health , physical condition is monitored by the use of annual fitness tests during both annual PSU training and officer safety training. The Force has also recently adopted an alternative fitness test which is taken when minor injuries mean Officers/Staff cannot fulfil the bleep test requirements. In addition the Force Physical Training Instructors (PTI) offers extra sessions, classes and action plans to those requiring them and annual opportunities are available for staff to have a health check from a visiting physician. • There are some roles within the Force where staff are exposed to traumatic incidents , such as fatal road traffic collisions. Such incidents can impact on staff and all managers have been trained in trauma and mental health awareness and OHU appointments are available on request. • In terms of specialisms , Firearms officers are subject to a more intensive medical annually and Support Officers have been appointed for those undergoing a PIM process. Regular debriefs are conducted for stressful and complex incidents. • Many staff (in particular Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officers - CTSFOs) work very long hours due to capacity issues and the nature of the role and are at risk of ‘burn out’. Overtime and rest days worked are monitored by the SLT to ensure that officers are allowed and indeed on occasion instructed to take the rest required.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Three: The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating in particular focussing our on threat, harm and risk.

Steps one and two have indicated that demand in relation to civil contingencies, public order and roads policing will remain static. Some of the key issues are not necessarily demand but are about addressing either capacity/capability gaps or some new challenges. In response the Force will:

• Through the North East Transformation Innovation and Collaboration (NETIC), all seven forces in the Region have considered capacity issues around a number of specialist operational command areas. In May 2018 the forces all agreed to the development of Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and where necessary Sec 22a agreements to ensure specialist operational command capability was available across the region with immediate effect. • Build on the PSU courses that have been delivered to student officers to address the inexperience issue. The next 12 months will see a further 150 student officers trained up as PSU Officers as this challenge continues. • Ensure that our less experienced Silver Commanders are supported and developed and exposed to the higher risk events in order to address the risk regarding the retirements of the Force’s most experienced Commanders. • In terms of roads policing, the level and nature of OCG activity across the strategic roads network is likely to increase requiring the capacity and capability of Roads Policing to work with covert and overt investigative functions, to disrupt and prevent criminal networks that are reliant on road use. • Within the remit of the LRF the Force and partners will continue to critically assess is preparedness to deal with significant events , for example the ability to respond to a marauding terrorist attack and enhance its plans accordingly. • In light of the evolving threat and terrorist methodologies, the Force explores all available opportunities for collaboration across the fields of counter terrorism and organised crime. This collaboration seeks to maximise intelligence gathering opportunities across agencies and enables a more comprehensive picture of threat and risk; helping to identify emerging issues, prevent or disrupt offences and better protect our communities. This integrated approach further enhances the Force’s effectiveness in collecting, sharing and responding to intelligence, in addition to achieving broader benefits and efficiencies with regard to expenditure and resourcing.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Four: The future demand we do not expect to be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making

Steps one and two have shown that demand is not predicted to increase to unmanageable levels and that the Force is able to meet its Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR) commitments. However, there are a number of concerns in relation to capacity/capability issues:

• Specialist Capabilities – there is a need to closely examine the Specialist Capabilities programme in particular relating to firearms. • Whilst demand around armed policing may grow, continued austerity measures and the limited armed uplift money and allocations periods, may mean that the Force may not be able to afford the model we currently have, should funding be reduced or cut.

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This Section is about the Force’s overall approach to the wellbeing of the people who work in it and will focus on: • An overall assessment of wellbeing • How this is expected to change • Assessment of the resources we have dedicated to wellbeing.

The Section will explain each four elements of the Force Management Statement in relation to Wellbeing: • Step One –The gap between current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years • Step Two – The current status of the workforce and other assets (their performance, condition, capacity, capability, serviceability, wellbeing and security of supply) in terms of responding to the demand types. • Step Three – The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating in particular focussing our on threat, harm and risk. • Step Four – The future demand we do not expect to be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making.

Introduction

Wellbeing is a key element our People Ambition which sets out the strategic direction of the Force in relation to Attracting, Recruiting and Retaining a talented and diverse workforce. The Force has a Wellbeing Board which is responsible for driving forward the wellbeing agenda. The Force also has a comprehensive Wellbeing Policy and key priorities for 2018 are to develop a Wellbeing Strategy, align our wellbeing initiatives under the Workforce Transformation Maturity Matrix and evaluate them against the Blue Light Wellbeing Framework. The Police and Crime Plan has a strong emphasis on investing in police officers, PCSOs, police staff, specials and volunteers in order to improve our service deliver, which is also important for the wellbeing of our staff.

Executive Summary

Current Predicted Factors Influencing Demand Demand 2017 Demand 2021 Sickness 3.95% hours Slight increase Demand increasing particularly around a breadth of mental lost to health issues, including stress (from increased workloads), sickness depression, anxiety, exposure to trauma/PTSD. This increase may be moderated by improvements in wellbeing provision. Referrals to 1,708 Slight increase Same as above OH Inciden ts on 1,905 Slight increase Significant increase on 2016 however, this is likely to be due to duty the push on recording. As recording of incidents settles, it is expected that incidents on duty will stabilise somewhat, with perhaps a slight increase Injuries on 1,828 Slight decrease Significant increase on 2016 due to the push on recording. Duty Numbers anticipated to reduce with better use of Body Worn Video (Physical assault currently accounts for 73% of injuries)

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Workload High workload Slight increase Demand across all areas is predicted to increase (especially in per officer complex areas such as Safeguarding) and numbers of officers will not increase significantly. Staff Improving Improving Levels of engagement are expected to improve as wellbeing, Engagement engagement and workforce agendas are progressed.

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Step One: The gap between current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years

This Section is about the wellbeing of the workforce and the services we have in place to provide wellbeing support to our people. In particular it examines • An overall assessment of wellbeing • How this is expected to change • Assessment of the resources we have dedicated to wellbeing.

Overall Assessment of Wellbeing

Our understanding around wellbeing demand can partly be understood around the data we collect. However the Force has also been working towards achieving Workplace Wellbeing Charter (WWC) status, and in 2017 was independently confirmed as achieving the ‘Achievement’ standard across all of the WWC standards. We are committed to a Wellbeing Action Plan to increase our wellbeing provision and thereby contribute towards achieving the ‘commitment’ level across several of the WWC standards. Our aspiration however is to achieve ‘Excellence’ across all eight standards. In line with this activity, we will be developing an overarching Employee Health and Wellbeing Strategy to provide strategic direction and assurance of the organisation’s commitment to wellbeing for the next five years and importantly implement an underpinning plan to address any gaps.

Sickness

Trends in Sickness Absence 5.00% 4.37% 4.00% 3.95% 3.39% 3.00%

2.00%

1.00%

0.00% Jul Jul 2014 Jul Jul 2015 Jul Jul 2016 Jul Jul 2017 Jan Jan 2015 Jan Jan 2016 Jan Jan 2017 Jan Jan 2018 Mar 2014 Mar Mar 2015 Mar Mar 2016 Mar Mar 2017 Mar Mar 2018 Mar Sep Sep 2014 Nov 2014 Sep Sep 2015 Nov 2015 Sep Sep 2016 Nov 2016 Sep Sep 2017 Nov 2017 May 2014 May May 2015 May May 2016 May May 2017 May

All Employees Police Officers Police Staff

• Overall sickness has increased marginally in the past three years from 3.59% of available hours lost to sickness in 2014 to 3.95% in 2017. • Sickness associated with mental health has risen significantly over the last three years, accounting for 26.3% of sickness in 2014/15 rising to 32.6% in 2016/17 (185,711 total hours lost). • All five Districts report that sickness associated with mental health (stress, anxiety and depression) is increasing. This correlates with the national trend where the Police Federation report that 39% of their officers had sought help with a mental health issue and 65% saying they had gone to work even though they shouldn’t because of their mental health. • Musculoskeletal issues/injuries consistently account for the second highest level of total absence (25.3% of total absence and 1445,429 total hours lost).

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Referrals to Occupational Health • Increasing levels of sickness have led to an increasing number of referrals to Occupational Health from 1382 in 2016/17 to 1732 in 2017/18. • In line with the most prevalent reasons for absence, the highest number of referrals is for Psychological issues (644), with this being split into anxiety and depression (501), Trauma (71), and other reasons (72). The second highest reason for referral was for Musculoskeletal issues/injuries (559), with this being split into lower limb (219), torso (158) and upper limb (125). • Operationally the delivery of a responsive Occupational Health service has been challenged by the sheer demand for service and the current programme of services available has meant that local solutions for certain risk groups (e.g. psychological assessment availability for members of staff in certain specialist services) have had to be developed. However, the Force has now appointed a Force Medical Officer and a Head of Health and Wellbeing. • Psychological assessments for staff involved in Safeguarding and other roles which involved distressing work have now been introduced. For Safeguarding Staff this involved an appointment with a nurse at OHU to identify levels of compassion satisfaction, burnout and secondary trauma. Key issues raised (workloads, lack of training and lack of support) are more about the working environment rather than the nature of the role.

Incidents on Duty (IOD) • There has been a significant increase in the number of incidents on duty from 1337 in 2016 to 1905 in 2017 (568 additional incidents, equating to a 42.5% increase). • Physical assaults by another person have significantly increased and account for 33.5% of all incidents (639). The increase may be partially explained by the promotion of the online system for reporting IODs, as well as a project and Gold Group chaired by the DCC in place to improve the reporting of assaults on officers and staff. Assaults on Officers has also been addressed on a weekly basis at the morning meeting at which all COT, Districts and Departments attend. • ‘Another kind of accident’ accounts for the next largest proportion (23.5%) of incidents (447 incidents). Numbers have increased, which again may be partially explained by the promotion of the online system for reporting • A significant reduction is shown in the number of incidents reported for ‘injured while handling, lifting or carrying’. There is no identifiable reason for this, so further monitoring would be required to identify any possible trend.

Injuries on Duty • There has been a significant increase in the number of injuries on duty from 1313 in 2016 to 1828 in 2017 (515 additional incidents, equating to a 39% increase). • Almost all of the injury types have shown an increase from 2016. Once again, this may be due to promotion and improvements in the reporting mechanisms in place. • Most injuries are minor, with more serious injuries such as lacerations, multiple injuries and concussion remaining low. • In terms of assaults on duty and in line with increased reporting there has been almost a doubling of incidents from 445 in 2016 to 877 in 2017 (97% increase). • Physical assaults by another person accounts for almost 73% of incidents and has increased from 360 in 2016 to 638 in 2017 (77% increase).

Workload and Supervision • It has been difficult to gather accurate data on workloads and supervision ratios, however, according to Value for Money profiles, West Yorkshire does have the lowest supervisory rate in the country with six Constables to every Sergeant. Strain on first line supervisors has been identified as a risk across most District Risk Registers.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • In some specialist areas, workloads are particularly high including Safeguarding and CID, which puts a strain on the wellbeing of Officers. These have been covered in more detail in the relevant sections.

Employee Engagement and Fairness • The Force has undertaken an annual Staff Survey for a number of years, in order to check the wellbeing and engagement of the workforce. Over the last two years this has been undertaken independently by Durham University. • Over the last year the response rate has doubled to 59.6% one of the highest of any of the 35 Forces working with Durham • The table below shows that improvements were found in all nine repeat levels, eight of which at statistically significant levels. Perceived organisational support was one of the largest improvements and is important for the wellbeing of the workforce.

Measure 2015 2017 Change* (Average) (Average) Vision Clarity 4.11 4.95 L Perceived Organisational Support 3.24 4.03 L Procedural Justice (Fairness) 3.43 3.82 S Supportive Leadership 4.79 5.18 S Job Satisfaction 4.79 5.24 S Uncertainty 6.00 4.69 L Ind-Code of Ethics Values Alignment 5.56 5.94 M-L Public Service Motivation** 4.88 5.57 M-L Emotional Energy 4.46 4.71 n.s. *Significance was confirmed using a matched sample and t-tests **The scale used in 2017 to measure PSM is shorter than the scale used in 2015. This is due to development of the scale

• Overall the Force now has one of the most positive staff survey results in the Country. Durham University have described the improvements as unprecedented for a larger Force. There is now the expectation that the Force will deliver against the post staff-survey engagement commitments (fairness, supportive leadership and removing barriers) and failure to do so will have a negative impact on the engagement of staff across the service. All Districts and Departments have plans in place to address the issues raised and will be held accountable for delivering them (including a session planned at the Force Accountability Meeting). • Follow up surveys have also been undertaken to measure the impact of change on those staff affected by Project Fusion (a significant review of the back office undertaken by Consultants in 2015/2016).

Future Wellbeing Demand

• Our expectation is that increasing operational demands, and an increase in the diversity of challenges that policing will face, will increase the likelihood of mental and physical ill health . Busier shifts and dealing with people who may be in crisis may lead to increased pressure and potentially more physical and personal abuse (accentuated if partners cannot deliver and more demand is placed on the Force). • Sickness is increasing marginally and we expect that trend to continue with the continued increase associated with mental ill-health. • The impact of this will be increased demand for Occupational Health Services and a need for the provision of services to address these issues, in particular specialist psychological services. • Currently in several areas, we do not provide the level of trend data to be able to effectively analyse any changes in wellbeing indicators. Currently we do not know whether assaults and injuries are actually increasing or whether this is due to a drive to increase recording. Demand may therefore look like it is increasing, but this is likely to be previously unrecorded demand. The Wellbeing Strategy will seek to address this and provide mechanisms for a more robust approach to gathering and interpreting wellbeing data, and using that data to 149

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED inform future plans. It is expected that this focus and the wider strategy will lead to an increase in positive metrics in relation to the wellbeing of our officers and staff. A positive focus on wellbeing through the strategy and initiatives introduced is likely to increase the demand for services across the Workforce. We expect that increased use of Body Worn Video will reduce assaults on officers as this provides a deterrent to offenders as well as evidence at court. As 73% of injuries are due to assaults, this could lead to a significant reduction. • An aging population and an increasing state pension age , means that both Officers and Staff will need to work longer which presents wellbeing issues for the Force. Lack of recruitment for the last few years creates a workforce with clear groups of younger and older people with different skills and expectations and different wellbeing needs. There is some evidence to suggest that a mix of older and younger people can strengthen workforce vitality. • The broader roll out of agile working is likely to have a positive impact on wellbeing in terms of a healthy work-life balance. However it may also lead to the support network for some workers being more tenuous and less effective.

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Step Two: The Current Status o f the Workforce and other Assets in terms of responding to the demand types

The wellbeing demand highlighted in Step One clearly has highlighted particular issues for us in terms of the condition of the workforce such as sickness (in particular mental health), workload pressures and injuries/incidents on duty. In this section we assess the services that we have in place or are committed to in order to provide wellbeing services to our workforce.

Wellbeing Charter Action Plan and Initiatives

• To understand in more detail the maturity of the Force in relation to wellbeing, the Force has produced a detailed self-assessment against the eight Wellbeing Charter areas (leadership, absence management, health and safety, mental health, smoking and tobacco, physical activity, healthy eating and alcohol/substance misuse). This was followed by an external assessment in March 2017, which led to the Force successfully obtaining Wellbeing Charter Status, having achieved at least ‘commitment’ in all eight areas, across the organisation. The Force was assessed as having reached ‘achievement’ in ‘(minimising) smoking’ and ‘alcohol/substance misuse and demonstrated elements of ‘achievement’ and ‘excellence’ across all eight categories. • A number of gaps have been identified through the Wellbeing Charter assessment with some key actions including: o Recruitment of a Wellbeing Co-ordinator o Increased awareness of attendance management and monitoring of sickness absence o Improved mental health training o Establishing a single intranet site for wellbeing information o Involving staff in the development of alcohol and substance misuse policies. • Various initiatives have been put in place to improve the wellbeing of the Workforce including The Global Challenge, a 100 day international, competitive, team based initiative to improve wellbeing, including physical activity, nutrition, sleep quality and stress levels. It had an extremely positive impact across a range of measures including increased physical activity, weight loss, improved sleep and productivity and concentration. 58% of participants reported being more aware of the Force’s commitment to health and wellbeing. • We have recently arranged mindfulness courses for 40 Officers/Staff as part of a pilot, funded by Police Mutual. The programme involved six two hour sessions over six weeks with an evaluation planned to determine the next steps. • The Force is a signatory to the Blue Light Time to Change Pledge, which is organised through the Charity Mind. This is focussed on showing a commitment to challenge mental health stigma and promoting positive wellbeing. The pledge includes commitments around promoting Peer Support, the use of champions and the promotion of the National Awareness Calendar, which has included the Force supporting days such as ‘Time to Talk’ and ‘Stress Awareness Day’. Work will continue to evolve on this agenda, with mental health seen as one of our key priorities. It is likely that WYP will migrate from the Workplace Wellbeing Charter to the Blue Light Wellbeing Framework (BLWF) in due course.

Occupational Health Provision • Occupational Health responds to in excess of 1300 referrals per year . Whereas some organisations may give staff a 20 minute appointment, the Force OH staff regularly spend over an hour in ensuring a ‘Gold standard service’ which includes offering support, signposting other help and where appropriate challenging the beliefs of individuals, to help them to take responsibility back. Some individuals self-refer and staff have an opportunity to put questions directly to nurses through a mailbox. Other support includes psychological screening for ‘at risk’ roles, other screening where operational requirements dictate (e.g. Chemical, Biological,

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Radiological and Nuclear - CBRN) and statutory health surveillance (e.g. hearing assessments for people in certain roles). • Currently there are seven Occupational Health Nurses responding the needs of the organisation. Given the increasing demand placed on our officers and staff, and the concurrent rise in those requiring support, it is likely that waiting times will increase beyond the current waiting time of between 6 to 10 working days. However, this may be tempered by the introduction of new systems and processes to promote some efficiencies within the service. • Other wellbeing related work carried out by OH staff includes giving specialist advice to Disaster Victim Identification Teams, providing a vaccination programme (Hepatitis B) and support following visits to A&E after contamination incidents. This can include physical and emotional support for up to six months. In certain circumstances six sessions of counselling will be provided and where an injury has been caused on duty, referrals can be made to a physio for a short course of treatment. OH Staff also arrange external specialists to carry out assessments regarding dyslexia and other learning spectrum matters. • The OH Department leads on a significant amount of health promotion work. This includes arranging regular free health checks through Police Mutual, producing health advice pages on the Force Intranet, creating i-learn resources such as ‘cancer in the workplace’, ‘resilience’ and the recently produced ‘psychological support following trauma’. Where possible, staff attend induction days to advise on health matters and all new starters receive an email introducing OH and raising awareness about risk issues such as shift work. OH also co-ordinate and source materials for a number of days of action through the year such as ‘No Smoking Day’ and ‘Men’s Health Day’. Staff also carry out complex Display Screen Equipment Assessments, assist Firearms officers in preparing to meet new medical standards and give advice to new recruits on matters such as the importance of sufficient sleep and Hepatitis B vaccinationa.

Mental health training • To date 1473 police officers have completed the Mental Health and the Police course and 5589 police officers have completed the Mental Ill Health and Learning Disability Awareness course. Both of these course include an element of recognising signs and symptoms of mental health problems. • The Initial Police Learning and Development Programme (IPLDP) includes a two hour lesson in Week 10 which is called ‘Mental Health’. However, there are numerous other lessons throughout the 13 week course which have a reference to Mental Health e.g. First Aid, Diversity and other lessons in Safeguarding Week which equates to approximately four further hours. • Post Foundation Course –the PFS3 course includes a ‘Wellbeing Day’ where a two hour slot covers Mental Health issues. This is provided by Turning Point who are well respected in the field. In addition, PFS4 is entitled ‘Advanced Public Protection Issues’ and there are numerous references to Mental Health throughout the two days (approximately one further hour). • PCSO Course – whilst there is no specific session called ‘Mental Health’, there are a number of courses which have a Mental Health element primarily around different aspects of safeguarding. • For 2017, approximately 500 police officers and 120 PCSOs went through the above courses.

