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Newsletter 4 June 29, 2009 CANADA-ASIA AGENDA www.asiapacific.ca Series Editor Brian Job Issue 1 Sri Lanka’s war ends -- peace is yet to come by Bruce Matthews The defeat of the organized armed resistance of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam has brought to an end the bloody Sri Lankan civil war that began in 1983. However, it has not resolved the position of the Ceylon Tamil minority in Sri Lankan society. And it has done nothing to ease the pressure by expatriate Tamils on the Government of Canada – or non- government representative like Bob Rae -- to intervene on behalf of their ethnic kin. On 17 May, 2009, the civil war that has embroiled Sri population of 20 million respectively.1 Their ongoing Lanka for a quarter century came to an end with the defeat discord has overshadowed all other features of life on the of the last conventional armed forces of the Liberation island and has dominated the image Sri Lanka presents to Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) at the remote Nanthi Kadal the world. This is especially the case for those countries lagoon on the edge of the Bay of Bengal. Importantly, to which large numbers of Sri Lankans have emigrated. this final battle also took the lives of the pivotal LTTE Canada alone has as many as 300,000 Ceylon Tamils founder and leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, as well as his who have fled their distressed homeland, and the world- wife, daughter and son. Although the government of Sri wide diaspora is estimated at one million - almost a-third Lanka can technically claim the war is ended, the issues of the total Ceylon Tamil population. Although the LTTE behind the conflict will have to be addressed speedily to has been crushed as a conventional fighting force, bring stability and progress to a badly wounded society, paradoxically the political and cultural significance of the economy and polity. movement has arguably been enhanced by the dilemma of defeat. Its presence will make itself felt long into the The two communities involved in the ethnic conflict future – it has already set about setting up “transnational” are the majority Sinhalese and the minority Ceylon government in cyberspace. Tamil communities, both historically indigenous to Sri Lanka, and forming approximately 75% and 12% of the About The Author Bruce Matthews is Professor Emeritus of Comparative Religion at Acadia University, Nova Scotia. A periodic consultant to government on ethnic communalism and political issues, he was the Canadian member of the Independent International Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP), appointed to review the work of Sri Lanka’s Presidential Commission of Inquiry to Investigate and Inquire into Alleged Serious Violations of Human Rights.To find out more visit: www.asiapacific.ca ISSN 1911-6039 JuneJune 29, 10, 2009 2009 www.asiapacific.ca www.asiapacific.ca IssueIssue 52 1 BACKGROUND Despite roots in antiquity, Sri Lanka’s identity-based order to rebuild LTTE defences), with resulting missed grievances accelerated after independence in 1948, opportunities for peace. There were serious compounded when Sinhalese-dominated parliaments increasingly blunders in tactical judgment. Foremost, these included ignored the need for a federal-style government that would Prabhakaran’s decision to assassinate former Indian permit Tamil minority citizens a viable local autonomy prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in India in 1991 (for fear of and language rights. This reinforced grievances and Indian intervention in Sri Lanka), a strategic error that intensified territorial and other claims. Capable and wrecked all future official relations between the LTTE respected Tamil leaders like S.J.V.Chelvanayakam were and New Delhi; the ruthless elimination of distinguished, unable to influence a Sinhalese (and frequently Buddhist) moderate Ceylon Tamils and the inexplicable boycott of nationalist agenda. After a vicious anti-Tamil pogrom in the last national elections in 2004, which deliberately 1983 it became evident that educated, moderate, largely propelled the current hawkish United National Front high-caste Tamils had failed to gain much-needed (and government of Mahinda Rajapaksa into power. The point warranted) political self-government by political and of no return came in December 2005 when Prabhakaran diplomatic means. Eventually, after years of often brutal made a fateful decision to reengage in war even though a infighting, Velupillai Prabhakaran’s LTTE eliminated all cease-fire was still technically in place. competition and took political issues to the battlefield.2 Whatever else might be said about Prabhakaran (cold- GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA RESPONSE blooded opportunist, mass assassin, megalomaniac), for over three decades he successfully fuelled a civil Perhaps Prabhakaran counted on provoking an over- war in Sri Lanka with his unique blend of charisma and reaction by the state with resultant human rights abuse, occasional strategic brilliance. thus winning international support for the LTTE. For him it was always a liberation war fought by necessity It has been rightly argued that the LTTE is the symptom, in an uncompromising, do-or-die struggle. It was not the cause of conflict. What started as an undersized Prabhakaran’s ill-fortune to have the LTTE swept into vanguard of Ceylon Tamil discontent evolved under the post 9/11 global ‘war of terror.’ Even before this, the Prabhakaran’s leadership into a mini-state in the Northern LTTE had been proscribed as a terrorist organization by India (1992), US (1997), UK (2000) and, later, by both the EU and Canada (2006). There was no international opprobrium when suddenly Rajapakse poured all the Prabhakaran’s leadership … flaws state’s resources into an all-out military engagement, eventually damaged his goal of a vastly improving the fire-power and tactical advantage of separate state and led to the near-ruin the armed forces. of a once grand Ceylon Tamil civilization By 2007, the state had regained control of the key Eastern Province (assisted by a timely break-up of LTTE unity with a splinter group siding with the government). Province, a parallel administration with its own police, Within a year, the LTTE had fallen back deep into the courts, taxes and associated bureaucracies, including Northern Province jungle (Vanni), taking with them a international offices, access to substantial wealth through non-combatant civilian population, but also experiencing overseas investments and remittances, and the increasing exponential territorial and manpower losses every month. allegiance of many emotionally volatile members of the In mid-May, 2009, the LTTE as an organized armed force, Ceylon Tamil diaspora. Nonetheless, remarkable as with its back to the sea, finally surrendered.3 Prabhakaran’s leadership was, fatal flaws eventually damaged his goal of a separate state and led to the near- A second perspective of the current conflict suggests the ruin of a once grand Ceylon Tamil civilization. Chief government of Sri Lanka correctly assessed that it was among these was the ‘one-man-rule’ cult that prevented simply not possible to negotiate with the LTTE. But the the LTTE from transforming itself into a modern political effective militarization of Sri Lanka’s polity has come at forum. Years of grinding military combat were pocked a great cost to civil society.4 Media freedom has been with occasional cease-fires (largely used to buy time in especially compromised, with any hint of criticism being ISSN 1911-6039 2 of 4 JuneJune 29, 10, 2009 2009 www.asiapacific.ca www.asiapacific.ca IssueIssue 52 1 branded as a traitorous act and ruthlessly punished (e.g., to sanction the Colombo government for the infamous assassination of Sunday Leader editor humanitarian abuses, to ramp up humanitarian Lasantha Wickramatunge in January 2009). Authoritarian assistance to the dispossessed Tamil community rule has greatly increased a ‘culture of impunity;’ INGOs in the Northern Province, as well as to accelerate are rigorously scrutinized, with any hint of foreign a program of immediate immigration for Tamils objection roundly scorned by Sinhala nationalists. who have family connections in Canada. For its part, Colombo has made it abundantly clear CANADIAN CEYLON TAMIL IDENTIFICATION WITH that it will not accept any Canadian, or other THE LTTE foreign involvement as it sets out on its own path to reintegrate its war-torn regions into the state For some countries, including Canada, there is the polity. Liberal Party foreign affairs critic Bob challenge of understanding the crisis in Sri Lanka as Rae, long involved in seeking a resolution to the it presents itself through the needs and anxieties of Sri Lanka conflict, was escorted across Colombo the Tamil diaspora. Although many Canadian Ceylon airport and put on the next plane out on June 10 Tamils likely detest the LTTE, they remain largely when he attempted to visit to gain some on-the- silent, intimidated by years of LTTE infiltration into the ground insight into the treatment of Tamils in the community. Activists agitate for Canadian government wake of the LTTE defeat. intervention in Sri Lanka’s political process, even after the May, 2009 defeat of LTTE forces. Mass protesters, CONCLUSION such as those who closed down Toronto’s Gardiner Expressway on 10 May 2009, brandish gaudy LTTE It is argued, firstly, that Sri Lanka has suffered banners (with its swirl of rifle bullets around a tiger’s the most grievous of all civil wars because the head, the latter a symbol of ancient Tamil warrior kings) conflict has been based largely, though not and continue to urge lifting the 2006 proscription against entirely, on ethnicity. The sad irony here is that the LTTE. They press for the Canadian government the Sinhala majority and Tamil minority DO YOU WANT TO KNOW MORE? Tamil Net.com, a news and feature service that focuses on providing reliable information on issues concern- ing the Tamil people in Sri Lanka.
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