A micro-history of an in-service teacher training programme in post-Revolutionary Libya
A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of PhD in the Faculty of Humanities
2018
Benedict C.M. Gray
School of Environment, Education and Development
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Declaration of Original Contribution
No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.
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Abstract
This PhD study focuses on the Libyan English Teacher Training Scheme (LETTS), a cascade-based in-service training programme for teachers of English launched in Libya in 2012 by the British Council and the Libyan Ministry of Education. This thesis examines the ideas and events that led to the decision to organise LETTS, how the programme was set up and managed, why – despite high expectations on both sides – it failed and what future education reform planners can learn from this experience.
The study adopts an approach which is not typically used in the field of TESOL (Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages). Data was mainly gathered using document collection, focus group and semi-structured interviews, and notes from the researcher’s diary. A historical methods approach was used to examine the data and produce a micro- history of LETTS. This was then analysed, together with further analysis of the collected data, and the main factors that influenced LETTS and contributed to its failure were organised into a set of key strands. These strands were then examined and interpreted, with the results used to produce a set of lessons learned from the LETTS experience.
The study found that mismatched expectations on both the British Council’s and the Libyan Ministry of Education’s part, along with the former’s attempt to impose a training model onto a system lacking the capacity to facilitate it, meant that LETTS suffered from a series of inherent weaknesses. These, combined with a number of wider influences, meant that the chances of LETTS succeeding in its initial format were slim. Furthermore, a failure by the programme organisers to comprehend that LETTS was on course to fail meant that a window of opportunity to fix the programme was missed. The study concludes by arguing that when organising education reform programmes, planners need to consider a number of issues, in particular partners’ perceptions of the reform and their required contributions, and the suitability of the initiative for the context in question. It also suggests that, if possible, planners conduct a feasibility study and/or pilot programme prior to launching the full reform.
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Table of Contents Abstract ...... 4
List of abbreviations used in the thesis ...... 9
Foreword ...... 11
PART 1: THE STUDY ...... 15
Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 16
Consideration of context ...... 18
Approaches to context in past education reform programmes ...... 25
Developing an approach to the study ...... 30
Micro-history: a possible way forward? ...... 39
What is micro-history?...... 40
Selection of micro-history as the way ahead ...... 47
A micro-historical approach versus a narrative approach ...... 49
Features and affordances of a micro-historical approach ...... 51
The research questions ...... 52
Chapter 2: A data collection approach for the study...... 54
Data collection approaches in previous micro-historical research ...... 54
Narrowing down my approach to data collection ...... 56
Individual and focus-group interviewing ...... 57
Use of focus groups in the study ...... 58
Change over time in the focus groups ...... 63
Overview of focus group interviews ...... 64
Use of informal conversations in the study ...... 66
Overview of use of informal conversations ...... 66
Use of individual interviews in the study ...... 67
Focus of interviews and use of data ...... 70
Overview of individual interviews ...... 72
Use of research diary in the study ...... 74
Overview of use of research diary ...... 76
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Collecting documents for the study ...... 77
Overview of documents collected ...... 78
Chapter 3: Stages in generating and analysing the micro-history ...... 79
Overview of the stages ...... 79
Stage 1: Producing the micro-history ...... 80
Stage 2: Analysing the micro-history ...... 83
Stage 3: Interpreting the strands ...... 85
Ensuring the study’s trustworthiness ...... 87
Use of news websites and British Council internal documents ...... 90
PART 2: THE MICRO-HISTORY OF LETTS ...... 94
Background to LETTS: a Sudanese success story ...... 95
High hopes and big visions ...... 97
A promising start ...... 101
A few initial complications: teething problems or long-term issues? ...... 104
The educator training course...... 108
The focus groups ...... 109
Post-training course developments ...... 113
The Approaches and Methodologies course ...... 114
A new year – same old expectations and assumptions ...... 120
Unfulfilled expectations and competing demands ...... 125
Scope for cautious optimism? ...... 127
The practical teacher training skills course ...... 129
Facing facts ...... 135
New realities ...... 137
Finally a breakthrough...... 138
Course preparations ...... 140
The teacher training courses ...... 144
Post-course developments ...... 149
A potentially bright future with a few dark clouds ...... 156
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Back to reality ...... 157
The second set of teacher training courses ...... 159
Post-course developments ...... 163
The breakthrough I had been looking for? ...... 164
In pursuit of answers ...... 169
Libya – going from bad to worse? ...... 172
Carrying on regardless ...... 173
A ray of hope for LETTS ...... 174
Slide to civil war? ...... 175
Keeping calm and carrying on ...... 178
Descent into chaos and departure ...... 179
Relocation to Tunisia ...... 180
PART 3: CONTRIBUTION ...... 181
Chapter 4: Looking back on LETTS: reflection and reassessment ...... 182
Strand One: A land of unparalleled opportunity ...... 182
Strand Two: My own professional agenda...... 185
Strand Three: Gaddafi’s legacy ...... 188
Strand Four: The failure to adjust ...... 192
Strand Five: The political-security situation ...... 196
Strand Six: The MoE’s view of teacher training ...... 201
Strand Seven: The MoE’s view of LETTS ...... 205
What the strands indicate ...... 207
Chapter 5: Lessons learned ...... 212
Lesson One: Understanding the wider local context ...... 212
Lesson Two: Understanding the local partner(s) ...... 218
Lesson Three: Clarifying expectations ...... 224
Lesson Four: Avoid imposing an ‘alien’ system ...... 227
Lesson Five: Develop a sense of ownership ...... 233
Lesson Six: Linking in with wider reform ...... 238
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Lesson Seven: Assess in advance whether the programme will work ...... 243
The lessons from LETTS and the notion of context ...... 246
Chapter 6: Where do we go from here? ...... 249
References ...... 252
Appendix 1: Timeline of key stages and events in LETTS and the study ...... 298
Appendix 2: Researcher’s / British Council ELT Manager’s main biographical details ... 303
Appendix 3: Ethical procedures adopted during the study ...... 304
Appendix 4: Example transcript of semi-structured interview ...... 309
Appendix 5: Example research diary entry ...... 319
Appendix 6: List of initial ideas regarding LETTS’ failure ...... 321
Appendix 7: Summary of the seven strands and the ideas informing each one ...... 326
Appendix 8: Timeline of key events in Libya prior to and during the micro-history ...... 330
Appendix 9: Memorandum of Understanding between British Council and Libyan Ministry of Education ...... 333
Appendix 10: Description of British Council's Trainer Development course ...... 338
Appendix 11: Description of British Council's English for Teaching course ...... 346
Word count: 102,789 words excluding references and appendices
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List of abbreviations used in the thesis
BC British Council CELTA Certificate in English Language Teaching to Adults CertTESOL Certificate in Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages DELTS Developing English Language Teaching Systems (an association for Libyan teachers of English established in 2012) DFID UK Department for International Development EDT Educational Development Trust ELT English language teaching EMI English as a medium of instruction EU European Union FCO UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office GCTED Libyan General Centre for Teacher Education and Development GNC Libyan General National Congress
GPCE Libyan General People’s Committee for Education ICELT In-service Certificate in English Language Teaching IATEFL International Association of Teachers of English as a Foreign Language KSTTP Khartoum State Teacher Training Programme L1 first language LETSS Libyan English Teaching in Secondary Schools LETTS Libyan English Teacher Training Scheme LETUP Libyan English Teaching at Universities Project MoD Ministry of Defence
MoE Ministry of Education MoHE Ministry of Higher Education MoU Memorandum of Understanding NARIC UK National Recognition Information Centre NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NBTVE Libyan National Board of Technical Vocational Education NCML Libyan National Centre for Modern Languages
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NTTP Sudanese National Teacher Training Programme OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PEELI Punjab Education and English Language Initiative PGCE Postgraduate Certificate in Education PKG Permantapan Kerja Guru (an Indonesian education reform project roughly translated as ‘Improvement of teachers’ performance’) PROSPER Project for Special Purpose English in Romania SA South Africa SCP student-centred pedagogy STEM science, technology, engineering and mathematics TESOL Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages TKT University of Cambridge Teaching Knowledge Test UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund US United States USAID United States Agency for International Development
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Foreword
In early 2017, I held the UK-based position of British Council (BC) Advisor for English and Exams, with one of my duties being to review the organisation’s current and recently completed teacher training reform programmes. The purpose was to examine how English language teaching (ELT) project teams throughout the BC’s global network were using internally produced teacher development products. Despite working for the BC for 20 years and being well informed regarding global developments in ELT and education in general, I was taken aback by the geographical spread, scale and variety of programmes that I came across. These included national in-service and pre-service training programmes in Burma, Japan, Malaysia and Thailand; blended-learning programmes in Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru; cascade programmes reaching thousands of teachers in India, Nepal and Pakistan; support programmes for teachers working with refugees in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey; and programmes to support qualification frameworks for teachers in Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan. Furthermore, when mentioning this to a senior colleague she reminded me that, in addition to teacher training, the BC manages programmes in curriculum reform, textbook development and testing and assessment, and increasingly works in more general education-related areas beyond English.
Furthermore, the BC is not unique. A glance at similar UK-based international educational assistance organisations’ websites reveals comparable large-scale initiatives, with some, such as the Educational Development Trust (formerly the Centre for British Teachers), emulating the BC by delivering programmes in a range of areas and contexts worldwide, and others such as Voluntary Service Overseas and Windle Trust focusing on specific regions and areas, with the former organising programmes in the developing world and the latter focusing on English language teaching projects in Africa.
This review taught me two things. First, at any one point in time there are a range of diverse education reform programmes being delivered across the globe, and second – despite growing numbers of international conferences, academic journals, and education and ELT newsletters – there remains a need for more disseminating and sharing of ideas and experiences by those organising educational reform activities. Indeed, the importance of this is shown by the fact that a number of programmes I examined were engaged in similar work and facing similar problems, yet were unaware of each other’s existence. In particular, I feel there needs to be more focus on programmes that fail to achieve or only partially achieve
11 their original objectives, as these are seldom widely reported on yet potentially offer important lessons that future planners can draw upon.
This PhD study can be seen as a step towards this. The Libyan English Teacher Training Scheme (LETTS) – the in-service teacher training programme the study will focus on – is typical of the type of ELT reform initiative that the BC aspires to in terms of aims, organisation and potential scale and impact. Set up by me in early 2012 in post- Revolutionary Libya in my capacity as the BC Libya ELT Manager, it was designed to rapidly establish a national system of in-service teacher training within Libya’s secondary school system and to be the first step in an education sector-wide ELT reform programme. Like many such programmes, it was based on an apparently effective model from another country – in this case the Sudanese National Teacher Training Programme (NTTP) that I had set up the previous year – was organised in response to requests from the relevant Ministry of Education and was based on the assumption that it would be largely client- funded. Furthermore, there were high expectations of the programme from the BC – both in Libya and in the organisation’s wider network – from the UK’s Libyan embassy and, so it appeared, from the Libyan Education Ministry. Indeed, this study’s original overall focus was to use the example of LETTS to show how large-scale ELT reform programmes could be made effective in developing countries.
Despite being launched with considerable fanfare and with apparent enthusiasm and support from Libya’s Education Ministry, by early 2013 it was clear that the programme was not working as intended, and there were a number of issues affecting it which I had not anticipated in the planning stage. However, because of the hopes and expectations LETTS had built up, because it was arguably the main focus of the BC’s English programme in Libya and because it was the focus of this PhD study, it took almost another year – during which LETTS achieved only a limited amount – before the decision was taken to suspend the programme, something that proved a personal humiliation for me and a major setback for the BC’s educational reform ambitions in Libya.
In such situations, there is a tendency for planners and programme managers to simply forget about the particular failure and to move on to the next programme, and this presents the risk of the same mistakes being repeated. With this in mind, I realised that what I called ‘the LETTS experience’ – particularly due to the programme’s initial ambitions and apparent potential, along with what it actually managed to achieve and its eventual collapse – offered a number of lessons for future programme planners, including myself, and could contribute to such professionals avoiding the mistakes I had made. I therefore reorientated my study to
12 an examination of the reasons for LETTS’ failure and a discussion of how the mistakes I had made could be avoided by programme planners in future. Furthermore, as well as focusing on the overt reasons for the programme’s failure, which are already well documented in ELT research, and include trying to replicate a successful programme from one context in a different one and the failure of Libya’s Ministry of Education to actively support LETTS, I also realised that there were other wider social, cultural and historical issues which had affected the programme and deserved consideration, particularly around the legacy of the country’s 40-year Gaddafi dictatorship, as well as certain assumptions about Libya’s post- Revolutionary development held by both the BC and the wider UK government. Such wider issues are often overlooked by professionals when planning education reform programmes, and therefore I felt that the study gave the opportunity to highlight and raise planners’ awareness of these.
To achieve this contribution to the development of future education reform programmes, the PhD study adopts an approach not typically used in the field of TESOL (Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages). This approach can be sub-divided into two parts. First, in writing the thesis I provide a narrative account of the journey I went through in producing the PhD, showing the reader how the study evolved over time, the decisions I took regarding research methodology and the processes I went through in analysing and interpreting the data and formulating the study’s findings. Second, and in connection with this, to tell the reader the story of LETTS and to produce an account of the programme that could be used to inform the research, I opted – following an extensive literature review – to write a micro- history of the programme. A description of this process is provided in the first part of the thesis, along with details of the research questions that were produced to guide the study and the approaches the study adopted to collecting and analysing the data. This is followed by the micro-history itself, which forms the second part of the thesis. In writing this I provide an account of the events that took place regarding the organisation of LETTS, interspersed with details of wider events in Libya. This is intended to aid the reader’s contextualisation of what can be best described as ‘the LETTS experience’.
The thesis’ third and final part draws upon the micro-history and further analysis of the data to identify and discuss the main reasons for LETTS’ failure and considers how a different approach may have resulted in a more successful and sustainable programme. This part then presents the key lessons learned from the LETTS experience and, by drawing both upon this experience and upon the wider literature, discusses how programme planners can apply these lessons to ensure their own programmes do not suffer a similar fate. I then conclude by discussing how the main protagonists involved in the LETTS experience – the
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British Council, the Libyan Ministry of Education and the researcher – can move ahead following this experience and the outcomes of this study.
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PART 1: THE STUDY
This part of the thesis introduces the study. It describes its origins as a study of the developmental processes trainee teacher educators went through on the Libyan English Teacher Training Scheme (LETTS) – a national in-service teacher training programme in post-Revolutionary Libya – and its subsequent transformation into a historical account of the programme. It then details how the study was contextualised through a review of studies of educational reform programmes, leading to the selection of a micro-historical approach as the most appropriate way of producing this account. This part also describes the data collection approaches used in the study and how the data was analysed mainly by employing a historical methods approach. The section concludes by outlining the research questions that were developed to guide the production of the micro-history and to examine the LETTS experience and the strands and lessons that emerged from this. For a timeline of the key stages and events in this study, see Appendix 1.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
When launching this study in early 2012, my original intent was far removed from how its actual focus has turned out. I had been appointed English Language Teaching (ELT) Manager for the British Council (BC) in Libya and had recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the new post-Revolutionary Ministry of Education (MoE) regarding the delivery of a series of programmes to improve the standard of English teaching in secondary schools. Central to this was a large teacher training programme aimed at developing a cadre of MoE teacher educators who would then deliver training to teachers in Tripoli and, at a later stage, in other towns and cities in Libya. My intention was to examine the developmental processes these educators underwent during their initial training and then when they started delivering training, as well as the support they required and the contribution they made to the classroom practices and professional development of the teachers they trained. The results of the study would then assist the BC and MoE with further developing the programme in order for it to be rolled out to other cities. The results would also be made available to BC offices in other countries to assist them in organising teacher development programmes in similar contexts.
The programme was entitled LETTS (Libyan English Teacher Training Scheme). Expectations were high both on the UK side and – so I assumed – on the Libyan side, and it was widely reported both within the BC and externally in publications such as the English Language Gazette (Humphries, 2012). Better school education had been one of Libya’s 2011 revolutionaries’ key demands, and the new government had quickly stated its intention to act upon this by delivering a large-scale sector-wide reform programme with English – largely neglected by the previous Gaddafi government – identified as a priority subject area. At the same time, as articles by Assed (2012) and Kreiba (2012) reveal, many students and their parents, viewing English language skills as key to obtaining an overseas scholarship and/or a good career, were also demanding improved provision of ELT at all levels in the education system. Indeed, the above-mentioned MoU had been signed in response to specific approaches from the Libyan government to the UK embassy and the BC for assistance with English, with Dr Sulieman Khoja, the then Deputy Minister for Education, in a meeting with the Education Programmes Director reportedly describing the BC as the ministry’s ‘natural partner’ in its ambitions to improve ELT.
LETTS itself was based upon what is commonly described by writers such as Borovikova (2010), Gilpin (1997) and Wedell (2005) as a cascade approach to teacher training. As these
16 writers explain, this typically involves so-called ‘master trainers’, often from overseas, training up cadres of local teacher trainers in developing countries via short intensive courses. These newly qualified teacher trainers are then expected to train other teachers, usually in their schools or institutes. The plan for LETTS, outlined in the BC–MoE MoU, was as follows: the BC would deploy a small team of international trainers to train up 20 teacher trainers, who would then become official MoE teacher educators and be engaged by the ministry to train secondary school teachers in Tripoli. The MoE would be responsible for selecting the potential future educators, for officially appointing them after their training and paying them a salary, and then for organising their training with the relevant teachers. The BC would provide support to the educators through training session observations, one-to- one mentoring and follow-up workshops, as well as providing the MoE with the materials for the training programmes the educators delivered. Once the training programme had been established in Tripoli and was judged to be working effectively, the BC and MoE would immediately begin extending it to other parts of Libya – in particular to Benghazi and the east of the country.
As writers such as Gray (2011), Hayes (2000) and Dichaba and Mokhele (2012) explain, cascade programmes are often believed to be ineffectual in establishing effective teacher training systems. This is partly because the local teacher trainers often fuse the approaches and techniques they are supposed to be training teachers to adopt with their own existing beliefs about teaching, resulting in training markedly different from that envisaged by the cascade planners. This is sometimes referred to as the ‘dilution’ effect (Hayes: p.137). One particular issue regarding this – as I experienced at first hand in a 2010 cascade programme in Sudan’s university sector (Gray, 2011) – is that trainers sometimes deliver training using the same deductive teacher-centred approaches they are supposed to be moving teachers away from, thereby actually reinforcing them. Another more important issue, which Bax (2002) discusses and exemplifies, is that cascade programmes often struggle to achieve sustainability because the relevant bodies and/or individuals responsible for organising them – such as ministries of education, teacher training institutes, schools, universities and/or the trainers themselves – lack the capacity to manage them effectively on a long-term basis, particularly once the relevant international assistance organisation’s support has come to an end.
However, in the case of LETTS I was genuinely optimistic regarding the programme’s potential to achieve its aims. Following a study of a number of both successful and unsuccessful cascade programmes, I had produced a set of criteria for the delivery of effective programmes which I had then applied in my previous position as BC English
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Language Advisor in Sudan when establishing the Khartoum State Teacher Training Programme (KSTTP), which at the time of my arrival in Libya was in the process of becoming a national programme entitled the Sudan National Teacher Training Programme (British Council, 2012). Furthermore, the BC had a proven track record of delivering ELT projects in Libya. These included LETUP (Libyan English Teaching at Universities Project), a nationwide capacity-building project for the university sector (Underhill, 2014), and a large teaching project for the Ministry of Health, both of which had been Libyan-funded and both of which were in the process of being restarted.
In 2013, however, I realised that LETTS was not proceeding as planned. The limited programme activity that had taken place had come to a complete stop and it had become evident that the MoE was either uninterested in trying to continue the programme or not in a position to. This led to a decision by the BC Country Director and myself to put LETTS on hold indefinitely. This placed me in a challenging position, as I had already carried out a substantialamount of work on gathering and analysing data, on writing up the initial parts of the study and on keeping my research diary relatively up to date. However, this research was not complete and I still needed more data, particularly with regard to examining the extent to which the programme was contributing to classroom-level change. Unfortunately, it was now unlikely that I would receive the opportunity to complete the required data- gathering in the near future and so I began examining options for reorientating the study. My objectives in this exercise were to find a way of moving forward which would make use of the data I had gathered in pursuing the originally envisaged study (see Part 2: The micro-history of LETTS for more information) and enable me to draw upon the experiences I had had in trying to organise LETTS, while at the same time working on a research project I could be confident of completing.
Consideration of context
From the beginning, I felt that it was important to consider the issue of context as I was unsure that this had been considered sufficiently when setting up LETTS – especially as it was essentially an attempt to replicate a programme in Sudan – and generally I was unsure that I had examined this issue sufficiently in my work over the years. Therefore, when reorientating the study, I decided to make a start by examining and reviewing a selection of literature on the role of context in educational reform programmes and in particular which aspects programme planners need to consider when organising initiatives such as LETTS.
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A paper traditionally referred to regarding the importance of context in organising educational reform programmes is Holliday’s 1992 study Tissue rejection and informal orders in ELT projects: collecting the right information. This introduces the concept of ‘tissue rejection’, a term taken from medicine, but one which Holliday feels is equally applicable to education reform projects, particularly those delivered in overseas contexts by external organisations like the British Council and/or imposed upon an institution or education system by the relevant authorities. Holliday argues that because project planners usually fail to understand the realities of the context – something he refers to throughout his paper as the ‘informal orders’ – the reforms are ‘rejected’ by the context, regardless of whether it is a single university, a network of institutes or an entire education system. This leads to the reform either not being implemented or initially being implemented but not becoming embedded in the relevant system and failing to achieve its intended results.
Holliday (1992) draws on Swales (1980) and Kennedy (1987), as well as his own experiences of organising a national project to reform teaching practices in Egyptian university faculties of education, to argue that planners often fail to understand the local context in a number of ways. First, as detailed in Swales’ account of the establishment of a specialist teaching unit at the University of Khartoum, planners attempt to import reforms based on foreign – usually western – models. These models may be different from practices already established in the context, and the reforms are consequently rejected by the teachers and students they are targeting. Similarly, in Kennedy’s example of the introduction of a new English curriculum in Tunisia, the relevant implementers – usually the teachers – pay lip service to the new reform while continuing to follow their existing practices. Second, planners often rely on official information from the relevant educational authorities, and this information may differ from the realities of the educational system on the ground. Holliday illustrates this using several examples, including that of Coleman’s (1988) experience in an Indonesian university, in which the books on the official reading lists of the university’s English programme were never accessed by either the teachers or the students, as they were too difficult.
Third, Holliday (1992) suggests that it is often challenging for planners to understand the ‘informal orders’ of an educational context, particularly if they are from organisations such as the BC and have limited experience of working in similar contexts. Local partners are often reluctant to reveal situations which the relevant planners may view as being substandard and may also want to provide the information that they feel the planners are looking for in order to create a favourable impression. Partners may also be wary of contradicting what planners have been told by higher-level authorities – a situation I faced myself when
19 managing an ELT reform project within the Ukrainian military education system (Gray, 2009) in which heads of English departments could be made accountable and disciplined if it was discovered that they were not following the officially prescribed teaching programmes. Holliday also argues that the information on the realities of the situation may not be available in documented format and it may be considered inappropriate for local personnel to provide this. I would also add, once again drawing upon my Ukraine experience and Lamb’s (1995) experience of trying to introduce communicative language teaching into schools in Indonesia, that often individuals such as heads of department and teachers are unaware that current practices are different from the ones they are supposed to be following officially. For example, in both the above-mentioned cases the partners believed they were using communicative learner-based approaches to teach English, whereas in reality the language was largely still being taught using the deductive teacher-centred approaches the reforms were intended to move teachers away from.
Another issue Holliday (1992) raises, by drawing upon studies by Coleman (1988) and Douglas (1977), is that as almost all academic systems share the same general ideas in terms of aims and principles, and that in many cases – particularly in those of former European colonies – features of Western education systems have been imported and transposed on local systems, planners from organisations like the BC often assume familiarity with the systems they are engaging with. However, in reality there are deeper informal elements – usually the result of social, cultural and/or historical influences – which result in actual systems and practices which are alien to these planners. Holliday exemplifies this by drawing upon Morfit (1980), who explains how planners in Indonesia belatedly discovered that their idea of educational research differed considerably from that of their local partners. Similar misconceptions can be found in Kroeker’s (2009) study of the introduction of compulsory English conversation classes in South Korean universities, in which teachers’ and students’ ideas about what constituted conversational English differed from those of the policy makers. They can also be found in Watkins’ 2006 article on how, in the initial stages of the Peacekeeping English Project in Ukraine, the BC discovered that the system of professional development training the Ukrainian Defence Ministry claimed was in place for the teachers of English working in its military training institutes involved attending lectures given by senior staff members – usually in Russian or Ukrainian – and watching so- called ‘open lessons’, in which the main objective was to criticise the teacher delivering the lesson – approaches which differed markedly from those that the BC project team had in mind.
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There are numerous examples within studies of both ELT and general education reform programmes in which a failure by planners to understand and engage with the local context has led to these initiatives failing to achieve their objectives. Such examples include the BC’s higher education ELT reform project in Albania – part of a wave of such projects in 1990s former Communist countries (see Enyedi and Medgyes, 1998) which Dushku (1998) provides a critical evaluation of. Based on the assumption that all former Eastern bloc countries’ ELT reform needs were similar, the project was largely pre-designed and made little attempt to understand existing teaching practices on the basis that they were ‘outdated and needed to be discarded’ (Dushku: p.380). Indeed, Dushku claims that no effort was made to examine Albania’s complex higher education system or the wider social– educational culture, and there was limited constructive engagement with teachers and other local partners. This led to the project managing to achieve only a limited amount of reform within the English departments of two universities as opposed to the national large-scale reform programme initially envisaged by the BC planners. Similarly Bax (2002), reporting on a BC teacher educator training programme designed to improve ELT in rural South African secondary schools, argues that the initiative failed to achieve its goal of training up large numbers of teachers as it failed to take into account the social–cultural contexts that the educators had to operate in. For example, there was little focus on establishing the educators’ credibility with local stakeholders, such as school head teachers whose support was vital for training to take place, or on helping the educators develop strategies to work with teachers who would essentially view them as their peers.
As Holliday (1992) implies, it is not exclusively external planners that are guilty of introducing reform programmes without due consideration of the relevant socio-educational context. Organisations such as the BC are invariably working with national governments and education ministries when putting in place such reforms and, although usually regarded by their national partners as being the experts, are often acting upon the instructions of these partners. For example, Simpson (2012) details the Rwandan government’s 2009 decision to launch the Rwandan English in Action Programme, which the BC co-delivered with the country’s education ministry and which was designed to introduce English as a medium of instruction (EMI) into the education system. The government overlooked issues, including resistance from local stakeholders such as administrators and head teachers – who it failed to engage with – along with teachers’ and students’ low English levels, their lack of exposure to the language and shortages of textbooks and other teaching resources, and as a result had to reverse the policy two years later. Similar situations are described in Patel’s (2012) paper, ‘The ETeMS project: English for Teaching of Mathematics and Science’, in which the Malaysian government introduced English as the medium of instruction for the teaching of
21 mathematics and science in schools, and by Nusrat (2015) in a paper detailing how the education ministry for Pakistan’s Punjab province introduced EMI into primary education. In both cases, these policies were launched with little regard for the relevant contexts and in the face of challenges including teachers’ low English levels, lack of teacher training systems to support the intended changes, resistance from grassroots stakeholders and the inability of the existing systems of teaching and learning to incorporate the changes, the policies were largely abandoned.
Indeed Hayes (2012) argues that national governments, viewing the improvement of ELT in their education systems as being vital to future economic development, often ignore their relevant local educational contexts and attempt to replicate English language teaching systems from other countries, where most students complete the school system with high levels of English language competency. Hayes points to Finland, ranked as having one of the world’s best education systems and, as a result, receiving over 100 delegations from other countries in 2009 – each one keen to repeat the Finns’ achievements in their own systems. He then proceeds to explain that despite the work of writers such as Holliday (1992) and Coleman (1988), there remains a naïve conviction among many policy makers – and indeed planners from organisations like the BC – that ‘policies and practices designed in one context can be unproblematically transported elsewhere’, (Hayes: p.50) and draws upon examples from Papua New Guinea (Alone, 2011) and China in which such practices have failed to achieve the envisaged outcomes.
Hayes (2012) argues that Finland’s success in developing its education system lies in its wider socio-cultural and historical context, including factors such as society’s attitudes towards education and learning, the socio-cultural role of school and education in students’ lives and a tradition of parental involvement in education, and these are elements that cannot be transposed. However, he acknowledges that it is important that countries work on reforming their education systems to support economic and technological development, and accepts that there are examples of good practice that planners can draw upon from successful education systems.
Hayes (2012) suggests that planners, when formulating reforms, examine their own education systems and ensure that they are able to identify and predict the effects of the reform in the wider context, beyond its immediate scope. Drawing upon examples from Vietnam and Thailand, in which communicative approaches to ELT have been introduced, he advises planners to look at issues such as how existing systems of pre-service and in- service training will support the initiative, how it will affect other subjects which continue to be
22 taught using traditional methods and – most importantly – whether there will be any mismatches between the new approach and any high-stakes national examinations which are often based on rote learning and repetition and are viewed by teachers, students, parents and head teachers as being the priority. Hayes concludes by arguing that to ensure that innovative reforms achieve their objectives, planners need to design them around the relevant wider contextual constraints and also to ensure that stakeholders at grassroots level, particularly the teachers, are consulted on the reform – and have their views taken into account – and are properly supported in terms of resources, guidance and training.
As writers including Bolitho (2012) and Murray and Christison (2012) explain, a thorough understanding of the context is key to ensuring that any large-scale educational reform initiative has a good chance of achieving its objectives, particularly one which involves changing approaches to teaching and learning. However, as mentioned earlier in this section, discovering the relevant context’s realities can be a challenge, particularly for planners from external organisations such as the BC, and it is not certain that more formal approaches to this, which Bolitho suggests, will yield the required information. With this in mind, Holliday (1992) suggests conducting an exercise he refers to as a ‘means analysis’ (p.411), which involves a process of examining the socio-cultural, historical, political and pedagogical features of the educational context when both designing and implementing the initiative. The data-gathering approach he suggests is largely informal and relies upon observing and talking to teachers, students and other stakeholders, along with adjusting the reform’s design and delivery to incorporate the contextual limitations, collaboratively involving the relevant local stakeholders and also ensuring that the reform’s ambitions are achievable and meet the context’s genuine teaching and learning needs.
Andrews (1984) – who is cited by Holliday – provides an example of how he was able to pursue this type of investigation to understand the informal orders at Khartoum Polytechnic and to then introduce innovative approaches to teaching English for Specific Purposes (ESP). Officially informed that English was the medium of instruction at university level in Sudan and tasked with introducing student-centred techniques into the polytechnic’s ESP curriculum, he faced resistance from students and his local co-teachers. Consequently, after spending time building trust with these individuals, informally observing typical teaching and learning practices and generally taking time to understand the context – a process he acknowledges required patience and time – Andrews discovered that in reality Arabic was being increasingly used as the language of instruction in most subjects and therefore students’ English levels were lower than officially assumed. Moreover, students’ previous learning experience had largely been lecture-based, and so expecting them to quickly adapt
23 to new teaching approaches was naïve. Therefore, Andrews initially adopted a lecture-based approach himself and gradually introduced more student-centred approaches over time, yet ensured that these remained within the relevant contextual constraints. Andrews concludes his study by arguing that often national education policies developed by governments are overtaken by less formal events on the ground – in this case the replacement of English by Arabic as the language of instruction – and argues that for any reform programme there needs to be a degree of micro-level planning, although he acknowledges that this can be a challenge in countries with centralised systems of government such as Sudan.
Markee (1986) describes an almost identical situation also at Khartoum Polytechnic in which – on the English courses she was delivering – she enabled students to use a mixture of Arabic and English in the lessons, as this was what they considered normal and were used to. Indeed, she proceeds to caution planners in such situations against automatically assuming that the existing approaches used to teach students are deficient and that the students will benefit more from the new approaches planners have in mind. Kiely (2012), drawing upon Holliday (1992) and Bolitho (2005), makes a similar point on a wider level by arguing that while an external organisation like the BC may see an education system as being defective, the system itself – working through Holliday’s ‘informal orders’ – in reality has a degree of stability and is able to meet the educational expectations and needs of its teachers, students and other stakeholders.
Kumaravadivelu (2001) builds upon this by arguing that it is important to look beyond the reform’s participants’ educational experiences and at their wider social, political and economic context, as this can have an effect on how changes in teaching practices are interpreted and implemented. The writer proceeds to provide an example from Sri Lanka of how Tamil students resisted the contents of their English textbooks due to these being based around Western culture and use of the language, and how the students themselves took steps to reframe and rewrite a lot of the content to meet their own needs, aspirations and values. Kumaravadivelu proceeds to provide similar examples from the Occupied Palestinian Territories and South Africa, before arguing that reforms cannot meet teachers’ and students’ educational needs and expectations without meeting their wider socio-cultural ones.
Kumaravadivelu (2001) along with Holliday (1992), Kiely (2012) and Tomlinson (1990) – the latter writing about his experiences of setting up and running a teacher development project in Indonesia – argue strongly that any educational reform must be designed to fit within the context’s education and wider socio-cultural features and constraints, and that changes to
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approaches to teaching and learning must be achievable and viewed as an organic process. Furthermore, Tomlinson, along with Hayes (1995), Simpson (2012) and Scholey (2012), argues that it is critical that the context’s relevant local stakeholders, particularly teachers, are involved in planning and organising the reform, as resistance from them and/or their misinterpretations of the nature of the reform are the main reasons such initiatives fail. However, simply expecting teachers to actively engage and contribute and commit to the reform – even if it has been designed with the ‘informal orders’ in mind – can be naïve. Sansom (2017), writing about his experience in introducing new teaching practices in China, cautions against expecting teachers to speak with one voice, and argues that while many may embrace the reform, others will be less enthusiastic, and argues that it is crucial planners work with teachers on understanding how the reform will work in their specific classrooms contexts.
Tomlinson (1990), however, warns against seeing the context’s main local stakeholders exclusively in terms of head teachers, teachers and students. In the case of his project, there was opposition from local educational administrators who did not understand the programme and felt that it was deviating students away from the norms of Indonesia’s traditional school values and culture, and permeating these norms with Western influence – a view shared by many Indonesian academics, particularly those involved in writing the school English curriculum and setting the national examinations. Furthermore, Palmer (2012), in his report on a BC ELT reform project in Brazil, describes how the BC faced local opposition – including from some of its partners – due to concerns over foreign interference in the country’s education system. Tomlinson (1990) suggests dealing with opposition from such stakeholders through public relations exercises and through taking the time to explain to them about the reform’s purpose and to gain their input and support. He also advises ensuring it is clearly communicated that the reform is supported at a national level and part of the official state education policy.
Approaches to context in past education reform programmes
Holliday (1992) and Tomlinson (1990) were both writing over 20 years ago, and indeed a number of the papers examined in the above-mentioned review – Hayes (1995), Kumaravadivelu (2001) and Bax (2002) – were produced in the 1990s and early 2000s. Therefore, it would be pertinent to assume that these studies’ lessons had been learned, and most modern ELT and more general educational reform programmes have been designed
25 with the relevant educational and wider socio-cultural contexts in mind. A brief review of studies of such programmes, however, presents a more mixed picture.
Tribble (2009), in a review of BC ELT programmes, describes three recent initiatives: a military English reform project with the Sri Lankan armed forces, and in-service teacher training reform programmes in Vietnam and Azerbaijan. The in-service programmes both saw initial implementation phases that achieved their objectives and positively engaged with their target audiences of teachers and other stakeholders. However, neither achieved their long-term aims of establishing sustainable training systems, as planners failed to consider the target education systems’ lack of appropriate frameworks to support ongoing training or its shortages of the required resources. Tribble suggests that the Sri Lankan project – which was part of a wider project to support the development of Tamil language skills within the country’s armed forces – had fared better, and praises the BC project team for applying cultural awareness and sensitivity in setting up and organising the project, in engaging from the outset with a suitable local partner and in ensuring the systems established were sustainable. As a result, Tribble states that ‘there was positive impact in the areas of methodology, resource upgrade, and the management of educational processes, as well as in learning outcomes for students’ (p.21) .
Crossey (2012), reporting on the BC’s Peacekeeping English Projects in former Communist bloc countries in the late 1990s and 2000s, argues that key to most projects establishing sustainable systems of ELT within their respective militaries was the fact that they ran for lengthy periods and were managed by long-serving staff members who understood the contexts and fully engaged with local partners. For example, the Peacekeeping English Project Ukraine, which I managed in 2006–09 (Gray, 2009) ran for a total of nine years, was based within Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence, was delivered in partnership with the ministry’s military training department and invested time and resources in engaging with teachers and other stakeholders in the country’s network of military institutes. A better-documented success story is the BC’s introduction of a blended-learning ELT programme in the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Whittaker, 2012), which adopted what the writer refers to as ‘an iterative approach’ (p.137). Recognising that this was a new approach to ELT within the relevant military training system, it was introduced over a three-year period, with the goal being the introduction of a sustainable system that was suitable for the context, met the military’s training needs and could be managed by the armed forces’ training department. Local stakeholders – particularly teachers and officer instructors – were fully involved, and feedback from the end users was sought, constraints recognised and accommodated, and the programme implemented via a process of trial and error, with the initial programme
26 model going through several redesigns. For example, the initial digital learning platform was an expensive commercially produced software application, and recognising that the armed forces would be unable to continue paying its licence fee, this was switched to an open source option. Echoing Crossey’s (2012) comments, Whittaker stresses that one of the main reasons this programme achieved its objectives was the time period at the project team’s disposal, which could explain why later Peacekeeping English Projects in countries like Colombia and Vietnam, which were closed early (Lotbinière, 2009), failed to put in place sustainable systems of ELT within their respective militaries.
Other examples of projects which have been reportedly successful due to careful consideration of contextual factors include the BC’s (Walter, 2012) project to design and introduce new sets of ELT coursebooks in Russia’s primary and secondary school sectors, which was part of a wider set of ELT reforms in the country in the 2000s. Designed and implemented by a UK–Russian project team working across the country with a range of stakeholders, including students and parents, the materials were produced by writers familiar with both Russia’s classroom and its wider socio-cultural contexts regarding ELT, and there was extensive piloting and redesigning. Despite the sharp deterioration in UK–Russian relations in the mid to late 2000s, the project survived and a study by Walter (2012) found that the books had been embedded into the country’s primary school and secondary school English curriculums. In a different example, Leather (2012) reports on a BC project to develop training courses to support newly qualified teachers of English in Azerbaijan when they started teaching. Through working with the local teachers’ association, Leather ensured that the courses’ aims were achievable, the activities suitable for the context and that they met teachers’ genuine needs, particularly around limited resources, classroom management and lack of confidence. Leather reports that the initiative achieved its aim of putting in place a sustainable system for supporting new teachers. However, although the local teachers’ association continued delivering the courses in the capital, Baku, due to limited funding the BC’s original ambition to reach new teachers across the entire country was never realised.
Unfortunately, not all modern ELT reform programmes spend time examining contextual factors and incorporating them into their aims and design as the ones outlined above managed to do, and as a result they have rarely achieved their intended objectives. For example, an in-service teacher development programme described by Hayes (2012) in the late 2000s in South Korea failed partly due to policy makers and administrators making assumptions about teachers’ training needs without engaging with the teachers themselves and gaining their perspectives on their classroom situations, and partly by failing to understand that due to socio-cultural norms teachers in Korea work on a largely solitary
27 basis – something that ran counter to the sort of collaborative professional development practice that was required for the reform to take place. In another example, a BC cascade teacher training programme in Syria (Law, 2011) failed to achieve its long-term objective, despite having the support of Syria’s Ministry of Education, because there was no real understanding on either the ministry’s or the BC’s part regarding how the training would be realised on the ground and how it would be supported by a system that lacked the required resources and support mechanisms. For instance, many of the ministry’s local supervisors responsible for cascading the training were not actually education professionals and lacked the knowledge and skills to take up the role of teacher trainers. Interestingly, Law, who managed the programme, was aware of the importance of understanding the local context and admits that the BC was ‘training blind’ (p.20), but claims that it was impossible for the BC to get the required information through school visits and classroom observations. This was due to Syrian suspicions of Western interference, especially as the programme was supported by the US – something planners could have possibly anticipated prior to the programme’s launch.
In a further example, Waters and Vilches (2008), in a study of the introduction of the Basic Education Curriculum in the Philippines – intended by policy makers to encourage collaborative teaching and learning in the classroom – suggest that a failure by planners to understand and factor in contextual constraints such as class sizes, limited resources and poorly trained teachers, along with the influences of the country’s social–cultural norms regarding teaching and learning, led to the curriculum being delivered using the traditional teacher-centred approaches it was intended to reform. Interestingly, the writers proceed to argue that though poorly organised state systems, financial constraints and lack of contextual awareness among the relevant planners are often cited as the main reasons for education reform failure in developing countries like the Philippines, similar situations can arise in developed countries. Waters and Vilches (2008) draw upon Ingvarson, Meiers and Beavis’ (2005) report on Australian teacher development programmes and Carless’ (1999) study of the introduction of a new curriculum in Hong Kong to provide examples of reform programmes in more developed countries that have failed to achieve their aims due to the mismanagement of resources, partly, Waters and Vilches imply, as a result of limited contextual awareness among the planners. A comparable example is also detailed earlier in this section, where I reviewed Hayes’ (2012) study of the failure of a teacher development programme in South Korea.
In sum, in my experience of working on BC ELT projects since 2004 (see Appendix 2 for my full biography) the importance of context in education reform programmes is better
28 understood nowadays than it was 20-30 years ago. This is especially the case for ascertaining a reform’s appropriateness and feasibility, along with the likelihood of it achieving long-term impact and sustainability. The idea that a reform initiative based on a seemingly successful western model can simply be transplanted into a context – particularly a non-western one - is largely redundant. Nowadays, reforms are usually informed by scoping studies, planned with the specific context in mind and receive input and data from local partners. However, there is also more awareness of the possibility that information and figures local partners provide are not always reliable and, in countries where I have worked, the BC’s approach has often been to gather information from several sources and then to triangulate this in order to gain an understanding of contextual realities. Reforms now tend to be delivered in partnership with the relevant local education bodies, and there is a recognition of the importance of groups like local education officials, head teachers, school inspectors, ministers and other senior education leaders. Furthermore, most reforms understand the importance of appreciating the limitations of teachers’ classroom contexts, as well as how teachers’ perceptions of ideas, such as professional development training and communicative language teaching, may differ from those of the planners.
However, there remains a tendency for planners to assume that successful reforms in one country can be replicated in another, with only minor adaptation. In my experience, this is particularly the case if both countries are located in the North African Maghreb and the Middle Eastern Levant. There also remains a tendency for the scoping studies and other data gathering activities to be undertaken by UK experts on a ‘jet in jet out’ basis. Thus, they may not be very familiar with the particular context, and they may, therefore, draw on their own experiences and perceived examples of successful practice from elsewhere when writing their reports. Furthermore, it is questionable whether planners always have sufficient opportunities to build up the type of contextual awareness recommended by writers such as Holliday (1992), or to adopt the sort of long term approaches that made the abovementioned Peacekeeping English Projects so successful. Planners are typically UK nationals based in country on 2-3 year postings, generally working in BC offices – which are often a lot different than the working environments of the relevant partners - and they are under pressure to start delivering. Often planners have never visited the relevant country before, and they arrive with their own preconceived ideas about state of the educational system and what sort of reform programmes they should be delivering. Indeed, the BC continues to approach most potential reform programmes with the underlying assumption that existing systems are defective, and that the BC has the expertise to judge what sort of reform is required.
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Developing an approach to the study
Particularly following my review of papers by writers such as Holliday (1992) on the importance of context and the reports on successful and less successful ELT reform programmes, I believed that a key reason for LETTS’ limited success was because it was an attempt to replicate a cascade teacher training programme from Sudan without sufficient consideration of Libya’s relevant contextual factors. Moreover, I also strongly suspected that within the BC’s global network, LETTS was not an isolated instance of this type of replication, and also that most programmes that were based on such replications met similar fates to LETTS. Indeed, I found myself agreeing with Blackie (2014) when he accuses the BC of regularly adopting a ‘one size fits all’ approach when it comes to educational reform initiatives.
As most of the reports I had consulted in the previous section, such as Law (2011) and Walter (2012), had adopted an approach that could be described as historical by providing an account of the origins of the relevant reform initiative and its development, including its accomplishments, the challenges it faced and the extent to which it achieved its original objectives, I felt that adopting a similar approach with my study would be an appropriate way forward. I decided, therefore, to produce a historical account of LETTS which would provide a narrative describing the background to its organisation and launch, the stages in its delivery, its main highlights and its eventual failure. In addition to this, it would examine the more general events taking place in Libya at the same time as the programme, as the country tried to move forward following a national revolution which had been preceded by a military dictatorship and years of political and economic stagnation, and would try to draw links between these events and the varying fortunes of LETTS, as well as looking more generically at the influence wider political, cultural and social factors had on the programme. This would provide me with the opportunity to reflect on the reasons for LETTS limited achievements, particularly around the issue of contextual considerations, and to consider how things could have been done differently.
Having decided to produce a historical account of LETTS, I felt that the most appropriate thing for me to do first was to conduct a review of studies of educational reform programmes in developing countries that could be viewed as adopting, to an extent, this type of approach. This would enable me to examine how the writers had approached these studies and to use their ideas to contextualise my own study and provide guidance on the options I had for moving forward. Moreover, learning more about the organisation and results of other reform programmes, and the themes emerging from these, would, I believed, inform my reflections
30 on LETTS and my analysis of the reasons for its failure, and would therefore contribute to the discussion of the strands and the lessons learned in the final part of the thesis. Furthermore, because I had largely focused on ELT-related programmes in my earlier discussion of the importance of context in education reform (see pp.17–27), for this next exercise I decided to widen my focus by also examining accounts of general educational reform programmes.
One of the first studies I examined was Paine and Fang’s (2006) paper on attempts by the Chinese government from the 1990s onwards to reform teaching practices in schools via a series of national in-service training programmes. This proved interesting for two reasons. Firstly, the classroom situation the Chinese were trying to reform was comparable to ones which I experienced while working as a teacher of English in the former Soviet Union in the early nineties – namely one which was predominantly teacher-based and focused on students rote-learning large amounts of prescribed information. Secondly, although larger, longer-term and focusing on all subjects as opposed to ELT, the programmes had similar aims and approaches to those I had organised in Libya and Sudan – namely to introduce student-centred, skills-based teaching approaches into schools through training and developing practising teachers.
The study itself provides an account of in-service training initiatives launched by the Chinese government within the framework of a wider ongoing process of educational reform, before briefly looking at one particular training project in Shanghai. For professionals engaged in educational reform projects, such as myself, it gives an idea of what sort of programmes are possible in terms of scale and ambition when managed and properly funded by strong, stable national governments, as opposed to being funded by donors and/or organised by international assistance organisations like the BC. For example, the paper describes a television-based system for training teachers in rural areas, which involved the setting up of a satellite TV system linking up 10,000 schools. However, because of the scale and the time period covered, the study was unable to give any real impression of how successful such programmes were and what they achieved at classroom level – the description of the Shanghai-based project is added almost as an afterthought. For example, the study mentions a 2003 cascade-based project involving the training of 10,000 teacher educators, but provides no details of how effective this was, and at the end of the paper the reader remains uninformed regarding how effective the various training initiatives had actually been.
Salitra (2003) provides a comparable account of the development of teacher education in Poland following the collapse of communism which, like the above-mentioned Chinese
31 programme, was part of a series of wider reforms to improve school education standards. Because the writer devotes the initial part of the paper to setting the context, because she adopts a more chronological approach than Paine and Fang (2006) and because – as I had worked on education projects in the former Soviet Union in the 2004–2009 period – I had experience of similar issues and challenges to the ones she mentions, I found this study straightforward to follow. However, although the writer details the measures undertaken to reform teacher education at both pre- and in-service level, including the establishment of a National Teacher Training Council and the setting up of networks of local and regional in- service training centres, and concludes that further reform is still needed, as with the previous study, no information is provided on whether the measures described contributed to any sort of change at classroom level.
Similar narratives are produced by several other writers, including Sayed (2004), who provides a lengthy and, to coin a term he himself uses, ‘macro-level’ (p.206) account of the changes made to pre-service teacher education in South Africa (SA) following the dismantling of the apartheid system in 1994 and the rationales behind these, and Deniz and Sahin (2006), who detail the development of the system of pre-service teacher education in modern Turkey and in particular how the reform process in the late 1990s led to the introduction of a Postgraduate Certificate in Education (PGCE) programme based on the UK and US models. Ozano (2013) gives an interesting account of how government policies, including the setting up of a quality assurance body and an abortive attempt to improve salaries, affected the development of teaching as an actual profession in Nigeria. These accounts provide an indication of the magnitude of the tasks education reformers often have to carry out. For example, the post-apartheid years in SA involved dismantling a complex system involving whites, coloureds, blacks and Indians being trained in separate teacher education institutes (Sayed, 2004). However, like Paine and Fang’s (2006) and Salitra’s (2003) accounts, they shed no light on how the relevant reforms influenced actual classroom teaching. Deniz and Sahin, for instance, devote a substantive part of their study discussing the benefits of the Turkish PGCE’s focus on practical classroom skills, as opposed to Turkey’s traditional pedagogical programmes which tended to be largely theory-bound. Yet the writers do not appear to consider whether this innovation resulted in improvements in teaching standards.
Cakiroglu and Cakiroglu (2003) adopt a slightly different approach in their paper, which also focuses on the development of pre-service teacher education in Turkey. Following an account of the major changes in teacher education since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1924, the writers then discuss the main external challenges to teacher
32 education, including population growth in urban centres, political instability and the limited attractiveness of teaching as a profession, and the internal issues, mainly the lack of relevance of the university-based education programmes to the realities of classroom teaching and, in connection with this, the fact that the design and content of these programmes are largely based on Western models without any real consideration of contextual and/or socio-cultural factors. The writers then conclude by describing their own experiences as trainee teachers as a way of supporting the arguments they had previously made.
Although Cakiroglu and Cakiroglu’s (2003) paper attempts to link their larger-scale narrative with the situation on the ground, as with Paine and Fang’s (2006) above-mentioned Shanghai-based case, this appears to be an afterthought and provides little information on the realities of the situation either on teacher training programmes or in the actual classroom. A more balanced study can be found in Altinyelken’s (2011) paper on a programme to introduce student-centred pedagogy (SCP) in Turkish primary schools. The writer provides an informative account of the development of SCP as a concept and a background to its introduction into the Turkish school system in 2004 by drawing upon the developments in the education system that had taken place since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The writer then introduces a research project which involved her carrying out interviews with a number of teachers and school officials in eight schools to gauge their ideas on SCP, along with a series of lesson observations to look at how these ideas were being applied in practice. The number of interviews and observations was extensive – 83 and 76 respectively – and the writer provides relatively detailed information on the results of these. Altinyelken then uses these results to discuss the obstacles to the implementation of SCP, such as the lack of suitable teaching materials and the influence of the national school exams, before explaining why she feels this reform was ultimately a failure. Furthermore, although the account is mainly about general issues and events, through her research project the writer is able to detail the realities of SCP on the ground and then to use her findings to comment on the introduction of the practice at a national level.
Several writers adopt a similar approach. Major and Tiro (2012) examine the pre-service training system for primary school teachers in Botswana through providing a historical account of teacher education in the country, along with a brief discussion on what constitutes a good teacher education programme, before conducting a case study based on interviews with 17 trainee teachers. The study’s results – that the current system is overly focused on studying theoretical aspects of teaching and not enough time is spent on actual teaching practice – are unsurprising. However, the writers are able to reinforce this by detailing the
33 trainees’ individual experiences of studying on the programme and their opinions that they needed more practical training. Although, as Major and Tiro only devote about half a page to this – instead opting to launch into a theoretical discussion of the importance of practical training for pre-service teachers – the reader is left with only a brief snapshot of trainees’ realities on the ground.
O’Sullivan (2002) adopts a more holistic approach with her study on the realities of a mid- 1990s reform programme organised by the Namibian government and international aid agencies to improve the provision of ELT at primary school level. The writer provides a background to the programme, part of a wider reform process aimed at introducing English as the language of instruction at school level, before detailing the various aspects of its implementation and her motives for embarking on the study. The study itself was conducted over three years, involved 145 teachers and 31 schools and included a range of data- gathering techniques, such as interviewing, lesson observations and document collection, and came to the overall conclusion that the initiative had been unsuccessful due to policy makers failing to take into account so-called ‘classroom realities’ (O’Sullivan, 2002: p.119). The writer then gives a breakdown of what the obstacles to reform were, including the professional capacity of teachers and their school principals, political factors and poor infrastructure, along with lessons learned which could be applied to similar programmes in future. Unlike Major and Tiro’s (2012) above-mentioned study, this paper provides information on the situation on the ground, therefore enabling the reader to build up a picture of how the reforms actually worked in practice. For example, the writer illustrates the challenges of limited resources and bureaucracy by describing how a head teacher was unable to obtain paper and pencils despite numerous attempts to procure these through the regional education office.
Osei (2006) produces a comparable paper with his account of how a series of educational reforms led to the deterioration of Ghanaian teachers’ working conditions. Although this paper initially takes a similar approach to Ozano’s (2013) above-mentioned paper on the changing status of Nigerian teachers, particularly by contextualising these reforms within the wider political and economic developments taking place in the country, Osei supports his arguments with a relatively wide-ranging study involving teachers, trainee teachers, teacher educators and private sector employers, and using a range of data-collection techniques such as focus groups, observations, interviews and survey questionnaires. Furthermore, he provides insight into the situation on the ground, mainly by presenting excerpts from his research interviews which inform the reader directly about issues such as the classroom discipline problems teachers faced and how most teachers had second jobs to supplement
34 their low salaries.
Although O’Sullivan (2002) and Osei (2006) have differing agendas, with the former intending her paper to provide guidance to governments and aid agencies planning similar reform programmes and the latter specifically arguing for an improvement in Ghanaian teachers’ pay and working environments, both enable the reader to form a picture of their relevant contexts at grassroots level, which in turn contributes substantively to their arguments. Similar papers are offered by Lacey et al. (1999) on a donor-funded project to train secondary school teachers for Seychelles secondary schools via a joint initiative between Seychelles Polytechnic and Sussex University, by Muthanna and Karaman (2014) on a training programme for future teachers of English being provided at Yemeni universities, and by Grossman and Sands (2008) on the effects of the reform of teacher education programmes in Turkish universities specifically through the eyes of the teacher educators delivering these programmes. From these writers’ accounts, the reader learns how the Seychelles–Sussex programme gave teachers several techniques, including that of developing strong rapports with their students, which, despite being completely new to their relevant contexts, proved markedly effective; about the frustrations felt by Yemeni teacher educators in working with classes containing over 150 trainees; and that in Turkey, despite the challenges, most of the educators interviewed felt that on the ground pre-service training was improving. Interestingly, all three studies appeared to take the stance that despite some achievements, the relevant reform process remains incomplete. Grossman and Sands suggest that all that is required in Turkey is a continuation of the ongoing reform process. Lacey et al. (1999) argue that a failure by both the relevant international donor and the Seychelles government to support and fund the programme in the long term led to it failing to achieve any large-scale impact or sustainability, and, echoing arguments made earlier by O’Sullivan (2002) and Muthanna and Karaman (2014), state that policy makers’ limited awareness of and lack of interest in the realities of the situation on teacher training programmes was the main barrier to any significant improvement in Yemen’s teacher education system.
At this point, although I had reviewed a number of academic papers on education reform initiatives, I had not found any which primarily focused on in-service cascade training programmes, although both Paine and Fang (2006) and Salitra (2003) mention that there were cascade programmes within the large-scale reform initiatives detailed in their respective papers. This was partly because a number of the studies that I did find, such as Hayes’ (2000) examination of a Department for International Development (DFID)-funded programme aimed at developing primary-level ELT in Sri Lanka, Miti and Herriot’s (1997)
35 description of a cascade programme organised by the Zambian MoE and the BC to improve the teaching of mathematics, science and English in primary and secondary schools, and Dove’s (1983) detailing of a Bangladeshi government programme to raise the general standards of primary education, were not narrative accounts and instead focused on describing how the programmes were designed and organised. Similarly, Barrett’s (2010-b) and Nusrat’s (2015) papers on cascade programmes in India and Pakistan respectively focus primarily on how these initiatives were monitored and evaluated. Likewise, although Gilpin’s (1997) description of programmes in India and Thailand and Borovikova’s (2010) report on a BC programme aimed at promoting the University of Cambridge Teaching Knowledge Test (TKT) as a qualification among Russian teachers of English are both narrative-based, the writers focus on the key stages involved in their programmes’ delivery, and only Gilipin (1997) comments on the extent to which his programmes achieved their aims.
I did, however, manage to source several papers which provided more narrative-style accounts of cascade programmes. These included McDevitt’s (1998) study of a programme in Botswana which aimed to support approximately 1,000 secondary teachers in teaching mixed-ability classes, although, despite entitling his paper a ‘case study’, the writer devotes the bulk of the paper to discussing the effectiveness of the cascade approach in general and, apart from providing some background information and a brief description of how it was delivered, only refers to the actual programme when supporting evidence for his arguments is required. The papers also included Thompson’s (1990) account of a cascade programme in Mexico in the 1980s which led to over 600 teacher trainers being trained and then placed as so-called ‘monitors’ (p.222) in schools, with responsibility for training their colleagues. Like McDevitt’s paper, this account is relatively brief and although it claims the programme achieved its aims, the writer does not really provide any evidence to support this apart from listing the programme’s guiding principles. A narrative account of sorts is provided by Peacock (1993), who details a programme to improve the teaching of science at primary schools in Namibia. However, his details of the cascade are interspersed with details of other initiatives and so, once again, information on the programme’s delivery is limited.
A more substantive narrative is provided by Thair and Treagust (2003) in their account of a professional development training initiative for Indonesian science teachers to encourage them to use student-centred learning in their teaching. The writers provide an account of the development of education in Indonesia and of the country’s approach to teacher training, before looking specifically at science education and the training of science teachers, including the failure of a previous large-scale cascade programme involving 18,000 teachers
36 and other education professionals. They then detail the Permantapan Kerja Guru (PKG) programme, which is the main focus of their paper. This was a donor-funded programme involving small groups of teachers attending overseas training programmes to enable them to become PKG instructors or master trainers and then being deployed to train and support other science teachers throughout Indonesia. It is extensively detailed by the writers from its inception in the late 1970s until its replacement with an Indonesian government programme in the mid 1990s. Thair and Treagust then reflect critically on the limitations to its long-term sustainability, namely a failure by the PKG to synchronise its activities with those government departments responsible for developing the curriculum and national examinations, pressure on science teachers from their head teachers to adhere to traditional practices and a reduction in funding once the PKG was replaced. Following this, they proceed to discuss the lessons learned from the programme, with a view to these being used by professionals planning similar programmes in other developing contexts.
Thair and Treagust’s (2003) paper provides a wealth of information on the issues involved in running cascade programmes in developing countries, and through giving a detailed narrative they enable the reader to place the programme within the wider context of developments within Indonesia’s education system and to understand the various stages of the PKG’s delivery, including those which resulted in it failing to achieve its aim of changing teachers’ approaches to teaching science. Moreover, the section on lessons learned is particularly informative for professionals such as myself, especially their comments on the importance of large-scale training initiatives being officially incorporated into the mainstream education policy of the relevant government. I was also pleased to find them echoing many of my own ideas (Gray, 2011) on cascade programmes, namely that in terms of training large numbers of teachers quickly and economically, cascade training is the only viable approach and so ways need to be devised to make the cascade effective, as opposed to looking at expensive and unsustainable alternatives. However, despite the detail provided, Thair and Treagust’s (2003) paper is very much at a macro-level and, as with some of the papers mentioned above, it provides a limited amount of information on how the PKG actually contributed to change at classroom level, and so it is challenging for the reader to develop a picture of the reform’s actual results.
A similar study is provided by Wedell (2005) in his paper on the implementation of a Chinese government-funded cascade teacher training programme designed to support the introduction of a communicative-based approach to the way English was taught in primary schools. Along similar lines to the PKG, this involved groups of teacher trainers being trained up overseas before being deployed to deliver training throughout China, although, unlike the
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Indonesian programme, this initiative was funded by the Chinese government as opposed to international donors. Through data gathered by questionnaires completed by approximately 500 teachers who received training from these teacher trainers, Wedell (2005) argues that the programme ultimately failed to achieve its objectives as it did not take into account teachers’ classroom contexts, including issues such as class sizes and the limited number of class hours for English. Furthermore, echoing comments made by Thair and Treagust (2003), Wedell states that the programme was not accompanied by changes in the national school examinations system, which continued to focus on formal knowledge of the language, and it was the results in these examinations which were viewed as being crucially important by teachers and other stakeholders such as head teachers and parents.
As with Thair and Treagust’s (2003) paper, the narrative Wedell (2005) provides enables the reader to contextualise the programme, and his discussion of lessons learned provides useful information for future programme planners. However, although Wedell’s account is very much at a macro-level, his use of data from the questionnaires provides readers with a more visual impression of the realities of the situation on the ground. For example, accounts are provided of classes containing 60–70 students, head teachers telling teachers to concentrate on preparing their students for national exams and teachers having to deliver lessons in short, 40-minute time slots. One issue regarding Wedell’s (2005) paper is that he relies on the data provided in the questionnaires, and what I felt could have complemented this and given more weight to his arguments would have been a more in-depth focus on certain aspects of the programme involving interviews with the teachers or observations of training sessions and/or lessons delivered by teachers trained on the cascade.
One study that provided this more in-depth focus was Bax’s (2002) paper on the English at Secondary Level and Primary English Teaching in Rural Areas projects, both of which were cascade programmes delivered in 1990s South Africa and organised along similar lines to those mentioned by Thair and Treagust (2003) and by Wedell (2005). Potential teacher trainers attended UK-based training courses and were then deployed as trainers in black rural schools, with the objective of improving standards in ELT. Bax (2002) provides a narrative account of these programmes, combined with a narrative of the research project he undertook when he began to feel that they were not achieving their aims. This research project involved interviews with the trainers, both during and after their UK courses, and a set of notes recording his observations and experiences during the programmes’ delivery, and it is the data from these that brings the programmes to life. For example, the reader learns at first hand how trainee trainers in the UK were critical of their peers, leading to participants being reluctant to present their work to others, and how, when on the ground in
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SA, trainers had to work hard to establish credibility with both the teachers they were training and certain stakeholders, such as head teachers. Bax’s (2002) main argument in this study is that trainee trainers need to be properly prepared with regard to the cultural and social issues they will face when they start delivering training, such as taking up positions which could be seen as giving them some sort of superiority over other teachers and the importance of learning about their trainees’ backgrounds. He then provides a detailed description of a training session that he delivered on the Primary English Teaching in Rural Areas project using the lessons learned from his study, although this feels like a separate paper and does not provide any information on whether this contributed to the project better achieving its aims.
Despite this, out of all the studies I examined, Bax’s (2002) was closest to the type of study that I was beginning to feel would be appropriate for detailing the LETTS experience, one that would enable me to explain the background to its inception and detail its delivery and eventual suspension, and, at the same time, to examine the influence of wider social, cultural, political and historical factors, and the role played by issues such as the BC’s ambitions in Libya and my own professional agenda. At the same time, by focusing on how events on the ground actually played out and giving a voice to the individuals involved – including myself – I could help the reader visualise and understand the programme’s realities and its wider context, and give weight to my conclusions and support the discussion of lessons learned. Furthermore, for such a study, I believed I could also make use of the data I had already generated – mainly from the focus group interviews with the teacher educators and the notes from my research diary – in pursuing the initially envisaged research project on how teacher educators developed on LETTS and the contribution they made to the classroom practices of the teachers they trained.
Micro-history: a possible way forward?
Following the above detailed literature review, I then began to consider what type of narrative would be most appropriate for the study I was now envisaging. As a history graduate, I was already familiar with the concept of grand narratives – the large histories which provide accounts of events which shaped the world and the progress and development of societies. I was also aware that, as evidenced in Toibin’s (2013) article on interpretations of Irish history, some academics had argued that such narratives oversimplified history and denied a voice to members of everyday societies, and as a result they were calling for more focus on smaller historical narratives, looking at the everyday lives and habits of normal people and societies and then connecting these to the larger histories
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of the relevant period. I realised that there were comparisons between grand narratives and the macro-level accounts of education reform programmes provided by writers such as Paine and Fang (2006), Sayed (2004) and Salitra (2003), while my narrative account of LETTS was essentially focusing on a small-scale programme based in a single geographical area and delivered over a limited period of time. When looking for alternative narrative approaches for the study, I discovered micro-history – an approach detailed by writers such as Steele (2006), Peltonen (2001) and Waddell (2012) – which appeared to be an emerging approach within social sciences. However, as this was the first time I had heard of this approach to historical research, I needed to find out what micro-history actually is, what the approach involved and whether it was indeed appropriate for the type of study I was now envisaging.
What is micro-history?
A comprehensive introduction is provided by Steele (2006) who suggests that, along with macro-history, micro-history is a sub-field of the ‘new history’ that emerged during the 20th century which purports to undertake research by examining the lives of real people in history. However, while macro-history takes a long view of history, similar to the more traditional and established approaches to writing history, and looks at multiple societies and nations over the course of centuries to make wide-ranging conclusions about historical periods and events, Steele argues that micro-history involves the writer focusing on a single individual or community and through study and analysis trying to understand the wider issues at play. Furthermore, Rion (2011) suggests that micro-history reduces the scale of observation to the microscopic and instead of dismissing small stories or anomalies in the research material gives them the same historical consideration as larger, seemingly more important events. Through this type of consideration, historians can express the complexities of the realities of historical communities and therefore offer new insights and breakthroughs.
These ideas are echoed by Magnusson (2003), who states that micro-history involves studying small units of history and how people conducted their lives within these, thus revealing the complicated function of individual relationships within each social setting and their difference from the assumed norm. He suggests that micro-historians use their studies to reflect on the workings of society at large and in particular to demonstrate how the authorities and/or formal institutions of the day handled their affairs and dealt with society. Brown (2003) goes further and suggests that there are several types of micro-history, as the scholars who have pioneered and developed this approach have applied their own individual interpretations. For example, Brown proceeds to explain that some historians have used
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micro-history to conduct a thorough examination of a particular locality over an extended period of time and to explore structural questions relating to family, property and politics, while others have used it to intensively study particular communities involved in or connected to specific and often unusual events, and through this provided explanations for these events.
Regarding its origin, the term micro-history is commonly seen by writers such as Brown (2003) and Peltonen (2001) as having originated from the work of Italian historians of the early modern age in the 1970s, namely Carlo Ginzburg, Giovanni Levi and a selection of their colleagues who decided to attach the micro-history label to a series of historical studies being published at the time. Of these, arguably the most famous is Ginzburg’s 1976 publication The Cheese and the Worms (translated into English in 1980), which studied an Italian miller who had been executed for heresy by the Inquisition on the orders of the Pope in 16th-century Italy. By accessing historical documents, particularly from Inquisitorial and other court records, Ginzburg was able to study the ideas and experiences of peasants in the 16th century and provide details of how Italian peasant society functioned at that time.
However, as Peltonen (2001) and Steele (2006) show, this wave of studies was not limited to Italy. Steele details US historian Jonathon Spence’s 1979 work The Death of Woman Wang , in which he examined a limited number of sources – a set of state records, a diary and a selection of fictional stories – connected with insignificant events in Shandong province in 17th-century China and used these to provide a description and analysis of Chinese peasant society at the time. Peltonen mentions Thompson’s (1975) Whigs and Hunters and Natalie Davis’ (1975) Society and Culture in Early Modern France as examples of micro-history studies from the 1970s. These were followed, according to Peltonen, by a second wave of studies in the 1980s, including Levi’s (1988) Inheriting Power (translated into English in 1989), which focused on a priest in 17th-century Italy who carried out unlicensed exorcisms, and Davis’ (1984) work The Return of Martin Guerre , which, by looking at a specific set of events in 16th-century rural France, provided an insight into French village life at the time. According to Peltonen (2001), this new approach to history proved controversial as it introduced new subjects, groups and people previously considered marginal in traditional studies and, in doing so, rejected what he refers to as the ‘standard textbook’ (p.347) approach to history, which viewed the nation-state as the unit of research and the principal building block of change and modernisation.
In terms of focus, Rion (2011) argues that most micro-historical studies are concerned with the early modern period, especially that of Italy, France and Spain, although he also
41 acknowledges that there are an increasing number of studies which examine other periods and/or geographic locations. This is exemplified by Brown (2003), who suggests that micro- history is particularly appropriate for the study of the early US Republic due to the wide array of public and private records that are intact. To illustrate this, he details a number of studies, including Patricia Cohen’s (1998) publication, The Murder of Helen Jewett: the Life and Death of a Prostitute in Nineteenth-Century New York , which uses a focus on context to transform a tabloid story into an analysis of the culture of gender relations at the time. Brown states that these studies do not claim to be micro-histories and, unlike European micro- historical studies, focus on social processes and interpersonal transactions as opposed to particular events. However, as they are tightly focused on subject, community, time and place, and the analyses rely on thorough multidimensional contextualisation, they are for all intents and purposes micro-histories.
Brown (2003) also proceeds to detail a 2002 article by Fredrickson, which suggests that US micro-historical studies have been concerned with detailing the experiences and achievements of communities and individuals who have been overlooked by more traditional historians, as opposed to trying to establish connections between the focus of the study and the wider issues and events of that particular period. Brown, however, while acknowledging that micro-history does indeed deal with such groups of people, refutes the second part of Fredrickson’s argument and states that micro-history, on both sides of the Atlantic, is first and foremost about establishing such connections. Indeed, both Peltonen (2001) and Brown argue that one of the primary goals of micro-histories is to test and refine existing and generalised assumptions about history. In the case of Ginzburg and Levi, Peltonen (2001), argues, this involves ‘the method of clues’ (p.347), which involves starting an investigation into something unusual that needs further investigation and which will reveal wider and hitherto-unknown issues which will, in turn, lead to a revision of the existing generalisations regarding the history of the period. Brown proceeds to provide the example of David Sabean’s 1991 study of life in a German village in the 18th and 19th centuries, which many scholars view as revealing generic patterns of European village life during the relevant period.
Indeed, one issue raised by Steele (2006), Peltonen (2001) and Brown (2003) is that micro- historians are often overly ambitious in the generalisations that their studies can provide. Brown states that certain micro-historians assume that their cases contain a social and cultural DNA which, when analysed, can provide an understanding of the organisation and behaviour of an entire past society and its culture. In connection with this, Steele explains that critics also argue that micro-histories’ focuses are not always applicable to the greater
42 questions that the author is trying to answer. Both Brown and Steele examine this assertion in connection with Ginzburg’s above-mentioned study, with the latter quoting two critics – Samuel Cohn (1982) and Kasper von Greyerz (1982) – the former suggesting that Ginzburg is unable to isolate the essential mental structure of an oral peasant culture and the latter arguing that the miller, who is the focus of the study, may not necessarily be as representative of peasant culture as is implied, particularly as millers were often isolated from peasant society at the time due to their links with the nobility, who held the rights to milling.
However, Steele (2006) proceeds to argue that even if this is the case, studies like Ginzburg’s (1976), and Spence’s (1979) The Death of Woman Wang , in which the main protagonist is an exceptional case rather than a norm, still provide valuable information on the attitudes, communities and social processes of the relevant historical contexts. In the case of Ginzburg, for example, this includes details of clerical and peasant attitudes towards heresy, and the intersections of high and low culture. A more interesting view of how micro- historians can use exceptional examples to make more general inferences regarding the period in question comes from Chin’s (2011) examination of Richard Cobb’s 1972 case studies – which were micro-historical in everything but name – on a group of violent bandits and a semi-literate provincial terrorist in revolutionary France. Chin argues that the way French society identified and engaged with these individuals reveals a great deal about its ideas, self-image and general condition.
In line with this, Brown (2003) provides two examples, Cohen’s (1998) The Murder of Helen Jewett and Taylor’s (1995) William Cooper's Town: Power and Persuasion on the Frontier of the Early American Republic , in which the historians have focused on and researched an unusual event or situation and been able to connect the micro to the macro without overreaching. Cohen’s study, for example, challenges the established assumptions about 19th-century gender relations in the US – which had been based mainly on the records of clergymen – and reveals a flourishing sexual customary counter-culture in New York, which was almost certainly replicated to a degree in other parts of the US at the time. In line with Steele’s (2006) above-mentioned points, Brown does not argue that these studies can lead to unequivocal generalisations about the time periods and the communities involved. Instead, he suggests that they provide valuable historical details which can potentially challenge the established assumptions.
These ideas are echoed by Szijarto (2002), who states that as micro-history is built upon ‘little facts’ (p.209) taken from the relevant sources, the details provided are more concrete
43 and reliable than those obtained from macro-histories and other more traditional wide- ranging studies. Brown (2003) adds to this by stating that as micro-historians study a specific and limited subject exhaustively, they ‘command the evidence on that subject beyond challenge’ (p.16) so that their audience learns to accept their authority and then they – the micro-historian – can begin to make broader interpretive statements. Even if a critic argued that the subject in question was unusual, as is often the case, and therefore unrepresentative and so the historian’s interpretations overreach the evidence that has been gathered, this evidence – in line with Steele’s (2006) above-mentioned comments – is still valuable and informative and cannot be dismissed.