Fitness • In terms of fitness testing a total of 2811 were undertaken in 2017 with only 13 failures (0.46%). The failure rate is not indicative of any significant issues. • There is a concern however that around 40% of mandatory training is not completed . This includes Officer Safety Training, which includes a fitness test as well as refresher training on personal safety and updates to any kit. Failure to attend presents a risk to physical wellbeing.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED One in Four’ Bid Initiatives’ • In March 2017, the Force was successful in a ‘One in Four’ bid for £150,000 from the Police Dependents Trust to fund a number of wellbeing related initiatives, which are being introduced over a three year period. These will improve the overall provision and further help plug gaps identified through the Wellbeing Charter Assessment Process. • Key to this was the recruitment of a Wellbeing Co-ordinator and the recent launch of the Peer Support Scheme. A research project with Huddersfield University is particularly innovative as it will involve a detailed review of the impact of trauma on Scientific Support staff, the development of a bespoke support framework, assistance with implementing recommendations and an evaluation of the impact. This is an area where there has been very little previous research. • Further planned initiatives for 2018 include Wellbeing days, a ‘56 days to change a habit’ campaign, access to a podiatry service, the development of a bespoke mental health training package for managers, and the provision of an employee assistance programme. • In addition to force wide wellbeing initiatives, districts and departments also create their own initiatives, allowing for a tailored and proactive focus out in area

Support for Colleagues Out of Force • The Force has had a number of officers and staff members working out of Force area, many as a result of significant incidents such as the recent terrorist attacks in Manchester and London. Where supervisors are also deployed away, they can maintain direct supervisory support for the period of deployment. Even where not deployed together, supervisors maintain close contact with those out of Force. However, those working away are offered support from the host location’s welfare/support services. This can include external resources such as local victim support. Individuals are encouraged to take responsibility for their own health and wellbeing, reporting any issues of concern. Consideration is also given to fitness to drive whilst working on such incidents, especially whilst dealing with particularly traumatic scenes . • Support offered upon return to Force includes one to one debriefs with line managers and referrals to OH where an individual has been involved in a traumatic event (in line with the Trauma Support Policy), to allow for a letter to be sent detailing what OH services are available. Roles which regularly involve handling or viewing particularly graphic material have access to routine psychological support services from qualified mental health practitioners. This allows their mental health to be “base lined”, regularly monitored (every six months) and appropriately treated if required. Supervisors within the teams that routinely deploy away from their home base are encouraged to attend psychological health awareness courses in order to help them look after themselves and their teams appropriately . Staff Association Support • A range of wellbeing support is also provided by staff associations and other support networks. Detention officers, PCSOs and Special Constables are now able to join Police Officers in benefiting from the Police Treatment Centre. The Police Dependents Trust offers support in certain circumstances, such as when an Officer is sectioned under the Mental Health Act. The Police Federation arranges its own health checks and works with OH in creating its own health promotion materials, courses, counselling and physio services as well as workshops/masterclasses. Officers and Staff also benefit from the help and support of a network of Force Chaplains from a number of religions.

Health and Safety • The Force has a separate and extensive three year action plan to continually improve Health and Safety within the Force, which is led by the Force Health and Safety Manager.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Three: The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating

A significant amount of work has already been undertaken to improve the physical and mental wellbeing of our Workforce. However, a key priority in 2018 is the creation of a Force Employee Health and Wellbeing Strategy which will set the strategic direction for the Force for the next five years. The following key actions will be delivered through the Strategy to ensure we can meet our increased demand around wellbeing. • Promoting wellbeing through Occupational Health and Safety – Incorporating proactive measures to reduce risk and likelihood of harm coming to our officers and staff, and the supportive measures to respond to the needs of individuals suffering from poor physical or mental health. • Promoting physical wellbeing – Providing access to information, resources and services, that enable and facilitate positive lifestyle behaviours, including discounts for external physical health promoting services, as well as internal initiatives promoting healthy eating, physical activity, smoking cessation, reducing alcohol consumption and sleep. • Promoting mental and emotional wellbeing – Access to information, resources and services that enable staff to promote and maintain their own mental and emotional wellbeing. This may include staff and management training, resources and guides for managers, support networks, relaxation and mindfulness initiatives. Mental Health has been identified as a key area of anticipated increased demand, and in response to this we are exploring opportunities to support our staff using a variety of mechanisms, including: o The introduction of personal resilience into induction processes for new starters o Increasing the volume and training of our peer supporters o Further mental health training for supervisors and line managers o Training for staff and managers (particularly in areas identified as high risk) in responding to trauma. • Promoting organisational wellbeing and people management – Supporting managers and supervisors in managing the wellbeing of their teams through education, training and resources. We will also integrate wellbeing into policy development, induction, training and development and personal development practices, collating information for monitoring wellbeing within the organisation, and providing it to relevant bodies. • Promoting wellbeing through information – Access to relevant wellbeing promotion information and materials, using all available media, linking to national campaigns and key wellbeing priorities identified via sickness absence monitoring and staff feedback. • Promoting economic wellbeing – Promoting opportunities to have fun and save money through the use of negotiated staff discounts and access to financial information and support.

The strategy will also focus on the sustainable development of wellbeing initiatives. Currently a significant proportion of our proactive wellbeing initiatives are externally funded, however we will look to reduce this reliance on external funding over the coming years, by implementing cost effective and sustainable initiatives. Underpinning the Strategy will be a co-ordinated action plan drawing on national guidance and best practice. Any actions will be evidence based and thoroughly evaluated to encourage ongoing development, and ensure maximum benefit. As the Health and Wellbeing Strategy and associated action plans are implemented, further information and data will become available and made available to determine future initiatives. • The roll-out of Body Worn Camera to all operational officers has the potential to reduce officer assaults significantly, which will then reduce sickness and increase the productivity of Officers. However, more work will be undertaken to ensure all Officers use the cameras in appropriate situations. • Wellbeing is an area being progressed through the Tri-Service Collaboration programme in relation to Occupational Health services with West Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service and Yorkshire Ambulance Service. This work in particular is focussed at this stage upon the potential for a joint service commissioning framework and it is anticipated that going forward through this, the Force will be able to more readily and efficiently access services which complement its current in-house provision . 154

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Four: The future demand we do not expect to be able to meet de spite the changes and efficiencies we will be making

We have undertaken a significant amount of work to improve the wellbeing provision of the Force. However the increasingly diverse nature of policing, and growing pressures of operational demand versus available resources are likely to present ongoing challenges for the delivery of wellbeing initiatives and interventions. In particular we would highlight: • Growing and complex demand, high workloads and supervision may see an increase in sickness associated with mental health. This is on an increasing trend and is likely to continue to increase. There is a reasonable risk that our current capacity/resources may not be able to meet this anticipated demand. • Where abstraction from duties is required, to undertake training or engage with a particular initiative/support mechanism, it is likely that this will become increasingly difficult with competing demands. Whilst this is incredibly difficult to quantify, it is likely to remain one of the most significant barriers to our wellbeing objectives and there will be a growing requirement to adopt initiatives which support our staff whilst minimising their time away from the workplace. • Funding for ongoing initiatives will remain a challenge . What is evident is that with the ongoing challenge of competing demands on resources, the development and maintenance of a clear Wellbeing strategy is key to ensure the Force remains focussed upon priority wellbeing campaigns with measured outcomes and reduces the number of uncoordinated initiatives going forward. • Our focus on wellbeing is extremely positive and is likely to raise expectations around accessibility and delivery. However, given increases in demand and particularly complex demand across all aspects of policing, we may not be able to deliver on all of our ambitions . The objectives set by the Blue Light Wellbeing Framework remain our aspiration, and we will therefore continue to focus on meeting those objectives, with a recognition that we must dedicate our limited resources to the highest priority/greatest need.

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This section is about Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and Information Management and will focus on : • How information and ICT assets make the Force more efficient and effective now and in the future • How useful, accurate, timely and secure our data and information are.

The Section will explain each four elements of the Force Management Statement in relation to ICT and Information Management • Step One –The gap between current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years • Step Two – The current status of the workforce and other assets (their performance, condition, capacity, capability, serviceability, wellbeing and security of supply) in terms of responding to the demand types. • Step Three – The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating in particular focussing our on threat, harm and risk. • Step Four – The future demand we do not expect to be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making.

Introduction

Digital Policing is one of the five strands of our Transformational Change Programme and therefore a critical element of our Policing Strategy and Efficiency Strategy. In line with the National Policing Vision we are maximising technology to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of officers and staff, help target resources more effectively to reduce crime and bring offenders to justice and be more accessible to our communities. Using resources effectively, through for example technology is a key element of the Police and Crime Plan. Good information management is also fundamental in underpinning our Policing Strategy and Police and Crime Plan as information and intelligence is an enabler to effectively addressing all outcomes and priorities, ensuring that we use and protect information and data in a lawful manner. Protecting the rights of individuals is important in maintaining public trust and confidence. It is also essential in terms of understanding the nature of demand and making effective operational and resourcing decisions.

Executive Summary

• There has been a gradual increase in demand in all areas of IT and Information Management over the last few years. Whilst the impact cannot yet be fully assessed, the Data Protection Reform coming into force in May, will place significant new responsibilities/demands on the Force with a risk of significant penalties for data breaches. From an IT perspective, demand from National Projects, Cyber threats and technology to support operational policing will increase. • In line with the National Policing Vision around Digital Policing, we are seeking to maximise the opportunities that investment in IT can make around for example Customer Records Management, Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), Robotics, Artificial Intelligence and Analytics to ensure we are as efficient and effective as we can be around operational policing and back office support. It is critical that we use IT to effectively support the frontline to be as efficient and effective as they can be, to utilise analytics to more intuitively target our reducing 156

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED resources and for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics to handle greater volumes of data and intelligence with fewer resources. • Investment and new structures have been put in place within Information Management, introducing new capabilities in response to the envisaged demand. However, data quality remains an issue that requires much greater local ownership. From an IT perspective, attracting, recruiting and retaining specialist and technical skills is the main issue.

Demand Factors influencing demand

IT Increasing • Areas which are likely to increase and require more technical/specialist skills include Cyber, Robotics, Artificial Intelligence and Analytics. • There are a significant number of national projects which are not necessarily linked to Force Projects. • Capacity and Capability is the biggest issue for IT as the pay offered is not comparable to private industry and therefore the Force struggles to attract specialist/technical skills IM Increasing • The impact of new Data Protection Legislation/General Date Protection Regulation (GDPR) is not yet known, but there are significant penalties for data breaches and increased accountabilities around data processing • There are significant additional statutory requirements including demonstrating compliance, accountability and increased individual rights, alongside significantly increased penalties for non-compliance and data breaches.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step One: The gap between current demand and the demand we expect in the next four years

The IT and Information Management Department are in the latter stages of a restructure and as such many areas report significant difficulty in predicting future demand.

Information Technology – Current and Predicted Demand

• Over the last five years there has been a 5% increase per year for business as usual support calls, driven primarily around the increase in the number of systems used. It is anticipated that this steady increase will continue, however the complexities are also increasing with a more diverse support platform and rapid increase in remote working. • Project and digital transformation work have risen significantly over the last few years and are expected to continue to rise. This is as a result of the number of national Digital Projects being developed/implemented by NPCC/Home Office and the work they generate as well as technology increasingly being one of the key enablers to addressing operational policing challenges.

• Current and historical demand has been high in the area of Digital Infrastructure. Over the next four years there are a number of big infrastructure refresh projects expected to be required.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • Additional risk and demand is predicted with expected cyber threats from national state actors and also in relation to the number of newly discovered vulnerabilities that require remediation. • Demand is likely to increase in the area of Data Analytics as the Force shifts away from application driven solutions to providing information derived from data to aid and inform policing. The challenge will be whether we have the resources and capabilities to maximise the opportunities data analytics and data science presents, but demand could be significant in the long term. • Demand is expected to rise as work continues on the Project Fusion Business re-structure and changed focus on internal data warehousing/analytics and the implementation of ERP. These also have implications for Information Management demand. • It is expected that additional future demand will come from system streamlining for example migrations, ERP, CRM and other major system projects as well as the National Enabling Projects. It is also likely that future data interfaces between applications will also increase demand. • Many of the Force’s reviews/projects have an IT implication, creating additional demand, the most significant ones being Digital Policing Projects such as handheld devices and body worn video, Demand Management and Agile Working. In addition wider transformation projects in particular the CJ Digital Transformation Project has a significant impact on IT demand as well as partners in the criminal justice system. • There are a number of other projects which will have an impact on future demand including the enhancement of CCTV as part of the Force Security Project, Estate refurbishments and the recording, uploading and streaming of drones by Protective Services Operations.

Information Management – Current and Predicted Demand

• There has been a gradual increase in demand in all areas over recent years, which has been managed through internal process improvement, partnership working and risk based decision making. • The biggest area of increase has been in relation to safeguarding disclosures, in particular Local Authority Court Orders which have increased by around 20% over the last year. • Whilst the impact cannot yet be fully assessed, the Data Protection Bill 2018 and GDRP which come into force from May 2018 places significant new responsibilities/demands on the Force. We predict that demand will increase in a number of areas: o Subject Rights – due to the rights to erasure, rectification and restriction of processing being strengthened and the associated publicity. o Internal Demand – due to new accountability obligations including mandatory Data Protection Impact Assessments, mandatory security breach reporting, privacy by design and auditing/documentation obligations. • Increasing demand in Digital Policing will have a consequential impact on Information Management (including in particular analytics and streamlining of key systems). • It is predicted that demand will increase as a result of the PCC focus on data quality and information sharing.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Two: The Current Status of the Workforce and other Assets in terms of responding to the demand types

Information Technology

Capacity and Capability The main challenge facing IT is not necessarily increased demand, but it is having the capacity and capability to deliver against the demand and to exploit the potential that IT offers for operational policing. Key issues are as follows:

• The Force struggles to attract specialist skills and experience it needs primarily because of the comparably low pay on offer for the technical knowledge and skills required. When compared to private industry or even the wider public sector (i.e. NHS), the Force is offering significantly lower pay. The Hay process does not adequately recognise technical capabilities, meaning roles cannot be graded to the appropriate financial level. • As a result of this there is a requirement to recruit candidates internally and whilst this is beneficial for staff development, there is increased training needs and lead-in time before staff become fully competent. This has an impact on operational capacity and productivity as in effect resources are doubling up. In addition, once staff are fully trained there is the risk of them being recruited by companies paying significantly higher salaries. • As a result of Project Fusion, there has been some staff displacement and loss of skills , which require attention. • Data analytics is a potential capability gap, both from a data architecture and specialist skills perspective. Analysis across the organisation is quite disparate and there are a number of different systems and data sources operating in silo which inhibit proactive analysis. There is a need to streamline existing systems and scale up Data Warehouse provision to support data analytics in order that the Force can adequately predict future demand and target resources with more precision.

Wellbeing • As the Department is not at full capacity in terms of the Fusion structure, workloads are high and welfare is at the forefront of managers’ considerations. • Absence lost through sickness remains low in the department with absence rates for 2017 at 1.58% remaining well below average. • Staff morale has been adversely affected by the constant review cycle and when combined with pay issues there needs to be continued work to retain current staffing. Buddy support has been introduced to assist new members of staff.

Effectiveness (Technology) • The Force has a large and varied range of systems which are integrated through various interfaces, which is beneficial and efficient for the end user although this has increased technical complexity significantly making further change more expensive and difficult. Systems are also interoperable with other Forces in a limited way and small scale. • The Force is in a strong position in terms of its server infrastructure , as all the hardware was refreshed as part of the Public Services Network (PSN) transition. A planned refresh period is in place. • In order to deliver office cloud services , work is being undertaken to update the infrastructure to meet the pre-requisites. • The Force’s core network is aging and nearing capacity in its’ current state. However, a replacement core network has been procured which will take the force into the next 10-15 years of delivering state of the art fixed, mobile and cloud digital policing solutions to meet the force’s operational needs. • In terms of telephony (force standard and Customer Contact Centre (CCC)) these have been identified as being end of sale and end of support, but the Force has placed these systems

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED under an extended support contract and a project has been setup to address the force telephony network to be delivered before the end of March 2020. • The force replaced its firewall infrastructure when the migration to PSN occurred so has for the past few years been in a strong position securing connectivity both into and out of force. • With National Enabling Programmes (NEPs) looking more to the cloud, an area in need of improved capability and investment is cyber security and real-time situational awareness. The more the force connects to the internet for shared services, the greater the risk of a security breach or malware infection. Since this area will certainly be expanding then heavy development and training of staff on cyber security and the use of such tools will need to be invested in.

Information Management

Effectiveness • The Force has a good basis of knowledge and experience in its Information Management Practitioners. We are particularly strong in relation to the Disclosure and Barring Service in terms of cost, quality and volume having been rated as outstanding. • The Force approach in relation to Freedom of Information (FOI) has been recognised as good practice by the National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit (NPFDU), in terms of the value our process adds to the Organisation’s business area improvements and understanding the public’s areas of interest. • West Yorkshire has volunteered to be one of the first Forces to be audited under the new legislation and is awaiting an inspection from the Information Commissioner’s Office in September. The areas for inspection will focus on information security, data sharing and data protection impact assessments. • A recent Joint Audit Inspection found Information Management to be self-aware and to have a good foundation moving in a positive direction.

Capacity and Capability Whilst in a strong position regarding capacity/capability, there are a number of issues that need to be addressed: • Fusion highlighted an imbalance between the allocation of resources for transactional activities and more complex, specialist matters. It found that the structure was not fit for purpose to meet the demands of the next four years. • Data Quality is an important issue for the Force, with three related high amber risks on the Strategic Risk Register (Crime Data Integrity, Nominals Integrity and Data Quality Integrity). Data quality is critical to underpin effective intelligence, planning and decision making in operational policing and wider business intelligence. • Capturing internal demand around information management is an issue as systems are not set up effectively to capture and understand this. • Whilst training provision is in place around the new legislation, a particular challenge relates to specialist knowledge as there are currently no external provision and legislation will need to be embedded and tested. • In terms of Crime Data Integrity (CDI), our current compliance rate for total crime is 85.4% (12 months to March 2018). A Gold Group is in place along with a CDI Plan and a regime of audit and inspection to check compliance with NCRS and Home Office Counting Rules (HOCR).

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Three: The actions we will need to take to ensure our workforce and other assets will be able to meet the demand we are anticipating in particular focussing our on threat, harm and risk.

In terms of Information Management, Steps one and two have identified that the demand associated with the new legislation will increase and that the structures currently in place will not meet that demand. As a result a number of actions are underway:

• There has been additional financial investment in Information Management recognising the increasing risk in this area. This investment allows the introduction of key new capabilities : o Specialised Data Protection Officer supported by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) o Increased audit and analytical capability • Given the uncertainty about the volume and nature of increased demand a new Change Function with Project Management support has been introduced to ensure the Force can meet the changing needs of the Force and ensure continuous improvement. • New technologies are being introduced to maximise self-service and automation whilst capturing demand for analysis and future planning, • Cultural change activities will be needed to increase awareness in relation to the local requirements for ownership, accountability and management of information to ensure maximum value is extracted to support effective and efficient force activity across all services. Information Management needs to be integrated in to the appropriate governance and decision making processes . • Development of a comprehensive and coherent Information and Data Strategy linked not only to compliance, but to maximising the value of data as an asset to meet force and business objectives and drive the Digital strategy and technologies. • Investment in the Force Crime Registrar is also planned to improve capacity in this area. Whilst the Force has made significant improvements in terms of CDI compliance, we recognise there is still work to do in this area.

In terms of IT the main challenge is around capacity and capability rather than increasing demand. Key actions are therefore:

• Address the issue of recruitment around technical/specialist skills and experience within IT. Unless remuneration is comparable with the private sector, we will struggle to recruit the skills needed. Apprenticeships, Fast Tracking of employees and career progression schemes also need consideration for long term retention and return on investment • New roles and capabilities need to be developed to respond to new demand including Data Scientists (with the growth of analytics) and Cyber Security Professionals (given that this threat will continue to evolve with advances in technology and the rise of the Internet of Things). • Investment is required in specialist training to support the complex digital infrastructure. This is both in staff and innovation, in order that repetitive processes can be automated. • There will need to be significant development and training of staff to support the implementation of TOGAF (The Open Group Architecture Framework), to provide better decision-making and interconnectivity of IT services. This will lead to a standard approach for both faster implementation and standardisation of design.

