Module 5 – Conflict Diagnosis Case Study

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Module 5 – Conflict Diagnosis Case Study MODULE 5 CONFLICT DIAGNOSIS: CASE STUDY Session Outline This session gives participants an opportunity to apply the conflict equation in small 5 groups to a complex, real-world case study. Session Duration: 1 hour, 45 minutes Module Section Time Presentation/Description Small groups will conduct a conflict diagnosis based on EXERCISE: CASE 60 the Sri Lanka case study and requests from the Mission STUDY MINS director AFTERNOON 15 Afternoon break BREAK MINS 25 REPORT OUT Groups to report out conclusions to the plenary MINS CONCLUSION 5 MINS Closing and homework assignment Checklist: Items Needed for This Module Case study in participant binder Mission director email request in participant binder Flipchart, tape, and markers for each group Objectives At the end of this workshop, participants will be able to: 1. Conduct a complex conflict diagnosis. 2. Identify factors that drive or mitigate conflict. 1 Mission Director Request Activity (60 minutes) The purpose of this exercise is for participants to conduct a mini analysis of the conflict dynamics in Sri Lanka using the case study and the components of the conflict equation: motives, means, opportunity, context, and mitigating factors. 1. 5 minutes: Direct participants to the email from the Mission director (located on the next page) in their binder in Module 5. Allow 5 minutes for participants to review the task instructions and skim the case study (participants should have already read the case study). Note that this task is similar to the one completed for Bolivia in Module 3, but now the groups have much more information to really consider the context and mitigating factors. Note that participants are to focus only on the period noted within the case study. Anything that happened after 2010 is not relevant and should not be part of the group’s analysis. (See page 9 for case study.) 2. As a group, identify a recorder and spokesperson to report out. 3. 40 minutes: Each tabletop group is to conduct a basic conflict diagnosis of the Sri Lanka case. Groups should apply all five components of the conflict equation (motives, means, opportunity, context and mitigating factors), specifically identifying social patterns of grievance and social patterns of resiliency, to identify the factors that drive and mitigate conflict. 4. Encourage groups to be aware of each member’s participation and ensure that each person has the opportunity to contribute. 5. Have participants capture their findings, using a flipchart as a visual aid so other groups can see their thought process during report out. Ask participants if they have any questions and reiterate they are to only consider dynamics within the time period of the case study. Ensure that resources are available to each group (flip chart, markers and Post-Its). Facilitators should check in with individual groups to ensure they are moving through each equation component swiftly. At 45 minute mark: Once participant groups have worked through the various equation components (about 45 minutes into the exercise), facilitator assigns each group one of the following four components (context, motives, means, and mitigating factors). If there is a fifth group, then assign opportunities as well, and if not, list opportunities in plenary. The assigning of components is done quietly at each individual group table, not in plenary. Note to each group that they will present their findings for that particular component and elicit feedback or additional points from their peers. Remind the group that they are to do a complete conflict diagnosis using all components in the conflict equation but will report out only on the component assigned to their team. They have 15 more minutes to continue working to prepare their component. They will have 5 minutes for report out. (See page 5 for report out instructions.) It is helpful for facilitators to provide 30-minute and 5-minute warnings. Facilitators should walk around the room and ensure that groups are moving through each component and saving enough time to also discuss opportunities and mitigating factors. 2 The Sri Lanka Case: Undertaking a Conflict Diagnosis *Disclaimer - This case study is being used as a historical example to generate discussion and developmental learning, and by no means reflects the current sentiment or disposition of the Government of Sri Lanka or the U.S. Government.* The following are excerpts from an email message you just received from USAID/Sri Lanka’s Mission director, who is on a quick tour of the North and the East: I do apologize for burdening you with such a significant assignment in your first days at post. But as you know, the Ambassador has made support for the transition from war to peace in Sri Lanka his top priority. With the Working Group meeting the day after tomorrow, we have a lot of work to do to present the development perspective effectively. To begin with, I would like a fresh assessment of the conflict dynamics at play in Sri Lanka. I understand that you just completed a course on conflict analysis; I am sure you will be able to apply what you have learned and produce something insightful based on the materials that have been pulled together for you. Please make sure that your analysis considers the context here in Sri Lanka; I think that is key. To the extent that you can, please also consider mitigating factors, as those may provide entry points for programming. I’d like you to email me what you can pull together in the next few hours, when I am back from my afternoon meetings. Once I see what you have produced, we can think about next steps. 