Furthermore, Brown (2003) and Steele (2006) suggest that macro-histories and other more traditional historical narratives suffer from being generalisations which are oversimplified or reductionist. Steele, discussing macro-histories alongside micro-histories, suggests that they require a huge amount of data to cover their required scope and so when faced with gaps in the verifiable data, historians use the techniques of social sciences to make estimates to fill these. She proceeds to provide several examples, including studies by Braudel (1992) and Pomeranz (2000), in which the relevant historian has taken this course of action, and as a result the reader cannot ascertain the accuracy of the relevant data. She follows on by stating that these large-scale histories risk overgeneralising by trying to create a unified theory to explain the particular historical period in question, even though it is questionable whether such a theory exists. This leads to them making general statements about societies, countries and continents which cannot stand up on their own. Indeed, Steele refers to Nirenberg’s (1996) micro-historical study of violence in medieval Europe in which the writer admits that had he adopted a macro-historical approach and found a single root cause, then this would have been wrong.
Micro-histories, as Steele (2006) proceeds to explain, require less evidence than macro- histories and, at the same time, historians are able to draw upon different sources, such as trial transcripts, journals and literary pieces. For example, Ginzburg’s (1976) above- mentioned study relied on court transcripts from the trial of the miller, Menocchio, backed up by a small number of literary and religious sources, while Spence, for his 1979 work, The Death of Woman Wang , used three main sources, including one literary source. Macro- histories, Steele suggests, use narrower criteria for their data sources, usually with an emphasis on verifiable figures collected by secondary sources, and, due to the size of their studies, are usually unable to examine other sources. For example, Pomeranz (2000) uses studies on longevity, average income and production in China to reach his particular conclusions on the standards of peasant life, and Steele contrasts the somewhat dry
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information he provides with the colourful details provided by Spence on the people in his study.
In connection with this, an interesting point raised by Szijarto (2002) and Rion (2011) is that micro-history, by focusing on specific and often unusual episodes in history, and by being concerned with the lives of particular individuals and/or communities, offers the historian the opportunity to provide an interesting and therefore readable publication which can appeal to an audience wider than a select group of historians. Rion, who refers to such works as ‘the micro-history as a short story or novel’ (p.18) details two publications, Gene Bruckner’s (1986) Giovanni and Lusanna , which was researched mainly from the trial records of a couple’s courtroom feud over a promise of marriage, and Judith Brown’s (1986) Immodest Acts: The Life of a Lesbian Nun in Renaissance Italy , once again based on trial records, this time of the legal proceedings taken against a nun in 17th-century Italy for indecent acts against her colleagues. Both works, Rion argues, put the reader directly into the story and engage their imaginations, while at the same time providing historical details on a range of areas, including sexuality, gender relationships, legal systems, the role of community gossip, and church law and punishment.
For many writers, micro-history is seen primarily as a modern form of social history which, in turn, is described by writers such as Evans (2008) and Samuel (1985) as the study of the lives of ordinary people and societies, and of how these people and societies engaged with each other at all levels, from the family unit to national and international levels. Indeed Szijarto (2002) explains that micro-history is ‘the flagship of contemporary social historians, taking over from historical anthropology and being intertwined with new cultural history’ (p.209). Zlokas (2013), drawing upon her own social history research and on Tosh’s 1991 publication, The Pursuit of History , argues that micro-history, by enabling historians to examine how ordinary people lived in particular historical periods and thus how their societies functioned, is crucial if historians wish to put forward valid social histories and avoid general and potentially inaccurate historical accounts. Moreover, as Alford et al. (2003) state, one of the main reasons for the increasing popularity of micro-history from the 1970s and 1980s onwards was due to the then prevailing trend for historians to focus more on social history as opposed to political and economic history.
Even writers who do not discuss micro-history as a type of social history, namely Brown (2003), Peltonen (2001) and Steele (2006), still discuss it largely as the historical study of societies and communities, and provide examples of studies to this effect. For example, Peltonen draws upon Michel de Certeau’s (1970) publication The Possession at Loudun
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(translated into English in 2000) and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s 1975 publication Montaillou (translated into English in 1978), both of which detail particular communities – a religious community in the town of Loudun in the 1630s and a 14th-century French peasant society – while Steele references the better-known studies mentioned earlier in this thesis, namely Ginzburg’s (1976) The Cheese and the Worms and Spence’s (1979) The Death of Woman Wang . Moreover, Mari (2013), through examining the work of Jill Lepore, a distinguished US micro-historian, argues that micro-history is the writing of historical biographies of ordinary and at the same time unusual individuals or groups of individuals in order to reveal the realities of everyday life and the relevant social trends of the time.
Furthermore, a number of the actual studies I examined demonstrated the use of micro- history as a type of social history. These include a study by Lehmann (2009) which examines the relations between Polish and Ukrainian communities in south-east Poland and in particular how, following violent clashes between the two groups in the 1940s, the social development of both communities and the links between them prevented further conflicts occurring. They also include a study by Jayawardena (1987), in which the writer details her experience of a social situation in Indonesia and how this reflected the wider religious and political influences on the development of Indonesian society. Interestingly the writer starts her study by providing an analysis of a 1971 study by Max Gluckman, which uses a micro- history of an event – the opening of a bridge in Zululand, South Africa – to examine the development of Zulu society in South Africa and the relationship between this society and the white European society that effectively ruled the country, and then applies this analysis to examining her own experiences in Indonesia. She also rounds off her study by discussing how the particular micro-historical approach she followed can be used for the study of similar socially related historical events. Another study I examined was Sodikoff’s (2007), which uses the micro-history of a strike on a Madagascan nature reserve as a microcosm of the wider situation between the country’s conservation industry and the workers from local communities that the industry depends on. The writer uses the situation that led to the strike to argue that contrary to the widely held view that working in the conservation industry offers local communities an alternative to subsistence farming – which is a threat to conservation – through low wages, poor working conditions and limited job opportunities the industry has in fact created a situation in which such communities are more dependent upon subsistence farming than ever.
Other studies include Brewer et al.’s (2011) micro-history of the development of universal pre-school education – referred to as ‘kindergarten’ – in one particular US city throughout the 20th century, which discusses how this development was primarily shaped by continually
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changing social patterns and processes. Interestingly, and in line with Steele’s (2006) above- mentioned comments regarding how micro-historians use their findings to comment upon macro-level issues, the writers position their study and its results as a reflection of the general development and current status of kindergarten in the US. Studies also include Munt’s (2004) examination of the issue of teacher stress in Australian schools through examining the micro-histories of a group of volunteer teachers at one secondary school in South Australia. In this study, Munt describes how the changing social and economic backgrounds of the school’s student population, together with government reforms and a new prescriptive school curriculum, led to increased workloads for teachers and contributed to the development of certain types of stress among these volunteers. Then, drawing upon the micro-history, the writer argues that teacher stress is a national issue and calls for it to be addressed through changes in teachers’ working practices and improved school environments.
Selection of micro-history as the way ahead
My review of the literature on micro-history convinced me that this approach was the most appropriate way forward for my study. This was because it would enable me to make use of the data I had already collected and my experiences of working on LETTS, and through further, more strategic, collection of data, would enable me to capture the way the programme had developed and was now beginning to unravel. Moreover, influenced by the micro-histories I had already consulted, especially Sodikoff’s (2007) study, I believed this would assist both the reader and myself in understanding how LETTS came about and the reasons for its failure, including the role played by my own background and professional agenda, along with factors such as the BC’s expectations for large-scale educational reform programmes in Libya, and the unwillingness and/or inability of the country’s MoE to provide the required contribution. I also felt it would enable me to properly contextualise LETTS within Libya’s wider post-Revolutionary situation as it struggled to move forward following 40 years of military dictatorship.
At the same time, as Waddell (2012) argues, micro-history involves a focus on the lives of ordinary people and their communities, and their involvement in particular situations, thus providing these individuals with a voice and recognition for the role they played in the relevant period in history. This is what Sodikoff (2007) does for the workers in her study, recognising the contribution that they made to both the development of the nature reserve they were employed on and to the more general development of Madagascar’s conservation industry, and implicitly acknowledging the fact that, on balance, they had not been fairly
47 treated by the NGO (non-governmental organisation) they were employed by. This is also the case in Munt’s (2004) study as she provides a group of teachers working in a challenging school in Australia the opportunity to tell their stories and to raise awareness of how their working environments were causing them stress and affecting their health. In my particular case, a micro-history of LETTS would give a voice to the teacher educators and also, to a lesser extent, to myself and my BC colleagues, and acknowledge the fact that we tried, under challenging and often unrewarding circumstances, to make a positive contribution to Libya’s future development, and possibly, from a different angle, to examine how our experiences fitted within the more general story of how the high expectations of both the Libyan people themselves and the international community following the 2011 Revolution were ultimately unfulfilled.
Finally, as the above-mentioned papers by Brown (2003), Chin (2011), Peltonen (2001) and Steele (2006) explain, micro-historians often try to use their findings to make more general inferences regarding the issues being examined – what Chin refers to as ‘micro to macro inferences’ (p.341). For example, Brewer et al. (2011) use their micro-history of the development of kindergarten education in Austin, Texas, as a way of explaining how US government policy on pre-school education has evolved and to highlight issues future policy makers should consider. Sodikoff (2007) uses her account of the strike by workers on a Madagascan nature reserve partly to illustrate how the conservation industry treats manual workers in developing countries and to argue for an alternative approach which recognises and values them.
In my case, I felt that a micro-history of LETTS could highlight and contribute to the addressing of an important issue in the field of educational reform programmes in developing countries. This is namely the fact that on many occasions reform programmes either unravel after being launched – as happened with LETTS – or are delivered but fail to achieve their aims or to put in place sustainable systems. However, though there are examples of studies describing such programmes and highlighting the lessons learned – for example, Wedell’s (2005) above-mentioned account of the Chinese cascade teacher training programme and Zikri’s (2012) paper on the 1975–91 Egyptian Ain Shams University Curriculum Reform Programme – it is more often the case that they are forgotten about and that the same mistakes are then made in similar programmes elsewhere. Identifying this as an issue fits within Busha and Harter’s (1980) guidance on conducting historical studies – which is detailed in Chapter 3 below – which states that the researcher should start by identifying a historical problem to be dealt with. Through a micro-history, I believed I could continue the work of writers such as Wedell and Zikri and contribute to the tackling of this issue by
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providing an illustration of the organisation of an unsuccessful reform programme which could then follow on with an examination of the reasons for this failure and the production of a set of lessons learned to inform future professionals engaged in planning such programmes in developing countries.
In addition I believed a micro-history could provide a commentary – with a focus on education – on how the UK and the international community as a whole underestimated the scale and nature of the challenge involved in rebuilding and developing post-Revolutionary Libya. At the same time, I was aware of Steele’s (2006) warning about being overly ambitious regarding making general assertions from a micro-history’s results, particularly one focused on Libya which, in line with arguments by Lawrence (2013) and Sizer (2015), was in many ways an exceptional case among the Arab Spring countries and indeed among developing countries, given its oil wealth, small and well-educated population and centralised Soviet-style political-economic system.
A micro-historical approach versus a narrative approach
As previously stated, one of my intentions in this study was to provide a narrative account of the LETTS experience (see page 30), and therefore I felt that it would be useful to examine the commonly pursued approaches to narrative research and to compare these with the micro-historical approach I intended to pursue.
As Creswell (2006) states, the term ‘narrative’ is usually applied to any text or discourse – written or spoken – told by an individual or group of individuals which gives an account of an event/action or series of events/actions – usually of a chronological nature – which they were involved in or were witness to. Paiva (2008) expands upon this by suggesting that narratives can include accounts of fictional events as well as the retelling of stories previously told to the relevant narrators.
From a brief review of the literature on narrative research, two distinct approaches emerge. The first is detailed by Bruner (1991) and sees narrative as a process. This approach focuses on how people use narrative to convey meaning through telling stories and providing accounts of events and experiences occurring over a specific period of time. The emphasis is on what the individuals involved in the narrative did, what events occurred and how, if at all, these affected the individuals, with researchers examining how social, cultural and linguistic issues, along with the relevant narrator’s interpretations and cognitive processes, shape the story. The second is detailed by Labov (1997) and views narrative as an attempt
49 by people to explain experiences and events from their lives, or from the lives of others, to an audience. Unlike Bruner’s approach, narrative is viewed as a product – a tale, an account or a story – with the focus on the language used and how this sets the scene, and how it organises the account and describes the event, along with detailing the narrator’s feelings and opinions. Furthermore, it looks at how the language enhances or detracts from the narrator’s credibility and how the narration is transferred to the audience. It also looks at how the language used connects the event being narrated to wider events and how this is influenced by socio-cultural factors and the narrator’s interpretations and ideas. Both these approaches do, however, view narrative as the narrator’s perceptions and interpretations of the events being described and as their attempt to get their relevant audiences to view the events in a similar way, and this is opposed to narratives being viewed simply as accounts providing accurate and factual information.
The micro-historical approach I intended to pursue differed from both these approaches. The interviews I organised were not narrative accounts of the relevant individuals’ experiences or events they had participated in or witnessed, and nor was I concerned with examining the language they used to convey the ideas and experiences they spoke of. Although, in line with the approaches described in the previous paragraphs, the information they provided was viewed as their own interpretations of the reasons for LETTS’ failure, along with any wider issues discussed, and not as statements of fact. Moreover, as shown by my frequent use of the term ‘narrative’ during the study, the micro-history can partly be viewed as my own personal narrative of my experiences and perceptions, both of trying to organise LETTS and of the wider events that unfolded in Libya during this time and how I believed these impacted upon the programme. Indeed, like narrative accounts used in the research methods detailed by Bruner (1991) and Labov (1997), it focused on a set of chronological events set within a fixed time period and it also aimed to enable the relevant readers to see the events described in a similar manner to how I saw them.
However, the emphasis of my micro-historical approach differed from that adopted by researchers engaged in narrative research. In narrative research the focus is on the individual or individuals providing the narration. This may include an interest in how this narration recounts events and/or experiences, what the roles of the individuals involved were, or the language used by the relevant individuals to provide the narrative account. On the other hand, the emphasis of the micro-history is on the events that took place during the stated time period and the context within which they occurred. The individuals involved in these events – including myself – are only considered with regard to the role that they played in the microhistory and/or the contribution they made in terms of data for the study.
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Furthermore, the micro-history was constructed from a range of data sources as well as my own recollections and diary entries, and my approach to examining the account followed that of a historian, which involved working through it thoroughly, extracting information relevant to the research questions and putting it into the relevant organisational framework – see Chapter 3 for more information on this. More importantly, the focus of the micro-history – which was on the decision-making processes, issues and events which led to LETTS being launched, what took place while it was being delivered and the reasons for its limited achievements and eventual collapse – was, I believed, a subject far more suitable for investigation by a historian as opposed to a narrative researcher.
Features and affordances of a micro-historical approach
Following my discussion of approaches to narrative research and the differences between these and the micro-historical approach I intended to pursue, I felt it would be worthwhile summarising the latter’s features and affordances to ensure my readers understood the exact nature of the approach and the reasoning behind my decision to use it. However, it is important that I explain that, as shown by my previous discussion of micro-history and particularly in drawing upon the work of writers such as Brown (2003), Peltonen (2001) and Mari (2013), the definition of what constitutes a micro-historical approach is partly down to the researcher’s own subjective interpretation, and therefore the summary I provide is based on what I believe are the key features of the approach and why I felt it was appropriate for my study.
As described by writers such as Steele (2006), Rion (2011) and Magnusson (2003), a micro- historical approach involves a focus on a particular situation or an event or a set of events, or a situation occurring within a specific and often limited geographical location, over a specific and usually, in historical terms, narrow time period, and commonly involving a small number of protagonists and/or communities. The data sources drawn upon by the researcher are also limited, and for modern micro-histories, such as those by Sodikoff (2007) and Munt (2004), primary sources are often interviews with and observations of the individuals and communities involved and secondary sources are contemporary reports relevant to the study’s focus. Focusing on these sources enables the researcher to conduct a thorough analysis of the relevant research area and then to use the findings to shed new light on this area and/or to test and refine existing assumptions about it.
For my study, it gave me the chance to use the data I had already collected for the originally envisaged study (see page 16) and to draw upon my own observations and experiences as
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one of LETTS’ main protagonists. I also had access to individuals who were involved directly and indirectly with the programme, and to other individuals who, while not involved with LETTS, were aware of the wider issues both in Libya’s education system and in the country as a whole that potentially impacted upon the programme. I also had access to contemporary articles and reports about both Libya’s education system and the wider situation in the country at the time. More importantly, it offered the opportunity to provide a readable account of the LETTS experience and use this to describe an ELT reform programme being delivered in an exceptional situation and context, yet which generated important lessons which future programme planners in developing countries could learn from and draw upon. In connection with this, the intense focus on the data sources, particularly my own experiences regarding LETTS, would give me the opportunity to reflect on my own role in the programme and to consider how I could have done things differently. Furthermore, it provided me with a way of ensuring that the voices of the individuals involved in LETTS would be heard, thus enabling me to honour one of the promises I made to the teacher educators: that their opinions about LETTS would be reported. Finally, it gave me the opportunity to approach the study as a historian, something that reflected my academic background and my own personal interest in research.
The research questions
On the basis of the decision to use a micro-historical approach and the affordances of pursuing this particular way of carrying out research, I formulated three research questions. These questions would collectively focus on responding to the issue I had identified regarding a general failure to learn from educational reform programmes which had either partly or wholly failed to achieve their stated objectives. They would be answered by the micro-history itself and/or by the overall study’s findings and the subsequent interpretation and discussion of these. The research questions were as follows:
1. How did LETTS unfold over time in Libya in 2012–14? This research question aimed to provide a narrative account of LETTS during the 2012–14 period through describing the key stages and events in the programme’s two-year history. It also aimed to detail how these stages and events were shaped by the individuals and organisations involved with LETTS, by Libya’s wider educational context and by the country’s general volatile post-Revolutionary situation.
2. What could be viewed as the principal reasons for LETTS’ limited success and its eventual failure?
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This research question aimed to look at the reasons behind both LETTS’ limited achievements – especially when compared to the programme’s initial grandiose ambitions – and its eventual unravelling. Within this, it also aimed to examine which issues were intractable and which could have possibly been overcome by the BC adopting an alternative approach to planning and managing the programme.
3. What are the lessons that the LETTS experience provides for programme planners working in developing countries similar to Libya? This research question aimed to identify and discuss the main lessons that were learned from the LETTS experience. It also aimed to look at how programme planners and other professionals working on educational reform initiatives in developing contexts comparable to the Libyan one could draw upon these lessons and avoid the mistakes that were arguably made by the BC regarding LETTS.
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Chapter 2: A data collection approach for the study
To develop an approach to generating and collecting data for both the micro-history and for the wider study, and to answer the above-detailed research questions, my first step was to examine the approaches used by researchers who had conducted and published studies using micro-history. I then drew on these and on the more general literature on educational research to develop what I believed was an appropriate approach to data collection.
Data collection approaches in previous micro-historical research
As Ellis (1996) points out, many micro-historical studies centre on specific individuals or events and require considerable focus – indeed she compares the approach to that of a biologist using a microscope to look at tiny obscure organisms. In terms of data collection, as the writer explains, a large number of studies rely on historical records regarding the individuals and/or events they are examining. For example, Ellis details Kagan’s (1990) investigation into a heresy trial of a young woman in 16th-century Spain, in which the researcher examined the records kept by the Inquisition and also the records of the young woman’s dreams which were transcribed on a daily basis by a priest. She also details how Macfarlane used trial depositions and personal records kept by a justice of the peace for his 1981 study of violence within a criminal gang in 17th-century England. Adrian (2013), in his paper on the micro-history of a rural estate in 15th- and 16th-century Switzerland, details how he sourced and examined the landlord’s records of dues from tenants in order to collect data.
Steele (2006) admits that one of the challenges facing micro-historians such as Ginzburg and Spence, whose protagonists lived in 16th-century Italy and 17th-century China respectively, is that they are often working with a limited amount of evidence and have to develop strategies to overcome the gaps in their data. Researchers conducting more modern micro-histories – a category I felt my proposed study could be placed into – have a wider range of data and thus data-gathering approaches at their disposal. Brewer et al. (2011), for example, in their micro-history of the development of pre-school education in Austin, Texas, were able to collect large quantities of both primary-source documents from newspapers, minutes of the Free Kindergarten Association meetings and school reports, and secondary-source documents from the histories of the kindergarten movement, the welfare state and Texas’s school system. The researchers were then able to work through both sets of sources and extract the data relevant to their research project. However, while having
54 access to a wider number of data sources than micro-historians focusing on earlier periods, Brewer et al. essentially use a similar approach to these historians in that they gather and collect data solely from written sources.
Other contemporary micro-historians adopt more varied approaches. Munt (2004), for example, in her micro-history of teacher stress at an Australian secondary school, gathered data from spending time at the school, shadowing and observing teachers in the classrooms and during staff meetings and breaks. At the same time she interviewed a number of the volunteer teachers in order to obtain their personal micro-histories, which she then transcribed and analysed. Lehmann (2009), in her paper on the micro-history of relations between Polish and Ukrainian communities in a small region in south-east Poland, appears – in a similar way to Munt – to have spent time with both communities, conducting informal interviews with community members and observing them in their daily lives. Given the time period she covers – from the 1940s until the late 2000s – the statistical data she produces and her account of the wider regional events which impacted upon the communities, I assume that she also undertook detailed research into the relevant historical records along with reading general historical literature relating to both the region and the relevant communities. Similarly Sodikoff (2007) appears to have spent time with the individuals and communities involved with the strike and to have undertaken an extensive examination of documents, records and published literature relating to the management of the national park the strike took place in and those relating more generally to internationally funded conservation projects in Madagascar.
The approach to collecting data adopted by Sodikoff (2007) and Lehmann (2009) is generally described as ‘ethnographic’. In line with ideas detailed by Naidoo (2012), both writers collected data through talking to, observing and spending time with their subjects in their real-world settings, and gathering insights into how these subjects lived and worked, how they related to their wider contexts and what their genuine attitudes were to the issues being examined. Jayawardena (1987) adopts a similar approach in her account of a social situation in rural Indonesia; indeed, I would argue that her study is as much a full ethnography – based on definitions provided by Naidoo (2012) and Zemliansky (2008) – as a micro-history, as it is written partly from a socio-anthropological perspective, and its main focus is an examination of social and cultural issues in a specific area in rural Indonesia.
My approach to collecting data would be more akin to Lehmann’s, Jayawardena’s and Sodikoff’s approaches, as opposed to the more document- and written records-based approaches of other micro-historians such as Brewer et al. (2011) and Stieber (1999) in his
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micro-history of the development of the concept of the modern city. Furthermore, while I realised that I would not be able to gain an ‘insider’ status within LETTS comparable to that achieved by Lehmann (2009) and Sodikoff (2007), and therefore would not be able to conduct the same level of informal observations and discussions as these writers, I did feel that I could spend time interviewing and observing the educators and the other relevant officials involved with LETTS, and draw upon this data when both writing the micro-history and conducting the subsequent analysis and interpretation.
Narrowing down my approach to data collection
As Sikes and Gale (2006) explain, there are a range of techniques that researchers have at their disposal when gathering data for a narrative they are producing, including observations, interviews, participant diaries and document collection. For my micro-history I felt that one of the main sources of data would need to come from interviewing participants, which would also fit in with my aim of giving the protagonists the opportunity to tell their stories. In my opinion, the central participants were the teacher educators trained by LETTS and the MoE officials responsible for organising the programme. There were other individuals, including BC staff members and senior MoE officials responsible for the general oversight of the education sector, who, while not directly involved with the programme, were aware of LETTS and could potentially provide useful information for the narrative account, including from the perspective of an outsider looking in. Furthermore, I had certain contacts in the wider Libyan educational context, such as the Head of English at the University of Tripoli’s Faculty of Education and the Director of the Education Development Trust (EDT) – who had recently worked with the MoE on a UNICEF-funded national review of the education system – who, while not involved with LETTS, could offer a more general perspective on developments in Libya’s education system, which could also contribute to the narrative, particularly in enabling me to place LETTS in the wider context of Libya’s post-2011 efforts to reform the education system.
Along with interviewing, the two other main data-gathering tools I believed were most appropriate were document collection – also mentioned by Sikes and Gale – and my own research diary. Regarding the former, I realised that compared to other countries where I had engaged with government ministries – mainly Sudan and Ukraine – Libya, as Beauchamp (2014) points out, had inherited a weak and incoherent bureaucracy from Gaddafi, and so sourcing records and other written data would be challenging. However, I was hopeful that there would be some ministerial documentation I could source to provide data on what the MoE wanted to achieve from both LETTS and its wider collaboration with
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the BC. There were also my own written communications with the MoE, which would aid my recollections of and reflections on what I was trying to achieve and my expectations of LETTS quickly becoming a sustainable national teacher training programme. Regarding the latter, I was aware that, as Altrichter et al. (1993) suggest, a diary or reflective log is a crucial tool for any researcher. Indeed, because I was the central protagonist in the organisation of LETTS, my ideas and experiences would arguably be key data sources in explaining why the programme was set up, how it was delivered and why it failed. Moreover, as with my above-mentioned communications with the MoE, examining the actual ideas I had at particular stages in the programme would also help me reflect on what I was trying to achieve at the time.
The following sections outline the data-collection procedures I undertook to generate research data for the study. These procedures included interviewing, document collection and keeping a research diary. At the end of the description of each procedure, I provide an overview of how it was applied, the data sources it drew upon, the period in which it was applied and any other information that I feel is relevant. Also, at the end of the section on the use of focus group interviews, I describe the informal conversations I had with LETTS participants, as this emerged incidentally as a data-collection technique during the study.
Individual and focus-group interviewing
As Gill et al. (2008) explain, there are four fundamental types of face-to-face research interviews: structured, semi-structured, unstructured and focus groups. Structured interviews are essentially verbally administered questionnaires in which predetermined questions are asked with no scope for follow-up questions. These are easy to administer, but because they allow only a limited response were not suitable for the type of research I was pursuing, in which more in-depth data was likely to be required. Semi-structured interviews, as the writers proceed to explain, consist of several key questions that help to define the areas to be explored, but also allow the interviewer or interviewee to diverge in order to pursue an idea or response in more detail. Unstructured interviews, on the other hand, as Gill et al. detail, do not reflect any preconceived ideas, generally start off with a generic question such as ‘Tell me about your experience on the teacher training course’ and are performed with little or no planning or organisation.
Focus groups, as Cohen and Crabtree (2006) explain, are semi-structured group interviews used to collect data on a specific topic or set of topics, and as well as for academic research are also used extensively for market research. Gill et al. (2008) describe them as group
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discussions on particular topics organised for research purposes, which are guided, monitored and recorded by moderators, and which are useful for generating data on collective views and the meanings behind them, as well as for producing a rich understanding of participants’ experiences and beliefs. Writers such as Gibbs (1997) and Morgan (1997) tend to distinguish between focus groups and other forms of group interviews, arguing that the former are more interactive, with group opinion as important as that of individual participants, while the latter are simply a way of gathering opinions from individuals within a group. However, for the purposes of this study I adopted a looser definition when using the term ‘focus groups’ and viewed them as interviews with groups of participants, focused on particular issues and providing the opportunity to obtain opinions from a number of different individuals, recognising, in line with Rabiee’s (2004) argument, that the group dynamics and interaction between participants could provide richer and more in-depth data than individual interviews.
Regarding the teacher educators, I was anxious to engage with as many of them as possible. As well as wanting to give them a voice – as mentioned in Chapter 1 – I was also aware that, in line with Goodson’s (1991) argument, in educational research it is often the everyday people such as teachers and students who are most affected by the research area and who are therefore able to offer the most important insights. I felt that this was applicable to the educators, as they were an integral part of LETTS and professionals working for the MoE, but were not part of its decision-making structure and so they potentially had unique ideas regarding the reasons for LETTS’ limited success. However, due to the relatively large number of educators involved in LETTS, I felt that one-to-one interviewing was not the most appropriate way forward due to the time involved and large quantities of data it would create. Furthermore, drawing upon Mason’s (2010) arguments, I anticipated that conducting the same interview with a large number of people – many of whom were likely to have similar views and ideas – would prove repetitive and lead, in line with Mason’s suggestions, to saturation, in that after time the data would fail to generate any new information.
Use of focus groups in the study
Following my examination of the different approaches to interviewing in the previous section, I decided to use focus groups to gather data from the teacher educators.1 I organised the first ones in November 2012 during the delivery of the first stage of the initial two-week
1 Please note that the decision to use focus groups to generate data was taken when planning the initial study and prior to the decision to use a micro-historical approach.
58 educator training course. There were 56 trainees on the course and these had been divided into two groups of 28 each. Two focus groups were organised, one midway through the course and one towards the end. In line with advice from writers such as Deem (1997), Eliot (2011), Gibbs (1997) and Hanan (2007), the purpose of the focus groups was clearly explained to trainees – in English and Arabic – during the course. It was also explained that participation was voluntary, their anonymity would be respected at all times, they would have the right of withdrawal at any time and that the results would not be shared with the MoE. Trainees interested in participating submitted their names to their trainer and then three participants were selected at random from each group. This gave a total of six participants for the focus group which, as Deem stresses, is the minimum number in order to ensure strong group dynamics.
While randomly selecting participants was the fairest and most transparent way to proceed, especially as those who had volunteered were evidently keen to take part, this approach is against the advice offered by certain writers, such as Eliot (2011), as it does not ensure that the focus group is representative of the wider grouping it is supposed to represent. Indeed, this was borne out by the fact that two of the focus group participants were men, despite there being only four males in the educator training course groups, and that two of the selected participants then failed to complete the training course to a satisfactory standard. Therefore, it may have been appropriate to have identified those volunteers who were likely to complete the course in order to ensure continuity in future focus groups and in other data- collection activities. However, due to concerns around fairness and giving all volunteers an equal chance to participate, and the fact that I was not certain that the international trainers or myself were in a position to identify such individuals at this stage, I decided against this. Furthermore, four of the participants were females aged in their late 20s and in their 30s, and so in general the participants were representative of most trainees in the educator training groups.
To facilitate the focus groups, I engaged an experienced local moderator to lead them in Arabic, the participants’ first language (L1). In line with Gray’s (2014) advice, I felt that using Arabic would make it easier for participants to articulate their opinions and speak openly. I also decided not to be present during the focus groups on the basis that as an ‘insider researcher’ (Unluer, 2012: pp.1–2) and as a professional seen as having high expectations for LETTS, my presence would also act as a barrier to participants speaking openly. Furthermore, I believed my presence could – as Collins et al. (2005) argue in their paper on problematic interviewee behaviour in research – lead to participants providing the answers they believed I wanted to hear and/or they felt would portray them in a favourable light in my
59 eyes. The focus groups were recorded and then several days later the moderator and I met to play these recordings. As the recordings were played, the moderator translated them, and together we discussed the ideas that emerged, with my notes from these discussions becoming my data.
The focus groups from the course each lasted over an hour and, as Gibbs (1997) warns, produced a large amount of data which took me a long time to go through and to extract the main points from. The moderator proved a competent facilitator, establishing, in line with Deem’s (1997) advice, the group’s ground rules at the start, reminding participants about confidentiality, not interrupting and not dominating, and effectively facilitating over two hours of discussion. My only concerns were that she had a tendency to empathise with the participants when they criticised the MoE instead of moving them towards a more balanced appraisal, and also that, at times, points which had previously been discussed – particularly the issue of Libyan teachers of English’s low English levels – were often returned to despite nothing new actually being spoken about.
I initially intended to have only two focus groups during the educator training stage of LETTS, as I had only planned on having one training course. However, although 20 trainees out of the original 56 were viewed by the international trainers as having the potential to become educators, both the trainers and myself had concerns about these trainees’ readiness to start training other teachers. Therefore a further course looking at teaching approaches and methodologies was organised, which presented the opportunity to organise further focus groups. My plan was to organise two more focus groups in a similar approach to the first two, using the same moderator and the same number of participants. Trainees were informed about the chance to be involved in the groups, and participants were selected using the same approach as before. The groups were to be facilitated using the same approach as before, with the moderator conducting the interviews in L1 and recording them for later discussion with me. Furthermore, while planning these new focus groups, I highlighted with the moderator my above-mentioned concerns regarding her facilitation of the previous groups, and she promised that similar issues would not occur this time round.
Unfortunately, due to an unexpected crisis in another ELT programme taking place in Misrata – a city 150 miles to the east of the capital – I was not in Tripoli when this second course was delivered, and despite me asking the BC international trainer and the moderator to organise two focus groups, only one group was actually conducted. This highlighted another issue, which was that in Libya it was important for me to actively manage all research activity as closely as possible in order to ensure it took place as planned.
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Like the previous two focus groups, this group yielded an impressive amount of data, although by this point I was now mindful of another issue, in that for all three focus groups I was reliant, due to my limited Arabic, upon the moderator’s translations regarding what the participants had actually said. As Birbili (2000) argues, there are risks to the validity of data provided via interpretation, mainly regarding poor-quality translations due to either interpreter incompetence and/or if the translation genuinely has differing connotations in the two languages, or when socio-cultural factors and/or their own feelings and bias influence the way the interpreter translates the data. The latter point was something I was well aware of, as the moderator, who had previously been a school teacher in southern Libya, was highly opinionated regarding the state of ELT in secondary schools. One solution, suggested by Temple (1997), is to have a process of continually discussing and debating the translated data with the interpreter, while another, detailed by Birbili, is to check the interpreter’s translations with another interpreter or to ‘back-translate’ the translation into the initial language and then to compare it with the original data. However, due to time pressures I was unable to apply either of these solutions at the time, and instead I made a note to go through these recordings with the moderator again, along with my notes from our original discussions, when I was writing up my analysis and interpretation of the data. However, due to subsequent events in Libya – particularly my evacuation from the country in mid 2014 – this was not possible.
I organised two further focus groups in 2013 with the teacher educators. The first was in early spring, following a three-week practical training course which had been organised at the BC to give the educators guided experience of training ‘real’ teachers. It was organised along similar lines to the previous one, with participation being voluntary and four participants being selected. The participants were all female and, apart from one who was in her early 20s with only a small amount of teaching experience, were all in their 30s and had been teaching for periods of 8–15 years. It was facilitated by a BC international trainer. This was partly because the moderator who had conducted the previous focus groups was unavailable, partly because I felt that the international trainer was suitably skilled, partly because I believed that these educators had sufficient English language skills to participate in a focus group interview conducted in English and partly because I was concerned by the potential risks discussed above regarding relying on translated data. Furthermore, in line with Billson’s (2006) advice for managing focus groups not conducted in participants’ first language, I instructed the moderator to ensure that questions were clear and direct, that paraphrasing was applied if required and that patience and understanding were exercised due to English not being participants’ L1.
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The international trainer managed the focus group well. Indeed, I felt she fulfilled the attributes for effective focus group moderation identified by Martin (2011). All participants were given the opportunity to contribute and, unlike the previous focus groups, time was not wasted repeating discussions about previous topics. However, possibly because of an inadequate briefing on my part, this moderator tended to focus on pedagogical issues as opposed to those concerning the ongoing and future delivery of LETTS. I also noted that although the participants were eager to contribute and often spoke at length, their ability to express themselves and to explore ideas was more limited than in the earlier focus groups conducted in L1.
The next focus group was conducted after the educators had delivered a set of MoE teacher training courses in the early summer of 2013. Eight educators had been responsible for delivering these courses and all were invited to participate. Although this group was larger than previous ones, the size still fell within the guidelines produced by writers such as Morgan (1997) and Onwuegbuzie et al. (2009), and when I discussed the prospect of the focus group with the educators informally, they were all eager to participate. Once again, participation was made voluntary, participant anonymity guaranteed and participants had the right to withdraw at any time. Once again, I decided to conduct the group in English, and on this occasion I asked the BC English Project Manager to moderate. This was because she had been extensively involved in LETTS and understood the issues concerning the programme and its future development, as well as what my research project was trying to achieve. Moreover, she was trusted by the educators and, like the first moderator, had been trained as a focus group facilitator. Furthermore, because I felt, from my discussions with the educators prior to the focus group, that I was also sufficiently trusted for them to speak openly in my presence, I also decided to attend.
This focus group lasted a long time, almost two hours, and yielded an array of revealing data. However, on reflection and in line with Stewart et al.’s (2007) advice, I ought to have spent more time considering the selection of the moderator. This was because as the focus group progressed, it began to have more in common with the group discussions and interviews described by Gibbs (1997) – who distinguishes between these and focus groups – with the moderator leading the discussion and managing the interaction, as opposed to the participants steering the group themselves. This was, I suspect, because the moderator was quite involved with LETTS and had her own ideas about its development, and also because the participants were used to having such discussions with her. However, on the other hand, the moderator’s management approach prevented issues repeatedly being rediscussed without new data being generated.
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Both of these focus groups were recorded, and unlike the initial groups, I listened to the recordings alone, taking notes and writing down my initial reactions to the ideas generated. In line with the suggestions I presented in my 2009 Master’s study, which examined how in- service training had contributed to the professional development of a group of Ukrainian teachers of English, I decided that it was not worth transcribing the entire interviews and instead transcribed the parts in which important points were made or issues discussed, and then noted my ideas underneath. My reasoning for not listening to and discussing these with the relevant moderator was that, unlike with the initial interviews, this was not required, as both focus groups had been conducted in English. However, with hindsight, and in line with Shenton’s (2004) ideas on ensuring validity in qualitative research, going through the recordings with the relevant moderator would have offered the opportunity to discuss my ideas with a well-informed professional and possibly to see things from a different angle.
Change over time in the focus groups
The first focus groups examined the trainee educators’ development as future teacher trainers. Although no specific questions were set, I agreed a number of prompts with the moderator that looked at the participants’ feelings regarding the training course, how confident they felt about training other teachers, what they felt the key challenges would be and how they felt the BC could best support them moving forward. I also wanted to use the groups to find out more information on the state of Libya’s education system – particularly regarding the teaching of English – and the trainees’ hopes and expectations for its future. As well as generating data for my study, these areas were also intended to inform the future development of LETTS and how the programme could be best organised to achieve its objectives.
This focus largely remained unchanged during the first three focus groups, although in the second group there was also an emphasis on examining how well the participants understood the nature and purpose of the training, as the first group had revealed that many of the trainees had applied for the course thinking it was a teacher training course. Also, in the second and third groups there was increased emphasis on how confident the participants were feeling regarding their forthcoming roles as educators and what further support they needed.
The fourth group – the group following the practical teacher training skills course – was once again organised with the relevant moderator – this time an international trainer – and myself agreeing on the prompts. These were aimed at discussing participants’ feelings about the
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course and its value, particularly regarding the opportunity it provided for them to gain practical training experience. It also gauged their feelings regarding the failure of the Libyan General Centre for Teacher Education and Development (GCTED) to move things forward regarding the organisation of the planned in-service teacher training programme. In addition to informing the study, the information from this group was also intended to support my belief that trainer training courses could benefit from a substantial practical training element – something lacking in most courses run by the BC at that time.
The final focus group – the one following the first set of teacher training courses – was concerned with the educators’ ideas and experiences regarding their first actual teacher training experience, how this had affected their confidence and contributed to their general development as educators, and what challenges they had faced. Intended to inform the future development of LETTS as well as the study, it also examined how supportive the GCTED had been, how teachers had been selected to attend the training and whether this approach – short intensive courses delivered when teachers had no teaching duties – was the way forward.
The focus group data was intended to inform the initially intended study (see page 16), which is why the moderators’ prompts were aimed at assessing the educators’ feelings regarding the training they were receiving, how their confidence was developing and what support they required from both the BC and the MoE. This importance of the data collected lessened when I changed the focus of the study. However, the focus groups were a key part of the LETTS experience and therefore of the micro-history, and so were particularly relevant for the first research question on how LETTS unfolded in 2012–14. Moreover, the participants were able to shed light on the state of Libya’s education system and the lack of any visible reform within the system, which contributed to the second research question on the reasons for LETTS’ failure.
Overview of focus group interviews
Table 1 below details the focus groups that were organised, when they took place, who the participants were, their length, the language used and the data collected. I have also included details of the follow-up discussions that were organised after those focus groups conducted in Arabic (participants’ L1).
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Table 1: Details of the focus groups organised Date LETTS stage Participants Length Language Data 25/10/12 Initial teacher 6 trainee 86 Arabic Recording of educator teacher minutes focus group training educators & local moderator 29/10/12 Initial teacher Researcher & 142 English Recording of educator local moderator minutes post focus training group discussion & researcher’s notes 01/11/12 Initial teacher 6 trainee 79 Arabic Recording of educator teacher minutes focus group training educators & local moderator 05/11/12 Initial teacher Researcher & 129 English Recording of educator local moderator minutes post focus training group discussion & researcher’s notes 06/12/12 Approaches & 6 trainee 82 Arabic Recording of Methodologies teacher minutes focus group course educators & (second phase local moderator of educator training) 13/12/12 Approaches & Researcher & 133 English Recording of Methodologies local moderator minutes post focus course group (second phase discussion & of educator researcher’s training) notes 02/04/13 Practical 4 trainee 64 English Recording of teacher educators & minutes focus group &
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training skills international researcher’s course teacher trainer notes (moderator) 02/07/13 First set of 8 educators & 125 English Recording of teacher English Project minutes focus group & training Manager researcher’s courses (moderator) notes
Use of informal conversations in the study
In addition to focus group interviewing, another form of obtaining data from the educators – and subsequently the teachers they trained – that emerged during the study was through having informal conversations with them. Similar to the ‘conversational interviewing’ technique described by Roulston (2008: pp.128–129) and that of ‘informal interviewing’ detailed by Dewalt and Dewalt (2002: pp.137–156), this involved speaking to educators and teachers informally about issues relevant to the study. With the exception of one preparation meeting at the BC prior to the delivery of the summer 2013 teacher training courses, I was not able to record these conversations. However, when useful information began to emerge in a conversation, I asked the educator or teacher if I could make a note of it for my research and followed up soon after by noting it in my research diary. Through using this technique, I was able to gain data that contributed to the ideas beginning to emerge from the study, particularly regarding how English was being taught in schools, general conditions in the education sector, the motivation of teachers to participate in professional development training and Libyan people’s changing attitudes towards the Revolution.
Overview of use of informal conversations
The informal conversations I had with the educators and teachers mainly took place during the initial educator training course in October–November 2013, the practical training skills course in March–April 2013 and the preparations for and delivery of the first set of teacher training courses in June 2013. On one of these occasions – the final preparation meeting for the June 2013 teacher training courses – I recorded the conversations. On others I simply noted down the relevant comments in my diary at the earliest opportunity.
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Use of individual interviews in the study
The focus groups produced a substantial amount of useful data. However, this data was related to the study’s initial focus on teacher educator development and I now needed data for a new set of research questions (see Chapter 1 for details of these), particularly regarding the reasons for LETTS’ limited success. I also realised that the data I had collected was essentially the ideas of one specific group of participants in LETTS, who had all been involved in a similar way and who mostly came from similar social backgrounds. I believed I needed data from other participants, particularly those involved at a senior level in the MoE and especially in the GCTED, and also from individuals who, although not necessarily participants in LETTS, were in a position to comment on issues regarding the programme.
Therefore I put together a list of individuals I planned to approach, including the minister and deputy ministers of education, the director of the GCTED I had originally worked with on organising LETTS, the current director and her deputy, and the Head of English at Tripoli University’s Faculty of Education. The latter, while not involved with LETTS, worked closely with the MoE and GCTED through his department’s pre-service training programme for future teachers of English and was aware of the issues regarding both organisations. I also decided to interview the BC Country Director who, as my line manager, had oversight of the programme, the BC’s Education Programme Manager, who despite a concerted effort had failed to get the MoE to engage with her on a series of general education projects, and the head of the EDT in Libya who had worked with the MoE on a major UNICEF-funded review of the general education system.
The collection method I decided to use to obtain the data from these individuals was semi- structured interviewing, which, as I explained earlier, involves the interviewer asking several key questions that help to define the areas to be explored, but also allows the interviewer and/or interviewee to diverge in order to pursue an idea or response in more detail. Keller and Conradin (2010) argue that semi-structured interviews are an effective way of providing reliable qualitative data as the researcher is able to plan and prepare the interview to ensure that all relevant issues are covered and that these issues can be explored in depth. They also encourage two-way communication, as those being interviewed can ask the interviewer questions.
The researchers whose work I had reviewed, such as Sodikoff (2007) and Lehmann (2009), had used a mixture of semi-structured and unstructured interviews, with the latter appearing
67 to have been organised when conversations with the individuals they were researching provided the opportunity for data collection. However, it was unlikely I would be able to emulate these more ethnographic researchers and properly integrate myself with the individuals mentioned above. Moreover, I had used unstructured interviews for an article on teachers’ experiences of taking a course on self-access learning (Gray, 2006), and found the interviews lengthy and difficult to manage and that they produced a lot of irrelevant information. I had previously used semi-structured interviews on my above-mentioned 2009 Master’s study on the professional development of a group of Ukrainian teachers of English, and found this approach to be effective in obtaining large amounts of focused data and especially useful, in line with Cohen and Crabtree’s (2006) suggestions, when, as was likely with most of my intended interviewees, there was only one opportunity to conduct the interview.
At the same time, I was mindful of Keller and Conradin’s (2010) comments about the importance of the researcher preparing properly for the interview to ensure all areas are covered and to avoid prescriptive or leading questions. I was also aware of Leech’s (2006) advice on the importance of building a rapport with the interviewee, encouraging them to speak via questions and prompts, and managing their responses in order to obtain the maximum amount of data, but at the same time preventing them from talking aimlessly. I also noted her recommendation that the interviewer avoid both seeming to be more knowledgeable than the interviewee about the subject area, even if this is the case, and trying – if this is an issue the interviewer feels strongly about – to win the interviewee round to his/her way of thinking.
I organised the interviews by contacting the relevant individuals by phone and then by email, explaining why I wanted to interview them, describing the sorts of questions I planned to ask and detailing the aims and purpose of my research project. In line with the ethical principles for conducting educational research provided by bodies such as the British Education Research Association (2018), I explained that participation in the interview was voluntary and they had the right to withdraw at any point either before or during the interview. I also explained that the interview would be recorded, but that I would be the only person who would have access to the recording, and that at no point in the research project would their names be mentioned. Furthermore, as writers such as Keller and Conradin (2010) and Leech (2006) advise, I ensured that the interviews were conducted in comfortable locations convenient for the interviewees, but also where we were unlikely to be disturbed, and that there was ample time – around two hours – for the exercise. For more information on the ethical procedures adopted by this study see the summary on pages 72-74 and Appendix 3.
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Between November 2013 and July 2014, I conducted interviews with most of the above- mentioned individuals (see Appendix 4 for an example of an interview transcript). To prepare for each interview, I followed Hanan’s (2007) advice and considered in depth what information I wanted to take from the relevant individual and then prepared my prompts accordingly. I also considered how I would deal with potentially sensitive areas, particularly those that called into question the competence of the individual being interviewed and/or reflected badly on Libya as a country. At one point I considered videoing the interviews, as Hanan advises, as it could potentially capture facial expressions and non-verbal gestures. However, I was unsure how the individuals would react, especially given local cultural sensitivities regarding being filmed or photographed, and so opted to audio record them as I had done with the focus groups.
For the first interview, with the GCTED director, I was accompanied by an interpreter, as although the interviewee understood English, I felt she might need support in articulating her answers. The interview itself was a curious affair, as the director’s deputy also attended, even though I had hoped to interview him separately, and a large part of the interview involved the pair of them discussing their answers before responding. At this point I was aware of Birbili’s (2000) above-mentioned arguments regarding the reliability of data gathered via translation, although I had the advantage that the interviewees understood both the questions and the translations of their answers, and also, in line with Temple’s (1997) advice, I questioned and briefly debated the answers with the interpreter to help ensure their accuracy. The interview yielded a large amount of data and gave me a number of useful insights into the reasons for LETTS’ limited success, including how wider issues regarding Libya’s general political and economic situation were affecting the work of the GCTED and therefore the centre’s ability to support LETTS.
The other interviews with the Libyan officials were all with individuals who had studied in the UK and/or who had qualified and practised as teachers of English, and so I felt that an interpreter was not required. This assumption was vindicated, as there were no real issues with communication in any of these interviews and, in general, the interviews – both with Libyans and with UK nationals – enabled the discussion of a range of issues relating to the research questions and produced large amounts of useful data.
Following each interview, and with time permitting, I then wrote down my immediate thoughts in my research diary and then within the next two to three days listened to the recording and took notes. As with the focus groups, I did not transcribe entire interviews and instead extracted certain excerpts which I then commented on. With hindsight and in line
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with Dipeolu’s (2010) advice, it may have been pertinent to have listened to and discussed the recordings with a fellow professional, although this would have compromised the ethics of my project as I had promised the interviewees that only I would listen to their interviews.
Because of the amount and quality of the data produced, I also opted to hold similar interviews with a number of other individuals. Firstly, I organised interviews with three of the teacher educators who were relatively well informed of developments within school sector education – two were active within the local association for teachers of English and one worked part time on local television and radio. These were organised in a similar way to the previous interviews, although they tended to be less formal. This was partly because I already knew the educators and felt that it was appropriate to have a less-structured, more- relaxed discussion with them and partly because as they had participated in the focus groups, they had discussed the main topic areas and so I was interested in exploring what additional ideas they could produce. These interviews managed to avoid revisiting issues discussed in the focus groups, and as well as providing new insights into the varying fortune of LETTS, they provided interesting information on the wider state of Libya’s education system.
Secondly, I organised an interview with the UK Ambassador to Libya. Although not involved with LETTS, the Ambassador had been kept informed of its main developments within the wider spectrum of BC English activities and I believed he could provide a higher-level, more- holistic view of events and developments in post-Revolutionary Libya which would help me examine how these influenced the programme. This took place in late 2014, and as both the embassy and the BC had been relocated to Tunisia by this point, it took place in the British embassy in Tunis. This was my final interview in this research project.
Focus of interviews and use of data
Unlike the focus groups, the interviews were organised once the study had been reorientated and the research questions on pages 52–53 were being developed. The overall focus of all the interviews was on the reasons for LETTS’ limited achievements and eventual unravelling, although the specific nature of the questions depended upon the individual being interviewed, as some of the interviewees were aware of the programme and had been involved, either directly or indirectly, whereas others had little awareness of it, but had extensive knowledge of the wider challenges facing both Libya’s education system and the country as a whole – such as the lack of strong political leadership – which had a direct or indirect influence on LETTS. Therefore, my question prompts were designed for the relevant
70 interviewee and the information I believed I was going to obtain. For example, when interviewing the GCTED director, the questions focused specifically on the reasons why the GCTED failed to support LETTS despite the centre signing a Memorandum of Understanding committing to this and despite the fact the centre had the funding to pay for the programme. With the former Deputy Minister for Education, the questions aimed to elicit his ideas regarding why there had been limited interest from the wider MoE in LETTS despite the ministry officially requesting the BC’s assistance with ELT in 2012. In both these examples, the interviews did not go according to plan, with the GCTED director declaring she believed LETTS had been a success and the Deputy Minister claiming to have no knowledge of LETTS, despite me personally briefing him on the programme in early 2013.
Regarding the interviews conducted with individuals who had not been involved with LETTS, I factored in providing a brief explanation about the programme and its history, and prepared question prompts looking at wider issues which I could then link to the MoE’s failure to engage with the BC on LETTS. For example, the former head of EDT had not been aware of LETTS, but was aware of the BC’s general and largely fruitless attempts to engage with the MoE. Therefore, the interview looked at the ministry’s failure to develop a comprehensive education sector reform programme which LETTS could have linked into, and its inability to engage with organisations like the BC due to its lack of both skilled staff and effective leadership.
The importance of the interview data and its contribution to the study was often hard to predict beforehand. For example, the Head of the Faculty of Education at Tripoli University, despite having considerable awareness of the education sector and its challenges, added little to what previous interviewees had said, while the BC Education Programme Manager spent part of of the interview explaining that LETTS had failed partly due to the MoE’s distrust of foreign organisations – an idea I later discovered was largely baseless. The interview with the UK Ambassador, despite it being a short interview organised on a spur-of- the-moment decision, produced a considerable amount of useful data on how wider historical, political and security issues had acted as an obstacle to any post-Revolutionary national reform programme.
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Overview of individual interviews
Table 2 below provides details of the interviews organised during the study, when they took place, who the participants were, their lengths and the data collected.
Table 2: Details of the individual interviews organised Date Participant(s) Length Data 17/11/13 Director of GCTED (2012–14), Deputy 51 minutes Recording of interview GCTED Director & local interpreter & researcher’s notes 28/11/13 Former Deputy Minister for Education 75 minutes Recording of interview (2012–13) & researcher’s notes 18/12/13 Head of English, School of Education 68 minutes Recording of interview (Souk Jomaa campus), University of & researcher’s notes Tripoli 03/02/14 BC Education Programme Manager 35 minutes Recording of interview & researcher’s notes 13/02/14 Former educator (individual active in 42 minutes Recording of interview local teachers’ association) & researcher’s notes 19/02/14 2 former educators (one active in local 45 minutes Recording of interview teachers’ association and one in local & researcher’s notes media) 17/04/14 Head of EDT in Libya (at time of 86 minutes Recording of interview LETTS) & researcher’s notes 25/05/14 BC Country Director 48 minutes Recording of interview & researcher’s notes 14/07/14 Serving Deputy Minister for Education 65 minutes Recording of interview (2014) & researcher’s notes 26/11/14 UK Ambassador to Libya (2013–15) 22 minutes Recording of interview & researcher’s notes
Summary of ethical procedures
Before moving on, I think it is useful to summarise the ethical procedures I followed when engaging with participants in this research. The procedures were based on guidelines I had consulted from the British Education Research Association (2018), and my approach was
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consistent with the ethical guidelines of the University of Manchester that were in force at the time of the data collection.
With the focus group participants I ensured they were verbally informed twice about the conditions of their participation – once during the call for volunteers for the focus groups and once at the start of the focus group interviews. For the focus groups that took place during the first and second educator training courses in October-December 2012, the moderator informed the participants in Arabic and English at the start of the focus groups. For the other focus groups the participants were informed by me in English. With the one to one interviews, the interviewees were informed by me about the conditions of their participation verbally in English over the telephone, then in writing by email, and then again verbally at the start of each interview. The conditions regarding participation for both the focus groups and the interviewees were as follows:
a) Participation in the interview was completely voluntary; b) Participants had the right of withdrawal at any time; c) Participants had the right to refuse to answer any questions they were uncomfortable with without providing a reason; d) The interviews would be recorded, but only myself – and for the first three focus groups the moderator – would listen to them; e) The recordings would be stored securely and only I would have access to them; f) The recordings would be deleted at the end of the study; g) Participants could request that the recordings be deleted at any time after the interview; h) Participants’ anonymity would be respected at all times and their names would never be mentioned during either the interview or the wider study.
In addition to this, prior to the start of both the focus groups and the one to one interviews, the organisation and purpose of the event was re-explained to the participants and they were given the opportunity to ask any questions or to raise any concerns they had.
For the informal conversations I engaged in as data collection, it was not possible to organise such a rigorous approach. Instead I asked the relevant individuals’ permission to use the information they were providing me with for my study, informing them that they had the right to refuse, that their names would not be mentioned and that they had the right to request that I withdraw the information at any time after our conversation. On the one occasion – during the planning meeting with the teacher educators prior to the start of the
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first set of teacher training courses – I recorded an informal conversation, I informed the educators in advance, told them that their anonymity would be respected and that the recording would be stored in a secure location. I also made it clear that only I would be listening to it, that it would be deleted at the end of the study, and that they had the right to ask for it to be deleted at any time.
Initially, when setting up the first focus groups, I considered asking participants to sign consent forms as this is suggested by most guidelines on ethical academic research procedures. However, I decided against this partly because given Libya’s unstable and rapidly changing situation I felt that participants, even if they understood the form, would be cautious about putting their names and signatures on it for fear of creating a record that could be accessed by some future government or authority whose political stance could not be predicted. Furthermore, as the verbal explanations and reassurances worked perfectly well with participants on the first two focus groups, I saw no reason to change this moving forward. With the interviewees I had similar concerns regarding asking them to put their names and signatures on a form and so instead, after our initial telephone conversation and as mentioned above, I opted to send them an email setting out the conditions of their participation.
For more information on the ethical procedures followed by the study please see Appendix 3.
Use of research diary in the study
In addition to interviewing, which formed the main data-gathering technique of the research project, the second data-collection technique, which I began to apply at the same time as the focus groups started, was the use of a research diary, also referred to by writers such as Borg (2001) and Zentz and Whalen (2013) as a research log or research journal. Keeping a research diary, as Borg, Engin (2011) and Lamb (2013) point out, is an essential part of the research project as it enables the researcher to organise and articulate their ideas and experiences, keeps a record of the research project’s progress and provides a rich source of data for analysis. Moreover, it contributes towards the further development of the project as it can identify issues for further investigation and/or inform the researcher when a reorientation of the project’s strategy is required. In addition, Borg and Lamb argue that as well as a data-collection tool and a way of conducting ongoing analysis, research diaries also support researchers’ own professional development through developing their critical thinking, problem solving, research planning and information management skills. Borg in
74 particular supports this by providing an account of the processes he went through on one specific research project and also argues that reading other researchers’ diaries can be a powerful tool for the training of both researchers and research supervisors, as they provide insights into the personal aspects of the research process not usually covered in more formal training materials.
Although I had never kept a regular diary – indeed, in line with Kellaway’s (2001) arguments, I believed I was not the type of person who could keep a diary – I had maintained a so-called reflective log in 2009, while conducting my Master’s study, which examined how the University of Cambridge ICELT course had contributed to the professional development of a group of Ukrainian teachers of English (Gray, 2009). This had involved me writing down my thoughts and reflections following my observations of the teachers’ lessons and our follow- up discussions, a process I found straightforward as it was essentially an extension of my actual notes from the observations and discussions. However, I was aware that for the research project in question I would need to make regular entries based on my reflections on developments regarding LETTS, my ongoing research and the influence of wider social, economic, cultural and political factors – something which would be more of a challenge.
The immediate issues I needed to tackle were how I was going to record and organise my entries, how the diary would contribute to my research and how to ensure that I was genuinely reflecting. In terms of the former, I found a number of guides by institutions such as Anglia Ruskin University (2009) and The Open University (2013) which detail several approaches, including using traditional diary-style entries, producing forms to be filled in and using mind maps. From my own limited experience and from consulting Moon’s (2010) ideas on keeping research diaries, I concluded that the way entries were recorded was in essence an individual decision by the researcher based on their specific preferences for recording information, the requirements of the relevant project and the data requirements of the relevant research questions. To ensure that the diary contributed constructively to the research project, and drawing upon ideas from Borg (2001) and Lamb (2013), I decided that I would review content on a regular basis and, if appropriate, provide updates or make further notes on any relevant areas.
Regarding the question of ensuring genuine reflection, once again I found a number of guides published by institutions on how this can be achieved – the ones I consulted were provided by Dundee and Angus College (2013) and the University of Edinburgh (2015). These guides stated that this should involve the researcher detailing objectively the events taking place and their feelings and interpretations regarding these, as well as any questions
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they might have, and, if the opportunity permits, discussing their ideas with others. The guides also stress the importance of returning to these notes, examining them objectively and critically, and noting down any further ideas and/or lessons learned. The notes can then be drawn upon by the researcher when conducting their analysis and answering the relevant research questions. In my case, these guides helped pull together what I already knew and provided a straightforward approach to writing down my thoughts during the research project.
In reality, however, keeping a diary in line with the above recommendations proved a challenge, confirming my above-mentioned view that I was not the type of person suited to doing this type of activity, and I found myself recording information using a number of methods, including emails to my supervisor, entries scribbled into notebooks and randomly saved Word documents. I also largely failed to make regular entries and instead generally made notes following particular stages and events in the delivery of LETTS and the research project, such as teacher training courses and focus group interviews. Despite this, I was able to keep a record of my ideas and experiences, and was also relatively systematic about reviewing these and updating my ideas when relevant.
Indeed the diary proved invaluable when writing up the micro-history, as it provided a record of the stages and events in the LETTS experience that I then used to plan and write the micro-history around. It also provided information on my ideas and reactions during this experience regarding both events on the training programme and wider events in Libya. This helped personalise my account and showed the reader how my feelings and expectations changed during the programme’s lifespan. Following the completion of the micro-history, I was able to further draw upon data in the diary, particularly regarding issues such as my initial and highly optimistic expectations for LETTS and my communications with Libya’s MoE, when examining the reasons for LETTS’ failure.
Overview of use of research diary
Between April 2012 and December 2014 I kept a research diary. I averaged between one and two entries a month (see Appendix 5 for an example of one of these entries). During periods in which I was engaged with LETTS-related activities and/or carrying out data- gathering activities, this increased to three entries. There were also several months in which I made no entries. In total there were 43 entries, and the average length was between 600 and 1,000 words. To 26 of these entries, I added additional details at a later stage. These additional details were mainly my further ideas on the content of the entry based on
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developments regarding both LETTS and Libya in general, and on new data produced by the research project.
Collecting documents for the study
When collecting documents for the study, my initial assumption was that these would be official MoE documents, such as policy statements and official communications regarding LETTS, and more general issues relating to ELT in the school education system. These documents could then be analysed, with the findings contributing to both the micro-history and the resulting examination of the reasons for LETTS’ failure. This assumption was largely based on my previous experience in Ukraine and Sudan, although I was aware, as mentioned above, that Libya’s state bureaucracy was weaker than these two countries’. For example, when conducting research projects in Ukraine on teacher training and language testing reform in the military education system, I had been able to obtain a number of official documents regarding the Ukrainian MoD’s plans and current policies. When looking initially at conducting my research project in Sudan in 2010–11, I had been able to access papers on the Sudanese MoE’s general policies on both teacher training and the teaching of English.
However, although I found several general reports on the Libyan education system, including a 2008 report by the former regime’s education ministry – the GPCE (General People’s Committee for Education) aimed at international audiences and several studies by international assistance organisations, including one on the school examination system by UNESCO and the Arab League (2013) and an assessment of the general condition of schools by ACTED-Reach Education and UNICEF (2012), I could find no MoE policy documents relating to LETTS or to education reform in general. Indeed, evidence collected for this research project would later indicate that the MoE had little in the way of educational reform policies, and whatever decision-making and internal communications that did take place within the ministry were not documented and mainly conducted on a verbal level. Therefore, the only documents I had specifically focusing on LETTS were the BC’s original programme proposal, the 2012 BC–MoE MoU which launched LETTS and my brief email proposal to the MoE for a national teacher training programme in late 2013. While these documents provide important information regarding my plans and ambitions for LETTS, they did not provide insight into the MoE’s ideas regarding the programme or its efforts – or lack of them – to take it forward. However, the documents I managed to source – especially the 2013 UNICEF report – provided valuable details on the state of the MoE and its capacity,
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and helped me develop a picture of the wider situation within the education sector at the time I was trying to deliver LETTS.
Overview of documents collected
Table 3 below provides details of the key documents sourced and subsequently analysed, including their publisher and the year of their publication:
Table 3: Details of the key documents collected and analysed Title Summary Published by Year The Development of Report by the GPCE on the status of GPCE 2008 Education: National the school education system and the Report of Libya ministry’s plans for its future development. LETTS Proposal Proposal by the BC for the delivery British Council 2012 of a nationwide secondary school teacher in-service training programme. Memorandum of Memorandum of Understanding British Council, 2012 Understanding between the BC and MoE regarding Libyan Ministry of the organisation and delivery of General LETTS. Education Libya Nationwide School Evaluative review of the state of UNICEF, 2012 Assessment Report post-Revolutionary Libya’s school ACTED-REACH system. Education Case study: Education Situational analysis of the school UNICEF 2013 Reform in Libya system and recommendations for future reform.
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Chapter 3: Stages in generating and analysing the micro-history
This chapter details the three-stage approach I adopted to analysing and interpreting the research data. It starts with an overview of the approach and each stage, and then follows on with a more detailed description.
Overview of the stages
Stage 1: Producing the micro-history. This involved using a historical methods approach. Drawing upon my research notes and general recollections of and reflections on the 2012– 14 period, along with data from the interviews, focus groups and document-collection activities, and reports and commentaries on Libya during this time, I wrote a narrative-based micro-historical account of LETTS. This answered Research Question 1 – How did LETTS unfold over time in Libya in 2012–14? and prepared the ground for answering Research Question 2 – What could be viewed as the principal reasons for LETTS’ limited success and its eventual failure?
Stage 2: Analysing the micro-history. While still in the process of writing the micro-history, I began analysing the narrative to identify the main strands that emerged regarding the reasons regarding LETTS’ limited achievements and eventual unravelling. Once the micro- history was completed, I then organised these ideas into seven key strands and proceeded to extract the supporting data for each of them from the narrative. This started to provide the answers for Research Question 2.
Stage 3: Interpreting the strands. I then organised the data for each strand into coherent content, providing my own interpretations regarding how this influenced LETTS and bringing in additional data and evidence from reports and commentaries on Libya to support my arguments. In particular I drew upon the interview data as a way of providing research participants with a voice to present their ideas regarding the LETTS experience. This completed the answers for Research Question 2. This also paved the way for the thesis’ final section in which I used the results of my interpretation of the strands to answer Research Question 3 – What are the lessons that the LETTS experience provides for programme planners working in developing countries similar to Libya? by drawing up a series of lessons learned from the LETTS experience that could provide future guidance to education professionals planning and organising reform programmes in similar contexts to the Libyan one.
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Stage 1: Producing the micro-history
Busha and Harter (1980) describe the historical methods approach as typically involving six stages:
1. Recognition of a historical problem or the need for certain historical knowledge 2. Gathering of as much relevant information as possible 3. (if appropriate) Forming of hypothesis explaining relationships between historical factors 4. Collection and organisation of data, and the verification of its authenticity 5. Selection, organisation and analysis of the most relevant data 6. Production of conclusions and recording of these in a meaningful narrative.
A similar outline is provided by Schneider (1963), who also suggests that in the later stages researchers subject their findings to a process of historical criticism, which as well as examining the authenticity of their data, also involves identifying any meanings behind the data, particularly if they are drawing upon sources such as newspapers or diaries. Pakvis (2007), on the other hand, suggests a different approach, in which historians formulate both the relevant research questions and theories at the onset of the research process and support the data collection and analysis process with a full background literature review, before ending with the relevant conclusions. Although these descriptions were written with more general historians in mind, my assumption, in line with Alford et al.’s (2003) ideas, is that this approach is equally applicable to micro-historians.
Of the micro-histories that I reviewed earlier in the study (see pages 40–47) only Brewer et al. (2011) detailed their approach to processing and analysing the data. Using similar procedures to those described above, they set out their study’s focus and the issues to be addressed, and then provided the theoretical assumptions underpinning their study. Following this, they engaged in an ‘iterative process’ (p.13) of going through primary and secondary data sources extracting the relevant information and using this to write the historical narrative. My assumption is that the other micro-historians adopted similar approaches, with Jayawardena (1987) and Lehmann (2009) gathering their relevant data together and then working through it to source information to answer their research questions and support their hypotheses. In Jayawardena’s case, I assume this data was mainly notes and recollections from the Indonesian ‘social incident’ her micro-history focuses on and the surrounding time period, and in Lehmann’s case her interview and observation notes from spending time with the Polish and Ukrainian communities she was studying in
80 south-east Poland, along with any post-war historical records relating to the region. However, my impression is that while Lehmann’s analysis was generated as she wrote the narrative, like Brewer et al.’s (2011), Jayawardena seems to have conducted her analysis after writing up her narrative, possibly because she was using her micro-history to support a wider argument regarding approaches to historical study.
Sodikoff (2007), whose micro-history I also reviewed earlier in the study, arguably provides the closest narrative to the one I had in mind in that she witnessed the events being described and her data is mostly drawn from interviews with participants, along with her observations and recollections. She appears to follow a similar approach to those described above, and although she does not go through a process of authentication and critical examination of the data, she comments on how her interviewees’ positions and backgrounds influenced their views. Like Brewer et al. (2011) and Lehmann (2009), Sodikoff seems to conduct her analysis as she writes the narrative, extracting data showing the principal reasons for the strike and then elaborating on these and placing them in the wider context of the issues she is focusing on. The main difference between this approach and my own, with regard to writing our respective narratives, was that my focus was on events related to the LETTS experience, while Sodikoff’s was influenced by her project’s ethnographic nature and, as a result, she also examines data providing insights into the lives of the striking workers and their particular social communities.
In my case, the issues to be investigated were set through the research questions prior to the start of the micro-history, while the bulk of the data-collection phases took place alongside and contributed directly to the writing of it. Unlike my fellow micro-historians, I did not have a hypothesis or theory underpinning my narrative, and like Sodikoff most of the data was gathered through my own notes and interviews. Furthermore, like her, I realised it was important to note how interviewees’ positions and backgrounds could shape their ideas. Moreover, while I was confident that the small number of documents and reports I planned to use as data sources were authentic, I noted that I needed to take into account reliability issues with some of the statistics, mainly due to the general challenges around getting accurate data regarding education in Libya (Rose, 2015), but also, in the case of one of my sources – the 2008 GPCE report – because, as Rose implies, the Gaddafi regime often distorted statistics for propaganda purposes. With this in mind, I went through the data and my own recollections, noted down details of key LETTS-related events, and my feelings regarding these, and then used these to map out and then to write the micro-history.
When producing the actual micro-history, I emulated Sodikoff (2007) in writing a descriptive
81 account of LETTS, along with details of the wider events taking place in Libya during this time and my own ever-changing ideas regarding the programme. I included in this account a number of data extracts – mainly from my research diary – which detailed events taking place at the time, both on the programme and in the country as a whole, and my ideas and feelings regarding these. Interestingly, although I did not overly consider this at the time, my previous experience of conducting evaluative studies on my own work as an ELT project manager meant that I avoided developing a potential researcher bias – an issue highlighted by Cohen et al. (2007) – and trying to portray LETTS’ failure as the fault of parties other than myself. I was also guided by Lepore (2001), who advises that micro-histories should essentially be non-fiction stories and should focus on description as well as analysis.
Indeed, this final point was particularly interesting for me, as it was the opposite of the approach to writing historical essays I had been instructed to follow during my years as a history undergraduate. The recommended approach was to focus on analysing the issue being examined and to keep description to a minimum, particularly in examinations during which time was limited. For example, in an essay on the causes and results of the 1870–71 Franco-Prussian War, I received excellent marks despite not even mentioning the main battles. Although it had been over 20 years since I completed my BA degree, I still assumed this was the way to write historical essays and so writing the micro-history involved realigning this assumption.
The process of writing the micro-history started in early 2014 and continued until my completion of a final draft in late November – ironically, the day after the British Council had formally ruled out any immediate return to Libya. The actual process involved an ongoing cycle of writing, reviewing and editing and/or rewriting, with me providing the narrative with, as Galyean (1995) advises, a continuous flow while embedding extracts from my research diary and other data sources, and ensuring that the story was told as it was without any foregone conclusions. Along with events relating to LETTS, I also detailed events regarding my own more general work for the BC and, if I felt they influenced or had a bearing on LETTS, wider events in Libya as the country moved forward following the 2011 Revolution. These measures I believed would help the reader to both contextualise the programme and see the bigger picture. In line with this I tried to show how the violence and chaos on the ground affected my life and those of the people I engaged with, and, on occasions, how this sometimes led to amusing and surreal situations, such as my experience in July 2014 of sitting in the BC office drinking coffee and talking about quarterly financial results with colleagues, with the sound of gunfire and explosions in the background. The micro-history is detailed in Part 2 of this thesis.
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Stage 2: Analysing the micro-history
As Earthy and Cronin (2008) and Riessman (2005) suggest, there are no established approaches in educational research regarding the analysis of narrative texts. Moreover, my own examination of research papers indicates that once again researchers employ methods which suit their relevant research projects. Furthermore, Bamberg (2012) argues that the use of narrative analysis for educational research usually falls into two categories: ‘research with narrative’ (p.78), in which researchers use the contents of the relevant accounts as a resource and extract information to answer the relevant research questions, and ‘research on narrative’ (p.79), in which researchers focus on the way the narrative is written to provide the answers they are looking for. Riessman suggests a third category, ‘interactional analysis’ (p.4), in which the focus is on the dialogic process between the narrator and the listener, although this is only applicable in situations such as interviews or focus groups. Riessman also proceeds to point out that most researchers use a combination of these categories when carrying out exercises in narrative analysis.
In terms of techniques, there are a number available at researchers’ disposal, depending upon their objectives and relevant narrative(s) being analysed. Richmond (2002) in her study of the development of literacy skills among adult learning programme participants uses a top-down approach in which she sets predetermined categories using an organising scheme she refers to as a ‘story map’, although most writers describe this as ‘categorisation’. Working with data from a series of interviews, Richmond analyses each participant’s narrative, extracting the appropriate information and placing it, using a table, within particular time periods and social settings. She then proceeds to examine and interpret the data, commenting on what the results show about how participants’ literary skills have developed and what the implications are for the programme’s future development.
Hunter (2010), on the other hand, while examining similar narratives – in this case, interviews with sex abuse victims – adopts a bottom-up approach by reading through the narratives and looking for ideas and themes to emerge. Generally referred to by writers such as Brikci and Green (2007) and Alhojailan (2012) as ‘thematic analysis’, this, according to these writers, is the most common approach to analysing narratives. Taylor-Powell and Renner (2003), however, suggest an alternative approach, which involves approaching the narrative with a set of predetermined categories and, at the same time, using the additional themes that emerge once the analysis has started. These approaches, along with the more complex ones which Hunter goes on to describe, can be labour intensive, as researchers need to work through the data identifying and coding all relevant extracts and then to
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organise them within a particular framework. While such a coding-driven approach may be useful in certain research exercises, I was approaching the analysis of the micro-history as a historian, and so I believed my approach should reflect this.