In terms of addressing demand a number of key actions need to be implemented: • The Force is equipping officers and staff with devices to access and input data remotely to then allow them to be more visible and productive in communities and to help detect crime. There is likely to be ongoing requirements as operational policing becomes more reliant on digital solutions. • Robotics and automation must be considered to aid the eradication of the day to day business as usual tasks and free up staff to assist in other areas. This includes for example using Artificial Intelligence and Robotics to scan intelligence submissions and case files to 162

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED quality assure them and identify the need for any rework, which will assist us in handling greater volumes of information with fewer people. • A holistic approach is needed around Analytics to move from reactive analysis to a more proactive and predictive analytical approaches. This is particularly important in order to target resources more effectively in order to address increasing demand. We have now started to scope this work out and visit other forces to learn the lessons from the pilots under the Police Transformation Fund. • There is a need for more data driven decision making which means we have all the right information in one place (e.g. demand, what resources we have and where etc.). We also need a better understanding of our callers in order to assess demand and needs of callers more effectively (e.g. repeat callers/vulnerable people). • There is a need to focus on a smaller number of products, services and functions and to prioritise projects rather than attempting to deliver the large number of projects that currently feature as priorities. • As we explore the capabilities offered by the transitioning to the cloud , which will provide collaboration, automation and productivity efficiencies, potentially the on premise foot print will shrink. (This is to be benchmarked as part of the benefits to be realised once live). This needs to be a high priority so we can leverage the support and benefits offered to early adopter forces under the NEP . • There is a need to review our server estate, exploring cloud to address Disaster Recovery and Business Contingency challenges, on a system by system basis and subject to cost. Moving to cloud will reduce expenditure and provide a long term technology platform and remove the challenges associated with hardware refreshes, expertise and delivery time scales depending on the approach. • A more strategic approach is needed along with standardisation , at present we have too many technologies that provide the same underlying benefits. Consolidation and rationalisation will help provide cashable saving around licences and hardware, whilst reducing the complexities around the support. The new ERP system will see the decommissioning of a number of servers and the implementation of new databases and application platforms ensuring the join-up of key systems across the Force. • Legacy systems , are becoming an unmanageable burden on support teams since they are still classified as operationally critical. There is a need to break free from the traditional way of working and constant refresh cycles. A unified communication platform will help free up back office and operational policing staff to focus on more important tasks.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Four: The future demand we do not expect to be able to meet despite the changes and efficiencies we will be making

In many areas it has been difficult to predict demand over the next four years. However, there are some key areas which do raise some concerns:

• Cyber Attacks – This is a constantly evolving threat and one which is a risk for many partners on the Local Resilience Forum. Whilst measures to mitigate the threat are in place, the demands for cyber security are likely to grow as the threat changes and evolves. • Data Strategy – The restructure of information management cannot resolve the longstanding cultural issue around local data ownership, management and its impact on local demand. Information Management can provide support and guidance, however, issues such as poor data input need local resolution and if not improved we risk poor decision making and non- compliance as well as increased fines as a result of new legislation. This could also impact on public confidence. • Some external demand is not within the control of Information Management and any changes to partnerships can have an impact on Information Management demand. • Data Analytics – The risk here links with data quality as well as the Force having the capacity/capability to maximise the potential this could bring, in particular around how it could be of benefit to operational policing in terms of intelligence and prevention. • National Programmes – there are 14 National IT projects which have the danger of operating in silo and without the connection to Force Projects. The demand and work arising from these projects could be significant and could either duplicate or be different to similar work ongoing in Forces. In addition there is the Criminal Justice Transformational Programme which has significant implications for IT both in force and with partners in the Criminal Justice Services.

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This section is about our Forcewide Functions and will focus on : • Human Resources, Workforce Planning and Learning and Development • Professional Standards • Finance and Legal Services • Corporate Services • Assets and Logistics (Estates and Fleet Management) • Special Constables and Volunteers

This section will focus on the key areas of demand, and strategic/local risks that Departments are also managing (red and amber only). Business as usual has not been included as the focus has been on areas of greatest importance/risk

Executive Summary

The Forcewide functions need to be understood within the context of Project Fusion which was a significant transformational review of the back office undertaken by Consultants Ernst & Young over 2015 and 2016. The Force is currently implementing Fusion in a staged approach, but the overall review is expected to lead to a reduction in 86 FTEs across the Departments resulting in £2.3m financial savings per annum by the end of the review in 2021/22. There are anticipated to be further savings of up to £5.8m across Commercial savings, Non Pay savings and Agency Staff savings. In total this should lead to recurring savings of £8.1m.

The key areas of organisational demand that the Force is facing are: • Workforce Planning – There is a need for a comprehensive workforce planning model that is informed by anticipating future demand rather than purely being shaped by financial modelling. Critical workforce issues include: o Short to medium term inexperience due to the high proportion of student officers which impacts on the demand pressures of Districts and Learning and Development o Detective/Investigative crisis (covered in more detail in Section 3) o Command resilience in Operational Support o Recruitment and retention issues in critical functions, primarily Safeguarding, CID and CCC, leading to high workloads o Wellbeing issues associated primarily with mental health which now accounts for the largest reason for sickness and referrals to OHU. • Learning and Development – Demand has increased significantly around student officers, but other critical issues relate to: o The lack of training needs analysis to identify training needs o Training of the vast majority of officers, without protected learning time being built into rotas meaning officers are not receiving ongoing competency training o The unknown demands around Policing Education Qualifications Framework (PEQF) • Professional Standards o The top threats by threat level are Sexual Misconduct, Disclosure of Information and Inappropriate and Notifiable Associations. The top threats by volume are Disclosure of Information, Inappropriate and Notifiable Associations and Dishonesty (Theft and Fraud). o The number of complaints allegations made in 2017 were 2583. The highest number of complaints are for neglect/failure of duty (1078), incivility/impoliteness and intolerance 165

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED (364) and other assault (196). These three categories are consistently the top three categories over a number of years and make up 63% of all complaints. • Finance and Legal o The key financial issues are captured in Section 11 o From a Legal Service Perspective, there aren’t any demands that cannot be met • Corporate Services – The Departments is responsible for setting strategic direction and is involved in all areas of demand covered by the FMS. To avoid duplication only the strategic and local risks are included in this section • Assets and Logistics – There aren’t any demands that cannot be met, although there is uncertainty around the Emergency Services Mobile Communications Programme (ESMCP) / Emergency Services Network (ESN); this is included as a Strategic Risk. • Specials and Volunteers – A strategic ambition is to increase the numbers of Specials and Volunteers, but this cannot be achieved within the current financial context and there are also the logistics of training, which already is challenged in meeting demand.

Strategic Risks

Organisational Risks are captured in the Strategic Risk Register, which was updated in April 2018 and shows the current risks facing the Force. These are managed by Forcewide functions.

↔Planned & ↔GDPR ↔ ESMCP / ESN ↔ Prevent act of Extreme spontaneous Compliance Terrorism (4 ) disorder

↔ Support & ↔ Fusion ↔ Maintain Digital ↔Command manage Programme Forensic Resilience accreditation for Staff through ↔ Detectives NECTU, ROCU & Implementation DFU ↔ Increase in Organisational Change ↔ Workforce Planning demand, IMPACT / CONSEQUENCE / HARM / CONSEQUENCE IMPACT ↓ Po C Training complexity & ↓ Savings ↔ National Projects Records unpredictability N Financial funded by Police Transformation stability of Fund Interserve High C Accuracy of N Randox (3) Key nominals N Disclosure ↔ Crime Recording ↔ Data Quality N CJ Digital First Programme

↔ Performance

Medium (2)

Low (1) Unlikely Possible Likely Almost Certain (1) (2) (3) (4) LIKELIHOOD / PROBABILITY / THREAT

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED People Directorate (Human Resources and Learning and Development)

Step one – Current and Predicted Demand In terms of the HR Function, the key demands are as follows: • Recruitment - during 2017 the Force recruited 1,493 Officers and Staff. Not only has this created significant demand for the Recruitment and Resourcing Team, but it has also created significant demand for Learning and Development, in particular around the training of Student Officers as well as demand pressures on Districts for tutorship. It is anticipated that the Force will need to recruit more specialist skills to meet the changing nature of demand • Medical appeals are increasing year on year and across all types, with a slight increase predicted next year. • Job evaluation demand during 2017 has been unprecedented due to the significant number of new and revised roles requiring role evaluation under the Fusion transformation programme. Demand will reduce as role evaluations are completed as part of Fusion. • Staff resolutions have increased for the last two years with 56 resolutions submitted in 2016/17, compared with 61 within 2017/18. A slight increase is expected over the next year

In terms of the Learning and Development Function the key demand is as follows: • The high levels of recruitment that commenced in May 2016, placed significant demand on Learning and Development as the Force moved from 50 to 500 new recruits per year. There is sufficient operational flex in the Foundation Training and associated departments to mitigate some of these issues but the unreliability of any future forecast due to Comprehensive Spending Reviews (CSRs) and budgetary changes remains a logistical concern. • Demand for training is high but there are currently a number of gaps identified below under capacity and capability. • PEQF presents significant changes and challenges to policing both culturally and organisationally and will have a significant impact on Learning and Development. • Current urgent provision is being put in place around investigations due to concerns raised in the last HMICFRS inspection and there is a planned delivery around Neighbourhoods, Problem solving and Early interventions for around 100 Neighbourhood staff. There does however remain a gap and plans have been prepared to deliver refresher (and then ongoing) training to the remainder of the Force (subject to additional resources being approved).

Strategic and Local Risks for the People Directorate are identified below.

People Directorate Risks Strategic Workforce Planning – there are issues in the force including detective/investigative Significant Risks capacity, command resilience, inexperience in the workforce due to high proportion of student officers, retention issues for critical areas of business including safeguarding and CCC Local Non-compliance with Health & Safety Legislation Significant Risks Failure to achieve recruitment requested by the Force Medium Inability to deliver “Business as usual” service to customers during the transition of the Medium existing HR structure to the new People Directorate. Inability for Learning & Development to deliver all training requirements in a timely Medium manner due to ongoing increase & changing demands in year. CAPITA profits warning & share price fall may lead to the failure of the company. Medium Capita IT Services Ltd provide technical support for the HR Origin System.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Two – Status of the Workforce • Once Fusion is fully implemented there is confidence that the HR function will have the right capabilities and sufficient capacity to meet demand and the function will be in a better position to flex resources in responding to any changes/peaks in demand. • There is currently very little workforce planning beyond the in-year projections thus resulting in a plan which primarily focuses upon the financial establishment. This is a significant gap for us in terms of ensuring that our workforce has the capacity and capability to respond to future demand and threats. • There are a range of approaches undertaken around training including masterclasses, e- learning and i-learning. • Collaborative approaches to training are being delivered in the Yorkshire and Humber Region in regards to operational policing as well as leadership, coaching and mentoring. • There is limited capacity and capability for effective training needs analysis or career pathways, with current training plans based on professional judgement and short/medium term projections from workforce planning. • There is an inability to deliver sufficient standard driving courses (and the resultant effect this has in reducing ability to provide other courses in trying to meet that priority). • There is a gap around the ongoing maintenance of competence training for frontline officers and staff for many core areas of business, • The Shift Review Post Implementation Review (PIR) highlighted that the loss of the training day since FSDR implementation has resulted in ad-hoc mandatory training across districts and Protective Services. Training is currently delivered differently across all five districts, sometimes added on to working shifts and/or through abstraction training. This approach is necessary due to a lack of dedicated training days • Since the high recruitment levels, training for existing officers and staff has been delivered through Districts on an ad-hoc reactive basis . In support of our desire to develop and retain in accordance with the People Ambition, there is a strong need to provide ‘made to measure’ training and development opportunities, but this is currently an identified gap for the Force. Specialist and Crime areas do receive specialist training and relatively regular refreshers in their areas, providing them with some opportunities for continued personal and professional development, however, front-line uniformed officers are one of the largest groups in the Force, but have not had the benefit of any recent overarching development from the Force. • The overall wellbeing of the team within the HR function as a whole is good with a sickness absence of 2.4%, which is below the Force average. The figures of 4.8% for Learning and Development are above the Force average. Within the People Directorate a range of wellbeing provision is in place including fitness classes, wellbeing inputs and sessions, focussing for example on mental health.

Step Three – Actions to address demand • The transformation programme under Fusion has enabled the newly-formed Directorate to introduce new capabilities into the team in the form of appointments of experienced leads into Strategic Workforce Planning, Health and Wellbeing, Employee Relations and People Business Partners, whilst at the same time developing the skills of existing team members. • A comprehensive workforce planning model is being developed so that we can understand and plan the effective deployment of certain roles across the workforce informed by an understanding of anticipated demand as opposed to being shaped by financial modelling alone. • The training programme for officers and staff is being developed and reviewed to ensure that we are focussing on equipping our teams with the essential skills to respond to service activity. This may require the development of new training programmes or a re-prioritisation of training delivery, which will be informed by such initiatives as the Investigations Review • We will continuously review how we utilise our People assets to identify when new roles/ skillsets may be required in response to the changing landscape including a focus on workforce modernisation to identify when police staff can be utilised in order to release police officers to work which requires the warranted role. 168

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • Responding efficiently to specific areas of challenge such as the current detective shortage by proactively engaging in and contributing to the regional and national developments in these areas. • The development of clear career pathways starting with a comprehensive apprenticeship plan in order to aid the retention of well-trained staff who recognise the longer-term opportunities of remaining with the Force. • Through the development of a strategic resourcing campaign, develop strategic links with universities and Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) to ensure that pipelines of graduates recognise the Force as a potential employer of choice. • Review our employment model to determine whether we effectively and flexibly resource against demand or whether in some, specialist areas, we should consider alternative accesses to such skills, including the buying-in of such services. • Development of a Learning and Development Strategy and new capabilities responsibility for developing a true understanding of demand, identifying learning priorities for West Yorkshire Police, to ensure Learning and Development deliver against the complex Statutory, Force, Regional and specialist priorities and requirements. • Undertake a comprehensive Force-wide training needs analysis to ensure we fully understand the organisational skill requirement, the skill gap and, from this, our learning and development priorities.

Step Four – Demand we cannot meet • With the new structures in place, the People Directorate will be able to meet the demand it faces. • A longer term and more demand-focussed approach to workforce planning will address some of the workforce threats we face. However, if the increase in activity in some areas of the service continues at its current pace, it is anticipated that despite activities to strengthen and prioritise our workforce against the highest areas of risk, we will not be able to deliver against all demand requirements.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Professional Standards (PSD)

Step One – Current and Predicted Demand • PSD regularly undertakes a threat assessment to identify the corruption threats facing the Force. The top threats by threat level are Sexual Misconduct, Disclosure of Information and Inappropriate and Notifiable Associations. The top threats by volume are Disclosure of Information, Inappropriate and Notifiable Associations and Dishonesty (Theft and Fraud). • The number of complaints allegations made in 2017 were 2583 and the total number of complaint cases were 1840 . The highest number of complaints was for neglect/failure of duty (1078), incivility/impoliteness and intolerance (364) and other assault (196). These three categories are consistently the top three categories over a number of years and make up 63% of all complaints. • In 2017, there were 165 police officers linked to conduct investigations and 50 staff members linked to police staff investigations. 154 cases were referred to the IOPC. • Demand within the Force Vetting Unit (FVU) has increased significantly over the last few years. In 2017 a total of 9237 vetting requests were processed, a 20% increase on the 2015 year. Additional demand is being placed on the FVU from the National Probation Service who require all their staff to be vetted so that they can access VISOR. Within West Yorkshire the numbers requiring clearance have been estimated at 250-300. • We predict an increased focus on the six strands of corruption that have been ratified by the National Counter Corruption Advisory Group (NCCAG) that will need reporting back to the HMICFRS on progress and compliance. We have seen this increase in work already come to fruition with the first national strand around ‘Abuse of Position’.

Strategic and local risks owned by PSD are shown below.

PSD Risks Strategic Risks None Local Risks Operational vulnerabilities relating to the mobile data rollout as new ways of High working are implemented without appropriate regard for monitoring / investigative opportunities with due regard to Data Protection and relevant Legislation. Behavioural gross misconduct by officers & staff as a result of dishonest activity. Significant Inability to recruit accredited Detectives into PSD roles in a timely manner. Significant

Resilience within the WYP Counter Corruption Unit. Medium New National Security Vetting Service proposed costs for SC vetting increases Medium from £11.77 to £40 or £400 for enhanced SC. Failing to effectively manage public complaint discrimination cases. Medium

Step Two – Status of the Workforce • PSD consists of 75.6 FTE and is made up of a number of functions/teams (Counter Corruption Unit, Vetting Unit, Reactive Investigation Team, Service Recovery Team, Compliance Unit, Training and Engagement Officer and Help Desk). • The PSD Counter Corruption Unit (CCU) is still under strength compared to Most Similar Forces. As a large metropolitan force we are hindered in our ability to respond proactively specially to insider threat and need to ask assistance from outside specialist departments to achieve our aims and objectives. This has always had the potential to compromise ongoing investigations. There is a requirement to upskill staff on the relevant CCU courses and be fully conversant in technological advancements around covert policing. • We are ensuring that all the staff are adequately trained in both nuances of the regulatory framework and key challenges around recent disclosure cases. This is somewhat offset with the use of Holmes 2 IT on large scale investigations with the department as well as accredited detectives. • The ability to monitor and audit force systems remains an area of vulnerability as the force rapidly moves forward with hand held devices and other smart technologies.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • In terms of wellbeing it is acknowledged that the work can be stressful due to the nature of some investigations and regular checks are made on staff welfare. The department has its own Wellbeing Group which meets on a regular basis to discuss current or future issues that do or may impact on staff welfare. PSD has recognised a need for officers and staff under investigation for misconduct to have the support of specially trained Welfare Officers. The introduction of Welfare Officers is currently taking place in force with representations from all Districts and members of minority group support networks.

Step Three – Actions to address demand In responding to demand and threats the following actions will be taken: • There is a need to recruit detective investigators with the right skills to carry out complex and covert investigations. Recruitment of Trainee Investigators is currently being explored. • There has been a recent growth bid submitted to the Chief Officer Team in light of the increase demand placed on the department (especially around police staff cases that PSD have led on since 2016). 90 cases per year are being managed with no growth being aligned and this is having an effect in some administrative functions including the regular updating of officers and staff on their case. • There is also a growth bid for the increased work that is coming from the Independent Office for Police Conduct. Their new direction and focus is to take on more independent investigations, the direct consequence of that is the request for information from data sets that is becoming extremely time consuming (for example requests for Body Worn Video footage and CCTV). • We continue to apply the principles of workforce modernisation as we look to increase the number of police staff roles within the PSD Service Recovery Team (SRT). Our ambition is to have a 50-50 mix of officers and staff dealing with local resolutions and No Service Requirement investigations. It is envisaged this will be in place by the end of 2018. The success of the SRT cannot be underestimated as we have drastically reduced the time it takes to delay with low level complaints. This is reflected is the quarterly IOPC bulletins. • The Intelligence Unit is a current area of vulnerability as we look to replace both analytical and Field Intelligence Officer roles. We have lost a level of experience recently and the new staff will take time to adopt to the methodology of PSD work. Relevant training and development programmes are in place to minimise this disruption.

Step Four – Demand we cannot meet • The National Police Chiefs’ Council strategy on The Abuse of Police Authority for a Sexual Purpose has been implemented by the Force and is led by the PSD CCU. There are five more strands yet to be rolled out and it is unknown what the impact will be on our physical resources. • The General Data Protection Regulation goes into effect on 25 th May 2018 and it is not yet known what impact this will have on the department and whether there would be a significant increase in the volume of cases for referral and investigation. The GDPR Information Audit has highlighted the need for processes to be established for the Retention and Weeding of all information within PSD. • Changes in Legislation in 2018 will see the IOPC taking on more Independent Investigations thus taking away work from the Re-Active Investigation Teams. As the Force has a shortage of DCs there may be a pressure to move staff out of the dept. and into other key business areas with shortfalls.

Finance and Commercial Services

Step One – Current and Predicted Demand • The critical role of Finance is identified in Section 11 in terms of shaping the Mid Term Financial Forecast (MTFF) for the Force and budget planning. • The Department has three key functions which generate demand in the Department around Accountancy, Payroll and Payments and Financial Systems and a new capability around Commercial Services all which bring demand which is manageable.

The Strategic and Local Risks owned by the Department are shown below. 171

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Finance and Commercial Services Risks Strategic National Projects funded by the Police Transformational Fund (jointly owned with Significant Risks IT) Local Integrity of Property Management. Significant Risks Different Fusion implementation dates between Directorates, could affect service Significant delivery, team resilience & cause disruption within our department.

Change of external auditors effective from 1/4/18 and in particular for the 18/19 Significant Closedown. Loss of apprentices. Medium The Payroll System has been upgraded & technical issues post implementation Medium are being experienced which need to be resolved.