3 Case Study Facilitator Notes Context: • High unemployment rates, particularly among youth • Over two decades of continuous conflict • 75% of population is in rural areas • Prone to natural disasters • India as a “big brother” to Sri Lanka and Tamil ethnic ties to India • Colonial history and ties to British/Tamil rule • History of separatism and marginalization • Middle-income developing country • History of patriarchal government Motives: • Drive for political and economic autonomy • Use or misuse of strategic resources • Exclusion of indigenous and minority groups, particularly in North and East • Each group’s enduring feelings of victimization • Human rights violations of local organizations, NGOs and individuals • Deterred civil society engagement • Dormant conflict, lack of drive of key actors for grievances • Lack of social justice for Tamils • Increased labor trafficking and sexual violence Key Actors: • LTTE leader, Prabhakaran • Armed Forces General, Farath Fonseka • Minster of Defence, Gotabhaya Rajapaks (brother of President) • Rajapaksa, GoSL • Tamil Tiger Commander, Karuna Means: • Anti-government protesters • Provincial political and economic leaders • Pro-government supporters • LTTE’s Black Tiger Squad • Tamil factions – TMVP Opportunities (triggers): • Referendum • Regional statutes • Hate speech • Organized demonstrations • Human rights violations • Elections, coup plot • Government’s instability and unwillingness to reconcile 4 Possible Mitigating Factors: • Repressive army, increased funding for rebuilding of army • Remittances from diaspora • Strong healthcare and education systems • Government’s easing of emergency laws • Willing and easily activated civil society 5 Report out (25 minutes) Post the flip charts and ask each group to report on their findings. When presenting, groups should facilitate discussion by asking colleagues from the other groups to share thoughts and findings or ask any questions on the presenting group’s assigned component. o Context Group. Give the context group some general guidance on the need to address the structural versus the governance issues. Thank the group and take time to refine the takeaway message if necessary. o Motives group. Ask this to report out on their findings. Take the time to push the group’s thinking beyond a simple laundry list of motives for violence. Challenge the group to identify patterns of grievance, and patterns of resilience. Make sure to prompt them to think about how grievances might be shaped by men’s and women’s different roles and perspectives. Do not close this part of the discussion until you are confident that participants understand the difference between listing motives and coming up with patterns of grievance that can be mobilized by key actors. Thank the group and take time to refine the takeaway message if necessary. o Means group. Give this group some general guidance on the need to identify not only key individuals, but also institutions. Encourage this group to consider core ideologies key actors might support and what resources these actors have access to (weapons, funding and other sources of support). o Mitigating factors group. Give this group some general guidance on identifying which aspect of the equation these mitigating factors apply to. As with the earlier “motives” discussion, prompt the group to consider how gender may shape mitigating factors (e.g., Might women’s groups play a role in peacebuilding? Might men mobilize to protect economic interests?). In closing, you may need to emphasize that each stage of the conflict equation has factors that mitigate these negative patterns and we must consciously look for these patterns of resilience. Thank the group and take time to refine the takeaway message if necessary. o Opportunities/triggers group. This group is last to be assigned. If there are only four tabletop groups, do not include this topic separately. Instead, incorporate/ask questions about resources as the groups move through the other components. 6 Conclusion (5 minutes) As a summary, review report-outs using the discussion as an opportunity to clarify significant issues relating to the topic. Ask for takeaway messages and if any points need clarification. Ask participants about their experience using the conflict equation to analyze a real- world case. Elicit key challenges, advantages or lessons. Ask participants what more they would need to know or understand in order to feel comfortable using this analytical tool.
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