The approach I decided to use for this part of the analysis was in line with those adopted by Brewer et al. (2011), Lehmann (2009) and Sodikoff (2007) and involved drawing upon historical research guidelines provided by Cronon (2009) and the Minnesota Historical Society (2008). Once I had started work on the micro-history, I made a note of Research Question 2 – What could be viewed as the principal reasons for LETTS’ limited success and its eventual failure? and as the narrative took shape continually looked for potential answers to this question. I did this through examining both the actual narrative and the data sources I was drawing on. Once the micro-history had been completed, and on an almost spontaneous level, I wrote down my initial ideas on why LETTS had failed, in no particular order and as they came to mind. I then used these as an initial guide to begin systematically analysing the micro-history and the relevant data sources – going through the materials on several occasions to confirm these ideas (see Appendix 6 for a full list of these ideas and details on which ones were confirmed). Also, in line with the Minnesota Historical Society’s guidelines, I began making notes about each one, questioning how much weight each one carried regarding LETTS’ failure.
For example, one of my initial assumptions was that one reason LETTS failed was because head teachers would not release teachers from their teaching duties to attend training. However, while this was an issue, my examination of the data showed that the problem was more around the GCTED being unwilling to undertake the work involved in organising for teachers to be released, and that teachers may have been willing to attend training during school holidays and/or at times when they were officially at work but had no teaching duties. I was also able to discount other ideas due to lack of evidence or when the data contradicted them. These included LETTS failing because the BC was perceived by the Libyans as being a foreign organisation with a hidden agenda and the view that the MoE was inherently sexist and so viewed teachers as being unimportant because they were mostly women.
At the same time I ensured that these initial ideas did not dictate the results of the analysis, and so I also looked for factors which I had not seriously considered or had not occurred to me when writing up the original micro-history. For example, when I initially noted down the MoE’s limited capacity as one reason why the ministry failed to engage effectively with the BC on LETTS, I put this down to the problems state bodies in developing countries tend to possess, for example bureaucracy, poor working conditions, low morale, poor work ethics
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and lack of suitably skilled staff. However, it was only when systematically analysing the micro-history and the other supporting documentation that I fully appreciated the influence of the Gaddafi regime’s legacy, in that it failed to build a functioning education ministry and left the MoE with a myriad of problems – particularly the over-supply of teachers – which it was poorly equipped to tackle. Similarly, although I realised that the MoE did not view teacher training as its main priority, I did not realise that this was because the ministry was focused on improving school facilities as a way of being seen as taking action and keeping the general populace happy. Nor did I appreciate the fact that this deprioritising of teacher training was partly a historical legacy, as Libya had never had any real system of in-service teacher training and the training teachers received at pre-service level largely ignored the actual process of classroom teaching, and so the MoE had little concept of what in-service training was, why it was important and what it could achieve.
Once I had produced what I felt was a definitive list, I then began to group these ideas – about 45 in total – under seven main themes or, as I began to refer to them, strands. Therefore, the BC’s high hopes for large Libyan government-funded education reform programmes, the more general UK assumption that Libya would award large contracts to British companies and the Libyan’s own view of Western assistance as a sort of ‘magic pill’ that would fix their problems were all incorporated under the strand: ‘A land of unparalleled opportunities’. It was testament to my sticking to the principles of the historical method and avoiding establishing any type of bias that two of the strands, ‘My own professional agenda’ and ‘The failure to adjust’, dealt with the shortcomings within my own approach to organising LETTS! Then, once I had a full set of notes written up (see Appendix 7 for an overview of these notes), I began drawing upon them to produce Stage 3.
Stage 3: Interpreting the strands
I began work on this stage following the completion of the micro-history. This stage also involved a change in perspective. A large part of the micro-history had been written while I was still based in Libya and while the focus was on the past – it was what could be described as ‘unfinished past’ as there was a sense things were still ongoing. However, this particular stage was started following my evacuation from Libya while I was based in Tunisia, and was undertaken from a different perspective. My discussion and expansion of the strands – which effectively constituted this stage – were carried out with my experiences of trying to organise LETTS firmly positioned as a series of past events. And, in line with Hexham’s (1999) advice, I realised that I needed to reflect on my ideas from my time in Libya to determine if I felt these were still valid, given the final results of both LETTS and the
85 wider story of Libya’s failure to develop into a modern democratic state. At the same time, I bore in mind Waller’s (2004) advice for historians on the ‘treacherous ally’ (p.115) that is hindsight and avoided adopting the assumption that these results were foregone conclusions. Indeed, in ‘The failure to adjust’ strand, I made a specific note to examine my approach to the BC’s ELT reform programmes with the university and vocational education sectors to consider whether using a comparable approach with LETTS would have yielded a different result.
My initial approach to this stage involved firstly gathering together the notes that I had made under each strand, in what Cohen et al.’s (2007) guidelines to historical report-writing describe as a ‘process of synthesis’ (p.195), involving the forming of a coherent discussion to support that particular strand. This meant bringing together ideas that initially seemed quite disparate such as, under the ‘Gaddafi’s legacy’ strand, the former dictator’s centralised system of government and the state of Libya’s education system. It also meant giving some consideration to how to report elements that straddled two or more strands, and, in line with Cohen’s et al.’s (2007) guidance, removing information that was of limited relevance, such as data on the secondary school English curriculum, which I had initially placed under ‘The MoE’s view of teacher training’ strand, and ensuring that the core arguments for each strand were properly articulated and supported. Secondly, once coherent draft texts had been produced for each strand, I then began bringing in evidence to support my interpretations from the data sets and from reports and commentaries on Libya. At the same time, in line with Hexham’s (1999) advice, I continually reviewed the ideas I was expressing to ensure any unconscious desires I had to portray my own role in a positive light remained in check.
Also at this stage I followed Corden and Sainsbury’s (2006) advice and used this section to give a ‘voice’ to the research project’s participants, mainly through using direct quotations from the interviews for my supporting evidence. This, as Corden (2007) suggests, gives participants the opportunity to speak for themselves and make their own arguments, and enables voices, which might not normally be listened to, to be heard. Also, as I discovered from reading Sodikoff’s (2007) and Lehmann’s (2009) micro-histories – both of which rely extensively on their participants’ voices – it enhances the narrative and, as Corden and Sainsbury (2006) argue, its readability and impact upon the reader. Furthermore, I realised that it offered the opportunity to fulfil my commitment to ensure that the teacher educators’ contribution to LETTS would be recognised, and – as Ponciano (2013) does in his research project with young people in foster care – through sharing my findings with senior contacts in the Libyan education sector, would enable these voices to be heard by potential future policy makers.
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For the above-described reasons, I made extensive use of participants’ quotations, ensuring as far as possible that the reported utterances matched what the relevant speaker had actually said. However, I also followed Corden and Sainsbury’s (2006) advice in removing certain phrases such as ‘um ’ and ‘er’ and occasionally tidying up participants’ – mainly educators’ – poor use of grammar to avoid the relevant speaker being portrayed negatively.
At the end of this stage I had written up all seven strands, with each supported by presentation of the relevant evidence and a thorough discussion. These strands were entitled as follows: ‘A land of unparalleled opportunity’, ‘My own professional agenda’, ‘Gaddafi’s legacy’, ‘The failure to adjust’, ‘The political-security situation’, ‘The MoE’s view of teacher training’ and ‘The MoE’s view of LETTS’. These strands are detailed in Part 3 of this thesis.
Ensuring the study’s trustworthiness
Before moving on to the micro-history itself, it is important to note that when conducting this study I recognised that I was working in an unstable and rapidly changing socio-political context. I also realised that it was important that my understanding and interpretation of developments in Libya, including in both the education sector and the wider country, remained as accurate as possible.
To achieve this I first worked on ensuring the micro-history’s credibility – that the developments detailed and discussed in the narrative were in line with what actually happened. I did this by obtaining information on these developments from a number of individuals working in a range of contexts and often holding different viewpoints on both Libya’s situation and the outlook for the future. These individuals included senior officials at the British Embassy and in particular the Deputy Ambassador, the UK Trade and Industry Officer, the Political Officer – who was a Libyan staff member – and the Overseas Security Manager. I also represented the BC at the weekly embassy meetings when the Country Director was out of Libya. These weekly meetings contained a full round-up of all major political and security developments in the country and I found them to be a useful source of information. As well as speaking to embassy officials, I spoke regularly to local BC staff members who were able to provide insights into the situation on the ground in Tripoli and in other parts of the country. Several of these staff members were from central and eastern Libya, which were locations that I was not allowed to visit. I also had regular conversations with senior officials and academic managers from the university and vocational education
87 sector. I worked closely with these individuals on a number of projects, such as the establishment of the National Centre for Modern Languages (see Underhill, 2016 for more information). They were not directly involved in the general education sector, but had a good level of awareness of what was happening in the sector and were often well connected politically.
Moreover, to ensure the confirmability of the micro-history – that my assumptions about and interpretations of events in Libya were derived from the data I was collecting, and not from my own ideas and biases - I regularly checked and discussed my ideas and interpretations with the above listed individuals. This was particularly the case with my BC colleagues and my contacts in Libya’s tertiary sector. These discussions were fulfilling, but sometimes challenging because, as time progressed, many of my colleagues and contacts had differing views on what was happening in Libya. Some individuals - like some of the teacher educators and teachers I spoke to (see pages 148-149 and 160) – began voicing frustration with Libya’s situation, and questioning the wisdom of the Revolution (see page 163), while others remained largely convinced that the overthrow of Gaddafi had been a good thing.
In order to do justice to the many different views, and as an act of triangulation of perspectives, I gathered data from multiple sources and used different approaches to collecting it. These included interviewing, document analysis and keeping a research diary, as well as ensuring I kept up to date with ongoing events in Libya via talking to the individuals detailed in the preceding paragraph and keeping abreast of developing news via the NewsNow.co.uk website, whose coverage of Africa, I believed, was very good.
Furthermore, in terms of my interviewing activity - arguably my main approach to data collection – I tried to reach a number of individuals from different backgrounds, and working in different contexts. This, I believe, enhanced the credibility of the ideas that emerged in my analyses. For example, through interviews with a range of different individuals, I was able to confirm my themes, such as the MoE being primarily focused on keeping the general populace happy through activities such as building new school facilities and sending staff abroad on training. Likewise, interviewing a variety of individuals also helped me to discount themes such as the ministry not prioritising training teachers as they were largely women and the ministry being wary of engaging with the BC because it was a foreign organisation. I was able, also, to confirm overriding themes such as the ministry’s lack of any overall general education sector reform programme and its lack of stable leadership. I was also able to further triangulate my interpretations by drawing, whenever possible, on secondary sources such as the various reports on Libya’s education system (detailed on pages 77–78).
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My own insider knowledge, working on LETTS and living in Libya, as well as my previous experience of challenging contexts such as Sudan and South Sudan, also enhanced the credibility of the study. For example, I recognised that the limited capacity of the education sector, in terms of the skills of its workforce, was an issue, yet few Libyans would openly admit that this was a problem. However, individuals would raise concerns about skills when talking about specific institutions (for example the former Deputy Education Minister’s comments on the GCTED – see page 190). This, I realized, raised issues around the confirmability of my findings, as there was a danger that they could be influenced by my own biases. However, I regularly reviewed the ideas I was generating to ensure that my own opinions were not having an overly distortive influence, and I also took the view that, at the end of the day, the micro-history - and indeed the wider study - was not intended to be a factual account of the LETTS experience – something I expand upon below. In addition to this, my approach to analysing the data enabled me pause and reflect on two occasions: firstly at the stage when I was writing the micro-history and particularly when I was finalising it in 2015, and secondly at stage two, when analysing it using the historical method. These opportunities for reflection allowed me to consider the findings from a more neutral, external and objective perspective, when being physically outside Libya, including a consideration of what had happened in the country since my evacuation.
A further consideration is the study’s dependability – that the research process I had undertaken to produce the micro-history, and the wider study, and my work to develop relevant conclusions was transparent, logical and properly documented. The main way of demonstrating dependability is my effort to provide detailed accounts of the data collection steps I engaged in – detailed in Chapter 2 - and the analytical and interpretive steps that followed – detailed in Chapter 3. I believe these accounts provide the reader with an accessible description of the stages of the entire research process and that the descriptions make transparent how the study’s findings were arrived at.
Finally, as mentioned above, it is important to note that I am not attesting that this micro- history is a one hundred per cent accurate account of LETTS and the wider events that took place around it. It is my interpretation, informed by as many data sources as I had access to, and my own observations and ideas. However, this thesis will be published and shared, and the ultimate test of trustworthiness will be the plausibility of the account, and this plausibility will only become apparent when the thesis is reviewed and critiqued by like-minded readers and historians.
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Use of news websites and British Council internal documents
Regarding sources of information, I also feel that before starting the micro-history I need to explain the reasons why this and indeed the wider PhD study draw extensively on both online news websites and internal British Council documents as reference sources, what the potential implications were and how I managed these. The use of each reference source is discussed separately.
Regarding the use of news websites, I started writing the micro-history when I was still on the ground in Libya and while events in the country were still unfolding, and I completed the first draft in late 2014, just over three years since the Revolution and when the country’s future was far from certain. During this time, there were no authoritative texts on Libya’s post-Revolutionary history available, and apart from briefings from the UK embassy and other international organisations, and information – often anecdotal – from contacts and colleagues, the only information sources that were available and relatively accessible were websites provided by news organisations. A number of these were linked to printed broadsheets such as the Guardian , The Daily Telegraph and The Washington Post , while others were linked to television news channels, such as the BBC, CNN and Al-Jazeera, or were providers specialising in purely digital news published on stand-alone websites, such as Al-Monitor, Libya Herald and Rediff. I also consulted a number of sites run by contemporary publications such as The Economist and World Politics Review which provide reports and commentaries on international affairs, sites specialising in certain topics such as Open Net – https://opennet.net/research/profiles/libya – which provides information on internet provision worldwide, and blogs such as the one by Ledger and Challis – http://www.proskills-academy.co.uk/blog-libya-free-safe – which comments on developments in professional skills training.
I understood that the news stories provided on these sites were usually reacting to events and making assumptions based on then current expectations and developments, and that these were not always accurate. For example, there were occasions, particularly during the 2012–13 period, that certain publications such as The Economist and the Guardian predicted that the country was about to turn a corner and things were going to improve; indeed, even in early 2014 certain sources were publishing articles optimistic about Libya’s long-term future – for example, see Laessing’s (2014-a) article on the Libyan stock market on the Reuters website. Therefore in the micro-history I ensured that the ideas being expressed by these sources were properly contextualised and that it was clear they were
90 reflecting the prevailing view at the time. I also consulted a range of publications to ensure the micro-history was informed by a range of views, although admittedly these were synonymous in taking the general view of the West that supporting the Revolution had been the right thing to do and that at some point Libya’s situation would improve, and I am aware I could have examined other sources which may have provided different interpretations of events. Examples include the World Socialist Website, which followed an anti-Revolutionary agenda when reporting on Libya, and sites sponsored by China, such as Global Times – http://www.globaltimes.cn/ – and Russia, such as TASS Russian News Agency – http://tass.com/ – whose stories most likely were influenced by their respective state’s opposition to the 2011 Western intervention. However, I believe that being on the ground in Libya and being aware of the realities of the country’s situation enabled me when examining sources to make a valid assessment of the report’s accuracy and credibility, and to discount the more sensationalist articles that were published. Examples include Firstpost’s (2014) claims that Tripoli’s central market had been turned into a weapons bazaar, and Galtier and Singal’s implications in their 2013 report for USA Today that the capital had descended into complete anarchy.
My use of a number of BC internal documents was largely down to expedience. The British Council Intranet contains a wealth of studies of and reports on ELT reform programmes. Some of these, such as Inci’s (2014) report on Afghanistan and Wiseman’s (2011) on Algeria, are scoping studies looking at opportunities for future programmes. Others, such as Borg’s (2015) report on the NTTP and Griffiths’ (2012-c) on LETUP, are evaluative reviews of particular programmes, and others, for example Finlayter’s (2016) report on BC ELT activities in Egypt and Jacobson’s (2003) on activities in India, are evaluations of the impact of BC programmes in particular contexts designed to inform internal stakeholders and guide the development of future programmes. Certain reports, such as Fortune’s (2014) study of ELT in Iraqi schools, are designed to provide the BC with an overview of the English language teaching situation in a particular context and/or sector, while others, including Yosief’s (2014) on a curriculum reform project in Yemen, are designed to outline specific programmes and other activities that the BC is hoping to organise in future. These studies often contained information and ideas directly relevant to my study, as they were concerned with developing contexts, with many detailing similar issues to the ones I faced in Libya, and the programmes described were usually similar to LETTS in the ways they were organised and managed, and in the sense they aimed to achieve large-scale systemic reform in ELT. Just as importantly, however, these documents were accessible and written in a language and style I could easily relate to.
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Although many of these papers were written by BC staff members, a number were written by external ELT consultants and teacher trainers, including writers such as Simon Borg and Christopher Tribble who are well-known academics and published authors. Indeed, certain reports, such as Fortune’s (2014) above-mentioned report and Tribble’s (2009) report on a recent history of BC ELT programmes, were originally intended for external publication, but, due most likely to funding and/or resourcing issues, were never published. Moreover, the reports reviewing and evaluating ELT reform programmes are often critical of the BC and the approach it adopted, something that can be seen in Tribble’s report, in Jacobson’s (2003) above-mentioned report on ELT activity in India and in Turner’s (2015) on the BC’s Skype- based university teacher training programme in Libya. It is also worth mentioning that at the time of the report, both Jacobson and Turner were BC staff members who had been involved in the programmes they were reporting on.
It is important to note that these documents all share certain features. Generally, they were organised in a similar way, with an introductory overview and background, details of the terms of references, a narrative of the relevant study, followed by a listing of the main findings, recommendations and/or conclusions. The documents were also all published with one overriding aim, including those produced by external writers, namely to provide information to the BC, usually to inform the development of existing and future programmes and to report to internal and external stakeholders. Therefore, unlike most peer-reviewed academic papers, the writers had not spent time reviewing published literature, examining previous studies, articulating and evaluating different arguments or engaging in empirical research through exhaustive data collection, analysis and interpretation. Moreover, even those documents written by Borg (2015) and Tribble (2009) reflect the BC’s view of how ELT programmes should be organised, what they should focus on and how reform is actually achieved, and therefore tend to be one dimensional in terms of ideas and approaches. Furthermore, they generally exclusively focus on ELT – often ignoring the fact that in most education systems, English is one of a number of subjects students study – and view teacher training and curriculum reform as the most effective ways of achieving change, while often overlooking other factors, especially testing and assessment. Most reports appear to make an automatic assumption that the relevant country views English as a priority subject, and wants and needs the BC’s assistance with ELT. Furthermore, they largely focus on regions and countries which are priorities for the BC and the UK, rarely drawing upon other contexts for the purposes of comparison. For example, South and Central America and Francophone Africa are rarely examined, whereas the Middle East and North Africa, and Central and South East Asia – especially China, India and Pakistan – are widely reported on.
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To manage the risk of an overreliance on BC documents narrowing this study’s focus and findings, I firstly ensured that I selected, as far as possible, a range of documents in terms of themes, objectives, format and geographic focus, although due to the nature of the study, I drew on a relatively large number of reports concerned with Libya and Sudan. Secondly, and more importantly, I also ensured that I consulted a wide range of academic papers from peer-reviewed journals and publications such as the International Journal of Educational Development and the English Language Teaching Journal , and websites such as Researchgate.net. Unlike the BC documents, these papers contained literature reviews and examinations and discussions of ideas and arguments regarding the relevant topic, and the theories and conclusions they produced were supported by empirical research.
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PART 2: THE MICRO-HISTORY OF LETTS
This part of the thesis provides a micro-history of LETTS and answers Research Question 1 – How did LETTS unfold over time in Libya in 2012–14? Like the wider study, the narrative is written from my own perspective and I use headings throughout the account that capture the essence of the situation and/or events being described. It begins in Sudan with the launch of the BC’s Khartoum State Teacher Training Programme (KSTTP) – which would later be renamed the National Teacher Training Programme (NTTP) and which provided the initial inspiration for LETTS. It then details LETTS’ official launch in post-Revolutionary Libya in 2012, its limited achievements in terms of the teacher training courses organised by the GCTED in 2013 and its eventual suspension at the end of that year, followed by the BC’s withdrawal from Libya in mid 2014, which effectively ended any prospect of the programme continuing. For a timeline of stages and key events in LETTS and the study see Appendix 1, and for a timeline of key events in Libya prior to and during the micro-history see Appendix 8. Figure 1 is a map of Libya showing the cities and towns mentioned in the micro-history.
Figure 1: Map of Libya (some of the cities and towns may be spelt differently from in the main thesis). Open source – see https://ian.macky.net/pat/map/ly/ly.html for more details.
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Background to LETTS: a Sudanese success story
In July 2011, Henry Bellingham, the then UK Minister for Africa, undertook an official visit to Sudan. One of the events on his agenda, along with various political and trade-related meetings, was the witnessing of the signing of a ‘Statement of Intent’ between the BC and the Sudanese Ministry of Education, which confirmed the intention of both organisations to work together in organising a large-scale in-service teacher training programme with the aim of improving ELT throughout Khartoum State. Organised by the embassy, anxious to draw the minister’s attention to the BC’s support for Sudan’s educational development, the event took place in a plush and heavily air-conditioned meeting room at the Ministry of Federal Education’s main office on Nile Avenue, a large tree-lined road running along the eastern side of Khartoum. In attendance were the UK Ambassador to Sudan, the Federal Minister for Education, the BC Country Director for Sudan, the Africa Minister himself and a range of senior officials from the MoE, the BC and the embassy. Originally it had been agreed that both ministers would sign the statement, but following various protocol-related issues, it was decided that they would both sign as witnesses and that the signatories would be the BC Country Director and the MoE’s Head of Teacher Training. The event received widespread publicity at a local level and within the wider UK FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and BC (Hansard, 2011), and was seen as a significant step forward in the development of Anglo-Sudanese relations.
The actual signing of this document was the result of over a year’s work by me in my capacity as BC English Language Advisor. The work had involved building relationships with MoE officials, running small-scale training events, providing the MoE with an example to aspire to by delivering a series of in-service training programmes within the university sector and getting the ministry to sign up to the proposed programme plan. Another equally important factor was the appointment of a new education minister who was genuinely interested in improving ELT in schools and in working with the BC. At the same time, there had also been some realigning of the BC’s expectations in terms of what sort of contribution, particularly regarding funding, the MoE was likely to be able to make to any large-scale training programme in the immediate term.
The signing event was followed by the organisation of a large-scale cascade training programme several months later. Twenty Sudanese teachers of English selected by the MoE were trained as teacher educators by the BC via a two-week intensive course, and then deployed in pairs to train groups of 45 teachers of English from secondary schools in and around Khartoum. The training, which aimed to both improve teachers’ English levels and
95 develop their teaching skills, was entitled the Khartoum State Teacher Training Programme (KSTTP). It led to approximately 900 teachers receiving training between October 2011 and March 2012 (British Council, 2012), a scale to rank alongside the well-established high- profile BC programmes in India and Malaysia. An initial BC report (Darn, 2012) indicated that the educators found their new roles enjoyable and rewarding, and that most of the teachers valued the training and believed it had positively influenced their teaching.
The KSTTP fulfilled one of the BC’s main strategic aims in Sudan, which was to engage with the school sector, contribute towards ELT reform and achieve impact at scale. Indeed, at the start of 2012, the BC and MoE were already talking about the programme being rolled out nationwide. The KSTTP also fulfilled my own personal academic and professional aims, namely to establish a large-scale cascade training programme that I could use to conduct research for my newly started PhD. In early 2011 I had conducted a study (Gray, 2011) examining how the cascade training model could be made effective in developing contexts and, at the same time, deliver training at scale on a sustainable basis. This hinged on a mechanism being put in place to support the local teacher educators and to provide them with ongoing guidance and further training. In Khartoum, I realised this mechanism by deploying a team of five so-called Supervisor Trainers, with each one assuming responsibility for two pairs of educators. These Supervisor Trainers worked with the educators on planning sessions, and through session observations and follow-up training workshops provided them with ongoing professional development. The theory I had developed, which was drawn from papers by writers such as Gilpin (1997), Hayes (2000), Lamb (1995) and Tomlinson (1988), and from my own professional experiences – in particular from an evaluation that I had managed of a UNICEF-funded cascade programme in South Sudan (Simpson, 2011) – was that this support would ensure the educators put into practice the ideas provided on their initial training programmes and deliver training as envisaged. By using locally sourced Supervisor Trainers, I was putting in place a sustainable support mechanism and, as my research had indicated, the local educators were more likely to genuinely respond to suggestions from professionals from their own contexts as opposed to those from so-called international experts.
There were, however, gaps in the KSTTP. The main one was that the programme, including training materials, educators’ salaries and refreshments for the coffee breaks, depended upon BC funding. This ran counter to one of the key ingredients for making cascade teacher training programmes effective, particularly in terms of sustainability, that I had identified in my study – namely that the partner education ministry had to be the main programme financier. However, despite various promises, the MoE was proving unwilling and/or unable
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to make any contribution to the KSTTP, citing temporary budgetary constraints. Therefore, partly because the ministry repeatedly stated that its budgetary problems were temporary and it would soon be in a position to contribute towards the programme and partly because both the Country Director and I felt that if the KSTTP was not launched at this time it might never happen, the BC agreed to cover all costs for the first 12 months. Another gap was the absence of a system for establishing whether the training was contributing to change at classroom level (Darn, 2012), which was the programme’s stated ultimate goal, although at the time I saw it as a priority to get a functioning cascade system in place and felt that examining classroom-level impact could be tackled once the programme was up and running. Despite these gaps, I was adamant that KSTTP would be a success and I would soon be able to start rolling the programme out at a national level.
My assumption was that I would be working on the programme for several years. However, at the end of 2011 things unexpectedly changed. I was offered the role of ELT Manager for BC Libya. This position provided a promotion, including a higher salary and benefits package, more professional development opportunities and the chance to work in a priority country for both the BC and UK FCO, and so I accepted. Although this meant handing over KSTTP to a yet-to-be-appointed successor and missing out on its future development, I felt the opportunities that Libya had to offer made this sacrifice worthwhile.
High hopes and big visions
Libya in late 2011 was seen as a land of immense opportunity by both the BC and the UK in general. The 2011 NATO-backed Revolution had ended 40 years of dictatorship under Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and replaced it, as Lacher (2011) details, with a transitional government committed to democracy, human rights and economic, educational and social reform. The prevailing attitude to Libya at this time was very much summed up by the then UK Defence Secretary, Philip Hammond, in October 2011, when he urged British businesses to ‘pack their suitcases’ (Adetunji, 2011) and to head to the country to secure lucrative reconstruction and development contracts. The country, with its vast oil wealth, shattered infrastructure and pro-Western cash-rich government, was viewed as a land of immense opportunity for British business, especially in the construction, security, oil and gas, and education and training sectors. In connection with this, as Adetunji (2011) explains, there was a feeling that Libya was in a sense indebted to the UK – a lead nation in the anti- Gaddafi NATO airstrikes – for the money it had spent on supporting the Revolution, and that it was only natural that this was repaid through future business for the UK.
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This optimism was not entirely unwarranted. After the Revolution, the new government had stated that it would reward those countries who had supported the Revolution (Adetunji, 2011), while Libyans themselves, as Goodley (2011) explains, realised that in order to rebuild and develop their shattered country, they needed Western advice and assistance. Moreover, the UK appeared to have a headstart compared to Libya’s other potential partners, partly because of the existing UK–Libya business links, particularly in the oil and gas sector, as Macalister (2009) details, but also in the education sector due to the Libyan government’s long-standing UK postgraduate scholarship programme, which meant most senior Libyan officials had studied at UK universities and viewed the country as a source of specialist expertise.
The BC in particular had good reason to be optimistic about future activity. The organisation had opened its office in Libya in 2003 and had gone on to establish a large-scale English language teaching operation through its Teaching Centre and to deliver large-scale ELT projects for the government, most notably LETUP (Libyan English Teaching at Universities Project), which had led to BC-staffed language centres being set up in Libya's ten main state universities (Underhill, 2014) and had received the BC 2009 Strategic Impact Award. Furthermore, access to better education had been a key demand of the 2011 protestors whose actions had triggered the Revolution – a demand acknowledged by the new government as having made educational reform a priority (UNESCO, 2012). And, as Assed (2012) and Kreiba (2012) point out, a main component of the stated reform programme was the improvement of ELT at all levels in the education system. The BC was arguably viewed as the country’s leading authority on ELT, and with its reputation and operational capacity on the ground was well positioned to take advantage of the anticipated large and lucrative Libyan-funded contract opportunities. Moreover, this optimism appeared justified when, in early 2012, a direct request was made by the new Libyan government for support with improving ELT.
Arriving in Libya in 2012, my assumption was that, in ELT terms, it was a land of immense opportunity. The provision of ELT under Gaddafi, as writers such as Finlayter (2011), Kreiba (2012), Orafi (2008) and Orafi and Borg (2009) comment, had been poor. The teaching of English, as Najeeb and Eldokali (2012) and Kreiba explain, had been banned in schools and restricted at university level from the mid 1980s to the late 1990s, due to deteriorating relations with the West and Gaddafi’s view of English as a weapon of colonialism. This meant a generation missed out on the opportunity to learn English, most teachers of English left their jobs or switched to teaching other subjects and no new teachers were trained. The government had made some attempts to improve English from 2000 onwards, including
98 introducing new curriculums for primary and secondary school, but overall the education system remained, as Tamtam et al. (2011) explain, focused on Gaddafi’s political ideologues and promoting his other agendas such as Islamic values and African nationalism. At the same time, as Humphries (2012) states, there was huge demand for English from almost every sector of society, from a government keen to engage with the West to young people and their parents viewing it as essential for their careers and future studies. And what I believed set Libya aside from the countries I had previously worked in – including Sudan, Ukraine and Moldova – was that as well as desperately wanting and needing help with ELT, the government was willing and able to pay for it.
Initially my assumptions seemed correct. Soon after arriving in Libya I was approached by the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) with a view to restarting LETUP – an ELT capacity- building project the BC had been running in the university sector before the Revolution (see Underhill, 2014 for more details) – by the National Board for Technical Vocational Education (NBTVE) for support for ELT in the vocational education sector, and by the newly formed Libyan Tourist Board regarding developing an ELT programme for its staff. A new association for teachers of English – Developing English Language Teaching Systems (DELTS) – was set up with BC support, and, at the same time, partnership agreements with Libya National Radio and the two mobile network providers saw the launch of the BC’s Learn English Radio and Learn English SMS services. Furthermore, not once was the BC asked for payment or was there the assumption that the BC would cover the cost of providing an activity. However, despite these developments, flushed with the apparent success of the KSTTP (British Council, 2012) and mindful of my research obligations, my main ambition was to organise a large-scale cascade teacher training programme, one which would be supported and – unlike the Sudanese programme – fully funded and resourced by the Libyan MoE, and thus would give me the opportunity to put to the test the model I had developed the previous year (Gray, 2011) and to pursue my planned study. Indeed, in my mind I visualised the BC and the MoE coordinating a national network of local teacher educators, with support being provided by a team of BC master trainers – all paid for by the MoE – and literally thousands of teachers being trained each year!
While my vision might have been on the grandiose side, I felt I had good reason to be confident. Prior to the Revolution, the BC had been working with the Libyan GPCE on organising a large-scale in-service training project for the secondary school sector. This programme – entitled Libyan English Teaching in Secondary Schools (LETSS) – had been based on using the existing network of LETUP centres to deliver the training (Finlayter, 2011), although it was now no longer viable due to the division of the GPCE into two
99 separate ministries – the MoE and MoHE – and the BC being unable to place international trainers, on which the programme depended, in centres outside Tripoli due to security concerns. Therefore, a cascade-based training programme delivered in partnership by the BC and MoE and with the initial teacher educator training delivered in Tripoli seemed an obvious solution and one I assumed would be of interest to the MoE. There was the question of how the local teacher educators outside Tripoli would be supported once they had been trained, but the BC’s general view was that the security situation would soon improve and within the next 12 months travel outside the capital would be less restrictive.
Indeed, in general in early 2012 Libya’s future looked promising. Reports by writers from different fields with different agendas, such as Grant (2012-a), Rausch (2012) and VanDyke (2012), all comment on the sense of optimism, not just among the Libyan government and the international community but among ordinary Libyans who, after over 40 years of oppression, stagnation and corruption under Gaddafi (Kalafa, 2011), saw this as a genuine opportunity to turn Libya into a prosperous first world state – indeed there was talk of Tripoli becoming the North African Dubai (Epatko, 2011). At an English Day organised at the University of Tripoli, the Head of English at the Faculty of Education, who later participated in this study, and his students outlined their plans for the improvement of the English Department, including state-of-the-art computer labs, wireless internet, a new library and the recruitment of native-speaker teachers of English from abroad. Furthermore, there were indications that things were improving. Oil production seemed set to reach pre-Revolution levels (Gumuchian and Shuaib, 2012), universities and schools reopened (Cousins, 2011), most ministries, such as the Ministry of Health (WHO, 2012) and Ministry of Education (UNESCO, 2012), announced ambitious reform programmes, and in July Libya held its first free and democratic elections in over 40 years (Kirkpatrick, 2012-a).
The main concern expressed by everyone from international observers (e.g. VanDyke, 2012) to the students at the above-mentioned English Day was security. The government was doing little to disarm the various militias (Stephen, 2012-a), while violent crime and particularly car-jacking, hitherto unknown in Libya, was fast becoming a problem. Furthermore, the situation was exacerbated by the fact that, as Reeve (2014) explains, Libya was awash with weapons due to the overrunning of Gaddafi’s arms dumps during the Revolution and the decision by France and Qatar to supply the rebels with large quantities of arms, and with no functioning system of law and order, disputes between individual Libyans, as Reeve details, were increasingly being settled by gun battles.
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My own individual concern was slightly different – as I noted in my research diary (week of entry: 06–12 May 2012) – most of the state sector officials I encountered seemed to view foreign expertise as some sort of ‘magic pill’ which would immediately solve the challenges they were facing. For example, the Head of the Foreign Languages Faculty at Tripoli University said that the solution to his faculty’s challenges in providing effective ELT was for the BC to recruit large quantities of native-speaker teachers on its behalf. While to address the perceived lack of skills in the country’s civil service, several ministries, most notably the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Labour, began sending large numbers of their employees on overseas training programmes. Furthermore, the MoE, as part of a scheme to improve mathematics and science teaching in secondary schools, had started introducing mathematics and science curriculums imported wholesale from Singapore’s school system (UNICEF, 2013).
Indeed, when, in May 2012, I set off for my first meeting with the director of the MoE’s General Centre for Teacher Education and Development (GCTED), my main worry was that he would be looking for a ‘magic pill’ solution to the challenges the school sector faced regarding ELT and would ask me to recruit large numbers of native-speaker teachers of English to work in Libya’s schools instead of signing up to the teacher training programme I had in mind.
A promising start
The GCTED had been established in 2006 (Moshen, 2014) and was responsible for improving the skills of Libyan teachers in the so-called basic school sector, which included primary school and middle school, ages 6–15, and secondary school, ages 15–18 (Schellekens, 2013). Although, as Moshen comments, during the Gaddafi era, the centre had delivered a small number of programmes and few, if any, had been for teachers of English, with the figures provided in reports, such as the GPCE’s 2008 report, bearing little resemblance to reality. One of the issues was that the GCTED was in an ambiguous position, as the school inspectorate was also, in theory, responsible for training and supporting teachers, and although school inspectors rarely organised training, MoE officials and head teachers saw training as the inspectorate’s role and little support or resources had traditionally been provided to the GCTED. However, this situation seemed destined to change in the new Libya. The recently appointed director of the GCTED had been a media personality during the Revolution, making speeches on the anti-Gaddafi Qatar-based Libya Al-Ahrar TV and was keen for the centre to start fulfilling its actual role.
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The GCTED was similar to most government buildings I visited in Libya – large, spacious, surrounded by a high wall and potentially impressive, but in need of renovation and repairs, although the director himself had a well-furnished modern office with, for some reason, a large TV on one of the walls linked to the centre’s CCTV system. Meeting the director for the first time it was easy to understand why he had been a popular TV personality. A friendly, larger-than-life character, he talked at length about the importance of English and the work of the BC, and about how it was vital to improve ELT in schools. During the meeting the director and I discussed the MoE’s needs regarding in-service training, how the BC could work with the GCTED on supporting teachers of English and what other areas our respective organisations could collaborate on. As well as my envisaged teacher training programme, the director was keen on the BC providing training to school inspectors, making the point that any attempt to introduce innovation into ELT in schools would need to have inspectors’ support. We also discussed the GCTED and MoE’s support for the broadcasting of the BC’s Teach English Radio series – a series of short radio programmes aimed at teachers of English – as Libyan National Radio was refusing to broadcast it as it was all in English and Gaddafi-era regulations had stated that no programme could be broadcast on state radio without having some Arabic content. At the end of the meeting we agreed that the BC and GCTED would sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) detailing the areas the organisations would collaborate on (see Appendix 9 for a copy of this), and to accompany this I would draft a proposal for an in-service teacher training programme.
I also had a tour of the GCTED, which had three floors of offices and training rooms, all, apart from those on the ground floor, empty and in disrepair. The centre also had a large central courtyard, a conference room seating up to 150 people and several outbuildings, all, once again, in need of renovation. However, apparently this situation was soon going to change – the director went into some detail about how the centre was going to receive huge amounts of state funding and within a year all rooms would be refurbished and fully equipped, and it would also have a café, Wi-Fi internet and a library–IT centre. More importantly, it would be fully staffed with its own large team of dedicated teacher trainers and other education specialists, such as materials writers and researchers.
The content of my discussion with the GCTED director was similar to several conversations I had had – and was to have – with state sector education officials, in which the relevant individual talked at length about how important English was, how the improvement of ELT in the school/vocational education/university sector was a priority and that they were keen to work with the BC on this. Similarly, his talk about the huge amounts of state funding the GCTED was going to get was similar to the sorts of comments I had heard at the University
102 of Tripoli, the National Board for Technical Vocational Education and the National Radio Station. And, with reflection, even at the time, in the back of my mind there seemed to be a sort of ‘jam tomorrow’2 undertone to these conversations, even though I had no doubt about the beliefs and/or good intentions of the official speaking at the time or the ability of Libya to actually pay for all this reconstruction and development.
Therefore, I remained optimistic. I drafted the agreed MoU and a proposal for an in-service teacher training programme which I christened LETTS (Libyan English Teacher Training Scheme). LETTS was essentially based on the KSTTP, with a group of potential educators being identified by the MoE with the support of the BC, then trained up by BC international trainers and finally deployed to train teachers with the BC’s support. Supporting the educators when they delivered training was the most challenging aspect as, unlike in Sudan, I did not have access to a pool of potential supervisor trainers, partly because at the time I lacked an extensive network of contacts in the university sector, and partly because those teachers I had encountered from this sector were not, in my judgement, suitable for providing the required support due to their lack of knowledge of the communicative approach and limited experience of teacher development.
However, there were a small number of international teachers in Tripoli working for the BC Teaching Centre – which was in the process of reopening – as well as International House and some of the oil companies, and I felt I could draw upon these. Furthermore, mindful of the potential need to support educators outside the capital and the BC’s increasing focus on digital teacher training solutions – shown by BC-supported research papers by Chan (2013), Hockly (2013) and Srinivas (2013) – I began looking at remote and online options for future educator support.
The MoU and the proposal for LETTS – which I attached as an annex – were sent to the GCTED. In these documents I outlined the GCTED’s responsibilities, which included providing refreshments for the initial educator training, officially appointing the educators at the end of the training, providing them with remuneration and covering all costs of the actual in-service training. Despite Libya’s wealth and the seemingly large amounts of money the country had to spend, after years of working with ministries reluctant to pay for anything, I was still taken aback when I received an email from the director accepting both documents and indeed regretted not asking the centre to cover more of the costs.
2 ‘Jam tomorrow’ is a term used to describe a pleasant situation or thing which is often promised, but rarely materialises.
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There was, however, one ominous event. I organised the signing ceremony for 5 June 2012. In the days prior to this, I was participating in a BC meeting in Lebanon, and was due to return to Libya on 4 June when my flight was cancelled due to one of the militias temporarily taking over Tripoli Airport (Shalchi, 2012), and so I was unable to attend. In spite of this, the signing went ahead in my absence, LETTS was officially launched (Humphries, 2012) and I was optimistic about its future prospects as a national training programme.
A few initial complications: teething problems or long-term issues?
In mid June I had my first post-MoU meeting with the GCTED director. Organising the meeting had not been easy and I was concerned that he had been avoiding me. However, when I finally met him he informed me that he was standing in the upcoming elections for the new parliament – the General National Congress (GNC) – and would be stepping down at the end of the month. Just as worryingly, after some discussion it became clear that the GCTED had no mechanism to source potential teacher educators and indeed had not given any thought to it, and we agreed that the only way would be to advertise in schools and ask interested teachers to apply. It also became evident that with the upcoming elections, coupled with school holidays and then Ramadan, we could not start the programme until September at the earliest.
There was, however, one development I perceived as being positive. The director’s successor was a former teacher and school inspector who had a reputation for being progressive and proactive. Like her soon-to-be predecessor, she was something of a revolutionary hero due to her organisation of makeshift schools for displaced children in eastern Libya during the Revolution. As noted in my diary (see below), I believed the new director being an education professional would help make LETTS a proper partnership, as she would appreciate the various pedagogical issues involved with the programme such as the importance of supporting and continuing to develop the teacher educators.
… (the GCTED director) being a former teacher and school inspector will I believe be helpful for (LETTS) as she should understand how the programme is going to work and why things like working with and supporting the (teacher educators) is important. Sometimes I wasn’t sure how much (the former GCTED director) understood about how (LETTS) would work and what exactly (the GCTED) would need to do, and I suspect this was partly due to him not being a teacher or having an education background. Week of entry: 17–23 June 2012
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Prior to the start of Ramadan, I met the new director to discuss the way forward with LETTS. Surprisingly she did not come across as being overly enthusiastic, pointing out that the programme was Tripoli-focused and that the GCTED needed nationwide support with teacher training, particularly in the east. I pointed out that LETTS was designed so that it could be delivered nationally at scale and so providing we could get the programme up and running properly in Tripoli, there was no reason why it could not be extended within a short space of time. Following this, we agreed that the training course for educators would go ahead in mid October, the BC would design and print flyers promoting the course, and these would then be distributed to schools throughout Tripoli, with applicants either submitting applications through the MoE or directly to the BC. From my experience in Ukraine and Sudan, I guessed that it would take the GCTED a long time to disseminate the flyers and for the applications to come in, and so I agreed with her that the flyers would be distributed at the start of September with an application deadline of the end of that month and with a view to starting the course on 14 October.
Although I was still optimistic about the future of LETTS, this meeting indicated that the way forward would not necessarily be straightforward, something that was beginning to be reflected more widely in my work in Libya and in the country’s situation in general. Regarding the former, an ELT capacity-building project I had been planning to deliver with the newly established Libyan Tourist Board had stagnated over issues regarding funding, contracting and internal issues within the board, while a professional development programme for school inspectors responsible for the supervision of ELT (Griffiths, 2012-a) got off to a poor start when the MoE proved unable to make any contribution apart from providing the venue, and a number of participants turned out to have limited English or were actually teachers and not inspectors. Regarding the latter, the June to September 2012 period provided further evidence that the general assumption that the situation in Libya would steadily improve had been unrealistic (Urban, 2012). In June, the UK Ambassador’s motorcade was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade in an attack in Benghazi (Al-Tommy, 2012) prompting the BC to cancel all planned activities in the city. This was the latest in a series of attacks against international interests in Benghazi (Telegraph, 2012) which would culminate in the September 2012 attack on the US consulate and murder of the US Ambassador (Stephen, 2012-b). At the same time, as Fragiskatos (2012) and Wehrey (2012-a) comment, the government seemed incapable of disarming the increasingly powerful militia groups, some of which were beginning to fight each other and/or to pursue radical Islamist agendas.
However, optimism remained. Despite some violence during the run-up, the national elections took place in June and were regarded by international observers as being free and
105 fair (Miles, 2012), the economic outlook continued to improve and towards the end of September a well-publicised anti-militia drive by the government and public protestors led to the so-called ‘unauthorised’ militias being forced out of Benghazi (Graff and Shennib, 2012) and Tripoli (Karadsheh, 2012). The crackdown was soon to be followed by a concerted effort, as Palmer (2012) explains, to integrate so-called ‘authorised’ militias into the police and military forces. Although these efforts to disband the militias were welcomed by observers such as Palmer (2012) and Smith (2012), it was evident that – as both writers comment – if the government was going to effectively disband the militias, it would need considerable determination and political willpower. Other observers, however, including Libya’s international partners, were more optimistic, adopting the view stated by Miles (2012) that Libya was experiencing ‘inevitable post Revolution problems’ that would disappear and that generally the country was moving towards its goal of becoming a modern, stable, democratic state.
Interestingly, the state-sponsored crackdown on the militias saw the BC office being affected directly by Libya’s ongoing security challenges. Opposite the BC’s premises in Tripoli was a large holiday village which, in the Gaddafi era, had been used to house visiting officials from sub-Saharan Africa. During the Revolution, this had been taken over by the so-called ‘Jadu’ militia group from the mountains west of Tripoli, who, like most militias, showed no sign of disbanding. Their presence was not a particular threat – indeed, like a lot of militias, they saw it as their duty to remain in Tripoli and protect the Revolution’s gains (Smith, 2012) and so treated the BC with respect. However, they were occupying a prime piece of coastal real estate and the government, as part of a slightly quixotic drive to develop Libya’s tourism sector (Gumuchian, 2013-a), was keen to remove them. One Sunday at about 18:00, after most regular staff had left for the day and the Teaching Centre’s early evening classes were in progress, I was on the top-floor balcony enjoying a coffee and a warm sea breeze when I noticed a large green column advancing down the road leading to the BC and the holiday village.
The column was the Libyan National Army and their role was to remove the Jadu militia from the village. There then followed a sequence of events involving a lot of shouting, arguing and then exchanges of gunfire, during which – as the most senior manager in the office – I had to organise a full evacuation despite having no previous experience and a limited amount of general security awareness training. In spite of some challenges – including a senior teacher who refused to leave on the basis that the two sides ‘were only arguing’ and who then flew into a panic when the shooting started – the evacuation proceeded well and all students and most staff members had left when the situation began to descend into serious fighting.
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The process of clearing the holiday village took several days, during which the BC remained officially closed, although, as with the case of most militia fighting in Tripoli, there was no serious fighting until the late afternoon and most senior managers went to the office in the mornings and left after lunch. The event was generally viewed by the BC and the embassy as a sign that the government really was tackling the militias, although, as several local staff members pointed out, the so-called ‘Libyan National Army’ that had done the clearing was, in reality, a collection of ‘authorised’ militias. For me, it had been a personal triumph. I received thanks from the regional and country directors and – following my posting on Facebook – a large number of congratulatory and concerned messages from friends and family, and the whole experience had been something I could never have imagined myself doing before coming to Libya. However, though I did not know it at the time, over the next two years I would repeat the process so often it would almost become second nature.
In the meantime, preparations for the educator training course proceeded as planned. As agreed with the GCTED, at the start of September the flyers – designed and printed at the BC’s expense – were passed to the GCTED. Assuming I would face a similar situation as in Sudan, in which trainees who had initially showed most potential had not always been the ones who performed best during the course (Watkins, 2011), I decided to spread the net widely and to train two groups of 20 trainees, with the aim of achieving an outcome similar to that in Sudan in which half the trainees would actually complete the course to the required level. Therefore I contracted two international teacher trainers, both with experience of working in similar contexts to the Libyan one, to manage the selection process and deliver the course.
As I predicted, most applications came in after the end-of-September deadline, although, due to my planning, this was not a problem as the international trainers carried out the selection on the Sunday/Monday of the week before the course. By then, two other issues had emerged. Firstly, and despite them committing to doing this in the MoU, the GCTED informed me that it was unable to cover the cost of the course refreshments and, secondly, was unable to organise for teachers to be released from school and so the training would need to be delivered in the late afternoons and early evenings. In a sense, the latter was, I assumed, unavoidable as trainees were only being selected the week before the course. However, I was concerned more about the refreshments issue, as it brought into question whether the GCTED was willing to support LETTS or whether it was going to look to the BC to fund the whole programme. As I noted in my research diary:
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... the inability of (the GCTED) to cover the cost of the snacks and drinks for the training came as a bit of a shock considering they had agreed to do this a few months earlier and my big concern is that if (the GCTED) is unable to cover the cost of some tea, coffee, water and biscuits for a short course then it doesn’t bode well for them paying for a national training programme. Week of entry: 7–13 October 2012
These issues were immediately followed by another potentially more serious one. Up until this point, my expectation had been that a group of potential teacher educators could be easily identified, trained up and then deployed, provided both the BC and GCTED met their respective commitments. However, this expectation was challenged when the international trainers began selecting trainees.
Despite a huge response to the advertising campaign – over 200 applications received – most forms, which had to be completed in English, had been badly written and had to be discarded. Initial telephone interviews with those who had submitted properly completed applications led to more applicants being rejected due to poor English levels. Moreover, most of those who could communicate in the interviews had, according to the trainers, intermediate-level English at best and little idea of communicative approaches to ELT, and would likely struggle on the forthcoming course. This was an unexpected development and raised concerns among the trainers and myself regarding how many trainees would complete the course. The only solution I could devise was to widen the net as far as possible and to accept all those who had got through the telephone interviews – 56 in total, including four males – in the hope that 20 would manage to complete the course to the required standard.
The educator training course
The course began on the afternoon of Sunday 14 October 2012. The venue was a small building adjacent to the GCTED. The rooms inside had recently been painted and carpeted, and the training rooms were equipped with new furniture and whiteboards, making me think that possibly the GCTED had indeed received the funding the previous director had told me about. The trainees came across as being a pleasant bunch, although, as I noted in my diary (week of entry: 14–20 October 2012), there seemed to be an ‘air of trepidation’ hanging over both groups, as if they did not know really what to expect.
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The training was based on the BC’s Trainer Development Course (see Appendix 10 for a description of this course). This course had been used in training initiatives in a number of developing countries, including in several programmes I organised in Sudan – including the KSTTP (Watkins, 2011) – and South Sudan. Two locally engaged BC teachers were brought in to support and shadow the trainers in the hope that they could provide the role of Supervisor Trainers in future teacher training. The course went well, although, as predicted, a number of trainees found the content challenging and there were several dropouts. Trainees arriving late and/or having to leave early due to family commitments was another issue, with several female trainees being collected by their husbands before the training sessions ended. Following an incident in which a husband interrupted a session to demand that his wife leave with him, the trainers informed their groups that leaving early was not an option and any trainee who repeatedly did this would be excluded from the course and would not receive a certificate. This helped alleviate the situation, but did not completely resolve it.
The focus groups
During the course I organised two focus groups, one midway through the course and one at the end. I asked the BC Senior Teacher, a UK national who had lived in Libya for over 40 years, was well respected in the local ELT community and who was shadowing the training, to moderate the focus group. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the focus groups were conducted in Arabic and were then listened to and discussed by the moderator and me. The focus group participants raised a number of issues, several of which they came back to repeatedly, and, as I lamented in my diary (week of entry: 28 October – 03 November 2012), a lot of time was spent ‘rehashing the same stuff over and over again’. However, key issues were raised, valuable data obtained and the focus groups succeeded in giving the trainees, who were in a sense the central protagonists in LETTS, a voice.
The first thing the participants pointed out was that most trainees had signed up believing it would be an English course and that this was their priority. Their own shortcomings and those of the other trainees regarding English language skills, and the need for them to improve, particularly if they were going to train other teachers, was a recurring theme. As the moderator pointed out:
What came across to me, going in there and talking to them, is that they are up for any course to improve their language and so really are grabbing at straws in the hope they will improve their English. The advice about how to teach can come later.
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In connection with this, and particularly in the second focus group in which participants had begun to start properly considering their roles as educators, the issue of teachers’ English was discussed in depth, with participants stating that as educators their priority had to be to improve teachers’ English. Several commented that in their schools there were few teachers of English who could use the language and that this was the main reason why it was badly taught, while another added that ELT had never really recovered from the Gaddafi ban in the 1980s and 1990s and this was why the education system was unable to produce teachers with good English. The moderator also told me that before the ban there had been a lot of good Sudanese and Egyptian teachers of English in schools, but when the ban was lifted these foreign teachers were not brought back.
One participant said that he and two other trainees had signed up thinking it was going to be a teacher training course. These, according to the moderator, were trainees who had previously participated in either BC programmes or those provided by Garnet Education to launch the English for Libya series in the 2000s. Moreover, only one participant had signed up knowing that it was a teacher educator training course, and according to the moderator she was probably the only one out of all 56 trainees who had actually read and understood the course flyer and application form.
A second issue was that the participants questioned how they could be educators when the ideas coming from the trainers were, to quote the moderator, ‘utterly and completely new to them’. Although participants who had participated in previous training programmes were aware of basic concepts such as pair/group work, student-centred teaching and skills development, for the other focus group participants and most of the trainees, these were new concepts. As the moderator said:
... it’s all been a shock to them, all the new terminology, methodology, interactive engagement, and other things. They’re seeing it for the first time.
The participants were unanimous in the opinion that they needed more than two weeks’ training to become educators. Indeed, they admitted a number of trainees were struggling to keep up because it was all new and, in their view, quite complex, although the moderator said that the trainers were keeping the content as simple as possible. The participants also stated that they needed to see examples of the ideas being used and the opportunity to try them out via a lot of micro-training practice. The situation they were in at the moment was, according to one, like teaching someone to use a computer when you had never used one yourself.
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Another barrier to their future work as educators was identified in the form of school inspectors. One participant pointed out that the inspectors may feel threatened because the educators would be taking their jobs, although the moderator laughed about this, stating that nobody in Libya’s state sector loses their job and the inspectors would possibly be pleased that someone was doing their jobs for them. A more realistic concern was that teachers would be afraid to innovate in their classes as the inspectors would mark them down and report them to their head teachers. Inspectors, the participants said, had fixed views of teaching and expected to see teachers at the front using the board, talking and, in the case of English, translating. If a teacher was getting students to talk to each other and work in pairs, they would be accused of being lazy. Suggestions which emerged in the second group of how to tackle this included training the inspectors and/or informing them about LETTS and asking them to support it.
One participant said that as educators they would need materials and resources – particularly computers – and asked how the MoE could provide these things when they could not provide basic resources in schools. This led to complaints about how badly schools were equipped, with the moderator saying:
They don’t have anything. They have been given a book, a teacher’s book if they are lucky, but which they don’t read. They usually haven’t got a cassette or CD player, nothing. Most teachers are trying to do their best with nothing!
One participant said that he knew some schools where they had computers, but teachers and students were not allowed to use them. A couple also said that now Gaddafi was gone, all schools were going to receive money to spend on everything they needed and teachers were going to get pay rises, something the moderator was sceptical about. In general, there was a lot of dissatisfaction with the state of schools and a mixture of short-term pessimism and long-term optimism regarding their future development.
The participants complained about the timing of the course, saying that they were, according to the moderator, ‘absolutely shattered’ and ‘unable to concentrate’ as they were teaching in the mornings and then coming to the training. They also stated that the actual training courses for teachers should not be run like this, something the moderator found incredulous, commenting that ‘most of them probably have a maximum of two 45-minute classes per day!’, although she then admitted that lot of the women were likely to have extensive family commitments which, despite living in Libya for 40 years, she was still struggling to cope with. Once again, this was a recurring theme, although by the second focus group the participants
111 were suggesting that the training took place during the school holidays, which consist of a holiday at New Year, two half terms and a summer holiday which, according to the moderator, ‘goes on from May till October … so long that teachers forget how to teach’ . In the focus group, the moderator asked if teachers would be happy to give up their holidays to attend training and the participants said they would prefer this to having to combine teaching and training.
The moderator suggested that the GCTED and schools make use of the so-called ‘standby teachers’, who are paid salaries but do not have any classes, and are supposed to provide cover:
… these schools they have all these teachers doing nothing and getting paid to do nothing and (they) sit at home or work in their DVD shops and so they can get these to teach!
She also stated, when I mentioned delivering the training on a semi-intensive basis over the course of several months, that this was not suitable for Libyans, as her experience in delivering English courses in this way for the BC Teaching Centre was that students lost interest and dropped out:
… they disappear off to weddings and take relatives abroad for hospital treatment, even though they’ve paid top dinar for the classes.
By the second focus group, the participants had begun to consider their future roles as educators and in particular the type of teachers they wanted to train, suggesting that they needed to work with younger teachers who were interested in change and had good English and IT skills, although the moderator – herself relatively senior – did not agree with this, pointing out that it tended to be the fresh graduates who had the worst English.
The focus group also revealed that only two participants and about half the total trainees were actually qualified teachers of English. The others were teachers of other subjects or graduates who had some English and had been asked to teach it. However, the qualified teachers stated that the ideas on the course were as new for them as for the others, as their lectures at university had examined topics such as ‘the psychology of teaching’, ‘checking attendance’ and ‘writing on the board’. The moderator also added that the situation was more complex as certain degrees, such as a BA in English Language, automatically entitled the holder to teach, without them needing to have completed any pre-service teacher
112 training.
Despite the focus group’s results, the moderator said that by the end of the course a lot of the trainees still had not grasped the course’s objectives. In one micro-training session to demonstrate pair work, the trainee leading the session got the others to work in pairs and upon discovering there was an odd number told the extra one to work in the corner on her own, while in other sessions, trainees, instead of using the communicative trainee-centred training approaches they had been shown, simply stood at the front and lectured the others. Moreover, several trainees spoke about how they were going to use ideas from the course in their lessons, instead of how they were going to train others, revealing that they saw it as a teacher training and not an educator training course.
Post-training course developments
At the end of the course, only 20 trainees had demonstrated the awareness, confidence and English levels to potentially take up roles as educators and to train other teachers. However, both the international trainers and the shadowing BC teachers expressed concerns regarding their readiness to start delivering training. Of particular concern was the fact that while most trainees now had some awareness that in future they would train other teachers, their notions about this and what the training would involve remained largely abstract. The international trainers’ concerns were backed up by my informal observations of and conversations with the trainees, along with the data acquired from the focus groups. As a result, I agreed with the trainers that these 20 trainees be given more training practice and more input on the communicative teaching methodologies they would later be expected to train teachers in. This, in turn, meant that my hopes and expectations of immediately moving to teacher training had suffered a setback, albeit a seemingly temporary one. As I noted in my diary:
The twenty (potential teacher educators) selected have been done so mainly on the basis of being the ‘best of the bunch’ and because they have demonstrated the potential to be competent (teacher educators) at some point in the future, but not without a lot more training. Although I should have realised this during the selection process, it has still come as a disappointment and means that the launch of the main teacher training part of LETTS will be even further delayed. Week of entry: 11–17 November 2012
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A second concern was that the GCTED had taken little interest in the course, even though it had taken place in their centre. The director attended the opening, but did not visit again and declined an invitation to attend the course closure on the basis it was too late in the evening. Moreover, during the course, the centre’s engagement had been limited to daily visits by a low-level administrator. Furthermore, there had been no interest from the wider MoE, even though several senior officials – including the minister and deputy minister – had been informed about it. As I noted at the time, this highlighted a gap between the MoE’s statements on how it wanted to work with the BC to improve ELT and what it actually did – or, to be more exact, did not do – when the opportunity arose. For the first time since launching LETTS, I began to ask myself if the Libyan government actually wanted the programme, as I noted in my diary:
… the ministry seemed to take zero interest in the training, which is another surprise given all their talk about how they wanted to work with (the BC) and wanted help with (ELT) and something I believe is quite insulting given all the work my team and I had put in and how much (the BC) has paid for the whole thing – makes me wonder if (LETTS) is really worth the effort. At least (the Sudanese MoE) took a very active interest in the KSTTP even if they didn’t want to pay anything for it … Week of entry: 11–17 November 2012
LETTS, however, received attention from within the wider BC network and was presented both internally (Gray, 2012) and externally as an example of how the BC was now delivering in Libya. Partly because of this and because I had invested time and energy in organising the programme, I was not about to consider putting things on hold, and so I continued to remain optimistic about LETTS’ long-term future. Therefore I resolved to try harder to engage the GCTED, and believed that the future development of the 20 selected teacher educators gave me the opportunity I needed.
The Approaches and Methodologies course
Together with one of the local BC teachers, I met the GCTED director and explained that the trainees needed more training and that I wanted to organise a two-week Approaches and Methodologies course to ensure they were familiar with the ideas they would need to present to teachers when they started delivering training. The course would be delivered by a BC international trainer and those trainees who completed the course would then be
114 recommended to the GCTED for appointment as teacher educators. I also informed her – truthfully – that they were unwilling to attend training in the afternoons or evenings, and had requested to be released from their teaching duties, something, after some discussion, she agreed to organise.
Also at the meeting I asked the director to provide the refreshments and a venue. However, once again she claimed the GCTED could not provide the refreshments and then, after initially agreeing to provide a venue, she contacted me after the meeting to say the centre could not provide this either as there was other training taking place. I found the latter claim surprising, as the centre was awash with rooms and I had never seen training taking place at the centre – indeed, I later discovered this was untrue. Furthermore, as the start of the course approached, the BC began to be contacted by trainees who were concerned that they had not received any confirmation regarding their release. I therefore tasked a BC local coordinator to contact all 20 educators and to tell them that I had been informed by the GCTED that they would all be released, thereby presenting the GCTED with a ‘fait accompli’ if they failed to formally organise this.
Indeed, the GCTED did fail to organise for the trainee educators to be released, and at the end of the week prior to the start of the course told me that it would need to be postponed or delivered in the afternoon. I informed the GCTED that I had already informed all the educators that they would be released and given them the course timings and so it was too late to re-inform them as training was due to start at 09:00 on the coming Sunday. The director then said that she would organise for their release on the Saturday – a working day for government ministries.
The course, which – due to the GCTED’s inability to provide a venue – took place at the BC, started as planned. However, at about 10:30 that morning, an MoE official turned up at the BC demanding that the course be cancelled and the educators return to their schools. At the time, I was attending a meeting in Zawia, a city 30km west of Tripoli, and had to constantly leave the meeting to coordinate an operation which involved not letting the official get past the BC reception desk and getting the GCTED to resolve the situation. Fortunately, the operation was successful. The director contacted each of the trainees’ school directors by phone and persuaded them to let the trainees complete the course, before contacting the MoE official to explain that the situation had been resolved. At the time, I was annoyed that the GCTED had not secured the release of the educators as agreed; however, the director later claimed that approval had been given verbally, but that this had not been communicated to the relevant officials in the MoE, although this was unsurprising as
115 everything had been organised at the last minute.
As before, the GCTED took little interest in the training – apart from the MoE official’s visit on the first day – and I was disappointed that the director did not even contact me to ask how many trainees had completed the course. The training itself went well. The BC international trainer adopted an interesting approach by initially giving the educators a series of French lessons to put them back into the position of being learners and to then show how a language can be taught communicatively. She then took them through the communicative ideas they would be expected to encourage their future trainees to adopt. At the end of the course, 14 educators were viewed by the trainer to have the ability to start delivering training (Cook, 2012), with the provision that they delivered low-level courses, such as the BC’s English for Teaching course (see Appendix 11 for a description of this course), and were supported by the BC as outlined in the LETTS proposal.
I had planned for two focus groups to be delivered alongside this course, one for the beginning of the second week and one on the last day of the course. As I was out of the office at this time, supporting a school inspector training course in Misrata, I tasked the moderator and the international trainer with organising these groups. However, the first focus group did not take place, with both responsible individuals blaming the other for not organising it. Therefore, for the second focus group I took the lead – remotely – on organising it by regularly cajoling both individuals to do what was required and, as a result, this took place as planned. As on previous occasions, the group was recorded and I then sat down together with the moderator several days later and we listened to the recording and discussed the data that emerged.
At the start of our discussion, the moderator, who had shadowed the course, said that in general it had proceeded more smoothly than the previous one, partly because the educators knew what its objectives were and what was expected of them and partly because they were the most capable trainees from the previous course. The actual focus group saw many of the themes from the first two groups repeated. In particular, participants stated that they needed more support with improving their English, more input on teaching methodologies and a lot more micro-training practice. One participant was, according to the moderator, quite vocal when talking about the latter:
… what she’s saying that they’ve had some theory and some practice, but this isn’t enough and they will all feel a lot more comfortable with a lot more help and practice.
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There was also a feeling that the trainees were used to each other by this point and that for future training practice they needed to work with teachers they did not know in order to make it more realistic. The moderator, however, had her own view on this:
If you ask me, they will only really build up confidence when they start training teachers; training a bunch of strangers in the BC might help, but it won’t make that much difference.
The moderator also went on to make a more important point and that was that, in her opinion, the participants did not know what they wanted or needed and that the real issue was that when they listened to the international trainer and/or the moderator herself it made them realise the limits of both their English language abilities and their awareness of teaching methodologies, and this led to feelings of frustration:
What I think is upsetting them is that they know their language isn’t up to my level or (the international trainer’s) level, and they know they don’t really know much about teaching, and they know they need to get better, and that’s really why they want more training, more of this, more of that …
Indeed, regarding trainees’ English, one participant pointed out that in micro-training they made a lot of mistakes and only the international trainer noticed and corrected these. Regarding their limited awareness of teaching methodologies, another said that on the course the trainer had shown them five different student-centred ways to present and practise ‘going to’ and that this was ‘absolutely completely amazing’ and that her colleagues and she had ‘never seen anything like it before’ . The moderator went on to say:
… everything that (the international trainer) did was completely new and amazing for them, the whole shebang of communicative teaching, learner-centred teaching was completely new.
Although the need for more training was discussed at length, the participants struggled to come up with a solution apart from more courses. However, two participants had, on the moderator’s advice, attended a recent workshop organised by the ELT Forum – a local teachers’ association run mainly by teachers from the private language school sector – and had found it beneficial and suggested that similar events could be organised aimed specifically at school teachers. Another commented that continuing training and development, including self-development, had not been covered on the courses and should
117 have been – something the moderator seemed to agree with.
As before, participants made the point that they could not deliver training at the same time as they were required to teach, and that both they and the teachers they were training would need to be released from their teaching duties or training would need to take place during holidays, although one participant said it could be manageable if the training only took place once or twice a week in the afternoon. Another commented that even if the educators agreed to deliver training at the same time as they were teaching, the teachers attending the training would complain and either refuse to attend or come with a negative attitude. Several participants added to this by saying that both the educators and the teachers would be extremely tired. The moderator cut this bit short as it was essentially covering old ground and, as she pointed out to me, ‘You’ll never have a perfect solution to something like this – someone will always object and complain.’ However, before the focus group moved on, a participant also pointed out that long sessions – like the ones they had had on the BC courses – were not a good idea, as after two hours all the trainees were ‘so very tired’.
Several participants complained that they did not know what was going to come next, with the moderator laughingly commenting that she ‘told them to ask you when you came back from Misrata’. The participants explained that they had received no communication from the GCTED about the future, even though the BC had told them they would, and now after attending four weeks of training they had no idea if and when they were going to start work as educators. This then led to another – to quote the moderator – ‘education ministry- bashing session’ in which participants, discreetly egged on by the moderator, complained about the lack of support from the GCTED and the general ineffectiveness of the MoE. One participant declared that she would organise a protest if the GCTED failed to honour its obligation to provide them with work as educators, while another suggested that the BC take the lead on this; although, interestingly, the general opinion, according to the moderator, was that it was up to Libyan institutions – in other words the GCTED – to organise teacher training in the long term. The question of how the educators would be paid and by whom was also raised, but this was not a priority for the group.
The focus group ended with participants asking questions about the training materials and who would supply them, what support the BC would provide and where the training would take place, with the moderator promising to pass these questions on to me. The moderator also commented on how this provided evidence that some of the trainees were genuinely ready to become educators:
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… this shows that they are really geared up and ready to go; some of them, like (name of a participant), are asking all the right questions. (Name of a participant) is really on the ball and I really feels she’s saying, ‘Yes, let’s do this.’
As mentioned above, I had been out of Tripoli for most of the Approaches and Methodologies course. The reason for my absence was a training programme the BC was delivering for school inspectors of English to change their perceptions regarding their roles and to move them towards providing a supportive role for teachers, particularly regarding developing communicative approaches to teaching (Griffiths, 2012-a). This programme had been agreed upon in the earlier BC–GCTED MoU and was intended to support LETTS, as, even before the recent focus groups, school inspectors had been identified as a barrier to promoting change at classroom level. One course had been delivered in Tripoli over the summer and a second course had been planned for Misrata at the same time as the second week of the Approaches and Methodologies course. I was not overly concerned about this, as my initial intention had been to travel to Misrata for half a day for the start of the course and then to return at the end of the week for the closing session. However, when I arrived, there were a range of issues due mainly to the unpreparedness of the local GCTED officials and the trainer’s accommodation and, as a result, I had to remain in Misrata for the whole week to resolve and manage things.
As well as meaning that I missed a lot of the Approaches and Methodologies course, my experience in Misrata further reduced my confidence in the GCTED. As Griffiths (2012-b) comments in her report, there were a range of failings, including training items promised by the centre not being provided and a number of participants not actually being school inspectors, which had been an issue on the Tripoli course (Griffiths, 2012-a) and one the GCTED had vowed would not be repeated. As a result, although the Misrata course was delivered as planned, I discreetly decided to discontinue the programme and not to organise any further activity with the GCTED or wider MoE outside Tripoli for the foreseeable future.
In late December, I had a meeting with the GCTED director in which I officially informed her about the 14 selected teacher educators and outlined several possible plans for using them to deliver training in the January–June 2013 period. Initially, the plan had been to emulate the Sudanese KSTTP, with training delivered semi-intensively on a two-days-per-week basis over periods of six weeks. However, due to the issues regarding teachers being released, I decided to provide the GCTED with different options, including training being delivered intensively in weekly blocks, possibly during school holidays; training being delivered intensively two days a week, as in the KSTTP; and training being delivered two to three
119 afternoons a week. My recommendation was to go for intensive courses and to get teachers released or to deliver them during holidays, but I said that ultimately it was up to the GCTED to find a workable solution. Notes from the meeting, including brief outlines of the proposed options, were later sent to the GCTED and to other senior officials in the MoE. In my diary I noted:
While (the GCTED director) was very pleasant, thanked the BC and me personally for the work done so far and spoke about how (the GCTED) really needed the BC’s help, she didn’t really seem to appreciate that it is now up to her and (the GCTED) to take things forward and that the BC is not in a position to lead any more. She was unable to comment on which of the plans I presented she felt are feasible or to say when the educators will be officially appointed to work for her centre or when she could conceivably imagine the training starting. Instead I was just given somewhat vague assurances that the programme will continue in the new year and for some reason it seemed as if (in the meeting) she was listening to a pleasant sounding song without really trying to understand the lyrics and what they meant. Week of entry: 23–29 December 2012
A new year – same old expectations and assumptions
At the start of 2013, I wrote up my research notes and reviewed what had been achieved so far compared to my initial aims and expectations. Firstly, it was obvious that the assumption that I could simply replicate Sudan’s KSTTP with LETTS straight after arriving in Libya had been naïve, as had my expectation that the Libyan MoE would fund and support it. The level of the potential educators, in terms of both English and pedagogical awareness, was lower than I had expected and if and when they started delivering training, they would need a lot of support. Moreover, the GCTED and wider MoE appeared to have little interest in LETTS, especially when it involved them contributing financially towards the programme, and this raised the question of LETTS’ viability as a potential long-term reform programme.
I was aware there had been failings on my part. Prior to launching LETTS, one factor I had been unaware of was that – as shown by Moshen’s (2014) history of ELT in Libya – there had been no state system of in-service teacher training in Libya since the 1960s. Data from the focus groups revealed that only a small number of trainees had received any in-service training, and my understanding, from feedback from the moderator, was that these trainees had either attended stand-alone courses delivered by organisations like the BC or had
120 participated in Garnet Education’s courses in the early 2000s (Jalova, 2013). Whereas in Sudan, as Siddiek (2011) explains, in-service teacher training had been a well-established practice since the colonial era and although this was continually grappling with various challenges – as my 2011 paper alludes to – there was still a training system in place. This meant that once the KSTTP was set up and resourced, the actual delivery phase was relatively straightforward, while in Libya the MoE had neither the experience of delivering in- service training nor any systems in place to facilitate it.
Another issue I failed to appreciate was the fact that, unlike their Sudanese counterparts, few teachers had the appropriate levels of English to make the transition to becoming educators. As I explained in my paper (Gray, 2011), until the government’s abortive 1990s policy of Arabisation (Weyers, 2009), Sudan had had an effective system of ELT at school and university level, and most teachers entered the profession with high levels of English. Moreover, as Siddiek (2011) explains, although English was deprioritised as a subject on the education curriculum, it continued to be taught on a limited basis. This meant that the education system retained a cadre of skilled practising teachers of English and the KSTTP was able to draw upon these when it was launched. Indeed, it was probably no coincidence that most educators on the Sudanese programme were in their 40s.
In Libya, English, although a compulsory school subject (Moshen, 2014), had not been taught to a high standard even before Gaddafi’s mid-1980s ban, as Hawana’s (1981) study of pre-service teacher training exemplifies. Indeed, due to the shortage of teachers with the appropriate language skills and in line with the focus group moderator’s above-detailed comments, school sector ELT had been dependent upon foreign expertise, with non- Libyans, mostly Egyptians, Sudanese and Palestinians, occupying 65 per cent of all secondary school teaching positions (Hawana, 1981). This, combined with the subsequent decade-long ban and the government’s failure to effectively develop ELT following its lifting, meant that in 2012 there were few teachers with the language levels to become educators.