Step Two – Status of the Workforce • The Department is currently going through transformation as part of Project Fusion. This will introduce a number of changes over the next two years supported through an integrated technology solution across several back office disciplines • The capacity of the Directorate is planned to be led by three Heads of Service reporting into the Director reflecting the functions above. • The business case for Project Fusion shows an indicative number of 145 Full Time Equivalent roles • In terms of wellbeing, the Finance and Commercial Services Directorate have a representative on the Force Wellbeing group who feeds back regularly to the SLT and wider Department. The current physical and mental condition of the workforce is measured through regular one to one meetings between staff members and line managers and any issues identified by staff are also picked up through the annual staff survey

Step Three – Actions to address demand A number of changes will be introduced as part of Project Fusion: • The Accountancy function will leverage a business partner model for management and financial accounting, which brings us in-line with how similar organisations operate. • Creation of shared services to enable the Directorate to leverage a pool resource for both execution of transactional tasks and the resource in turn to develop their career development. • Use of technology to streamline reporting and transaction, through the investment in ERP. • Introduction of new capabilities around commercial services • Change and focus of operating model to be more strategic and streamlined.

Step Four – Demand we cannot meet Given that an assessment of demands informed Project Fusion, the Department is reasonably confident that the structure will be able to meet future demand.

Legal Services

Step One – Current and Predicted Demand • The demand on Legal Services changes constantly for a variety of reasons e.g. new legislation, changes in case law, funding within the wider legal community, changes in court fees, changing priorities within the police service. Currently known pressure points and factors include: o The increasing number and length of Article 2 inquests o Public inquiries – Undercover Policing, Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse and potentially Grenfell Tower (NPAS) o The development of Article 3 claims o The erosion of police service immunities in respect of negligence claims o Gang injunctions o Drug Dealing Telecommunication Restriction Orders 172

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED o Ever increasing disclosure demands in parallel criminal and care proceedings o GDPR and consequential claims/risks o IOPC – increased involvement in misconduct proceedings o Collaborations between forces and with Blue Light partners o The abolition of fees in Employment Tribunals o Criminal Finance Act – the extension of Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) forfeiture provisions to include property • The potential creation of a regional commercial law hub is progressing which would entail other forces paying to recruit one or more additional specialist lawyers to conduct the commercial and procurement work on a regional basis. • The extent to which demands over the next four years will be adequately met by these additional resources is impossible to predict/guarantee. We do however have a case management system and recording regime which facilitates close monitoring of resources and trends.

Step Two – Status of the Workforce • Legal Services has a very stable and experienced workforce with an established degree of specialist autonomy and peer support through subject leads/teams and supervisory processes which are audited and accredited (Lexcel and Investors in People). • In terms of wellbeing, sickness absence is consistently low and staff turnover is also extremely low. In the most recent staff survey Legal Services ranked highly for job satisfaction, perceived organisational support and supportive management.

Step Three – Actions to address demand • The Department is recruiting two new lawyers and intend to use the opportunity to increase specialism within Legal Services, which in turn should reduce reliance and expenditure on counsel.

Step Four – Demand we cannot meet • There are no issues in terms of demand that cannot be met.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Corporate Services

Corporate Services is headed by a Chief Superintendent and has 236 members of staff delivering the following functions: • Strategy and Force Performance • Change Delivery • Corporate Communications • Safeguarding • Criminal Justice/Custody

The Department sets the strategic direction of the Force and ensure the organisation proactively responds to future challenges and issues. As such much of the demand has already been covered in other sections of the FMS as follows: • Demand prediction for all elements of the FMS • Ownership of Section 2 of the FMS (Change Delivery/Local Policing Support) • Co-ownership of Section 3 of the FMS (Local Policing Support and Criminal Justice) • Ownership of Section 4 of the FMS (Safeguarding) • Ownership of Section 5 of the FMS (Local Policing Support and Safeguarding).

The Department is closely monitoring through its environmental scanning capability the progress of Brexit and the implications this could have in regards to key elements of the Force Management Statement in particular serious and organised crime, criminal justice and investigations.

The strategic risks owned by the Department are identified below.

Corporate Services Risks Strategic Increase in Demand Complexity High Performance Significant Crime Recording Significant CJ Digital First Programme Significant Fusion Implementation Medium Programme of Change Savings Medium Local Inability to maintain required specialist skill-base in a range of functions across Significant the department, such as analytical resources to support Programme of Change.

Children and Social Work act 2017 - Implications on local children safeguarding Significant boards (LCSB) structures, funding and greater accountability for Police under this legislation. Reduction in morale as a result of organisational change which could potentially Medium lead to underperforming staff and therefore the inability to meet operational demands and performance targets. The increasing volume of Safeguarding crimes of abuse both online & contact Medium offences has resulted in the movement of resources from non-specialist posts into safeguarding units. This has impacted on both training arrangements & the health & well-being of staff who have not previously dealt with this traumatic offence type. Lack of capacity & capability to tackle the growing demand of Child Abuse, this Medium includes child sexual abuse, child physical abuse, CSEA legacy cases & historic care home abuse. Implications of the national NPCC Mental health Escalation Policy. Medium

Failure to have signed YatH Collaboration agreements for Regional Medium Collaboration.

The Department drives the transformational change programme and the roadmap below illustrates the change that has been undertaken since 2010. 174

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Assets and Logistics

Step One – Current and Predicted Demand • The Force estate comprises 71 properties and complexes either in freehold/leasehold ownership (53), occupied under a tenancy agreement (15) or provided through the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) (3). On top of 71 disposals completed since 2010, the Force has completed a further seven disposals in 2017 . • The Department is responsible for managing all aspects of the estate with demand including ensuring the estate complies with all legislative requirements including legionella, Disability Discrimination Act Fire Safety and asbestos management, contracts for repair and maintenance and utilities, building inspections and audits, managing the PFI contract, maintenance of mail services etc. • The Force fleet comprises 1118 vehicles, and supports a number of operational and support functions. In 2017 the Force carried out 1,377 services and a further 5,719 job cards were raised over the same period. • There is no methodology for forecasting fleet usage and therefore any fleet reviews are made on historic information rather than future projections.

Predicted demand over the next four years will include: • Completion of the programme of Estate Rationalisation (based on current assumptions this will see eight buildings disposed of with four being replaced by a smaller footprint). • Construction of the new District Headquarters for Kirklees and the refurbishment of Calderdale DHQ. • Completion of the programme of refurbishment including welfare and security works at the Force’s outlying, smaller Police Stations. • Completion of any identified infrastructure works as a result of condition surveys. • Establishing a long term refurbishment plan for the entire estate, paying particular cognisance to custody refurbishment, and some of the more recently acquired/constructed buildings we have. • Considering the future risks around environmental issues on the Force in particular around the estate, procurement and the fleet (e.g. diesel).

Strategic and local risks owned by the Department are shown below

Assets and Logist ics Risks Strategic Financial Stability of Interserve Medium Local Fusion & Other Change Projects/Impact on capacity. Significant

Inflation linked to contracts, utilities, statutory business rates, petrol and other key Significant costs. Health & Safety. Following recent occurrences a risk has been identified that Significant certain staff within Transport may be subjected to Hand-Arm Vibration Syndrome and/or Carpal Tunnel Syndrome as a result of using vibrating equipment. Loss of staff as a result of Fusion Implementation which could impact on all short Medium to medium term service delivery issues. Financial Savings – delivery of Estates plans. . Medium Co-location/Partnership Working. Medium Compliance. Potential risk of significant non-compliance with statutory Medium requirements caused through an aging estate, reduced budget and changes in the operating models for how buildings are utilised. It is likely that there will be a request for Increased labour rates for certain Medium contracts, which may affect Force budgets.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Step Two – Current Status of the Workforce/Assets • The condition of the estate varies considerably, with some small locations being in poor condition and at the other extreme, where we have new or recently refurbished buildings the conditions are excellent. At present £2m of funding in the MTFF has been allocated to welfare upgrades to smaller Police Stations. • Physical security has also been upgraded in light of the security threat level. £1m per annum has been allocated to fund improved security around fencing, door replacement, window guards, access control and CCTV. Each site has had a security assessment carried out by Architectural Liaison Officers and the Counter Terrorism equivalent, with the programme of works determined when considered against the risk, the cost and any other factors such as planning constraints. • Transport is sufficiently resourced to maintain the Force’s fleet, ensuring that all commissioning, servicing and repairs, collision repairs and end of life disposals can be completed within the resources available. • In respect of the wellbeing of staff, the restructure of the Department as a result of Fusion has had an impact (i.e. uncertainty, holding of vacancies, stress etc.) but as the Department puts in place its permanent structures these should be mitigated.

Step Three – Actions to address Demand The Department has the capacity to manage the demand it currently faces. There are some emerging risks and the following actions will be undertaken to mitigate these including: • Continued monitoring of key contractors, both performance wise and also financial viability. • Having robust Business Continuity Plans in place for the immediate loss of a key contractor. • Determining and ensuring the Force, where possible, adheres to corporate standards of accommodation. • Improved strategic workforce planning, to ensure changes in structure are planned in advance and are less reactive. • Seeking to influence the national picture rather than be reactive or taking a piecemeal approach. • Plan collaborative activity appropriately including developing properly constructed and informed Business Cases.

Step Four – Demand we cannot meet • Unless there are any significant changes in circumstances, there is no demand that cannot be met from an Estates perspective. • From a Transport perspective, ESMCP presents uncertainty. The intention is for the West Yorkshire Police Transport function to install the equipment in all of our vehicles, thereby saving using expensive external contracts. If the issue is managed appropriately and notice is given to plan resources we may have the ability, albeit potentially bringing in additional resources, to provide installation services to neighbouring Forces, generating much needed income for the Force and also saving other Forces as against using external contractors. Not many Forces have the Vehicle Preparation capacity and capability of West Yorkshire. However, if the ESMCP project is not planned correctly we may have to outsource this work or forego other income streams to meet the demand internally.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Specials and Volunteers

Step One – Current and Predicted Demand • There are currently 409 Special Constables within West Yorkshire Police. • In the short and medium term the organisation will seek to maintain current numbers and specialisms, whilst significant regular officer recruitment is ongoing. In the longer term if capacity can be achieved then the desire would be to increase the Special Constabulary to around 12% of our police office number and have 600 Special Constables. • We plan to recruit another 200 Volunteer Police Cadets in 2018 which will increase our number of cadets by 180. This will require an increase of around 42 Police Support Volunteer’s in the specific role of Police Cadet Leaders. • The vision of the Force is to maintain the number of cadet units at 16 with 400 police cadets consistently in the programme at any one time for the next 4 years.

Step Two – Current Status of the Workforce • There has been a significant reduction in Special Officer numbers from 579 in January 2017 to 409 currently • The capability of the Special Constabulary is mixed. We currently have 270 attested and ‘active’ Special Constables, of which 135 have ‘Independent Patrol’ status and 135 have ‘Non Independent Patrol’ status. • Established Special Constables have the following skill sets: o PSU Level 2 (21) o Trainer’s (10) o Basic Compliant Stop (111) o Response Driving (37) o Initial Phase Pursuit (2) o Roads Policing Trained (10) • In 2017 106,585 hours of additional policing was contributed by Special Constables, compared to 186,290 in 2015. • 11% of Specials are from BME backgrounds. • In terms of wellbeing there is a senior Special Constable appointed as a Wellbeing and Inclusion lead, who promotes health and wellbeing amongst the Constabulary’s ranks and seeks to ensure that Special Constables are included in all aspects of organisational wellbeing strategies. • The Force has a range of Volunteers and as at December 2017 had 221 Police Support Volunteers, 114 Community Volunteers, 186 Volunteer Police Cadets and 2162 Neighbourhood Watch Schemes.

Step Three – Actions to address demand • There is a desire to expand Special Constables into detective roles in response to organisational demand. However this can only occur when operational Special Constable numbers are increased as the priority requirement is to meet uniform operational demand. • The pace of technological advancement has meant that Special Constables have not been collectively issued Mobile Data Devices. The planned rollout of the new device this year will include the training and allocation of devices to Special Constables. • Continuous Personal Development events are planned at this time for 2018/19 with a view to maintaining a skilled workforce. • The increase in demand currently falls to the planned expansion of the Cadet scheme over the next two years and this demand will be met through our recruitment of extra volunteer cadet leaders. This increase in the number of cadet leaders will be combined with the sharing of

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED those leaders in particular those with specialist skills (DofE assessor qualified and DofE expedition qualified etc.) between the different cadet units.

Step Four – Demand that we cannot meet • ‘Citizens in Policing’ is an expanding area of policing and the force at strategic level works with regional forces to share best practice and work in collaboration to meet future demand. • Currently flexibility is built into the current Cohort training system to double the capacity of training Special Constables to 240 officers but this cannot be achieved without significant financial cost and an increase in officers allocated and trained to deliver training.

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This section is about Finance will focus on : • The Force’s financial position as at June 2018 when this FMS was submitted to HMICFRS. • The projected changes in income and expenditures as identified in our Medium Term Financial Forecast • The gaps in our financial plans which exist and are likely to exist as a result if the demand the forces currently faces and is predicted to face. • The final section provides an update, as at November 2018, regarding significant financial challenges the Force is now facing.

Introduction

Providing Value for Money is one of the five purposes of the Force’s Policing Strategy and Providing Resources is a key delivery mechanism of the Police and Crime Plan. The Plan emphasises the need to make best use of resources and commits to continually reviewing levels of demand to ensure the Force is equipped to meet this.

Executive Summary

Whilst West Yorkshire Police has been consistently graded by HMICFRS as ‘Good’ for efficiency and understanding demand, this Force Management Statement shows that the threat and risk we face within the context of reduced resources, increasing demand and rising levels of crime are making it more difficult for us to meet our joint vision with the Police and Crime Commissioner to “Keep West Yorkshire Safe and Feeling Safe”. Since 2010 there has been a 35% reduction in funding, resulting in almost 1,400 fewer staff. On top of the £140m savings we have already delivered, our Medium Term Financial Forecast predicts that a further £5.832 million permanent savings will need to be made over the next four years. The Force has over the last seven years significantly transformed the organisation, rationalised the estate and are leading the way nationally with digital policing; but we will struggle to meet any further budget cuts, without this impacting on operational policing.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Current Financial Position

• Since the beginning of austerity in 2010 West Yorkshire Police has seen funding reduce by more than 35%, but at the same time demand has significantly increased. As can be seen from Section 4 – all aspects of vulnerability have increased and present significant threat. • As a result, we have had to align diminishing resources to threat, harm and risk and a consequence of this has been an erosion of neighbourhood policing, less proactivity and an inability to get to calls as quickly as we had done previously. • At the same time, funding for partners has also significantly reduced and they too have had to make difficult decisions around their allocation of resources. As has been shown in Section 2 this has led to a diminishing contribution to some community safety initiatives, in particular youth diversion. • The financial position has improved as a result of the latest police settlement in December. The MTFF deficit is now £5.8m savings over the next four years. However this is predicated on all savings plans fully delivering and for 2018/19 there is reliance upon use of reserves and other ‘one off’ savings. Whilst the budget balances in the short term there is still a very significant challenge ahead to deliver the savings required

Medium Term Financial Forecast (MTFF)

• The MTFF approved as part of the budget setting process in February 2017 showed a deficit as at 31 March 2021 of £30.8 million . This was based on a set of assumptions around inflation and Government funding. • The Medium Term Financial Forecast presented today shows a balanced position for 2018/19 following the use of £17.252m of revenue reserves (£11.37m of which is specifically for organisational transformation) and the position for future years, if the significant saving plans in place are met, as: o 2019/20 £4.830m shortfall o 2020/21 £1.023m shortfall o 2021/22 £balanced

Assumptions of the MTFF • Government funding is assumed £ 313,323,000 every year of the MTFF although the Ministerial Letter indicated this was only guaranteed to 2019/20. • Consolidate 1% Bonus and Pay inflation assumed at 2% per annum (effectively 3% in 2018/19 and 2% thereafter) • Non Pay inflation assumed at 2% per annum. • Fusion costs and benefits taken from the latest estimates. • Estates Rationalisation savings have been built in over the last few years, with a further £920k to be achieved in 18/19. • ESN airwave menu savings of £2.6m have been built in from 20/21. • Assumption of a maximum of 100 officers leaving the Force on voluntary severance scheme for each of the next three years, starting this financial year. • Leeds City Council to contribute £635k towards the cost of PCSOs for two years and the balance is assumed to be funded from reserves. • That NPAS national funding formula does not change. • Additional costs for National Enabling Programmes has been built in. • Additional costs for National ANPR project built in.

• The MTFF means that in total to 31 March 2022 £5.823 million savings will need to be made. This means the position at 31 March 2021 has moved from an overall deficit of £30.8 million to one of a balanced position. The table below shows how some of the movements have contributed to reduction in the budget deficit from the MTFF in February. These savings must be delivered in order to balance the budget, in addition to a further £ 5.823 million.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED MTFF deficit as at 31 st March 2021 from February MTFF 30.842 Headline Savings (not an exhaustive list) Fusion Staff Savings -3.860 Fusion Commercial Savings -4.831 Fusion Agency Savings -0.587 Fusion Non Pay Savings -0.855 Removal of 42 growth posts towards 5,000 -1.357 Voluntary Exit Scheme Maximum of 100 Officers -6.610 Adjustment to Police Pay Standard Costs -3.122 Removal of Direct Revenue Financing of £ 1.2 million. -1.200 Contact Management Savings pending approval of final business case -0.569 Public Enquiry Counter Review, already approved and in the process of -0.589 being implemented Zero Based Budgeting Review delivered in conjunction with Finance team -0.542 and budget holders. External Income with more co-ordinated delivery through commercial -0.104 services team. Reduction in calls to NPAS at 2% more than other Forces under current -0.054 funding model PCSO Shift Savings, net of any additional costs of moving to new shift -0.075 pattern. Tax Base Increase -0.603 Additional Police Grant Compared to Assumptions -4.616 PFI reserve release 2018/19 -3.300 Early Savings Carried Forward 2018/19 -2,600 Headline additional Costs (not an exhaustive list) Ongoing Fusion Revenue Costs 1.748 Business Rates Inflation 0.500 Regional Custody Healthcare provision 2.214 Additional Borrowing Costs 3.043 Costs of National Enabling Programmes 3.600 National ANPR Programme Costs 3.000 MTFF deficit as at 31 st March 2021 January MTFF 0

Operational Context and Workforce Planning

• Given the significant reduction in officer numbers since 2010, the Force has recruited 1,046 officers since April 2016. However, Officer numbers in March 2018 are still significantly less than pre-austerity (707 fewer headcount than in 2010). • Due to uncertainty around future funding, no additional officers have been forecast for 2019/20 and beyond. This presents a significant concern given the increasing demand and in particular complex demand the Force is facing, evidenced in this Force Management Statement. • The 2018/19 budget is based upon the following numbers at 31 March 2019:

Officers Staff PCSOs Total: Total FTEs 4,911 3442 603 8956 National or Regional Commitments including, NECTU, Regional Crime, 328 742 1070 NPAS, Regional Scientific Support, VIPER and national firearms.

