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Correspondence Helen E Correspondence Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen F. Burgess South Africa’s Nuclear Decisions Peter Liberman To the Editors: In his article “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” Peter Liberman uses orga- nizational politics theory to explain South Africa’s latent development of a nuclear weapons program before 1977.1 He cites post-1976 security threats (from the Soviet Union and Cuba) as triggers for the militarization of the nuclear program and the build- ing of six bombs. Although Liberman is less clear about the motivations for disarma- ment, he does suggest three contributing factors: the end of security threats, the change in South Africa to a more outward-looking leadershipin 1989, and the unacceptableex - penseCorrespondence of the nuclear weapons program. Liberman produces new insights on both the South African case and contending the- ories that can be used to explain it. In seeking parsimony, however, he weighs the ex- 2 planatory value of only three theories and overlooks other relevant factors —most 3 notably, political psychology. This omission leads to a portrait of South Africa as a seemingly ordinary state, rather than the minority-ruled, security-obsessed regime that darkened the international stage for four decades and that developed a secret, sophisti- 4 cated chemical and biological warfare (CBW) program in the 1980s. Helen E. Purkitt is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at the U.S. Naval Academy. Stephen F. Burgess is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Strategy and International Security at the U.S. Air War College. Peter Liberman is Associate Professor of Political Science,Queens College,City University of New York. 1. Peter Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 45–86. Additional references to this article appear parenthetically in the text. 2. The full range of factors will be considered in Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen F. Burgess, South Af- rica and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, forthcoming). For in- stance, outside powers (especially Israel) played an important role in developing South Africa’s nuclear bomb and missile programs. 3. Margaret G. Hermann, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework,” International Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 47–81; Robert Jervis, “Political Psy- chology: Some Challenges and Opportunities,” Political Psychology, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1989), pp. 481– 516; and Thomas J. Scheff, Bloody Revenge: Emotions,Nationalism,and War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994). See the papers presented at the “Responding to Negative Feedback: Decision- making in Protracted Foreign Policy Problems Symposium,” sponsored by the Center for Presi- dential Studies, George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, College Station, May 18–20, 2001. 4. Stephen F. Burgess and Helen E. Purkitt, The Rollback of the South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program, monograph (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center, 2001). This also appeared as The Rollback of the South African Biological Warfare Program, monograph (Colorado Springs, Colo.: Institute of National Security Studies, U.S. Air Force Acad- International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002), pp. 186–194 © 2002 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 186 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228802320231271 by guest on 30 September 2021 Correspondence 187 Regarding disarmament, Liberman focuses on change in the leadershipfrom the na - tionalist-militarist president P.W. Botha to the more liberal, democratic F.W. de Klerk and seeks to evaluate Etel Solingen’s proposition that transition from statist leaders to economic liberalizers lessens support for expensive nuclear weapons programs (pp. 47, 5 81–82). He does not stress, however, the high levels of pressure that the United States exerted on the South African political leadership from 1987 to 1989, which was based on fears that a transition to a regime led by the African National Congress (ANC) might bring with it nuclear proliferation. Similarly, in 1994 the United States issued a démarche to the de Klerk government based on fears of CBW proliferation. In both 1989 and 1994, the de Klerk regime negotiated with U.S. ofªcials and largely conformed to 6 their demands. Liberman also overlooks pressure from the South African Defense Force (SADF), which argued that the nuclear weapons and missile programs were sap- ping defense budget funds that military leaders felt they needed to modernize South 7 Africa’s conventional forces. the psychology of nuclear armament Psychological factors, including apartheid leaders’ extreme sense of nationalism, a 8 laager (or “circle the wagons”) complex, and fear of onslaughts by Soviet-backed com- munists and black nationalists contributed signiªcantly to South Africa’s decision to 9 build the bomb. In 1961 South Africa withdrew from the British Commonwealth and by 1972 had decreased the number of international organizations in which it partici- 10 pated from forty to two. With the start of negotiations in Geneva in 1964 on the Nu- clear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd decided against South African participation. In 1970 his successor, B.J. Vorster, rejected the NPT and in- stead announced the creation of a new South African uranium enrichment process and 11 invited collaboration by “non-Communist countries” in developing it. While empha- emy, 2001). Helen E. Purkitt, “The Politics of Denuclearization: The Case of South Africa,” paper presented at the “Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) Results Conference,” U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, November 9, 1994. 5. Etel Solingen, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 126–169. 6. Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen F. Burgess, “Changing Course and Responding to Negative Feed- back: A Case of Sequential Decision-making in South Africa, 1989–94,” paper presented at the an- nual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, August 29– September 2, 2001. 7. Interviews with former SADF senior military leaders, discussed in Purkitt, “The Politics of Denuclearization.” At the same time, SADF leaders felt that the CBW program was still necessary for other security purposes, including the production of tear gas. 8. William H. Vatcher, White Laager: The Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism (New York: Praeger, 1965). 9. Purkitt, “The Politics of Denuclearization,” p. 8; and Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Taking the Plunge: Emotion and Identity in the Decision to Build Nuclear Weapons,” paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1–3, 2000. 10. Deon Geldenhuys, Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1990), p. 181. 11. Donald B. Sole, former U.S. ambassador to South Africa, “The South African Nuclear Case in the Light of Recent Revelations,” paper presented at the “New Horizons in Arms Control and Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228802320231271 by guest on 30 September 2021 International Security 27:1 188 sizing the peaceful aims of the program in parliament, Vorster also proclaimed that South Africa would not be limited to promotion of the peaceful application of nuclear 12 energy. From 1961 to 1968, apartheid leaders cited growing threats from black guerrilla movements backed by the Soviet Union and China as justiªcation for a sixfold increase in defense expenditures. Also in the 1960s, the regime became increasingly militarized, as the job of secretary of defense shifted from a civilian to a uniformed position, and 13 parliament lost effective oversight of the military. As a consequence of heightened threat perceptions, few domestic constraints were placed on apartheid rulers and scien- tists as they led South Africa toward the development of nuclear weapons. Liberman argues that the U.S. NPT sanctions regime of the late 1970s compelled South Africa to launch a secret nuclear weapons program (p. 69). Evidence shows, how- ever, that Vorster had decided to developsuch a program in 1974, following a series of 14 technical successes; proof of sufªcient “homegrown” expertise; and consultations 15 with cabinet heads, the SADF chief, and the Atomic Energy Board (AEB) chief. By combining decisions related to nuclear power and nuclear weapons, Vorster ofªcially 16 redeªned the thrust of ongoing nuclear weapons research in South Africa. Vorster decided to keepthe nuclear program secret so as not to alienate the West and thereby jeopardize South Africa’s ability to obtain highly enriched uranium. Also, Vorster stopped relying on PNE justiªcations for South Africa’s nuclear program and moved toward developing a secret nuclear weapons program in the wake of (1) unex- pectedly vocal criticism by the United States and other supporters of India’s May 1974 17 “peaceful” nuclear test and (2) South Africa’s secret cooperation with Israel. Veriªcation Conference,” John G. Tower Center for Policy Studies, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, October 15, 1993, p. 5. 12. Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantle- ment,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 10 (December 1995/January 1996), pp. 4–7. 13. Kenneth Grundy,
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