Moreover, in Sudan, teachers generally had some awareness of communicative approaches to ELT, even though they often had eclectic interpretations of how these worked in practice. In Libya, however, the research data I had gathered suggested that few teachers were aware of even basic communicative concepts such as pair work and developing language skills. Had I anticipated and factored this in, along with teachers’ low English levels, I would have planned a longer-term more sustained programme of educator training from the outset, as opposed to a ‘quick-fix’ two-week course.
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In connection with all of the above, I was also beginning to realise that I had underestimated the general education sector’s poor state following years of mismanagement and neglect under the Gaddafi regime. Focus group data revealed that most schools had minimal resources – some did not even have basic equipment such as CD players or photocopiers – and it also seemed that most teachers only taught a few hours a week or did not teach at all. Furthermore, the focus group participants’ general opinion had been that the GCTED and wider MoE were at best ineffectual and that, in the short term, the situation in the education sector was unlikely to improve. Therefore, for the first time, I began to consider whether the GCTED’s lack of support for LETTS was due more to a lack of capacity and/or experience than to a genuine lack of interest. This in turn begged the question of whether Libya was actually ready for LETTS, as I noted in my diary:
… it is possible that rather than being uninterested in LETTS and in working with (the BC) , the GCTED and wider MoE aren’t really at a level where they can work with (the BC) and so don’t know what they should be doing to support the programme. If this is the case then it could explain a lot! Week of entry: 20–26 January 2013
Two other things struck me from my experience of organising the educator training courses and running the focus groups. Firstly, despite a literacy rate of over 90 per cent (UNESCO, 2013) and a relatively rich literary tradition (Tarbush, 2011), I now realised that most Libyans, in line with Swehli’s (2011) arguments, seldom read documents, information sheets or indeed any written publication, which was one reason the country had few newspapers (BBC, 2016). This was also the reason why most applicants for the initial educator training course did so believing it to be an English course or a teacher training course – because they had not read the actual flyer properly. Secondly, I was surprised at how willing the focus group participants were to criticise both the MoE and Libyan government as a whole, despite them having spent the bulk of their lives living under a military dictatorship which, as Cordon (2011) explains, had dealt ruthlessly with dissent. Initially, I attributed this willingness to speak out to the spirit of the new democratic Libya. However, papers on ELT in schools and/or in-service training by Libyan researchers such as Hawana (1981), Kshir (1999) and Orafi (2008), published during the Gadaffi era, are also critical of both the Gaddafi-era MoE – the Libyan General People’s Committee for Education – and the education system in general.
Despite the above-mentioned issues, I proceeded on the assumption that the teacher training part of LETTS would start in early 2013. This was partly because I believed that, in
122 reality, there was little I could do. It was also because I believed that, despite issues with their state of readiness and confidence, the selected educators could, with the right support, make effective teacher educators, as they were interested and motivated, and data from the focus group suggested they were thinking about issues relating to delivering training in future. More importantly, however, at the back of my mind I remained convinced that, despite the GCTED’s limited support for LETTS, the centre’s director genuinely wanted to improve ELT in Libya and would fulfil the GCTED’s commitments regarding LETTS. I also believed that, as often with Libyan government-led activities, there would be a short space of time between the decision to start the training and the actual start date, as so I prepared myself to move quickly at short notice. Furthermore, I resigned myself to the fact that the GCTED would need a lot of BC support and would rely on the organisation to provide the training materials, stationery and refreshments. As I noted in my diary:
… my prediction is that I will receive a panicky phone call from (the GCTED director) saying that she has approval to start the training and that she wants to start the following week. The centre will look to me to foot the bill for everything from bottles of water to the end-of-course certificates. This will not be a great problem as long as the centre is responsible for paying the educators and takes an active interest in the course. If they do this, then I will be happy and will see it as an important first step towards the establishment of a fully sustainable programme. Week of entry: 27 January – 2 February 2013
Drawing upon my previous experience, I believed that the main challenge was to get the GCTED to actually start organising training and using the educators. Once the centre had taken this initial step and the training had started and it could see how LETTS worked and the results it could yield, then – I assumed – it was unlikely that the GCTED would stop. This would then establish a base which I could use to work collaboratively with the GCTED on developing and expanding LETTS, although I realised that I needed to be less ambitious in terms of the pace of educator development, moving to scale and expecting the MoE to cover all the costs, as I noted in the research diary:
... the idea that LETTS was going to become a Libyan-funded national teacher training programme within a year was, with hindsight, obviously unrealistic and the reality is that this is likely to be a more drawn-out and tortuous process. However, if I can (get) the programme up and running properly I am convinced
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that it will grow and I will eventually achieve what I set out to do. Week of entry: 27 January – 02 February 2013
This continued optimism was buoyed by a general improvement in BC activities in Libya. As mentioned earlier, the BC Teaching Centre had been reopened in the early summer of 2012 and by the end of the year was fully operational in terms of teachers and student numbers. A review of the current status of the LETUP project (Griffiths, 2012-c) resulted in the production of a BC–MoHE plan for its resumption in certain universities and this plan’s submission to the BC UK security team for approval, something I believed would be forthcoming. The ELT projects team, which I managed, signed a contract with the Ministry of Culture to send a large number of their officials to study English in the UK, and signed a partnership agreement with the NBTVE to deliver Teaching Knowledge Test (TKT) courses to teachers of English in the vocational education sector. More importantly, towards the end of the year, an experienced English Project Manager joined my team, with one of her key deliverables being to support the development and delivery of LETTS.
In Libya more generally, however, the situation continued to be one of uncertainty. Despite the apparent state-sponsored crackdown on ‘unauthorised’ militias in September–October 2012, the security situation was showing little signs of improving as reports by Bechert (2012), Fahim (2012-a) and Kirkpatrick (2012-b) reveal. The government continued to rely on the militias for security, but, despite a scheme to integrate them into the police and military, remained seemingly unable to bring them under its control. More worryingly, there were an increasing number of clashes between various state-authorised militias, including a major gun battle in Tripoli in November (Fahim, 2012-b), while in the east there was also a growth in the power and influence of hardline Islamist militias which pursued anti- government and anti-Western agendas. This situation was accentuated by the ongoing weakness of the new government, due partly to internal political divisions, resulting in the forcing out of the then prime minister in October (Rediff News, 2012), and, as Nilsson (2012) explains, partly to growing tribal and regional factionalism which made it increasingly difficult for the government to exert its power outside the capital.
However, long-term optimism persisted. Civil society, as Nilsson (2012) details, while weak after decades of suppression under Gaddafi, was beginning to develop – helped, in part, by BC programmes such as Young Arab Voices and Active Citizens (British Council, 2013). Oil production, as Gura (2012) describes, was back at pre-Revolution levels and foreign oil companies, such as BP (Raja, 2012), were returning to the country, while the more general view from the UK – as shown by presentations by bodies such as the Arab British Chamber
124 of Commerce (2012) – was that Libya remained a land of considerable opportunity. Furthermore, a report in The Economist (2012) – entitled ‘Rising from the Ruins’ – argued that despite the ongoing violence, the country was beginning to rebuild its infrastructure and public services, and to develop the apparatus of a modern state, particularly due to local governments taking responsibility for improving their towns and cities.
Interestingly, in late 2012, supporting Libya in developing modern military and police forces was identified by the BC and the UK embassy as a major opportunity. I submitted proposals to the training section of Libya’s General Staff and to the Libyan navy for client-funded ELT capacity-building programmes, while the embassy’s defence section (Grant, 2012-b) organised a series of training initiatives, including UK study and training placements, with a view to lining up a large-scale military training contract for the UK MoD. There were also similar initiatives for the new post-Gaddafi Libyan police force, including a potential contract for the BC Teaching Centre to provide lessons for serving officers. In general, as I later reflected upon in my diary, there was a tendency to see such prospects as proof that operating in Libya was worth the risk as there would be a payoff in the near future. Indeed this essentially summed up my attitude towards LETTS as I went forward into 2013, which was, to quote my diary entry (week of entry: 27 January – 02 February 2013), that ‘at some point the BC’s investment in getting ( LETTS ) set up and ready to go will reap dividends.’
Unfulfilled expectations and competing demands
The first months of 2013 started well for the BC ELT Projects Team. The University of Tripoli agreed to work with the BC on organising a national ELT conference for early spring, and the NBTVE training programme began as planned with the first group of teachers from the vocational education sector starting their training in early February. Moreover, although the BC’s UK security team had refused to approve the restarting of LETUP, citing security concerns, the MoHE awarded the BC a one million GBP contract to establish a new National Centre for Modern Languages (NCML) to provide specialist training and consultancy services relating to language teaching within the university sector. There appeared to be strong interest from the Libyan military in the proposals I had submitted, and I was also approached by several ministries wanting to emulate the Culture Ministry by sending their officials to study English in the UK. Furthermore, the appointment of a new UK Ambassador who was a former teacher of English with a keen interest in ELT offered the prospect of increased embassy support for my team’s programmes.
In Libya too there were signs that the optimism of 2012 may not have been mistaken. While
125 the country’s general state of instability continued – as reports by Smirnov (2013) and McGregor (2013) exemplify – with the government grappling with challenges hitherto unknown in Libya, such as drugs-related crime (Dettmer, 2013-a) and the rise of radical Islamist groups (USA Today, 2013), along with the continuing problems of the militias’ unchecked power and regional demands for more autonomy (Eljarh, 2013), the situation in early 2013 did not look overly bleak. As Eljarh argues, although dissatisfaction with the government and pace of change frequently led to petitions and protests, the fact that people were able to do this and the government was responding showed that the democratic process was working. Similarly, as Eljarh goes on to state, the slow process of political decision making was mainly due to political leaders having to continually compromise in order to satisfy all sides in the parliament, which, he suggests, meant that Libya was avoiding the polarisation affecting other Arab Spring countries such as Egypt and Tunisia.
The run-up to the second anniversary of the Revolution in February 2013 saw predictions of large-scale violence, mass protests and a ‘Second Revolution’ (Al-Baraki, 2013) spearheaded by pro-Gaddafi counter-revolutionary forces. Indeed, these predictions were taken so seriously that the government closed Libya’s borders and outlawed demonstrations during the anniversary, while the BC – acting on embassy advice – instructed all international employees to remain indoors. Despite this, the anniversary resulted in three days of wild celebrations throughout Tripoli and most of the country – celebrations which, despite the embassy advice, the UK Ambassador participated in by putting in a public appearance in Tripoli’s Martyr’s Square on the evening of 17 February (Elserari, 2013). The Revolution’s second anniversary also gave countries such as the UK the opportunity to reaffirm their support for the new Libya (Zapita, 2013-a), and in the BC it gave our UK Executive Board the opportunity to reaffirm that the country remained a top priority. It also allayed the fears of internationals on the ground in Tripoli regarding the potential for any large-scale violence, and indeed, as I noted in my diary, I started viewing the security alerts we received from the embassy and the reports of rising crime and militia violence as features of daily life in the capital:
Less than a year ago people seemed horrified with all the militia fighting, crime and general decline in the security situation, whereas these days they seem to shrug them off as everyday inconveniences. Certainly I have become accustomed to these things and my heart no longer skips a beat at the sound of gunfire or at warnings from the embassy not to visit certain nearby locations due to fighting. Week of entry: 17–23 February 2013
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To my surprise there was no communication from the GCTED regarding LETTS’ continuation, although due to other commitments, I did not contact the centre to ask for an update. By early spring, my team’s programmes with the higher and vocational education sectors were well under way and I was developing a large-scale UK English study programme for the Ministry of Planning. Moreover, there was a growing view within the BC Libya’s senior management team that as there were so many opportunities in other sectors with partners ready to actively engage with the BC, it was nonsensical to invest resources in trying to work with an education ministry which was uninterested in engagement. As well as LETTS, this was also due to the then recent failure of the BC’s Connecting Classrooms (British Council, 2015-a) project in Libya due to a lack of MoE support, despite the project being launched – like LETTS – in response to MoE requests!
However, I was not ready to give up on LETTS, partly due to my research ambitions, partly because the programme had been my primary goal since arriving in Libya the previous year and partly because I still wanted the opportunity to apply my ideas (Gray, 2011) for establishing effective and sustainable cascade training programmes. Furthermore, despite the challenges, I remained convinced that once LETTS was actually launched it would quickly develop and expand. Finally, as I noted in my diary, I was also aware that BC Sudan’s KSTTP had now become the National Teacher Training Programme (NTTP) and was going from strength to strength in terms of scale and impact, and I was anxious to compensate for having missed out on the opportunity to deliver this. In my diary I noted:
… (the KSTTP) has now grown into a national programme operating in 8 states and although I comfort myself that everything from the (supervisor trainers’) salaries to the bottles of water is being paid for by the Council, the programme has been very successful and I can’t help feeling that I have missed out on an opportunity with this and so really need to make up for this by making the Libya programme a success. Week of entry: 03–09 March 2013
Scope for cautious optimism?
In mid March 2013, the BC and the University of Tripoli organised a high-profile national ELT conference (Libya Herald, 2013), the first such event since the Revolution. To mark the occasion, a reception was organised at the Radisson Blu Hotel attended by, among others, several high-level MoE officials, including the Deputy Minister for Education and the GCTED director. I used the occasion to raise the issue of LETTS with both individuals and to ask if
127 they were in a position to start working with me on the programme, and, at the same time, to ask some questions about the general situation in the MoE and wider education sector.
Although I failed to receive any commitment from the GCTED director, she stated that the centre was still interested in launching LETTS later that year. She also admitted that the centre was dealing with a number of challenges in fulfilling its role, especially as it still had not received its budget from the Ministry of Finance and she was concerned that the money would only be available in the middle of the year, meaning that the centre would struggle to meet its delivery and spending targets. She also informed me that she was being given unrealistic targets by the MoE and that as well as training teachers of English, the centre was also being expected to train all mathematics, science and information technology teachers. The Deputy Minister had been in office since the end of 2012, although this was the first time I had met him, and surprisingly he had not heard about LETTS or about any of the other work the BC had been trying to organise with the MoE. We spoke for some time about LETTS and other ways in which the BC could engage with his ministry, although, as I noted in my diary at the time, I did not feel inspired by our conversation:
In a sense it felt like I had been there before. Like his predecessors, the minister spoke about the importance of English in the new Libya, the importance of teacher training and how valuable the work of the BC was, but did not provide any specific suggestions on how the BC and MoE could work together. Nor, apart from a general request to keep him informed about LETTS’ progress, did he show any particular desire to facilitate this in future, and, as a result, my expectations are that he will be about as supportive as the other ministers. Week of entry: 17–23 March 2013
The Deputy Minister did, however, reaffirm the GCTED director’s point about the MoE budget being delayed and that this was having a disruptive effect on activities – apparently only the money for salaries was being provided at that time. He also informed me that the proposed Political Isolation Law was causing concern within the MoE and wider government, and this was also making it challenging to focus on implementing reform.
Although I had not read any articles about state budgets being delayed, I had heard anecdotally that public finances were in a disorganised state. Indeed, despite various reports on the opportunities Libya had to offer, such as those by Zentner (2013) and the Arab British Chamber of Commerce (2012), it was proving challenging for foreign organisations to actually sign contracts and get paid, something alluded to by Mason’s (2013) report on a
128 then recent high-profile UK trade mission. Moreover, this had largely been my experience as, while I had successfully negotiated UK study contracts with the Culture and Planning Ministries, I had discussed UK English study programmes with several other state bodies and these discussions had broken down when it became clear the potential partner did not have the required funds at its disposal. Moreover, other contracts for in-country ELT work I had been pursuing, such as those with the military, had also not been signed due to funding- related issues. This took me back to an earlier conversation I had had with the moderator about the GCTED’s contribution to LETTS, which I had noted in my diary at the time:
I then told (the moderator) about how there was a disconnect between (GCTED director’s) talk of all the programmes the centre was going to deliver and the fact that they couldn’t even pay for the refreshments for the training, to which she responded by laughing and saying that all their money was on paper and that this was the same for the whole government and that public finances were in a complete mess. Week of entry: 28 October – 03 November 2012
In contrast, I had read a lot about the proposed Political Isolation Law which was, as Fick (2013) explains, designed to bar former Gaddafi-era officials from holding senior government positions and was indeed causing concern within state ministries. It was controversial partly because of its wording which, as Fick points out, was still ‘vague’ and so it was unclear how it would operate and who it would apply to, and partly because so many officials in the government had served under the Gaddafi regime. The law had been spoken about for some time, and by March 2013 it had been drafted and was being debated by the GNC. It was now looking increasingly likely the law would be passed, and when this happened it would almost certainly add to Libya’s continued political instability.
The practical teacher training skills course
The conversations at the reception, coupled with progress in other areas, strengthened my optimism about the future delivery of LETTS. Therefore, conscious of the need to keep the educators motivated and of the feedback from the focus groups that they needed more training and were chiefly concerned about how they were going to train groups of teachers, I decided to organise further training for the selected group of 14. In an article on the delivery of the BC Trainer Development Course to university teachers in Sudan (Gray, 2010), I highlighted the fact that on this, and on trainer training courses in general, there was little actual training practice and argued that this was why local teacher educators often employed
129 the same deductive teacher-centred approaches that they were trying to move teachers away from. With this in mind, I decided to organise a practical training skills course modelled on the teaching practice component of courses like CELTA (Certificate in English Language Teaching to Adults) and CertTESOL (Certificate in Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages), mainly because these were the types of training courses I was most familiar with. A group of volunteer teachers would attend a three-week semi-intensive in-service training course, with sessions delivered by the teacher educators and observations conducted and feedback delivered by an international trainer.
To follow official procedures, I informed the GCTED and asked the centre to inform the educators, provide a venue and organise the volunteer teachers. However, as I had no faith in the GCTED to provide these things, I arranged to use the BC and tasked my team with contacting the educators and sourcing volunteer teachers. My predictions regarding the GCTED were completely accurate and the centre did nothing – indeed, on this occasion it did not even inform me that it could not provide any support. Fortunately, my own organisational efforts paid off and the course was delivered as planned in April 2013.
As on a CELTA/CertTESOL course, the educators were given assistance in planning and preparing sessions, and those they delivered were observed and post-session feedback provided. At the same time, other educators observed the sessions and completed observation tasks. I deployed one of the BC international trainers who had delivered the initial educator training to facilitate the course as she had background knowledge of the educators, the context they were likely to be operating in and their developmental needs, thus meeting many of the requirements for the delivery of effective training programmes highlighted by writers such as Bax (1997) and Hayes (1995), and avoiding the issues that can arise with deploying so-called ‘jet in jet out’ trainers (Srimavin et al., 2013: p.1). I also took advantage of having the educators gathered together by having informal discussions with them during the course and by organising a further focus group with four of them, which was conducted in English and moderated by the international trainer.
The educators’ attitude towards the course was positive, with both the focus group participants and the ones I spoke to informally stating how much they valued the opportunity to gain experience in training ‘real teachers’ as I noted in my diary:
… several (educators) mentioned during the week how working with so-called ‘real teachers’ was much better than the micro-training they had done (on their previous training courses) and has given them a real taste of what it will be like
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when (or if) they ever start work for the (GCTED). Week of entry: 07–13 April 2013
Although at the start most educators had been quite nervous, this soon changed when they actually started working with the volunteer teachers, and they began to relax and become more confident. As one focus group participant commented:
… if we compare ourselves between the first lecture and the second one we feel ourselves more self-confident from the first one as we actually did not know how to deal with our new colleagues and the question itself if our new colleagues accept us or not.
As I anticipated, the educators behaved in a similar way to trainees on a CELTA course, with the trainer playing the role of course tutor and providing support to the educators in selecting topics, preparing materials and planning sessions. Indeed, one of the elements of the course the educators appreciated was the trainer’s feedback on their sessions. One focus group participant pointed out that she valued the international trainer telling her about the areas she needed to develop and where she had made what she referred to as her ‘mistakes’:
Yes, how will I learn if I didn’t know my mistakes or the things I did (in a) bad way, something like that. I have to know them!
In connection with this, the educators also felt they benefited from observing colleagues and listening to feedback on their sessions:
… when (the international trainer) will give advice to my colleague I can also listen to what (the international trainer) says and what they discuss, and to learn something new.
Indeed, despite participating in the course in the afternoons after teaching in school in the mornings and – so they claimed – being very tired, most educators tried to attend all the sessions in order to observe their colleagues, even though this was not compulsory. And, in general, their attitude towards the course was professional and dedicated, with most of them working particularly hard on planning and preparation.
Despite this enthusiasm, there were aspects of the course that proved challenging. One of these was that despite the training materials coming from English for Teaching – a BC
131 course designed to be delivered by trainers with low English levels – my observations indicated that the educators only possessed abstract knowledge about the ideas they were training the volunteer teachers in. For example, in the focus group, when one educator was asked what he was planning to do in his next session, he stated:
I'm going to do some grammar ideas, some techniques for grammar, for teaching it, yes. I'm going to do with the teachers some new ideas (regarding) how to teach grammar depending on reading and writing so they don't have to (teach it) traditionally on the board ...
Moreover, I observed several sessions in which the educators struggled due to a combination of nervousness, difficulty in expressing themselves in English and limited knowledge of the area they were focusing on. This led to them talking a lot, giving long and unclear explanations, trying to do activities as a whole group instead of asking teachers to do them in pairs or small groups, and failing to use techniques they had been shown on the initial educator training courses such as getting teachers to provide the explanations. In connection with this, timing also proved a particular challenge, with participants given long amounts of time to complete relatively short tasks and vice versa, although this was an area the educators visibly improved in as the course progressed.
However, the main issue for the educators was managing and dealing with participants, some of whom were quite strong and asked challenging questions and/or did not do what they were asked to, as I noted in my diary:
On one occasion a participant challenged an educator regarding the way certain words were pronounced and the educator clearly found the situation difficult and merely said that there wasn’t time to discuss the issue and tried to move things on. Week of entry: 07–13 April 2013
The educators, however, recognised that this was an issue, and in the focus group the following exchange took place about disruptive teachers:
M = Moderator P = Participant
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P1: … she can be so late, knocks on door and says ‘salem alekom’ and interrupts us. M: (interrupts) Well, as a trainer at the front, you are the boss, someone comes into your class, it’s ‘Thank you very much, please sit down, page whatever.’ P2: And there’s (name of a second teacher). P1: She’s not coming late, I don’t think so. M: (Teacher’s name) is different . She is disruptive in a different way. P1: She always asks about something, asks why, why not. It takes time.
The international trainer tried to elicit ideas from the participants regarding ways of dealing with such teachers – mainly focused on classroom management and good planning – although they were unable to articulate these, and both the trainer’s and my own conclusions were that developmentally the educators were not yet at a level where they could do this.
One issue the focus group highlighted was that although the course was three weeks long, because it was organised while the educators were working and held in the afternoons, it only gave each educator the opportunity to deliver three training sessions – about one a week – which both they and I felt was insufficient, and the now familiar request for more training was raised several times during the focus group, as this exchange shows:
P1 … more training and practice, like this course we are having now. P2 Yes, I think we all still need time and practice so we can start training the teachers. M: Do you think you need more help with methodology or more practice? P1: We need training with all things! P3: We need to know more about computers as these are now important, yes, very important for our work. M: Does your school have a computer room? P3: No, but soon all schools will have, (the MoE) promised us.
The participants also took the opportunity to re-emphasise the fact that they had been working at the same time as the course and that this was difficult. As one explained:
P1: Later in day one hour and a half it (unclear) because roads are crowded and it can be difficult and … M: (interrupts) Tiring?
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P1: Yes, we are tired and the teachers too!
As well as being tired and having to travel across Tripoli, two participants pointed out that they had family commitments and that it was difficult to manage these and to attend the course. Although, as Libyan women seldom socialise outside their extended families, other educators informally mentioned to me that both they and the teachers had enjoyed the opportunity the course had provided to meet and socialise with people outside their families.
The educators, both in the focus group and in our informal conversations, also made it clear that they remained dissatisfied with the MoE and had little faith in its ability to improve the education sector. This led to the following exchange:
P1: … we don’t see any changes, nothing, they just promise and say everything will change, but there is no change. M: I thought that the government was spending a lot of money on improving education? P2: (laughs) In my school there is damage from the bomb, from the NATO bomb, and nobody makes repairs. P3: Many schools have nothing, no CD players, computers, photocopiers or anything else.
The educators I had informal conversations with were sceptical that the GCTED would deploy them to deliver training later in the year or make any real effort to support teachers in general, and suggested that the BC organise the training itself, as my diary entry shows:
I detected a lot of dissatisfaction with (the GCTED) and particularly with (the GCTED director) who the teachers felt was generally inept and was unable to do the job, with one educator posing the question, ‘Tell me, what has she done, actually?’ and another claiming that she was corrupt and had organised for overseas scholarships and training courses for her cronies. There was also, as I understood, the perception that as someone from Benghazi she was not really interested in Tripoli and western Libya, and would only really support the programme if we could do it in eastern Libya. At the same time, there was general dissatisfaction with the MoE as – as far as I could make out – none of the teachers had seen any improvements to their schools, classrooms or salaries, despite apparent promises by the government and despite the fact it
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was now over one and a half years since the end of the Revolution. Week of entry: 07–13 April 2013
I had mixed feelings following the practical training course. On the one hand, the international trainer, the English Project Manager and I all felt that the educators were genuinely at a level where, with support, they could deliver training, and the educators themselves – as far as I could make out – were eager to start. Also, informal conversations with the volunteer teachers who attended the course reaffirmed my earlier findings that a lot of practising teachers of English were desperate for any kind of professional support and so there was a definite need for LETTS. On a more personal level, I felt that my professional belief that trainer training courses required a substantive practical training element had been vindicated. However, on the other hand, the GCTED had done nothing to support this course nor taken any interest in it, and so the prospect of the centre supporting LETTS in the near future looked uncertain. Moreover, from my informal conversations with the educators and the teachers – the latter something I wished I had done more of – the evidence suggested that generally the situation regarding school education in Libya was one of stagnation and inertia.
The course also showed that educators and teachers would participate in afternoon training courses when this was the only option, although the moderator – from the first focus groups – had previously cautioned me against looking at this as the way forward, as I noted in my diary:
… (the moderator) informed me that being a teacher was seen as an acceptable job for a married woman as it gave them time to manage their childcare and household duties, and to meet their commitments to their extended families, which are extensive in Libya. According to her, a lot of teachers will not have the time to attend afternoon training or be disallowed by their husbands from attending. Week of entry: 07–13 April 2013
Facing facts
Before I could consider further how to follow on from the course, the BC Country Director organised a meeting with our Education Programme Manager, who had been responsible for the BC’s failed Connecting Classrooms programme (British Council, 2015-a), the English Project Manager and myself to review our position on engaging with the MoE. This was in
135 light of the Country Director’s growing opinion that the MoE was so overwhelmed by the enormity of the task involved in reforming Libya’s school education system that it was incapable of doing anything – ‘like a rabbit dazzled in the headlights’ was her exact phrase – and therefore organising programmes with the ministry was arguably a waste of time and resources. She also believed that what Libya’s education system needed was a massive reform programme involving large amounts of resources, funding and manpower, and there were increasing signs that instead of being Libyan-funded – as the BC had hitherto assumed – this was more likely to be funded by international donors. For example, UNICEF was becoming increasingly active and had contracted the EDT to review the national curriculum and state of the teaching workforce in the basic school sector (UNICEF, 2013), and was due to sign an agreement with the MoE to improve the general school education system (UN News, 2013). There were also unconfirmed reports of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – Germany’s leading state donor organisation and usually referred to in English as ‘The German Society for International Cooperation’ – USAID and other Western aid agencies looking to fund education reform in Libya.
The Country Director’s view was that the BC’s time and resources could be better invested in the organisation’s rapidly developing ELT and education programmes with other sectors, and leaving the school sector to the international donors, although obviously the BC would pursue any relevant contract opportunities that were put out to tender. My view was different, as I felt that a UNICEF-funded programme was unlikely to focus on English language teaching and so it was worth continuing to pursue LETTS if the Education Ministry was still interested, especially as a considerable amount of time, money and resources had already been invested in training up the educators. Moreover, setting up such a programme I felt would place the BC in a strong position to bid for any donor-funded educational reform programmes. However, I conceded that evidence suggested that the GCTED was uninterested in delivering LETTS or any other programme if it involved them doing anything themselves or contributing financially to it, and I accepted the English Project Manager’s point – which I quoted in my diary (week of entry: 05–11 May 2013) – that spending more money on the programme at that time would be ‘chucking good money after bad’, and so from this point onwards I decided that it would now be up to the GCTED to take things forward – something I noted in my diary:
I still think LETTS is viable and can happen, but I agree with my colleagues that more needs to come from (the GCTED) and that organising more activities for the educators and running round after the likes of (the GCTED director) is a waste of time and resources. However, I am still optimistic in the long term that
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something will happen, possibly when stability and security improve, or when the flow of state finances improves. Week of entry: 05–11 May 2013
New realities
In April and May 2013, a series of events brought the issues of security and political stability back on the agenda. On 23 April, a car bomb attack on the French embassy in Tripoli and unconfirmed reports – which I am not in a position to confirm or deny – of a failed attack on the BC (Dettmer, 2013-b), marked the first attack(s) against Western diplomatic interests in Tripoli since the Revolution and led to speculation by analysts such as Walt (2013) and Crisp (2013-a) that hard-line anti-Western Islamic militants were now active in Tripoli. Less than a week later, to pressure the government into passing the Political Isolation Law, a number of militia groups stormed the Interior Ministry and State Television Station and then surrounded the Foreign and Justice Ministries (Jawad, 2013-a). The law was passed (Zapita, 2013-b) overwhelmingly by Libya’s parliament – the General National Congress – although admittedly, as commentators such as Gomati (2013) pointed out, this was done at gunpoint. This was then followed by a stand-off between the government and the militias, who began demanding that the government disband (Sherlock, 2013). In protest at the government’s inability to control the militias – most of which were on the state payroll (Deutsche Welle, 2013-b) – and due to concerns over the potential escalation of the situation, a number of Western embassies and organisations, including the UK embassy (Blair, 2013), the BC and BP (Daily Express, 2013) temporarily withdrew non-essential staff.
The siege of the ministries was soon lifted (Jawad, 2013-b) and was followed by a series of anti-militia demonstrations in Libya’s main cities (Greenfield, 2013), culminating in the shooting of over 30 demonstrators in Benghazi in June (Kirkpatrick, 2013). This was met by a state-sponsored anti-militia crackdown – particularly in the east, with one of the most powerful militia groups, Libya Shield, forced out of Benghazi – and a considerable amount of determined government rhetoric. Once again this was seized upon as a sign that things were going to get better – or, at least, not any worse – with one senior UK diplomat remarking at a meeting at the UK embassy that ‘if things were going to tip over, they would have done so by now’ and The Economist (2013) posing the question, ‘Is the Tide Turning?’ However, to more cynical observers it seemed like a repeat performance of autumn 2012, with the government once again relying on ‘authorised militias’ to do the cracking down, even if this time they all wore official police and army uniforms. Moreover, as one local BC staff member remarked to me in an informal conversation: ‘When you have young guys in flip-flops and
137 tank tops armed with automatic weapons surrounding government ministries and nobody can touch them, it’s a sign that the country isn’t heading anywhere good.’
Finally a breakthrough
On Thursday 30 May 2013, with Libya wracked by continued political instability and Tripoli dealing with regular power cuts and disruptions to the water supply (Zapita, 2013-c), the vision I had had for LETTS one year earlier seemed remote. However, shortly before lunch, the BC received a phone call from the GCTED that would change everything – at least temporarily. According to my project coordinator, who took the call, the GCTED was going to organise week-long, intensive training courses for four groups of 20–25 secondary school teachers, with each group trained by two teacher educators. The training would be delivered in local schools and would take place in the period between the end of the school term and the start of Ramadan, when teachers were still officially working but had no classes. Following this news, I immediately called the GCTED myself and organised a meeting with the centre director for the Sunday morning. Over the weekend, as I waited with anticipation, I emailed the BC Country Director and a number of colleagues telling them that this could just be the breakthrough I needed to get LETTS moving.
At the meeting, the GCTED director informed me that the centre would select and inform both the educators and the teachers about the training, that the educators would be paid and that the GCTED needed the BC’s help with preparing and supporting the educators and, as I had predicted almost half a year earlier, with providing the materials, stationery and refreshments. Although they were only using eight educators, this training was a pilot and, if successful, it would be repeated using the same model – short, intensive courses when teachers were officially working but had no teaching duties – using all 14 educators. The training would take place on 23–27 June, and on each day would run from 09:00–14:30, with a 30-minute break in the middle, with the aim of giving the teachers 25 hours of training by the week’s end. This provided just less than three weeks’ preparation time. A meeting at the GCTED with the selected educators was organised for later that week, and I immediately contacted the English Project Manager to inform her that our priority was to ensure that the educators were fully prepared and supported for the forthcoming training.
The weeks leading up to the training saw the BC ELT Projects Team making frantic preparations with the enthusiastic participation of the educators, but little visible involvement from the GCTED, although I presumed they were selecting teachers and identifying venues. Following the initial meeting at the GCTED in which the director officially informed the
138 educators about the forthcoming training and how their payment would be organised, several so-called ‘preparation meetings’ were held at the BC to look at the relevant materials and to plan the course. There was also a final briefing at the GCTED on the Thursday prior to the start of the course. Due to time pressures as a result of this and of other activity taking place at the same time – including preparation for a review of ELT in the vocational education sector – I was unable to organise any formal focus groups. However, I agreed with the educators and the English Project Manager that I would keep a record of any interesting comments or information that emerged in our informal conversations during the course preparations. During this time, I recorded one of the meetings – the final preparation meeting – and made several diary entries, a couple of which reveal the high hopes I had for the training and the future of LETTS, with one reading:
There is an issue regarding the sustainability of the current ‘BC pays for everything’ approach, but given the importance of actually running the courses and getting the MoE and GCTED to go through the relevant processes, I think this is a battle I can fight at a later date. Once they do this and get the mechanisms in place, then I can start to get them to take over paying for different stuff in stages. Getting the courses delivered right and delivered well is the most important thing for now. Week of entry: 09–15 June 2013
In reality, though, the BC was not paying for everything – I had avoided falling into the trap I had fallen into in Sudan and ensured that the GCTED would pay the educators. I was also more sympathetic to the GCTED’s inability to pay for other things than I had been previously. The government’s well-publicised anti-corruption drive (Eljarh, 2013) was making state sector officials reluctant to approve spending on new projects, due to fears of being accused of wrongdoing, while the MoE was struggling with a burgeoning wage bill due to a recent government decision to increase public sector salaries (Saleh, 2013). Also, I began to consider the fact that the MoE’s bureaucratic poorly organised internal systems were probably making it difficult for the GCTED to earmark funding for things like stationery and refreshments. I reflected on this in my diary:
… I forgot that in Ukraine, which, like Libya, was a former Soviet-style state, it had taken years for me to get the (Ministry of Defence) to put lines in its budgets not just for teacher training courses, but for things like stationery and tea and coffee for the breaks. It wasn’t so much a situation of the military not wanting to pay or not having the cash, but more with them not having the procedures in
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place to pay for certain items, and, due to a hierarchical top-down command structure, it was very difficult to get them put in place. For the Libyan MoE, which is in a far more chaotic state than anything I ever came across in (the former Soviet Union) I can imagine it is even more difficult. In Ukraine my technique was to pressure the decision maker until I got what I wanted – a relatively easy thing to do as I was based in the actual ministry. However, in Libya this wasn’t really an option – or at least one I never really explored. Week of entry: 09–15 June 2013
When developing Ukraine’s MoD’s national training programme for military teachers of English, I first set up and launched the programme and then gradually over a four-year period handed over management and funding to the ministry. And while, given the scale of both the need for teacher training in Libya and my aspirations for LETTS, such an approach was not practical, I realised there was a need for some realism and flexibility on my part around what could be initially achieved.
Course preparations
The educators were confident about the course, noticeably impressing the GCTED director and her deputy, as well as the English Project Manager and myself. This feeling among the educators was, in my opinion, partly due to a general notion that as they had had a lot of training it was time to use what they had learned, and also because their fears around actually training teachers had largely been overcome via the practical training course, as I noted in my diary:
… (the GCTED director) seemed quite taken aback by how keen the educators were and how on the ball they were with what they had to do; she also later confided in me that she was surprised they didn’t ask about how much they were going to get paid. I explained to (the GCTED director) that they had been quite frustrated that they had had lots of training, but never actually started work as trainers, and so were mad keen to actually start work, and also that following the training back in April they were quite confident about dealing with teachers. Week of entry: 09–15 June 2013
However, the point was made by one educator that while the teachers who attended the practical training course were there voluntarily, this might not be the case with those attending the forthcoming training. Despite teachers officially being at work at the time of the
140 course, in reality, as there would be no classes, most would simply stay at home, meaning that those on the course might resent being forced to attend, especially with Ramadan approaching, as most were likely to be women and would have commitments at home. This was summed up by the English Project Manager in the final preparation meeting, after the subject had been discussed for over ten minutes:
Well, yes, those teachers you trained were there because they wanted to be and these ones might be told to attend by their schools or by the ministry, and, yes, I can imagine some of them will wish they are at home cooking for Ramadan (educators murmur in agreement) , but I am sure if you make activities interesting and keep them busy they will forget about this and start being glad they are there with you.
Although in my diary I noted:
… the discussion and (English Project Manager’s) summary went a long way to alleviate the educators’ concerns, but one later confided in me that she was concerned that some of the teachers would not want to be in the training and would have a very low level of English, and so would be very challenging to work with. Week of entry: 16–22 June 2013
The educators, the English Project Manager and myself all agreed that English for Teaching would be the most suitable course for the training. On the former’s advice, the educators’ preparations involved planning on going through the course progressively at a rate of one module a day, although there was some disagreement between the English Project Manager, who advised them to miss out content they were not confident about delivering or felt was irrelevant, and the educators who felt that they had to cover everything in the modules. This, the English Project Manager and I believed, was due to the way they were instructed to teach by school inspectors who, according to the moderator,3 routinely told teachers they had to teach everything in the book, and although we both made constructive arguments against this, my feeling was that even after these the educators were not convinced. I made the following diary entry:
3 This was the moderator for the first three focus groups.
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(Name of an educator) was particularly insistent that she and her co-trainer would try to do the whole module in a session, even though (the English Project Manager) had pointed out that this was likely to prove challenging and that the educators should select their material in advance and be unafraid to skip things, as indeed had happened on the (practical training skills course). I was a bit surprised this had become such an issue as none of (the educators) had had a problem with this approach during that course. Week of entry: 16–22 June 2013
The educators were pleased with the arrangement for them to deliver training in pairs. Although discussed on the previous training courses, this was not a topic that had been focused on, and on the recent practical training course the educators had worked individually, and so the English Project Manager and I decided to let each pair arrange how this would actually work by themselves. Interestingly, the main reason the educators liked the idea of delivering training in pairs was because they thought that the hour-long sessions on the practical training course had been too long for one trainer and so I was interested to see how they would cope with delivering training for several hours while working together.
Certain educators were concerned with aspects of their training which had been identified on the practical training course as requiring development and were reassured by the fact that the English Project Manager and I were going to be visiting the sessions and observing and providing informal feedback. One thing I was pleased about was the way they seemed ready to support each other, a situation exemplified by the following exchange that took place in the final preparation meeting:
EPM = English Project Manager E = Educator
E1: But, also we will need, some, yes some advices when we start the training if we have some problems, you know, some difficulties with our colleagues. EPM: You mean the teachers you are training? E1: Yes, that’s exactly right. We need to know how we can do things better if things (unclear). E2: (interrupts) But first I will ask my colleagues, the another trainer and maybe someone else from our group. EPM: You mean one of the other trainers? One of this group? (Several educators say
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at the same time that this is what they will do)
Despite this being the only time this issue was discussed explicitly, there were several comments from the educators in our informal conversations that made me realise that my efforts to promote networking among them had paid off and there had been a degree of contact and collaboration. This was a significant achievement because, as well as the importance of collaborative networking for their professional development – in line with the ideas of Rhodes and Beneicke (2002) – this was a concept which, half a year earlier, had been alien to them. Regrettably, it was only on reflection that I realised the importance of this, and at the time failed to follow up on exploring how the educators had networked and how they felt this had benefited them. Had I done so, then the information produced could have provided guidance to support the development of an organised educator network as LETTS expanded.
Criticisms of the GCTED were regularly aired, mainly around the fact that it had taken the director so long to organise the training, along with the now traditional complaints about the centre and the MoE in general not doing anything to develop education, with one educator commenting in the final meeting:
We had one course and then nothing and then after two or three months did another course, and then nothing, instead of having (sequenced) courses together … to have big experience about teaching, to be a teacher trainer. So, that’s the problem here, this was wasting time and losing knowledge.
Although I did not explicitly record this in my diary, my feeling was that some of this was unfair, as the GCTED had organised the forthcoming courses and – particularly given the state of Libya’s government at that time – this was something of an achievement, and personally I believed that the GCTED had performed well under the circumstances. They had informed the educators at a relatively early stage, organised an initial meeting and followed up with a final briefing just before the training started. Moreover, the venues had been selected and – I had been assured – checked to ensure they met the minimum standards in terms of chairs, desks and a whiteboard, locations had been set up for the refreshment breaks, and the GCTED had also organised for their staff to visit the training to monitor the training, particularly regarding teacher attendance. I was more sympathetic regarding the educators’ feelings about the wider ministry, given its ongoing disinterest in engaging with the BC, although, once again, I realised that, at the time, the MoE was probably struggling just to keep functioning.
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One thing the educators questioned that surprised me, but that I also agreed with and recorded in my diary, was why the BC was paying for everything:
… (names of educators) both pointed towards the fact that we were paying for everything and seemed to find it incredulous that (the GCTED director) could not provide stationery or bottles of water. This came as a welcome surprise, as in Ukraine and Sudan I had got used to teachers and the like asking why the BC wasn’t paying for everything, and underlined the big plus of Libya not having a donor mentality. Week of entry: 16–22 June 2013
However, as mentioned above, I had resigned myself to the BC covering most of the costs for the time being, and generally I was pleased with the GCTED’s performance and that of the educators and in my diary (week of entry: 16–22 June 2013) described myself as ‘almost high on optimism’ as the course began.
The teacher training courses
The courses took place as planned. In each of the four centres a group of teachers took the first five modules of the English for Teaching course. In all the centres, there were small numbers of late arrivals and dropouts as the week progressed, with one centre seeing only four teachers actually finish the course. Predictably there were complaints from the teachers about being informed about the training at the last minute or after it had started, although from discussing this with the educators, the teachers and the GCTED, this was possibly due to poor internal communications in schools as opposed to shortcomings by the GCTED. Punctuality, with the exception of the late arrivals and dropouts, was good, and feedback from the educators indicated that most teachers arrived on time and stayed until the end of each day’s training.
The training centres themselves varied from two located in spacious, but slightly drab, assembly halls – although one had issues with faulty lighting and noisy air-conditioning – one located in a small, poorly furnished classroom and one located in a large, well-furnished room which also doubled as a computer room. The latter was in a school which was, compared to the others, clean and modern-looking, and I was later informed that this had been the school where Gaddafi’s senior officials had sent their children. The room, however, had limited space, as did the other classroom, but this did not seem to cause any major problems and in general all four pairs of educators made the best of their locations.
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Furthermore, the above-mentioned lighting and air-conditioning issues aside, the educators reported that their schools had been supportive in making sure the rooms were clean, accessible and – to the best of their abilities – that everything was working.
The GCTED, to the noticeable surprise of the educators, took an active interest in the training. In each centre there was an administrator present to check on attendance and provide support to the educators, although the educators in the hall with the lighting and air- conditioning issues said that they had asked their administrator to resolve these issues and she had been unable to. There was also a visit to each centre from a high-ranking district MoE official, who spoke to the educators and teachers and promised further and more long- term training courses to come. In general, and as I noted in my diary, there was a genuine sense of ownership from the GCTED which I believed boded well for the future:
From what the educators have been telling me and (the English Project Manager) and from meeting one of the visiting senior officials myself, it seems that (the GCTED) is for the first time genuinely interested and engaged with this, and there is a genuine sense that this is ‘their’ training programme, something that the positive feedback these officials have apparently received from the educators and trainees has – I hope – only strengthened. Giving the centre the sense that the programme is theirs is a major milestone on the road to getting them to buy into it, scale it up and take it over completely Week of entry: 30 June – 06 July 2013
The English Project Manager and I visited each of the training centres individually during the week – meaning two centres received a visit from her and two from me. We arrived in the mid morning, when the groups had a short break, and remained until the end of the training day. This gave us the opportunity to observe the educators and provide feedback at the end of the session when the teachers had left, and also enabled us to speak to the teachers during the main break and to ensure the refreshments were being provided as arranged. We then visited each centre on the last training day, with the English Project Manager visiting the two I had visited earlier in the week and vice versa, in order to give out certificates and to administer BC scorecard questionnaires – required for our impact records.
Both the English Project Manager and I were pleased with what we saw on the courses. In three groups, the educators delivered the training as a team and, from our observations, this appeared to be more effective than the fourth group where the educators took it in turns. This was partly because when the educators worked together, they supported each other on
145 an ongoing basis, but also because there was a higher level of engagement with the teachers. Along with making the best use of their training rooms, the educators dealt well with several challenges, including one teacher who – according to the educators – demanded in the first session to be trained by ‘British Council English speakers’ , one who was bilingual in Arabic and English and tried to dominate the training and one who, at the start, refused to participate in group and pair work as she was ‘very experienced with an MA and knew everything already’ . However, the most interesting example was a male teacher who was very conservative and at the beginning said he was unable to work with females at close proximity, yet due to a process of gentle coaxing by the educators by the end of the course was participating actively in session activities. I was particularly impressed by this, as I noted in my diary:
… the way the educators dealt with (name of teacher) was almost a blueprint for encouraging members of the opposite sex to work together in conservative Muslim contexts, and I couldn’t help thinking how these two women with a few weeks of training and passable English could show some of these high-profile international teacher trainers a thing or two about tackling the problem of mixing genders in training sessions in conservative Muslim countries. Week of entry: 30 June – 06 July 2013
The educators were unfazed by the presence of the GCTED official, with one educator telling me that theirs was there because ‘she has to be given what to do’ . They were also unfazed by the visits of the more senior officials and in general they were more confident than they had been on the practical training course. Moreover, although there were a range of issues that the English Project Manager and I noted as requiring development, including spelling and grammar errors on their board-work, not considering solutions for anticipated problems and – as predicted – a tendency to try to go through all the material , our overall feeling was that the educators were developing well and would soon be capable of operating autonomously.
My informal conversations with the teachers proved an interesting experience. My understanding was that only a few had received any in-service training before, and this was on the above-mentioned Garnet Education training programme for the introduction of English for Libya . Furthermore, a number of them – as was the case with the teachers who applied for the initial educator training course – were not actually qualified teachers of English. Their English levels were generally – based on the English Project Manager’s estimate – around lower intermediate, although several were elementary and a small number were upper-
146 intermediate/advanced. No teachers we spoke to resented having to attend the training instead of being at home preparing for Ramadan, and most appeared to enjoy the social opportunity the course presented. Similarly, with a couple of exceptions at the start, the teachers had no problems with being trained by local Libyan educators, as I noted in my diary:
I then asked the teachers if at the start of the course they had expected English/ international trainers as opposed to Libyans. The teachers did not say whether they had expected this or not; however, they did say that they had no problems with it and they didn’t seem to think it was an issue, as Arabic was seldom used in the sessions. Week of entry: 30 June – 06 July 2013
Indeed, the visiting officials, the English Project Manager and myself were told by the teachers we spoke to how much they valued the training, with one teacher describing it as ‘amazing’ and another saying that she liked it because it showed them ‘how to use the simple techniques with the students’, such as asking students to work in pairs, to talk to each other and to check their answers with each other, all of which could be used in class, while a third teacher could not stop talking about how the educators had shown her ‘how to mix the groups, the weakest and the good students’ . However, they also said that they needed a lot more than just a week-long training course and wanted and expected further courses. Most also said it would be challenging to attend training at the same time as they were teaching, and one teacher complained that having lengthy training sessions every day was making her feel like a ‘squeezed lemon’ and suggested having training every other day. The teachers also made the point that the training centre had to be relatively accessible due to most of them being dependent upon male family members for transport. Indeed, I later learned that the reason for the poor attendance and high dropout rate in one of the centres had been due to its location and teachers being unable to reach it easily.
My informal conversations with the teachers also helped me build a better picture of the situation regarding ELT in schools. All teachers followed the English for Libya course and were required to teach one whole book per school year, although, due to the amount they were required to cover, the lack of CD players – required for the listening activities – in their schools, and the fact that each class only had four 45-minute lessons per week, they tended to only cover the grammar, vocabulary and reading exercises. They also said that their students’ English levels were a lot lower than that of the book, which also made it challenging to teach the material effectively – a situation compounded by the fact that
147 because of this the students were often demotivated. One teacher I spoke to, however, said that she occasionally tried the course’s communicative activities and that her students had enjoyed these and she believed they were worthwhile. The same teacher also told me that she and her colleagues occasionally discussed teaching ideas, and that she had provided support to a new teacher:
One time last year, my colleague, she’s a new teacher, asked me ‘I want to see, your lesson’ and I didn’t tell the principal, and my students asked me ‘Who is she? Why’s she’s coming?’ and I say ‘She’s an inspector, so keep silent.’
The teacher deliberately did not inform her head teacher as apparently he would have opposed this, and generally head teachers were viewed as being barriers to change. Most teachers said they rarely saw their head teachers and that their priorities were making sure all students were in class being taught and doing as little as possible, hence their opposition to releasing teachers during term time for training as it would involve additional work for themselves. With the exception of the above-mentioned teacher, in most schools there was no practice of colleagues supporting each other, partly because teachers were afraid of giving advice and looking big-headed or asking for advice and appearing unable to do their jobs. All teachers were inspected regularly, usually three times a year, although inspectors tended ‘not to know English’ and saw their roles as to check that lessons were starting and finishing on time, the English for Libya book was being used and, more generally, to criticise the teachers. According to the teachers, both their head teachers and the inspectors would be opposed to any attempt to introduce communicative approaches into the classroom, as they tended to believe teachers should follow traditional ‘translating the words and the grammar’ approaches.
The courses were the first time the teachers had had any contact with the GCTED, and some even admitted to asking ‘What is this general centre for teachers?’ when they were informed about the training. In general, they were scathing about the MoE and the likelihood of any improvements in the short term. However, they admitted that in providing these courses the MoE had taken a step in the right direction, with one teacher saying that ‘it is the first time ( the MoE ) has done something nice for us’ and generally they were optimistic about Libya’s long-term future. Although one teacher confided in me that the events of the previous month had made them question whether the Revolution had been worth it, as I noted in my diary:
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… (the teacher), whose family member – I think her brother – had been killed in the fighting, became quite agitated when she spoke to me about her feelings regarding the events of the previous month and how a lot of Libyans felt that they had made great sacrifices only to see their hopes for a better future ruined by bands of armed men and a weak ineffective government. She also said that it was very difficult for people to speak out too strongly as they would immediately be branded as ‘Gaddafi supporters’. Week of entry: 30 June – 06 July 2013
Interestingly, two of the younger teachers had recently graduated as teachers of English from Tripoli University’s Faculty of Education, and were able to tell me about the pre-service training they received. The programmes they described sounded very similar to the ones I had come across in Ukraine (Gray, 2009), and consisted of lectures on theories of teaching and learning, while the English language tuition they received was lecture-based and mainly involved lecturers talking about linguistics. One of the teachers also said that most teachers at the university were ‘Indian and from the Philippines’ and that it was difficult to understand them.
Post-course developments
The week after the course, the English Project Manager and I met the educators on two occasions. The first was a meeting at the GCTED between the centre director, the educators and the BC about how things would move forward following the courses, although unfortunately most of the discussion was in Arabic and so the English Project Manager and I were unable to participate properly and often had to ask the educators to translate so that we could keep up. The director informed the educators that there was a delay to their payment and they would only receive this in August, which, to my surprise, did not lead to any complaints. She also informed us that her deputy would be directly responsible for the programme and that the next set of courses would be run for two weeks, from 25 August to 5 September, with sessions taking place again in the mornings and the number of centres being expanded to six, which meant that four more educators from the list of 14 would be selected. She asked me about the BC’s continued support for the training, which I confirmed, and also asked about the possibility of repeating the educator training programme in Benghazi. My response was that this required further discussion, as the BC was not in a position to travel to Benghazi and so any training would need to be delivered in Tripoli. The director then discussed with the educators any issues they wanted to raise, which – as far as I could gather – were mainly regarding informing teachers in advance about the training,
149 making sure they were able and willing to attend and ensuring everything in the training rooms worked properly, all of which the director promised to deal with.
The second occasion was a formal focus group that I organised at the BC with the aim of examining the educators’ thoughts about the courses – particularly regarding areas in their approaches to training they still needed to work on – and their expectations for the future now that, as I believed at the time, LETTS had finally got off the ground. The English Project Manager moderated the focus group and I attended as an observer. In the focus group, the educators came across as being enthused by the training, with one of them stating that they felt ‘absolutely great’, and collectively they all stated that they were looking forward to delivering the next courses. They also said that they were now considering which areas of their training they needed to develop and how they were going to do things differently next time round, with three educators making the following contributions:
E = Educator
E1: I would give the teachers (training in) how to plan the lessons because they didn’t know how to prepare a good lesson plan for the lessons, so just … E2: (interrupts) How to manage time … E1: (continues talking) For example, lead in, to prepare classes, because (begins speaking Arabic) E3: Because we (gave) them this in the middle of the course only.
However, for the educators, the priority next time round was to explain course aims clearly at the start as on the previous courses most teachers had initially assumed that they were English language courses. One of the educators commented:
(Most) of them, they (think) they are coming to improve their language and this is a very big problem. We try to solve this by saying ‘No, we try to give you some new techniques, some new knowledges that can help you in your teaching not in your language.’
In response to this, the English Project Manager pointed out that English for Teaching was partly a language development course – something that had been explained on a number of occasions to the educators – and advised them to tell teachers that the course would develop both their English language and their teaching skills. Indeed, the low level of some of the teachers’ English had taken the educators – who had relatively high levels by Libyan
150 standards – aback and a large part of the meeting was spent discussing how such teachers could be best supported as the ones on the course had been desperate for help, as the following exchange reveals:
E1: … they concentrate only on language, they (come in), saying, ‘We have a problem in speaking, in our pronunciation, we really need help with these’ … E2: (interrupts) Yes, one of my trainees called me four days (after the end of) the course, and she asked me to give her a private course for writing …
The educators believed that teachers asking for English courses would be a constant challenge and several indicated that they believed this is what the sessions should focus on. Following a lengthy discussion, it was agreed that the educators would help teachers to explore options for improving their own English, such as self-study books, online resources and English language courses, rather than replacing English for Teaching with a course such as Headway. The English Project Manager also made the point that the educators should make sure their courses were ‘full immersion’ and not to let teachers use Arabic.
Some educators then – with no prompting from the English Project Manager – began discussing how teachers could be supported following the training, as many had been disappointed with the short length of the course. Ideas suggested included running one-off training events and visits, by the educators, to teachers’ schools to observe their lessons and give them further support. This last idea was very interesting for the English Project Manager:
EPM = English Project Manager E = Educator
EPM: You mean to be like school inspectors? E1: (interrupts) It’s not like inspectors. E2: (interrupts) It’s something like (unclear) it’s just the teachers who attended the courses, to help them (to) start using these techniques, (to show them) how they can use (them), (to) try to help them. EPM: OK, great. E1: If we visit schools we may have a very close look at how they deal with the students, do they use a technique or not. We may give them feedback that can help them.
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E2: It depends on the situation, it depends on the school, students ...
I was impressed that the educators were thinking about post-course support for teachers and had come up with a potential plan. However, as this was a topic for a conversation with the GCTED, I moved the discussion on to the educators’ other concerns, a major one being the selection of teachers. Several educators claimed to have had teachers in their groups who were uninterested in change. One educator commented:
I faced three older teachers (everyone laughs) who said, ‘No, it will never work in our classes. It’s a great idea, but we tried and we did that’ and so on (unclear), but the young teachers said, ‘No, they are great ideas, great activities’, but (the older teachers) they just started complaining again, again and again, so I …
The same educator went on to say:
… (we should be) giving the ideas for people who will use them, not losing time with people who will never use them.
Generally there was a feeling that the GCTED needed to have better procedures for selecting teachers and informing them in advance about the training. One pair of educators admitted that they had had teachers coming in the middle of the course – which was news to the English Project Manager and myself – who had only been informed about the training after it had started. Another stated that in her group there had been primary school teachers whose English levels, she felt, had been too low for the course, although it was unclear whether this was her adhering to the popular perception that primary school teachers usually had poor English and teaching skills. Both the English Project Manager and I were surprised about this, as officially LETTS was a programme aimed at secondary school teachers, although the educators pointed out that it was sometimes difficult to separate teachers in this way:
E1: We have secondary schools and primary school inside (unclear). EPM: Sorry? E2: They are in the same building, I mean, we mean they are the same school. EPM: So some teachers can teach primary and secondary? E2: Not that, but they have one headmaster, one deputy …
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It was challenging to work out how teachers had been selected. My assumption had been that the GCTED had been responsible for this, and initially this seemed correct, although at the back of my mind I realised that it assumed a level of organisation and competence at the centre which I was not sure existed. One of the educators stated that in her centre the senior official from the MoE seemed to know the names of the teachers who were supposed to be there:
I noticed one thing, that the man who is from the Ministry of Education, he knows everyone, he knows every teacher, really he knows them (unclear) he says the names before they come, if he sees someone who is a stranger (he says) ‘OK, what’s your name?’
The English Project Manager, however, assumed it was head teachers who had actually nominated teachers for the course:
EPM: So was it the school head masters who nominated the teachers? E1: Yes ... E2: (interrupts) No, not the head master, a person from the international (unclear) EPM: They come and they put the notice up? E3: The training centre they tell people (unclear) it depends on the area. EPM: So different notices go up in different schools or one notice in one area? E2: One notice in one area. E4: The office responsible for that area, the ministry gave them a paper, but they didn’t tell anybody in the area for our school.
At the end of this part of the discussion, it was not completely clear to the English Project Manager – or to myself – how the teachers had actually been chosen, as none of the educators seemed to really know, although the most likely answer is that it depended upon the local education authority responsible for that particular area and they had the option of nominating teachers directly or asking head teachers to nominate people. Several educators commented that some local authorities were better organised than others and said that authorities in some parts of Tripoli had not bothered informing schools and their teachers about the training.
The issue of the training rooms was also raised, with one pair of educators complaining that their room had been ‘very small and the environment was not suitable’ and the English Project Manager, who had carried out an observation in that room, describing it as ‘old and
153 dusty’, and the consensus was that the GCTED had to make sure rooms were suitable for training. The English Project Manager made the point that the educators had made the best use of the rooms put at their disposal and overcome obstacles posed by things like faulty lights and air-conditioners, while one educator jokingly remarked that these were ‘problems we will face and will need to decide’. Indeed, the educators then went on to state that they had limited confidence in the GCTED to actually deal with any of the issues they had raised in the post-course meeting, but, as one educator said with a hint of sarcasm, ‘We must hope the best will happen.’
One of the questions the English Project Manager asked the educators was how they thought future training courses could be organised. This prompted considerable discussion, as they all felt that a one-week intensive course was not long enough, although some also felt that it was too intensive as teachers on the courses had complained about the number of hours. As one educator stated:
… (the teachers) said it was too long, they couldn’t sit (at) the desks, even though they were very, very good, but they said it was too long and maybe better one day yes and one day no, and so on.
The English Project Manager stated that if a lot of teachers were going to be properly trained, then short, intensive courses were not an option and suggested that teachers attend training for two hours a day over two weeks after school, arguing that they were likely to learn more this way. This promoted the following response:
E1: After classes? (laughs) They would be so tired, they would tell us ‘We are so tired.’ E2: It’s too intensive … E3: (interrupts) But we have to do that because at the beginning of the year, in September, we have to do something. EPM: Maybe two sessions twice a week for a month? E2: That’s too long, better for two weeks.
By this point, it was clear to the English Project Manager that whatever format the training courses were in, there would be complaints from the teachers and the educators, and so it was not worth pursuing this at this stage.
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One thing the educators mentioned was the fact that teachers faced a serious challenge with the level of the English for Libya course, as the following exchange shows:
E1: … the level of the book is not suitable for the level of the students. EPM: And for some of the teachers? E2: (laughs) Yes, that too. You see in 2000, 2004, when these books came (the MoE) was not thinking, they did it randomly, they were doing it in their sleep … E3: (interrupts) When we said, ‘Guys, it’s too hard’, they said ‘No, this is your students’ level. We know this better than you.’
One educator, who was active in DELTS – the recently established local association for teachers of English – and generally better informed than the others, said that she had heard the English curriculum at basic school level, primary and secondary, was going to change – something I had also heard anecdotally – and that this would influence the training they would need to deliver in future. However, after some discussion, neither the educators nor the English Project Manager seriously believed that the MoE, in its current state, was capable of introducing such a reform, although I was less convinced, as the MoE had, as mentioned above, imported mathematics and science curriculums from abroad and it was not inconceivable they were planning to do something similar with English.
The educators made three more interesting comments about the state of ELT in schools. Firstly, they said that although they were ‘waiting’ and ‘hoping’ , and despite the MoE regularly stating that English was now a priority subject, they had not seen any changes in ELT at school level. Secondly, they explained that all end-of-year English tests, apart from those at the end of Year 9 and Year 12, were written and marked by the teachers, and that in many schools students with very poor English often received high marks. Thirdly, they told us that although school inspectors visited their classes around three times a year, they rarely made reports and, when they did, these were not shared with the teachers and instead only given to the local education authority and to the head teacher, neither of whom usually bothered to read them. They also said that, contrary to what we had been told earlier, some inspectors were very supportive, but the problem was that ‘most (inspectors ) don’t really know the English language or modern methods of how to teach’ and therefore tended to fall back on telling teachers to follow a translate-and-drill approach, often involving – in line with Humphries’ (2012) comments – more focus on the Arabic than the English!
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A potentially bright future with a few dark clouds
Both the English Project Manager and I had been stimulated by the delivery of the teacher training courses, especially by the way the educators conducted themselves and by the teachers’ positive responses. Indeed, regarding the latter, we felt that the educators had been too hard regarding their comments on some of the older teachers as, in both our cases, the ones we spoke to who could be placed into this bracket had been very positive, and we both agreed that there was scope for the educators to reflect on this and to try to change their perceptions, while at the same time looking at developing techniques for managing such teachers in future training.
The selection process was an issue, especially the seemingly eclectic approaches employed by certain education authorities in identifying teachers for the training. However, I was unsure that the information I had received from the educators was accurate as, in most cases, they had received this via the teachers. It was clear that at some stage the GCTED would have to ensure that education authorities employed a standardised and transparent system of selecting teachers and that this would be based around identifying those who would benefit most from attending, although this I felt could be tackled further down the line. My immediate priority was to keep the training up and running and to get the GCTED managing it properly, and once there was a training system in place, to then develop and improve it. The educators’ idea of supporting teachers after the course, while praiseworthy and a sign that the educators were getting into their roles, also fitted into this later-stage category, especially as it would involve head teachers and possibly school inspectors as well as the GCTED.
Talking to the educators and teachers also made me appreciate even more – in line with Aylett and Halliday’s (2013) and Moshen’s (2014) reports – just how dilapidated Libya’s school education system was and the challenge faced by the government in reforming it. More importantly, I realised that the long-term viability of LETTS relied on this reform process, as without the MoE and wider education sector developing the capacity to organise and manage a national training programme, LETTS would continue to consist of individual sets of short courses, each set dependent upon the BC and specific decisions by the GCTED. My other concern was regarding the GCTED’s desire to extend LETTS to the east, as I noted in my diary:
While (extending LETTS to the east) is something I am keen to do, I am not sure if (the GCTED director) understands or – more to the point – wants to
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understand that I am not allowed to travel there. Like most Libyans from the east, she clings to the assumption that everything is fine and refuses to see the reality of the situation there. While this is frustrating, it is also understandable as it is for her and others a way of coping, and the same could be said of the BC here in Tripoli. Week of entry: 14–20 July 2013
In Libya, tribal and regional loyalties were strong and there was a tradition – most famously with Gaddafi’s large-scale public spending on his home town of Sirte (Jeursen and Van der Borgh, 2014) – for government officials to prioritise public activity and spending in regions where they were from, so it was understandable that the director would want to provide similar training programmes in the east – indeed, several educators had complained that the director was ‘only interested in the east’ . However, partly because the region had been purposefully neglected by the Gaddafi regime – as articles by Dziadosz (2011), Gumuchian (2013-b) and Kaplan (2012) explain – and partly due to Benghazi’s role as the so-called ‘cradle of Libya’s Revolution’ (Engel, 2013), the new government was under tremendous pressure to focus on the city and surrounding area, and so politically the director’s position was understandable. However, I was unable to travel to the east, and so any extension of LETTS would require the GCTED to put in place the resources and capacity to organise for potential educators to travel to Tripoli. If they could not do this, then it would present a serious obstacle to LETTS’ future growth.
Going forward, however, both the English Project Manager and I were optimistic. The only challenge was that I would be on leave during the next set of courses and, due to pre- existing arrangements, it was impossible for me to change this. Therefore, my plan was to spend July 2013 supporting the educators in preparing for the forthcoming training. Even though I would be Acting Country Director for the whole of this month, I believed that I would have time to focus on LETTS, as from 9 July onwards it was Ramadan, traditionally a quiet time for the BC in most Muslim countries. Unfortunately, as I would soon discover, events in Libya during Ramadan 2013 would be anything but quiet.
Back to reality
Despite the state crackdown on militia groups at the start of June, Tripoli’s security situation had not improved and gun battles between rival groups were now regular occurrences, as exemplified by reports from Karadsheh (2013-a) and Wahab et al. (2013). Although, following the spate of attacks on Western missions, the Ministry of the Interior had posted
157 police units outside all embassies and cultural centres, including the BC, for me, as Acting Country Director, their presence created more problems than it solved. Whenever there was fighting in the vicinity of the office, they usually deserted their posts as quickly as possible, and initiatives to persuade them to stay proved counter-productive. In one example, prior to the start of Ramadan, I agreed to let them have whatever they wanted from the BC café, only to find that one had taken a box of 50 chocolate bars and was selling them outside to passers-by. At the same time, the general stress levels of staff, both local and UK, were not helped by rumours of the UK military being deployed in Libya to tackle the threat from extremists (Drury, 2013) and a potential anti-British backlash.
Ramadan, I assumed – particularly one falling during the hottest time of the year – would lead to a quieting of the fighting that plagued Tripoli. However, had I examined historical precedents in Middle Eastern conflict areas, as Bindley (2013) explains, I would have realised this was naïve, and as it turned out I spent my entire period as Acting Country Director dealing with one security crisis after another. These included tension between the police and our neighbouring militia – which had returned to the holiday village in mid June – culminating in a physical confrontation, shots being fired and the police refusing to remain outside the office; militias firing rocket-propelled grenades into the sea just outside the office during the evening classes, protestors – ironically, demonstrating against the lawlessness in Tripoli – barricading the top of the road leading to the BC, fighting between rival drugs gangs near the BC teachers’ apartment block and an attack on the UAE embassy compound (Shennib and Gumuchian, 2013), located only several streets away from the BC office. While the BC and its staff remained unscathed, there were concerns, particularly among the BC’s UK security team, about the worsening situation, and a lot of my time was spent liaising with them and the UK embassy on security-related matters. At the same time, Tripoli’s more general chaos continued with a failed rocket attack on the Corinthia Hotel, where the government was accommodated, and regular fighting between Islamist and non-Islamist militia groups. After I went on leave and the BC Teaching Centre Manager took over as Acting Country Director – he was due to cover the post for two weeks until the Country Director returned – my ‘successor’ declared he could not manage and closed the office as a temporary measure.
During this time, there were several developments which would have profound consequences for Libya’s future development and, at the same time, lay bare the reality of the security situation. Firstly, despite the government’s pledge to disband militias unwilling to integrate with state security services, no timetable had been announced and the government showed no sign of actually taking action. Secondly, as Sullivan (2013) explains, in Tripoli
158 and in the country in general, many militias were openly conducting illegal activities, including drug and alcohol dealing, arms dealing and people smuggling. Thirdly, as detailed in an IHS Markit report (2013), two powerful tribal-political camps were beginning to emerge in Tripoli, with the first controlled by revolutionary leaders from the western town of Zintan and the second controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood and supported by the city of Misrata. The camps pursued non-Islamist and pro-Islamist agendas respectively, were held together by pre-2011 tribal alliances and were both backed by powerful militia brigades. As IHS Markit comments, while a major armed confrontation was not at this stage a certainty, it was a distinct possibility.
At the end of July I travelled back to the UK to take a much-needed extended period of leave. During Ramadan, I had made little headway in supporting the educators with planning for the next set of courses, partly because I was busy with more immediate issues such as the security of the British Council office and its staff, but also because the educators themselves were mostly unavailable due to their domestic commitments. Therefore, I tasked the English Project Manager and the rest of the ELT Projects Team with working with the educators in August on preparing for the courses, and in monitoring and observing the training. I also asked the English Project Manager to organise a focus group for the educators at the end of the courses.
The second set of teacher training courses
The courses went ahead as planned. The English Project Manager organised a series of preparation sessions in the week before and spent extra time working with the four additional educators. With Ramadan over, the educators were happy to participate in these and were enthusiastic about the forthcoming training, although there were certain issues that were causing discontent and the English Project Manager was sufficiently concerned to advise that we discuss them with the GCTED upon my return in order to avoid them having any long-term negative effects on LETTS. The main issues were firstly that the educators had still not been paid for the previous courses and secondly that the GCTED expected them to deliver this training and then to go back to their full-time teaching jobs, despite both their and our expectation – based on the original agreement with the centre – that they would be appointed as part-time GCTED teacher educators and given reduced teaching hours. These issues, according to the English Project Manager, gave the educators the impression that the GCTED did not value them or their work, and dampened their enthusiasm for the forthcoming training. There were also indications that the educators were beginning to have
159 unrealistic expectations about what sort of training they themselves were entitled to, as I later noted in my diary:
… then, according to (the English Project Manager) during one of their discussions (name of educator) was telling them about when he went to BELL in Cambridge to do that TKT, and (names of educators) said that they should be sent there as well either by us or by (the GCTED). Week of entry: 08–14 September 2013
A fear shared by the English Project Manager and myself was that, as with the expectations voiced by many of the teachers on the Libyan English Teaching at Universities Project in a 2012 review of the project (Griffiths, 2012-c) and the wider ‘culture of entitlement’ (St John, 2015: p.125), which, as St John suggests, permeates most of Libyan society, there was a risk that educators were going to start expecting well-funded overseas training opportunities, which neither the BC nor GCTED were in a position to provide.
The English Project Manager also reported that the educators were showing signs of frustration and tiredness with Tripoli’s ongoing instability and violence. This was symptomatic of a growing sense of despair among Libyans as a whole, something I had picked up on from comments by Libyan BC colleagues and, as mentioned above, from a conversation with one of the trainees on the previous set of courses. Throughout August, Tripoli had been plagued by power cuts and fuel shortages, and there were growing rumours of the city’s water supply – the Great Man Made River – being cut off (Essul and Elraqubi, 2013) by tribes in the south of Libya. At the same time, as Stephen (2013-a) reports, Tripoli was witnessing nightly gun battles between armed groups, with attempts to improve security by bringing in supposedly pro-government militia making matters worse. The government, divided between Islamist and non-Islamist factions, seemed incapable of taking the situation in hand and, as the Tripoli Post (2013) reported, was under pressure as questions were being asked regarding how it had managed to spend 103 billion US dollars during the past year and yet had little to show for it. The educators complained about not being able to buy petrol, having to endure lengthy power cuts and not being able to go out after dark in their neighbourhoods, while one mentioned that her father had recently had his car stolen by a militia when driving through a checkpoint. Two of the educators had played active roles in the Revolution and several had had family members killed or injured in the fighting, and, according to the English Project Manager, several had questioned out loud whether the uprising had indeed been worth it – something which would have been unthinkable a year before.
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Despite this, preparations for the training had proceeded smoothly, with the English Project Manager reporting that the educators mostly ‘just got on and did it’ and ‘dragged’ the ‘first- timers’ along with them. The English Project Manager was also pleased that they all had indicated that they would be team-training, and they seemed to have learned from their previous training experiences by actively planning around anticipated problems such as dealing with teachers with unrealistic expectations and with different levels of English and teaching experience, as well as some teachers arriving two or three days into the course.
Although I tasked the English Project Manager to gather data for the research project, including noting down issues arising from session observations and interesting comments by the educators and conducting a focus group at the courses’ end, in reality a limited amount of actual data-gathering took place. This was mainly due to her becoming involved in a proposal for an ELT scholarships programme with Libya’s National Oil Corporation, which had recently announced it was going to send large numbers of its staff on English language training programmes abroad (Clark, 2013). Therefore, I had to rely on her recollections, as opposed to any systematically collected research data.
The courses started as planned, although in one centre – located at the actual GCTED – the English Project Manager reported that ‘they were supposed to be doing a course ( at the GCTED ), but didn’t manage to get any teachers, and the two women who were there were really disappointed as they had done loads of prep.’ Moreover, for these courses, as well as printing the training materials, as it had done previously, the BC also had to distribute them on the first day of the training as the GCTED proved unable to organise this itself. There was also confusion with participants’ names, with the educators reporting that the lists that the GCTED administrator had given them bore no resemblance to the teachers who turned up, although, interestingly, when local education authority officials visited the training, their lists matched the actual list of teachers in attendance. It also seemed that, once again, there was still no uniform way of teachers being selected, with some apparently nominated and others asked if they wanted to attend. However, it needs to be remembered that these courses took place just after the school holidays, and indeed just two months after the first set, and it was unrealistic to expect a significant organisational improvement in so short a time.