WY core availability 4,583 2700 603 7886

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• The Force has appointed 481 new student officers this financial year to date and there are plans to appoint a further 48 before the end of March 2018. In addition 82 transferees have been appointed since 1 April 2017 and a further six are to be appointed in February. This takes the total number of new police officers appointed in 2017/18 to 617 , the highest number of officers appointed in several years. • The police settlement announced in December allows PCCs to raise the local precept by up to £12 per annum. The additional £7 above the previously assumed £5 in West Yorkshire generates £4.469 million in 2018/19 and allows in cash terms, for the recruitment of an additional 143 Police Officers in a full year or 146 Police Staff in more specialist areas. The costs of these additional staff have been built into the MTFF. • An additional 143 Officers would take the total number of anticipated recruits in 2018/19 to 622 which would be outside the current training delivery capacity which is currently 540 per annum. The Force is already planning on recruiting 476 new starters in 2018/19, which would allow for an additional 64 Police Officers to be recruited and trained. This would then potentially allow recruitment of 82 additional Police Staff in specialist areas • The 2018/19 proposed budget therefore allows additional budgeted posts for West Yorkshire as at 31/3/2019 of: o 143 Officer equivalents (officer equivalents is the term used as some specialist roles for example in Cyber Crime may not require warranted officers). o PCSO numbers protected at 603 following additional recruitment in 2017/18 over and above initial planning of 571 for 2017/18. • The Medium Term Financial Forecast has been prepared alongside current workforce planning, which includes predicting police officer leavers of each rank, PCSO and police staff leavers, workforce modernisation plans and recruitment plans, including probationers and transferees. Other variables that may impact on the recruitment strategy continue to be monitored i.e. career breaks and seconded officer returns. • The continuing Transformational Change Programme initiatives also feed into the workforce plan and may result in the re-assessment of the workforce mix going forward to meet the outcomes and priorities included in the Police and Crime Plan. • There have also been cost increases that have been factored into the MTFF including the recent Custody Healthcare Procurement contract, which has added an additional £ 2.2 million across the MTFF period. Business Rates inflation will be 3.9% which increases costs by £0.5million and some of the anticipated savings from Project Fusion have slipped from 2018/19 to 2019/20. • Over the period of the MTFF there will be investment in Project Fusion which is transforming the back office delivery to the Force. Reserves will be used to finance the one off costs of Fusion such as investment in new technology, project support to help deliver the savings and investment in new and enhanced capabilities such as commercial services or strategic workforce planning.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Impact of Increasing Demand

• The graph above shows that crime and demand (particularly complex demand) has been steadily increasing, during a time when both our workforce and financial resources have been reducing. • Our current financial planning considers the threats and risk the Force faces and this has been factored into the 2018/19 budget: o Retaining the mainstreaming of the operational initiatives ( Cyber Crime, Child Sexual Exploitation, Human Trafficking and non-recent cases ) which were first funded through the core budget rather than through reserves in 2016/17. o Continuing to set aside additional funding for the Partnership Executive Group to provide resources for improved partnership working in areas such as domestic abuse and mental health. o Continuing to set aside additional funding for Community Safety Partnership (CSP) projects with out partners covering areas such as preventing anti-social behaviour and road safety. o Increasing resource in priority areas in addition to the increase to neighbourhood policing in 2017/18 including Cybercrime and Digital Investigations, Safeguarding, Specialist Posts within Protected Services and further Neighbourhood Policing Supervision. • The Policing Minister indicated in his letter in relation to funding settlements that future flexibility around police precepts will be linked to meeting some conditions. The increase needed to be matched by a serious commitment from PCCs and Chief Constables to reform and improve productivity and efficiency . This needs to include substantial commercial savings and embracing mobile technology to free up more officer time to spend at the frontline. This should deliver clear and substantial progress on productivity and efficiency. West Yorkshire Police have an efficiency strategy in place that will help to meet these requirements outlined by the policing minister. • In addition to the work towards improving efficiency and productivity there is an expectation on PCCs to have more detailed information on reserves. West Yorkshire has a reserves strategy in place to outline the plan for using reserves in line with the Medium Term Financial Strategy period.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Predicted Demand and Financial outlook

• Since austerity measures began in 2010, we have done all that we can to meet the increasing pressures we face. We have entered into collaboration to improve capabilities and make efficiencies, rationalised the estate to minimise the impact on the frontline and have significantly transformed the organisation in order to provide the best possible service we can to the diverse communities that we serve; in order to keep people safe and feeling safe. We have also invested in technology and are leading the way nationally with digital policing, meaning our officers are more accessible, visible and productive out in our communities. • However, the pressures we now face and will face given predicted demand are becoming increasingly untenable. Despite all the efficiencies and transformational changes we will be making to manage the predicted demand identified in this Force Management Statement, we will still require a significant uplift in resources to meet this additional demand. • If we are to balance our approach by investing in neighbourhood policing, investigating crime, safeguarding vulnerable people and tackling serious and organised crime all within the context of an increasing threat around terrorism, we require funding that reflects the nature of the threat and risk we face. A stand-still position, or indeed any further reductions of funding, will continue to significantly impact on the quality of service we are able to provide. This will lead to a more reactive service that struggles to get ahead of demand, fails to intervene early and is not able to problem solve long term issues in our communities, ultimately leading to potential failures in respect of tackling crime, providing reassurance and protecting the most vulnerable people in our society. Financial update December 2018

• The financial position has worsened significantly since the February 2018 MTFF. The MTFF deficit has risen to over £30m over the next four years from a position of £5.8m reported in February 2017. • A large element of the additional financial pressure is related to a change in employers’ pension contributions for police officers which has increased by 6.8% and amounts to an additional £11.7m per annum the force will have to pay. Additionally, ESN airwave menu savings of £2.7m have been added back to the MTFF in each year 2020/21 to 2022/23 due to significant delays within the overall national project. There remains a great deal of uncertainty in this area • The recent 2019/20 proposed settlement has seen Home Office increase police grant funding by 2.1% along with an additional one off grant towards increased pension costs. Government also announced increased flexibility for PCCs to increase local precept, however as this is the final settlement within the current CSR period, financial forecasting beyond 2019/20 remains difficult. • Work is currently underway on both production of a balanced budget for 2019/20, (a legal requirement) and to identify options for savings to close financial deficit gap.

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This section has been provided by the North East Collaboration and Innovation (NETIC) Team, other than the final input on Regional Procurement. This section covers:

• Disaster Victim Identification Services • Regional Information Coordination Centre for Mobilisation • Yorkshire and the Humber Regional Organised Crime Unit (YH ROCU) • Chemical Biological Radioactive Nuclear (CBRN) • Counter Terrorism Policing North East • Forensic Services • Underwater Search and Marine • Regional Procurement

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Disaster Victim Identification Services

Description of the service Describe the service provided, the approach to providing that service (lead force, host force etc.), end dates, or agreed review point and place in the appropriate FMS classification. Providing force: North Yorkshire Services provided collaboratively to: Cleveland, Durham, Humberside, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire and Northumbria. FMS Classification: Responding to major events • Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) is the police-led response to a mass fatality incident. This includes the recovery and identification of deceased persons, support to families, and the provision of a casualty bureau. This response has been reviewed to ensure that the seven forces in the No 2 Region work effectively together to provide the appropriate capability, both in terms of the scale of the response and the quality of the service provided to the public. • A Regional DVI service specification, detailing the core inputs, features, outputs and outcomes of a DVI response was developed and agreed and used as the framework for the high level proposals. In addition to building a service based on clear operational requirements, it also reflects the common values of the forces involved in terms of public reassurance and confidence in the police. Delivery was based on a single joint approach, funded with costs shared according to an agreed formula.

Costs and Service levels Detail the cost to itself of the collaborative service, and the agreed service levels.

A. Legal framework A single Section 22A agreement between all seven forces in the Region is required to form the legal basis for collaborative working. A sub-functional agreement specifically for DVI is also required . B. Staffing and Each force provides an agreed capability to a Regional cadre. This will capability comprise a number of specialist staff with a range of skills. C. Command A single Regional Senior Identification Manager (SIM) cadre from multiple forces is identified. Each force retains at least two SIMs, with additional resilience provided regionally. D. Coordination of A single coordinating function for regional and national mobilisation of DVI response resources provided by the existing Regional Information Coordination Centre mobilisation (RICC) in Humberside. E. Kit and An agreed regional equipment list and issue policy has been introduced. All equipment issue DVI Victim Recovery trained staff should be issued with a ‘grab bag’ of and access personal issue DVI Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and equipment. Additional PPE and equipment should be held by host forces and deployed to an incident if required. F. Training and Training and exercising is coordinated and delivered regionally at a number of exercising agreed locations, and funded by individual forces. G. Coordination of A single coordinating function for regional DVI provision, provided by North the Regional DVI Yorkshire Police. Funding to be agreed. This coordination function could be provision provided either by an individual, or a small team. A full role description will be developed during implementation. H. Governance A single Regional DVI Board has been established to manage the regional DVI provision. It should report into the existing regional governance structure through the NPCC lead. I. Coordination of A single regional database, with all forces’ data managed by the Regional recording of DVI Coordinator. training, inoculations, passport details, risk assessments and deployments

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED J. S tandard Operating A series of Regional SOPs are to be developed, based on Authorised Procedures (SOPs) Professional Practice (APP) K. Resource Model Proportional by force budget, using the Net Revenue Expenditure (NRE) model. L. Casualty Bureau Regional casualty bureau provision, to include casualty bureau provision for Operation Power.

Current Issues with Service Provision identified Identify if there are any current issues with service provision (based on existing performance monitoring).

Regional Scientific Support Services • The regional collaboration crosses over into the RSSS collaboration for the YaTH forces. It is agreed that requests for DVI trained Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) staff should be via the RSSS control room to ensure service level agreements for core business are maintained to YaTH forces. Provision of resources from RSSS needs to be carefully managed by the Area Forensic Manager.

Availability of Senior Identification Manager (SIM) • This role is key to the initial investigation procedures and casualty bureau process, timely appointment of a SIM is recommended. • Consideration has been given to operating a SIM rota to ensure a timely response to incidents. It has been decided there may be a conflict with other ‘on call’ rotas such as SIO and Silver Commander. SIMs have been requested to formulate a buddy system for periods of absence to ensure cover is maintained. The DVI coordinator is to develop a spread sheet to show annual leave and availability of SIMs within the region.

Demand Identify the demand for this service (latent and patent / crime and non-crime). • DVI deployments on call to assist the Foreign Commonwealth Office deployment overseas. If there is a major disaster overseas (for example the Tsunami) the region deploys to help with repatriation of the bodies. • Regional DVI are only deployed when requested to do so. .

Future Issues Identify any issues in the next 3-5 years that may affect the service nationally or regionally. • Issue would be for people who are multi skilled. For Manchester the deployment of specialist within the first critical hours had a knock on effect. Already highlighted that DVI specialism is not known widely nationally and more needs to be done to promote this. • Grenfell – long exposure the staff coming back (fit for purpose for normal duties), how robust are we Occupational Health wise to look after them. Engaged with Occupational Health and have procedures but would question Occupational Health resource to deal with staff involved in large scale incidents. Line Managers have responsibility to ensure assessment takes place. Lack of awareness locally, regionally and nationally as to what a DVI brings to the process.

Asset Serviceability Detail the serviceability of the collaborative assets – how able are they to deliver the collaborative service detailed now and over the next 3-5 years A series of Regional Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are in place, based on Authorised Professional Practice (APP) and have been agreed by the Regions ACCs. NYPs ACC is the Regional Strategic Lead for DVI: • Maintain a database of the officers to make sure they are skilled • Training refreshed every 2 years, monitored by the Regional DVI Co-ordinator • Arrange refresher courses and foundation courses to ensure sufficient numbers • Succession planning around the key DVI management roles to ensure each force has 2 Senior Identification Managers (SIMs) (14 for the region) 1 Scene Evidence Recovery Manager 188

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED (SERM) (7 for the region) and 1 Police Mortuary Operations Coordinator (PMOC) (7 for the region) • Exercise check each year – each force accounts for assets and equipment (body bags, body storage facilities etc.) • Mutual aid – Nationally and Internationally • Reviewing each of the forces plans for emergency mortuary’s as the NEMA (National Emergency Mortuary Arrangement) has ceased to exist, each of the plans for emergency mortuaries are being collated on Resilience Direct (A database under the North East (NE) DVI). • Part of workshops with the Home Office to try and negotiate the securing of equipment into the region from the breakup of NEMA. • Obtaining body storage equipment in Durham and NYP as a result of the breakup of NEMA equipment which will be available to the Region • Exercise both Nationally (Dartford and Leicester) and Regionally (Exercise last year in Northumbria, this year in NYP).

Capacity and Capability • Staffing and capability: The table below outlines the agreed minimum number of trained DVI specialists each force must provide to a Regional cadre. Forces may retain additional resources if deemed necessary, however if any force falls below the minimum requirement the Regional DVI Board must be informed.

Scene Evidence Police Mortuary Dual Trained Senior Recovery Operations Victim Recovery Identification Force Manager Coordinator and Mortuary Manager Officers (SERM) (PMOC) (SIM)

Cleveland 1 1 10 2

Durham 1 1 10 2

Humberside 1 1 14 2 Northumbria 1 1 22 2

North Yorkshire 1 1 11 2

South Yorkshire 1 1 20 2 West Yorkshire 1 1 33 2

Total 7 7 120 14

• In relation to what we have in the region national and mutual aid – the collaboration indicated we should have 120 dual trained officers (body recovery and mortuary officers) (120 for the region) to ensure we are fit for purpose. The numbers are above 120 as forces have built in resilience for sickness etc. and to maintain capacity and capability. • Regional agreement is 120 officers but at the moment currently standing at 160 for body recovery and mortuary trained. • 14 SIMs and PMOCS. Police Mortuary Operations Co-ordinator • 1 SERM in each force which is a scene evidence recovery manager • 3 Trainers which are based as part of the collaboration in South Yorkshire Police Area – refresher and foundation course training. • Command: A single Regional Senior Identification Manager (SIM) cadre from multiple forces is identified. Each force retains at least two SIMs, with additional resilience provided regionally. • Co-ordination of response: A single coordinating function for regional and national mobilisation of DVI resources provided by the existing Regional Information Coordination Centre (RICC) in Humberside.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • Kit and equipment issue/storage: An agreed regional equipment list and issue policy is introduced. All DVI Victim Recovery trained staff should be issued with a ‘grab bag’ of personal issue DVI PPE and equipment. Additional PPE and equipment should be held by host forces and deployed to an incident if required. • Training: Training and exercising is coordinated and delivered regionally at a number of agreed locations, and funded by individual forces. • Co-ordination of DVI provision: A single coordinating function for regional DVI provision, provided by North Yorkshire Police. A single regional database, with all forces’ data managed by the Regional DVI Coordinator. • Where vacancies arise in a Force’s DVI responder numbers, the responsibility to provide a replacement post-holder will lie with that Force. The relevant Force lead SIM is responsible for the recruitment and selection process, in conjunction with that Force’s HR Department. • Where a Force is unable to provide a post-holder as required, the matter may be referred to the Regional DVI NPCC Lead Officer for a decision as to whether that Force, or another Force, should assume responsibility for that post. • Forces must have a succession plan in place for all DVI roles in order to maintain Regional capability. The responsibility for succession planning for DVI responders and specialists in each Force will lies with the Force lead SIM. • A database with relevant DVI information as agreed by the Regional DVI Board will be available to assist with resource planning and deployment. The database will be available to each force to ensure adequate response to an incident requiring a DVI response. The data collected will include: o DVI trained personnel within the North East Region o Vaccination advice for DVI o Vaccination requirement for UKDVI overseas deployment o Standard Operating Procedures o Operation Power – On call assistance to Foreign and Commonwealth Office o Levels of kit and equipment o Regional training and exercising calendar and programme o Access to local plans with DVI response requirement • If an incident occurs within the Region, a SIM from the host force would manage the DVI response. If a SIM from the host force is not available immediately, a request will be made for another SIM in the Region to provide advice to the Gold Command as an interim measure until a host force SIM becomes available. A SOP will be developed during implementation to articulate further detail of this arrangement. • During Operation Power, when the Region is on call on behalf of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) an on-call rota will be populated with SIMs from all forces in the Region.

Future Supply of assets Are there any issues with future supply of assets (trained staff, equipment etc.) Discussions reference capabilities of forces is reviewed at the DVI Board (also nationally) no national guidelines as to how many forces should have trained for DVI. If we had to review it as part of the National and Regional picture we have a DVI Board who would discuss resourcing issues and agreement would need to be gained from the board as to resource increase as part of the collaboration. Demand is very low. The Region will maintain it 120 numbers. Mutual Aid.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Regional Information Coordination Centre for Mobilisation

Description of the service Describe the service provided, the approach to providing that service (lead force, host force etc.), end dates, or agreed review point and place in the appropriate FMS classification. Providing force: Humberside Services provided collaboratively to: Northumbria, Cleveland, Durham, North Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, Humberside FMS Classification: Regional Information Coordination Centre for Mobilisation. • In September 2013 Humberside took on the role of the Regional Information Coordination Centre (RICC) for mobilisation of the North East Region comprising of 7 Forces. The North East RICC is one of 9 RICCs that report directly to the National Police Coordination Centre (NPOCC) in London and deal with all things mobilisation. • In the early days of the RICC, mobilisation was mainly centred around the request for PSU staff. This has developed and now grown into the mobilisation of 190 role profiles within 23 portfolio areas • A National software programme called Mercury, is used to capture the movement of all mobilisation requests and delivery across Forces, Regions and Nationally. • The Mercury programme is also used to record Force’s Capacity and Capability data which is audited and updated every 3 months. This provides NPOCC with up to date data with which they brief the Home Office and National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC). • The RICC also performs a role within Force, Regional and National Testing and Exercising of mobilisation. • The RICC provides and maintains Force and Regional mobilisation protocols in line with National mobilisation plans. • The RICC sits within Ops Planning which is now part of the HUB Logistics function. There isn’t a dedicated person who deals with the RICC but there are 3 people within Ops Planning who perform the role as part of their day job. The RICC is covered Monday to Friday 0800 – 1600 hours by Ops Planning and outside of these hours the RICC is passed to the on duty Force Incident Manager (FIM). • In times of need or significant demand, outside of normal day time hours, the Ops Planning team will pick up and maintain the RICC to reduce the pressure and load on the FIM.

Costs and Service levels Detail the cost to itself of the collaborative service, and the agreed service levels. • In September 2013 the work of the RICC was added to the Ops Planning daily workload and was not seen to be too arduous. As the demands of mobilisation increased so did the workload and in 2015 / 2016 the demand was such that the Forces in the North East Region agreed to provide money to fund a 1 x Police Constable post within Ops Planning. The RICC used this money to increase staffing by 1 x PC.

Current Issues with Service Provision identified Identify if there are any current issues with service provision (based on existing performance monitoring). • At times of high demand such as the raising of the threat level to critical, there is a requirement to stand up the RICC for 24/7. There is not enough staff within Ops Planning who can perform this role. • There are agreements within the Region that for operations such as Temperer, that the other Forces may provide staff to bolster the RICC. There are issues associated with this such as security and IT access.

Demand Identify the demand for this service (latent and patent / crime and non-crime). • The RICC services an ever increasing demand for mobilisation and data. The movement of all assets is recorded in Force, Regionally and Nationally and even internationally. (Aid to the British Virgin Islands). The movement of Football Spotters is now recorded which equates to 191

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED approximately 5000 football matches per season. Many of those 5000 matches will have other associated mobilisation requests which could include upwards of 200 Police assets per game. • The RICC processes about 3 or 4 mobilisation requests per week which includes about 100 emails and 100 phone calls, all of which have to recorded and captured on Mercury or in folders. • The RICC records weekly mobilisation data and takes part in a weekly telecom with NPOCC. The RICC takes part in a quarterly mobilisation meeting at NPOCC and holds a 6 monthly Regional mobilisation meeting.

Future Issues Identify any issues in the next 3-5 years that may affect the service nationally or regionally. • No issues identified.

Asset Serviceability Detail the serviceability of the collaborative assets – how able are they to deliver the collaborative service detailed now and over the next 3-5 years • The RICC has no assets.

Future Supply of assets Are there any issues with future supply of assets (trained staff, equipment etc.) • The unit is currently fully staffed with no issues foreseen.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Yorkshire and the Humber Regional Organised Crime Unit (YH ROCU)

Description of the service Describe the service provided, the approach to providing that service (lead force, host force etc.), end dates, or agreed review point and place in the appropriate FMS classification. Providing force: West Yorkshire as lead force. Services provided collaboratively to: Humberside (HP), South Yorkshire (SYP), West Yorkshire (WYP), and North Yorkshire Police (NYP). FMS Classification: Disrupting organised crime

Regional Intelligence Unit (RIU) • The aim of the RIU is to gather, analyse and disseminate intelligence relating to organised criminal activity which affects several forces across the region. The YH ROCU RIU is set up in a Threat Desk model, with a Threat Desk representing each of the regions Control Strategy Priorities. Threat Desks have a minimum staff of at least one Intelligence Analyst and one Researcher per desk. The RIU produces intelligence products to support the Regional Tasking Process, both Tactical and Strategic; as well as supporting the regions Threat Reduction Groups, which also align to the regions Control Strategy Priorities. The Threat Desks scan and analyse intelligence pertaining to their control strategy priority, highlighting high priority individuals, vulnerabilities and organised crime groups (OCG), feeding these into the Regional Tasking Process. The RIU also provides operational intelligence support to other YH ROCU resources. • The Threat Desks provide a single point of contact (SPoC) for forces, the NCA, and other Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), for all matters pertaining to their thematic. In addition to the SPoC role, the RIU hosts a number of embeds from partners. At current this includes representatives from Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs (HMRC), Home Office Immigration Enforcement (HOIE), the National Crime Agency (NCA), and the Gangmasters & Labour Abuse Authority (GLAA). The YH ROCU is currently engaging with other partners to broaden the scope of the embed network, by inviting embeds from other LEA and non-LEA organisations. • The RIU also hosts representatives of national networks who have been funded by the Police Transformational Fund (PTF). This includes a Regional Co-ordinator and Strategic Analyst from the Modern Slavery Police Transformational Team; and until April 2018 a Regional Co- ordinator and Intelligence Analyst from the Child Protection and Abuse Investigation Network.

Regional Organised Crime Threat Assessment Team (ROCTA) • The ROCTA team was setup in January 2018, as a result implementation of new practices and process has only recently begun. The aim of the ROCTA is to provide a single regional capability that will assess, manage and understand the threat and risk from serious and organised crime. • The ROCTA team engages in the Organised Crime Group Mapping (OCGM) process on behalf of the four forces, ensuring that assessment across the region is in line with national standards, and that each force receives an agreed level of service. The ROCTA utilises the Management of Risk in Law Enforcement (MoRiLE) model to better understand the threat posed by the individuals, vulnerabilities, and organised crime groups that it identifies and are identified to it. • The ROCTA is responsible for performance reporting on behalf of the YH ROCU. This includes the collection, collation, and analysis of performance data pertaining to disruptions achieved by YH ROCU resources. The ROCTA contributes to the intelligence products that support Regional Tasking, providing assessments of risk, performance statistics and OCGM management information.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Regional Prison Intelligence Unit (RPIU) • The RPIU has now transferred to North East Counter Terrorism Unit (NECTU). The YH ROCU continues to have a close working relationship with the RPIU, but governance sits within NECTU.

Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN+) • GAIN+ has two strands; the National GAIN Hub and the YH GAIN Co-ordinator. The hub is a national team that is designed to provide all processing in relation to 'GAIN referrals'. The GAIN Coordinator is responsible for coordinating intelligence and investigations between law enforcement and partner agencies, ensuring strong communications remain throughout any collaborative working. • The Coordinator is also responsible for seeking out disruption opportunities against organised crime groups (OCG’s), working closely with the Regional Disruptions Team. An essential aspect of the GAIN Coordinator is to build new relationships with partners and actively seek out new opportunities to work collaboratively. The Coordinator can also act on behalf of LEAs and partners when attending force and regional level meetings.

Regional Asset Recovery Team (RART) • The North East RART service the requirements of the 7 forces of the North North East Region, 2 ROCU’s (Yorkshire & Humber, and North East) and partner agencies. They provide a proactive and reactive capability for the investigation of money laundering offences linked to serious and organised criminality; a financial investigation capability covering the full range of the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002 investigation and enforcement options; and a financial analytical team supporting the work of the RART and the wider ROCU capabilities. • RART Purpose (as is current outlined but may be subject to change): o Develop financial intelligence to deliver successful investigations o Disrupt Organised Crime by the use of financial investigation o Work with other operational resources to effectively disrupt organised crime o Recover assets and reduce criminality using all tools available o Work with partner agencies and support them to achieve all of the above o Lead the development of understanding into money laundering for all agencies through the National Co-ordination Office o Establish links internationally in order to maintain the highest levels of knowledge concerning criminal finances. Regional Fraud Team (RFT) • The Regional Fraud Team are part of the core capabilities of the YH ROCU. The team investigate serious and complex fraud which impacts across force and regional boundaries and provide support, advice and guidance to local fraud capabilities within the Y&H forces as required. In addition to being an investigation resource the team are developing opportunities to deliver fraud based PREVENT and PROTECT activity against current and emerging threats across the region.

Operational Investigative Team (Ops) • The Ops Team are a proactive investigation team targeting priority organised crime groups and high risk individuals involved in 'Level 2' criminality. Their work provides a vital link between national and local policing, working closely with intelligence sources from national, regional and local law enforcement. The team works closely with regional forces and partners, supporting their needs where possible with specialist resources in order to disrupt and dismantle organised crime networks. The team bridges the gap between force and regional boundaries. • The Ops team utilise the full range of covert tactics, conducting investigations from inception through to post conviction.

YH ROCU Special Operations Unit • The regional undercover structure consists of 3 distinct parts each managed by a Detective Inspector:

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED UK Protected Person Service (UKPPS) • The UKPPS is delivered regionally through the YH ROCU to the four constituent forces. UKPPS accept referrals from agencies within this region (predominantly the four police forces) for cases where there is a real and immediate threat to life. Where the cases meet the UKPPS acceptance criteria (which are set out nationally), UKPPS take responsibility for managing the risk to the people under threat and provide enhanced protection measures to do so. • Management of the risk to these people will continue for a lifetime unless applying services becomes untenable or they choose to leave their protection arrangements. Those cases deemed suitable by the Designated Protection Provider (DPP) (Head of ROCU), are afforded statutory status as protected persons. In other cases where the acceptance criteria are not met, UKPPS may provide specialist safeguarding advice to operational teams. Alternatively, the DPP may direct UKPPS to take on other roles where safeguarding measures are required; for example where the sensitive nature of the case make it appropriate for UKPPS to provide those measures.

Technical Surveillance Unit (TSU) Regional Function • Within the regional function there will be a centrally based ROCU TSU team who will deal with the higher level TSU capabilities supporting both the ROCU Operational requirements and the four Force Specialist Crime areas (SOCU/HMET/MIT/SB/ACU) with their operational requirements. The staff identified within this area work regular day shift with options around shift changes to accommodate operational demand. This team will also provide a 24/7 standby capability for urgent tasking requests. • All staff are/will have full College Of Policing TSU Accreditation as outlined within the authorised professional practice (APP). This accreditation will allow them to respond to all TSU identified responsibilities across the region.

TSU Force Function • A force TSU function will be based within each force, with shared management delivering a local technical surveillance capability encompassing the force local priority crimes and volume crime operational requests. These force teams will also work regular day shifts with options for out of hours working yet to be identified. All staff within these roles are/will have the required level of TSU accreditation through the College Of Policing as outlined within the APP allowing them to carry out their force technical responsibilities. • Both the Regional and Force functions will be delivered under regional governance and have identified recognised levels of training and equipment requirements in line with the role’s responsibilities. This allows TSU to maximise the funding allocated to the department, ensuring value for money, standardisation of technology, training and the ability to flex across the four force areas in times of high demand.

Regional Cyber Crime Unit (RCCU) • The RCCU is a unit made up of several smaller distinct teams aligned to the 4Ps (Prevent, Protect, Prepare, and Pursue). The team work closely and collaborate on issues within Cyber Crime arena.

Pursue Team (RCCU PURSUE) • The unit is a proactive/reactive regional investigative asset responding to and combatting serious incidents of cyber-crime impacting the region. The self-contained and secure nature of the unit is designed to accommodate highly confidential, sensitive and covert digital investigations. The unit is self- reliant with the option for rapid deployment of covert techniques.

Regional Digital Forensics Unit (RDFU) • The RDFU support ROCU investigations through digital forensic analysis of storage media, mobile devices and exploiting other digital forensic opportunities.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Costs and Service levels Detail the cost to itself of the collaborative service, and the agreed service levels.

YH ROCU Costs • The overall ROCU budget for the 2018 / 2019 financial year is £13,019,313. This is made up of a Home Office Grant, funding from the West Yorkshire Police, South Yorkshire Police, North Yorkshire Police and Humberside Police (Four Force Funding), and 'Other Income'. This is broken down as follows:

Income Stream Amount (£) Proportion of Total (%) Home Office Grant 6,957,865.00 53.4 Four Force Funding 5,983,761.00 46.0 Other Income 77,687.00 0.6 Total 13,019,313.00 100 • Current financial projections show a fall in funding for the 2019/2020 and 2020/2021 financial years:

Financial Projection Amount (£) Change from 2018/2019 (£) 2018/2019 13,019,313.00 - 2019/2020 12,630,313.00 -389,000.00 2020/2021 11,729,313.00 -1,290,000.00

• The above reductions in funding are solely from the Home Office Grant and does not assume any change to the four force funding arrangements which have not been agreed for 2019/2020 and 2020/2021. This funding projection also assumes a flat rate of income generation through 'Other Income' streams. • The reduction in Home Office Grant funding specifically relates to cliff edge funding built into a number of work streams. • The above budgetary statements include the entire YH ROCU with two exceptions. The RPIU is included, but governance has passed to NECTU; the TSU function is currently undergoing the process of regionalisation and as yet has not been included in budgetary statement. The cost of the TSU capability is expected to be £2,665,408.00 within the 2018/2019 financial year.

YH ROCU Service Levels • A Collaboration Agreement exists between the four regional forces, which allows for collaborative effort to tackle crime and disorder within the region. Under this broad Collaboration Agreement are a number of Functional Collaboration Agreements which specifically account for the YH ROCU and its functions. • The YH ROCU operates a tasking process where the four constituent forces are able to bid for resources. In doing so the YH ROCU can take ownership of a problem, such as an Organised Crime Group, Priority Individual or Priority Thematic, including all the associated risk and mitigation. Alternatively the ROCU can task specific resources with specialist capabilities to assist forces in achieving their stated tactical objectives. In this case force retain ownership of the associated risk and overall ownership of the problem. This tasking process is also open to regional and national LEAs and partners. • The tasking process is made up of strategic and tactical elements; representatives of the four forces at a senior management and executive level are represented throughout. Strategic tasking, meets twice a year and sets the strategic priorities for the YH ROCU. It is informed by an annual Strategic Assessment and the priorities are set out in the Regional Control Strategy. Tactical tasking meets on a quarterly basis; this process agrees the deployment of YH ROCU resources against stated threats. This process is supported by Tactical Intelligence Assessments. In addition to the risk presented by the stated threat, consideration is given during the tactical tasking process that tasks contribute towards the ROCUs strategic objectives. 196

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • The YH ROCU uses Thematic and Tactical MoRiLE to quantify risks and assist in making tasking decisions. Thematic MoRiLE is used during the production of the annual Strategic Assessment and informs the Regional Control Strategy. Tactical MoRiLE is used to understand the risks posed by the subjects of operations the ROCU owns or bids brought to the ROCU by forces and partners. • In addition to the regional tasking process, some functions within YH ROCU will provide service if there is a requirement that meets their minimum threshold. For instance, any case that meets the UKPPS acceptance criteria will be resourced; once accepted the costs in relation to the protection of that individual will be borne by the YH ROCU. • The Regional Tasking arrangements sits within the context of a wider national and force tasking structure. This allows for a 'local to global' approach, where issues can be passed from Basic Command Units to forces, to ROCUs, to the NCA; and vice versa. Some units within the ROCU, such as the RCCU, RCU and UKPPS, receive tasking directly from their national counterparts.

Current Issues with Service Provision identified Identify if there are any current issues with service provision (based on existing performance monitoring). The overall assessment is positive; the YH ROCU does not have significant issues providing a service to the forces and partners with the Yorkshire & Humber Region. That being said the following issues have been identified:

Barriers to Engagement • Demand for the ROCUs services is greater than the service provision available. This is accounted for by the Regional Tasking process. As described in section b) Costs and Service Levels , the regional tasking process allows for forces to bid for YH ROCU resources to be tasked against identified issues. Tactical tasking occurs quarterly, and as a result issues arise that need resources to be deployed with more urgency. In these situations dynamic tasking decisions are made by the YH ROCU Senior Leadership Team (SLT). • Both through the tactical tasking and dynamic tasking process bids from forces and partners can be rejected. Multiple factors can lead to a bid being rejected; such as the appropriateness of the request, strength of the intelligence case, or due to the available capacity with the ROCU. In cases where capacity is an issue the tasking process takes into account the risk associated with the bid, and compares it to the current tasking being undertaken by the ROCU. Tasks currently assigned to the ROCU can be halted so that deployments can be made against a more urgent issue. • The tasking process provides a justifiable framework for the ROCUs deployment of resources, but the rejection of bids can be a barrier to further engagement. Individuals who engage in the process of bidding for resources and are not successful can become disenfranchised. This results in organisations being less likely to engage in the future and reduces the overall level of support given to them. This can become a perpetual cycle which results in a negative view of the ROCU. To combat this the YH ROCU has hosted an awareness event to promote its services, and is working with forces to develop closer relationships.

Recruitment – There are a number of factors that makes recruitment of staff and officers to the YH ROCU difficult: • Forces within the region are currently experiencing critical resourcing issues. There are a number of nuanced aspects that have caused this; including large recruitment drives in the late 1980s which have resulted in a number of officers retiring at a similar time, combined with more recent recruitment freezes. The recruitment and training of Detective's is also proving difficult reducing the pool of available trained investigators. This results in forces being reticent to advertise posts and release staff, especially when those officers work in roles that are difficult to back fill. In turn this results in the ROCU carrying vacancies, reducing capacity, and being under-represented in officers from non-host forces. • Geographically the Yorkshire and Humber Region is very large. The ROCU's central location is within West Yorkshire and relatively accessible through the motorway network; however 197

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED attracting staff and officers to travel from the urban centres in the other counties can be difficult. Travel from Hull, York or Sheffield would result in a daily commute in excess of 50 miles, in some cases nearer 100 miles. This results in an additional time and monetary cost to employees who commute those distances. The ROCU does have some mitigating factors, such as satellite locations and agile working, but these are not universally available. • Unlike Police Officer pay Police Staff pay is not set nationally, but by each force. The YH ROCU therefore adheres to West Yorkshire Police pay scales. In some roles this can lead to a disparity between the remuneration available for the same role in the ROCU when compared to the non-host forces. Where this disparity is in deficit it can be difficult to induce experienced staff to take up roles within the ROCU, especially when there is an additional cost involved in travelling outside their home county. • There is currently a national issue surrounding the recruitment of Foundation Undercover Officer, which in turn has an effect on the recruitment of Advanced Undercover Officers. This issue is thought to be rooted in historical negative press relating to undercover police work, and the ongoing Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). The Special Operations Unit have put in place a recruitment and mentoring strategy in an attempt to alleviate this issue.

Staff Training • The ROCU offers a number of specialist services from resources that do not have common skillsets. In addition to the previously discussed issues around recruitment, the development of new and existing staff can prove difficult as specialist courses can be difficult to source and fund. For example officers working within the Regional Cyber Crime Unit require significant training; RCCU Officers spend approximately 8 weeks per year on training courses, conferences, webinar’s, and networking events to maintain skill, knowledge and relevance. • Intelligence Analysts tasked with supporting operations require Communications Data Analysis training which is not available locally, or from a College of Policing accredited provider. The YH ROCU has worked with WYPs Training Department to improve the provision of training, but it would not be practical for them to meet all the ROCUs training requirements.

Staff Retention • As previously stated the ROCU offers a number of specialist services, and to deliver these service the ROCU must invest heavily in staff training and development. Equipping staff with these specialist skillsets makes them more attractive to private industry. Private companies are able to offer staff with specialist and sometime rare skills set remuneration packages that the ROCU is not. This makes staff retention increasingly difficult. It is a pattern evident within the Cyber Crime arena, has potential to become more prevalent across other specialist areas.

National IT Systems • A number of ROCU function are currently effected by delays in the roll out of national IT projects. Most notable of these is the delay to the project that will move OCGM to PND. In all cases the YH ROCU has mitigating plans and processes in place to minimise the disruption to service provision.

Interoperability of Regional IT Systems • At current the YH ROCU utilises West Yorkshire Police's IT infrastructure for the majority of its functions. Access to non-WYP systems is enabled through a remote desktop connection. This allows YH ROCU staff to perform systems checks on nominals, vehicles, addresses, and other single entities. This is adequate for operational purposes, but does have a number of drawback that affect service provision. • Remote access to four force systems requires staff, especially those working within an intelligence function, to be trained and experienced in the use of a significantly greater number of systems than their peers that work within a single force. This increases the time and training required before a member of staff is operationally effective, and makes the omission of critical information more likely. • In addition the current remote access setup does not allow for the collection of bulk data from the four forces. This compromises the ability of the YH ROCUs intelligence function to 198

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED undertake strategic analysis, and consequently the ROCUs ability to understand some broader issues. Mitigation is in place, where the ROCU requests data extracts from the forces, but this leads to delays and is inefficient for both the ROCU and forces. Enhancing this capability would have a positive benefit for both strategic and tactical intelligence assessment. • When functions are regionalised this interoperability can also be problematic. During the early phases of the regionalisation of TSU it was identified that four task management systems were in place within the region. As a result a replacement has to be sought. TSU are in the process of identifying a suitable regional solution that will enable easy access and tasking across the region. This is in the early stages, but a seven force solution spanning the YH ROCU and NERSOU is being investigated.

Regional Management of Force Resources • The Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the recently introduced ROCTA unit states that "local force resources undertaking Organised Crime Assessment function should as a minimum remain in forces, but be under the direction of the ROCTA." "It is important to note that the central ROCTA staff are not a replacement for force level staff, the ROCTA is an enhancement to the current process." This involves staff within forces being 'red circled' for direction by the ROCTA team. • Resources in forces that undertook Organised Crime Assessment were not always dedicated to this task full time, but also held other responsibilities. In practice the identification and subsequent tasking of force level resources has proven difficult. Efforts are being undertaken in within forces to resolve this issue, but similar difficulties may be experience when other programs, such a 'Regional Managed, Locally Deliver' Cyber-Crime Investigations, are rolled out.

Extraction of Information from Data Storage (ISO 17025) • The Forensic Science Regulator has defined digital forensics as: “The process by which information is extracted from data storage media (e.g. devices, remote storage and systems associated with computing, imaging, image comparison, video processing and enhancement (including CCTV), audio analysis, satellite navigation, communications etc.), rendered into a useable form, processed and interpreted for the purpose of obtaining intelligence for use in investigations, or evidence for use in criminal proceedings”. The definition is intentionally wide and any exclusions will be explicit. • The Regulator has stipulated that ALL of digital forensics (within the above definition) must be accredited, however, for the October 2017 deadline the following three high level categories have been prioritised. i. Imaging of hard drives and removable media ii. Screening or recovery of data from a device using an off the shelf tool for factual reporting iii. Extraction and analysis of data from digital media including remote storage • The RCCU has gained accreditation and is imbedded with West Yorkshire Police Digital Forensic Lab. The accreditation is in place; however, the resources required to validate all processes and staff on a regular is challenging. Ensuring that all operating procedures are compliant with new releases of software and digital devices has a significant impact on the RCCUs ability to service demand.

Demand Identify the demand for this service (latent and patent / crime and non-crime). • Quantifying the demands placed upon the ROCU is extremely difficult. As the ROCU tackles serious and organised crime, this is not frequently reported to police forces and cannot be measured in the same way as other crime or calls for service. • Primarily demand is placed on the ROCU through the tasking framework, and dynamic tasking requests. The vast majority of demand comes in the latter form; with forces and agencies approaching the ROCU for assistance outside the formal tasking structure. The YH ROCU does not record these dynamic tasking requests, and as a result a quantifiable measure cannot be provided in this report. The YH ROCU is currently taking steps to change this by introducing mechanisms to record dynamic tasking requests, both those that are serviced and 199

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED those that aren't. In future this will allow the YH ROCU to better understand the demands placed on it, and the requirements of the forces and partners it works with. • In addition, as stated in section 'b) Costs and Service Levels'; "Some units within the ROCU, such as the RCCU, RCU and UKPPS, receive tasking directly from their national counterparts". Again this is not currently captured within the YH ROCU, and will be monitor in the future. • More recently the YH ROCU has been required to work more closely with the NECTU. During recent months NECTU have requested operational assistance from the YH ROCU due to capacity issues within the CTU network. • In line with the National ROCU performance framework, the YH ROCU records and reports on 'disruptions'. This is the primary performance measure for the ROCU network and affects all functions. As this is a measure of the ROCUs 'output', it demonstrates what demand was met, but not the demand itself.