With the exception of the slight worsening of the GCTED’s capacity, the courses proceeded in a similar way as the previous ones, with the BC monitoring and observing, although the English Project Manager admitted that doing it all on her own was ‘absolutely knackering’ . The GCTED and wider MoE took an active interest in the training; there was an official from the centre as before, but apparently she – they were all females – often left early. Each
161 centre was visited at least once by a senior official, although apparently neither the GCTED director nor her deputy – now nominally responsible for the training – visited. As before, a number of teachers came one or two days after the courses had started, claiming that they had not been informed earlier, and there were a small number of dropouts, although the English Project Manager said that it was surprising there were not more.
As before, there were issues with poorly furnished rooms, noisy air-conditioning units and training venues’ locations. The English Project Manager also faced challenges in getting across Tripoli on certain days, due to the threat of fighting in or en route to the relevant centre’s location, which resulted in her being unable to travel to one particular centre to give out end-of-course certificates. However, generally the educators performed well, and although there were still areas they needed to work on, the English Project Manager reported that their confidence had improved, particularly when dealing with troublesome trainees, and they managed timings and answer-checking sessions much better. Two of the educators who were delivering training for the first time even organised for a group of practice students for the teachers to practise on in the afternoons and carried out teaching practice with them, which impressed both the English Project Manager and the visiting MoE officials. In two of the groups, there were single men who, due to cultural issues, were initially uncomfortable with working closely with females, but, as before, the educators gradually got them involved in the groups and after several days there were no real problems.
The English Project Manager organised a debriefing session with the educators the week after the training, which she then reported on. During this, it emerged that they had still not been paid for the previous training and had been informed that the budget for the second set of courses had been based on one educator training at any one time so they were only going to be paid half of the initially promised sum, which, at a time when the government was talking of multi-million pound education projects, such as those described in reports by ICEF (2013), was quite insulting. The educators also complained that neither the GCTED director nor her deputy had bothered to visit the training. They also had heard nothing about what would happen when school started and appeared resigned to the fact that they would be going back to full-time teaching jobs. The two who had no sessions did not attend, and one educator said they were not interested in delivering training any more. The visiting MoE officials had spoken about further training, but when the educators asked them for more details, they said the GCTED was organising it. The English Project Manager ended her report by stating that along with the satisfaction of having delivered the course, there was disappointment, as the educators felt undervalued and there was no way forward in sight.
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Post-course developments
I returned to Libya after the teacher training courses had finished, disappointed that I had missed them. I was also concerned that rather than moving forward, with the GCTED organising more training courses, as I had predicted, LETTS now seemed to be grinding to a halt. There had been no word from the GCTED on future training. My attempts to contact the director proved futile, and when I managed to meet her deputy, he had no idea about any plans for future training. In my diary I commented:
In my particular world view, by this point LETTS should be poised to take off as the GCTED has been through the process of organising two sets of courses and although there have been a number of issues, generally speaking they have been successful and have proved popular with the teachers and the wider MoE. However, it is as if the GCTED has forgotten about the training or has decided that future courses are not worth the effort. I really can’t understand what has gone wrong. Week of entry: 22–28 September 2013
At the same time, Libya also seemed to be grinding to a halt, with the government grappling with armed groups with varying demands blockading ports and oilfields (Jawad, 2013-c) – a situation which in turn led to increasing power cuts and regular petrol shortages in the capital. As before, lawlessness continued, with an increase in the number of political assassinations (Foster and Blair, 2013) and increasing fighting throughout the country between rival militias and tribal groups (Cockburn, 2013). Indeed, commentators such as Stafford (2013) and Crisp (2013-b) were increasingly beginning to refer to Libya as a potential failed state. As I wrote in my diary:
… the mood among most members of Council staff and other Libyans we work with seems to have taken a definite turn for the worse. For the first time it is possible to hear people openly questioning whether the Revolution was a good thing. On the way to the airport to fly to Cairo for a regional English meeting (the BC driver) responded to (the English Project Manager’s) offer to bring him back something by saying, ‘Maybe you can bring back another Gaddafi.’ Indeed there is very little left of the optimism and spirit of 2012 and it really is hard to see anything getting better at the moment. Week of entry: 22–28 September 2013
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Despite the country’s reported increasing economic challenges (Ma,2013), the BC found itself being approached by several state organisations interested in organising UK English study programmes for their staff. This meant that most of my time upon my return was spent working on these. At the same time, my projects unit began organising a national teacher mentoring programme in partnership with the university sector and also continued with its TKT programme for vocational education sector teachers. Alongside this, towards the end of September, I also had another stint as Acting Country Director and had to deal with another office evacuation and temporary period of closure due to fighting between the Jadu militia in the holiday village next to the BC and a rival militia. Indeed LETTS’ continuation was the last thing that was on my mind when on 29 September I received a phone call from the GCTED director which had the potential to turn this situation completely on its head.
The breakthrough I had been looking for?
In the call, the director said she wanted to see me urgently about a large-scale MoE-funded national teacher training programme. In my diary (week of entry: 06–12 October 2013) I later noted that when taking the call I had to ‘pinch myself and then pinch ( the English Project Manager ) who was also listening’ as neither of us could quite believe it! Unable to quite take this latest development in, I organised a meeting with the director for the very next morning and went to see her together with the English Project Manager and our Education Programme Manager, who also knew the director and, like her, came from eastern Libya.
The meeting began with the usual formalities – small talk and cups of coffee – and then the GCTED director began talking about the large-scale teacher training programme – Libyan English Teaching in Secondary Schools – that the Gaddafi-era MoE and BC had been due to deliver (see Finlayter, 2011 for more information). This came as a surprise, as this programme had not been mentioned in any BC–MoE discussions beforehand, and my assumption had been that either the officials who had dealt with the programme were no longer working for the MoE or that the ministry had simply accepted my proposed cascade programme as being the way forward with in-service training. However, the director knew all about it and more crucially stated that the funding allocated for it – approximately three million GBP – was still available! Given the fact that it was originally intended for the BC and that the organisation was already delivering teacher training, the GCTED wanted the BC to use the funding to deliver a nationwide programme of training for teachers. This was very much an out-of-the-blue moment – indeed, in my diary (week of entry: 06–12 October 2013) I drew upon Taleb’s (2008) renowned book, The Black Swan: the impact of the highly improbable , and referred to it as my own ‘Black Swan’ event, as it was unexpected and had
164 the potential to change LETTS and indeed our wider ELT programme completely. However, the GCTED wanted the programme to start as soon as possible, ideally by the end of the year! This meant quickly coming up with a plan to begin delivering LETTS at scale and at a national level, as opposed to the current piecemeal Tripoli-based approach. As I later noted in my diary:
The challenge is that the original grandiose programme I envisaged back in early 2012 was based on the stable, secure and developing Libya everyone was expecting and not the chaotic, lawless and increasingly fragmented state I now find myself faced with. Week of entry: 06–12 October 2013
The proposal I came up with – a draft, as the GCTED wanted it straightaway – was based on identifying potential educators in Libya’s main cities, giving them extensive input and training practice in Tripoli and supporting them in their home cities through telephone and Skype, and, if possible, sourcing Supervisor Trainers on the ground from BC-trained former LETUP teachers. The BC would provide materials, expertise and master training, and would use the existing educators to help with the selection, initial training and support. The proposal initially envisaged training 100–120 educators for 150,000–200,000 GBP. It also laid out the issues that the BC and GCTED had to resolve together, including the official appointment of the educators, selection of teachers for training and scheduling of the in-service training courses. The latter was highlighted as crucial, as the BC–GCTED needed to have training programmes in place so the educators could start work when their own training had been completed – or at least know when they were going to start – to avoid a repeat of the previous situation with the existing educators, where there had been a half-year gap between their training and when they started to train teachers.
In the proposal, I presented the GCTED with three options: organise the training during school holidays and/or periods when teachers were officially at work but had no classes; organise training in the afternoons after lessons had finished; or organise intensive or semi- intensive training during term time and get the MoE to officially instruct head teachers to release selected teachers so they could attend. My preferred option was the latter, and I suggested in the proposal that the MoE consider instructing head teachers to use the so- called ‘standby’ teachers to provide cover for teachers being released.
The draft proposal was sent on 1 October 2013. Although brief, it covered all the points raised by the GCTED and, in line with their requests, included a full breakdown of all
165 anticipated costs and BC fees, and detailed the obligations I expected the centre to fulfil. I proposed a follow-up workshop to be held the week after, in which the BC and GCTED would work through the proposal, expand on the existing details, deal with any areas not covered, address any concerns either organisation had and produce a final, well-detailed, mutually agreed plan. I could then use this plan to do a full proposal for LETTS to be delivered nationwide using the GCTED’s available budget. I received a short email from the director, thanking me for the proposal and saying she was pleased with my suggestions and would be in touch with a workshop date. I forwarded the email to the Country Director, the English Project Manager and the Education Programme Manager, together with a short note commenting that this was the breakthrough I had been looking for and finally the BC was going to deliver ELT reform at scale in the Libyan school sector, and, feeling very pleased with myself, began to pencil in dates for the initial educator training and to think about potential international trainers I could use. Little did I know at the time, but this would be the last time I would receive any official communication from the GCTED about LETTS or indeed any other ELT reform programme.
In the weeks that followed, I sent several emails to the GCTED director asking about potential workshop dates and to see if she needed more information, to which I received no response. It also proved challenging to reach her by phone, and when I managed, the response I received was that she would call me back, which she never did. By the end of October I was growing desperate, as I noted in my diary:
I can’t really understand what has happened and have spent a lot of time running though recent events in my mind. Is there something wrong with the proposal? Am I asking too much from the centre’s side? Has there been a better proposal from (the EDT) ? In a way an email or call (from the GCTED) saying that they are no longer interested would be better than the complete silence I am getting, as the worst thing is the uncertainty. Week of entry: 27 October – 02 November 2013
One option I considered was going to the GCTED, knocking on the director’s door and if she was out, simply waiting for her to come back. Another was enquiring officially through the MoE regarding the situation with the proposal, although the ministry would have most likely passed it on to the GCTED. Instead I did nothing, heeding the informal advice of the BC Country Director who told me ‘if they really want it, they will call you’ , apart from making a few informal enquiries through a BC contact in the education sector. Feedback from these
166 enquiries indicated that the director was dealing with several challenges both from inside the GCTED and from other sections of the MoE, as I noted in my diary:
(Name of contact) said that (the GCTED’s) staff had been on strike in protest at (the GCTED director’s) management approach and at their general working conditions and salaries. He also said that the ministry had been giving her a hard time about a programme sending teachers to do training abroad, although he couldn’t elaborate on what the programme was about or why there were issues with it. Whatever the exact reasons are, it is evident that (the GCTED director) is facing a number of issues and, given the centre’s hierarchical set-up, dealing with these is probably preventing any other work from being done. Week of entry: 27 October – 02 November 2013
As October moved into November, I began to accept that LETTS was not going to continue either in its current form or as a large-scale national training programme. There had been no communication from the GCTED, and what could best be described as my ‘gut feeling’ was that either the centre was not in a position to engage with the BC on LETTS or there was no interest in the programme any more. In a meeting with the Country Director and other BC programme heads in mid November, I was advised not to invest any further time in pursuing LETTS and I agreed to view the programme as being indefinitely on hold and instead to focus on the BC’s other expanding ELT programme activities.
The situation I found myself in with LETTS appeared to mirror general developments in Libya. Things had continued to worsen, with a series of incidents revealing just how precarious security had become in the capital. In October, the Prime Minister was briefly kidnapped (Stephen and Watt, 2013) by a militia group and the Russian embassy stormed by gunmen (Russia Today, 2013-b), leading to Russia temporarily withdrawing its diplomatic staff. In November, a major gun battle between the Islamist and non-Islamist militias plunged central Tripoli into chaos (Shennib and Laessing, 2013), leading to a BC external consultant, who was staying in the centrally located Radisson Blu Hotel, having to spend the night sheltering in the hotel basement with staff and other guests, while foreign guests in another city centre hotel, The Waddan, were less fortunate, as gunmen entered the hotel and robbed them of their money and possessions.
These events were followed by now-familiar government demands for the militias to disarm, accompanied by threats to take them off the state payroll, and by another wave of anti-militia protests, although on this occasion one militia group shot 43 protestors (Karadsheh, 2013-b)
167 in Tripoli. Reports by Dettmer (2013-c) and Deutsche Welle (2013-a) asked if Libya was ‘on the brink?’, with the latter’s report urging more action by the international community and a different approach from simply propping up the Tripoli government. Furthermore, the situation in Tripoli began to have a serious effect on BC operations. A teacher was held up at gunpoint on a busy street in the middle of the day, several staff members travelling back from a meeting were caught up in a shoot-out and at the end of the year a BC vehicle was carjacked. This led to international staff being provided with more security, the BC investing in armoured vehicles and restrictions being put in place regarding travelling round the capital. At the same time, several activities were cancelled or postponed, including – due to the university’s nervousness about sending one of its academics to Libya – a management course for heads of Libyan university English departments due to be delivered by a specialist from the University of Nottingham.
However, most programmes continued as planned. An ICELT course was delivered by the International Teacher Training Centre – a UK-based teacher training centre – at Tripoli University (Underhill, 2014), the TKT programme for vocational education teachers continued, the planned review of vocational education sector ELT was delivered by a UK expert (Schellekens, 2013) and the English Project Manager had begun planning for a similar review in the university sector. At the same time, a 1.75 million GBP contract was signed with the Warriors Affairs Commission – the government body responsible for the demobilising of the militias – to deliver a programme to teach English to former fighters, and an agreement between the BC, EnglishUK and UKTI paved the way for a large UK ELT trade mission in the new year.
Indeed, within the BC network, Libya received considerable praise for adopting a ‘business as usual’ approach, despite an array of challenges. In my diary in early November, I wrote:
The situation is almost surreal. On one Thursday evening we were sitting in the Country Director’s garden having a drink by the pool, with one person swimming and children playing in the garden of the house next door, and in the background we could hear machine gun-fire and explosions. On another, while driving to the local supermarket to do some after-work shopping, some colleagues and I saw one man shoot another – not lethally, as the second man got up and ran off – and although this made us jump and our driver quickly drove away from the scene – we then went shopping as normal and within 20 minutes were chatting as if nothing had happened. Week of entry: 10–16 November 2013
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In pursuit of answers
Following the meeting with the BC Country Director (see page 167), and as I began to finally realise that the GCTED was unlikely to move any further regarding organising LETTS, I began reorientating my study with a shift in focus from its original intention of looking at the programme’s delivery, the educators’ development and LETTS’ influence on teachers’ classroom practice – all of which relied on the programme achieving its aim of establishing a properly functioning cascade-based training system – to one looking at the reasons behind LETTS’ limited achievements and subsequent failure, although at this stage I had not worked out what these reasons could be! The MoE had stated repeatedly that it wanted help in developing ELT in schools and LETTS had proved popular with the teachers and, to an extent, with the MoE itself. Moreover, from the GCTED’s admission, the ministry had had the money to pay for such a programme sitting in a bank account!
I decided that the best way forward would be firstly to interview key individuals who had been involved with LETTS, including those who had been directly involved, like the GCTED director and selected teacher educators, and those who had been less directly involved but had a good general awareness of the programme, like the BC Country Director. I also felt it would be worthwhile interviewing individuals, such as education ministers and deputy ministers, who, while probably not well informed about LETTS, were aware of the general situation within the MoE and wider school sector, and would be well placed to comment on possible wider reasons for the programme’s limited achievements and eventual unravelling. At the same time, I made a concerted effort to continue keeping a research diary and to record my findings and any other relevant information on an ongoing basis, as well as periodically reviewing and reflecting on my existing records.
These interviews were conducted from late 2013 until late 2014. The format I followed is outlined in Part 1. Chapter 2 of this thesis and the data generated by the interviews were subsequently drawn upon systemically and overtly to develop the strands in Part 3 of the study. My first interviewee was the GCTED director, the main MoE official involved with LETTS and the individual who – as I understood from informal conversations with them – the teacher educators, along with the English Project Manager and myself, largely blamed for LETTS’ failure. Indeed, because of this and the importance of me approaching the interview as a researcher, when preparing I made a note to avoid any questions which would imply that I felt she was accountable. As noted in Chapter 2, the interview was conducted in English and Arabic with the help of a local interpreter and we were also joined by the director’s deputy who had been nominally responsible for LETTS and who I had originally
169 wanted to interview separately, although it turned out that he had little to add to what his superior said.
The interview did not go as I had anticipated, as the director declared that she believed LETTS had been a success and that she was planning to continue the programme in the coming year, blaming her then ongoing inaction on overwork, the GCTED’s limited capacity and the pressures of having to spend the centre’s budget by the year’s end. However, it also emerged that she had not properly read my proposal for the scaling-up of LETTS that she had requested earlier in the year and she provided few details on when and how she saw the programme restarting in 2014. And so, as I noted in my diary (week of entry: 01–07 December 2013), I left the interview with ‘little faith in her fulfilling this intention’.
The next individuals I planned to interview were the deputy minister who had made the initial approach to the BC for assistance with ELT reform and the previous GCTED director who had signed the MoU that launched LETTS. However, the latter had gone into politics and was fighting allegations of corruption and was unavailable, while the former was in France as the Libyan representative for UNESCO and proved impossible to contact. Formal and informal requests to interview the then current education minister and/or deputy minister also received no response. Fortunately, other opportunities emerged through my contacts and I was able to organise interviews with the former deputy education minister who had served from late 2012 until mid 2013 and who I had previously met in March 2013, and with the Head of English at Tripoli University’s Faculty of Education. The latter, while not holding any official position in the MoE, was responsible for his university’s training programme for future teachers of English and had a good general awareness of issues within the ministry and the wider education sector.
Early 2014 saw a series of interviews, starting with the BC Education Programme Manager who had been responsible for non-ELT programmes with the MoE – mainly the abortive Connecting Classrooms programme – and who occasionally provided support to LETTS, particularly in participating in the meeting with the GCTED director in autumn 2013. This was followed by interviews with three of the educators, all of whom were highly opinionated about the failure of the GCTED to support LETTS and the poor general state of Libya’s education system. Due to timing issues, the second and third educators – the only males out of the 14 educators trained through LETTS – participated in the interview together, but apart from constantly interrupting and speaking to each other in a mixture of Arabic and English, this did not affect the quality or amount of data gathered.
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Following this, in April I interviewed – via Skype – the former head of the EDT in Libya who had led on UNICEF’s 2013 Case study: Education Reform in Libya which reviewed Libya’s education sector and had focused, among other things, on the teaching workforce’s state and needs. The interviewee’s experience of working with the GCTED and in particular its director had been, according to the interviewee, largely positive and he was able to portray her in a different light from the one I tended to view her in. In general, he was despondent about the state of the education system and the ability of the MoE to carry out constructive reform. Indeed, he provided an insight into the scale of the MoE’s then ongoing overseas training programme, which formed a large part of what seemed to pass for the ministry’s general reform programme, and the short-term misguided intentions fueling this. Then, in May, I interviewed the BC Country Director, who was also highly opinionated about the MoE and its failure to engage with the BC and was also able to provide a more holistic explanation regarding why the actual programme had failed and to suggest how an alternative approach may have been more effective.
These interviews were followed by one in July 2014 with the then recently appointed Deputy Minister for Education. This was carried out shortly after Tripoli Airport had been destroyed and at a time when the capital was being engulfed by militia fighting, so both the interviewee and myself had difficulty focusing as we were concerned with the deteriorating security situation. This, along with the fact that the interviewee had only heard about LETTS from me and indeed had had little actual experience of dealing with the GCTED, may have influenced the scope and depth of the interview, which was a brief affair mainly consisting of the interviewee informing me about the challenges the MoE faced in developing the school sector and how these were being accentuated by the country’s growing instability, along with what he felt the reform priorities were.
The interview with the Deputy Minister in July 2014 was my last on Libyan soil. Within two weeks I had been evacuated and would spend the remainder of my time as BC ELT Manager remotely managing Libya’s English programmes from Tunisia. There was, however, one final interview. In late 2014, I represented the BC at a UK parliamentary enquiry into the British government’s 2011 intervention in Libya’s Revolution and the resulting aftermath, and was impressed by the UK Ambassador’s argument that the country’s collapse was the result of Gaddafi’s failure to build any state institutions rather than any ill-conceived Western military intervention. I therefore organised an interview with him to discuss this issue in more detail and, in particular, the implications this failure had for the education sector and therefore for LETTS. While the Ambassador knew only a limited amount of information about LETTS, he had been aware of the BC’s general efforts to
171 engage with the MoE and of the general state of the education sector, and was able to talk about how both this and Libya’s wider issues effectively stymied any chance of constructive educational reform.
Libya – going from bad to worse?
December 2013 saw most of the BC’s international staff leave Libya for Christmas, while I stayed until the end of the month in the role of Acting Country Director. Apart from continuing issues with crime and general lawlessness, during this time Tripoli experienced a period of relative calm, particularly compared to previous months. Various BC activities not dependent upon international trainers continued, and most of my time was spent supervising these, although I managed to organise a Christmas lunch for local staff, which took place on the office balcony at the start of the Christmas week.
Outside the capital, the chaos and violence continued unabated, with Benghazi witnessing the first suicide bombing in Libya since the Revolution (Jawad, 2013-d). The attack, which targeted an army base, marked an escalation of tactics used by the eastern-based Islamist militias in their fight against the new government and promoted commentators such as Dettmer (2013-d) to speculate that these organisations were becoming increasingly dominated by Al-Qaeda-linked foreign fighters. Furthermore, also in Benghazi, the shooting of an American teacher (Stephen, 2013-b) underlined the increasing targeting of Westerners in Libya, something that would soon be seen closer to Tripoli in early January 2014 with the execution-style killing of a British man and New Zealand woman on an isolated beach to the west of the capital (Borger, 2014). At the same time, the detainment of four US security personnel by government forces (Heine, 2013) while scoping potential evacuation routes from Tripoli showed that Western embassies were now seriously considering the possibility of Libya’s complete collapse.
The early months of 2014 started badly, with the government plunging into chaos following the withdrawal of the main Islamist group, the Justice and Construction Party (BBC, 2014), in protest at the continuing lawlessness. At the same time, armed groups, which had taken control of large swathes of eastern Libya and, more importantly, a number of key oil ports, proclaimed a new autonomous province of Cyrenaica and stated they were going to export oil independently of the Tripoli government. In the south – another oil-rich part of the country – the government, struggling to contain a series of large-scale ethnic and tribal conflicts, declared a state of emergency. More importantly for the BC and the rest of Libya’s international community, a conflict between a tribal group based in the western suburbs of
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Tripoli, the Warshefana, and government-backed militias brought large-scale tribal conflict literally to, to quote Deutsche Welle (2014), ‘the gates of Tripoli’.
Things worsened further still in February when the GNC parliament extended its mandate, mainly through pressure from the Islamist camp and their supporting militias who were keen to maintain the disproportionate influence they wielded. This set off protests in the capital and an announcement by General Hafter, a leading figure in the Revolution and a senior military commander, calling for the suspension of parliament. This prompted some commentators to speculate that what was in fact unfolding was a military coup, although these ideas were soon shown to be off the mark. As Mohamed (2014) points out, the army lacked the capacity for this type of action, and given Libya’s fragmented state, Hafter’s actions were like declaring ‘a coup over a bowl of jelly’. However, the fact that Hafter had made this announcement and the government subsequently proved incapable of acting against him further underlined the country’s parlous state.
By late March, the pro-Western Prime Minister had been voted out of office and had subsequently fled Libya, further polarising the divisions between the Islamist and non- Islamist camps, while the parliament itself had relocated to a luxury hotel following an invasion of the parliament building by armed protestors (Al-Jazeera, 2014). At the same time, attacks against foreign interests, including an armed attack on the Portuguese embassy (Al-Arabiya, 2014), led to many embassies withdrawing staff and scaling down their presence and also led to a further deterioration in the country’s already poor foreign investment climate. Indeed, many commentators, such as Khan and Milbert (2014) began suggesting that Libya, faced with a collapse in oil production due to continuing strikes and blockades, mushrooming state sector wage bills and rampant corruption, was heading for complete economic collapse as the government burned through its hard currency reserves.
Carrying on regardless
BC operations continued, although the Teaching Centre, facing growing operating costs due to providing increased security for teachers and the regular cancellation of classes because of fighting in Tripoli, began looking at alternative operating models. However, English Projects’ activities continued almost uninterrupted, with a series of training courses delivered for university teachers, another ELT conference – this time in collaboration with DELTS – and a professional development course for educational travel agents to give them the skills to produce and submit UK study visa applications. The market for state contracts also seemed buoyant, with a small-scale UK English language study contract signed with the
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Bureau of Statistics and Census and negotiations regarding a much larger contract with the Ministry of Labour. In fact – LETTS notwithstanding – the only programme my team was struggling to deliver was the Warriors Affairs Commission (WAC) contract, mainly due to the WAC being focused on actually demobilising the militias, as The Centre for Security Governance’s (2013) report explains, and not yet being in a position where they could engage with the BC on training.
In April 2014, I delivered a well-attended presentation at the IATEFL conference in Harrogate on opportunities in Libya for UK ELT providers. While I outlined the many challenges involved in doing business in Libya, my message was that there were still large contract opportunities for both in-country training work and UK-based English study programmes for state officials. I also voiced my opinion that although Libya was unstable, and security in particular was an issue, I was confident that things would settle down in future and the country would start to develop.
On reflection, I now realise that at this time I, along with my UK colleagues, simply had grown to accept the deteriorating political-security situation and the resulting restrictive operating environment as a challenge to be endured. This can best be illustrated by my own experience in early 2014 during the above-mentioned fighting between government forces and the Warshefana tribal group. During this time, my residence was located in Janzeur, a western suburb of Tripoli bordering the Warshefana area, and I was woken up early Friday morning to hear rockets landing on either side of my villa! A call to the BC Security Advisor revealed that these were being fired by the Warshefana in retaliation for recent government attacks, and that I was not to worry as, if a rocket did hit the house, it was unlikely to penetrate the walls or roof. Following this, I went back to sleep.
A ray of hope for LETTS
By spring 2014 I had given up hope of LETTS becoming a national programme. However, in late April, shortly after arriving back in Libya from IATEFL, I was contacted by the new Deputy Minister for Education regarding a potential meeting. The minister had previously held the position of Deputy President of the Libyan Postgraduate Academy and I had met him on several occasions, although I did not know him well enough to make any kind of pre- judgement. Therefore, although I approached the meeting with an open mind, due to my previous experience in dealing with education ministers my expectations were low.
The meeting, however, changed my perspective regarding future work with the MoE. The
174 minister explained that he knew that the school sector was in urgent need of reform and that little had actually been achieved since the Revolution, and that the work that had been done – such as sending teachers and MoE staff for training abroad and importing curriculums from overseas – had been ineffective. He went on to say that the MoE needed the BC’s help, both with English and with general reform, and that he was working on ensuring that the MoE had the funding to pay for this. I informed him about LETTS and about the other work I had tried to carry out with the MoE, including the broadcasting of the Teach English Radio series and the secondary-level English curriculum review, and he promised to support these projects moving forward. Regarding LETTS, we agreed that he would speak to the GCTED to establish whether any decision had been made regarding the national teaching training programme proposal I had submitted and if the budget the GCTED director had mentioned was still available. As I noted in my diary following the meeting:
For the first time in a long time I had met an official from that ministry who I really felt I could work with and who was genuine about wanting change and wanting (the British Council’s) help, and although I knew better than to get totally carried away, the whole vibe from our meeting and conversation was very positive. Week of entry: 20–26 April 2014
I had several concerns though. Firstly, the minister was new and possibly underappreciated the scale of the challenges involved in education reform. Secondly, with our next meeting scheduled for late May, as we were both due to travel, Ramadan was due to start in late June and my summer leave was due to last for the whole of August, it was unlikely a start would be made until September and there was a risk that the current impetus would peter out and the minister would become bogged down with other affairs. Thirdly, I was also concerned that Libya’s increasing instability would make even the sort of national programme I had envisaged back in autumn 2013 unviable.
Slide to civil war?
By late May, the situation in Libya was becoming markedly worse. Despite the failure of his apparent coup, General Hafter was becoming a rallying point for the non-Islamist camp and those favouring a more authoritarian solution to Libya’s problems, drawing the Interior Ministry and sections of the armed forces to his cause. In mid May forces supporting Hafter stormed the parliament building, demanding that the interim GNC government, whose mandate had expired and which was viewed as being dominated by the Islamist camp, be dissolved and Islamist parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, be outlawed. This led to
175 calls by the Islamist camp for support from their supporting militias, setting off a wave of fighting throughout the capital and leading to commentators such as Cockburn (2014) stating that the lines were being drawn for the second Libyan civil war! A number of countries, most visibly the USA, began preparing for a possible evacuation (Karadsheh and Starr, 2014), while others, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, closed their embassies or reduced their diplomatic presence.
The BC at this point began changing its operating model. The Teaching Centre was closed, all international staff – including myself – were rehoused in a secure compound and plans were drafted for certain staff members to be based part of the time in Tunis. At the same time, the English Project Manager and myself, together with colleagues in the wider region, began working on a project to produce a new digital solution to the challenges of reaching large numbers of teachers and learners of English in countries such as Libya, Iraq and Algeria, where logistics and security posed significant challenges. These measures aside, the BC’s approach was to continue with planned activity, despite growing predictions of impending civil war, such as those by Cruickshank (2014) and Hoke (2014). Indeed, in early June, I agreed upon a project with the Telecommunications Ministry to set up a national digital training academy, and a new Country Director was appointed, with a planned August start date.
The meeting with the Deputy Education Minister went ahead as planned. He remained optimistic, although he admitted that due to the ongoing political crisis it was unlikely he could start putting into practice any envisaged reforms until later in the year. We did, however, spend over an hour discussing how to proceed with LETTS and agreed that after Ramadan we would contact regional education authorities and work with them on identifying potential teacher educators who could be brought to Tripoli for training and that the BC would find a solution for providing these with remote support. The minister agreed to speak to the GCTED and to order the centre to work in partnership with the BC and, at the same time, to look at how the various elements involved in the process – the GCTED, regional and local education authorities and head teachers – could work together on the proposed programme. Although I was pleased with the meeting and its potential results, I found myself lacking the euphoria I had felt following previous meetings, commenting in my diary:
… it was a peculiar feeling. I feel that I ought to be jumping for joy, but for some reason I just can’t get enthusiastic about the future prospects of the training programme even though I have done so in the past and even though (the Deputy Minister) is by far the most convincing and progressive person I have met from
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that ministry since I arrived in Libya. I can’t really articulate the reasons for this limited enthusiasm, but I suspect it is largely due to a combination of having had several false starts in the past and the effect of the general grind of life on the ground in Tripoli. Week of entry: 08–14 June 2014
I also realised that for the deputy minister to start work on any sort of meaningful reform programme, the political-security situation had to improve and this seemed unlikely in the near future. Hafter’s movement was gaining momentum, with regular large-scale demonstrations in support of his so-called ‘Operation Dignity’ campaign in Tripoli and Benghazi (Karadsheh and Tawfeeq, 2014). Indeed, the east of Libya, and particularly Benghazi, was rapidly becoming a war zone as Hafter began attacking Islamist militias, accusing them of being terrorist organisations. In Tripoli, a stand-off between Islamist and non-Islamist militias began to develop, with both sides claiming to represent the government and increasingly bolstering their forces. In early June, a curious situation developed in which the country had two prime ministers – each one backed by one of the rival camps – with the situation being resolved when the Islamist candidate stepped down and the non-Islamist candidate and his cabinet fled to the east of the country for their own protection (Fadel, 2014).
On 25 June, Libya held another general election aimed at replacing the GNC with a new House of Representatives parliament based in Benghazi. Largely seen as Libya’s last chance to connect with democracy (Stephen, 2014-a), the elections passed off relatively peacefully, although voter turnout was low, with less than half of the 2.8 million who had voted in the 2012 elections coming out to vote, and in parts of the country security issues prevented voting from taking place. In Tripoli I detected none of the enthusiasm and general buzz that there had been two years previously, when voters had waved their blackened fingers – a sign they had voted – in the air and election night was celebrated with fireworks and gunfire, and a number of commentators, such as Sengupta (2014), cited voter apathy as the prevailing trend of these new elections. Indeed, the turnout appeared to underline the disillusionment and disappointment held by most Libyans in the country’s post-Revolutionary situation and their lack of faith in the political process to produce a government capable of tackling Libya’s problems. And, although understandable, as Fetouri (2014) comments, it also signified the failure of Libya’s first democratic government to win people’s trust and to genuinely represent their interests and aspirations.
For the BC there was a more tragic outcome of the elections. One of the associates of the
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BC’s civil society programme, Salwa Bugaighis, a prominent human rights activist and leading figure from the Revolution, was murdered in Benghazi (Stephen, 2014-b) by, it was assumed, Islamist militants following a television interview in which she supported the democratic process. This murder was part of a series of attacks on the elections in the east by Islamist militants, which served to highlight the threat extremism posed and further strengthened support for Hafter’s Operation Dignity campaign.
Keeping calm and carrying on
Prior to the elections, in mid June, I, along with other senior BC colleagues and important contacts, attended the annual Queen’s Birthday Party at the former UK Ambassador’s residence in central Tripoli. The Ambassador had been unable to move in due to the fact it had been looted and badly damaged during the Revolution and had not yet been repaired. However, it was used for large, high-profile events and I was amazed to see so many Westerners and other internationals in attendance, given the situation in Tripoli. There was also an air of unreality about the event – possibly because of the serving of bottled British real ale, whipped ice cream in cones with ‘99’ flakes, and fish and chips, or possibly because of the Ambassador’s speech, which stated that despite the various challenges Libya faced, it was still on the right path to peace, stability and prosperity. Moreover, the guests I spoke to – including foreign diplomats and officials from NGOs – all seemed, like me, to be clinging to this belief that at some point soon Libya would turn a corner and things would start getting better.
Indeed, I had so much confidence in Libya’s future that in June I signed a contract extension for a further two years and recruited a new staff member – a Self-Access Learning Manager – for the English Projects Team. At the same time I organised a short course in Teaching English for Academic Purposes at the University of Tripoli delivered by a UK trainer from the University of Northumbria, and my team supported a national ELT conference at the University of Zawia – about 30 kilometres west of Tripoli. However, the English Project Manager, who had been speaking at the conference, returned quite shaken, as a group of young men in a car had shouted at her and trailed her car when she had left the event. This led to the BC banning staff from travelling to future high-profile events outside Tripoli.
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Descent into chaos and departure
In early July 2014, the BC Country Director and most international staff members went on summer leave, leaving me as Acting Country Director. Despite it being Ramadan, the first two weeks of the month had seen several gun battles in Tripoli between rival militias, including one outside the compound where I was staying, which led to a colleague and myself spending the night sheltering in a ground-floor flat drinking tea, in a situation I would later compare anecdotally to the dinner party from the 1968 British comedy film Carry on Up the Khyber. However, the weekend of 11–12 July had passed peacefully and I even managed a trip to Tripoli’s central market to purchase two carpets, and so I was unprepared for the phone call I received from a local staff member on the morning of Sunday 13 July. In the call, the staff member informed me that there had been a large gun battle during the night between Islamist and non-Islamist militias over Tripoli Airport, and that a large part of the airport had been destroyed. A quick call to the embassy Security Manager – the BC Security Advisor being out of the country – confirmed the news and informed me that the fighting was still ongoing and all flights had been cancelled.
The reason for the airport battle and the more general deterioration in the security situation lay in the recent election results in which the Islamists had fared poorly. Facing a non- Islamist-dominated parliament and a loss of power, the Islamists had gone on the offensive and attacked their rivals’ main power bases in the capital, including the airport. In the days that followed, Tripoli slowly descended into chaos, with militia-fighting centred around the remains of the airport (Stocker, 2014) but spreading to other parts of the city. As the fighting intensified, Tripoli began grinding to a halt. Power cuts lasting five to six hours became a daily occurrence, many shops and businesses closed, including all the capital’s petrol stations, leading to chronic fuel shortages, and many people left the capital for Tunisia and other parts of the country.
Surprisingly, the embassy did not recommend an immediate evacuation, instead keeping the travel advice for Tripoli and the surrounding area as ‘essential travel only’, leading to internationals travelling to and from Libya through the land border with Tunisia or via flights to and from Mitiga Airport, a former military airport which had begun operating a small number of domestic and regional flights (Laessing, 2014-b) following the international airport’s destruction. As a result, the initial view, both from the embassy and from the BC, was that this was another storm to be weathered and life would return to ‘normal’. I carried on managing BC operations – indeed, at one point I found myself sitting at my desk talking about financial planning in a teleconference with colleagues in the UK, with gunfire and
179 explosions in the background – although this proved challenging due to staff being unable to travel to work and dwindling fuel supplies for the office generator and armoured vehicles.
On 21 July, the BC Security Advisor arrived back in Tripoli and I then organised my own departure from Libya for the following Thursday. I was due to go on leave anyway, and was fully expecting things to settle down and to return as planned in early September – indeed, I put several bottles of beer into the fridge so that I could enjoy a drink when I arrived back. Then, on the morning of 24 July in a UK embassy armoured convoy, I was taken to the Libya–Tunisia border, which I walked across. I was collected on the other side by another embassy car, which took me to the airport at the Tunisian holiday resort of Djerba, from where I took a connecting flight back to the UK. Although I did not realise it at the time, I would never again set foot in Libya as the BC ELT Manager.
Relocation to Tunisia
In early August 2014, due to Tripoli’s deteriorating security situation and the embassy’s eventual decision to recommend ‘against all travel’ to Libya, the formal decision was made to close the BC office and to relocate international staff – none of whom had actually returned to Libya following their summer leave – to a new ‘temporary’ office at BC Tunisia. Initially, the assumption was that this was a short-term measure that would last a maximum of three to four months. Indeed, by October, the Tripoli office had reopened, local staff had returned to work and plans were being made for the return of international staff and the resumption of normal operations, albeit under tight security restrictions.
This return never took place. The large-scale fighting in Tripoli subsided by September 2014 and the city largely remained calm for the rest of the year. However, the situation on the ground remained volatile. Islamist forces, which had succeeded in taking over the capital, established their own unrecognised regime – the Government of National Salvation – while the internationally recognised House of Representatives (HoR) government remained in eastern Libya, from where it exerted a limited amount of influence on the rest of the country. In November – ironically, on the day procedures for a short initial return visit were agreed – HoR forces bombed Mitiga Airport, and in early 2015 Islamic State launched an anti- foreigner attack on The Corinthia Hotel (Westcott, 2015). Furthermore, outside the capital, fighting and the general collapse in law and order continued in large parts of the country, including to the west of Tripoli, meaning that the land route to and from Tunisia ceased to be a secure option. As a result, at the end of 2014, plans for BC international staff to return to Tripoli were put on hold indefinitely.
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PART 3: CONTRIBUTION
To some extent this part is a continuation of the micro-history. This is because I continued to approach the study as a historian. However, the discussion shifts to being more analytical and retrospective. That is, in line with the approaches adopted by the micro-histories examined earlier in the thesis, such as those by Sodikoff (2007) and Brewer et al. (2011), following my production of a micro-historical narrative on LETTS I looked back and reflected on the programme. I did this from two different angles: the reasons why LETTS had failed and what can be learned from the LETTS experience.
To look back and to reflect on LETTS I divided Part 3 into three sections. The first section answers Research Question 2 – What could be viewed as the principal reasons for LETTS’ limited success and its eventual failure? It does this through identifying and discussing the main strands that emerged from the analysis of the micro-history and further analysis of the collected data. The second section answers Research Question 3 – What are the lessons that the LETTS experience provides for programme planners working in developing countries similar to Libya? This is achieved by looking at the lessons future programme planners and other professionals from international assistance organisations like the BC can learn from the LETTS experience, and how they can apply them when organising their own education reform programmes. The third section concludes this study by briefly discussing how the main protagonists in the LETTS experience – the BC, the Libyan MoE and myself – can move forward following this study’s findings.
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Chapter 4: Looking back on LETTS: reflection and reassessment
In late 2014 and now based in Tunisia, I realised that any chance of organising LETTS had now vanished and it was time to look back at the micro-history and conduct a systematic review of the programme’s narrative, the data collected and my own experiences, and to examine what had gone wrong, how and why. I decided to proceed by identifying and contextualising the main strands emerging from the micro-history regarding the reasons for LETTS’ limited success, and discussing these in light of both my wider knowledge of educational reform in developing countries and my awareness – mostly developed while writing the micro-history – of typical challenges facing developing and/or post-conflict states. This would enable me to provide answers for Research Question 2 – What could be viewed as the principal reasons for LETTS’ limited success and its eventual failure? and inform my thinking on and provide a bridge into the answers for Research Question 3 – What are the lessons that the LETTS experience provides for programme planners working in developing countries similar to Libya? It would also enable me to answer one of the questions I posed to the UK Ambassador during our interview: could things have been done differently?
Strand One: A land of unparalleled opportunity
This strand examines the contribution that the BC’s 2012 view of Libya made towards both LETTS’ creation and eventual failure. It explains how the widely held idea that the country offered easy-to-secure, partner-funded opportunities for large-scale education project work resulted in me developing unrealistic expectations about what could be achieved and producing a programme that was fundamentally unsuitable for both the context and the capacity of relevant partners.
As outlined in the micro-history, in 2012 the BC believed that it would benefit from large contract opportunities in the reform and development of Libya’s education system. While with hindsight this appears naïve, at the time it was anticipated that there would be a national reconstruction and development programme (Adetunji, 2011) in which education would be central (UNESCO, 2012) and in which UK companies would secure large contracts. This anticipation was fuelled by the new post-Gaddafi government, with officials such as the Planning Minister, Dr Isa al-Tuwayjri (Al-Monitor, 2012), stating that the country urgently needed large-scale foreign assistance and had the money to pay for it. Moreover, as the micro-history explains, the BC believed it was well positioned to take advantage of the opportunities that would arise due to its presence on the ground in Libya and its track record
182 and reputation (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011).
When I arrived in Libya, expectations were high on all sides, particularly following the MoE’s announcement of its national reform programme and its subsequent approach to the BC for assistance with ELT. I was quickly made aware that the BC, the embassy and the Libyan government wanted to see large-scale project activity at a national level that would support ‘systemic’ change – the then emerging BC buzzword. I was also made aware that time was limited. While the BC could expect preferential treatment due to Libya’s gratitude for the UK’s role in toppling Gaddafi, this, I was told, would not last forever. ‘Within a year,’ the BC Regional Director warned me, ‘it will be business as usual.’ Moreover, it was felt that if the BC was going to maintain its position as Libya’s ‘leading authority on English’ – a phrase widely coined in 2012 – it had to be seen by the wider Libyan populace as stepping up to the challenge of meeting the huge demand for improved ELT (Humphries, 2012).
LETTS seemed an obvious choice. It was focused on improving ELT, offered the potential to become a national programme in a short space of time and, I believed, would be straightforward to set up, launch and deliver. Furthermore, using a cascade model would enable me to work around the logistical and security-related constraints regarding delivering activity in eastern and southern Libya and, at the same time, was in line with the BC’s expectations and then current policies; at that time, a number of the BC’s large-scale ELT reform interventions involved cascade training programmes. Indeed, my proposal was quickly signed off by the BC Country Director and the regional English lead. I also believed it was in line with the MoE’s expectations, partly due to the fact that they had signed an agreement with the BC regarding organising a national teacher training programme prior to the Revolution (Finlayter, 2011), partly because the GCTED director swiftly agreed to my proposal when I presented it to him and, more generally, because I was repeatedly told that the MoE needed the BC’s support with ELT.
However, on reflection, there was a deeper reason why I felt LETTS was an appropriate solution for Libya; namely because I became caught up in the idea, prevalent throughout all sections of Libyan society, that anything was now possible (Harding et al., 2012) and the country’s future was one of modernisation and prosperity (Ripard, 2012). I subsequently referred to this phenomenon in my diary as the ‘Spirit of 2012’ (entry made on a number of occasions), and the idea that I could put in place a national training programme within a short space of time in a country recovering from a major revolution and with no previous experience of any similar interventions was a product of that spirit, something revealed by this early diary entry from 2012:
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I was taken aback that (the GCTED director) agreed so quickly to my proposal and kicked myself that I had not asked (the GCTED) to stump up more of the cost as money really doesn’t seem to be a problem. Anyway (the GCTED) signing up for this and agreeing to the conditions and timeline without even a quibble is a great start and shows Libya is serious about improving its English teaching and on working with (the BC) and so I have nothing but optimism about the future of (LETTS). Week of entry: 20–26 May 2012
Looking back, there are three things I should have considered before going ahead with LETTS. First, like the idea that Libya was going to award lucrative contracts to UK companies (Mason, 2013), LETTS seemed too easy. As mentioned in the micro-history, I was surprised how swiftly the MoU which launched the programme had been accepted and signed (Humphries, 2012), particularly when compared to previous programmes I had been involved in – the Sudanese KSTTP, for example, had taken over a year to organise. Moreover, Barrett (2010-a), drawing upon BC experience of organising cascade programmes in India, recommends factoring in a setting up stage of 6–18 months, while the Nepalese national programme described by Suzuki (2008) took four years to organise! Yet the agreement regarding LETTS had been signed within a month and my initial expectations were that within one or two years the programme would be being delivered at a national level. All this in a country with a shattered education system, no real tradition of in-service training and possessing a state bureaucracy which, to quote a 2014 US State Department report, was ‘one of the most opaque and amorphous in the Middle East’ .
Second, as noted in my research diary (week of entry: 06–12 May 2012), Libyan officials viewed Western assistance as a sort of ‘magic pill’ which would fix things instantly, and failed to grasp that work was required on their part. On reflection, my assumption now is that the GCTED director signed the MoU regarding LETTS thinking that it would result in teachers across Libya receiving training without the centre having to do anything, and while the agreement outlined what was expected of the GCTED, it is questionable how carefully the relevant officials had read and comprehended this. There are other examples of this attitude within Libya’s education sector, the best one being the ministry’s decision to import Singapore’s mathematics and science curriculums into the school system on the assumption that this would lead Libya to achieve similar standards to those Singapore had achieved in both subjects (UNICEF, 2013). Furthermore, the problem of Libyan state officials not reading key documents and communications was to become a recurring problem for the BC, and manifested itself most obviously with the signing of the 2013 agreement between the BC and
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MoHE for the former to manage Libya’s UK postgraduate scholarships programme (Gough, 2013). Despite this being a multi-million pound project, I was anecdotally informed by the BC managers dealing with it that the agreement had not been read by the Libyans prior to signing, and as a result the MoHE proved unable to manage the process of transferring the programme to the BC.
Third, there were few details of what the much-heralded national education reform programme, which LETTS was intended to support, actually consisted of and had I investigated I would have discovered that there was no actual plan in place. Instead, as the Ambassador commented, there was a series of workshops, conferences and reports – such as those by ACTED-Reach Education and UNICEF (2012), UNICEF (2013), NARIC (2013) and UNESCO and the Arab League (2013) – which never led to any action being taken:
We had these conferences on the future of education and, well, there were some people and organisations who tried to move things forward, to get things going, but there didn’t seem to be much interest from (the MoE) so I didn’t get the impression anything was changing very much.
Instead, as I later noted (week of entry: 30 November – 06 December 2014), what the MoE seemed to have was ‘an ever-shifting set of priorities and ideas’ which they perceived as a plan. For example, following the interview with the then deputy education minister in mid 2014, I noted:
… my conversation with (the deputy minister) hit home to me that what the ministry was working off was a loose collection of ideas – some of them relevant and credible and some of them vague – and that this is their idea of a plan. Week of entry: 13–19 July, 2014
Strand Two: My own professional agenda
This strand runs in parallel with the previous one. It discusses how my professional ambition of organising a large-scale cascade training initiative led to a programme being imposed upon Libya’s MoE without due consideration of its readiness and capacity to provide the required support and contribution.
As detailed in the micro-history, I had, prior to my arrival in Libya and as part of my preparations for this study, devised what I believed was a system for organising effective
185 and sustainable large-scale cascade training programmes (Gray, 2011). I had used this as a model for the Sudanese KSTTP, and initial reports on the programme indicated that the system was working (Darn, 2012). However, I left Sudan while the KSTTP was still in its initial stages and was disappointed professionally that I had not had the opportunity to fully put my ideas into practice, later writing in my diary:
Despite Libya being a promotion and despite the already achieved successes of (the KSTTP), I left Sudan with a heavy heart, feeling that I had lost out on being able to put my ideas into practice on a national cascade programme which would rank alongside (BC programmes in) India and Malaysia in terms of size and impact. This despondency if anything increased after my arrival in Libya, as my successor in Sudan immediately started, as I saw it, to remove my connection with the programme and to try to claim all the credit for it herself. Week of entry: 22–28 June 2012
I also realised that my study was based around the KSTTP and it becoming an effective and sustainable large-scale teacher training programme and that to continue I needed to have access to a similar large-scale cascade programme in Libya. However, as there was not one in existence, this meant I needed to organise one. Therefore, I had started planning LETTS prior to my arrival in Libya, later noting in my diary (week of entry: 19–25 October 2014) that: ‘even before arriving in Libya I had subconsciously decided that one of my main objectives would be to organise a large-scale cascade programme in the mould of (the KSTTP ).’
At the time, I believed that these plans were compatible with both BC and MoE expectations regarding ELT reform – indeed, I had been offered the position partly due to my achievements regarding both the KSTTP and the setting up of a network of in-service training centres in Sudanese universities in 2010–11. Furthermore, I felt that LETTS was essentially a way of moving forward with the work previously done by the BC and MoE on designing and agreeing on the LETSS project (Finlayter, 2011), which at the time I assumed the MoE was still interested in and which I believed LETTS was a suitable alternative for. My assumptions were further vindicated when, as noted in the micro-history and in Strand One, the BC Country Director signed off the LETTS proposal and the MoE readily agreed to it, seemingly accepting that it was a viable solution for its needs regarding ELT support, and signed the relevant MoU.
Although I did not consider this at the time, in arriving in a country which I had never worked in or visited before and trying to deliver a pre-planned large-scale cascade programme
186 based on a model developed for and delivered in another country, I was essentially going against the prevailing wisdom regarding educational reform programmes shown in studies by writers such as Bax (1997), Hayes (1995), Lamb (1995), Tomlinson (1988) and Waters and Vilches (2008). These writers all caution against imposing reform programmes on partners and instead argue that such initiatives should be developed with due consideration of the relevant local contextual and socio-cultural factors. More importantly, I had seen at first hand the results of such ‘imposed’ programmes in both UNICEF’s South Sudanese teacher training programme (Simpson, 2011) and the US government’s attempt to introduce English language training systems based on the audio-visual American Language Course into the militaries of the former Eastern bloc countries (Fletcher and Hare, 2012). In both cases these initiatives failed to either engage local partners or effectively embed the reform into the relevant education or training systems, and therefore neither achieved long-term change or sustainability.
LETTS was not based on a pre-designed ‘one size fits all’ model, which is the principal reason why – as Bax (1997), Hayes (1995) and Lamb (1995) explain – reform programmes, such as the examples listed above, generally fail. Indeed, the mechanism for organising cascade programmes that I had developed (Gray, 2011) was designed to be flexible, something shown when the KSTPP was extended to other Sudanese states in 2012–13 – becoming the NTTP – and was adjusted by the relevant BC managers to take into account relevant regional conditions (Parker, 2013). The model’s organisation and delivery were, however, still dependent upon certain key ingredients, particularly partner engagement and support, and it is questionable whether these were available in Libya. Furthermore, the more general issue with LETTS was that it imposed a cascade training system upon an MoE and education sector that had no experience of running similar programmes nor any capacity to facilitate or support it.
On reflection, I should have spent my initial time in Libya learning about the context, particularly the state of the education sector and the MoE’s capacity, and about any previous educational reform initiatives, and then looked at a range of options for supporting ELT reform within the relevant contextual constraints – something I will expand upon in the next section on lessons learned. As I will discuss in Strand Four, there were other options which I could have pursued, which would have still enabled me to organise a cascade programme and possibly led to a more sustainable initiative with the potential to survive the country’s 2014 collapse. In my diary I later noted:
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… looking back I suspect that trying to do a piece of research on the state of ELT in secondary schools similar to those done by (Schellekens, 2013) and (Borg, 2014) on ELT in vocational education and in higher education (respectively) or simply spending more time trying to understand what would and wouldn’t work in the Libya context would have yielded much better dividends than me simply ploughing ahead – against all conventional wisdom – with a teacher training programme that I felt I needed to do and had worked elsewhere. Week of entry: 19–25 October 2014
Strand Three: Gaddafi’s legacy
This strand explores the impact of the Gaddafi regime’s legacy on LETTS. Evidence from the micro-history and the data suggests this manifested itself in two interconnected ways. Firstly, the regime’s failure to build state institutions resulted in an education ministry with little capacity to support major reform programmes, and secondly the capacity that did exist was insufficient to tackle the complex task of rebuilding a system shattered by years of underinvestment and mismanagement. As a result, this legacy saw the MoE avoid embarking upon any constructive reform, meaning there was little scope for it to partner with the BC on LETTS.
A 2016 report by El-Gamaty in The New Arab – a UK-based online news publication on Middle Eastern affairs – argues that the Gaddafi regime’s legacy was the overriding reason for Libya’s post-Revolutionary descent into chaos as it left the country without functioning state institutions or the officials to operate them. During his 40-year rule, Gaddafi established a system of government controlled completely by himself and his inner circle, as comments by the UK Ambassador during our interview show: ‘You know, Gaddafi wanted a system (that was ) totally centralised around his personality and that was (so ) complicated (that ) nobody else could do anything.’ This led to huge structural problems with – to further quote the Ambassador – ‘every ministry, every government department, state body and public service’, and resulted, as noted in the above-mentioned 2014 US State Department report, in those institutions that did exist containing hierarchical and opaque internal systems.
In the MoE’s case this resulted, as UNICEF’s 2013 report explains, in it being a dysfunctional institution consisting of 18 departments and four related bodies which were largely ‘free standing’ (p.16) and operating ‘in a relatively uncoordinated way’ (p.29) . Furthermore, under Gaddafi, there had been ‘constant tinkering with ( departments ) roles and responsibilities’ (p.8) resulting in what the report describes as a ‘silo culture’ (p.8) with
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‘duplication of responsibility for some functions and glaring gaps in others’ (p.8) . For example, no department was responsible for overall sector planning, while responsibility for in-service training sat within both the GCTED’s remit and that of the School Inspectorate Department. This also meant that initiatives such as LETTS, which required cross- departmental collaboration – in this case, between the GCTED and those departments responsible for secondary education and for planning and budgeting – were challenging to implement. Indeed, when collecting data for the UNICEF report, which was designed to support educational reform, the Head of the EDT, who had been contracted to produce the report, found it challenging to engage with several departments despite them being ordered to cooperate by the Education Minister. In our interview, he commented: ‘Several of them, particularly the Curriculum Department, clearly didn’t want to work with us, something I understand is not unusual when working (with the MoE ).’
The non-cohesive state structure established by Gaddafi also meant that once the dictator and his inner circle had been removed, it was impossible for institutions like the MoE to function, as the officials who replaced them lacked the knowledge and experience to get these institutions to function. As the UK Ambassador explained:
… then you lost your sort of senior management, they all disappeared. I’m not talking about a ‘Bathification’ scenario, but really ministries changed their senior people and the (senior officials) who came (into the ministries) were keen across the board I think and some of them knew, some of them had ideas, some didn’t, but some had ideas about what they wanted to achieve, but they didn’t know how to make the system work, they didn’t know how to sort of just set things up so that when they pulled a lever from their minister or deputy minister point of view, something happened. It was the same right up to the Prime Minister, so (name of Libyan Prime Minister 2012–14) was sort of trying to make things happen, but he couldn’t make anything happen because the system had been, I think the system was gummed up.
This problem was compounded by the fact that, due to Gaddafi’s centralised system of rule, there was no practice of decision making among middle-management-level ministerial staff and most officials were poorly trained and incapable of working effectively. These problems were particularly acute in the MoE. The 2013 UNICEF report (p.30) notes a ‘reluctance to make decisions’ among officials, and those decisions that were made being generally ‘ad hoc and inconsistent’ . When interviewed, one of the educators commented: ‘(in the ministry ) the system is very poor, a lot of bosses, a lot of managers, a lot of, how to say, service
189 officers, a lot of responsibles without (any of them doing ) effective work. They can’t do anything.’ The BC Country Director voiced a similar opinion: ‘Their staff are not at the level you would expect them to be, especially those (in senior positions ) and in bits like (the department of ) international cooperation. That’s why they find any engagement difficult.’
According to the former deputy education minister, the issue of poorly trained MoE officials was particularly acute in the GCTED: ‘There ( are ) no specialists that exist in the centre, you know, people who are specialised or who have the ideas of how to improve things. These people do not exist in the centre.’ The centre director herself complained about this, as I noted during the interview: ‘( the GCTED director ) then complained that she did not have many skilled staff members working in the centre and so everything relied upon her and she had to design and ( manage ) all programmes.’ Moreover, the UNICEF report (2013: p.34) also notes that while many GCTED staff members had ‘master trainer status’, in reality ‘little training ( was ) undertaken by centre staff.’ And while this latter issue did not affect LETTS, the general lack of capable officials within both the centre and the ministry overall provided a major obstacle to engaging with them on LETTS.
The reason for Libya’s lack of suitably skilled state officials can also be found in Gaddafi’s legacy. As articles by Ledger and Challis (2014) and Fasanotti (2016) argue, Gaddafi intentionally ‘deskilled’ the Libyan workforce – 80 per cent of whom worked for the state – through a poor education and training system that made them ‘functionally illiterate’ . This was part of his policy of making the populace dependent upon him and ensuring that Libya could not function without him – a policy which, ironically, as I noted in my diary, ultimately achieved its aims.
… my experience with (the MoE) and with other ministries, especially the ministries of culture and industry, was that they were not well run and their staff largely ineffective, and because of this they struggled to function effectively – particularly the education ministry! I also suspect this was true across the board and that this was one reason why Libya collapsed so quickly despite its wealth, resources and international support – the system could not function without Gaddafi! Week of entry: 14–20 December 2014
There was another Gaddafi-era legacy that, to quote my diary (week of entry: 14–20 December 2014), ‘loomed large’ over the education sector and had implications for LETTS. Under Gaddafi, the school system had for years suffered from underinvestment,
190 mismanagement and corruption. In our interview, the former deputy education minister stated: ‘You see, Gaddafi was not really interested in good education and (the ) problems we are facing now (are ) because education was in the last interests of the Gaddafi regime.’ This opinion was shared by his then serving successor who commented that ‘the education system during the Gaddafi era was really hit and damaged completely.’ Libya’s education system in 2012, as data from the 2013 UNICEF report indicates, faced an array of challenges including badly equipped schools, poorly trained and managed staff, a barely functioning internal communications system, shortages of resources at all levels and, most critically, a massive oversupply of teachers, which, as several of the interviewees pointed out, put considerable pressure on the MoE’s finances. As the BC Country Director stated, ‘because so much money goes on salaries, there’s not much left for anything else’, while the former head of the EDT provided the following description:
(The MoE) has a big surplus of teachers which is a dead weight on everything. For one thing it’s a dead weight on (the MoE’s) finances, as from their budget of 7 billion dinars about 6 billion goes on teachers’ salaries. Now, obviously they need to sort it out, but socially it’s a very difficult thing to do; you can’t just dismiss 200,000 teachers.
The MoE faced a massively complex problem in reforming the education system, yet lacked the leadership, expertise or internal systems to make a constructive start. At the same time, as mentioned in the micro-history, access to better education had been one of the 2011 revolutionaries’ key demands and there were high expectations regarding educational reform, particularly in the more marginalised parts of Libya (Gatehouse, 2012). As the 2013 UNICEF report (p.12) states, quoting a well-known Libyan journalist: ‘The fighting with guns has ended, but it is yet to begin with the pen. Education is undeniably the most serious concern for many as it holds the key to the future of Libya.’ This mixture of expectations and demands served to exert a considerable amount of pressure on the MoE and in turn, as the BC Country Director argued, led to the MoE becoming overawed by the task it faced and unable to make any kind of productive start: ‘( the MoE is ) kind of like a rabbit in the headlights, there’s so much that needs to be done in secondary, primary education in Libya, they don’t know where to start and they are phased by the enormity of the problems.’
Therefore, the MoE embarked upon a policy which the BC Country Director summed up as a combination of ‘being seen to be doing something and keeping everyone happy’ . This manifested itself in sending staff abroad for training and improving – or at least, talking about improving – school infrastructures. The latter will be discussed in more detail in Strand Five,
191 while the former was seen as an easy solution to addressing the MoE’s capacity-related needs, although as the former head of the EDT explained, this was a poorly thought-out approach:
… at the moment it’s funding a bit of training here, a bit there. You know, they send off people to Malaysia to be trained, send off people to Jordan to be trained, which doesn’t embed it in the country. You know, they want action, they want a quick fix. They think, ‘Right, done that, tick it off’, but actually (the MoE is) just wasting time as it’s not very beneficial and you would have done better to start with the basics and plan on doing it in-country. If you send everyone abroad, you then put off that important step of doing long-term planning and doing it in-country.
LETTS was not a ‘quick fix’; it was out of sync with the type of programmes the MoE was pursuing and required a level of engagement which the ministry was unable and/or unwilling to provide. As the BC Country Director remarked, ‘If you’d given them a pill they could have taken to fix everything, they’d probably have been up for it, but working on teacher training, I don’t know.’ The fact that LETTS was focused on English and teacher training, and perceived – as I will discuss in later strands – as a Tripoli-based programme, also led to it having limited appeal for the MoE, as it failed to provide the sort of system-wide solution it was looking for. As I will detail in Strand Four, if LETTS had been part of a national sector- wide reform programme managed by the BC and other external organisations, then the MoE may have been more receptive. However, this was never considered – by either the BC or the MoE – as an option at the time.
Strand Four: The failure to adjust
This strand examines the idea that LETTS failed partly because, as time progressed, the BC did not recognise that in its existing format the programme was unviable and, as a result, failed to readjust it and make it suitable for Libya’s contextual realities and the relevant local partners’ interests and capacities.
For most of 2012–13, my assumption – drawn from my experiences in Ukraine and Sudan – was that once the MoE began organising in-service training in Tripoli and the required systems were put in place, then scaling up and extending LETTS at a national level would be a straightforward process. This was despite evidence – detailed by the micro-history – of the MoE’s lack of ability to support LETTS and its limited interest in the programme. As a
192 result, I accepted at face value the GCTED’s claims that it could not organise for teachers to be released to attend training, ignoring the fact that, as the BC Country Director stated, facilitating measures like this in most contexts was largely down to ‘political will’ . I also accepted the centre’s claims that it lacked the funding to provide refreshments and stationery on training courses, ignoring the issue that – as the BC Country Director argued – it ‘wasn’t really very much money’ . Likewise, the 2013 summer teacher training courses and the GCTED’s later approach to the BC for a proposal for a national programme were viewed by me as signs that LETTS was about to take off, whereas in reality the MoE’s failure to follow up with either of these underlined the above-mentioned lack of interest and capacity.
There were other indicators. The MoE’s general lack of capacity was revealed when it failed to support the BC’s Connecting Classrooms project, despite initially requesting it. As the BC Country Director, when comparing this project to LETTS, commented: ‘It was the same sort of carry-on; generally, they were incompetent, I mean ( the project ) wasn’t exactly difficult to organise, but they seemed to find it quite a challenge.’ Various reports such as those by UNICEF (2013) and UNESCO and the Arab League (2013) highlighted the MoE’s poor organisational structure and lack of functionality as a major barrier to reform, with the latter (p.9) outlining ‘developing institutional capacity within the ministry and the education system as a whole’ as a key initial priority for any reform programme.
Moreover, closer to home and as detailed in the micro-history, the initial educator training courses revealed the low English levels of most teachers and the fact that few had any awareness of modern communicative approaches to ELT. Furthermore, data from the focus groups raised my awareness of how dilapidated the school sector was and the barriers to change presented by school inspectors, head teachers and the teachers themselves, who, while claiming to be interested in professional development, had a limited appetite for attending training in their own time and/or for intensive and potentially tiring courses. At the same time, I was regularly informed by the moderator from the first three focus groups – who, as mentioned in Chapter 3, had previously been a school teacher in Libya – that despite regularly professing its commitment to large-scale reform (UNESCO, 2012), the MoE, in reality, was doing little to develop education, and that neither she nor her contacts in the sector had any confidence that this would change in the short term. As I noted in my diary:
I had heard on a number of occasions from (the moderator from the first three focus groups) about how poor the school education system was and how there was little chance of the likes of (the Minister for Education) actually doing
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anything to improve things. The educators had also repeatedly made comments about what could best be described as a ‘broken system’. However, I think, like my attitude to Libya’s general situation, I clung to the belief that at some point things would take a turn for the better and everything would be OK. Week of entry: 19–25 October 2014
Had I examined these indicators collectively, I would have realised that they pointed to an education system unprepared for a programme such as LETTS and, with hindsight, could have adopted an alternative approach to teacher training, particularly after the MoE failed to organise further training after the 2013 courses. The BC Country Director suggested informally doing the training ourselves on several occasions, and this was the approach I used on programmes with the NBTVE and MoHE. However, I was concerned about the sustainability aspect. In the case of the above-mentioned programmes, the partners provided the required resources and covered most costs, and there was little chance of the MoE doing this. Furthermore, I had also received anecdotal advice from the moderator, who stated that ‘if you start doing the training for (the MoE ) then they’ll never do it themselves’, and I was also concerned that – with no real stake in the training – the MoE may have become even less engaged in LETTS, and problems such as finding a venue and releasing teachers from their teaching duties to attend training would have persisted. Furthermore, my concerns regarding the sustainability aspect were supported by reports I received in late 2013 that the Sudanese NTTP, which had inspired LETTS, was grinding to a halt due to the Sudanese MoE’s refusal to start co-funding the programme.
One viable alternative, suggested by a number of individuals, including the former deputy education minister, the Head of the English Department at Tripoli University’s Education Faculty and Professor Simon Borg, while on a 2014 visit to Tripoli,4 was to focus on trainee teachers still studying at university. The BC had a history of collaboration with the higher education sector, mainly through LETUP (Underhill, 2014), and following the Revolution there had been a number of joint activities with the sector around ELT, such as the MoHE- funded NCML project (Underhill, 2016). In 2012–14, the BC developed links with a number of university faculties of education, most notably at Tripoli University, and with hindsight it may have been a better use of BC resources to focus on supporting the pre-service training of teachers. The former Deputy Education Minister argued: ‘It’s better, I mean, better now, especially the programme (shouldn’t be organised ) with the Ministry of Education, but it should be with the Ministry of Higher Education, with (name of the MoHE ELT Coordinator ),
4 This visit was part of Professor Borg’s review of ELT in Libya’s university sector.
194 so that will be concerning the training of the new teachers with the faculties of education, in my opinion that should be the programme.’
Further evidence to support this assumption can be found in my experience of engaging with universities following my evacuation to Tunisia in mid 2014. Starting off in late 2014, the BC organised a Skype-based teacher training programme (Rudd, 2015) in partnership with Libya’s main state universities, and in 2015 launched an ELT department reform project entitled Towards Quality and Excellence in the Teaching of English in Libyan Universities (Borg, 2016), in which heads of department worked collaboratively on teaching reform projects. In the former, a series of Skype-based training courses were delivered to groups of trainee teachers of English studying in education faculties, and in the latter 15 of the 39 participants were department heads from education faculties. In my opinion, this indicates that university faculties of education would have responded positively to an initiative aimed at developing the skills of trainee teachers.
Another suggestion, voiced by the BC Country Director in our interview, was that LETTS and other reform projects would have been more attractive to the MoE had they been part of a national sector-wide reform programme: ‘I think It needed to be in the context of a general project, a whole programme of education reform activity. You can’t just do ( teacher training ) and not do everything else. I think that’s the problem.’ This is also a point I touched upon in Strand Three when I mentioned that LETTS was limited in terms of scope and focus, and not the sort of ‘all-in-one’ solution that may have galvanised the ministry.
The MoE was under pressure to deliver reform at a national level and despite its reticence to tackle the education sector’s structural weaknesses, was aware from reports by UNESCO and the Arab League (2013), ACTED-Reach Education and UNICEF (2012) and UNICEF (2013) that a sector-wide overhaul was required. It may have been receptive to a sector- wide reform programme, especially one delivered by organisations such as the BC with the relevant expertise, capacity and experience. Moreover, such an initiative was arguably more appropriate for Libya than LETTS and the other activities that the BC tried to deliver that focused on specific areas. As writers such as Hayes (2012) and Popovici (2012) argue, innovation and reform in one part of an education system are generally ineffective unless matched by similar initiatives in others sections. Indeed, one reason why certain education projects I had managed had achieved their aims, such as the Peacekeeping English Project in Ukraine (Gray, 2009) and the above-mentioned project with Libya’s vocational education sector, was because they had been part of more general reform programmes within the relevant state body.
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However, my own opinion is that even with the involvement of an international organisation such as the BC, organising and delivering a sector-wide education reform programme would have required capable leadership within the MoE which, for most of the 2012–14 period, was lacking, and can be contrasted with the NBTVE (TVET UK, 2013), which had strong senior leadership and had secured funding, resources and external expertise to support system- wide reform. It would also have required a substantial investment in terms of funding and resources from either the Libyan government or an international donor, and a willingness by the MoE to embark upon potentially unpopular courses of action, particularly tackling the huge oversupply of teachers, which they showed no appetite in wanting to do. As the BC Country Director remarked: ‘They don’t want to bite that bullet either, do they?’
However, examining the micro-history and evidence emerging from the strands, and reflecting on my actions during this time, I think my biggest failing was not following the advice of Fitzgerald and Baird (2011) and taking a step back and critically reflecting on what was taking place with LETTS and what could be done differently, instead of continually trying to push the MoE into taking things forward, and then, from late 2013, largely giving up.
Strand Five: The political-security situation
This strand examines the contribution that the gradual deterioration of Libya’s political- security situation made to LETTS’ limited achievements and eventual unravelling. It suggests that while this was not instrumental in the programme’s failure, it prevented the establishment of conditions within the MoE and wider education sector which could have made LETTS and similar reform projects more viable.
As documented by the micro-history and by reports by analysts such as Dettmer (2013-e) and Cockburn (2013), 2012–14 saw Libya gradually become consumed by a never-ending spiral of political instability, collapsing law and order, and violence. This made it challenging for the government to focus on reconstruction and reform – both generally and within the field of education – for three principal reasons.
Firstly, the government found itself managing an endless series of crises, from militias surrounding state ministries (Deutsche Welle, 2013-b) to blockades of oil export terminals (Russia Today, 2013-a), and, as I later noted in my diary (week of entry: 30 November – 06 December 2014), was ‘so involved with what is commonly referred to in BC-speak as “fire- fighting” it never had any sort of space to focus on long-term planning’. The effects of these crises permeated to the highest levels of government, as the UK Ambassador explained:
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(Name of Prime Minister 2012–14) was very reactive. I don’t think he ever, you know, we tried to get him to write a plan for the government, a vision and all this sort of thing and he never did so, he never got to the stage where he could do that and he was always just faced with terrible problems and reacting to them. I suppose, you know, a strong minister could have said, ‘Well, actually I’ll get on with it’, but, I don’t get the impression there was any.
Secondly, as reported in the micro-history, the government became increasingly divided between Islamist and non-Islamist camps whose infighting, as a report by Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies (2013) explains, made it challenging for the government to implement constructive reform policies. Although in a minority, the Islamists were, according to the UK Ambassador, ‘better educated’ and ‘better organised’ , and occupied certain key positions in state ministries – including in education – and often used these to block reforms. The Ambassador provided the following explanation:
… on top of that you had the political rivalry between, for want of better terminology, Islamists and Non-Islamists, and although the Islamists were a fairly small minority they did get into some positions of power and influence. So you had competing streams within the different bits of the administration all trying to do different things and if they couldn’t do what they wanted at least they could stop the other side doing what they wanted and so that again bunged up the system when you had (a lot of) deputy ministers (who) were from the sort of Islamist side of the house even if the ministers weren’t.
Thirdly, in 2012–14 Libya had five governments. While this was largely due to the chaotic political situation – at one point in June 2014 there were two prime ministers (Fadel, 2014) – it was also because this was an interim period in which the task of the legislative bodies – both the 2011–12 National Transitional Council and the 2012–14 General National Congress – was to work towards establishing a permanent parliamentary system (Pack and Pack, 2012). This led to a succession of different ministers and other senior officials who often came with their own teams, as the BC Education Programme Manager, discussing the MoE, illustrated: ‘The new minister could change the people around them, for example, the International Cooperation Office ( of the MoE ) changed a lot because the government changed.’ Once again, this worked against the development of constructive well-planned reform programmes, as there was little time or motivation for the relevant officials to put things in place. As the UK Ambassador argued: ‘Because it was an interim period, nobody wanted to tackle (Libya’s various problems ) and then you had these various ministers
197 coming and going and not actually managing to do anything.’ The BC Education Programme Manager took a more cynical view: ‘( Ministers and senior officials ) just want to relax, to enjoy their positions, instead of delivering and doing work.’