Future Issues Identify any issues in the next 3-5 years that may affect the service nationally or regionally. The horizon scanning by the YH ROCU has identified a number of issues that may affect service provision over the next 3 to 5 years: • Investigatory Powers (IP) Act 2016: The IP concerns the "interception of communications, equipment interference and the acquisition and retention of communications data" . The YH ROCU is currently assessing the operational impact of this legislation, and any revisions to systems and processes that will need to be made. • General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): When it comes into force in May 2018 GDPR, along with the anticipated Data Protection Bill, will reform the current legislation on data protection. Although there are exemptions that allow UK law enforcement to process personal data for the " prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences ", this regulation will provide new rights to individuals and affect the way UK LEAs operate. In addition the new regulations put an onus onto organisations to report data breaches. It is considered nationally that the introduction of GDPR will increase reporting by 10%. This will result in increased demand on Regional Cyber Crime Units, and the YH ROCU needs to ensure that it is prepared; having the capacity and capability to deal with the increase in cyber dependent crime reporting. • Transfer of UKPPS to the NCA: The UKPPS is due to be delivered by the National Crime Agency (NCA). This has been agreed between the NPCC, NCA and Home Office. Plans were very advanced for this transition to happen in April 2018, but due to Home Office funding issues, it is now due in April 2019. This entails an amount of standardisation work and transitional arrangements. Recruitment and training will be an ongoing issue, as some staff have stated a desire not to move to the NCA. Once NCA based, forces will be able to refer into the UKPPS in exactly the same way as they do now. The cost model, i.e. all costs being borne by the UKPPS once a case has been accepted, will continue. • At Scene Digital Forensics (ISO 17020) : ISO 17020 considers the standards of “at scene digital forensics” ; the standard is anticipated to come into being in the next two years. This will further challenge the YH ROCUs ability to meet the demand as resources get to grips with new standard operating procedures and the additional requirements for reporting, validation, and dip sampling. Further horizon scanning will be required to ensure that processes implemented by the ROCU remain current to ensure accreditation. • Regionally Managed/Locally Delivered – Cyber Dependent Crime Investigation: The YH ROCU is currently entering the early adoption scheme of 'Regionally Managed / Locally Delivered'. Once implement all cyber depend crime will enter the ROCU through the RCCU. A co-ordination hub at the RCCU will triage reports and task teams within the forces, allocating crimes.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Asset Serviceability Detail the serviceability of the collaborative assets – how able are they to deliver the collaborative service detailed now and over the next 3-5 years The majority of YH ROCU functions are accounted for under current and projected budgets. This assumes no significant change to staffing levels, training requirements and the replacement of equipment assets as they reach the end of their life cycle. These functions have been in place for a number of years, and without accounting for unforeseen challenges, are expected to be serviceable over the short and medium term. HO grant funding will significantly reduce over the next 3 years until 2021. Work is currently underway to understand how this will affect future sustainable funding and service delivery.

Comment is made on the following functions as they are not established ROCU functions, or are subject to specific funding that is projected to end within the next 5 years: • ROCTA: The ROCTA was implemented in the 2017/2018 financial year, going 'live' from January 2018. The ROCTA is funded through a central grant. Grant funding has been secured for 3 years, with year 3 funding secured at 50% of year 2. As ROCTA implements the regionalisation of the OCGM process it is difficult to envisage that this function can cease when central funding ends. The implementation of ROCTA within the YH ROCU involved an uplift of 7 staff, all of which were recruited on permanent contracts. • RDT : Prior to the national program the YH ROCU already had a regional disruption capability; this function has been extended to cover all the requirements of the national program. Grant funding commenced in April 2018 and has been secured for 3 years, with year 3 funding secured at 50% of year 2. As the RDT implements a function that is fundamental to the way the YH ROCU conducts its business, it expected to be in high demand it is difficult to envisage that this function can cease when central funding ends. The grant funds an uplift of 6 police officers and 5 police staff, with the YH ROCU funding an additional police officer. All staff have been recruit on permanent contracts. • Undercover Online / CSEA Online Investigation Unit: The UCOL / CSEA OIU was implemented in the 2017/2018 financial year, going 'live' from May 2018. These units funded through a central grant. Grant funding has been secured for 2 years. As UCOL implements a new specialist function that is expected to be in high demand it is difficult to envisage that this function can cease when central funding ends. The implementation of UCOL / CSEA OIU within the YH ROCU involved an uplift of 10 officers and 6 staff, all of which were recruited on permanent contracts. • Undercover Foundation Unit (UCF): The UCF has undergone a program of regionalisation, with capabilities transferring from the four forces to the ROCU. The unit went live from January 2018. It is funded through a force contribution model (force funding). In total 11 officers and 2 staff were transferred to the YH ROCU from the forces. • TSU: Regionalisation of the TSU will allow for equipment rationalisation; demand analysis of each capability is currently being undertaken to identify potential savings. As the four force units have previously had a close working relationship where assets were routinely shared, there is consistency across numerous platforms. This rationalisation of assets will allow the TSU to identify gaps within its capability and procure equipment to fill these gaps, enhancing its overall capability. Current TSU budgets allow for asset replacement as equipment reaches the end of its recognised life expectancy or is superseded by similar equipment that delivers a superior quality product. With regards to the staffing, the regional collaboration project has identified the amount of staff required within the structure to deliver the current demand for TSU services. Future demand is currently unknown; however once the regional structure begins to deliver services further data can be gathered. As with any new structure, this function will be subject to a post implementation review and regularly reviews over the coming years; this will identify required structural or financial changes. • RCCU : The current assets benefit from funding through National Cyber Security Program (NCSP) which is in place until 2021. It is not known how the current assets will be funded post 2021. The unit requires extensive funding over and above standard resourcing costs to ensure that equipment and training is current and relevant to meet the service requirements.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Future Supply of assets Are there any issues with future supply of assets (trained staff, equipment etc.) • A number of issues that will affect the future supply of assets have already been addressed in this report, under section 'c) Current Issues with Service Provision Identified' . It is likely that, although mitigation is in place, these issues will persist into the future. The already discussed issues are: o Recruitment o Staff Training o Staff Retention o Interoperability of Regional IT Systems In addition to the above, the following issues have been identified as being potential barriers to acquiring and retaining assets: Temporary Contracts • A number of new function are funded through a central grant. Typically these grants have agreed funding for 2 to 3 years. The grants provide for an uplift in staff to deliver the prescribed function. As funding streams have only been confirmed for 2 or 3 years to ROCU is faced with two options, recruit staff on temporary contracts for the duration of the funding, or recruit staff on permanent contracts in the hope of securing funding in the future. This is less of an issue when Police Officers are recruited, as when funding streams end they are returned to their home force. The recruitment of Police Staff, however, is more problematics. • As the ROCU delivers specialist capabilities, the staff required to deliver these functions need to have specific skills and experience. Recruiting staff with these specialised skills on temporary contracts can be very challenging. Individuals with these skill sets are more marketable and increased competition within the marketplace makes recruiting individuals into what many see as a less than optimal contractual arrangement more difficult. The ROCU is often faced with the prospect of recruiting people with fewer skills and experience, and developing the individuals once in role. This brings additional challenges, as those individuals take longer to become effective in role. • In a number of cases the YH ROCU has opted to employ individuals on permanent contracts, even though the funding stream for their function is time limited. This has enabled the ROCU to recruit more experienced individuals, and allowed units to become operationally effective more quickly. It has also reduced the immediate training burden. Whilst although there are positive effects, there is also a potential risk. If funding cannot be secured for these functions once this central grant has ceased, the ROCU will have a number of employees on permanent contracts without further funding to continue their employment. Subsequently this could result in redeployment or redundancy.

202

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Chemical Biological Radioactive Nuclear (CBRN)

Description of the service Describe the service provided, the approach to providing that service (lead force, host force etc.), end dates, or agreed review point and place in the appropriate FMS classification. Providing force: North Yorkshire Services provided collaboratively to: Cleveland, Durham, Humberside, Northumbria, North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire FMS Classification: Responding to major events • A Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) incident involves the deliberate release of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material for terrorist purposes. North Yorkshire Police is the lead force for CBRN. • Based on a single joint approach, funded through cost share according to an agreed formula, the No 2 Region (7 forces) Cleveland, Durham, Humberside, Northumbria, North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire currently have a No. 2 Region CBRN response that provides the appropriate capability, both in terms of the scale of the response and the quality of the service provided to the public. The level of service across the region has been improved through clarity of purpose, standardisation of methods, skills and resource allocation, using common processes and procedures, training jointly and working as a regional resource rather than seven individual forces. • The Region has a CBRN service specification, detailing the core inputs, features, outputs and outcomes of a CBRN response. It focuses on protecting and saving lives, minimising the impact on the public and keeping them informed, the fulfilment of normal police functions and the efficient return to normality following an incident, as well as the efficiencies and increased service effectiveness achieved through joint working. In addition to building a service based on clear operational requirements, it also reflects the common values of the forces involved in terms of public reassurance and confidence in the police.

Costs and Service levels Detail the cost to itself of the collaborative service, and the agreed service levels. • There is no cost associated with the CBRN collaborative services. Each force pays for their own training needs. Equipment such as PPE is issued and paid for by the National CBRN Centre and funded by the Government. There are regional agreements for numbers of trained responders, tactical advisors and Commanders to cover regional demand, and there is currently a move to create an on-call rota for Commanders and tactical advisors.

Net Revenue Expenditure (NRE) Calculations 2014/15

Forces’ complete Net Revenue Expenditure Budget NRE % share £000 NRE % share (rounded) Cleveland 126,221 8.4% 8% Durham 115,984 7.8% 8% Humberside 174,534 11.7% 12% Northumbria 271,206 18.2% 18% North Yorkshire 139,079 9.3% 9% South Yorkshire 247,599 16.6% 17% West Yorkshire 418,679 28.0% 28% 1,493,302 100.0% 100%

Current Issues with Service Provision identified Identify if there are any current issues with service provision (based on existing performance monitoring).

Demand Identify the demand for this service (latent and patent / crime and non-crime). 203

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • CBRN incidents are seen as being low probability, but high impact. Demand is undertaken through the STA (Strategic Risk Assessment). CBRN incidents are entered onto the Force Niche system. There are no requirements from the Region reference current demand figures, therefore these are not looked at, collated or submitted for analysis. • When a force in the No 2 Region experiences a CBRN incident and reports it to the No 2 CBRN SPOC (in North Yorkshire Police), the CBRN SPoC forwards the data to the National CBRN centre. Incidents dealt with are Terrorism but specifically relating to CBRN. Individual Chemical Exposure (ICE) attacks with corrosive substances and illicit drugs laboratories are now included in the reporting. The National CBRN centre publishes the numbers of incidents reported to them, this is not mandatory and relies on forces reporting such incidents, also incidents are not necessarily crime related.

Future Issues Identify any issues in the next 3-5 years that may affect the service nationally or regionally. • Given the continued, and elevating, risk of a CBRN threat it is proposed that through the North East Transformation, Innovation and Collaboration (NETIC), added stimulus is given to the support of all seven forces in the operationalisation of the Section 22a Agreement signed by all seven Chief Constables and PCCs between December 2015 and February 2016. • The need to activate the Gold and Silver command structure in response to a CBRN matter is extremely rare. More commonly Silver commanders become involved in policing responses to chemical suicides and challenges associated with drugs laboratories. This lack of demand supports having the smallest possible cohort of individuals to maximise their operational exposure. • A further consideration is the risk of a CBRN threat manifesting itself and this is included in the national alert states. In particular any move above SEVERE which involves the risk of a CBRN attack would of course be influential. • CBRN incidents are seen as being low probability, but high impact. Future demand is not predictable, resources are deployed as and when an incident occurs.

Asset Serviceability Detail the serviceability of the collaborative assets – how able are they to deliver the collaborative service detailed now and over the next 3-5 years Effectiveness & Efficiency • A series of Regional Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are in place, based on Authorised Professional Practice (APP) and have been agreed by the Regions ACCs. NYPs ACC is the Regional Strategic Lead for CBRN. • The CBRN Responders attend 2 days training per year, the CBRN SPOC is responsible for assuring training takes place and this currently takes place jointly with Cleveland, trends are looked at and training adjusted e.g. to include response to acid attacks. • Commanders and TAC advisors attend Continual Professional Development (CPD) events run by the CBRN Centre. The CPD events undertake table top exercises and can also include educational visits to the Tactical Response Force (TRF) which is a specific section of the Army that responds to CBRN incidents. The Saton Force exercise (joint police and military) is run by West Yorkshire, and is a table top exercise which includes an outdoor CBRN search. The CBRN SPOC and commanders attend live exercises as part of CPD. • Kit is all up to date and in line with the CBRN centre and is monitored by the CBRN SPOC. Training is undertaken by the CBRN SPOC for dispatchers and call handers within the Force Control Room, in relation to identifying a CBRN incident and giving advice to public and first responders.

204

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Counter Terrorism Policing North East

Description of the service Describe the service provided, the approach to providing that service (lead force, host force etc.), end dates, or agreed review point and place in the appropriate FMS classification. Providing force: Counter Terrorism Policing North East (lead force- West Yorkshire) Services provided collaboratively to: Durham, Cleveland, Humberside, Northumbria, North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire. FMS Classification: Responding to major events • The threat to the UK from international terrorism is SEVERE, meaning an attack is highly likely. • The terror threat in the UK comes principally from Daesh (ISIL, ISIS and IS) and al Qaida and groups and individuals who are directed encouraged or inspired by them. • The online radicalisation of lone actors, who may then progress into action very quickly, remains a key concern which is both difficult to predict and prepare for. • We remain committed to tackling extremism in all its forms and any ideologies which pose a threat to public safety. The threat from the extreme right wing is also a concern, with groups like National Action seeing an increase in their following and activities, resulting in their proscription as a recognised terrorist organisation in December 2016. • The level of threat is complex and multi-dimensional and ranges from lone actors intent on carrying out crude attacks to sophisticated networks pursuing ambitious and coordinated plots. • The threat posed by UK nationals seeking to return from Syria or Iraq is something UK policing has planned for and a wide range of measures and powers are being used to manage and mitigate that threat. • Last year the threat level in the UK was increased from SUBSTANTIAL to CRITICAL on two occasions, following the attacks in Manchester and Parsons Green. For West Yorkshire, as the lead force for Counter Terrorism policing North East (CTP NE), the capacity and capability of the force to respond to the increased threat was tested. Since the attacks, we have seen a direct significant increase in the volume of intelligence received and in the demand for investigative resources.

Costs and Service levels Detail the cost to itself of the collaborative service, and the agreed service levels. • By virtue of a Collaboration Agreement made between the Chief Constables and their respective Police and Crime Commissioners of the seven Forces of the North East Region, the parties agreed to collaborate in respect of such operational policing functions as they deem to be in the interests of effectiveness and efficiency. • It was resolved that in terms of Counter-Terrorism Policing and associated functions that West Yorkshire Police shall be the lead force with the responsibility for the management and administration of these on behalf of the parties. • It has been agreed that in order to facilitate the lead force arrangements that the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police should exercise Direction and Control over all staff working within the agreed Functions.

Current Issues with Service Provision identified Identify if there are any current issues with service provision (based on existing performance monitoring). • Each force utilises different models with regard to service provision, implementation and delivery. In addition, IT systems are not compatible across all business areas across the region. These issues make it more challenging to standardise practices, consistently monitor performance or benchmark ways of working across all forces. Further consideration is being given to these issues going forward.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Demand Identify the demand for this service (latent and patent / crime and non-crime). • The UK continues to face an increasing threat from terrorism. The threat is international in scope and involves a variety of networks, groups and individuals who seek to advance their aims through acts of violent extremism. • Due to an increased demand placed on CT policing to stop attacks, bring offenders to justice, protect crowded places, mitigate against attacks and prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. Our security measures and activities are constantly reviewed to reflect where the threats exist and the level of threat we are facing. • Liaising closely with CTP NE, the force works in support of the National CT/DE Policing strategy and the Government’s overarching CONTEST strategy. • Threat and risk management and safeguarding activity is delivered locally with CTP NE in line with key stakeholders within districts, local authorities and partnerships. This approach is coordinated through established tasking and coordination processes and also partnership forums, which work to agreed priorities as identified in the Counter Terrorism Local Profiles (CTLPs). • This national process aims to help both police and partners understand and prioritise threat and vulnerability, with suggested recommendations to address any risk. The CTLP is a key tool for driving the two way sharing of information. • Alongside partners, the force also fulfils its statutory duties under the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015, to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. (Prevent Duty). • Through the national CT network and CTP NE the force keeps up to date with national strategy, recommendations and developments in relation to the threat level, protective security measures and threat and risk management. Working alongside CTP NE West Yorkshire Police constantly reviews its counter terrorism measures to provide the best possible protection for people living in West Yorkshire. As a precaution, activities and intelligence are also reviewed in response to a range of attacks, risks and threats, including those seen in the UK and overseas in the 12 months. • Nationally the threat assessment is influenced by a range of factors including current intelligence, recent events and what is known about terrorist intentions, methodology and capabilities. Any decisions regarding appropriate security responses in West Yorkshire are made with this in mind and are supported by detailed analysis. Threat assessments are also produced (as necessary) for individuals and events. • Under the Home Office National Exercise Programme, work is continually ongoing to ensure readiness to respond to major incidents in West Yorkshire. This work is supported by CTP NE and local exercising plans. These routine counter terrorism training exercises are organised to test contingency plans and the co-ordinated response of the emergency services and partner agencies in the event of a terrorist attack. Such exercises provide valuable opportunities for West Yorkshire Police and its blue light partners to work together to develop, test and strengthen our combined response, should a major incident occur. • West Yorkshire has dedicated Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs) who are coordinated, trained and tasked by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office. • The CTSAs carry out daily activities to help increase the protection and security of our communities, public institutions, critical national infrastructure sites, businesses and crowded places. Our measures and activities are constantly reviewed to reflect where the threats exist and the level of threat the country is facing. The CTSAs also promote awareness of the threat from terrorism and develop positive ongoing relationships with the local business community, partner agencies and site owners to encourage a coordinated approach. They work closely with representatives of trade organisations and professional bodies to ensure counter terrorism protective security advice is incorporated in general crime prevention regimes.

Future Issues Identify any issues in the next 3-5 years that may affect the service nationally or regionally. • The demand experienced in the last 12 months has been unprecedented and continues to rise. National indications suggest that further increases in the national threat level are likely in the future and that the volume of CT investigations and demand for resources will remain high. 206

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • As mentioned in our response to Q1, the issues of online radicalisation and lone actors remain key concerns, but the manifestation of these threats is hard to predict. • In addition to acts of terrorism and violent extremism, issues like CSE, national and international events and conflicts, all have potential implications for the force with regard to community cohesion, tensions and public order. These matters and the subsequent increase in hate crime, demonstrations and counter protests all require a comprehensive and effective policing response to protect public safety and manage any spontaneous or pre-planned disorder. As such they continue to present potential challenges from a resourcing perspective in the current policing climate. • In light of the evolving threat and terrorist methodologies, the Force explores all available opportunities for collaboration across the fields of counter terrorism and organised crime. This collaboration seeks to maximise intelligence gathering opportunities across agencies and enables a more comprehensive picture of threat and risk; helping to identify emerging issues, prevent or disrupt offences and better protect our communities. • This integrated approach further enhances the Force’s effectiveness in collecting, sharing and responding to intelligence, in addition to achieving broader benefits and efficiencies with regard to expenditure and resourcing.

Asset Serviceability Detail the serviceability of the collaborative assets – how able are they to deliver the collaborative service detailed now and over the next 3-5 years • CT policing in the UK is serviced by the national CT network made up of Counter Terrorism Units, Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units and Intelligence partners. This network is supported by local police forces and partner agencies. • In West Yorkshire, the force liaises closely with CTP NE to ensure it is better equipped to prevent or respond to incidents of terrorism and domestic extremism to investigate and prosecute those involved. Through CTP NE the force can access specialist expertise including; skilled detectives, financial investigators, community contact teams, intelligence analysts, forensic specialists and high-tech investigators. It can also ensure the effective co-ordination and management of enquiries and operations, without compromising the force’s commitment to day to day policing. • All CT officers undertake regular specialist training, regionally and nationally, in relation to their roles. Wider CT advice and awareness products are regularly delivered to front line officers and staff. These may take the form of threat briefings, vigilance and awareness videos, and messaging around personal and operational security.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Forensic Services

Description of the service Describe the service provided, the approach to providing that service (lead force, host force etc.), end dates, or agreed review point and place in the appropriate FMS classification. Providing force: North Yorkshire Services provided collaboratively to: South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire and Humberside FMS Classification: Investigations • Forensic Services are delivered by a regional body; Yorkshire and Humber Regional Scientific Support Services. Capabilities include: o Forensic Services o Crime Scene Investigation o Identification Services o Imaging Services o Accreditation and Performance • Other services such as; Toxicology Biology Body Fluid analysis Drug analysis (etc.) are provided by a Forensic Service Provider (FSP) delivering to the 7 forces of the North East under a sole service provider arrangement procured on behalf of the NE region. Some specialist capabilities are contracted to service provides as required. • Regional Forensic services staffing by function/unit are detailed in the attached link below. • All resources are trained appropriately and services accredited in accordance with the Forensic Science Regulator (FSR) requirements. • Shift patterns of operational resources are aligned wherever possible to demand profiles, as such all critical business areas are covered either by shift arrangements or when routine shift working is prohibitively expensive standby arrangements are in place to ensure service delivery 24/7 • RSSS YatH holds assets which enable them to deliver service affectively across the Region. Assets range from specialist lasers, laboratory equipment, Livescan Unit to camera’s, wireless flash cards and scene tents etc. It is prohibitively time consuming to list all the assets held by RSSS YatH.