These issues impacted upon LETTS in several ways. Firstly, the MoE, like the wider government, found itself dealing with endless challenges, including teachers’ strikes, schools closed due to militia fighting and security issues within schools. As a result, for most of the 2012–14 period, the ministry was focused on dealing with these and had little opportunity to implement meaningful long-term reform programmes, as the BC Education Programme Manager explained in the following exchange:
Int = Interviewer (me) Inv = Interviewee (BC Education Programme Manager)
Inv: (The MoE) still have other huge issues. Int: What sort of issues? Inv: For example, the secondary schools. If it’s a girls’ school they are always threatened by groups from outside and they don’t have security inside, and some of the secondary schools are closed because of the threats from outside, because of the bad guys who are coming into schools without permission and they could do whatever they want. For the boys’ secondary schools there’s the problem of using, let’s say, in a very nice way, not drugs, but they are taking pills, they have weapons and sometimes (the MoE feels) like (managing these issues) is more (of) a priority. (So the MoE) just (wants) to educate them and let them finish the curriculum before anything happens. Int: OK. Inv: There’s the problem of unstable conditions; the schools have to close so many times because of the teachers’ strike, because of other things, for example (fighting has) closed schools in Benghazi, Derna, Sebha. Other issues (like these) are more important than focusing on English language.
Secondly, the education sector became a battleground between the non-Islamist and Islamist camps with the latter – as shown by their demands for segregation and the veiling of female teachers – trying to implement Islamic values into Libyan schools, often with the support of the country’s religious leaders (Dettmer, 2013-f). While this pressure was generally resisted, once again this prevented the MoE from focusing on long-term reform, especially as several deputy education ministers came from the Islamist camp and retaliated
198 by blocking more generic reforms, as I noted in my diary (week of entry: 30 November – 06 December 2014) following my interview with the UK Ambassador: ‘Although I had not been aware of this at the time, my understanding from ( the Ambassador’s ) comments was that there had been several deputy ( education ) ministers from the Islamist side who blocked the limited attempts to introduce reform.’
Thirdly, the lack of any overall reconstruction and reform plan for the Libyan state meant that there was nothing for the MoE to take its lead from and/or to place its own reform programme within, which in turn meant that there was no sector-wide programme that LETTS could connect with. Moreover, the lack of direction and planning from the top levels of the government meant that while there was a sizeable degree of pressure on the MoE to take action – which it did in the form of sending staff on training overseas and talking about building school facilities – there was, as I noted in my diary (week of entry: 30 November – 06 December 2014), ‘a lack of top-level guidance-orientated pressure’ on the ministry to produce any kind of long-term reform programme. As the Ambassador argued: ‘and because you had ( prime ministers ) who had no real vision, then this, I guess you could say, lack of direction of course then filtered down to ministers, deputy ministers, undersecretaries and so on.’
Fourthly, this situation was exacerbated by a succession of education ministers due to the ever-changing political situation, meaning that there was no long-term leadership in the MoE – indeed the English Project Manager once remarked that every time she checked, there seemed to be a new minister or deputy minister. This in turn meant that none of the education ministers had either the opportunity or the motivation to put in place long-term reform programmes or to make long-term structural changes to the MoE or the wider education system. Indeed, often ministers were political appointees with no interest in or experience of education-related work, as one of the educators stated when speaking about the MoE’s lack of interest in LETTS:
… (the then Education Minister) is not related to the education system. He is a doctor from the oil sector and he took some deputies with him, and so he doesn't have any idea what’s the education (system) needs. He gets himself on other things which is not related to the development of teachers.
Finally, ongoing political infighting in Libya’s parliament and collapsing oil revenues, which the state relied on for 90 per cent of its income (Lister, 2014), due to the blockading of the country’s oil export terminals by armed groups led to state budgets – including the education
199 budget – being continually delayed. As noted in the micro-history, in March 2013 the GCTED director attributed this to her being unable to commit to LETTS, and during the interview she complained, via the interpreter, that:
… (the centre) only received its budget in September and they have to close (their budget at the end of) December so they have to do all the programmes in three months! And now they are confused about the programmes. Not just English language, but other subjects and they don’t know which to start and which to close because of the short time.
However, while the budget delays were an issue, particularly in causing general disruption within the MoE, LETTS – particularly in its initial format – was not an expensive project, as the BC Country Director commented: ‘But this wasn’t really very much money was it? Some things, yes, that would be a reasonable excuse, but I don’t think in this case it was much.’ Moreover, as detailed in the micro-history, at one point the GCTED claimed to have access to the funding originally allocated for the pre-Revolution Libyan English Teaching in Secondary Schools project (Finlayter, 2011) and, as discussed in Strand Two, the MoE was managing to spend large amounts of money on overseas staff training. Possibly, as the BC Education Programme Manager explained, the pressures of having to clear its budget in a short space of time and the complexities of organising it to support LETTS simply led to the MoE spending it in the easiest way possible:
Also the budget wasn’t released (on time) and when (the Ministry of Finance) released the budget they released it (at) the wrong time and so (the MoE) spent the money on unnecessary things because they just needed to (spend the money) as quickly as they could.
There were two further ways that the political-security situation contributed to LETTS’ failure. Firstly, as noted in the micro-history, the grinding effect of the chaos and violence essentially sapped the Libyan people’s moral and motivation. By 2013, as Askew (2013) explains, people were tired of the ongoing chaos and simply wanted a return to normality – an issue mentioned several times in the micro-history. This in turn made the people involved with LETTS, from MoE officials to the educators and teachers, less interested in working towards improving ELT in schools and other aspects of the education system. As the head of the Education Department at the University of Tripoli commented:
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You see, most people, those in the ministry – indeed, most Libyan people – feel so frustrated because of the political and security situation, you know, so we don’t have the same motivation (to try to change things) as we did two years ago and that’s a problem.
Secondly, the security situation meant that the BC was only able to deliver and support training activities in Tripoli and the surrounding area, while the GCTED was under pressure to organise training throughout the country, as the director’s comments (via the interpreter) indicate: ‘The training needs to be outside Tripoli, a lot of people asked and are asking about it, and when they come here she is embarrassed because there is nothing to offer and because they don’t see the safety problems that the British Council sees.’ There was particular pressure to organise activities in the more marginalised areas of eastern and southern Libya, however, as papers by Wehrey (2012-b) and Daragahi (2014) reveal. It was these areas where there had been an almost total breakdown of security, and which were challenging even for the GCTED to send its own staff to, as the director admitted (via the interpreter): ‘and they are working in a big country with some safety challenges and it’s not always easy to go to some places.’
The BC’s limitations regarding delivering training outside Tripoli had implications for LETTS, particularly regarding how the MoE viewed the programme, and these will be discussed in Strand Six. Indeed, even in Tripoli, training could be disrupted by outbreaks of unrest. During the second set of the 2013 courses, for example, the English Project Manager was unable to travel to one training venue to hand out end-of-course certificates due to fighting in the relevant area, as I noted in my diary (week of entry: 08–14 September 2013):
(The English Project Manager) was disappointed, as on the last day of the training she had been unable to get to (the) Souk Jomaa venue to give out the certificates due to fighting between, as it later turned out, two rival families, and this had been one of the best performing groups (of teachers).
Strand Six: The MoE’s view of teacher training
This strand looks at how LETTS was perceived by the MoE. It discusses the possibility that the ministry was never genuinely interested in supporting LETTS, as it did not view training teachers as a priority due to established Libyan socio-cultural perceptions around teaching as a profession.
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While the GCTED director saw teacher training as a priority, evidence from both the micro- history and the collected data suggests that the wider MoE did not share this view. The ministry’s initial request for assistance with ELT had been generic and, as shown in Strands One and Two, it was my response to this request as BC ELT Manager that had led to a teacher training programme. Moreover, as noted in the micro-history, despite my informing the MoE about LETTS-related activity, particularly the initial educator training course, the ministry – with the arguable exception of the GCTED and the MoE officials involved in the 2013 courses – took no interest in LETTS, a position due to, according to the BC Country Director, the MoE not seeing teachers as being important:
You know, maybe teachers are not that important to them? I think it’s also a (sense) I seem to get, you know, generally they don’t seem to think teachers are very important. In a way, the students are important and kind of in a way parents are important, and obviously ministers, people like that are extremely important. I don’t know whether they think teachers are important. Teachers tend to be women, don’t they? Which would probably mean they are intrinsically unimportant!
Drawing upon these comments and other research data, my impression is that the MoE was never interested in teacher training and saw other areas as more of a priority, in particular improving the school environment, as the BC Country Director commented: ‘Also, in terms of the kind of programme we were talking about, to develop English teachers, it wasn’t their top priority, now goodness knows what their top priority was or is because it’s never been clear to anybody, but I strongly suspect that it’s to make Libya’s wider populace happy. It’s a lot more about buildings, about physically improving the environment.’ Evidence also came from the interview with the former deputy minister, who confirmed the BC Country Director’s ideas:
… it’s important to find good schools, you have to have good labs, you have to have a good environment first. We know teachers (are) one of the elements, but not the whole thing. So the challenges that face the ministry (are) not only the training and in our minds the training will come a little bit later.
Furthermore, proof of the MoE’s disinterest in teacher training was revealed by the fact I had told the above-mentioned former deputy minister about LETTS in March 2013, as detailed in the micro-history. Yet when I was briefing him on LETTS at the start of the interview, he
202 claimed to know nothing about the programme, saying:
Well, I am not really familiar with what happened at that time when (the former minister for education who initially approached the BC for support with ELT) and (the former GCTED director who signed the MoU) were in the ministry. At the time I was working in the ministry nothing (was) brought up concerning the programme, so in that case I am not really knowing what happened and what were the wrong procedures being (carried out) concerning this programme.
Indeed, even the then serving deputy minister – arguably the only senior MoE official to take a genuine interest in LETTS – indicated that he shared his predecessor’s view of the ‘environment’ being a priority, saying:
The priorities are the building of new schools, construction, maintenance, building laboratories, toilets, sports facilities, as well as staff (training), as well as making major changes in the curriculums of our schools. These are the major issues, the issues I am working on, focusing on.
The reasons behind this lack of interest lie in the way teaching and teachers are perceived in Libya. As mentioned by the moderator from the first three focus groups in the micro-history and as detailed by UNICEF’s 2013 report, teaching in Libya was seen as an acceptable profession for a married woman because of the light workload which allowed them to focus on their housekeeping and childcare responsibilities. Therefore, it was not viewed as being a skilled or important job either by the MoE – which therefore felt that it was not worth investing money in training them – or by the teachers themselves, who, according to a number of the interviewees, were not interested in change.
Indeed, almost all interviewees mentioned teachers as a challenge to any education reform programme. The former deputy minister commented that ‘a lot of teachers, their level is not good and they don’t have the enthusiasm of being teachers’, while the Ambassador suggested that most teachers ‘weren’t interested in getting promoted through the system; they just wanted to have a job and to look after their kids at the same time.’ Moreover, the former Head of the EDT complained that ‘( being a teacher in Libya ) is a job for people seeking an easy life and so that’s what sort of people it attracts.’ This, however, was not entirely in line with my experience, as I commented in my diary:
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… the interviewees were pretty scathing about teachers in terms of their interest in professional development training, while my experience from LETTS and particularly from the interest in the initial educator training and the responses of teachers on the summer 2013 courses was that a lot of teachers were interested in developing, particularly their English (language) skills, if given the opportunity. Week of entry: 14–20 December 2014
Comments from certain interviewees also painted a mixed picture. One of the educators argued that ‘I think most of the teachers want (to attend in-service training ), but they need time and they want a ( convenient ) place and not a long time to travel to. If not, then they won’t (be interested ).’ Likewise, the GCTED director told me (via the interpreter), ‘Yes, (teachers ) ask about training, but then they find excuses. They don’t want to travel, to go to the training centre, they have kids and things like that. They always find excuses. Sometimes she plans a programme and only five attend.’ The Head of the Education Faculty at the University of Tripoli described his experience of running an in-service training programme for non-English teachers before the Revolution:5
Here in the Faculty of Education we ran a programme for three years and it was really good. We had more than 800 teachers. So, at least 200 to 250 got benefit from this. But the rest didn’t. Why? Because some of them are not really motivated at all; they don’t like to be teachers. So they work in the field of teaching because they don’t find any alternatives. And, they are not motivated.
While it is beyond the remit of this thesis to discuss the position of teachers in Libya, my view is, in line with my above-mentioned comments, that although there were many teachers uninterested in innovation and development, particularly the ‘standby’ teachers who had no teaching duties, there were those who were interested if and when the opportunity was offered. However, as UNICEF’s 2013 report states, teaching has traditionally offered ‘a lack of professional development opportunities’ (p.23) and ‘few career promotion opportunities’ (p.23), and that many teachers themselves suffer from ‘low esteem’ (p.23) . Therefore, teachers seldom expected to receive training or support, and instead simply acquiesced in their situations, meaning, in turn, that there was no upward pressure on the MoE to provide in-service training and little scope for teachers to organise themselves to provide this at grassroots level as has been the case in other developing countries (OECD, 2009). For
5 This initiative seems to have been organised locally by the university and not through any wider MoE programme.
204 example, in recent years, Morocco’s local English teachers’ association has pressured the government into engaging in ELT reform and has also organised its own activities to improve how English is taught in schools (Worldaware, 2004).
Libya’s institutionalisation of teaching as a low-status career also explains why head teachers saw covering classes as more important than teachers receiving training, as one of the educators commented:
… the main point for the headmasters is they don’t look for the teacher if she is good or not, if she needs training or not, (they look) just to cover the class. For example, if we have a course for a week or something (they think) I can’t allow the teacher to attend the course. Why? It isn’t because I don’t want her to come, but because it is impossible for the class (to be) without (a) teacher, so who can cover that? I can’t allow (an) empty class.
In addition, it explains why Libya had little tradition of in-service training (Moshen, 2014), despite claims to the contrary in Gaddafi-era reports – such as the 2008 GPCE report consulted for this study – and why, despite recommendations from several post-2011 studies including those by UNICEF (2013) and ACTED-Reach Education and UNICEF (2012) – with the latter outlining as a top priority the organisation of ‘in-service teacher training programmes, based on the analysis of existing capacity and training needs’ (p.52) – the MoE made no attempt to set up any type of programme in 2012–14 and instead continued sending mainly non-teaching staff on overseas training.
Strand Seven: The MoE’s view of LETTS
This strand discusses whether the GCTED actually viewed LETTS as the potential national training programme it was intended to be or if it simply saw it as a small-scale, Tripoli-based initiative.
In late 2013, when I interviewed the GCTED director, my perspective – shared by BC colleagues and detailed in the micro-history – was that LETTS had so far been a failure. My assumption was that the director would hold a similar view. Indeed, prior to the interview, I noted one of my main objectives as being to gauge her opinion regarding the reasons for the programme’s limited achievements and by now apparent failure. I was therefore surprised
205 when at the onset of the interview she remarked (via the interpreter) that she felt that LETTS had been a success and was generally pleased with its results:
She believes that it was a successful programme, even though it was small and only in Tripoli. She thinks it was successful in getting at least 14 trainers so far, so, yes, she thinks it was a success.
This raised the hitherto unanticipated question of whether the GCTED had ever seen LETTS as a national training programme. In 2012–13, I invested a considerable amount of time in explaining to the centre how LETTS, as a cascade-based initiative, would work, and indeed, as detailed in the micro-history, on several occasions presented options to the GCTED regarding how the programme could move forward. My assumption had always been that the director – and her predecessor – had understood the principles behind LETTS and how it could be rolled out nationally. However, her interview comments called this view into question, even though I had actually discussed training in other parts of Libya with the director on several occasions in 2012–13 and, indeed, during the interview she stated (via the interpreter): ‘She believes ( LETTS ) should be repeated in the east, west, north and south. If we get ten trainers in each area, all certified, then this means a lot.’
On reflection, I suspect that while the GCTED director realised that there was a general aim to train teachers throughout Libya, she never properly comprehended how LETTS was designed to work. This is possibly because she found the concept of cascaded training genuinely complex, possibly because it did not provide the sort of ‘quick fix’ that the centre was looking for and/or possibly because subconsciously she realised that ultimately the MoE lacked the capacity to work in partnership with the BC on any sort of national reform programme. Whatever the reason, the result was that the director only really ever saw LETTS as a set of small-scale courses in the capital. As I noted in my diary following the interview:
… my impression was that (the GCTED director) viewed LETTS as a small-scale Tripoli-based programme to be started and stopped at the centre’s convenience, as opposed to my own view of it as a potential national teacher training programme. I think she got the fact that the educators trained other teachers as opposed to the BC delivering the training and that the goal was to deliver training across Libya; however, I don’t think she really understood – or tried to understand – how the programme would provide this. Week of entry: 01–07 December, 2013
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Further evidence for the centre’s lack of interest in LETTS can be found from my interviews with both the former and the then serving deputy education ministers. The former informed me that in early 2013 when he asked the GCTED about its training programmes, the director did not mention LETTS: ‘At the time we contacted the centre about ( training ) programmes, but they did not point out that the British Council, anybody from the British government, I mean, had introduced a programme.’ The latter admitted that ‘the ( GCTED director ) did not tell anything about British Council programmes in (the centre’s ) reports. I only became informed about this in meetings with your colleagues and then with you.’ Moreover, in one of the interviews with the teacher educators, the interviewee also took the view that the GCTED director – who the educators generally viewed negatively – was uninterested in supporting the programme, commenting: ‘Frankly speaking, I’ll not be lying with you, but (the GCTED director ), yes, I think she doesn’t care. If she wanted to help, you know, to work then she can I think, but she doesn’t want.’
This view of LETTS, I suspect, is one reason why the centre only ever provided limited support to the programme and that no further training took place after the 2013 summer courses – the GCTED director did not feel it was worth focusing on, especially given the other demands on her time. More importantly, it also explains why, when we met to discuss a potential national training programme in autumn 2013 she made no reference to LETTS or to using the assets – the teacher educators – we already had, and, on reflection, I believe this is because she saw this programme as something separate. Indeed, in line with the MoE’s general approach, I believe that the director was looking for an instant solution to Libya’s teacher training needs rather than a programme requiring the centre’s active engagement, and so from the outset was uninterested in my proposal. I later reflected:
… quite what (the GCTED director) was expecting me to pull out of my hat when we had that meeting is anybody’s guess. However, I think that as, during the meeting, I started banging on about building upon LETTS, using the (teacher educators) , bringing trainees to Tripoli, cascade training, etc, she lost interest, and this could be why she never properly read the draft proposal I sent her or took any interest in taking things further.
What the strands indicate
Before proceeding to discuss the lessons learned from the strands I believe it is worthwhile discussing briefly what they indicate about the British Council’s, the UK
207 government’s, the Western media’s and my own personal views and understanding of the Libyan context and how these evolved during 2012–14.
The general view taken by the BC, the UK government and Western media of Libya in early 2012 can be seen in Strand One ‘A land of unparalleled opportunity’, in that the country was seen as being on course to develop into a prosperous pro-Western democracy which would develop strong economic ties with the West and, as part of this, offer lucrative contract opportunities for the BC and other UK organisations. This view, as detailed in the micro- history, was encouraged by the Libyan government’s various statements on how it needed Western assistance for its future development and was ready to pay for this – for example, see the comments by the Libyan Minister of Planning on page 182. Although this was a simplified view, it was one that could be comprehended by the UK’s political leaders, the BC’s senior management and the UK media and their readership, and, more importantly, it justified the decision made by the UK government the previous year to intervene in Libya’s Revolution and to support the rebels in toppling Gaddafi. This view appealed in particular to the BC, as it appeared to offer the opportunity to secure large-scale, partner-funded education reform projects with the new Libyan government and at the same time to raise the organisation’s profile with the UK government through playing an instrumental role in the development of the new Libya.
Though this view acknowledged issues such as control of the militias and public-sector corruption, it ignored the complex array of challenges the country faced such as the lack of any national security forces, state infrastructure or government institutions, or the threat posed by tribalism and Islamic militants. This is largely because the view was formulated by policy makers and journalists who had a limited knowledge of Libya and also because the assumption at the time was that as an oil-rich country with substantive cash reserves, it would emulate the UAE and Qatar and quickly develop into a modern prosperous state, and that most of the problems the country faced would disappear as part of this process.
The failure of the UK government, the BC and the media to understand Libya’s situation is underlined by Strands Three ‘Gaddafi’s legacy’ and Four ‘The failure to adjust’. Although these strands are discussed principally around how they influenced LETTS, they are reflective of a wider failure by the above-mentioned organisations to recognise the importance of Libya’s history and its socio-cultural traits, and through a thorough examination to use these to anticipate the problems the country would face in its post- Revolutionary development. These strands also indicate a failure by these organisations to understand that in early 2012, Libya’s future was essentially unpredictable, and that certain
208 actions – in the case of the UK government, actively encouraging UK businesses to set up operations in the country (Adetunji, 2011) and in the case of the BC, reopening the Teaching Centre and operating it on its pre-2011 model – were possibly premature. Moreover, although the UK government and the BC began to realise the challenges posed by the country’s deteriorating political-security situation, as indicated in Strand Five ‘The political- security situation’, and modified their approaches to operating in the country – in the case of the UK government, represented by the embassy – there remained a tendency, in line with the ideas expressed in Strand Four, for both organisations to maintain the view that the situation in Libya would improve in the long term and the country would become a prosperous pro-Western democratic state. On reflection I suspect that modifying this stance and admitting that Libya was becoming a failed state would have also been an admission that the intervention in the Revolution had been a mistake, and this was not something the UK government was willing to do.
The media, while making both optimistic and pessimistic predictions for Libya’s future, generally veered towards the latter as time progressed, although they were often reacting to certain events and, by their nature, a lot of news reports could be described as sensationalist. There was also rarely any reflection on whether the West’s decision to intervene in the Revolution had been a mistake. Moreover, it is questionable how well most media organisations really understood what was happening in Libya beyond events in the major cities – most Western journalists were restricted to certain parts of the country – and there was, as mentioned on page 90, a lack of any detailed authoritative analysis of the country’s recent history and its situation at that time. Indeed, reviewing media articles on Libya during the 2012–14 period and reflecting on my own conversations with officials from the UK embassy, even when it became evident that political turmoil and security issues were destabilising the country, the situation was simplified by being portrayed initially as fighting between the government and counter-revolutionary forces (for example, see Meo and Morajea’s 2012 article on the fighting in Bani Walid) and then later as a struggle between Islamist and non-Islamist factions (see Fox News’ 2013 report), while in reality the situation was more complex and rooted in the way Gaddafi had ruled the country during the previous 40 years. This also conveniently ignored issues including the West’s lack of a plan for assisting post-Revolutionary Libya and its failure to support Libya’s new government in identifying and dealing with the militia threat in early 2012, mistakes that the then UK Ambassador, Dominic Asquith, was later to acknowledge in 2015 (see Sputnik News’ 2015 report).
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Strands One ‘A land of unparalleled opportunity’ and Two ‘My own professional agenda’ also show that I myself believed the notion that Libya offered the potential for large-scale education reform programmes and made a number of assumptions about what the Libyans wanted and needed regarding support with ELT, mainly that the best way forward was through a national in-service teacher training programme delivered in partnership with the MoE. This, as well as being in line with the aims of my study, was also an approach that I was familiar with and one that would enable me to raise my profile within the BC and to meet the expectations of the organisation’s internal and external stakeholders. More importantly, as it was simplistic and, at the same time, grandiose in terms of potential scale and impact, it was an approach that I could explain to BC managers and embassy officials, who largely came from non-ELT/educational backgrounds, and one that they would be very receptive to given what it promised to achieve.
However, developing this approach indicates my naivety regarding Libya, in that I expected the MoE to enthusiastically sign up to my proposal, to engage with the BC as a reliable relatively well-organised partner and to provide most of the funding, and although I expected some challenges, generally I anticipated that the programme would run smoothly. In connection with this, it also shows my lack of knowledge of an educational context that – as shown in Strands Three ‘Gaddafi’s legacy’ and Six ‘The MoE’s view of teacher training’ – lacked the experience, the capacity or the motivation to support the reform programme I had envisaged. Furthermore, when these and other issues, such as those detailed in Strand Seven ‘The MoE’s view of LETTS’, began to surface, I continued – as detailed in Strand Four ‘The failure to adjust’ – to persist in getting the programme up and running, convincing myself that at some point it would start to move forward as originally planned.
On reflection and as shown in the strands and the micro-history, I believe that for most of 2012–14 I was too close to LETTS and needed to take a step back and to examine what was happening – and what was not happening – both with the programme and with educational reform in general. Moreover, I also believe, as implied particularly by the ‘The failure to adjust’ strand, that because LETTS had received so much attention within the wider BC and because senior managers in the region and in the UK were expecting to see a large-scale education reform programme in the school sector, I was reluctant to admit that LETTS had been a failure. Furthermore, when, in 2014, I finally realised that LETTS was unlikely to happen, the fact that I was not in a position to consider viable alternatives indicates that I still had a limited awareness of the context. For example, it was only when I was conducting interviews for the study that I realised that what the MoE probably needed and wanted was a national general educational reform programme reaching large areas of
210 the country from an early stage – particularly in the east – and one that required a limited contribution from their part in terms of organisation and expertise.
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Chapter 5: Lessons learned
In this section I examine what the study’s contributions to knowledge about planning and delivering education reform programmes are. Drawing upon a combination of ideas and experiences from the relevant literature and those emerging from the micro-history and the strands, I have highlighted seven key lessons that may be seen as contributions to knowledge, and which can be used to inform future programmes both from a viability perspective and from a design and delivery one. As will be explained below, these lessons are largely interconnected and designed to be used collectively in the relevant planning process.
Lesson One: Understanding the wider local context
The first lesson I identified is the importance of examining and understanding the local context beyond the immediate field of the reform area and the education sector. This will enable programme planners to make a judgement on whether the context will support and/or help facilitate the reform initiative or vice versa. It will also enable them to identify any wider contextual factors which could pose a risk. Planners can then use their findings to make decisions regarding how to proceed.
As discussed primarily in Strands Three ‘Gadaffi’s legacy’, Five ‘The political-security situation’ and Six ‘The MoE’s view of teacher training’, Libya’s wider context was not conducive to educational reform and there were a series of issues, including socio-cultural attitudes towards teachers, political instability and the absence of any national reform programme, which had not been properly considered and were all to have adverse effects on LETTS. Had the required consideration been applied and, if necessary, the programme modified and/or put on hold until Libya’s path towards future development had become clearer, then it may have achieved more in terms of impact and long-term sustainability, and would have certainly avoided the losses in terms of BC staff time, resources and money that LETTS incurred.
In terms of ELT-related literature on the question of assessing the wider context when planning large-scale reform, there are few sources – something I found strange given the number of papers on the importance of socio-cultural considerations when organising in- service teacher training programmes. For example, Bax (2002), Leather (2001) and Pacek (1996) discuss in-service development programmes in South Africa, Georgia and Japan
212 respectively, with each writer emphasising the importance of building such considerations into both the training and envisaged outcomes in order to ensure that the programmes promote genuine development among teachers. One paper that does discuss the importance of the wider context is Rubdy’s (2008) paper on English curriculum reform in the general education systems of India and Singapore, in which the writer argues that a failure by planners to take into account socio-cultural, political, economic and historical factors limited the reform’s impact and achievements. Another is Woods’ (2012) presentation of a set of guidelines for ELT project managers at the planning and implementation stages. Woods, drawing upon a number of BC ELT project case studies, highlights the importance of recognising external risk factors through the examples of a teacher training project in Brazil’s Parana State, which was disrupted on a number of occasions due to state-level political instability, and the launch of a new curriculum in Egypt which, partly due to planners’ failure to recognise the social context of the reform, did not develop local ownership or capacity. Woods also illustrates the example of the BC’s Early Bilingual Education project in Spain, which has been running since the 1990s (British Council, 2017a), as being successful largely due to wider political support and pressure from parents who were a key local stakeholder group.
Moreover, there are sources within literature both on general education reform programmes in developing countries and on the broader topic of international development projects. Haddad (1995), for example, in a paper providing general advice for education reform planners, suggests considering features of the relevant social context which are likely to affect implementation, including political, demographic, economic and socio-cultural, and in particular whether education is valued by the country’s general populace and whether it features high on politicians’ agendas. Wilmot (2004) examines how both teacher education programmes and education systems in general are shaped by wider political and economic forces – at both a national and international level – and shows how the dismantling of South Africa’s apartheid system and the rise of globalisation created a need for a new innovative approach to teacher training in the country. Furthermore, Akirog and Akirog (2003) argue that one reason Turkey had historically struggled to reform its general education system was due to planners’ failure to factor in ongoing wider changes within the country, in particular the population growth that had put more pressure on schools in certain locations. They also suggest that a number of the country’s long-term education reform programmes had been disrupted and left incomplete due to ongoing political instability. Also writing about educational reform in Turkey, in this case the government’s attempt in the 1990s to make school attendance compulsory for all children aged 5 to 13, Dulger (2004) cautions against reform being overly guided by wider non-pedagogic factors – on this occasion, the country’s
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EU membership aspirations and a desire to counter social instability. In Turkey, these factors saw a focus on quantitative results without a comparable attempt to improve the quality of education, which in turn was neglected and led to a deterioration in teaching standards.
Writing about general issues around managing development programmes, Gow and Morss (1988) provide a set of wider contextual factors that planners working in developing countries need to consider. These include differences in the aims of the programme compared to those of the recipient government, which are often focused on staying in power and maintaining popular support rather than on development and reform; economic challenges which may limit the government’s ability to contribute to and/or take over the programme; and historical and socio-cultural issues such as demographics, religion, gender roles and kinship networks which may influence how the government and certain sectors of the wider populace react to the reform. They proceed to suggest designing the programme to work around the relevant constraints or attempting to change them via the programme, or abandoning the programme altogether, stating that the first option is usually the one followed. These issues are largely echoed by Kwak and Dewan (2001) in their paper on managing risks in international development projects. The writers highlight poor infrastructure and weak institutions in the recipient country as being common risks, and make the point that the latter can be an intractable problem as it is often in the country’s rulers’ interests to keep institutions weak.
Drawing upon the above-mentioned ideas and those discussed in the strands, I feel that the first step planners need to take is to gauge the interest in reform within the wider government and to contextualise the envisaged programme within the country’s wider development. If there is a general movement towards innovation and reform, such as the ones in former communist Eastern European countries in the 1990s (Ekiert, 2012), then provided it is properly planned and implemented, it should be possible for an education reform programme to position itself within this wider movement. Indeed, as will be discussed later, such conditions enabled the BC to run large-scale ELT reform programmes in most countries in Eastern Europe in the 1990s – exemplified by the large-scale teacher training initiatives in Poland (Enyedi and Medgyes, 1998), Hungary (Bolitho and Medgyes, 2000) and Romania (Bardi, 2012).
However, it is important to invest time and resources into properly investigating this interest. In most contexts, political leaders will invariably state that they want and need innovation and change – particularly in the case of potential programmes funded from external sources, such as international donors – and therefore it is critical to establish whether these
214 statements are genuine or whether they are merely paying lip service to what they think the relevant audiences, such as their general populaces and/or international partners, are expecting to hear.
As shown by the micro-history, Libya’s new leaders, despite claiming to be committed to national development, were unwilling and largely unable to undertake the required work in planning and implementing reform programmes, especially when the latter involved making potentially unpopular decisions. And, while there was a certain amount of public pressure on the government for reform, their solutions mainly focused on perceived ‘quick fixes’ and on finding ways to keep the populace content, for example sending state officials on overseas training, increasing public sector salaries (Daragahi, 2014) and, in the education sector, building new school facilities and expanding the overseas postgraduate scholarships programme (ICEF, 2013). This lack of genuine commitment quickly became apparent in 2012–13 as promised reforms failed to materialise in most sectors, including, along with education, healthcare (Hedayat, 2013) and the economy (Khan and Mezran, 2013).
The mistakes I made in this area, which planners need to avoid, were firstly accepting the new Libyan government’s statements, reinforced by statements from my own government (Adetunji, 2011), about the country’s large-scale reform and reconstruction programme rather than examining what was actually taking place – or, more to the point, not taking place – and using the findings to inform my own planning. Secondly, when it became clear the MoE had little interest in LETTS, I failed to view this within the wider issues of the government’s failure to put in place any meaningful national reform programme which, by mid 2013, was becoming evident (Crisp, 2013-b). Had I done this, then it is possible I would have thought more seriously about persisting with the programme until the end of 2013.
The importance of this is underlined by the fact that Libya is by no means an isolated example. Indeed, as a report by Williamson (2009) on the ineffectiveness of international assistance explains, there are numerous examples throughout the developing world, and while most of these relate to donor-funded initiatives – which LETTS was not – they bear similarities to the Libyan experience. Nepal provides arguably the best example. As reports by Bell (2015) and The Economist (2011) explain, while the country has a 50-year history of large-scale, donor-funded reform programmes, a lack of genuine support from the country’s leaders – despite them giving the pretence of being committed to reform – has prevented most of these programmes leading to development and change. Indeed, writers such as Bell and Karkee and Comfort (2016) suggest that by continuing to organise reform programmes without the government’s support, international assistance organisations are holding back
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Nepal’s development, as this consolidates the status quo and prevents most programmes from achieving sustainability.
At the same time, planners need to be aware of the general risks posed by the context beyond that of the immediate reform area. In many developing contexts there is likely to be political instability and poor security conditions which, as in Libya, could be connected. In my case, I was aware of Libya’s ongoing political instability and security challenges, as noted in the micro-history, and realised that they affected the programme at a certain level by preventing the BC from training up educators in eastern and southern Libya, and by having a wearing-down effect on the people we worked with. However, I failed to factor in the general threat they posed by obstructing the development of conditions that could have been conducive to reform and in their potential to tip the country into chaos, which they ultimately did. Had I done this, I would have most likely reconsidered putting in place a programme that was reliant on an active partnership with a government ministry.
Admittedly Libya provides an extreme example, although not an isolated one – in recent years there have been comparable situations in countries such as South Sudan and Yemen in which BC reform programmes with education ministries have collapsed due to a complete breakdown in law and order. Less extreme examples can be found in Bangladesh (Tahrima and Jaegal, 2012) and Thailand (ICEF, 2015-a), in which periods of continued political instability, at times intertwined with large-scale violence, have acted as a barrier to national development and reform, including in the education sector. For example, Phaktanakul (2014) argues that in Thailand, political instability from 1999 to 2009 prevented the implementation of the 1999 National Education Act, which was intended to promote inclusive education throughout the Thai school system.
In certain contexts there may be additional risks requiring consideration. One risk, highlighted in the above-discussed literature, is economic instability, particularly if a programme is dependent upon funding by the relevant local partners. In Ukraine, the Peacekeeping English Project I managed was almost derailed during the country’s 2008–09 financial crisis (Stern, 2009) when the Ukrainian MoD had its budget cut and claimed it could no longer afford to continue funding its ELT reform programme. Likewise, although not mentioned in the various programme reports by Darn (2012), Parker (2013) and Borg (2015), I suspect one reason why, as detailed in the micro-history, the Sudanese MoE was unable to take over funding of the NTTP as initially agreed in 2011 was due to the country’s economic collapse following its loss of the South Sudanese oil revenues (Al-Arabiya, 2012). Another risk, also highlighted, is weak infrastructure, and I feel this is particularly true around
216 communications networks, given the current propensity for organisations like the BC to deliver training and similar activities via digital channels. Indeed, on reflection, if I had managed to organise for LETTS to be extended outside Tripoli, it is likely that my plan to support educators remotely would have been hampered by the country’s poor telecommunications and internet networks (Open Net, 2009).
Socio-cultural issues can pose another challenge. In Libya, school teachers were not viewed by the government as being a priority due to their socio-cultural position within society, and therefore a reform programme focusing on teacher training was of limited appeal – something I did not fully realise until I started gathering data for this study! A similar situation exists in Brazil where teaching, as Peltola (2016) explains, is viewed as a low-status, poorly paid profession in which members are badly qualified, lack basic teaching skills and are frequently absent, and therefore recent reform attempts (Bevins, 2012) have focused on achieving universal education as opposed to improving teachers’ skills. In certain Muslim countries, reform which encourages co-education and/or the secularisation of education is, in line with ideas expressed by writers such as Asadullah (2014), Butt (2015) and Dawn (2003), likely to face opposition from more conservative political-religious factions.
Interestingly, the UK MoD’s 2014 training programme for Libyan military cadets provides an example of the perils of ignoring socio-cultural factors. Designed to support military reform and seen as the start of a major and lucrative military assistance programme, the training, as articles by Booth et al. (2014) and Hilsum (2014) explain, was poorly planned, with the MoD failing to appreciate the issues around bringing together 300 young Muslim men, most with little prior military training, from different and often remote parts of Libya and placing them on a UK military base on the outskirts of Cambridge. Nor was the MoD expecting many cadets to view the programme as a paid holiday (Hilsum, 2014), despite this reflecting the traditional Libyan view of overseas training, exemplified in Hope’s (2011) report on a Libyan frogman sent for military diver training in Italy where it emerged he was unable to swim and was only there for a ‘vacation in Rome’ . As a result the UK MoD was unprepared for the cadets’ lack of discipline and anti-social behaviour and the training had to be curtailed prematurely, proving a major embarrassment for the British government.
To apply such lessons, planners need to examine, research and familiarise themselves with the relevant wider context prior to drawing up and embarking upon any major reform programme. As well as assessing how committed the country’s leaders are to reform and whether there is a general trend towards change and innovation, it should also involve actively identifying, weighing up and assessing the likelihood of potential contextual risks,
217 and, if necessary, putting mitigation strategies in place. This could be done informally or through a full risk-management exercise as recommended by Eger and Egerova (2015) and as is now mandatory during both the planning and implementation stages of most British Council large-scale projects.
Lesson Two: Understanding the local partner(s)
The second lesson follows on from the first. Once planners have studied the general context and made a judgement on how – or whether – to move forward, they then need to make a similar appraisal regarding working with the relevant local partner. This should involve examining the partner’s interest in the potential reform and their capacity to provide the required engagement and contribution, and to ascertain if there are any issues – general and/or specific – that pose a risk to the programme. In most cases partners will be education ministries and/or related bodies, such as centres for in-service teacher training like the GCTED, while for higher education projects it could be universities and other tertiary-level institutions. More specialised projects could involve other state bodies. For example, the BC Peacekeeping English Project (Woods, 2006), which focused on supporting former Soviet bloc countries in developing self-sustaining systems of ELT within their military and security forces, involved working with education and training departments from the relevant countries’ defence and/or interior ministries. Certain programmes could involve engaging with two or more partners. For example, Hiebert (2015) details how a UNESCO pre-service teacher training project in Iraq involved the organisation dealing with both the general education and higher education ministries.
In terms of literature, I sourced a number of ELT-related and more general papers on the issues international assistance organisations such as the BC encounter when engaging with ministries and other state bodies on educational reform programmes. Two of the most informative were Woods’ (2012) and Tribble’s (2009) discussions of lessons learned from BC ELT reform project case studies, in which both writers highlight steps that planners need to follow to ensure that engagement with partners proceeds as planned. These include ensuring that the partner is effectively led and managed, that it is committed to the reform, has the capacity to contribute to and facilitate its implementation – particularly in contexts where state bodies function in a centralised manner – and that it can provide all required support in terms of resources and funding.
The issues of effective leadership and commitment to reform are raised by several writers, including Chansopheak (2009) and Chealy (2009), who present them as the principal factors
218 driving educational reform in Cambodia, and Obanya (1989) who views their absence as a reason for reform failure in a number of sub-Saharan African states. Angula and Lewis (1997), discussing education reform in Namibia, argue that both factors were key to the initial gains of its post-independence reform programme and that their disappearance by the late 1990s contributed to that reform process becoming stalled. This is echoed by Buchert (2002) in a paper on educational reform in Ghana, where implementation proceeded well in 1993–97 under a capable education minister, but then began unravelling under a series of less-able successors. The issue of commitment to reform is also raised by Bolitho (2012) in a paper on the general principles around introducing ELT reform, in which he argues that without this – particularly among partners’ leaders – reforms have little chance of achieving their long-term aims.
Woods’ (2012) and Tribble’s (2009) point about partner capacity is also discussed by a number of writers. Buchert (2002), Samoff (2004) and Riddell and Nino-Zarazua (2016) – all writing about reform programmes in West African countries – detail how limited capacity within education ministries, especially regarding staff skills and internal structures and procedures, proved a major obstacle to the implementation of education reforms in the countries in question. Similarly, Dick and Maynard (2014) and Simpson (2012) illustrate how MoE’s in Sri Lanka and Rwanda respectively lacked the internal systems to introduce EMI (English as a medium of instruction) into their school systems. Furthermore, Buchert proceeds to contrast his West African examples with that of Mozambique, where the Education Ministry’s well-trained staff body and effective internal structures supported the effective implementation of a sector-wide reform programme.
One challenge around capacity, highlighted by Rose and Greeley (2006) regarding Mozambique’s MoE and by Loveluck (2012) with regard to Egypt’s, is that many education ministries operate in a centralised manner, which can make delivering the reform on the ground challenging, particularly in countries where logistics, geography and/or weak infrastructure are issues and where, as Patel (2012) – drawing upon the example of a national ELT reform programme in Malaysia – suggests, there is resistance from local stakeholders. Another, often the result of having a centralised system, is that many MoE’s have complex bureaucracies which, as Dushku (1998) – citing the example of Albania’s MoHE’s Soviet-era bureaucracy – argues, makes implementing reforms a slow-moving, problematic process, especially as such bureaucracies breed officials uninterested in reform and unwilling to make decisions, an argument echoed by Aziz et al. (2014) in their paper on reform in Pakistan and by Avalos (2000) and Chapman and Miric (2009) in papers on general issues around teacher education reform in developing countries.
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Solutions to this are provided by Johnstone (2010) and Patel (2012) who, writing about ELT reform programmes in East Asia, suggest that planners identify potential challenges through conducting feasibility studies and/or organising initial small-scale pilot programmes, and then ensure these challenges are addressed by the main reform programme – something that will be explored in more detail in Lesson Seven. Writers such as Aziz et al. (2014) and Smith (2005) argue that sector-wide reform programmes in particular need to focus on reforming actual education ministries, including improving internal procedures and processes, especially through dismantling top-down ministerial hierarchies by empowering middle managers to make decisions, and putting in place two-way systems of communication to improve both operational capacity and stakeholder engagement. The writers also argue that staff training should be a priority, with Smith (2005) emphasising that this should focus on creating a skilled ‘critical mass’ (p.449) within the organisation as opposed to training a few senior officials.
Woods’ (2012) and Tribble’s (2009) final point – the ability of the partner to provide the required funding and resources – is generally overlooked by those writers focusing on general education reform, largely because, I suspect, they are concerned with donor- financed projects in which funding from recipient partners is not an immediate issue. However, Salmi (1992), writing about higher education reform, highlights the fact that in many cases education ministries lack the financial systems and resources to continue reform once funding finishes, and argues that planners need to ensure that programmes support partners in putting the relevant budgetary structures in place. Writers focusing on ELT programmes, such as Wiseman (2011) and Finlayter (2016), however, often focus on this issue, as these tend to be organised by international assistance organisations like the BC and are reliant on partner co-financing and co-resourcing unless the programmes are fully donor-funded. Indeed, many BC programmes, such as the Peacekeeping English Project (Woods, 2006) and the Indian cascade programmes (Barrett, 2010-a), while externally financed, were still partly dependent upon contributions from recipient partners. Furthermore, such contributions, as well as ensuring the project proceeds as planned, also – in line with Gray’s (2009) arguments – develop partner ownership and project sustainability.
Drawing upon the LETTS experience and the literature, I believe that planners’ first step ought to be gauging the interest and effectiveness of the partner’s leaders and examining whether they are genuinely committed to the reform. As with the previous lesson, a certain amount of investigation is required. Most ministers and other key officials will – as they did in Libya – enthusiastically state their commitment to reform, knowing this is what both planners and their country’s general populace want to hear, and planners need to judge whether
220 these officials in reality have the motivation and ability to support the relevant programme as required. In most contexts there are likely to be tell-tale signs. In Libya, these included ministers being unwilling to tackle the education system’s major challenges, particularly the oversupply of teachers (UNICEF, 2013) and their lack of interest in LETTS – despite me informing them about it on several occasions – and in other BC programmes. A more obvious sign came from the GCTED director’s limited support for the programme – from claiming to lack the funds to provide refreshments for the educator training to being unable to organise for teachers to be released from school to attend training sessions – and, as LETTS arguably depended upon this support, then these actions ought to have triggered a review instead of an unfounded expectation that interest would develop in due course.
It is useful to compare the LETTS experience to the one the BC had in engaging with Libya’s NBTVE on vocational education sector reform, as this demonstrates what is possible when both commitment and capable leadership exist. As writers such as Leney (2014), Schellekens (2013) and Rose (2015) comment, despite facing similar challenges to those faced by the education sector – albeit on a smaller scale – following Libya’s Revolution the Board embarked upon a well-planned sector-wide reform programme which saw changes introduced into the curriculums, staff training and quality assurance. This was down to a forward-looking chairman and an organised team, and led to the BC running a number of large-scale reform initiatives including a Skills for Employability project, an EU-funded TVET project and a large-scale professional development programme for the sector’s teachers of English, which was funded and co-managed by the Board and led to several hundred teachers receiving the TKT qualification.
In connection with the above, before embarking upon a reform programme, planners also need to make a judgement on the partner’s organisational capacity to support the reform, particularly regarding the effectiveness of its internal systems and the skills of its staff. If partners lack the required capacity, then it is likely the initiative will fail, particularly in the case of large-scale programmes as demonstrated in the above-mentioned examples from Sri Lanka (Dick and Maynard, 2014) and Rwanda (Simpson, 2012). In Libya, had I properly examined the other reform initiatives the MoE was pursuing along with its track record of delivering large-scale reform, it is likely I would not have been as confident as I was regarding LETTS becoming a national programme. As detailed by UNICEF (2013), the MoE’s attempts at reforming the mathematics and science curriculums by importing curriculums from overseas had been a disaster, while in terms of previous reform programmes, the introduction of a new English curriculum in the 2000s based on the communicative approach had largely failed to achieve its overall aim of changing the way
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English was taught in Libyan schools, despite the involvement of a UK provider in the form of Garnet Education. As Ibrahim and Carey (2016) and Orafi and Borg (2009) explain, one reason why the reform failed was because the Gaddafi-era MoE lacked the organisational structures and systems to disseminate information about the curriculum and to provide training and support to teachers.
In most developing countries, MoEs are likely to be centralised and heavily bureaucratic, so planners need to consider the issues involved in any required directives being processed, and in instructions to ministerial staff being acted upon appropriately, and, if possible, to find ways to expedite such processes. In the Ukrainian MoD, for example, all official communications from the BC had to go via the Department of International Cooperation (DIC), which took weeks, sometimes months, to forward them to the appropriate officials. To circumvent the challenge this posed, I began ensuring that while all communications were addressed to the DIC they were also copied to the officials they were intended for and therefore could be acted upon in a timely manner. Likewise, one reason why the BC Pakistan’s Punjab Education and English Language Initiative (PEELI; Fisher, 2016) has achieved its aims of establishing a large-scale sustainable cascade teacher training programme in Punjab State has been the institutional relationship with the state MoE which has enabled the BC to liaise directly with the relevant officials responsible for processing project directives.
Planners may however find themselves operating in countries similar to Libya where the absence of functioning state institutions poses a challenge. For example, BC reports on the potential for ELT reform programmes in Afghanistan (Inci, 2014) and Yemen (Yosief, 2014) highlight weak institutions as a potential risk. In these contexts, serious consideration needs to be given to the reform’s chances of achieving its goals. In Libya, despite a large centralised bureaucracy, the MoE lacked any functioning internal procedures due to the Gaddafi regime’s failure to develop the ministry as an institution, meaning that processing directives and other instructions proved difficult. This may explain the GCTED’s challenges in obtaining funding to remunerate the educators for the 2013 training courses and the director’s reluctance to proceed with LETTS following these. A comparable example can be found in Libya’s MoHE, in which Borg (2014), in his review of ELT in the university sector, reported that officials struggled to secure funding for reform activity due to an inability to obtain the required approvals via the MoHE’s internal systems, as opposed to any lack of available money.
Planners may also find themselves dealing with partners whose staff lack the skills to
222 support the reform’s implementation, and if this is the case need to make judgements on how to proceed. One option, applied in Ukraine via the BC-managed Professional Development Programme for MoD civil servants (Mcllwraith, 2008), is to provide staff training via the programme. However, in contexts where the scope of the envisaged reform is restricted and/or, like Libya (Abuhadra and Ajaali, 2014), the public sector suffers from an oversaturation of employees and low productivity, this may not be a viable option, particularly if – as in Libya (Strategy World, 2014) – staff see their positions as an entitlement as opposed to ones requiring them to fulfil certain duties. Indeed, building upon the above-mentioned point regarding the GCTED, I also believe the fact that, by her own admission, the director was unable to rely upon centre staff to carry out tasks without her direct involvement also contributed to her reluctance to move forward with LETTS.
As mentioned above, partners’ capacity and willingness to provide funding and other resources to support a programme is particularly important. In the case of LETTs, while it was arguably unrealistic of me to expect the MoE to immediately start funding the programme, the fact that it was unwilling or unable to provide refreshments or stationery and, at times, even a venue – despite having a large and largely unused training centre – should have set off alarm bells, especially as the NBTVE and MoHE were largely funding and resourcing their relevant reform programmes. Programmes that start off dependent upon funding from the relevant assistance organisation must have a plan for the handing over of funding, along with other responsibilities, to the partner – and for partners to then be held to account. Indeed, one of the weaknesses of the KSTTP/NTTP was that while there had been a commitment from the Sudanese MoE to take over funding of the programme, this was never realised and the ministry was never properly held accountable regarding this by my successors.
A final element of this lesson which I believe planners need to consider, and which links in with the previous lesson, is the effect of wider contextual issues upon the partner’s internal capacity to support the reform. In Libya’s case, political rivalries between ministers, changes in leadership due to political instability, ongoing security challenges in schools and strike action by staff meant that the MoE lacked the sort of ‘window of opportunity’ (UNESCO, 2009: pp.37) that other states, such as Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and South Africa, have been able to exploit in reforming their education systems following the toppling of oppressive regimes and/or periods of conflict. Instead, from the outset, the MoE was dealing with a stream of immediate challenges which it was ill-equipped to manage and which meant it had little time for long-term programmes such as LETTS. And, particularly as there are numerous comparable examples to the Libyan experience from countries such as
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Bangladesh (Tahrima and Jaegal, 2012) and Thailand (ICEF, 2015-a), planners need to consider whether they and their recipient partners will have their own ‘windows of opportunity’ to work in, and then to plan accordingly.
Lesson Three: Clarifying expectations
This overlaps with the previous lesson as it involves making an evaluation of recipient partners’ expectations regarding the reform. In laying the ground for a programme, planners need to understand and to clarify what partners expect in terms of both their own contributions to the reform and those of the relevant international assistance organisation, and what they anticipate in terms of actual results. As I will explain below, I feel that this is a key and often understated issue in educational reform programmes and a particularly relevant one in LETTS’ case.
In terms of the literature I reviewed for the study, most papers I sourced focused on both recipients’ and international assistance organisations’ expectations regarding programme results as opposed to delivery and/or content. For example, Hayes’ (1995) paper on ELT reforms in Malaysia and Thailand, Karavas-Doukas’ (1995) paper on ELT reforms in Greece and O’Sullivan’s (2002) on ELT reforms in Namibia all discuss the failure of the relevant programmes to introduce communicative approaches to ELT at classroom level despite stakeholder expectations. Furthermore, on a more general level, papers by Aziz et al. (2014) and Takala (1998) discuss the failure of sector-wide education programmes to address the challenge of youth unemployment in Pakistan and Namibia respectively, and Hoel (2012), ICEF (2015-b) and Llorent-Bedmar (2015) discuss the mixed success of Morocco’s donor- supported attempts to reform its education system to meet labour market needs. Moreover, Chisholm and Leyendecker (2008) detail how attempts to introduce innovative new curriculums based on learner-centred and outcomes-based approaches and national qualifications frameworks in a number of African countries failed to achieve the expected transformational change due to poor planning and limited capacity.
Regarding expectations around the delivery and content of reform programmes, Kunje’s (2002) paper describes how Malawi’s Integrated In-Service Teacher Education Programme, set up by the MoE with the assistance of Germany’s Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit and the World Bank to address the country’s shortage of primary school teachers, suffered from unrealistic expectations among the stakeholders and a mismatch in how the various organisations involved perceived their roles and tasks. As a result, while managing to train 18,000 teachers over four years, unanticipated issues around programme
224 management, training quality and funding emerged, which meant that it failed to achieve its overall goal of becoming a sustainable programme embedded within the education system. In another example, Dushku (1998), evaluating a 1990s BC ELT reform project in Albania’s higher education sector, argues that one reason for the programme’s limited achievements was because the BC embarked upon it with expectations based upon pre-established assumptions about the sector’s needs, its experience of running such programmes in other countries, its internal organisational culture and the UK’s wider political-cultural agenda in the former Soviet bloc, and failed to understand the requirements and expectations of its Albanian partners. At the same time, the writer acknowledges that a secondary reason for the project’s problems was unrealistic expectations from both Albania’s university sector and its MoHE regarding what the BC would provide in terms of training and resources, the pace of change and the reform’s results. However, my own view, having read Dushku’s paper carefully and having had first-hand experience of managing such projects myself, is that the root cause of these issues and the apparent failure of the project to achieve its intended outcomes was probably due to a mismatch between the BC’s and the recipients’ expectations about how the project would be delivered, what each side’s contributions would be and what the ultimate goals were.
Woods (2012) pursues a similar thread by arguing that differences in expectations can often be at the heart of many of the problems reform programmes face and proceeds to draw upon examples from Poland and Tunisia in which such instances led to delays and/or unintended outcomes. The Tunisian experience is detailed by McIlwraith (2012) in the same volume, who explains how mismatched expectations regarding an ELT programme resulted in two different programme plans – one produced by the BC and one by the MoE – employing different methodologies. Furthermore, Crossey (2012) explains that when the Peacekeeping English Project was launched in Poland, the Polish MoD expected a series of English courses delivered by native-speaker teachers, whereas in reality it was a capacity- building programme focusing on language testing, curriculum development and teacher training, which – due to the mismatch – the MoD was initially ill-prepared to support.
In the case of LETTS, there were two interconnected mismatches in expectations. First, there was the GCTED’s view of LETTS and the 2012–13 training activities as a small-scale Tripoli-based programme as opposed to a national training programme in which the courses were the first step. Second, there was the centre’s expectation – articulated in late 2013 – that somehow the BC could provide such a national programme instantly and without any substantive contribution from them, apart from the funding, while my position was that this could only be done via a full partnership. And while these mismatches emerged at specific
225 instances during the LETTS experience, they indicate that from the outset there was a general difference in understanding between the BC and GCTED regarding the programme, and one I was largely unaware of.
Although planners need to ensure that recipient ministries and other partners fully understand the nature of the reform programme, what each side will be expected to contribute and what the intended output and outcomes are, LETTS shows how simply explaining these to potential partners and asking them to sign some sort of agreement is likely to be insufficient. In most contexts, potential partners will have developed pre- established assumptions about the international assistance organisation and what it ought to provide, and these will modify their understanding of the message the organisation is conveying. As well as with LETTS, I also feel that this was partly the case with the above- mentioned Albanian and Malawian examples. Moreover – and I only fully realised this while working on this lesson – I believe, on reflection, that this was the case with the KSTTP/NTTP in Sudan. While the Sudanese MoE signed an agreement committing it to funding the programme in future and was repeatedly reminded of this during the programme, this was at odds with their assumption – based on a combination of historical, cultural and political influences – that as a perceived Western donor organisation it was the BC’s role to fund the programme. This position was strengthened by the fact that this was, for them, the preferable option and also by the BC continuing to fund the programme when this commitment was repeatedly reneged upon.
Possibly reflecting the above-mentioned point about partner expectations being an overlooked area in reform programme planning, within the literature I struggled to find any real discussion of solutions to this. Woods (2012) advises planners to ‘avoid’ (p.236) such mismatches, Reilly (2012), writing about expectations regarding the results of a bilingual education project in Spain, suggests ensuring partner comprehension and Dushku (1998) advises establishing clear systems of communication. However, in none of these cases do the writers go into details about what such measures could be. Moreover, Mcllwraith (2012) and Crossey (2012) in their above-mentioned papers highlight this as an issue, but then fail to examine possible solutions. Fisher, however, in a 2016 review of the BC’s approach to PEELI – a project which had faced challenges around partners’ expectations regarding results and funding – argues that in such projects partners need to be encouraged to articulate their expectations themselves as part of the wider planning and delivery management process. Once all sides are aware of potential mismatches in expectations these can then be addressed through negotiation and discussion.
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Furthermore, Stephenson (1994) advises taking time to explain to partners about reform programmes and what their expected roles are, and making allowances for cross-cultural and linguistic differences and for individuals who may not be ELT and/or education specialists. In addition to this, from my experience I feel that it is important planners ensure that all communication with partners is in an accessible format. For example, when managing the Peacekeeping English Project Ukraine (Gray, 2009), I ensured that all agreements and arrangements with the local MoD were confirmed via formal directives through official channels. Moreover, one reason for the success of the above-mentioned ELT programme with Libya’s NBTVE was because all formal communication was in Arabic and English, and all written communication carried out using short, bullet-pointed communiques which partners were likely to read. Furthermore, all agreements were signed off officially by both the NBTVE chairman and the BC director.
Finally, once the programme starts, it is important to make partners accountable for commitments they have signed up to, a process helped by making these manageable and, in the case of large-scale projects, ensuring this is a staged approach. For example, with the Peacekeeping English Project Ukraine, such an approach was built into the project plan (Gray, 2009), which led to provision of ELT to future peacekeeping personnel being handed over to the MoD in 2005 and staffing, management and funding of the self-access centres in 2006–07. On both occasions, the MoD initially claimed it was unprepared to take over the activity. However, following the BC’s refusal to continue supporting the activities from its own resources, the MoD did proceed to assume full responsibility for both activities. This can be compared to Peacekeeping English Projects in certain other countries in which, when faced with similar situations, BC project managers agreed to carry on organising and funding the relevant activity, which led to sustainability issues once the project finished. Such an approach, however, needs to be balanced against the risk of derailing the project, which was an issue with the Sudanese KSTTP/NTTP when it came to making the MoE accountable, although it is important to note that the programme failed to achieve its overall goal of becoming fully sustainable.
Lesson Four: Avoid imposing an ‘alien’ system
This lesson links in with Lessons Two and Three. Reform interventions in developing countries often take place in contexts where there is an urgent need for large-scale education reform and high expectations from partners, other stakeholders and from within the assistance organisation itself. In these situations there is a tendency for planners to design programmes modelled upon ones that have been successfully delivered in
227 comparable contexts, which fit in with the prevailing approaches of the times and that are designed to achieve results in a short space of time. However, as was arguably the case with LETTS, this can lead to programmes being imposed that are comparatively ‘alien’ to the context and which struggle to achieve intended results, particularly in the long term. Therefore, it is important that planners ensure that any envisaged reform programme is something that can be introduced constructively – as opposed to ‘imposed’ – and in partnership with recipients, and that it is an intervention partners can comprehend in terms of both organisation and objectives and accept from a socio-cultural perspective, and that they have the systems in place to support and to facilitate it as envisaged.
The issue of ELT and more general educational reform programmes being ‘imposed’ onto contexts without due consideration of whether they are appropriate or how the intervention will be realised is discussed by a number of writers. The one regularly quoted – for example, by Bax (1995), Enyedi and Medgyes (1998) and Leather (2001) – is Holliday, who in his 1992 paper introduces the concept of ‘tissue rejection’, in which ELT reform initiatives, usually organised by international assistance organisations such as the BC, fail to embed themselves into the relevant education system or institution and are ‘rejected’ once the project support comes to an end – generally manifesting itself in the programme soon unravelling and/or the intended outcomes not being achieved. Interestingly for me – as I will detail below – Holliday largely draws upon the example of a 1970s ELT project at the University of Khartoum to illustrate this argument. As both Holliday and Swales (1980) – who delivered the project and whose subsequent report Holliday draws upon – explain, this intervention established an English Language Serving Unit at the university, which then tried to develop and reform the university’s approach to delivering English for Specific Purposes courses. However, due to a combination of importing foreign systems of teaching and assessment, the assumption that Sudanese university systems functioned in a similar way to those in the UK, a reliance upon official university information regarding the delivery of academic programmes that bore little resemblance to reality, and a failure by expatriate staff to learn about and adapt to this reality, this intervention failed to achieve the desired results and to make the unit an integral part of the university.
As papers by Barrett (2010-b) and O’Hare (2010) demonstrate, approaches to introducing ELT reform in overseas teaching contexts have come some way since the 1970s and 1980s, and, as Bax (1995) explains, there is now a degree of awareness among planners regarding the importance of factoring into programme development the educational and socio-cultural realities of the relevant context. However, as Bax proceeds to suggest, there remains a tendency for the planners to design the relevant reform programmes, look for ways to make
228 them work in the relevant context and then employ a ‘jet in jet out’ trainer (Bax, 1995: p.347) to deliver them, and while Bax himself was writing over 20 years ago and arguing that this situation was beginning to change, articles by Bellingham (2013) and Guelzim, Akkouch and Zakari (2013) on the BC’s Maghreb CPD programme show that this practice still continues. Moreover, the main aim of most ELT reform programmes has changed little since the 1990s – Lamb (1995) and Pacek (1996) describe 1990s programmes in Indonesia and Japan respectively, while Wedell (2005) and Law (2011) discuss ones in China and Syria in the 2000s. And while the scale and delivery method has changed – the first two writers detail small-scale training courses delivered directly and the second describe large-scale cascade programmes – the aim of all four was to introduce new communicative, learner-based approaches to ELT in their relevant contexts and to move teachers away from traditional teacher-centred approaches.
According to the relevant writer, each of these initiatives failed due to reasons which could be attributed to ‘tissue rejection’ (Holliday, 1992) as they were imposed upon their contexts by their relevant MoEs and the international assistance organisations. Furthermore, it is important to note that while neither the Indonesian (Lamb, 1995) nor Japanese (Pacek, 1996) programmes were designed with their classroom or wider socio-cultural contexts in mind – and that this was arguably a principal reason why both failed – this was not the case with the later Chinese (Wedell, 2005) and Syrian (Law, 2011) programmes which were much less ‘imposed’. However, both failed to factor in wider issues, such as the absence of effective systems on the ground to monitor and support cascaded training, ensuring the relevant educators and other stakeholders such as school head teachers understood and supported the initiatives, and the lack of comparable change within the wider education systems. For example, one reason why the Chinese programme largely failed to achieve its intended goal of promoting communicative language teaching in schools was due to the continuance of the national university entrance testing system, which focused on language knowledge as opposed to language skills and communicative competence. Indeed, in none of the above-mentioned four cases was the context’s education system sufficiently developed to support and facilitate the reform.
Holliday (1992) advises avoiding ‘tissue rejection’ by carrying out a procedure he refers to as a ‘means analysis’, which involves adopting an ethnographic approach to investigating the host environment, identifying the various educational and wider social-cultural issues, assessing how these would interact with the proposed project and then planning accordingly. In particular, the analysis should identify the prevailing teaching and learning methodologies and approaches, especially those that differ from official doctrines, and should ensure the
229 project works with and not against them. The analysis also involves formulating hypotheses regarding what is likely to happen when the relevant innovations are introduced, in order to ascertain that these will be properly implemented. Furthermore, the analysis should be viewed as an ongoing exercise to be continued throughout both the planning and delivery stages in order for changes and amendments to be made as required, and to ensure the project achieves the envisaged results.
Holliday (1992) proceeds to detail how this approach was effectively applied in a project to renew ELT curriculums in faculties of education in Egypt’s university sector. By conducting a ‘means analysis’, the author was able to learn about the realities of the teaching and learning situation, and particularly the fact that most Egyptian teachers had their own curriculums, used their own materials and followed their own academic programmes. Therefore, Holliday was able to adjust the project from one in which he coordinated a central curriculum development committee to one in which he supported individual lecturers in developing and improving what they were already doing.
Holliday’s (1992) ability to deviate radically from his project’s initial terms of reference along with its five-year time frame and apparent absence of any supervisory body to report to are luxuries unavailable in most modern ELT reform programmes. Moreover – and while examining this is beyond the remit of this particular study – I also question how successful this project was in promoting systemic change in the long term. However, the writer’s points about taking steps to understand the realities of the local context and making adjustments to incorporate educational and socio-cultural factors are issues planners need to consider to ensure that programmes are not ‘imposed’.
There are a number of examples, within the relevant literature, of programmes which have introduced reform in challenging contexts by following Holliday’s (1992) guidelines. In China, often, as shown by Wedell’s (2005) above-mentioned study and by Gu’s (2005) study of BC ELT projects in Chinese universities, a socio-cultural minefield in terms of introducing ELT reform, Hong (2012) details how a cascade programme in Guandong Province localised the training process, ensuring both the appropriateness of both approach and content – even altering these to meet the levels and needs of teachers in specific localities – and the full involvement and support of local stakeholders. This enabled the programme to continue to develop after the BC’s involvement ceased in 2005. Nusrat (2015) and Fisher (2016) explain how by working in partnership with education authorities, engaging with stakeholders at all levels, utilising local training expertise and ensuring content and project ambitions reflected teachers’ levels, needs and socio-cultural contexts, the BC managed to introduce a large-
230 scale cascade teacher training programme into Pakistan’s Punjab province – home to one of the world’s largest and most complex public education systems. Moreover, the success of this has led to the project being expanded, with the aim of training over 100,000 teachers in 2017–2020 – up from 5,000 in 2013–16 – and to a programme of similar size being launched in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (British Council, 2016-a).
LETTS presents a lesson regarding ‘imposing’ ELT reform programmes for three reasons. Firstly, it acts as a warning against planners attempting to foist a particular reform initiative such as a training programme or a new curriculum upon a partner in response to external pressures and/or because that specific initiative is ‘in vogue’. LETTS, as detailed in the strands, was largely driven by external factors, namely my own professional agenda and expectations from the BC. Moreover, it was also driven by the BC’s policy – informed by internal communications and by teacher training programmes in India and Malaysia – of viewing large-scale cascade programmes as the ‘de facto’ approach to delivering teacher training in developing countries. And, while there was ample evidence – as revealed in papers by Shihiba (2011), Orafi (2008) and Orafi and Borg (2009) – that Libya needed considerable support with ELT, there was no indication that the MoE wanted a cascade programme or indeed had a wider policy for developing ELT that such a programme would support. Instead, as detailed in the micro-history and the strands, the MoE assumed that the BC could simply ‘fix’ Libya’s ELT-related problems and so agreed with whatever I proposed, which largely suited my own agenda at the time.
Secondly, it underlines the importance of guarding against a reform being imposed, through conducting a thorough examination of the context. While it is unlikely planners will have the time and resources to conduct the above-mentioned ‘means analysis’, it is important that the relevant feasibility study – something that will be explored in Lesson Seven – looks beyond official information provided by MoEs and examines what Holliday (1992) refers to as the ‘informal orders’, namely the unique features of the relevant education system, the realities of the teaching–learning situation and the relevant socio-cultural influences. It is also important that planners ensure – in line with Barrett’s (2010-b) suggestions – that there is an ongoing system of monitoring and evaluation so that challenges can be identified and changes made. No study was carried out prior to launching LETTS, and while there had been a feasibility study and pilot programme regarding the previously planned LETSS project (Finlayter, 2011), this had been based on a national face-to-face training programme delivered in a stable and secure Libya, and building organically upon the then ongoing LETUP project (Underhill, 2014), and bore no connection to the format and organisation of LETTS. Had a study been carried out, then I suspect it would have not recommended a
231 cascade programme. Indeed, the success of the BC’s ELT programme with Libya’s NBTVE, as detailed above, was partly due to it being informed by a full study (Schellekens, 2013) and a successful pilot (Malcolm, 2013), along with my team’s own informal information gathering, which led us to organise client-funded, face-to-face training, with a plan to hand over to BC-supported NBTVE educators in 2014–15.
Thirdly, both the LETTS experience and examples of successful ELT BC reform programmes such as LETUP (Underhill, 2014) and the Russian Textbook Project (Walter, 2012) show the importance of partnerships when working on educational reform programmes. As detailed in the micro-history, LETTS although intended to be a partnership never felt like one – neither the GCTED nor the wider MoE had either the capacity or the interest to engage with the BC, and so any reform programme would inevitably be to a degree imposed. Had a partnership been in place from the start or had one developed – as seemed likely for a brief period in 2013 – then this could have enabled an alternative approach to teacher training to be developed or for the BC to have provided the GCTED with the required technical support and resources to organise LETTS, recognising that this was an entirely new activity for the centre.
My view is that planners need to ensure that a partnership is developed with the relevant recipient ministry or institute from the programme’s planning stage onwards and if, as in Libya, this fails to develop due to interest and/or capacity-related issues, then other options for taking the programme forward must be explored – as they should have been in Libya, i.e. engaging with university faculties of education as opposed to the GCTED. Evidence that a properly managed partnership can ensure that a programme is introduced instead of being imposed can be seen through the example of the BC Peacekeeping English Projects, which, as Woods (2006), Crossey (2008) and Fletcher and Hare (2012) explain, were set up to introduce new systems of ELT, teacher training and assessment into the training departments of former Soviet bloc militaries. In most cases, these differed radically from recipients’ established approaches and so any attempt to simply impose these would have likely failed – as indeed happened with the US Defense School of Languages’ parallel attempt to encourage these militaries to adopt the audio-lingual American Language Course. However, through working in partnership with the recipient MoD’s military education departments and by initially covering most of the work and then gradually handing over activity, the BC delivered major ELT reform programmes in the militaries of most countries in the former Communist bloc.
Another example illustrating this approach at a more localised level and which can be
232 compared to Swale’s (1980) example of the English unit he set up at the University of Khartoum is my own experience in setting up that university’s English Language Institute in 2010–11. Swale’s establishment of the unit, while approved by the university authorities, was done unilaterally by his team and was, in a sense, ‘imposed’ upon the wider university, while my approach to setting up the ELI was different. From the outset, the project was a partnership between the BC, the university authorities and the various English departments, and the decision to establish an institute to provide specialist language, training and consultancy services to the university – while inspired by an initial scoping study by Griffiths (2009) – was the result of an ongoing process of engagement and negotiation, covering a number of the areas Holliday (1992) suggests examining via the ‘means analysis’. As a result, the ELI was opened in 2011 and, despite the BC’s technical and financial support being withdrawn in late 2012, has continued to develop and function to this day (Nur, 2017).
Lesson Five: Develop a sense of ownership
As well as minimising the risk of ‘tissue rejection’, working in partnership with the relevant recipient encourages a sense of ownership – a vital ingredient if a reform is to achieve sustainability and long-term impact. There are two levels to this that planners need to consider. The first involves getting the higher-level authorities in the MoE or relevant partner organisation to take ownership of the programme, particularly around allocating funding and resources, and developing the required policies and procedures. The second involves ensuring that all stakeholders, particularly at a local level, are involved in the reform and have a sense of owning it, as without this the chances of the initiative being implemented are low. LETTS, as I will explain below, provides an interesting example, as although little progress was made on the first level, there was a modest amount of progress regarding the second.
The importance of developing a sense of ownership regarding educational reform programmes is covered extensively by both general and ELT-specific literature sources. Traditionally, as Samoff (1996), Smith (2005) and Riddell and Nino-Zarazua (2016) argue, donor agencies have focused on delivering the relevant reform programmes and meeting their short-term objectives, and neglecting the question of the ownership of the initiative by the relevant partner. This, as Samoff argues in his 1996, 1999 and 2004 papers, encourages MoEs to become dependent upon such interventions and leads to a matching deterioration in their own sense of responsibility for reform and consequently a failure to maintain the systems and structures put into place once the relevant donor’s involvement and financial support ceases. Samoff proceeds to acknowledge that donors are beginning to understand
233 this and are changing their approaches by making ownership a key programme objective and linking reforms to sector-wide development programmes.
This is illustrated by Gillies (2010) in a major evaluation of US-funded educational reform programmes from 1990 to 2009. The writer presents ownership as one of the four central tenets in the delivery of successful programmes, arguing that national stakeholders must ‘own’ the reforms in order for the effects to be positive and for the achievement of the other three tenets – impact, sustainability and scaling up. This is also echoed in papers on the effectiveness of educational reform programmes by Riddell and Nino-Zarazua (2016), who suggest that fostering the local MoE’s sense of ownership and leadership of the reform is essential for sustainability to be achieved, by Smith (2005), who advises ensuring that reforms – and therefore ownership of them – remain manageable for ministries especially in terms of their technical and budgetary capabilities, and by Hashimoto and Hudson (2008), who stress that the ownership development process includes recipients being fully involved in programme evaluations and reviews.
In terms of ELT-related literature, writers tend to adopt similar positions to Hayes (2000) and Leather (2012) – discussing ELT reform programmes in Sri Lanka and Azerbaijan respectively – making similar points to those outlined above. Barrett (2010-a) and O’Donahue (2012) argue that a key reason why the BC was able to organise and deliver large-scale cascade programmes in India was due to the collaborative consultation, participatory planning and decision-making processes that took place between the BC and its government partners from the outset and which embedded into the programmes a strong sense of national ownership – a factor which has led to these programmes continuing to this day (British Council, 2017-b). Whereas Zikri (2012) describes how Egypt’s longest-running ELT programme – the 1975–91 Ain Shams University Curriculum Reform Programme, which was co-delivered by the BC and a consortium of US educational institutes – did not achieve the envisaged level of sustainability due to a failure to develop a sense of ownership among the relevant local partners and stakeholders, which in turn was the result of the expatriate team focusing on achieving results and neglecting to involve local staff members in decision- making and programme activities, along with a failure by the BC and its international partners to understand what was happening until it was too late.