Costs and Service levels Detail the cost to itself of the collaborative service, and the agreed service levels.

The 17/18 figures for NYP were as follows: - Fixed Costs £610,339 Funded on NRE basis. Management & Admin teams, General Running Costs, Vehicle Fleet etc. Variable Costs £1,581,078 Funded on demand basis. Forensic Submission Unit, ID Unit, Imaging Unit. Funded on FTE basis – CSI etc. Forensic Submission £879,977 Forensic submissions from LGC/Eurofins Costs Livescan Costs £100,244 IDENT1 – Home Office charge TOTAL £3,171,638

Current Issues with Service Provision identified Identify if there are any current issues with service provision (based on existing performance monitoring). • Current issues with service provision within Regional Scientific Support Services include meeting the requirements of the Forensic Science Regulator (FSR), attaining and maintaining accreditation in an environment of budget pressures. This impact is not only financial but also productivity has been reduced through increased bureaucracy and administration. • The location of RSSS Central Services in another Force area does increase the length of abstraction due to travel time if required to attend RSSS HQ.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Demand Identify the demand for this service (latent and patent / crime and non-crime). • Regional Scientific services (RSS) for North Yorkshire Police (NYP) are deployed regionally, covering NYP, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire and Humberside. As an example analysis of NYP demand for 2017 shows that: 4380 scenes were visited. • The data provided in NYP HMIC Force Data Management will show the breakdown of crimes that the Forensic Services attended with the highest being residential burglary (1102). The number of identifications made from examinations and the timescales for attendance and examination. Forensic spend for 01/04/17 to 31/01/18 was £743,915.69

Future Issues Identify any issues in the next 3-5 years that may affect the service nationally or regionally. • Forensic Services could suffer a reduction in the allocation of funds, in which case external submissions will need to be more carefully scrutinised. • The forensic services contract is due for renewal in 2020, and it is highly likely that market prices in most areas will be less competitive than they were when the last contract was procured in 2013. Additional scrutiny over quality standards in external FSP’s and costs associated with compliance to FSR requirements, together with a withdrawal of KFS Ltd from the competitive marketplace, are likely to see the cost of external tests increase. In contrast, costs associated with recent forensic advances (such as new DNA techniques) will reduce over time as they become a commodity (e.g. YSTR) in a similar way to the shift from Low Copy Number to DNA17.

Asset Serviceability Detail the serviceability of the collaborative assets – how able are they to deliver the collaborative service detailed now and over the next 3-5 years • The current structure of Yorkshire and the Humber Regional Scientific Support Services is suitable to meet current demands. • Forensics Service has extensive triage systems in place and it is unlikely that demand for external provision will reduce in most areas. In fact, an increased demand can be anticipated in Cold Case Reviews (as forensic science advances) and in some forensic disciplines which have been traditionally in-sourced (such as firearms classification) and now need to be ISO accredited. In contrast, demand may decrease as a result of police in-sourcing forensic tests – biological search examinations, ‘rapid’ DNA, simple drugs analysis (particularly cannabis plant identification) etc. • ISO 17025 implementation and maintenance, maintaining this standard in compliance with the Forensic Regulators is process and resource intensive, operational staff are being diverted to deliver the requirement. • Government Policing Spending Cuts; it is anticipated that year on year cuts will affect the services ability to maintain delivery of a service to the four police forces of the Yorkshire and Humber region. • Transformational Business change; a project to review Forensic service delivery is being undertaken, initial proposals will fundamentally change the landscape in respect of Forensic Service delivery. • Forensic services provide assistance to investigations with positive results from forensic analysis, which can lead to convictions. The attached link (3 Identifications) below details the number of identifications made through various examinations carried out.

Future Supply of assets Are there any issues with future supply of assets (trained staff, equipment etc.) • RSSS is heavily dependent on the provision of current technical equipment. Additionally the demands of maintaining staff competence in specialised fields, which are continuously evolving is essential. The ability of RSSS to maintain effective services relies heavily upon financial investment.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Underwater Search and Marine

Description of the service Describe the service provided, the approach to providing that service (lead force, host force etc.), end dates, or agreed review point and place in the appropriate FMS classification. Providing force: Humberside as lead force Services provided collaboratively to: Humberside, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, North Yorkshire FMS Classification: Investigations / Responding to Major events • The Regional Marine and Underwater Search Unit was formed in September 2012 creating a single team in order to make substantial financial savings for all forces. Three dive teams were reduced to one, trained staff from thirty to the present ten. The collaboration has delivered savings in relation to ongoing training, equipment purchase and maintenance. • The unit consists of a supervisor and nine constables, all qualified divers, between 08.00 and 16.00, Monday to Friday in order to make best use of daylight hours. A 24 hour on call specialised advice facility is provided and the team are available on a voluntary call out basis to meet operational demand. The Marine Unit provides core cover on 252 days throughout the year. • The core role of the unit is defined as any task which is on, under or on the edge of water where other officers or emergency services staff cannot be safely deployed. This includes: o Providing an operational dive team (5 officers’ minimum) throughout the Yorkshire region when required during office hours. o Wade searching. o Confined Space Searching. o Kayak Searching. o High visibility boat patrols incorporating project Kraken which targets the regions inlets, boat yards, docks and waterways to gather intelligence on any terrorism or criminal related activity. o Police Search Advisor led activity in or close to bodies of water, sub surface searches or drains. o The scanning of bodies of water with specialist “sonar” equipment to locate submerged items. o Responding to incidents of flooding utilising swift water rescue techniques.

Costs and Service levels Detail the cost to itself of the collaborative service, and the agreed service levels. • The marine unit is funded by Humberside, West Yorkshire and South Yorkshire on a demand based percentage system with the budget for 2016 to 2017 set and agreed at £695,922.10. Humberside contribute 50% of this cost (due to the coastline and major river in the force area), West and South Yorkshire contribute 31% and 19% respectively. • North Yorkshire have an agreement whereby an initial payment of £36,000 is made. This £36,000 is then spent by North Yorkshire under the following agreement, for each small team deployment £2,000 per day is spent, with a full dive team costing £4,000 per day. Once the initial £36,000 has been spent these figures increase to £2,500 and £5,000 per day respectively. Contributions from North Yorkshire that are above the agreed budget are returned to the other three forces annually.

Current Issues with Service Provision identified Identify if there are any current issues with service provision (based on existing performance monitoring). • Since 2012, the team has effectively serviced the entire Yorkshire region, absorbing further budget reductions of over 6% throughout that time. These reductions have been managed through a threat and risk based, triage approach to demand, in consultation with local Senior Investigating Officers and Police Search Advisors. • The marine unit maintains a detailed system of performance collation which is completed on a daily basis to capture every aspect of a deployment. 210

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • It is important to note that attending a request for service often takes an entire duty day or multiple days which can often become extended duty tours. There are several factors contributing to this, some of which are explained below: • Staff numbers – The Health and Safety Executive Diving at work regulations, in conjunction with the Police Dive rules 2014 state that for a standard, low risk dive to take place there must be a minimum of five staff on site (a diver, diver’s attendant, standby diver and attendant, and a dive supervisor). Without the availability and use of these trained staff the functions of an underwater search cannot take place. These numbers can easily increase to seven or eight when the risk assessment dictates a higher level of risk, where for example a safety boat is required, or more specialised diving equipment is needed. • Travel – As the marine unit services 5,800 square miles, inevitably a proportion of travel time needs to be factored into deployments. • Preparation / Maintenance – The unit uses specialised life support equipment which must be maintained daily as well as being subject to manufacturer’s maintenance schedules. Maintenance is mostly completed by qualified unit staff to minimise associated costs from external providers. Breathing gas cylinders must also be re-filled by the team post deployment.

Demand Identify the demand for this service (latent and patent / crime and non-crime). • Since 2012 requests for service from each policing area have fluctuated depending on demand at the time. Overall however all forces use the team on a regular basis, often in relation to high profile incidents that can attract national media attention. • The marine unit also retain a number of ongoing tasks which are managed on a threat and risk basis by the unit supervisor. These can include high profile missing persons, firearms incidents where a weapon has been discarded and historic murder enquires. • The following table shows the operational deployments that the unit have been engaged in between April 2016 to March 2017 (excluding training deployments):

Underwater Search and Marine Unit Demand Total operational deployments - 320 Force No. of Percentage Deployments Humberside 171 53% West Yorkshire 91 28% South Yorkshire 37 12% North Yorkshire 9 3% External 12 4% TOTAL 320 100%

Future Issues Identify any issues in the next 3-5 years that may affect the service nationally or regionally. • No major issues identified.

Asset Serviceability Detail the serviceability of the collaborative assets – how able are they to deliver the collaborative service detailed now and over the next 3-5 years • The unit have made a number of improvements over the years to increase their capability and capacity. For example, fleet improvements have enabled the team, where appropriate, to split on a dynamic threat assessed basis to attend more than one deployment on any given day. • The region has invested in specialised, surface operated sonar equipment which has the ability to search large areas quickly and potentially locate a person in a short space of time. This has proven useful on several occasions as a smaller team can be initially sent to search and other force operational resources can be redeployed to other tasks. • As new technology becomes available to improve the service provided or reduce cost, this will be considered.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • The Police dive rules 2014 stipulate that a training regime should be in place in order to maintain operational competence. The marine unit have a well-established training programme which is reviewed on a regular basis. This programme is audited by the Humberside health and safety representative.

Future Supply of assets Are there any issues with future supply of assets (trained staff, equipment etc.) • The team are currently recruiting to vacant positions, which can be difficult to fill given the skills requirement. In order to manage the future recruitment the current round will identify potential future candidates as well as filling current vacancies.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Regional Procurement

• It is recognised that effective procurement arrangements are fundamental to achieving organisational success for the four forces of Yorkshire and The Humber in delivering their corporate priorities and contributing to the outcomes within each individual Police and Crime Plan. • In support of the collaborative agenda, the Regional Yorkshire and Humber Procurement Team was established in 2012 and works in partnership with each force and the National Police Air Service (NPAS), ensuring that activity is prioritised in line with individual Police and Crime Plans. The overarching aim is to ensure that all opportunities to adopt regional collaborative approaches are exploited in the pursuit of value for money. • The four forces currently spend in excess of £220 million per annum on goods and services. The Procurement Strategy sets out the commitment to achieve value for money for the public purse through all procurement and commissioning activity, in order to both protect frontline services and support a sustainable economic environment. • In performing this role, the Procurement Team engage and work in partnership with providers in the public, private as well as voluntary & community sectors. At all times the Forces must secure value for money and demonstrate that public funds are being spent responsibly and equitably. • The team consisting of 38 Procurement professionals, work within a Category Management business model to maximise the benefits from procurement collaboration for categories and sub-categories of works, goods and services. The key categories are: o Estates and Facilities Management o Transport o IT/ISD o Crime & Forensics o Policing o Corporate Services o Aviation • Category Strategies and underpinning forward plans have been established for each category area. These are complemented by savings and benefits plans. • The team manage region wide contracts and provide strategic and commercial support to other business areas that are responsible for managing business critical contracts. • They are also responsible for monitoring and reporting performance and benefits tracking to the Police and Crime Commissioners, the Regional Collaboration Board, Force Command Teams, and the Home Office. • Following a detailed yearlong assessment by the Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply (CIPS), Yorkshire & Humber Police Regional Procurement Team has been awarded CIPS Corporate Accreditation. • The decision to work towards this award was taken against the backdrop of increased collaborative activity on a local and national level and in support of work that the team are leading on as part of the National Collaborative Law Enforcement Procurement (CLEP) Programme. The award not only enables the four forces of Yorkshire and the Humber and the National Air Service to be assured that their Procurement Function operates within a credible and robust framework, but also places Yorkshire and the Humber in a unique position amongst UK Police & other Blue Light procurement functions. • CIPS, the global procurement industry’s professional body, required Regional Procurement to evidence its’ operations relating to five Dimensions; o Leadership & Organisation o Strategy o People o Processes & Systems o Performance Management

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED • During the assessment period, working with their assigned CIPS consultant, the team seized the opportunity to identify better ways of working and to close any ‘gaps’ in existing processes. This is not a one-off process, however; CIPS will conduct an Interim Assessment after 18 months followed by a full re-assessment after 3 years. • The team have also successfully received the CIPS Corporate Code of Ethics standard for the last two consecutive years. This voluntary code demonstrates our commitment to reinforce ethical values across all procurement and supply practices. The accreditation process involved all procurement staff receiving training and successfully passing an assessment. • Over the last five years, the team have delivered over £30m of cashable savings on behalf of the four forces and have actively supported the National Collaborative law Enforcement Procurement (CLEP) Programme. To sustain the ongoing delivery of savings and to embed new collaborative ways of working it is acknowledged that additional resource is required within the team. Work is underway with the regional Financial Leads and PCCs to explore such ‘invest to save’ resource opportunities. • The Regional Procurement Team are national commercial leads for the Fleet and Aviation categories and therefore in order to pursue both additional savings and efficiencies and ensure that goods and services procured are fit for modern policing, extra resource will be required to support these activities. A bid will be made to the National Collaboration Board to seek interim resources, in order for work to commence on these category areas.

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Glossary

ABE Achieving Best Evidence MSG Most Similar Group. This is a grouping of police forces with similar socio-economic conditions for performance comparison purposes. ACC Assistant Chief Constable MSHT Modern Slavery Human Trafficking ACE Adverse Childhood Experience MTFF Mid Term Financial Forecast AFI Area for Improvement NABIS The National Ballistics Intelligence Service AFO Authorised Firearms Officer NCA National Crime Agency AI Artificial Intelligence NCCAG National Counter Corruption Advisory Group AID Area Index of Demand NCRS National Crime Recording Standards AIU Abusive Images Unit NCSP National Cyber Security Program ANPR Automatic Number Plate Recognition NECTU North East Counter Terrorism Unit APP Authorised Professional Practice NEMA National Emergency Mortuary Arrangement ARMS Active Risk Management System NEPs National Enabling Programmes ARV Armed Response Vehicle NETIC North East Transformation Innovation and Collaboration ASB Anti Social Behaviour Niche West Yorkshire Police’s current crime recording and management system BLWF Blue Light Wellbeing Framework NPAS National Police Air Service BME Black and Minority Ethnic NPCC National Police Chief’s Council BOLO Be on Look out For NPFDU National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and NPOCC National Police Coordination Centre Nuclear CCC Customer Contact Centre NPT Neighbourhood Policing Team CCU Counter Corruption Unit NRE Net Revenue Expenditure CDI Crime Data Integrity NRM National Referral Mechanism CEOP Child Exploitation and Online Protection NSPCC National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children CID Criminal Investigations Department NYP North Yorkshire Police CIPS Chartered Institute of Procurement and OAC Organised Acquisitive Crime Supply CJ Criminal Justice OCG Organised Crime Group CLEP National Collaborative Law Enforcement OCGM Organised Crime Group Mapping Procurement COT Chief Officer Team OH / OHU Occupational Health / Occupational Health Unit CPIA Criminal Procedure and Investigations OIC Officer in the Case Act CPS Crown Prosecution Service ONS Office for National Statistics CRM Customer Records Management PACE Police and Criminal Evidence Act CSEA Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse PACT Police and Communities Together Meeting CSI Crime Scene Investigation PCC Police and Crime Commissioner CSP Community Safety Partnership PCSO Police Community Support Officer CSR Comprehensive Spending Review PDR Performance Development Review CSDS Child Sexual Offences Disclosure PEC Public Enquiry Counter Scheme CSEW Crime Survey England and Wales PEEL Police Efficiency Effectiveness and Legitimacy

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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED CT Counter Terrorism PEQF Policing Education Qualifications Framework CT/DE Counter Terrorism & Domestic PFI Private Finance Initiative Extremism CTLPs Counter Terrorism Local Profiles PIP Professionalising the Investigation Programme CTP NE Counter Terrorism Policing North East PIR Post Implementation Review CTSAs Counter Terrorism Security Advisors PLP Police Led Prosecutions (CTSAs) CTSFO Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms PLT Police Liaison Team Officers DASH Domestic Abuse Stalking and PMOC Police Mortuary Operations Coordinator Harassment DCR District Control Room PNC Police National Computer DHQ District Headquarters PND Penalty Notice for Disorder DFU Digital Forensics Unit POCA Proceeds of Crime Act DMI Digital Media Investigator POPS Public Order/Public Safety DPP Designated Protection Provider POTAC Public Order Tactical Advisor DVI Disaster Victim Identification PPN Public Protection Notice DVPO Domestic Violence Protection Order PRC Postal Requisition and Charge ECU Economic Crime Unit PRT Protest Removal Team EDL English Defence League PSD Professional Standards Department EG Evidence Gatherers PSIs Police Staff Investigators EI(F) Early Intervention (Foundation) PSN Public Services Network ERP Enterprise Resource Planning PSU Police Support Unit ESMCP Emergency Services Mobile PTF Police Transformational Fund Communications Programme ESN Emergency Services Network PTI Physical Training Instructor FCMU Force Crime Management Unit PVoT Potential Victims of Trafficking FGM Female Genital Mutilation PWA Partnership Working Area FIM Force Incident Manager (another term for RART Regional Asset Recovery Team FSUP) FIT Forward Intelligence Team RCCU Regional Cyber Crime Unit FLO Family Liaison Officer RDFU Regional Digital Forensics Unit FM Forced Marriage RFT Regional Fraud Team FMS Forced Management Statement RICC Regional Information Coordination Centre FNO Foreign National Offender RIU Regional Intelligence Unit FOI Freedom of Information ROCTA Regional Organised Crime Threat Assessment FSDR Force Standard Duty Rota ROCU Regional Organised Crime Unit FSP Forensic Service Provider RPIU Regional Prison Intelligence Unit FSR Forensic Science Regulator RSO Registered Sex Offender FSUP Force Supervisor RSSS Regional Scientific Support Service FTA Failing to Appear RTC Road Traffic Collision FTE Full Time Equivalent RUI Released Under Investigation FVU Force Vetting Unit SARC Sexual Assault Referral Centre GAIN Government Agency Intelligence SCAIDP Serious Child Abuse Investigators Network Development Programme GDPR General Date Protection Regulation SERM Scene Evidence Recovery Manager GLAA Gangmasters & Labour Abuse Authority SHPO Sexual Harm Prevention Order HBA Honour Based Abuse SFC Strategic Firearms Commander HEIs Higher Education Institutions SIM Senior Identification Manager HMET Homicide and Major Enquiry Team SIO Senior Investigation Officer HMICFRS Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of SLT Senior Leadership Team Constabulary Fire and Rescue Service 216

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs SMEs Subject Matter Experts HOCR Home Office Counting Rules SOC Serious and Organised Crime HOIE Home Office Immigration Enforcement SOCU Serious and Organised Crime Unit IAM Individual Accountability Meeting SPoC Single Point of Contact ICIDP Initial Crime Investigators Development SPR Strategic Policing Requirement Programme ICACCOPS Internet Crimes against Children – Child SPS Special Police Service Online Protection System IDVA Independent Domestic Violence SRT Service Recovery Team Advocates IIOC Indecent Images of Children STO Specially Trained Officer IOD Incident on Duty STORM West Yorkshire Police’s current incident recording and management system IOM Integrated Offender Management STRA Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment IOPC Independent Office for Police Conduct TFC Tactical Firearms Commander IPLDP Initial Police Learning and Development TI Trainee Investigators Programme ISVA Independent Sexual Violence Advocates TOGAF The Open Group Architecture Framework ICT Information and Communications TSU Technical Surveillance Unit Technology IT Information Technology TWIF Two Way Interface ITFC Initial Tactical Firearms Commander UCF Undercover Foundation Unit JESIP Joint Emergency Services UKPPS UK Protected Person Service Interoperability Principles KSI Killed or Seriously Injured VIPEX VIP Escort LRF Local Resilience Forum ViSOR Violent and Sexual Offender Register LCSBs Local Childrens Safeguarding Boards WWC Workplace Wellbeing Charter LEAs Law Enforcement Agencies WYFRS West Yorkshire Fire & Rescue Service LSE London School of Economics XLW Extreme Left Wing LSOA Lower Super Output Area XRW Extreme Right Wing MAPPA Multi Agency Public Protection YaTH Yorkshire and the Humber Arrangements MARAC Multi Agency Risk Assessment YOS/YOT Youth Offending Service/Team Conference MASH Multi Agency Safeguarding Hub VIPER Video Identification Parade Electronic Recording MIT Major Investigation Team MoRiLE Management of Risk in Law Enforcement MOUs Memorandums of Understanding

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