Regarding the Peacekeeping English Project, arguably a major BC achievement in organising sustainable large-scale ELT reform programmes (Hay, 2010), individual projects were required – as Crossey (2008) explains – to provide evidence at certain stages of the project lifecycle that the relevant local partners were taking ownership of the reform process
234 through measures such as putting in place sustainable ELT policies and reliable and transparent testing procedures, and appointing specialist local staff. Failure to provide this information resulted in the relevant projects being reviewed by the project’s UK MoD/FCO sponsors. Indeed, Crossey touches on an ownership-related issue that BC ELT projects often have to face, namely that as well as with the relevant recipient partners, these projects also have to work on developing a sense of ownership among the relevant donor or sponsor in order to ensure client satisfaction and continued funding. In the Peacekeeping English Project’s case, this was the UK MoD and FCO, while Hayes (2000), describing the Sri Lanka Primary English Language Project, mentions how the project worked to ensure a sense of ownership within DFID, and Barrett (2010-a) and O’Donahue (2012), describing the management of the Indian cascade programmes, detail how UNICEF – which was co- funding the programmes – was fully involved in all relevant decision making.
Interestingly, a number of ELT-related papers focus on the importance of the above- mentioned second level of ownership, possibly because ELT project managers tend to be closer to the actual implementation process and possibly because most such managers – as in the case of myself – have previously held positions as teachers and teacher trainers on such activities. As writers including Bolitho (2012) and Kiely (2012) argue, teachers and teacher educators, while often the target of reform initiatives, are also the front-line change implementers, and so need to be involved in the programme from the earliest possible stage and inspired to take ownership of it. For example, Scholey (2012) details the introduction of a new English coursebook in Turkey’s vocational education sector. Teachers from across the country were involved in producing and piloting the book and then, with the BC’s support, were responsible for providing training and support to their peers in using it, while specific measures, including the production of a handbook in Turkish explaining the rationale for the new book, were taken to develop a sense of ownership among the heads of institutes and other key stakeholders. Furthermore, Scholey argues that a key factor in the programme’s success was the two-way flow of communication, which enabled issues at the implementation level to be communicated to the programme managers and swiftly dealt with, and which also ensured that local stakeholders knew they were playing full roles in the programme’s organisation.
Similar experiences are detailed by O’Donahue (2010) regarding the cascade training programmes she organised in India, in which she attributes their success to ensuring teachers, teacher educators and all other local stakeholders were communicated with, made aware of their roles and listened to and treated equally; and by Reilly (2012) and Hong (2012) who, when detailing their respective Spanish and Chinese programmes, argue that a
235 key factor in their interventions achieving their envisaged aims was an active policy of developing ownership among local stakeholders such as head teachers, local government officials, school inspectors and parents.
Indeed, it is interesting to compare such experiences to Wedell’s (2005) experience in China – detailed in Lesson Four – in which teachers and other local stakeholders were not involved in the reform process and which contributed to their resistance to the proposed changes. A similar example can be found with Dushku’s (1998) account of the BC’s ELT reform programme in Albania’s university sector in which she claims that one reason the initiative failed was because teachers and other local stakeholders were treated as ‘outsiders’ (p.382) in the decision-making process. Another can be found with Orafi’s (2008) account of the Libyan MoE’s abortive attempt to introduce the new English for Libya -based secondary school English curriculum in the early 2000s. The writer details how the MoE tried to impose the curriculum upon teachers via training sessions delivered by ministry officials, which led to the teachers refusing to attend the sessions as they felt it was not the place of the officials to tell them how to teach. As a result, the MoE was forced to organise for the sessions to be delivered by local university lecturers who knew little about the new curriculum and were generally opposed to it.
There is, however, as Stephenson (1994) argues, a danger of viewing the development of local stakeholder ownership as a straightforward process. In some contexts, the writer suggests, there may be socio-cultural issues around certain stakeholders, especially teachers, being involved in developing reform programmes and, particularly in contexts with strict top-down hierarchies, there may be resistance from officials or administrators. Stephenson goes on to argue that all local stakeholders need to be brought in to the relevant programme at an early stage, otherwise they will feel they are merely paying lip service to already agreed plans. Both issues, the writer argues, can be avoided through proper planning and the development of the appropriate participatory mechanisms. Furthermore, Stephenson also advises planners to ensure their own role in the reform programme is clear, as one barrier to developing ownership can be when the initiative is seen by partners and/or stakeholders as being primarily led by the relevant international assistance organisation and/or donor.
An obvious lesson from the LETTS experience is the importance of developing a sense of ownership among the relevant high-level authorities. As evidenced by the micro-history and the strands, this is something LETTS did not develop and a key reason the programme failed. Indeed, this is something I should have recognised at an earlier stage and taken steps
236 to address, possibly by involving the GCTED director more in the programme by asking for her ideas on LETTS’ content, design and focus as opposed to simply asking for her views on potential modes of delivery and scheduling. As a practising education professional, she could have had suggestions, and asking for and incorporating these into LETTS could have helped develop that sense of ownership that the programme needed.
In line with themes developed in previous lessons, planners need to find ways of checking that indications of a sense of ownership are genuine. For example, as in the case of LETTS, education ministers and other key officials saying that they support the reform may simply be the relevant individuals saying what they think people want to hear. However, as with the above-mentioned BC programmes with Libya’s vocational education sector, officials participating in planning meetings, actively taking an interest in programme events and providing funding and resources to support programme activities are all signs of a developing sense of ownership. Moreover, planners should not necessarily view potential stakeholders questioning and/or objecting to programme plans as a sign of resistance against ownership. As shown in McIlwraith’s 2008 report on the BC’s NATO-sponsored Professional Development Programme for Ukrainian MoD civil servants – in which there were regular disagreements between the BC and the local MoD on programme delivery – this can be a sign that stakeholders are developing a sense of ownership and with it opinions on the programme and how it should be delivered.
As noted above, developing ownership among teachers, educators and other local stakeholders is generally vital to a reform intervention’s success – indeed, Musset (2010) argues that a ‘bottom up’ (p.44) approach to reform based on local-level ownership can be more effective than one focusing on developing ownership among central government ministries. LETTS, I believe, as also noted above, did manage to implant a sense of ownership into such groups. The educators were fully involved in developing the format and content of the programme and making decisions about delivery styles and task types, and data from the focus groups and interviews indicated that they felt strongly about LETTS and were angered by the GCTED’s failure to support and develop it. Similarly, the local MoE officials that visited the 2013 courses took an active interest in the training – arguably more than the GCTED – and promised both the educators and teachers that they would support such activities in future.
On reflection, with LETTS it may have been a better way forward to focus on developing a sense of ownership among local stakeholders, including, in addition to those mentioned above, school inspectors and head teachers. If a sense of ownership had been developed at
237 a local level then it could have pressured the GCTED and wider MoE into providing the support LETTS needed. While this may sound fanciful, it is worth noting that, as shown in the micro-history, the post-Gaddafi Libyan government was both sensitive and responsive to grassroots pressure.
Whatever the possible outcomes for LETTS had the BC tried this approach, it is crucial that programme planners aim to develop a sense of ownership among local stakeholders. Along with Stephenson’s (1994) above-mentioned guidance, there are a number of papers providing guidance on how this can be achieved, including Wilson’s (2000), which states that stakeholders must view all aspects of programme planning, management and delivery as a participatory process; Hayes’ (2000), which suggests planners find ways to engage with key individuals, particularly educators, on an ongoing basis; and Gulyamova et al.’s (2014), which advises providing training and ongoing support to give stakeholders the skills and confidence to take ownership of the reform. However – and this would have been relevant had LETTS developed – Tribble (2009) recommends focusing on stakeholders who are going to be involved with the programme for the long term and who are committed to change, and ascertaining that these have the support of their relevant superiors.
Lesson Six: Linking in with wider reform
As detailed in the micro-history and the strands, LETTS was organised partly in response to the announcement by Libya’s MoE of the launch of a sector-wide school education reform programme – indeed, discussions with the ministry indicated that it was looking to the BC to provide the programme’s entire ELT component. The fact that this programme never took place is one reason why LETTS failed and, as I will explain, planners need to examine whether their particular reform initiative is taking place within a wider programme or if it is likely to act as a catalyst for further reform if delivered as planned. If the programme is likely to be more of a stand-alone affair, then planners should give due consideration to its chances of achieving long-term sustainability and genuine impact.
Regarding specific programmes being linked to wider sector reform, I could find little within the general literature on donor-supported educational reform, largely because writers tend to focus on sector-wide approaches – often referred to as SWaPs – as opposed to more focused programmes such as LETTS. SWaPs tend to involve the relevant international donors and national governments working together on developing, implementing and funding large-scale unified reform programmes under the relevant recipient government’s leadership and covering the entire education sector, including pre-school, higher and
238 vocational education, and all relevant components, such as planning, quality assurance, curriculum development and in-service training. The merits and demerits of this approach, which gained popularity in the 1990s and 2000s, are strongly debated, with writers such as Riddell and Nino-Zarazua (2016) arguing that it encourages national ownership, builds capacity and, as governments are responsible for the disbursement of funding, develops recipients’ accountability and transparency procedures, as well as maximising the utilisation of donor funds and resources. Others, such as Boak and Ndaruhutse (2011), Smith (2005) and Buchert (2002), suggest that national governments often struggle to coordinate donor support, certain donors continue to pursue specific project agendas which can lead to support being fragmented, and the focus on the allocation of funding and resources is often at the expense both of technical support – which for a lot of countries is more important – and of engaging local stakeholders such as teachers, educators and parents, upon which reform ultimately depends.
Within ELT-related literature, the concept of sector-wide reform programmes is used more loosely. This is largely because, I suspect – as mentioned in Lesson Five – the relevant writers are often practising or former ELT trainers and/or consultants, and their papers are connected with programmes delivered by the BC and other international assistance organisations such as Windle Trust (Simpson, 2011) and the EDT (Thomson, 2009). These organisations approach such activities at a delivery-implementation level as opposed to donors who operate on a more strategic and political level – indeed organisations like the BC are often employed by donors for the programme delivery side. For example, BC initiatives which have been referred to as sector-wide include the Peacekeeping English Project (Woods, 2006), which adopted a sector-wide reform of ELT in project countries’ relevant military and/or state security sectors; the Burmese English for Education College Trainers Project, which focused on developing approaches to ELT and training throughout Burma’s pre-service teacher education sector (British Council, 2014; British Council, 2016-b) and the Rwanda English in Action Project, which, as Simpson (2012) explains, supported the introduction of EMI in the Rwandan school system.
Within this literature, there is evidence to support the assertion that programmes achieve much better results when linked to or running in parallel with reform taking place within the wider sector. For example, Wedell (2012), drawing upon the example of an Omani reform programme delivered by the University of Leeds to provide local teachers of English with BAs in TESOL, argues that a key reason for its success was it being part of a ‘whole-system’ (p.174) change, in which similar pedagogical changes were being introduced to teaching and learning across all school curriculum subjects. This meant that teachers’ studies were
239 complemented by changes in the English curriculum and assessment system, and the reforms were supported by a general culture of innovation and change within Oman’s MoE. Kelly (2015) describes how an initiative to introduce the BC’s LearnEnglish Connect blended-learning product into Morocco’s higher education sector was supported by the introduction of English as a compulsory subject for all STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) undergraduates at Moroccan universities. Furthermore, in a separate paper, Kelly (2016) proceeds to explain that the Moroccan Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training’s Vision for 2030 (Naaim, 2014) plan’s decision to introduce a baccalaureate system as part of an overall aim to raise the standard of school education enabled the BC and ministry to launch the ongoing English Baccalaureate Project (Kelly and Hooper, 2016).
Moreover, Hardman et al. (2011) provide examples of large-scale Kenyan and Ugandan in- service training programmes which encompassed teachers of all subjects and were supported by reforms in other parts of the education system. This, the writers argue, led to both programmes achieving their objectives and to overall improvements in both countries’ standard of basic education. The writers then contrast these examples with Tanzania, where failures to make in-service training fully encompassing and to introduce reforms in areas such as curriculum and assessment meant that the training’s objective – to introduce learner-based approaches into teachers’ classroom practices – largely failed. A comparable example can be found in Law’s (2011) account of the cascade programme in Syria which was organised following requests from the Syrian government to the UK and US – who jointly funded the programme – for assistance with ELT reform. Despite MoE declarations of its intention to overhaul the education sector and to prioritise English, the ministry made no attempt to introduce further reforms – including the introduction of a new English curriculum on which the programme depended. As a result, although the programme achieved its goal of training up a national team of 80 teacher educators – known as supervisors – once it finished, all training ceased and a later review concluded it had had no long-term impact.
Several papers report on how specific reforms essentially kick-started further and more wide-ranging reforms – indeed, Hayes (2012) suggests that any large-scale reform is likely to send out ripples into the wider education system. For example, Gulyamova et al. (2014) explain how an in-service training programme for university teachers in Uzbekistan led to the introduction of a new curriculum for pre-service teachers of English and contributed to a decision by the government to make English a compulsory subject from primary school to university. Likewise, as papers and reports by Fisher (2016), Nusrat (2015) and the British Council (2015-b) explain, the PEELI project, launched to support the introduction of EMI into
240 the primary and secondary education sectors in Punjab State through large-scale cascade teacher training programmes also led to professional development programmes for head teachers and education managers, improvements in the education system’s quality assurance mechanisms and the launching of curriculum and assessment-related reform initiatives.
Drawing upon the LETTS experience, I believe that planners when designing a reform programme need to establish whether there are reforms taking place in the wider sector and to go beyond ministerial announcements and examine what measures are actually being put in place. In Libya, as detailed in the strands, there was no overall general education sector reform programme, and the measures that were being brought in, such as importing overseas curriculums and sending staff on training abroad (UNICEF, 2013), could not be classed as sustainable structural reforms. This can be contrasted with the BC’s above- mentioned experience in Libya’s vocational education sector where an overall reform programme was in place (Schellekens, 2013), thus enabling the organisation of a series of BC training and capacity-building initiatives. I would also advise planners to look at reform plans throughout the wider education sector, as there may be links between reforms in different sectors. For example, reform in the general education sector can act as a catalyst for reform in the higher education sector, particularly around pre-service teacher training, as in the above-mentioned Uzbek programme, and in other areas such as school leaving/ university entrance exams, as in the case of the 2008–14 World Bank project to establish a national education assessment system in Tajikistan (World Bank, 2014). Linking in with Lesson One, there may also be reforms within the wider state sector which can support education reform. The Peacekeeping English Project, for example, was successful in countries such as the Baltic States and Poland (Crossey, 2012) largely because it was part of these countries’ militaries’ general transition from their existing Soviet models to ones based on those of their new NATO allies. Similarly, Bardi’s (2012) PROSPER (Project for Special Purpose English in Romania) project, which aimed to develop English for Specific Purposes in the tertiary sector, was supported by moves by Romania’s government to increase English proficiency within key parts of the state sector.
If there is no wider reform programme – or, more to the point, one that is relevant – then planners need to establish if their own particular initiative is likely to act as a catalyst for further change. This would most likely involve planners conducting their own research into areas outlined in previous lessons, such as the government’s plans for education, the MoE’s or relevant partner’s commitment to reform, its capacity to support reform and whether these plans can be realised at grassroots level. Planners familiar with the relevant context should
241 also be ready to draw upon their own judgement. For example, my decision in late 2014 to launch the BC’s Skype-based Teacher Training Programme for Libyan Universities (Rudd, 2015) was taken largely on my own calculation that universities, in the absence of a national and properly functioning MoHE, would welcome the opportunity to engage unilaterally with the BC, and that it would pave the way for wider collaboration. This judgement proved correct and the programme led to projects to reform university ELT departments (Borg, 2016) and to redefine universities’ relationship with the MoHE (Morgan, 2016). In addition to this and the above-mentioned PEELI project, in the BC’s recent history there have been a number of programmes which have kick-started further reform. For example, the Vietnamese government’s National Foreign Languages Project 2020 (Baker, 2012) was launched partly due to the BC’s Primary Innovations Project and a number of other small-scale ELT projects.
One issue planners working in aid-dependent contexts ought to consider is that even if the chances of a national government embarking on wider education reform are limited, it still may be worth organising programme activity in order to position planners’ relevant organisation to secure future donor-funded opportunities. Griffiths (2009) in her report on ELT opportunities in Sudan argues that delivering programme activity strengthens the organisation’s position as a source of ELT and/or educational expertise within the context and provides evidence of its ability to deliver on the ground, which can then be used to support a bid or proposal to an international donor. For example, one reason for the launch of the Sudanese KSTTP and other initiatives such as the Sudanese English Teachers’ Forum (Godfrey, 2011) and the training of university teacher educators project (Gray, 2010) was – in line with the aims of the BC English for Sudan strategy that the Country Director and I developed in 2009 (Weyers, 2009) – to position the BC as Sudan’s leading authority on English and the partner of choice for donors regarding ELT reform. These investments came to fruition in 2014–15 when the BC secured a contract to organise the English Language Curriculum Reform Project, which produced a modern English curriculum for the basic and secondary school sectors (British Council, 2017-c), and in 2016 when it won an EU-funded project to improve the quality of mathematics, science and English language teaching in Sudan’s education system (British Council, 2018), with a particular focus on education for refugees and internally displaced people. Similar recent examples include the DFID-funded Tanzanian Education Quality Improvement Project for English Language Teacher Training (Tayler, 2013) and the EU-funded Language and Academic Skills and e-Learning Resources Project (Field, 2016) for Syrian refugees in Jordan, both of which were obtained on the back of BC-funded teacher training programmes in the relevant countries.
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Lesson Seven: Assess in advance whether the programme will work
A recurring message throughout this section has been the importance of planners conducting some sort of study into the relevant context prior to launching a reform programme. Such a study would be guided by the preceding six lessons, by planners’ established approaches to carrying out data gathering and by any factors specific to the envisaged programme. It could be conducted on a general level to provide the relevant international assistance organisation and recipient partners with an overview of the state of ELT and/or general education, along with details of the priorities and opportunities for ELT and/or wider educational reform. It could also be conducted regarding a specific programme, with the focus more on the resources the organisation and recipient would need to have in place, potential challenges and risks, and what the key milestones and key success factors – to borrow two of the BC’s currently ‘in-vogue’ terms – are likely to be.
The organisation of this type of study is discussed by Johnstone (2010) and Patel (2012), who refer to it as a ‘feasibility study’ (Johnstone: p.112; Patel: p.133) and suggest that this should be one of the first steps in any programme-planning exercise. This is echoed by Winters (2014), who argues that not doing a feasibility study can be, in the long run, more costly in terms of time and money, as unforeseen challenges will invariably emerge causing plans to veer off track and leading to delays, replanning and reorganisation. Carfax – a leading international education consultancy – states that the relevant study should be based on good practice and be specifically tailored to the context and the planned programme’s aims, time frame and available resources, and depending upon requirements can cover all relevant areas from educational infrastructures to availability of local programme staff to estimates of potential costs (Carfax Education Projects, 2017).
Most donors and assistance organisations carry out some sort of study prior to launching programme activity. International donors, such as DFID and USAID, require studies – sometimes referred to as ‘scoping studies’ – to be carried out as part of the programme’s conception stage, the first step in the so-called ‘project delivery cycle’ (British Council, 2015- c). The BC’s standard approach regarding potential ELT reform programmes is to carry out a general sector-wide review such as Fortune’s (2014) examination of ELT in Iraq’s education sector and Griffiths’ (2009) on Sudan’s. This type of review, as with Jacobson’s (2003) examination of ELT activity in India, can also be used to gauge the status and measure the impact of BC ELT programmes in particular countries and to use this information to inform future activities. Sector reviews are also used as ways of informing potential recipient partners about their ELT needs and of strengthening relations with the BC. For example,
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Schellekens’ (2013) review of ELT in Libya’s vocational education was funded and organised jointly by the BC and the NBTVE and helped consolidate the two organisations’ existing partnership.
Studies can also be used to inform and support proposals for donor-funded projects. Examples include Wilkins’ (2010) study on the feasibility of establishing a Southern Sudanese Institute of Education – intended to function as a centre of excellence regarding South Sudan’s training of teachers – which was aimed at securing UNICEF funding for a joint BC and University of London project to develop the institute. They also include Woods’ (2009) study of ELT in the Sudanese military, which was designed as part of a submission to the UK MoD for funding for a Peacekeeping English Project Sudan. In some situations, a general review may be followed by a specific project-related study. For example, the Burmese 2012–14 Comprehensive Education Sector Review (Relief Web, 2012), which the BC co-organised with Burma’s MoE, highlighted the need for reform in the pre-service education sector. Therefore, a study focusing on this specific area (Clifford et al., 2014) was carried out and submitted as part of a proposal to Burma’s Ministry of Education and DFID, who agreed to co-fund the initiative, which led to the above-mentioned BC Burmese English for Education College Trainers Project (British Council, 2014; British Council, 2016-b).
Patel (2012) suggests that following the study, planners should further ensure programme viability by running a small-scale pilot, which, if closely monitored and properly evaluated, can highlight areas of strength and concern, and bring to light elements that may have been overlooked. Patel proceeds to state that the highlighted issues can then inform the programme at a national level, arguing that it is easier and less costly to modify planning documents than trying to change a large-scale project that is already up and running. Indeed, in a number of cases, for example in higher education programmes in China (China British Business Council, 2016) and Ukraine (PonINTU, 2015), the BC has used small-scale pilot projects as a way of informing the design and delivery of future large-scale national programmes. In addition to this, Borovikova (2010) and Walter (2012), writing about ELT reform projects in Russia in the 2000s, argue that piloting provides an opportunity to begin developing relations with local stakeholders, and to start embedding the initiative within the relevant local systems. However, Turner (2015) – using the example of the BC’s Skype- based training programme for Libyan university teachers – cautions against over-relying on pilots, as they often take place in the optimum setting and unforeseen problems can emerge when activity takes place in less accommodating locations. In the case of this particular programme, it was piloted in Libya’s NCML, a modern, well-equipped, Tripoli-based centre
244 staffed by UK-trained professionals, and, according to Turner, failed to prepare the BC for the challenges of delivering it in universities in eastern and southern Libya.
The LETTS experience demonstrates the importance of planners conducting a thorough study of the ELT and/or general educational situation within the relevant context. The reform programmes I managed to deliver in Sudan and Libya were informed by the above- mentioned studies by Griffiths (2009), Schellekens (2013) and Borg (2014), yet the only reports I examined while developing my plans for LETTS were Finlayter’s (2011) paper on the proposed LETSS project, which was carried out in pre-Revolutionary Libya for a different programme, and Watkins’ (2011) and Darn’s (2012) reports on the Sudanese KSTTP, upon which LETTS was modelled. On reflection, what was required was a review of ELT in Libya’s general education sector based around a comprehensive set of terms of reference and with a number of set deliverables – possibly with a focus on the viability of a teacher training programme. This could have provided data on the issues raised by the previous six lessons, outlined the relevant opportunities and challenges and provided a road map for future activity. Although it is debatable whether the MoE would have engaged as required, the EDT (UNICEF, 2013) did manage to carry out an extensive review of the general education sector in partnership with the GCTED and so it may have been possible. Furthermore, if the GCTED and wider MoE had failed to engage, then this would have acted as a clear warning against proceeding any further.
Similarly, LETTS underlines the importance of organising a small-scale pilot prior to any major reform programme. While, as mentioned in the micro-history, the Tripoli-based phase of LETTS was intended be an initial pilot that would then inform the programme’s extension to the rest of Libya, this, with hindsight, was just a general idea. It was not time-bound and there was no attempt to review or evaluate this phase and to then use the results to further develop the programme. Instead there was an assumption that LETTS would simply be a huge success. As a result, despite examining LETTS on an ongoing basis via my research diary and discussions with my team, other colleagues and MoE contacts, particularly the educators, its progress was never formally reviewed against any set criteria. If I had applied such procedures to LETTS, it is likely that, as discussed in the strands, the issues regarding the programme would have been articulated and identified, and it could have been curtailed earlier or developed into something more viable and sustainable.
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The lessons from LETTS and the notion of context
The lessons as a whole point to the need for continued change in the way educational reform programmes are organised and managed. Previously, particularly in the 1970s, 80s and 90s, most education reform programmes were guided by the idea that they involved the transmission and transfer of knowledge, skills and resources from developed countries, such as the UK, to developing countries. Examples of this can be seen in papers detailed earlier in this study, including those by Andrews (1984), Zikri (2012) and Holliday (1992). The general principle behind this was that developed countries knew best what sort of education systems countries the developing world needed, and this explains why most educational assistance programmes were centred around implanting models based on education systems in the UK and in other Western countries. The lessons reaffirm the fact – increasingly recognised in recent years by both TESOL and more general literature on education reform – that this approach is ineffective and seldom results in the relevant reform leading to genuine systemic change, and that, in many cases, the approach rarely has any long-term impact.
Another idea that is also shown to be flawed – even though it still persists within organisations like the BC – is that an educational reform initiative that has been effectively delivered and has achieved its aims in one context is likely to be just as successful in another context, particularly if there are some similarities between the two. While in such cases programme planners usually try to adapt the initiative to suit the context – as I did when trying to replicate the Sudanese NTTP with LETTS in Libya – the reform’s overall aims and structure, along with its guiding principles, remain the same. This explains why, as evidenced on a number of occasions, the BC has achieved mixed success with cascade teacher training programmes. This mixed success is consistent with published research and reports on cascade programmes, including studies showing success in certain contexts, such as India (see O’Donahue’s 2010 and 2012 papers), Russia (see Borovikova’s 2012 paper) and Pakistan (see the British Council reports 2015-b and 2016-a), and effective lack of success in others, such as Syria (see Law’s 2011 paper) and Libya.
Furthermore, both the above-detailed ideas are underlined by the principle that in all education programmes there is an ‘us and them’ relationship between the relevant recipient local partner and the international assistance organisation, and that the latter knows best and it is the former’s role to defer to this and to provide the international assistance organisation with what support is required. This can be seen by the fact that these
246 organisations often employ international consultants with titles such as ‘key experts’ or ‘advisors’ – indeed, my job title in Sudan in 2009–12 was English Language Advisor. It can also be seen that in the event of a reform programme failing to achieve its goals, there is sometimes a tendency to attribute this more to shortcomings within the local partner than to the fact that the initiative was inappropriate for the context from the start. Law’s (2011) paper on the Syrian cascade programme provides a good example of this.
In moving away from the established approaches to organising educational reform, the lessons highlight the fact that in all reform initiatives the priority for planners needs to be understanding both the local context and the relevant local partners, along with examining the suitability and workability of the ideas proposed. At the same time, the lessons are not proposing simply asking potential partners what they want and trying to meet their requests and wishes. Often, partners will have unrealistic expectations of what reforms can achieve, particularly in the short term, and will – as in Libya’s case – expect international assistance organisations to simply ‘fix’ their education systems without any real contribution from themselves. This is something that programme planners need to be aware of and to prepare for, along with the fact that the local partners may have even less awareness of what their reform needs are than the planners, or what sort of support their existing systems are able to provide in the way of facilitation.
In view of the above, what the lessons learned suggest is a need for programme planners to enter into a process of dialogue and negotiation with local partners, and for both sides to collectively decide on the most appropriate way forward regarding the reform. This requires each side to see the initiative through the eyes of the other. It is particularly important that both sides find middle ground in understanding what sort of reform initiative is most suitable for the context, how it can be achieved within the relevant systems and contextual constraints, and what contributions are required from both sides. This will deal with the challenges identified in Lessons One to Four, and will build the insights of Lesson Five ‘Develop a sense of ownership’ into the reform programme plan. This process will also enable both sides to consider how the programme fits into the wider situation regarding innovation and change within the relevant education sector, and how it can support and/or be supported by other initiatives taking place, thus applying the ideas outlined in Lesson Six. If the proposed programme is the only reform initiative taking place, then both sides should reflect on its appropriateness and what further innovations are likely to be required to ensure the reform achieves its aims.
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In connection with the above, neither side should adopt a simplified view of the reform process and assume that it will be straightforward. As implied in the lessons, education reform programmes, particularly those in post-conflict and/or fragile states, are likely to face an array of challenges, and so commitment and resilience are required from both sides. Applying the ideas outlined in Lesson Seven, including conducting a feasibility study and organising an initial pilot, will contribute to both sides entering the programme with realistic expectations. The expectation, then, is for both partners to participate actively in both activities, for the results of this preliminary work to be examined and disseminated as required and that ideas or lessons emerging from this work are acted upon appropriately. Working together on these activities will build mutual trust and respect, enable each side to further understand the other’s way of thinking and working, and, if required, lead to further negotiation around issues such as expectations, ownership and contributions, and thus support the development of the strong collaborative partnership that is required for the reform programme’s ultimate success.
To conclude this chapter, it is worth looking back to the literature review’s conclusion on pages 28-29, and my experiences regarding the extent lessons from previous reform programmes regarding the importance of context have been taken on board by contemporary programme planners. A number of the issues I highlighted – such as the BC’s continued assumption that a successful reform programme in one context can be replicated in a similar one – have been touched up earlier in this section. However, there is also the issue of the time spent on the planning stage. As mentioned on page 29, planners are often based in a BC office, posted in-country for relatively limited periods of time and under pressure to deliver as quickly as possible. Thus, even when there is genuine dialogue and negotiation between planners and local partners, the time devoted to this is limited. Indeed, most of the planning period is often taken up with what can best be described as ‘BC bureaucracy’. What is required is a much longer period of time for discussions with the relevant partners. This would give planners more time to understand the local partners’ ideas and agendas – and vice versa. In the case of differences in perceptions, this would increase the likelihood of appropriate opportunities for further negotiations to be built into the actual programme delivery phase. In the next chapter, I will suggest that the BC adopt a more systematic approach to sharing information regarding reform planning experiences, throughout its network. This, I will suggest, can be drawn upon by planners and used to inform and guide the relevant negotiations, particularly regarding the areas that need to be covered and pitfalls planners need to avoid.
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Chapter 6: Where do we go from here?
As outlined at the start of Part 3, to conclude this study I decided to detail how I believe the main protagonists in the LETTS experience need to move forward following this study’s results. I identified three protagonists: the British Council, the Libyan MoE and myself as both the main BC lead and the researcher conducting this study.
Regarding the British Council, I have two interrelated suggestions. Firstly, there needs to be more dissemination of information on reform initiatives such as LETTS so that project teams throughout the BC network can draw upon experiences and lessons learned when planning their own programmes. At present, there is no visible way forward for this study’s findings to be shared internally, apart from a summary piece in an internal bulletin and circulating the study among colleagues and then saving it to the BC English Sharepoint Intranet site where it will be occasionally accessed by colleagues fortunate enough to enter the right search terms. This, I suspect, is what has happened to most of the unpublished BC reports I came across, such as Tribble’s (2009) collection of case studies and Fortune’s (2014) report on ELT in Iraq, a number of which I found sitting in randomly created folders only after several search attempts. Similarly, as mentioned in this study’s foreword, while conducting a global review of BC ELT programmes in 2016–17, I was taken aback firstly by the number of programmes being delivered and secondly by the fact that there were similar programmes being delivered in different parts of the world and, in certain cases, experiencing the same challenges, yet there was little communication or sharing of experiences among country teams.
Although this situation needs to change, putting in place an effective system for disseminating information within the BC is a challenge due to issues around resourcing and management – something exemplified by the number of previous and short-lived attempts to do this. A further challenge lies with country teams’ limited capacity to compile the required information and a reluctance to report on programmes which have partly or wholly failed to achieve their intended objectives. My preferred solution would be to establish a dedicated full-time middle management post to ensure that all relevant programmes are being logged, to work with country teams on obtaining all required information and to compile this in an actively managed information bank. Although this will require funding, in the long term I believe it will deliver savings, as less time and money will be lost through programmes failing or underachieving after repeating the same mistakes as previous initiatives.
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In connection with this, country teams must ensure they build a phase into the programme- planning process which involves reviewing similar initiatives and applying the relevant lessons learned. Although – as was the case with LETTS – teams are often under pressure to start delivery, nowadays they are required to follow certain procedures regarding planning and costing programmes, and a review phase could easily be incorporated into these. However, for this to be achieved it is important that the required information is available and accessible, and that teams, who are not always led by ELT or education-specialised project managers, are supported in drawing upon the information to inform their programme. This is a role the above-mentioned middle management post could also cover.
Concerning Libya’s Ministry of Education, it is more challenging to recommend a concrete way forward as the country’s future development remains uncertain. Since I left in mid 2014, Libya has been mired in an ongoing state of internal conflict, economic collapse and political deadlock, and despite recent achievements – namely the 2016 establishment of an internationally recognised government in Tripoli (Amara, 2016) – it is unlikely this situation will change in the short to mid term. Moreover, as the UK Ambassador remarked when interviewed for this study, when stability does return, the existing problems within the education system will still need to be tackled ‘and all the same problems are going to arise (in the education system ); there’s not going to be a panacea’, and, as evidenced by this study, this will involve a complex long-term reform programme.
My view is that in line with ideas discussed earlier in this part of the study, this will only be achievable if there is strong and capable leadership – within both the MoE and the wider government – along with genuine commitment to reform, a willingness to make unpopular decisions and a whole-sector reform plan. Ironically, the fact that the MoE will be in a less- advantageous position financially than it was in 2012 may be beneficial, as it will not be in a position to behave as it did previously, for example sending staff on overseas training and continuing to employ excess numbers of teachers, and will have to take steps to cut costs and improve efficiencies.
At the time of writing, it is probable that the BC will be involved in a future reform initiative. There is regular communication between the internationally recognised government’s MoE and the BC Libya, and there are several national ELT programmes established during my time as ELT Manager which have continued to this day, most notably the Skype-based teacher training programme for university teachers and Teach English Radio, and this has continued to buoy the BC’s position as Libya’s leading authority on English. However, due to funding constraints and changing policy objectives, it is unlikely that the BC will be in a
250 position to launch a programme such as LETTS, and its involvement will either be based around donor-funded activity or will be restricted to providing advice and small-scale training activities. Furthermore, my advice to the relevant BC manager who leads on this will be to carefully consider the lessons I learned from LETTS, particularly around ascertaining the programme’s likelihood of achieving its envisaged objectives prior to deploying any significant amount of time and resources, and ensuring that the MoE is held to account for meeting its obligations and commitments.
In terms of my own professional development as an educational project manager, undertaking this study has, in particular, highlighted the pitfalls of rushing into organising programmes in response to internal and external pressures, over-relying on presumptions based on my own ideas and past experiences, and adopting a programme delivery strategy based around relying on things turning out all right in the end, especially if there is no immediate alternative. In line with this, it has raised my awareness of the importance of thorough planning and preparation, particularly examining wider contextual issues, clarifying partners’ expectations and putting in place conditions to ensure programme success. It has also shown the imperativeness of dealing with challenges quickly and appropriately, even if this puts the programme at risk and/or involves adopting a radically different approach. Indeed, I have applied these ideas in a number of post-LETTS programmes, most recently in my new position as Deputy Director Iraq, when I put a potential large-scale secondary school reform programme in Kurdistan on hold due to issues around partner funding and the viability of certain objectives.
Regarding the further development of this study, I have already discussed with the BC Research and Publications team the possibility of publishing it as a BC research publication or as a book. Plans are still in the preliminary stages and it is likely the content will need more work, for example the micro-history could benefit from the links between wider events in Libya and LETTS being made more explicit. However, this is something I intend to take forward before LETTS becomes too dated. I also plan to write an internal BC paper summarising my findings and recommendations, including my calls for more systematic approaches to reviewing and sharing information on reform programmes. In terms of building upon the study’s findings, I feel that a logical step could be to examine an apparently successful, large-scale, high-impact programme and to look at the key reasons for its success, as well as whether the programme’s delivery led to the envisaged long-term changes.
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Appendix 1: Timeline of key stages and events in LETTS and the study
Date Stage/event 2012, January Libyan government announces intention to organise large-scale reform of school education sector. Priorities include removing the Gaddafi-era curriculum – guided by the late dictator’s political ideologies – and improving teaching of mathematics, science and English language. 2012, February Ministry of Education officially requests assistance of British Council in reforming English language teaching in school sector. 2012, April Researcher arrives in Libya to take up the position of English Language Teaching Manager. 2012, May Researcher meets Director of the General Centre for Teacher Education and Development (GCTED) – the MoE department responsible for in-service teacher training in the school education sector. British Council and GCTED agree to work together on Libyan English Teacher Training Scheme (LETTS) to provide in- service training to teachers of English in secondary school sector. The programme and the obligations of both parties to be formalised in a Memorandum of Understanding between the British Council and the GCTED. 2012, June Memorandum of Understanding signed between British Council and GCTED. 2012, June GCTED director resigns to pursue political career. New Centre Director is former school inspector and teacher from Eastern Libya with a reputation for being progressive and forward-looking. 2012, July First meeting with new GCTED director. British Council and GCTED agree to organise the educator training course in October. 2012, September GCTED claims it cannot organise for teachers to be released to attend the training course. GCTED also claims it cannot cover cost of course refreshments, despite the centre committing to do this in the Memorandum of Understanding. 2012, September– Large response (over 200 applications) to advertisements posted in October schools for teachers interested in becoming teacher educators.
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When selecting trainees, international trainers express concern regarding applicants’ English levels and pedagogical awareness. 2012, October Educator training course takes place. Trainees divided into two groups of 28. Focus groups are organised. Focus groups reveal most trainees applied for the training believing it would be an English language course. Focus groups and feedback from international trainers reveal that majority of trainees are not at a level where they can become teacher educators. Twenty trainees are viewed as having potential to become educators with more training. GCTED takes little interest in course. 2012, November– Approaches and Methodologies course is organised to provide December further input to selected potential teacher educators. One focus group takes place during this course. Fourteen trainees are viewed as being potential educators and their names forwarded to the GCTED. GCTED fails to provide a venue for the training and takes less interest in the course than in the previous training. 2012, December Researcher (wearing his English Language Teaching Manager hat) meets GCTED director and sets out series of options for delivering teacher training courses in Tripoli in line with the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding. Researcher explains it is up to the GCTED to lead on this. 2012, December English Project Manager arrives in Tripoli to support the English Projects Team. 2013, January–March No communication from GCTED regarding LETTS. 2013, March At a reception to mark the first national English language teaching conference since the Revolution, the GCTED director informs the researcher that the centre is still interested in working on LETTS later in the year. Also at the reception, the researcher meets the Deputy Minister for Education, who has no idea about LETTS or any of the other projects the British Council is trying to organise with the education sector. 2013, April Researcher organises Practical Teacher Training Course for the 14 teacher educators to give them experience of training actual teachers. Course is received positively by the educators who – through a focus group and informal conversations with the researcher – claim that their skills and confidence as teacher
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educators have improved. GCTED is informed about the course, but takes no interest in it. 2013, June GCTED informs British Council it is planning to organise four one- week long intensive training courses using eight of the teacher educators at the end of the month (two educators per course). GCTED requests British Council’s support in preparing the educators and providing the materials, stationery and refreshments, with the GCTED paying the educators and providing the venues. GCTED states that these courses will be a pilot and if successful further courses will be organised. 2013, June Courses are delivered as planned. Educators manage well and the training is perceived positively by the participating teachers. GCTED takes an interest in the training. Several issues emerge, particularly around teachers being informed about and/or selected for the training, but these are viewed by the British Council as being relatively minor and resolvable. One focus group is organised following these courses. 2013, July GCTED informs British Council that it was pleased with the courses – especially the positive feedback from the teachers and educators – and is planning to have another set of courses in August– September. There will be six courses (using 12 of the teacher educators) running for two weeks and it needs the British Council’s support as before. GCTED promises to address the issues that emerged in the previous training courses. 2013, August– Courses are delivered. As before, the educators manage well and September the training is perceived positively by the trainees. Problems that emerged during first set of courses are not tackled by GCTED. GCTED appears to take less interest in these than in previous courses. One course is cancelled after no teachers attend. Issues emerge with educators’ payments for these and for previous courses. Security issues in Tripoli obstruct British Council’s efforts to monitor and support the training. 2013, September– GCTED contacts British Council regarding organising a national in- October service training programme by the end of the year. GCTED states it has the funding and requests a costed proposal from the British Council as soon as possible. The proposal is submitted within a
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week. The GCTED acknowledges receipt of the proposal and promises to respond in the near future. 2013, October– GCTED does not respond to the proposal. Attempts to contact and November meet with the GCTED director prove futile. In mid November, British Council Country Director advises researcher not to waste any more time pursuing this and to focus on other activities. 2013, November Researcher takes the decision to reorientate the study into one looking at the reasons for LETTS’ limited success and the lessons that can be learned from this. As a first step, the researcher decides to start interviewing key individuals involved with LETTS (i.e. the GCTED director) and other individuals who – while not directly involved with the programme – are able to comment on the wider reasons for the programme’s lack of success (i.e. the former head of the Educational Development Trust in Libya). 2013, November In an interview, GCTED director claims that she feels LETTS has been a success and is planning to continue with the programme in 2014. The director admits that the GCTED was under a lot of pressure from the Ministry of Education to deliver large-scale programme activity and is struggling to meet the ministry’s demands due to capacity- and security-related issues. 2013, November – Series of interviews conducted with education sector officials, 2014, April British Council staff, teacher educators and former head of the Educational Development Trust in Libya reveals that GCTED has been spending large amounts of money sending teachers and other Ministry of Education staff abroad. They also reveal that the GCTED director has faced considerable challenges in running the centre, including strikes by her staff and criticisms from the Ministry of Education’s senior leadership. Furthemore, the interviews indicate that the ministry did not view training teachers as a priority and had no proper overall education reform programme. 2014, April Following an extensive literature review, the researcher decides the best way forward is to write a micro-historical narrative of LETTS. The researcher starts work on a draft which encompasses the events from 2012 up until the then present. Researcher will continue working on this draft until the end of 2014. 2014, April New Deputy Minister of Education brings ray of hope for LETTS.
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Minister states that the ministry needs the British Council’s help in developing English language teaching in schools and education in general. Minister agrees to support the relaunch of LETTS. 2014, May Deputy Minister agrees to order the GCTED to engage with the British Council on LETTS and to look at how the centre could work with regional and local education authorities, and head teachers to develop the programme and extend it beyond the capital. However, it is unlikely this will be achieved until the autumn due to Ramadan and other commitments on both the Minister's and British Council’s part. 2014, July Tripoli descends into chaos as the country descends into a state of civil war. Following the destruction of Tripoli International Airport, the British Council evacuates all international staff and temporarily ceases operations. This effectively ends any chance of LETTS being launched. 2014, October Interview with UK Ambassador for Libya takes place in Tunisia. This is the last interview carried out for the study. 2014, December – Researcher works on finalising the micro-history. This answers 2015, December Research Question 1 ‘How did LETTS unfold over time in Libya in 2012–14?’ Researcher begins conducting the data analysis using a historical methods approach. 2015, December – Researcher completes the data analysis and interpretation. 2016, July Researcher uses this to develop the strands section of the study. This answers Research Question 2 ‘What could be viewed as the principal reasons for LETTS’ limited success and its eventual failure?’ 2016, July – Drawing upon the strands, researcher completes the Lessons 2017, June Learned section of the study. This answers Research Question 3 ‘What are the lessons that the LETTS experience provides for programme planners working in developing countries similar to Libya?’ 2017, August Researcher submits draft thesis for review to supervisors at the University of Manchester 2017, September Researcher makers a number of amendments to the thesis based on feedback from the supervisors 2017, October Researcher submits thesis
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Appendix 2: Researcher’s / British Council ELT Manager’s main biographical details
Date Position held 1993–1994 Volunteer, Cresset House, Midrand, South Africa 1994–1995 Retail Assistant, Freeport Shopping Village, Fleetwood, UK 1995–1996 Teacher of English, Valmiera First Secondary School, Valmiera, Latvia 1996–1997 Teacher of English, Kuressaare Grammar School, Kuressaare, Estonia 1997–2004 Teacher of English. British Council Teaching Centre, St Petersburg, Russia 2004–2006 Consultant/Teacher Trainer, British Council Peacekeeping English Project, Lviv Army Institute, Lviv, Ukraine 2006–2009 Project Manager, British Council Peacekeeping English Project, Ministry of Defence, Kyiv, Ukraine 2009–2012 English Language Advisor, British Council Sudan, Khartoum, Sudan 2012–2016 English Language Teaching Manager, British Council Libya, Tripoli, Libya (in 2014–2016 based in Tunis, Tunisia) 2016–2017 English and Exams Advisor, British Council, Manchester, UK 2017–Present Deputy Country Director, British Council Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq
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Appendix 3: Ethical procedures adopted during the study This appendix provides three examples of the ethical procedures the study adopted.
Example one: Procedures followed in organising the focus groups with the trainee teacher educators/teacher educators
• Groups of trainee teacher educators/teacher educators were addressed during the relevant training sessions by the international trainer and/or moderator. • The trainee educators/educators were informed about the group, its purpose, how it would be organised, when and where it would take place, how long approximately it would last and who would be present. • The trainee educators/educators were informed that the data would be used to inform a study examining the delivery of the Libyan English Teacher Training Scheme (LETTS) and their own development as teacher trainers. They were also told that the information collected would be used to develop the programme and to assist the British Council in finding the most effective ways to support them once they started work as educators. • The trainee educators/educators were told that participation was completely voluntary and anonymous and that their confidentiality would be respected at all times. • Any trainee educators/educators interested in participating in the focus groups were asked to pass their names and contact details to the trainer or moderator within a given time frame. • If a larger number of individuals volunteered to participate in the groups than was required, then the names of all individuals were placed inside a box and the required number selected at random. • The selected participants were informed by phone or in person. Participants were told that they had the right to withdraw from participation at any time prior to the relevant focus group session. They were also told that they had the right to leave the group during the session and that in all cases of withdrawal no explanation would be required. • Prior to the focus group, the participants were told that the focus group would be recorded on a voice recorder and the recording would be transferred to the researcher’s personal computer which only he had access to. There, it would be stored in a folder requiring password access. In some cases – when the groups were conducted in Arabic – the researcher would listen to the recordings with the moderator. Recordings of groups conducted in English would only be listened to by the researcher. • Participants were informed that following their participation in a focus group they had the right to request that the recording be deleted and not used in the study without any explanation being required. They were also told that following the study’s completion, the recording would be deleted. • Participants were also informed that at no stage in the study – either in the notes or the final thesis – would their names be mentioned or their identity compromised.
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• Participants were also given the option of speaking in confidence to a trusted individual – the moderator, the international trainer or the English Project manager – if they were uncomfortable with any aspect of their participation in the focus groups either prior to or following the relevant group session.
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Example two: Example of email sent to interviewee following the initial telephone conversation and prior to the interview
Dear Prof XXXXX
Hope you are well.
Further to our recent telephone conversation I am writing to request the opportunity to conduct an interview with you for my current research study, which is examining the reasons for the limited success of the Libyan English Teacher Training Scheme (LETTS) – the in- service teacher training programme organised by the British Council and the General Centre for Teacher Education and Development (GCTED) in 2012–13.
I realise that you were not involved in this programme. However, as discussed, I feel that your previous position in the Ministry of General Education will enable you to provide me with important information regarding the situation within the wider education sector during this time, which could provide some insights into why the GCTED failed to engage with the British Council on the programme despite signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) regarding the programme in early 2012.
The questions I am planning to ask you will focus on your ideas on why the GCTED did not engage with the British Council as outlined on the 2012 MoU, how the situation in the wider education sector influenced the programme’s limited success and how a different approach by the British Council could have achieved better results.
Please note that your participation in this interview is completely voluntary. I will understand perfectly well if you change your mind about being interviewed and decline to take part. Also, during the interview I will also understand if you refuse to answer any questions you are not comfortable with, or decide you would like to terminate the interview early. Following the interview you will also have the right to request that the data you have provided is not used in the study.
Please also note that your name will not be mentioned in either my research notes or my final study. You will simply be referred to as a former Deputy Education Minister and no other information will be provided that could be used to identify you.
The interview will be recorded using a voice recorder. This will then be transferred to my
306 personal computer which only I have access to and will be stored in a folder requiring password access. Only I will listen to the recording. Once my study has been completed and submitted, this recording will be deleted. You will have the right to request a copy of the recording at any time.
I would be grateful if you could confirm via a written reply to this email that you are still willing to be interviewed and that the date, time and location we agreed upon in our telephone conversation are still suitable for you.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or need more information. I look forward to hearing from you.
Ben Gray English Language Teaching Manager British Council Libya
T +218 (0)21 4843164 -67 Ext.252 | F +218 (0)21 484 0178 | BCTN 352 1252 Casablanca Street, Hey El Wihda, Al -Arabia, Siyahia. PO Box 6797 Tripoli, Libya. [email protected] British Council Libya | Facebook | Twitter
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Example three: Procedures followed in starting the individual interviews
• The researcher checked that the venue was prepared, that it was sufficiently comfortable and that the interview would not be interrupted. For interviews taking place in interviewees’ offices and places of work, the researcher asked the interviewee to ensure that interruptions were kept to a minimum. • The researcher re-explained the purpose of the interview, how it was going to be organised, the questions that were going to be asked and how the data was going to be used. • The researcher reminded the interviewee that they had to right to withdraw from the interview at any point or to refuse to answer any questions without providing an explanation. • The researcher reminded the interviewee that the interview was going to be recorded, but that only the researcher would listen to the recording, the recording would be stored in a secure location and would be deleted once the study was completed. The researcher also pointed out that the interviewee had the right to ask for the recording to be deleted at any point after the interview. • The researcher re-emphasised the fact that the interview would be completely confidential, that the interviewee’s identity would remain anonymous and that his/her name would never be mentioned in either the study or any of the accompanying researcher’s notes. • The researcher gave the interviewee the opportunity to ask any questions or to raise any concerns before the recorder was switched on and the interview started.
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Appendix 4: Example transcript of semi-structured interview
Transcript of interview with former head of the Educational Development Trust (formerly the Centre for British Teachers) in Libya
Interview conducted on 17 April 2014 Int = interviewer Inv = interviewee
Interview starts with interviewer and interviewee making general conversation about their current situations and future plans.
Int: Okay, anyway, let’s …
Inv: (interrupts ) Yes, let’s get going …
Int: (interrupts ) Just to give you a bit of background on what I’m doing and why I have asked to speak to you. As I said in that email, I’m doing some university research for a doctorate, erm, based on my experiences in Libya of trying to organise that teacher training programme with the Ministry of Education. The programme wasn’t successful, erm, I should point out, but I think, yes, I think I may have told you this already. And, because of this I’m doing, erm, I’m doing I suppose you could call it like a micro-history of my experience in running the programme and how the, erm, the situation with the Ministry of Education and wider social political context, how this influenced the programme and how it led to it not being successful. Did that, erm, did that make sense?
Inv: Yes, yep.
Int: And, erm, as I know you are, well, you’ve done, you’re quite experienced in Libya and you’ve done a lot of work with the Ministry of Education, particularly with the, the General Centre for Teacher Education and Development. And, I wonder if you could talk about your experience in working with them, because the stuff you did with them was a lot more successful than the stuff I tried to do …
Inv: (interrupts ) Was your, was the teacher training, was that the work you were trying to do with the General Centre for Teacher …
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Int: (interrupts ) Yes. Now, before I go on, I think I said in the email, I am recording this if that’s okay, and (laughs) I need to give you a blurb about how it, how I’m going to use it only for my study, my research. I won’t share it or do anything else with it, it’ll be stored securely, I mean it’ll be kept in a safe place and at no time, erm, I mean, I won’t mention your name at any point. Hope this is all okay?
Inv: Yes, that’s fine.
Int: Okay, so, erm, I agreed with ( name of GCTED director )’s successor, I mean, predecessor, what was his name, ( name of previous GCTED director ), yeah, that’s him, and I agreed basically with him we would train up a group of teacher trainers and these teacher trainers would then be used by the centre to train other teachers with the British Council’s support and, I mean, we …
Inv: (interrupts ) You mean the in-service training you were doing?
Int: Exactly, yes, yeah.
Inv: And was it just for English or for other subjects?
Int: It was English.
Inv: Yes, yeah. I wonder if it’s, if it was because you did it through ( name of previous GCTED director ) to begin with, erm, because we’ve found that ( name of GCTED director ) has always been extremely positive and very supportive, erm, of everything we’ve done with her, so, I’m wondering if it didn’t work for you because it wasn’t originally her programme. I don’t know, just ( unclear ).
Int: I don’t think it was because she wasn’t very keen on the idea. One of the problems was the centre wasn’t particularly good at, erm, organising for the in-service training to take place, and in particular they really struggled to get teachers released to attend training and (name of GCTED director ) seemed either not to be able to or not to want to try to get the headmasters to release the teachers.
Inv: Yeah.
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Int: So that was one challenge. And the second challenge was, erm, they were supposed to actually pay the teacher trainers, they were supposed to officially appoint them, to give them some money and …
Inv: (interrupts ) These were the ones doing the in-service training?
Int: Yeah, and they ended up, they promised to pay, erm, when we actually did some training they never managed to actually pay the teacher trainers. And, as I understand, there were budget problems in the ministry and that was the reason.
Inv: Yeah, because in our experience ( name of GCTED director ) had her own budget and therefore there shouldn’t have been, if it was her programme, there shouldn’t have been budget problems. So, erm, because right from the very beginning when I first went to see her, she, erm, I was impressed by the fact that, in my first meeting I had with her, I had just sent her a sort of proposal with UNICEF and I’d just got it translated. I don’t know if I told you this. And, erm, I only managed to get it to her at ten o’clock at night and ( laughs ) I had a meeting with her the next morning, and I said, ‘I’m very sorry, I’ve only got it translated’, and she said, ‘No, no, that’s no problem’, and opened her laptop and said, ‘Right, now, I like this, but I am not sure about that.’ And, I thought, ‘My goodness, somebody at the Ministry of Education has not only looked at it, but ( unclear ) after ten o’clock at night before our meeting the next morning.’ And from then on she was very much behind the programme, she saw it was looking at teachers, because she’s very sympathetic with teachers’ problems, you know, the fact that they aren’t well paid, they don’t have decent career paths, their training isn’t well organised, it’s supply-led rather than demand-led, that sort of thing. So she thought looking into it and doing what we did which was finding out from the teachers what they felt and, erm, what their hopes were, that sort of thing ( unclear ). And so from that moment on, erm, the agreement UNICEF had with the Ministry of Education for each of the projects they were running was that UNICEF would contribute so much, there were two columns and UNICEF would contribute this and there would be, erm, partnerships with the different departments and they would contribute so much, a lot of which was ‘in kind’, you know, providing rooms, providing transport, that sort of thing. And, even before we actually signed off with UNICEF, she already had her budget set aside ( unclear ), this is how much we need, this is the budget for making sure people can come to the workshops, etc., etc. And she also set up the team that we worked with, again in advance of us starting the project and they’ve been a very good team to work with, and so we found that when we trained this team, erm, they cascaded it very well to all the other teams which went out to the different schools. Very often cascading isn’t always that successful, there are hitches along the way, but they
311 collected all the data that we wanted and so, yes, she’s been very cooperative and, erm, partly due to the fact she chose a good team, erm, meant that things progressed very well. It was very much in contrast to the projects we had with some other departments, erm, several of them, particularly the Curriculum Department, clearly didn’t want to work with us, something I understand is not unusual when working ( with the MoE) whereas the positive response we’ve had with ( name of GCTED director )’s department ( unclear ).
Int: Okay.
Inv: Talking of teacher training we are hoping to be doing another project with ( name of GCTED director ) which is funded by the ministry and not by UNICEF and is looking at, erm, their role, the teachers centre’s role and ( name of EDT colleague ) who you saw in last year’s presentation is quite keen that the ministry looks at the roles of all the different departments, erm, as sometimes there are dozens of piecemeal, erm, plans, sort of actions to respond to ideas rather than standing back and looking at education as a whole. One of the things is that the GCTED shouldn’t actually be in charge of the training. Well, they should be in charge of it, but they shouldn’t necessarily be the ones who do it. It could be something done by the different training departments in universities or whatever so that, erm, rather than just let’s say funding a bit of training here, you know they send people off to Malaysia to be trained, off to Jordan to be trained, which doesn’t embed it in the country. If they are being trained in Jordan, any practice that they are doing is not in-country with the actual realistic practice that they would need. So we are talking about looking at the, their whole role, the whole role of the teaching centre and taking it from the very basics and then deciding what, erm, what they should be doing as a department, erm, so yes, they are a bit reluctant because they want to get going, they want to do training, but if the training isn’t right then, erm, better not to do it. The clearest example of this is the inspections. I think they are sending off a whole load of inspectors to be trained in Jordan, whereas in fact the whole inspections system needs a complete rethink and so to train inspectors to improve a little bit on what they are doing at the moment is probably a waste of time because you actually want to get the system right and then train them for the new system rather than training them for what they are doing at the moment which is simply going in and watching teachers, looking at the school, and the whole …
Int: (interrupts ) But, I mean, why are they so keen on sending people out to places like Jordan and Malaysia?
Inv: Well, they want to do something. They know they haven’t got the capacity and we’ve
312 tried to persuade them that it’s more haste and less speed, but, well, you see, at the moment it’s funding a bit of training here, a bit there. You know, they send off people to Malaysia to be trained, send off people to Jordan to be trained, which doesn’t embed it in the country. You know, they want action, they want a quick fix. They think, ‘Right, done that, tick it off’, but actually they are just wasting time as it’s not very beneficial and you would have done better to start with the basics and plan on doing it in-country. If you send everyone abroad, you then put off that important step of doing long-term planning and doing it in-country. I mean, as I understand, they were sending off a whole load of people to Malaysia as teacher trainers, erm, and then said, ‘Well, they can come back and train inspectors as well.’ So you’ve got two for the price of one! So you got these people being training in Malaysia, a context different from Libya, to train teachers and, again it’s this thing of trying to have a quick fix, they think they can have one person who’s been trained for a few months in Malaysia to train teachers as well as to train inspectors. But, of course, these are very different activities and when we had our inspector out there, he went through all the processes they were required to do to become inspectors and they were a bit shocked (laughs ). So, I think this is the problem. They want to do something, they want to get going, they want to show the populace they are doing something, and there are quick fixes you can do, but these aren’t the right ones. Well, not quick fixes, but quick wins that you can do. But, not this!
Int: And is it the situation that, well, they are going out of Libya and also I presume they get very good allowances when they travel? Is it the case that it isn’t always the right people who are being selected and being sent off to Malaysia or to Jordan, but people who, for example, who have the best connections or are the most senior?
Inv: I suspect that’s often the case, but with ( name of GCTED director ) that’s not the case. She gave me an example of a, erm, she was sending some teachers to a workshop in, erm, with the British Council in Cairo, I think it was Cairo or Dubai, somewhere like that. Anyway, and she’d noticed a teacher putting up lessons on Facebook, things that she’d designed and she was in somewhere like Jadu or some place like that, erm, and so she contacted this teacher and said, ‘I’ve been impressed by the way you’ve been doing your own work and putting it on Facebook and we’d like you to go to this workshop in Egypt.’ And the teacher said, ‘Well, why me?’, you know, implying ‘I’ve got no connections’, you know, ‘I’m not anybody’s cousin.’ And ( name of GCTED director ) said, ‘No, but you’re the person who’s been doing the work and so ( unclear ).’ And I think she is trying to get over this thing of it’s just the people in the right place with the right connections. Whether she manages to do it on a large-scale I don’t know, it’s certainly what she wants to do. But, well, I know she’s
313 had difficulty fighting the system and she’s held her own pretty well. When she was first in her position there were moves to push her out because people in the department, erm, teaching centre, were resentful that this person came in. I know somebody who’s been working there for some time and he said to me, ‘Why has she been brought in here? What does she know? I’ve been here for many years.’ And, as much as I like him, I thought, ‘Yeah, and look at how much you’ve done’ ( laughs ). And there were strikes and things she had to deal with and I think she has established herself and managed to get through those difficult things.
Int: I thought at one point a lot of people in the department felt that she shouldn’t be the director because of what she used to be under the old Gaddafi regime. Didn’t she have some senior position or something?
Inv: I think it was used as a way to try to get rid of her. I mean, she was a school inspector under the regime, erm, and, I mean, of course, everybody who was in the ministry was working for the previous regime, and, erm, but I don’t think she had a particularly senior post and she did training in Benghazi during the Revolution with Save the Children, I think, She did training in, erm, in child-centred learning, which she got very enthusiastic about, erm, to such an extent that she insisted on teaching it herself, which is something, I mean, someone in that position in the ministry doesn’t do that sort of thing, I mean, take classes in the evening. So, you know, that fact, whatever her position had been before, the fact she was in Benghazi during the Revolution doing courses with Save the Children would indicate she was, she’d moved to the new regime pretty quickly.
Int: Okay. And, erm, I mean speaking about the ministry’s attempts to get an in-service training system in place, apart from trying to fall back on quick fixes, erm, what do you think the other challenges were, erm, and still are? You know, based on your experiences …
Inv: (interrupts ) Well, I think a big challenge is coordinating in-service and pre-service, because they are under different ministries and you have these two ministries, I mean, not working at odds, but working separately when they should be working closely together so, erm. And so, as far as I can make out, the system, particularly the in-service system, doesn’t respond to needs, they don’t, erm, they think, ‘Oh, it’ll be a nice idea to have some training for physics teachers’, and ( unclear ) so it’s physics teachers that need training, rather than finding out what the needs are and designing the course around that. I think, I mean, this is what I hope we might be doing with them, erm, getting them to think what their role is, should they be doing the training themselves, should they be outsourcing it to colleges, and then
314 redesigning the system of how do you decide what training courses to have, that sort of thing and then looking at the courses themselves. I haven’t actually seen their courses, but, erm, looking at their in-service training curriculum and so on, I suspect, erm, that they are very theoretical and not very practical.
Int: Was there any in-service training before the Revolution?
Inv: Yes, yes. This, the centre, the centre for, erm, what was it called? I can’t remember. Anyway, yes, it, erm, it wasn’t where it now is, it was moved to a purpose-built centre in Tajura, and it had sort of nice training rooms and so on, and then the Tajurans, you know, they were one of the leaders in the Revolution, one of the first areas where there was unrest and, as has happened with a lot of places, they’ve taken the law into their own hands and decided this building is very nice for their own purposes ( laughs ) and took over the centre. I don’t know what they are using it for because it’s not like the present one which was a school. I mean it had more space, erm, but ( name of GCTED director ) is doing her best with what she has. She’s revamping the lecture hall, getting all the new desks, all that sort of thing. I heard at one stage they said that they were going to go back to Tajura, but as she’s doing all this work then I don’t think she is.
Int: Well, like I said, with the programme we were trying to run she appeared quite enthusiastic about, but my understanding was that she either didn’t have the will to set it up because there were obstacles, especially with the headmasters, and when I actually spoke to her, interviewing her for this research, she said that one of the problems was that she didn’t really have much capacity in the centre to organise, erm, the training. The second was the budgets, because she told me she had received the budgets for the centre quite late, and then had to try to spend it all by the end of the year. And, also she had problems with getting teachers released. She didn’t want to do that, and she said that most of the teachers and the teacher trainers wouldn’t work in the afternoons and weren’t prepared to work, to attend training at weekends.
Inv: Erm, well, we haven’t actually got that far. We’ve only worked, been working with people from the teacher training centre. We haven’t come across the problem of getting teachers released because most of the people we’ve worked with have actually been in the department and, erm, the people who came to Tripoli to be trained for the research were all people from the administration rather than teaching. So we didn’t have this problem and I think it is a difficulty because, I mean, if they come in the afternoon, well, most of them are women and they want to go home and to cook lunch for the kids and so, erm, it should
315 theoretically be possible to organise as they have all these surplus teachers, so you’d have thought if you take two or three teachers from one school that’d be chance to deploy some of your surplus, but, I don’t know …
Int: (interrupts ) Possibly because they were English teachers? In my experience, even the more competent English teachers didn’t have great English. So I suspect the surplus teachers of English, you know, had virtually nothing at all.
Inv: (laughs ) I suspect that’s true. Yes. There’s all sorts of things, you know, they can’t teach if they haven’t been inspected and all that sort of thing. Even though they’ve got these teachers the impediment to deploying them is …
Int: (interrupts ) I didn’t know that. I knew there were surplus teachers. I didn’t know there were impediments to deploying them.
Inv: It’s crazy. You’ve got two hundred thousand extra teachers not being used, but being fully paid. I mean, we were in a very nice school with a good headmaster in Higher Andalus, erm, and, erm, it was a school where they had students’ work on the walls, it was well kept and all that sort of thing, and we said, ‘Why don’t you use your teachers more?’, and he said, ‘Well, I tried.’ You see, by law, to teach a teacher has to be inspected four times a year and the extra teachers sit there and they can’t teach because they haven’t been inspected. So this man was using these teachers as teaching assistants, he was dividing classes, that sort of thing, and the inspectors said, you know, ‘We’re only designated to inspect a certain number of teachers, we’re not supposed to be inspecting these extra teachers. It’s not legal to use them if they are not being inspected.’ Therefore, he was being investigated by the inspection department for trying to use the teachers that are sitting there drinking tea. So the inspection department doesn’t just not have an effect, it has a detrimental effect because it doesn’t allow him to make some use of the surplus teachers he’s got. ( laughs ) That’s why I’m saying the whole thing needs a complete, particularly the inspection department, I mean it, erm, all it does is look at teachers, it doesn’t look at the school, it doesn’t look at the performance in different subjects, it doesn’t look at interaction between teachers or anything else, it doesn’t look at the head teacher’s responsibilities, erm. Even the head of inspections said it’s just a policing department and, added to that, the quality assurance people who are supposed to accredit schools, they go and inspect schools and check they have a certain number of classrooms, a certain number of teachers, and so on, but their report is not informed by the reports from the inspection department, so the reports from the inspectors who have been watching teachers don’t have any influence on the quality assurance
316 department who accredit the school. So, this most important part of ( unclear ) isn’t added to the quality assurance report.
Int: Speaking more generally, erm, about education in Libya, what do you think the main obstacles to the future development of the school education system are?
Inv: Well, I suppose one of the biggest is this surplus of teachers, which is a huge weight on everything. For one thing it’s a dead weight on the ministry’s finances, as from their budget of seven billion dinars about six billion goes on teachers’ salaries. Now, obviously they need to sort it out, but socially and politically it’s a very difficult thing to do. You can’t just dismiss two hundred thousand teachers. So, erm, I think that’s a huge problem and so, yes, I think from everything to do, perhaps that’s the worst thing. I think everything to do with teachers is a dead weight on progress. Another one is the fact that 85 per cent of teachers are women. Erm, this is not being sexist, but the fact that they are women means that they think of it on the whole as being a second, a second salary; therefore, there’s no incentive, I mean, they are quite happy to come in, to pick up their salary, teach as simply as possible with no lesson planning or anything like that, erm, and there’s no incentive for them to move up a career ladder, they are all paid the same, they don’t get extra salary for extra training or anything like that so there’s no incentive for self-improvement, erm, there’s no, erm, it’s a long, it’s a very flat hierarchy so there’s no moving up to be head of department. So there’s no incentive, no impetus to improve anything. It’s a bit of a vicious circle – if there’s nothing to aim for then why try to aim for it? It makes it a job for people seeking an easy life and so that’s what sort of people it attracts, and that’s just the job it is and so on. You know, poorly paid, second salary, no incentive to improve, no career path, and this is the big thing they are going to have to get over, and salaries is an important thing. But, they need to make it an attractive profession, a profession that’s respected. I mean, a lot of countries have been through this, erm, but of course they can’t pay decent salaries until they get rid of their surplus of two hundred thousand teachers. So, erm, I think the way the whole system is organised is also detrimental to progress because the different departments don’t speak to each other and then you’ve got the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education working separately. I mean, it can work, as it does in many countries, but they need to communicate. And you’ve got this quality assurance and inspections department who are all trying to do the same job and they don’t share data, communicate with each other, so, erm, the whole system of the way the ministry’s organised I think needs to be rethought, but I think most importantly I think it’s doing something to make the teaching profession attractive, career paths. Of course, the in-service training has a lot to do with that, erm, but it’s a long-term thing.
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Int: Right, okay, I think that’s given me plenty of data, thank you very much.
Inv: Good, I hope that ( laughs ).
Int: No, it has. You know, I think one of the British Council’s problems is we often tend to see things in terms of English and that can often, it often means we miss the bigger picture.
Inv: Yes, well, we, I mean, here in Britain we work across the board, when we do inspections and stuff like that, and we have, we usually have the same approach in other countries. So, in Libya we looked, erm, looked at the schools as a whole, at all subjects. And, English needs to be a part of it …
Conversation carries briefly on about general issues relating to the work of both the Educational Development Trust and the British Council in Libya.
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Appendix 5: Example research diary entry
Week of entry: 08–14 June 2014
The meeting with (the Deputy Minister for Education) went well. I met him together with (the BC Self-Access Learning Manager) as I was keen to talk about Teach English Radio (TER) as well as LETTS. I also wanted to talk about the review of the secondary school English curriculum which I had heard nothing about for almost a year. From my last meeting with him I was cautiously optimistic, as unlike his predecessors – at least the ones I had met – he was genuinely interested in improving English and education, and ready to work with the BC.
Most of the meeting was spent discussing LETTS and how we were going to move forward and I felt a bit sorry for (the BC Self-Access Learning Manager) as our talk about TER lasted about ten minutes, although she seemed quite interested in our conversation about LETTS as she had already heard a lot about the programme. Similarly we spoke for five minutes about the curriculum review, partly reflecting my level of interest in it at that time when compared to LETTS, partly because there isn’t an immediately clear way forward and partly because I suspect it will take more than an order from the deputy education minister to get the Curriculum Centre to actually do anything!
The minister came across as still being positive about working with the BC on LETTS – and in general – and said he would do his utmost to make it happen, which was music to my ears. Although, as (the BC Education Programme Manager) had warned me, he said it would not be possible to do anything – both with ELT/LETTS and with education reform in general – until after the current political crisis had subsided and though, like most Libyans, he tried to put a brave face on this by saying it would soon be sorted out, he didn’t appear particularly convinced and therefore convincing when he said it.
We did, however, map out how we would take LETTS forward. I got him to agree that (the GCTED) would be told to work with us and that he would find a way to look for potential educators and arrange for them to be sent to Tripoli and that he would also ensure teachers could be released to attend training courses. He also spoke about the importance of considering and involving all the players in organising LETTS, including regional and local education authorities, headmasters and school inspectors, along with (the GCTED). The fact that these suggestions came from him did a lot to enthuse me. For my part – or rather our part as (the SAL Manager) made a few suggestions – I went through a few ideas I had about
319 providing remote support in looking for potential educators and screening them, and then in supporting them as they delivered training. I did point out that this might involve the ministry investing in Wi-Max Internet connections for teachers, although (the SAL Manager) pointed out that in eastern Libya there were already better and cheaper providers than Libyan Telecom and Technology – which I did not believe 100%. We finished the meeting agreeing to stay in touch and after Ramadan to start contacting education authorities outside Tripoli – most likely in the east – to ask them to begin identifying potential educators.
However, coming back in the car and chatting to (the SAL Manager) I felt strange – it was a peculiar feeling. I feel that I ought to be jumping for joy, but for some reason I just can’t get enthusiastic about the future prospects of the training programme even though I have done so in the past and even though (the Deputy Minister) i s by far the most convincing and progressive person I had met from that ministry since I arrived in Libya. I can’t really articulate the reasons for this limited enthusiasm, but I suspect it is largely due to a combination of having had several false starts in the past and the effect of the general grind of life on the ground in Tripoli.
One particular concern I have is that Libya seems to have been in an almost permanent state of political crisis for almost a year and the chances of things resolving themselves in the next 2–3 weeks are almost nil. Secondly, even if we do get some sort of MoE green light for LETTS, trying to organise any sort of national training programme based on the proposed model is going to be a major challenge given the absolutely chaotic state of the country and the risk of things constantly going wrong. One option could be to focus on places like Misrata, Tobruk, Al-Beida, etc., where things are calm and some sort of training is possible, but there will still be the issue of training up the educators in Tripoli – unless we can get permission to travel to these places, which is possible – and it may also lead to complaints from Benghazi and Sebha that they are being ignored. Although, maybe I am thinking ahead too much, as I still need things to settle down and the green light!
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Appendix 6: List of initial ideas regarding LETTS’ failure
Below are the initial ideas I had regarding the reasons for LETTS failure before I analysed the micro-history and the data. This table shows whether they were confirmed and the reasons why/why not. Idea Confirmed Notes Funding – the MoE was No The MoE had access to funding for training – unable to provide the evidenced by the large numbers of staff it sent required funding on overseas training. It also had – by its own admission – the funding allocated for the previous LETSS project. Funding – the MoE was Yes Due to its perceptions of LETTS, the fact the unwilling to provide the programme was not an instant solution to its required funding ELT-related needs and because it required a significant contribution on its part, the Ministry of Education (and within this the GCTED) did not view LETTS as being worth funding. However, it is possible that the ministry may have provided funding if this had been easier to obtain via its own internal processes. Funding – the MoE believed No While there were issues with the MoE the BC should pay for financially supporting the limited LETTS-related LETTS activity that took place, there was no evidence to suggest it believed that the BC should pay instead. Interest – the MoE was Yes With the exception of the Deputy Education generally uninterested in Minister who was in post for the first part of LETTS due to general 2014, there was no interest in LETTS (or apathy within the ministry indeed in any BC education reform programmes) from senior officials in the MoE. There was some interest from the GCTED and from local education officials, but this was limited – particularly regarding the former – and not sufficient to sustain LETTS. Reach – the MoE was Yes This is a key reason why there was limited uninterested in LETTS support for LETTS. The MoE was under
321 because the BC could only pressure to deliver reform throughout Libya, run it from Tripoli particularly in the more marginalised parts of the east and south. The fact that the BC could only organise the educator training and directly support teacher training in Tripoli meant that from the start LETTS had limited appeal, especially as it is questionable how well the ministry understood how the cascade training was intended to work. Capacity – the MoE lacked Yes This is arguably the main reason why LETTS the capacity to support failed. The MoE lacked the leadership, the LETTS suitably skilled staff and the internal processes, communications and infrastructure required to facilitate LETTS. Timings – the MoE was Partly While this was an issue, the data suggests it unable to get teachers was more the case of the MoE being unwilling released to attend training in to undertake the work involved in organising for the daytime and teachers teachers to be released. Moreover, the data were unwilling/unable to suggests that there may have been scope to attend at other times organise training during school holidays and/or when teachers had no classes, but these options were never properly examined by the MoE. Engagement – the BC did Partly The BC tried repeatedly to engage with the not engage with the MoE MoE (both the GCTED and the wider ministry) sufficiently on numerous occasions regarding LETTS. It also needs to be remembered that LETTS was launched partly in response to requests for assistance from the ministry and so there was some onus on it to be proactive. It is arguable – however, by no means certain – that if the BC had tried to ‘involve’ the director of the GCTED in decision-making about LETTS, then this may have produced a more favourable outcome. ‘One size fits all’ – BC Yes Although LETTS was not a ‘one size fits all’ attempted to impose a solution and was designed for the Libyan
322 cascade-based teacher context, it did involve imposing a particular training programme onto the model of teacher training which was unsuitable MoE without sufficient for Libya’s MoE and wider education system. consideration of its appropriateness Partners – BC made a Partly The BC should have looked at alternative mistake partnering with the options to working with the MoE much earlier, MoE and should have and evidence suggests that more progress partnered with university could have been made with either university faculties of education and/or education faculties or local education local education authorities authorities. However, this is by no means certain. Moreover, it is unlikely that either partner would have had the organisational capacity to replicate a programme of LETTS’ scale and reach. Political instability Yes Though this did not directly affect LETTS, the lack of stability in the government meant that no constructive reform programme was developed and implemented, which in turn meant that no national education reform programme was produced – despite one being announced – which LETTS could slot into. Furthermore, the succession of education ministers meant that the MoE suffered from a lack of stable long-term leadership, which also prevented any effective education reform programme being developed. Security issues Yes These impacted LETTS in two ways. Firstly, they prevented the BC organising educator training outside Tripoli. Secondly, the continued militia violence and increasing crime had a ‘wearing-down’ effect on many of the people working in the education sector (as well as on most Libyans in general) and made them less interested in contributing to reform and development activities.
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BC’s over-optimism Yes LETTS was organised by the BC on the regarding potential for large- assumption that the MoE would sign up to the scale Libyan-funded ELT programme and would provide full funding and opportunities all required administrative and logistical support. This was part of a wider UK/BC assumption that Libya was desperate for technical assistance, would accept anything offered and would pay. Internal and external Yes One reason LETTS was organised so quickly expectations was because there were high expectations from within both the BC and the wider UK government, and (seemingly) from the Libyans themselves, that BC Libya was going to launch a large-scale ELT/education reform programme. MoE expectations regarding Yes The MoE saw BC support as a sort of ‘magic BC support pill’ to fixing the education system problems, both with ELT and more generally. When it became apparent that LETTS was not such a solution and required a significant contribution from its side, the MoE lost whatever initial interest it had. MoE was suspicious of BC No This was suggested by one of the interviewees, as a foreign organisation but I could find no real evidence to support this with a ‘hidden agenda’ idea. MoE was uninterested in No Although suggested by one of the interviewees, LETTS because most I could find no evidence to support the fact that teachers were female the MoE was uninterested in LETTS because most teachers were female. MoE was uninterested in Yes Evidence suggested that due to social-cultural LETTS because most reasons teaching was not seen as a serious teachers were married profession. Instead it was seen as an housewives acceptable job for married women – which most teachers were – as it allowed them to work a small number of hours and to focus on their domestic duties. Thus, this idea focused on the teachers being female, being married,
324 and the common expectations of married females in Libya.
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Appendix 7: Summary of the seven strands and the ideas informing each one
These ideas were generated from examining the micro-history and the data. They were then grouped into strands.
Strand One: A land of unparalleled opportunities • High expectations of large-scale education reform programmes from BC Libya and within wider organisation • High expectations of large-scale BC education reform programmes from UK FCO and wider UK government • General UK expectation that British organisations would secure large lucrative contracts in post-Gaddafi Libya • Libyan government declared that it needs Western assistance in rebuilding and developing the country, had the money to pay for it and would reward – through lucrative contracts – those countries that helped topple Gaddafi • BC well positioned to take advantage of opportunities in Libya: worked in Libya since mid 2000, presence on ground, seen as country’s leading authority on ELT, history of working with Libya education sector (i.e. LETUP) and good reputation • ‘Spirit of 2012’ – idea among most Libyans and wider international community that following the removal of Gaddafi and with the country’s vast cash reserves and oil riches anything was now possible and that Libya would quickly develop into a modern progressive first-world state (i.e. the new Dubai) • BC optimism led it to ignore certain issues – idea that large contracts would ‘fall’ into its lap was too easy, Libyan government officials saw Western assistance as a ‘magic pill’ and despite a lot of talk from new Ministry of Education there was no actual national education reform programme
Strand Two: My own professional agenda • Legacy of the Sudanese NTTP – having missed out on chance to organise large- scale cascade programme in Sudan, I wanted opportunity to do so in Libya • To continue PhD study I needed a large-scale cascade training programme I could observe and gather data from • I had developed an approach I believed could ensure the success of cascade programmes and wanted to try it out • My ‘agenda’ led me to ignore prevailing wisdom of the dangers of trying to organise an education reform programme based on a model successfully implemented in a different context • My ‘agenda’ also led me to overlook the need to conduct a thorough examination of whether the programme was suitable for the Libyan contact • In reality I had subconsciously decided on LETTS prior to arriving in Libya in early 2012
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Strand Three: Gaddafi’s legacy • Failure to build state institutions meant that the Ministry of Education (MoE) – along with the government as a whole – had little capacity to organise and support reform • Gaddafi created a state system dependent upon himself and his close associates. When they were removed, the officials that replaced them – including in education – could not get the system to work • MoE was a dysfunctional institution – 18 departments and four related bodies functioning separately, with little coordination and leading to duplication of responsibilities in some areas and gaps in others • MoE officials and other staff were poorly trained and lacked the skills to organise and manage reform • Due to Gaddafi’s centralised system of government there was no system of decision making among top- and middle-level managers in Libyan state structures • Gaddafi left Libya with a shattered education system requiring a massive complex reform programme which the MoE was incapable of organising • The scale and complexity of the task it faced in reforming the education system – coupled with the pressure it was under to carry out reform – led the MoE to embark upon a programme of keeping the populace happy and being seen to be doing something • Oversupply of teachers was particularly problematic due to its drain on the MoE budget
Strand Four: The failure to adjust • BC (i.e. me in my capacity as the ELT Manager and LETTS lead) failed to recognise that there was little chance of the MoE partnering on LETTS as envisaged, despite the growing indications and evidence • BC clung to belief that once LETTS started properly (i.e. once the teacher training started), then it would simply carry on and develop as envisaged in the programme plan • Specific warning indicators were ignored. These include the inability/unwillingness of the MoE to cover the cost of refreshments for the training or to provide stationery, or to organise for teachers to be released to participate in training, along with the general lack of interest in the programme from senior MoE officials • More general indicators were also ignored. These include the dilapidated state of the education system, the low level of teachers, the general lack of confidence in the MoE among educators and teachers, and the MoE’s failure to organise an effective sector-wide reform programme • The BC failed to examine these indicators collectively. If it (i.e. if I) had, then it would have recognised that the education system was not ready for a programme such as LETTS • At no stage did the BC seriously consider an alternative approach, develop a Plan B and/or engage with a different partner (i.e. university faculties of education)
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Strand Five: The political-security situation • Libya’s continually deteriorating political and security situation had an indirect but significant effect on LETTS • Libyan government found itself ‘fire-fighting’ – dealing with a never-ending series of crises which meant it never had the opportunity to plan and organise any sort of national reform programme • In-fighting in the government between the Islamist and non-Islamist factions also caused political deadlock • A succession of short-term governments and, within this, a series of different ministers and other senior officials also meant there were limited prospects for the development of any kind of long-term reform programme • These issues directly affected the MoE – lack of overall national reform programme that could support education reform, ministry found itself dealing with never-ending challenges, struggle between Islamist and non-Islamist factions being played out in MoE and succession of ministers and other senior leaders • Deteriorating security situation had ‘wearing-down’ effect on most Libyans, including educators, teachers and other people involved both with LETTS and with developing the education system in general • The security situation also prevented the BC from being able to organise educator training and other reform activities – both LETTS-related and more general ones – outside Tripoli
Strand Six: The MoE’s view of teacher training • Libya’s MoE – with the possible exception of the General Centre for Teacher Education and Development (GCTED) – did not view training teachers as a priority. Therefore, LETTS – from the outset – was not viewed as an important programme • MoE viewed main priority as building new school facilities and replacing the Gaddafi- era curriculums • Officials such as head teachers and inspectors saw the pupils being in class and having lessons as the priority • Libya had no proper tradition of in-service teacher training • Teaching was not a high-level profession in Libya. Teachers were poorly paid and had no career paths or opportunities for advancement • Due to this and to socio-cultural reasons, teaching in Libya was traditionally viewed as an acceptable job for a housewife, but not as a serious career • This was compounded by the fact that most teachers were attracted to the profession because it enabled them to combine their housewife/domestic duties with having a job
Strand Seven: The MoE’s view of LETTS • LETTS viewed by the GCTED as a small-scale Tripoli-based teacher training programme • LETTS did not provide ‘quick-fix’ or the ‘magic solution’ the GCTED was looking for regarding in-service training
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• Debatable whether GCTED really understood how the cascade system upon which LETTS was based would work • GCTED director may have guessed MoE did not have capacity and resources to support LETTS • Request from GCTED for proposed national teacher training programme seen by centre as something separate from LETTS
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Appendix 8: Timeline of key events in Libya prior to and during the micro-history
Date Events 2011, February Inspired by popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, anti-Gaddafi protests break out in Benghazi, quickly spreading to other cities and turning into a full-scale revolt. 2011, March NATO forces led by UK and France launch military intervention in Libya, ostensibly to implement UN ceasefire. In reality, the intervention supports the rebels and turns the tide against the Gaddafi forces. 2011, July–August National Transitional Council (NTC) established as recognised government of Libya. Rebels overrun Tripoli and Gaddafi flees into hiding. 2011, October Gaddafi is captured and killed. NTC declares Libya is ‘liberated’ and the Revolution completed. 2011, October UK embassy reopens in Libya. UK government urges British businesses to ‘pack their suitcases’ and head to Libya to secure lucrative contracts with new government. New government promises to reward those countries that supported the Revolution and helped topple Gaddafi. 2012, January–June NTC struggles to exert its authority outside Tripoli – particularly in the east – and to control the militias. Violent crime – previously unknown in Tripoli – becomes a problem in the capital. 2012, June UK Ambassador’s motorcade attacked in Benghazi. In response, UK advises its citizens not to travel to the city and to other parts of eastern Libya. 2012, July Libya holds its first democratic elections. Elections are largely viewed by international observers as being free and fair. 2012, August NTC is replaced by the newly elected Greater National Congress (GNC). 2012, September US Ambassador to Libya is killed by Islamist militants in Benghazi. 2012, September– GNC launches anti-militia crackdown. State-recognised militias are October to be incorporated into police and military. Other militias are forcibly removed from major cities and officially disbanded.
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2012, October Prime Minister elect Mustafa Abushagur is ousted and replaced by Ali Zeidan. 2013, January Ministry of the Interior reports a 500 per cent increase in Libya’s murder rate in 2012 and a 450 per cent increase in thefts. 2013, February Second anniversary of the Revolution is marked by large-scale peaceful celebrations in Tripoli and in other major cities, despite predictions of anti-Revolutionary attacks by pro-Gaddafi factions. 2013, April Car bomb explodes outside French embassy. Reports of attempt of a similar attack against the British Council are widely circulated. 2013, May Militias surround government ministries and force GNC to pass the controversial Political Isolation Law barring Gaddafi-era officials from holding political office. In response to government’s inability to control militias, the UK and other foreign diplomatic missions temporarily withdraw non-essential staff. 2013, June Anti-militia demonstrations in major cities culminate in shooting of 30 unarmed protestors in Benghazi. In response, government announces another crackdown on the militias. 2013, August Militia groups and protestors begin blockades of oil terminals in various parts of country, preventing oil exports and cutting off government’s main source of income. 2013, October Prime Minister Ali Zeidan is briefly kidnapped in Tripoli by a militia group. 2013, November Tripoli witnesses worst violence since the Revolution, with rival militias battling for control of capital. Subsequent anti-militia protests leads to shooting of 43 protestors. 2014, January Two Westerners killed, allegedly by Islamist extremists, on a beach to west of Tripoli. This is the latest in a series of killings of Westerners in Libya, but the first time such an event has taken place near the capital. 2014, January Main Islamist party – second largest political party in GNC – withdraws from ruling coalition, plunging government into chaos. 2014, February Fighting between the Warshefana tribal group and pro-government militias brings ongoing large-scale conflict to outskirts of Tripoli. 2014, February GNC extends its mandate due to pressure from Islamist factions setting off protests in Tripoli and other cities. 2014, February General Hafter, a senior military commander and leading figure in
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Revolution, calls for popular uprising against the GNC. Although unsuccessful in his appeal, Hafter quickly becomes a rallying point for anti-Islamist factions and those looking for more authoritarian leadership. 2014, March Ali Zeidan, the pro-Western Prime Minister, is voted out of office and flees the country. Storming of parliament by armed protestors leads to government temporarily relocating to a nearby luxury hotel. 2014, May Hafter launches Operation Dignity – a military campaign against Islamist militias in Benghazi and eastern Libya. Pro-Hafter rallies organised in Tripoli and other cities. 2014, May GNC stormed by pro-Hafter militias demanding that parliament be dissolved. GNC announces elections for a new House of Representatives government in June. 2014, June Elections marred by low turnout and violence. Islamists suffer heavy defeat. Fighting breaks out in Tripoli between Islamist and non-Islamist/pro-Hafter militias. 2014, July Fighting destroys Tripoli International Airport and plunges capital into chaos. Many parts of country – especially the east – also descend into violence and lawlessness. UN, most foreign embassies and international NGOs – including the British Council – withdraw from the country.
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Appendix 9: Memorandum of Understanding between British Council and Libyan Ministry of Education
(see next page)
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The Ministry of Education
Memorandum of Understanding
This is a Memorandum of Understanding regarding a partnership between the Ministry of Education General Centre for Teacher Education and Development (GCTED) and the British Council (BC) to improve the provision of English language teaching (ELT) at secondary school level.
Overview The BC and the GCTED are committed to working together in partnership to provide professional development and language learning opportunities for Libyan secondary school teachers of English. This will be achieved through a series of professional development workshops for teachers and other MoE officials, the development and support of cadres of teacher trainers in main cities and towns, the broadcasting of the Teach English radio series and the distribution of BC learning products throughout schools across the country. The specific activities that will be undertaken and which are covered by this memorandum are outlined below, along with the responsibilities of both parties.
1. LETTS (Libyan English Teacher Training Scheme)
LETTS will develop cadres of teacher trainers in Tripoli and in the other main cities and towns in Libya. These trainers will be trained via a two week intensive course which will contain a combination of face to face input and supervised training practice. Following the course those trainers who meet the required standard will be officially employed as teacher trainers and will run in-service training programmes for teachers in their localities.
Responsibilities of the parties The BC and GCTED will work together in selecting trainees for the trainer training. Trainees will be selected on the basis of aptitude, motivation, language level and previous (if any) training experience, and it is envisaged that most of these will be practicing teachers of English in secondary schools. The GCTED will make the initial selections and then both organizations will be responsible for interviewing potential trainees and making the final selection.
The BC will organize and deliver the trainer training courses. This will include recruiting and contracting an appropriately qualified and experienced specialist trainer, and covering all aspects of his / her engagement, including fees, visas, travel, accommodation, per diems, etc. The BC will provide all required training materials, stationery and equipment, and will issue certificates certifying trainees who successfully complete the course as BC recognized teacher trainers. The BC will also be responsible for providing materials and ongoing support to the teacher trainers - both remotely and via follow up workshops - once they actually start to deliver training.
The GCTED will provide the training venues and meals and refreshments, and will cover all costs of the trainees’ participation in the courses, except materials and stationery. The GCTED will also ensure all selected trainees attend the training and to deal with any issues regarding non-attendance or poor punctuality. The GCTED will ensure all teacher
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trainers are offered official positions, complete with job titles and remuneration, following their successful completion of the course.
A full description of LETTS, a programme plan and a suggested timetable are provided as an annex to this agreement.
2. ELT Consultancy
A specialized consultancy to examine the current state of ELT at secondary school level in Libya and to provide a series of achievable recommendations for its future development will be organized before the end of 2012. This will be delivered by an external consultant.
Responsibilities of the parties The BC and GCTED will work together to produce the consultancy terms of reference. These should be comprehensive and practical, but should also be sufficient to encompass the range of issues relating to secondary level ELT. These terms will then be incorporated into the contract that the consultant will sign.
The BC will recruit and contract an appropriately experienced and qualified consultant. The BC will be responsible for covering all costs relating to the consultancy including fees, travel (inside and outside Libya), visas, communications, accommodation, meals and personal incidental expenses.
The GCTED will ensure that the consultant and any accompanying BC staff are given access to the relevant documents, schools and stakeholders, including ministry officials, teachers and students, to enable the consultancy to fully meet all the above-mentioned terms of reference.
3. ELT Forums
A series of professional development forums for teachers of English from all backgrounds will be organized in the main cities and towns in Libya. Forums will be delivered by international speakers and will be aimed at large numbers of participants (300+). As well as the workshop, the events will include competitions and professional networking opportunities, and will aim to be the beginning of the establishment of a professional association for Libyan teachers of English.
Responsibilities of the parties Both the BC and GCTED will plan and organize the forums. It is envisaged that the first forums will take place in the autumn of 2012 and will be held in Tripoli, Benghazi and at least three other large cities or towns. Both parties will be responsible for promoting the event.
The BC will source and contract the forum presenters, and cover all related costs and expenses, including fees, travel, accommodation, etc. The BC will also design and print promotional materials and cover the cost of any newspaper advertising when this is required, as well as the relevant competition prizes.
The GCTED will organize the forum venues, ensuring they are of sufficient size and quality to enable the successfully delivery of the forum, including the provision of properly 2
functioning visual and audio equipment, and will also provide forum refreshments. The GCTED will also support the promotion of the forums by distributing information and fliers to all teachers in the relevant cities and / or towns.
4. Teach English Radio
Teach English Radio 1 and 2 will be broadcast throughout Libya. Each series comprises 12 fifteen minute programmes - each looking at a certain aspect of teaching – and are designed specially for teachers of English in developing countries.
Responsibilities of the parties The BC will provide copies of both radio series on CD along with electronic copies of the accompanying worksheets. The BC will also provide guidance on how the series can be incorporated into a wider teacher training programme.
The GCTED will organize for both series to be broadcast at a national level and will ensure teachers from all backgrounds are informed about the broadcasts and aware of the dates, times and frequencies. The GCTED will distribute worksheets to schools and other relevant centres as appropriate.
5. BC Language Learning and Teaching Products
The BC language learning products – Learn English website, Learn English Newspaper, Teaching English website and Premier Skills – will be promoted and distributed in schools throughout Libya.
Responsibilities of the parties The BC will burn copies of the Learn English, Teaching English and Premier Skills websites onto CDs and give these and accompanying materials to the GCTED. The BC will also provide copies of Learn English Newspaper to the GCTED for publication in the MoE newspaper.
The GCTED will copy and distribute the CDs and materials to schools throughout Libya, and will organize for Learn English Newspaper to be published in the MoE newspaper.
6. Training for school inspectors
Specialized training for school inspectors with responsibility for supervising English language teaching at secondary level will be organized in centres in Tripoli and Benghazi. Training will be delivered in week long intensive courses by an international specialist. This training will take place in June 2012.
Responsibilities of the parties The BC will source and contract an international specialist to deliver the required training. The BC will cover all costs relating to this including fees, travel, visas, accommodation, etc, and will be responsible for providing all materials and stationery required for the training.
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The GCTED will provide suitably equipped training venues in both Tripoli and Benghazi. The venues should be appropriately equipped and furnished. The GCTED will also provide meals and refreshments. The GCTED will ensure that all inspectors are informed of the dates, times and locations of the training well in advance, and that they are all officially released to attend. The GCTED will also deal appropriately with any issues regarding attendance, late-coming or performance if and when they arise.
Additional Responsibilities of the Parties
The GCTED undertakes to provide the BC with any required information on the activities covered by this memorandum and in particular details on the numbers of individuals reached by these activities and – if required – their opinions on the activity and its value. The GCTED also commits to nominating a general coordinator from its staff members who will be responsible for acting as a point of contact for the BC and for working with the organization on the abovementioned activities.
Any disagreement that may arise from this 'Memorandum of Understanding' will be resolved through consultation with both parties.
Signatures
This agreement, plus any further amendments, takes effect from the date as signed, and remains valid one year, unless either party requests termination. This termination provision applies three months after the date of the request.
This Agreement, signed in Tripoli on DD/MM/YYYY, is between the Libyan Ministry of Education General Centre for Teacher Education and Development and the British Council; it is produced in Arabic and English with both copies having equal legal standing.
For the General Centre for Teacher For the British Council, Libya Education and Development, Ministry of Education, Libya
……………………………………………… ………………………………………………
(Name removed) (Name removed)
Director Country Director General Centre for Teacher Education and British Council Libya Development
4 Appendix 10: Description of British Council's Trainer Development course
(see the next page)
338
TRAINER DEVELOPMENT COURSE Information and Guide
Introduction
The Trainer Development Course is an in-service course designed to enable participants to develop the skills, knowledge and values essential for delivering training and development activities to teachers. The course comprises seven workshops which support the professional practices in the British Council’s CPD Framework for Teacher Educators.
Each workshop has two components: trainer notes and participant workbooks. The trainer notes have detailed training plans, including comprehensive feedback and information to provide extra support for trainers. The participant coursebook has a range of activities which promote co-operation in pairs and groups to increase opportunities for exchanging ideas and sharing learning and experience.
The role of this course in Teaching for Success programmes
The Trainer Development course is an essential element of Teaching for Success programmes to ensure that all trainers are effectively prepared to train other teachers. This is part of the quality assurance process for Teaching for Success programmes. Our message to clients and teachers is that quality in teacher education is required to achieve the desired improvements in classroom teaching. To achieve this in all our programmes. we uphold quality standards for trainers, resources, and the training conditions involved.
The evidence about effective professional development on which Teaching for Success is based also shows that professional learning needs to be supported in a sustained way following training activities. This ensures that participants have the opportunities for extended practice and feedback on their performance so that their learning is effectively embedded throughout their activity as teacher trainers. It is very important that systems to provide this sustained support are included in any programme using the Trainer Development course. The final section of this guide suggests options for doing this.
www.britishcouncil.org 1
The course is suitable for teacher educators at any stage of the framework. It is equally suitable for teachers who have little or no experience of delivering teacher training who wish to move into this field.
Eligible participants will have a recognised teaching qualification. The language proficiency required is a minimum B2 on the CEFR scale across all skills. Whilst, as mentioned above, previous experience is not a pre-requisite, participants should have a minimum of 5 years’ teaching experience. Course trainers are expected to have extensive teaching experience and substantial experience in teacher training. As a minimum they will have a first degree, plus a higher level academic or professional qualification as well as a formal teaching qualification. Their language proficiency will be a minimum C1 competency on the CEFR scale across all skills. They will be at stage 3 or 4 of the developmental stages in the CPD Framework for Teacher Educators.
www.britishcouncil.org 2
CPD Framework for Teacher Educators
The course supports development of several of the professional practices in the framework as well as components of the ‘Enabling skills’ and ‘Self-awareness features outlined in the framework. See table below for details of these.
Professional practices ü Understanding the teaching context. ü Understanding how teachers learn. ü Planning, managing and moderating. ü Teacher learning. ü Managing and developing learning. ü Resources for teachers. ü Supporting and mentoring teachers. ü Monitoring teacher potential and performance.
Enabling skills ü Communicating effectively. ü Teamworking skills. ü Building relationships. ü Effective organisational skills. ü Increasing motivation.
Self-awareness features ü Openness. ü Conscientiousness. ü Interactivity. ü Empathy.
www.britishcouncil.org 3
Delivering the course
The course is progressive and workshops are intended to be delivered in sequence. Workshops 1–5 provide approximately three to four hours of content, though the actual time each workshop takes will vary according to the level of experience of the participants. Workshop 6 includes microtraining and a full day is recommended for this. Workshop 7 requires two to three days. Note, workshops 5 and 6 require additional materials from a range of British Council courses. evaluate training materials for trainees of different experiential levels.
The course is suitable for delivery to groups of up to 24 participants, depending on the size of the training room. The room should be equipped with a board and provided with paper, coloured pens, flip- chart paper, scissors, Blu-Tak and Post-it notes.
Icons are used in the Trainer Notes to indicate approximate timings for each section. In the coursebook, icons are used to indicate dynamics – individual, pair or group work and for activity types such as speaking, reading, writing and role play. For workshops 6 and 7, participants may need to have photocopies made of their activities.
Content and approach
The course combines a communicative, learner-centred and inclusive approach with input on training concepts such as adult learning, making reasonable adjustments, learning preferences, motivation and feedback The course tasks and activities are pro-active and require a high degree of participant involvement. The approach is very much based on practical learning and course participants are encouraged to relate workshop content to their own educational contexts and to share ideas and learning from their personal experiences. The course begins with a focus on teaching and training roles, and transferable skills. Subsequent workshops explore learning styles, motivation, feedback, materials evaluation, and practical delivery issues. The activities participants engage in include group discussion, analysis, presentations, questionnaires and games. Activities can be adapted for participants to use both in teaching and teacher training contexts. Each workshop concludes with guided activities to promote reflective practice. The course is progressive and each workshop builds on learning from the previous one. The table below provides a synopsis of the content of the workshops. An integral part of the course is the micro-training which takes place in Workshop 6. This provides opportunities for participants to try out British Council course activities within a supportive framework and to give and receive constructive feedback.
Workshop 7 provides practical guidance on planning and structuring a workshop. Participants share experience, knowledge and ideas in brainstorming, discussion, analysis and planning activities. The principal outcome of the workshop is the creation and delivery of a 50-minute workshop related to the specific working contexts of the participants.
www.britishcouncil.org 4
Workshop 1 Main areas of focus − Teaching beliefs, styles and approaches. Introduction − Teacher roles, training roles and transferrable skills. − Differences between teaching children and teaching/training adults. − Self-evaluation.
Workshop 2 Main areas of focus − Initial assessment. Understanding your − Inclusion, learner differences, learning styles, learner preferences. course participants − Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. − Maslow’s theory of needs.
Workshop 3 Main areas of focus − Analysis of British Council teacher development activities. Issues and challenges − Issues and challenges in delivering training. − Problem-solving issues in training delivery.
Workshop 4 Main areas of focus − Factors of effective training. Making training − Supporting and building rapport with course participants. effective − Constructive, sensitive and developmental feedback. − Techniques for effective instructions.
Workshop 5 Main areas of focus − Evaluation of British Council course materials. Preparing for training − Effective learning outcomes. − Peer feedback criteria. − Selection, adaptation and preparation of teacher development activities.
Workshop 6 Main areas of focus − Delivery of teacher development activities to peers. Micro-training − Provision of constructive peer feedback.
Workshop 7 Main areas of focus − Review of learning from the course. Workshop design and − Analysis of the structure of a British Council workshop. delivery − Workshop assessment criteria. − Planning and design of a workshop. − Peer workshop delivery. − Peer feedback.
www.britishcouncil.org 5
Tips for trainers To help trainers prepare for training, here are some tips.
ü Expand your knowledge of the workshop themes – visit our website for articles and ideas www.teachingenglish.org.uk ü Look at the learning outcomes of the workshops and write down any questions you have. Then read the trainer notes – are your questions answered, or do you need more information? If more information is needed, go to our website. ü Equality, diversity and inclusion - although the materials include a range of task types, getting to know your participants will help you to adapt activities to ensure that everyone is catered for. Carry out a needs’ analysis prior to the start of the course, or, if this is not feasible, on the first day of the course. ü Check understanding – although the participants are teachers, don’t assume that all concepts and methodology will be familiar to them. ü Monitor – again, you need to do this for the same reasons you would do it with learners, i.e. to ensure they are able to complete tasks. Provide support where they need it and be on hand to answer any questions they have. ü Personalisation – although many of the tasks require participants to relate course content to their own contexts, you can further encourage this by giving examples from your own experience where possible. ü Pacing – the materials are flexible, if participants need more time or less time to complete an activity, slow down or speed up. ü You may find it more practicable for participants to hold some discussion in their mother tongue where this would enable a more extensive exchange of views.
Tips for course participants Participants are expected to play an active role in their own development by: ü Reflecting on their learning. ü Ensuring they are inclusive and co-operative in their dealings with other course participants. ü Applying the methodology presented in the course to their own educational contexts. ü Actively contributing to the learning environment by sharing personal experiences and knowledge. ü Engaging proactively in the training process through discussions, group work and micro-training.
www.britishcouncil.org 6
Supporting the continuing professional development of teacher educators participating in the course
Participants in training need to have the opportunities for extended practice, feedback on their performance and mutual support to ensure that their learning is effectively embedded throughout their activity as teacher educators.
The following are options to be included in Teaching for Success programmes to provide such extended support of teacher educators. Any programme containing these elements needs to be designed and co- ordinated by an expert teacher educator.
• Online community of practice for all trainers where they can share ideas and get help. • Peer observation systems. • Developmental observation and feedback from experienced teacher educators. • Performance evaluation systems. • Further reading lists and discussion groups. • Sharing video of teacher educators at work in the training room. • Follow-up events and webinars exploring more advanced areas of teacher education. • School leader training in supporting professional learning of teachers in school.
www.britishcouncil.org 7
Appendix 11: Description of British Council's English for Teaching course
(see the next page)
346
English for Teaching 1
Course information and trainer’s guide
www.teachingenglish.org.uk
English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
Contents
Contents page
1 About the course Why we wrote English for Teaching 1 2 What is English for Teaching 1? 2 How long does the course take? 3 Who is English for Teaching for? 3 What facilities and equipment are necessary? 4 What is expected of participants? 4
2 Course components Icons 5
3 Course structure Syllabus 6 Approach and methodology 6 The modules 6
4 Course contents Language 7 Why language analysis? 7 Why consciousness-raising 7 Common mistakes 7 Methodology 8 Pronunciation 8 Magazine 8 Vocabulary 8 Activity page 9 In the classroom 9 Reflection 9
5 Teacher Development Journal 10
6 Assessment Progression to EfT2 13
7 Recommended reading for trainers 13
Appendix 1 Icons 14
Appendix 2 Syllabus 17
Appendix 3 A2 and B1 Level descriptors 19
Appendix 4 How to deliver EfT 20
Appendix 5 How to use the Development Journal 21 Self-assessment 22 Follow up activities 22 Procedures 22 Modules 22
Appendix 6 Level testing participants 23
Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 1 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
1 About the course
Why we wrote English for Teaching 1
The English of L2 English language teachers in many parts of the world is below the B1 Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR)1 level. This has inevitable consequences for teachers - able to offer only a restricted linguistic range; and for language learners - whose progress is correspondingly hampered.
Whilst a General English course may seem to be an obvious choice for these teachers, there are good reasons why this may simply not be feasible. For example: local availability of courses, time constraints, loss of face (in cultures where teachers are expected to be the experts), and costs.
More significantly, a General English course does not provide a framework to enable teachers to apply and practise the language they are learning in teaching-related contexts. Teachers who have received no training, or whose training has consisted of ‘traditional’ methodology, face particular challenges in teaching English. To enable them to teach more effectively, it is important that they develop both linguistic competence and confidence in parallel with developing English language teaching skills and knowledge. English for Teaching (EfT) has been created to meet these dual needs.
The course will have benefits not only for the course participants, but their improved language competency and teaching skills will have a positive impact on their learners and colleagues and the schools in which they work. For example, course participants can share their learning with colleagues in their schools by using the course materials for discussion and demonstration of language and techniques.
EfT provides a viable option for Ministries of Education seeking to improve the quality of English language learning and teaching.
What is English for Teaching 1?
English for Teaching (EfT) is an in-service course for L2 teachers whose English language competency is A2.2 See descriptor below, from the Common Reference Levels: global scale
Can understand sentences and frequently used expressions related to areas of most immediate relevance (e.g. very basic personal and family information, shopping, local geography, employment). Can communicate in simple and routine tasks requiring a simple and direct exchange of information on familiar and routine matters. Can describe in simple terms aspects of his/her background, immediate environment and matters in areas of immediate need.
The language component of the syllabus provides input and practice on the grammatical and lexical items requisite for progression to B1. See descriptor below, from the Common Reference Levels: global scale.
Can understand the main points of clear standard input on familiar matters regularly encountered in work, school, leisure, etc. Can deal with most situations likely to arise whilst travelling in an area where the language is spoken. Can produce simple connected text on topics which are familiar or of personal interest. Can describe experiences and events, dreams, hopes and ambitions and briefly give reasons and explanations for opinions and plans.
For Syllabus and fuller CEFR descriptors, see Appendix 2.
1 For more information on CEFR, go to http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/linguistic/cadre_en.asp 2 For the complete CEFR text, go to http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/linguistic/Source/Framework_EN.pdf
2 Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
The course comprises 18 modules which combine a structured language syllabus with input on communicative, learner-centred and reflective teaching approaches. Participants engage in a varied range of tasks and activities which enable them to develop grammar analysis, teaching, speaking, listening, reading, writing and reflective skills. The tasks and activities provide models of current ELT methodology which participants can adapt for use with their own learners.
The course title ´English for Teaching´ was chosen to reflect the rationale of the course, ie, that the content is directly applicable to English language teaching environments and that it has been written specifically for teachers of English.
An integral part of the course is the micro teaching stage: ‘In the Classroom’. This provides opportunities for participants to try out teaching techniques and ideas within a supportive framework and to give and receive constructive feedback.
How long does the course take?
The course provides approximately 120 hours of content. The timescale for course delivery will be a local decision. In order to allow participants time to reflect on their work and complete the development journal effectively, it is recommended that the course is delivered once or twice a week or twice a month. Alternatively, it may be more appropriate to run part of the course intensively during a period when teachers are free from classroom duties or on holiday. To suit time availability, the course may also be delivered in 3 blocks: Modules 1-6, Modules 7- 12 and modules 13-18.
Who is English for Teaching for?
EfT is aimed at teachers who are at stages 1, 2 or 3 of the British Council’s Continuing Professional Development Framework (see illustration below).
1 Starting Learning the principles
2 Newly-qualified Putting principles into practice
3 Developing Building confidence and skills
4 Proficient Demonstrating confidence, experience and reflection
5 Advanced Exemplifying good practice
6 Specialist Leading and advising
The course is suitable for teachers with different degrees of teaching experience: some teachers may have substantial experience of teaching other subjects, but have had to switch to teaching English because of local or national Ministry of Education requirements. Others may be qualified English language teachers who wish to develop more up-to-date teaching skills in tandem with improving their language competency.
As a pre-requisite to the course, participants are expected to have achieved an A2 competency level.
In addition, participants should have a minimum of one year’s teaching experience in order to be able to reflect and contribute to the group activities. Participants who are between A2 and B1 competency levels could begin the course at a module which best reflects their linguistic knowledge. However, we do recommend they work through the methodology sections of the earlier modules.
Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 3 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
What facilities and equipment are necessary?
The course is suitable for delivery to groups of up to 24 participants, depending on the size of the training room. The room should be equipped with a board and it would be useful to have paper, coloured pens and post-it notes available. The course includes recorded CD listening material and DVD clips. These are also available via computer. If equipment is not available, tape and video-scripts can be given to participants though this will involve modifying the accompanying activities.
Trainers delivering the course are expected to be experienced in the delivery of teacher training and to be familiar with:
• the theory and practice of communicative language teaching • reflective teaching and Learning • encouraging a learner centred approach • learning styles and their impact on learning and teaching
Trainers should have a minimum CEFR level of C1, or Cambridge ESOL Proficiency Level or IELTS 6.5/7.0.
What is expected of participants?
Participants are expected to play an active role in their own development by:
• Continually reflecting on their own teaching • Applying to their own teaching contexts the accepted and current teaching practice presented in the course • Actively contributing to the learning environment through sharing personal experiences and knowledge • Engaging in the training process through discussions, groupwork and micro teaching • Taking responsibility for their own development and demonstrating this through the Development Journal.
4 Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
2 Course components
The course provides two main components: a fully comprehensive trainer’s book with detailed training plan, including information and explanatory comments to provide extra support for trainers; and a coursebook for participants which comprises a range of activities reflecting current ELT classroom practice. The main ELT terminology from the modules is listed and explained in a separate glossary. The course also includes a Development Journal (see below), a CD and DVD.
Icons
Icons are used in the Trainer’s book to indicate approximate timings and to help locate information easily. In the coursebook, icons are used to indicate activity types. See Appendix 1 for an explanation of the icons.
Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 5 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
3 Course structure
Syllabus
The course syllabus is based on the linguistic and communicative competencies of the Common European Framework of Reference for Language (CEFR), and contains the language items required to progress from A2 to B1. See Appendix 2 for descriptors.
Approach and methodology
EfT follows a balanced approach which includes both a focus on communicative methodology as well as opportunities for study and analysis of grammatical patterns. Key features are:
• contextualised language input and practice • opportunities to relate content to participants’ own teaching situations • communicative task stages related to ELT contexts which guides participants through a series of preparation activities to complete the task • analysis of target language items • focus on common learner mistakes to determine underlying causes • consciousness-raising approach to language analysis through guided discovery and deductive activities • communicative skills development through pair and group work, class surveys, role play, classroom games • sharing experience, knowledge, and views through discussion work and personalised activities • exposure to different teaching techniques and methods • reflective activities to facilitate learning and improve teaching • hands on practice through micro teaching and tasks in the Teacher Development Journal
The Modules
The course comprises 18 modules. Each module provides up to 7 hours of face2face content. There are three review modules: Modules 6, 12 and 18 which provide further practice and consolidation of learning from the preceding modules. Some modules - 1, 3, 5 and 13 contain video clips and all modules contain recorded listening material.
The modules begin with a language section which contextualises the target language specified in the syllabus. It is analysed and practised through tasks and activities which participants are encouraged to relate to their own classrooms. The stages following the language section are: Pronunciation, Magazine, Vocabulary, Activity Page, In the Classroom (an important feature of the course where participants put learning into practice through peer teaching sessions (In the Classroom), and Reflection.
6 Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
4 Course contents
This part of the Trainer Guide provides detailed information on the rationale of the coursebook contents. The materials are however, intended to be flexible and trainers may adapt them to suit their own contexts by selecting, substituting, modifying, adding and leaving out activities as appropriate for the needs of the participants.
Language
The first part of this stage is built around a task and includes – a pre-task stage, a task stage and a reporting on task stage. The aim of the pre-task stage is to explore the topic, activate and share language participants know, and prepare for task completion. The reporting stage involves planning and presenting a report on an aspect of the task to the whole group. There are ‘useful language boxes’ containing exponents related to the theme of the task to help with task preparation. Tasks include: describing learners, carrying out a class survey on work experience, describing the ideal classroom, presentation of teaching resources, and planning a school trip. For suggestions on how to deliver this section, please see Appendix 3.
Why language analysis?
Tasks and recordings containing the target language items, as well as language produced by participants provide the data for language analysis. Language analysis is an essential skill for teachers to develop. It is part of the process of teaching effectively. It is important for teachers to develop the habit of carrying out language analysis prior to teaching lessons which include a language focus. Ensuring that they understand how language works in different contexts will help them to teach more confidently and have a better awareness of learner difficulties and confusions.
Why consciousness-raising?
Consciousness-raising (CR) activities help participants to make sense of language patterns and discover how the language works. The focus is on form and meaning combined. CR helps participants to build language knowledge, increase grammatical awareness, recall structures and patterns more effectively. Consciousness- raising activities used in the course, include ‘noticing’. There are two aspects to noticing:
(a) Paying attention – to grammar as it occurs in different contexts (b) Noticing the gap – participants becoming aware of differences in their performance and L1 competence. Following noticing activities, participants return to their tasks and reports, and consider how they could change or improve them in the light of what they have ‘noticed’.
Types of noticing activities in the course include:
• Comparing how different tenses affect meaning • Identifying how time expressions relate to tenses • Defining question types • Identifying rules and patterns • Analysing differences in forms
Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 7 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
Common mistakes
In this stage, participants analyse the underlying reasons for the types of mistakes learners make with the target forms. They discuss how to help learners understand and deal with these mistakes. Participants are encouraged to reflect on their own classes and students and add to the typical mistakes presented in the coursebook.
Methodology
The methodology stages present a selection of teaching techniques and activities which exemplify models of current ELT practice, including: elicitation & concept checking questions, noticing, using timelines, error correction, maintaining discipline, encouraging learner independence, setting up writing activities etc.
The methodology relates to the language contexts of the modules. For example, module 2 contextualises the target language - question forms, through ‘getting to know you’ and needs analysis questionnaires. The methodology stage then deals with elicitation and concept questioning techniques.
A variety of resources are used to demonstrate and illustrate the techniques, including DVD clips, cartoon stories, descriptions, sample activities and pictures. Participants engage in analysis and discussion, try out activities, assess and compare techniques and activities with reference to their own experience and teaching contexts.
The methodology techniques and activities will be new for many participants and there may be concerns about the relevance to their own classrooms. The discussion and analysis tasks are designed to encourage participants to relate the methodology to their own teaching contexts. There are opportunities for adapting and practising techniques in the ‘In the Classroom’ section and the Development Journal.
Pronunciation
This takes participants through the basics of pronunciation: stress and intonation patterns, stress and meaning, voiced and unvoiced consonants, rhythm, connected speech, linking and elision. The materials are linked to the target language and several modules provide recordings for study and practice. The pronunciation activities can be adapted for use with participants’ own learners. The methodology section in Module 8 deals with how to teach pronunciation.
Magazine
This stage provides reading material giving further input on the methodology and themes of the module. For example, in Module 1, the article is ‘Classroom English – a waste of time or a communicative opportunity?’ This relates to the target language and methodology of the module, ie, past and present simple and continuous forms and their use to set up classroom activities and give instructions. The articles are accompanied by activities for participants to adapt and try out in their own classrooms.
Vocabulary
Vocabulary is dealt with systematically in each module. It ranges from individual words, phrases, expressions, idioms and collocations which arise in the module. Practice activities include vocabulary building, matching, gap-fills, word-searches, memory games, and learner training vocabulary skills. All activities can be adapted for use with participants’ own classes.
8 Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
Activity page
This stage introduces participants to classroom games and activities, such as: Find someone who …, Noughts and Crosses, spot the difference, crosswords, jazz chants, writing games, role plays. Participants firstly engage in the activities as ‘learners’, and then use the experience to discuss how to adapt them for their own classes.
In the classroom
In this stage participants engage in simulated classroom practice, where they role play teachers and learners (Micro-teaching). The aim is for participants to try out ideas from the modules and receive oral feedback from their peers in a supportive environment.
Participants may feel nervous about micro teaching if they have no previous experience of it. The activities are designed to be as non-threatening as possible. It is non-judgemental and often it is carried out in small groups. To help participants feel comfortable, explain that micro teaching is a technique for professional development which enables them to try out teaching ideas, activities and techniques with each other and receive feedback which will help them to improve and develop. Discuss the advantages with them, ie, that it provides an opportunity to practise teaching in a non-threatening, non-judgemental environment. Feedback is given sensitively. The idea is to boost confidence by highlighting what went well and foster development by pinpointing areas for improvement. There are only disadvantages if the group are not supportive of one another and feedback is not constructive.
Reflection
The aim of this final stage in each module is to help participants develop as reflective practitioners. The activities are designed to encourage participants to consider their learning from the course and how it can be incorporated into their everyday teaching practice. Participants engage in a range of reflective activities including: discussions, action planning, post-module evaluation, and mingles.
Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 9 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
5 Teacher Development journal (DJ)
This is an integral part of the course which is linked to the learning outcomes of each module (language development and methodology). The Development Journal can also be used as an assessable record of participants’ progress and achievements. (See 6 Assessment).
There is one DJ module for each module in the course except for the review modules (6,12 and 18). Each DJ module consists of two parts -
Language focuses on the language aims of the main modules (structure, vocabulary, pronunciation etc.) Teaching focuses on the methodology of the main modules.
Each part includes a task, which participants complete.
Objectives The DJ has two main objectives, which are to provide participants with the opportunity to:
Demonstrate their understanding of the learning outcomes of the main module
Personalise the content of the main module
See examples below for Modules 1-5:
Self - Module Task Grade Assessment
Language Write about your experience as a teacher/student 1 Teaching Create a find someone who… activity for your own class
Language Create a report about your training group 2 Teaching Write concept checking questions for your class
Language Write about your school 3 Teaching Create a Learner Training worksheet for your class
Language Create a Learner Profile 4 Teaching Create a correction code for your class
Write about differences and similarities between Language you and your teaching partner 5
Teaching Analyse Target Language for your class
10 Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
Below are examples of specific tasks for module 3.
Module 3 Language
Write about your school
Think about your school. What are all the positive things about it? e.g. There aren't many lazy students. Complete the first column in the table.
Now do the same for the negative column. e.g. There's a lot of old furniture in the staff room.
Write notes. Don't worry if you can't fill in every gap.
Positive things Negative things
There's a(n)
There isn't a(n)
There are some
There aren't any
There's a lot of old furniture in the staff room
There are a lot of
There isn't much
There aren't many lazy students
There are a few
There's little
Now look at this structure for a short essay:
Introduction Every school has a mixture of postitive things and negative things. Here are some of the things I like about my school and some of the things I don't like.
First paragraph There are lots of good things...
Second paragraph However, there are some negative things...
Final paragraph In conclusion, I like my school because...
Use this structure, or one of your own, with your notes. Write 150 words about your school.
Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 11 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
Module 3 Teaching
Create a Learner Training worksheet for your class
Look at this worksheet a teacher has made to help her class start recording vocabulary. She has been teaching vocabulary about free time activities and has used this to demonstrate the different techniques.
Think of some vocabulary you will teach to your class this term. Write it here.
Make a worksheet for your class to help them record this new vocabulary. You can make your own worksheet or use the template provided.
12 Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
6 Assessment
As stated in the previous section, the Development Journal may be used to provide a basis for assessment. Trainers can use the DJ to assess participants as they progress through the course. For each task trainers award three separate grades from 0 to 10, then calculate the mean average to get the overall grade for each participant. See marking criteria in Appendix 4.
The recommended pass mark is 6. Re-submission policy is a local decision. However, it is recommended that participants who receive an average of less than 6 for any particular module be given a second chance to submit their work.
Please see Appendix 4 for guidance on how to use the Development Journal for assessment.
Progression to EfT2
Participants who have successfully completed EfT1- with a passmark of 60% or above - may progress to EfT2.
7 Recommended reading for Trainers
A framework for Task-based Learning, Jane Willis, Longman, 1996
Uncovering Grammar, Scott Thornbury, MacMillan, 2001
Learning Teaching, Jim Scrivener, MacMillan 2005
Learning and Teaching English, Lindsay and Knight, OUP 2006
Creating Chants and Songs, Carolyn Graham, OUP, 2006.
Grammar for Young Learners, Lewis and Mol, OUP 2009
Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 13 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
Appendix 1
Icons
These are used in both the trainer’s book and coursebook, as follows:
Trainer’s book
Clocks - These indicate approximate lengths of activities. They are a guide only. Trainers should decide on the timing of activities depending on the abilities and knowledge of course participants. It may be that the participants require less time or more time than is indicated by the clocks.
up to 1 hour or more
up to 45 minutes
up to 30 minutes
up to 15-20 minutes
✓ Answers or Feedback
Additional information on theme/topic
Coursebook
Game Groupwork Individual task Listening Magazine
Pairwork Pronunciation Question Reflection Reading
Role play Speaking Video Vocabulary Writing
The examples on the next two pages show extracts from the trainer’s book and coursebook with icons.
14 Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
Trainer’s book
English for Teaching 1 Module 5: In my experience Trainer book
1 Language
1.1 Meet May Lee
This activity introduces the topic of work experience and activates schemata through discussion and pre-teaching of vocabulary. A gist listening task introduces the target language in context, and helps prepare for the detailed listening task which follows.
Materials • Coursebook 1.1 • CD recording
Instructions • Ask participants to look at picture 1. Explain that the woman on the right is called May Lee and she’s a teacher. • Divide participants into pairs. • Ask them to discuss pictures 1 to 5 – what do they tell us about May Lee’s work experience? • Elicit some ideas from pairs. • Play the recording for participants to check their ideas. • Whole class feedback.
Answers
Picture 1 She went to university (graduated 2004) Picture 2 She teaches English Picture 3 She’s had her current job for five years. Picture 4 She’s worked in two schools. Picture 5 She’s taught kindergarten/her favourite class is kindergarten.
Information Ask participants how using the pictures helped to prepare them for the listening task – by introducing the topic and key vocabulary and helping them to think about the kinds of things they might hear. Point out that listening to check predictions is a good way to give learners a reason for listening and is more personalised than simply answering questions from the textbook
Module 4: In my experience © British Council 2011 3
Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 15 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
Coursebook
English for Teaching 1 Module 5: In my experience Coursebook
1 Language
1.1 Meet May Lee
May Lee is an English language teacher. Look at these pictures. What do they tell you about May Lee’s work experience?
Picture 1 Picture 2 Picture 3
Picture 4 Picture 5
Now listen to May Lee talking about her work experience. Were you right?
Module 5: In my experience © British Council 2011 1
16 Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
Appendix 2
Syllabus ors ry it! and
oom wing ent ou T ering en err ecting ection In the er w to teach or ocabulary vie echniques Classr ole pl ay di ff for holding stages of a ranking jniors' for alphabet r Setting up lesson plan T Corr Eliciting Re Deliv corr functions Ho 4.4. Y grammar 4.5 Set up an err Instructions 2.2 Giving attention 3.2 activities spok instructions code w v onunciation eading ocabulary lesson stages activities Eliciting Sign-posting pr Consolidating ne Design a spelling R activities v competition w on't e e e e e es for ew ork flection oductory flectiv flectiv flectiv cles flection flectiv flectiv Re eeping a discussion fram action cir objectiv planning questions Re Re SMART Intr Re re questions statements I will... w Re Find someone K Re mingle What? So What? No who teaching diary What? ost module w ocusing questions P questions student Making plans F bottle - getting Self-assessment Message in a One minute feedback ev alutation w vie vie rd y ation oom w e vie ding oss wo riting eading ole pla esent discussion games Pyramid W Making a contract observ r Re classr Names in a hat activities ence osses Activity Page ecor oad of life: re earner training 1: ocabulary of countables and cr uncountables The question game R Self-assessment Noughts and Find someone wh o L R of question forms fer ex change: re for learner s v Information ompts for e
ch comparing past Spot the and pr Jazz Chants Using pictur The talking game Half a cr pr jigsaw r dif e e e, elated efor oom ess esear om the ofessional writ : wast visual oom ating, esson en, work ds r ogr oach - ested in ests and , main ds and ds ds connected ess r r r or List een on, ealistic d-desk-chair; acceptable, describing appr communicativ phrases in to classr connectied with interaction, k consistent, Wo encourage Wo Phrases motiv inter ability - good at, d ev elopment Vw Wo action r with pr r contracts - classr inter onunciation essions onunciation y terms fr e, opportunities oach, ds connected auxiliary elated to language r too long, on the eal communication, a language point,
find out, save time xis connected Expr ocabulary erminology: ocabulary appr brainstorm, antonym, synonym aids, elicit, and spelling with the pr T building sounds Stages of a L Wo V Le with pr oblems, check V ch: Ke , ta ke oom English: er ed, activat ing, notice, train, ther essions: ds connected with learner dsear wledge-learning-pr r r oom e tance of xical sets: boar edict pr ation wing oach erminology: egist start, stop. meaning and pr of time, set up tasks, ta ke r verb, subject, object, learner- in pairs, ask and answe r, centr hot tips. other hand, r pr Expr training: tool, encourage, modules 1-5 Classr T Wo Collocations r analysis, eg: Le Wo kno sh ow e ofessional rd vie
appr Communicati ve contracts: re Classr The Motiv Impor and using them Agony uncle Pr d ev elopment for establishing rules teacher ork balance ou a or toon strips for eading whizz - aining - e y oblems and oss wo esson Planning . Mo re oom traditional advice writing activities grammar whizz or interactiv Life-w methodology a r Modern v Agony Aunt - L Car Ar cr questionnair Pr our eading oom ery t of tunity?" oom ?" ection oducing Magazine t earner Tr benefits of using English classr techniques What is an err hom ew ork" on the topic of English - a waste intr corr techniques questioning language analysis "L "Classr "Doing y "Don't tell them, Using English in The Ar the classr Ask them". The Jigsaw r Ideas for Disc ov communicati ve oppor code of time or a on noticing ess
rd eak forms eak forms and ess ent spelling - assimilation W elision and Silent letters Using polite Contractions, Connected speech - w contractions intonation thm oiced ess ess fer oiced and str str unv phonemic char consonant s Sentence str V Phonemic cubes Rhy Sounds & the Dif same sound onunciation rd rd oom ess & Pr questions Wo Connected Intonation in Syllables, wo Syllable str Wo speech phonemes str patterns ter e ection ompts classr ws ation pr tance of oom ocabulary; wing oduct or corr w to giv vie fecti ve w v onunciation ocess eaching speaking eaching functions ocabulary esson planning echniques for eaching echniques for eading observ classr management re Ef Err T Ho Impor T techniques feedback af pr and staging v pr r strategies; using elicitng stories in class consolidating T T ne L T Setting up writing Using ne pictu re in guided writing vs.pr activities - onunciation Methodology echniques for eaching grammar pr noticing Mutual dictation Using timelines Elicitation T Giving T checking instructions mingle activities Concept Setting up ? oup our xt y rip ces oom om s ou w of viour y ask tner has ork w my T e esentations: vie esentation xplaing the esour eading mini- riting a classr changed ideal lesson Describing and e Pr Describe and Planning a Describing a r par teaching School T Ho discuss r xperience our debate beha pr life plan What will Ideal student Speaking Giving a gr Re Describe y happen ne learning points activities on w Describing Getting to Class sur ve y Describing e Describing W the ideal life-lines school pictu re nair question- kn ow better learners story fr
es ork
xt oom ces and ting oaches to oom our onment xperiences wledge of conte xis esson plans, eaching eer eading skills esour le appr r activities eliciting and Describing Comparing Exploiting L T change setting up writing r teaching course plans consolidating om modules 1- alking about alking about alking about earner est y Language in outines elated to w ducation in our futu re alking about alking about eaching egulations. Questioning learners - good life e the school 5 learner grammar items autonomy characteristics kno T T Questionnair T Life ev ents T envir fr L the classr r r techniques in Classr y speaking r personal plans and ambitions. suggestions suppor T E T School life. T Giving advice the futu re teacher s when Rules and car and making , ys, in e to onouns to, ganised essions ve erbs - wada ? What .... orse than e pr a lot of, es: 'er', 'est', edictions. y, xpr orking – lazy ould lik , no erbs: et. ated, or ar elativ d-w 7 ears ago, in the eams and es - learner erbs. der in questions y. e plans: going een - not 3 y erbs of manner eg: 3-1 or esent continuous, equency adv rd obabl y egular v entl y, e': What's ... li ke , fluentl ould, what about, why Adjectiv ten, sometimes. esent simple and es & superlativ , pr esent habits and states e/less/ better/w ould and still for comparing since, just y esent and past simple e; wo e? ely w of 1 ou, if... w of 1-5 on't, might for pr wledging and challenging ganised, k pr ated – demotiv w Pr w of 7- 11 e clauses and r , interrupting, ested. Adv essions - last ye ys, of Language d ev elopment e forms: pr vie vie vie esent simple. Time e esent perfect contrasted with fectiv e egular/irr vie erbs of permission and xpr ook lik 2000, curr pr Quantifiers - much, man continuous + past characteristics: har inter R alwa - disor Re Question forms: 'wh' questions; Countable & uncountable nouns. Uses of 'lik Pr open/closed questions; questions with: fo r, L e simple/continuous forms. Time little, enough. with auxiliary 'do'; question structur motiv nineties. Fr ef floor ackno don't y definitely oblication - must, can, ha opinions to/planning to. Dr 1st conditional. Adv Will, w language of debate - holding the Describing futur V 2nd conditional and modals for Re suggestions and advice. Shall, ambitions - want to/w should should, w elativ constructions past and pr as/as. Re Comparativ Used to, w R passi ve Futur going to. better/mor w s e e
es alk u een w it e is in 6R The w do T 13 18 ties 12 eading yo hand 2 Any erybody Learner Giving a school 15 mak 14 Module helping 5 In my w to learn R 9 Let's about it xperience our hands mista ke 1Back to 8 Ho betw & teacher esponsibili the lines compar 3 The ideal 4 Learning 7 Ho futur Ev questions? 16 17 e 1 y the futur r used to be ho 10 write right! 1 Then & no
Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 17 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
Syllabus ors ry it! and oom wing ent ou T ering en err ecting ection In the er w to teach or ocabulary vie echniques Classr ole pl ay di ff for holding stages of a ranking jniors' for alphabet r Corr T Setting up lesson plan Eliciting Re Deliv functions corr Ho grammar 4.4. Y attention Instructions 2.2 Giving 4.5 Set up an err 3.2 activities spok instructions code w v onunciation eading ocabulary lesson stages activities Eliciting Sign-posting Consolidating ne pr R Design a spelling activities competition v w on't e e e e e es for ew ork flection oductory flectiv flectiv flectiv cles flection flectiv flectiv Re eeping a discussion action fram cir questions objectiv planning Re Intr SMART Re Re re questions statements I will... w Find someone Re K Re What? So mingle What? No who teaching diary What? ost module w ocusing questions questions P student Making plans Self-assessment F bottle - getting Message in a One minute feedback ev alutation w vie vie rd y ation oom w e vie ding oss wo riting eading ole pla esent discussion games W Making a Pyramid contract observ r Re classr Names in a hat activities ence osses Activity Page ecor oad of life: re earner training 1: ocabulary of countables and cr uncountables R The question game Find someone wh o Noughts and L Self-assessment of question forms R fer ex change: re v for learner s Information ompts for e
ch comparing past and pr Spot the Jazz Chants The talking game Using pictur Half a cr jigsaw r pr dif e e e, elated efor oom ess esear om the ofessional writ : wast visual oom ating, esson en, work ds r ogr oach - ested in ests and , main ds and ds ds connected ess r r r or List een on, ealistic d-desk-chair; acceptable, describing appr communicativ phrases in to classr k consistent, connectied with interaction, Wo encourage Phrases Wo ability - good at, inter d ev elopment Vw motiv Wo action r with pr contracts - r classr inter onunciation essions onunciation y terms fr e, opportunities oach, ds connected auxiliary elated to language r too long, on the eal communication, a language point,
find out, save time xis connected Expr ocabulary erminology: ocabulary appr brainstorm, antonym, synonym aids, elicit, and spelling with the pr T building sounds Stages of a L Wo V Le with pr oblems, check V ch: Ke , ta ke oom English: er ed, activat ing, notice, train, ther essions: ds connected with learner dsear wledge-learning-pr r r oom e tance of xical sets: boar edict pr ation wing oach erminology: egist start, stop. meaning and pr of time, set up tasks, ta ke r verb, subject, object, learner- in pairs, ask and answe r, centr hot tips. other hand, r pr Expr training: tool, encourage, modules 1-5 Classr T Collocations r analysis, eg: Le Wo Wo kno sh ow e - ofessional rd vie
appr Communicati ve contracts: re Classr Motiv The Impor and using them Agony uncle Pr d ev elopment for establishing rules teacher ork balance ou a or toon strips for eading whizz - aining e y oblems and oss wo esson Planning . Mo re oom traditional advice writing activities grammar whizz or interactiv Life-w a r methodology Modern v Agony Aunt - L Car Ar cr questionnair Pr our eading oom ery t of tunity?" oom ?" ection oducing Magazine t earner Tr benefits of using English classr techniques hom ew ork" on the topic of English - a waste intr What is an err corr techniques questioning language analysis "L "Classr "Don't tell them, "Doing y Using English in The Ar the classr Ask them". The Jigsaw r Ideas for Disc ov communicati ve oppor of time or a code on noticing ess rd eak forms eak forms and ess ent spelling - assimilation W elision and Silent letters Contractions, Using polite Connected speech - w contractions intonation thm oiced ess ess fer oiced and str str phonemic char unv consonant s Sentence str Phonemic cubes V Rhy Sounds & the Dif same sound onunciation rd rd oom ess & Pr questions Wo Intonation in Syllables, wo Connected Syllable str Wo speech phonemes str patterns ter e ection ompts classr ws ation pr tance of oom ocabulary; wing oduct or corr w to giv vie fecti ve w v onunciation ocess eaching speaking eaching functions ocabulary esson planning echniques for eaching echniques for eading observ classr management re Ef Err Ho T Impor T techniques feedback af pr and staging v pr r strategies; using stories in class elicitng consolidating T ne T T L pictu re Using ne Setting up writing in guided writing vs.pr activities - onunciation Methodology echniques for eaching grammar pr noticing Mutual dictation Elicitation Using timelines T Giving T checking instructions mingle activities Concept Setting up ? oup our xt y rip ces oom om s ou w of viour y ask tner has ork w my T e esentations: vie esentation xplaing the esour eading mini- riting a classr changed lesson ideal Describing and e Pr Describe and Planning a Describing a r par teaching School T Ho discuss r xperience our debate beha pr life plan Ideal student What will Giving a gr Speaking Re Describe y happen ne learning points activities on w Describing Getting to Class sur ve y Describing e Describing W the ideal life-lines school pictu re nair question- story fr learners better kn ow es ork xt oom ces and ting oaches to oom our onment xperiences wledge of conte xis esson plans, eaching eer eading skills esour appr le r activities eliciting and Describing Exploiting L Comparing T change setting up r writing teaching course plans consolidating om modules 1- alking about alking about alking about earner est y Language in outines elated to w ducation in our futu re alking about alking about eaching egulations. Questioning learners - good life e the school 5 grammar items learner autonomy characteristics kno T T T Questionnair T Life ev ents fr envir L the classr r r techniques in Classr y r speaking personal plans and ambitions. suggestions suppor T E School life. T T Giving advice the futu re teacher s when Rules and car and making , ys, in e to onouns to, ganised essions ve erbs - wada ? What .... orse than e pr a lot of, es: 'er', 'est', edictions. y, xpr orking – lazy ould lik , no erbs: et. ated, or ar elativ d-w 7 ears ago, in the eams and es - learner erbs. der in questions y. e plans: going een - not 3 y erbs of manner eg: 3-1 or esent continuous, equency adv rd obabl y egular v entl y, e': What's ... li ke , fluentl ould, what about, why Adjectiv ten, sometimes. esent simple and es & superlativ , pr esent habits and states e/less/ better/w ould and still for comparing since, just y esent and past simple e; wo e? ely w of 1 ou, if... w of 1-5 on't, might for pr wledging and challenging ganised, k pr ated – demotiv w Pr w of 7- 11 e clauses and r , interrupting, ested. Adv essions - last ye ys, of Language d ev elopment e forms: pr vie vie vie esent simple. Time e esent perfect contrasted with fectiv e egular/irr vie erbs of permission and xpr ook lik 2000, curr pr Quantifiers - much, man characteristics: har continuous + past inter R alwa - disor Re Question forms: 'wh' questions; Countable & uncountable nouns. Uses of 'lik Pr open/closed questions; questions with: fo r, L e simple/continuous forms. Time little, enough. with auxiliary 'do'; question structur motiv nineties. Fr ef floor ackno don't y definitely oblication - must, can, ha to/planning to. Dr opinions 1st conditional. Adv Will, w language of debate - holding the Describing futur V 2nd conditional and modals for Re suggestions and advice. Shall, ambitions - want to/w should should, w elativ constructions past and pr as/as. Re Comparativ Used to, w R passi ve Futur going to. better/mor w s e e
es alk u een w it e is in 6R The w do T 13 18 ties 12 eading yo hand 2 Any erybody Learner Giving a school 15 mak 14 Module helping 5 In my w to learn R 9 Let's about it xperience our hands mista ke 1Back to 8 Ho betw & teacher esponsibili the lines compar 3 The ideal 4 Learning 7 Ho futur Ev questions? 16 17 e 1 y the futur r used to be ho 10 write right! 1 Then & no
18 Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
Appendix 3 A2 and B1 Level descriptors
The following are extracts from the descriptors for levels A2 and B1. The descriptors illustrate what participants should be expected to be able to do at the start of the course (A2) and what they will be able to do by the end of the course (B1).
A2 B1
Speaking Can give a simple description people, living or Can give detailed accounts of experiences, working conditions, daily routines, likes/dislikes, etc. describing feelings and reactions. Can tell a story or describe something in a simple list Can describe dreams, hopes and ambitions. of points. Can give a prepared straightforward presentation on Can describe plans and arrangements, habits and a familiar topic within his/her field routines, past activities and personal experiences. Can exchange, check, confirm information, deal with Can express how he/she feels in simple terms, and less routine situations and explain why something is a express thanks. problem. Can generally follow changes of topic in formal Can express thoughts on more abstract, cultural discussion related to his/her field. topics such as films, books, music etc.
Writing Can write his/her environment, e.g. people, places, a Can write a description of an event, a recent trip. job or study experience in linked sentences. Can write short, simple essays on topics of interest. Can write very short, basic descriptions of events, Can summarise, report and give his/her opinion past activities and personal experiences. about accumulated factual information on familiar topics.
Listening Can understand phrases and expressions related to Can understand straightforward factual information areas of most immediate priority (e.g. very basic about common everyday or job related topics, identifying both general messages and specific personal and family information, shopping, local details. Can understand the information content of geography, employment) provided speech is clearly the majority of recorded or broadcast audio material and slowly articulated. on topics of personal interest.
Reading Can understand short, simple texts on familiar Can scan longer texts to locate information, and matters in everyday or job-related language. gather information from different parts of a text to fulfil a specific task. Can find specific information in material such as prospectuses, menus, reference lists and timetables. Can identify main conclusions in argumentative texts. Can identify specific information in simpler written Can recognise the line of argument in the treatment material of the issue presented.
Watching TV and film Can identify the main point of TV news items Can understand a large part of TV programmes on reporting events, accidents etc. where the visual topics of personal interest - interviews, short lectures, supports the commentary. news reports when delivery is relatively slow and clear. Can follow changes of topic of factual TV news items, and form an idea of the main content. Can follow many films in which visuals and action carry much of the storyline, and which are delivered clearly in straightforward language.
Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 19 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
Appendix 4
How to deliver EfT
The approach followed in the language section may cause confusion or anxiety to participants who are used to more traditional methodology where the target grammar is presented and then practised in a controlled way. It is important to help participants understand the rationale of the approach and how it will contribute to developing effective language learning and teaching skills. To help participants adapt to the approach:
Explain the rationale
Without the pressure to produce newly introduced language structures participants are able to concentrate on expressing their ideas and experiences in a way which is meaningful for them. The tasks in EfT are constructed around educational contexts which participants will be able to relate to. Participants draw on their own resources – activating and sharing previously learnt language. All tasks have specific outcomes. This gives purpose and meaning to the activities and helps to give participants a sense of achievement.
Support is provided in the pre-task activities, which may include listening and reading materials relating to the theme of the task. Participants can make selections from these materials of any language items they feel are relevant and useful. In order to fully prepare participants for the task it is recommended that all pre-task activities are completed.
Further support is provided by the trainer, whose role is to facilitate – responding to participant requests for language they need, clarifications regarding the task and consulting on ideas. Encourage participants to experiment with and explore language which relates to real-life contexts relevant to them. Shared responsibility for task completion helps to create a supportive, non-threatening environment conducive to building confidence and developing effective communication skills.
In the reporting stage, participants are firstly given time to plan what they are going to say. This provides a further opportunity for participants to explore language and help them to consider the words they need to make their reports meaningful to their fellow-participants. Again, they may consult their trainer for advice.
It is equally important to reassure participants that language study has not been abandoned. Carrying out the task, planning reports, listening to each others’ reports, explaining and clarifying points, provides a framework for the language analysis stage where participants engage in consciousness-raising activities focusing on target language forms.
Prepare the ground
Do a practice run. Carry out the task in Module 1, following the instructions given. Alternatively, provide a simple task such as:
• Groups brainstorm and rank the good points about being a teacher, then compare and prepare a final list • Brainstorm all the English words participants know connected with the classroom and make a glossary • Carry out a survey – how many learners do participants have in one class? What is the average number?
Following the task, ask participants to assess what they gained from the task, for example: How much speaking in English did they do? What did they learn from each other? What new language did they learn? How much did their previous knowledge help them? How do they rate their task achievement? Discuss with participants how their responses to these questions would be different, if a more traditional teaching approach had been followed.
Tips
• Always explain the task goals to participants whenever starting a new module. • Make any adjustments necessary to tasks to ensure they relate to participants’ teaching contexts • If a task doesn’t work, explore the reasons with participants • Allow participants to explore and experiment – don’t jump in and correct participants • After carrying out language analysis, ask participants to go back to their tasks and reports and decide how they can improve them. • Suggest participants keep a training diary where they monitor their own development and progress.
20 Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
Appendix 5
How to use the Development Journal
As stated above, the recommended pass mark is 6 and a re-submission policy is recommended for participants who receive an average of less than 6 for any particular module. Trainers will then record the marks to give a final mark at the end of the course. The overall pass-mark for the course is 60%.
The following criteria have been established to provide a consistent assessment framework for trainers: Marking criteria Language assignments
Grade Task completion Use of target language (TL) Presentation
10 All requirements of the task TL completely accurate Professionally produced, completely satisfied and appropriate attractive and engaging for reader
8 All requirements of the task TL mainly accurate Well presented, easy to read covered sufficiently but could and appropriate and engaging for reader be more fully extended
6 Minimum requirements of the Some inaccurate and Reader can understand task covered inappropriate use of TL with ease but could be but does not hinder more engaging communication
4 Task attempted but not all TL attempted but severely Presentation causes minor requirements covered inaccurate or inappropriate strain for reader
2 Task not addressed TL not used Presentation causes severe strain for reader
0 Assignment not submitted
Teaching assignments
Application to Grade Task completion Presentation teaching context
10 All requirements of the task Completely appropriate Professionally produced, completely satisfied and relevant to learners’ needs attractive and engaging and interests for reader
8 All requirements of the task Mainly appropriate and relevant Well presented, easy to read covered sufficiently but could to learners’ needs and interests and engaging for reader be more fully extended
6 Minimum requirements of the Some evidence of learners’ Reader can understand task covered needs being taken into account with ease but could be more engaging
4 Task attempted but not all Little evidence of learners’ Presentation causes minor requirements covered needs being taken into account strain for reader
2 Task not addressed No evidence of learners’ needs Presentation causes severe being taken into account. strain for reader
0 Assignment not submitted
The marking system is based on the criteria and is not based on ranking participants in order.
Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 21 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
Self-assessment
Reflection is an important part of the English for Teaching course. To reinforce this, each task includes a self- assessment section. Trainers should encourage participants to reflect on their own work and assess themselves against the criteria. Do not accept work from participants if they have not done this. See example below:
Use of Target Task Completion Presentation Average Language (TL)
Self- Assessment
Trainer's Assesment
If your own assessment is different from a participant’s self-assessment, use the criteria to explain why. As you progress through the course and participants become more familiar with the assessment process, you should find that participants’ self-assessments become more accurate.
Follow-up activities
For many of the Teaching tasks, participants have to create teaching materials or plan lessons for their real classes. Always follow this up in class with feedback and discussion on how the lessons went and encourage reflection.
Procedures
At the beginning of the course use the introduction in the participants’ DJ to go through and check understanding of the DJ objectives as a class. If you will be using the DJ for assessment then go through the marking criteria and resubmission policy. Make sure that participants understand that they own their DJ – it is their record of their professional development.
Modules
Most tasks are simple to understand. Before starting a module in the main course, look at the relevant module in the DJ. Plan when you are going to set the tasks and the deadlines you give the participants. All of the tasks can be done during training sessions but some can also be set for homework if you prefer.
22 Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 English for Teaching 1 Course information and trainer's guide
Appendix 6
Prior to beginning the course, participants should be tested to ensure they are at the A2 level. The British Council's International Language Assessment (ILA) (see below for information) is recommended as it has been aligned to the CEFR, although a local test may be used if preferred. NB any test selected should only be used for the purpose of ascertaining the level of the participants and not as a progress test or end-of-course test.
The ILA The test is available in three test forms: Paper C - (B2-C2), Paper B - (A2-B2) and (A1-A2). In addition, there is a Supplementary Paper designed for use with learners who are total beginners (Level A0). There are three parts to the test: Pre-test activities – self-assessment activities which participants carry out themselves. The purpose of this is to help decide which of the test forms (A, B, C or supplementary) the participants should take. This part of the test is flexible – if time is an issue or this type of testing is culturally not appropriate, the number of activities may be reduced or this part left out altogether. The ILA – this tests grammar (section1), vocabulary (section 2) and reading (section 3). Each of these sections is completed within a specific time, see below:
Timing for the ILA papers Supplementary Paper A Paper B Paper C Paper Grammar N/A 7 10 7 Vocabulary 10 8 10 8 Reading N/A 15 20 25 Total time 10 minutes 30 minutes 40 minutes 40 minutes
Oral interview – the content and format of the interview is produced locally at British Council teaching centres. Information about this can be obtained from local centres. The ILA uses a Multiple-choice question format. For British Council offices who do not have access to a teaching centre, please contact Martin Lowder, [email protected] to obtain copies of the test and the user manual.
Course information and trainer's guide © British Council 2011 23