June 29, 2009

CANADA-ASIA AGENDA www.asiapacific.ca Series Editor Brian Job Issue 1

Sri Lanka’s war ends -- peace is yet to come by Bruce Matthews

The defeat of the organized armed resistance of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam has brought to an end the bloody that began in 1983. However, it has not resolved the position of the Ceylon Tamil minority in Sri Lankan society. And it has done nothing to ease the pressure by expatriate Tamils on the Government of Canada – or non- government representative like Bob Rae -- to intervene on behalf of their ethnic kin.

On 17 May, 2009, the civil war that has embroiled Sri population of 20 million respectively.1 Their ongoing Lanka for a quarter century came to an end with the defeat discord has overshadowed all other features of life on the of the last conventional armed forces of the Liberation island and has dominated the image presents to Tigers of (LTTE) at the remote Nanthi Kadal the world. This is especially the case for those countries lagoon on the edge of the . Importantly, to which large numbers of Sri Lankans have emigrated. this final battle also took the lives of the pivotal LTTE Canada alone has as many as 300,000 Ceylon Tamils founder and leader, , as well as his who have fled their distressed homeland, and the world- wife, daughter and son. Although the government of Sri wide diaspora is estimated at one million - almost a-third Lanka can technically claim the war is ended, the issues of the total Ceylon Tamil population. Although the LTTE behind the conflict will have to be addressed speedily to has been crushed as a conventional fighting force, bring stability and progress to a badly wounded society, paradoxically the political and cultural significance of the economy and polity. movement has arguably been enhanced by the dilemma of defeat. Its presence will make itself felt long into the The two communities involved in the ethnic conflict future – it has already set about setting up “transnational” are the majority Sinhalese and the minority Ceylon government in cyberspace. Tamil communities, both historically indigenous to Sri Lanka, and forming approximately 75% and 12% of the

About The Author

Bruce Matthews is Professor Emeritus of Comparative Religion at Acadia University, Nova Scotia. A periodic consultant to government on ethnic communalism and political issues, he was the Canadian member of the Independent International Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP), appointed to review the work of Sri Lanka’s Presidential Commission of Inquiry to Investigate and Inquire into Alleged Serious Violations of Human Rights.To find out more visit: www.asiapacific.ca

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BACKGROUND

Despite roots in antiquity, Sri Lanka’s identity-based order to rebuild LTTE defences), with resulting missed grievances accelerated after independence in 1948, opportunities for peace. There were serious compounded when Sinhalese-dominated parliaments increasingly blunders in tactical judgment. Foremost, these included ignored the need for a federal-style government that would Prabhakaran’s decision to assassinate former Indian permit Tamil minority citizens a viable local autonomy prime minister in in 1991 (for fear of and language rights. This reinforced grievances and Indian intervention in Sri Lanka), a strategic error that intensified territorial and other claims. Capable and wrecked all future official relations between the LTTE respected Tamil leaders like S.J.V.Chelvanayakam were and New Delhi; the ruthless elimination of distinguished, unable to influence a Sinhalese (and frequently Buddhist) moderate Ceylon Tamils and the inexplicable boycott of nationalist agenda. After a vicious anti-Tamil pogrom in the last national elections in 2004, which deliberately 1983 it became evident that educated, moderate, largely propelled the current hawkish United National Front high-caste Tamils had failed to gain much-needed (and government of into power. The point warranted) political self-government by political and of no return came in December 2005 when Prabhakaran diplomatic means. Eventually, after years of often brutal made a fateful decision to reengage in war even though a infighting, Velupillai Prabhakaran’s LTTE eliminated all cease-fire was still technically in place. competition and took political issues to the battlefield.2 Whatever else might be said about Prabhakaran (cold- RESPONSE blooded opportunist, mass assassin, megalomaniac), for over three decades he successfully fuelled a civil Perhaps Prabhakaran counted on provoking an over- war in Sri Lanka with his unique blend of charisma and reaction by the state with resultant human rights abuse, occasional strategic brilliance. thus winning international support for the LTTE. For him it was always a liberation war fought by necessity It has been rightly argued that the LTTE is the symptom, in an uncompromising, do-or-die struggle. It was not the cause of conflict. What started as an undersized Prabhakaran’s ill-fortune to have the LTTE swept into vanguard of Ceylon Tamil discontent evolved under the post 9/11 global ‘war of terror.’ Even before this, the Prabhakaran’s leadership into a mini-state in the Northern LTTE had been proscribed as a terrorist organization by India (1992), US (1997), UK (2000) and, later, by both the EU and Canada (2006). There was no international opprobrium when suddenly Rajapakse poured all the Prabhakaran’s leadership … flaws state’s resources into an all-out engagement, eventually damaged his goal of a vastly improving the fire-power and tactical advantage of separate state and led to the near-ruin the armed forces. of a once grand Ceylon Tamil civilization By 2007, the state had regained control of the key Eastern Province (assisted by a timely break-up of LTTE unity with a splinter group siding with the government). Province, a parallel administration with its own police, Within a year, the LTTE had fallen back deep into the courts, taxes and associated bureaucracies, including Northern Province jungle (Vanni), taking with them a international offices, access to substantial wealth through non-combatant civilian population, but also experiencing overseas investments and remittances, and the increasing exponential territorial and manpower losses every month. allegiance of many emotionally volatile members of the In mid-May, 2009, the LTTE as an organized armed force, Ceylon Tamil diaspora. Nonetheless, remarkable as with its back to the sea, finally surrendered.3 Prabhakaran’s leadership was, fatal flaws eventually damaged his goal of a separate state and led to the near- A second perspective of the current conflict suggests the ruin of a once grand Ceylon Tamil civilization. Chief government of Sri Lanka correctly assessed that it was among these was the ‘one-man-rule’ cult that prevented simply not possible to negotiate with the LTTE. But the the LTTE from transforming itself into a modern political effective militarization of Sri Lanka’s polity has come at forum. Years of grinding military combat were pocked a great cost to civil society.4 Media freedom has been with occasional cease-fires (largely used to buy time in especially compromised, with any hint of criticism being

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branded as a traitorous act and ruthlessly punished (e.g., to sanction the government for the infamous assassination of Sunday Leader editor humanitarian abuses, to ramp up humanitarian Lasantha Wickramatunge in January 2009). Authoritarian assistance to the dispossessed Tamil community rule has greatly increased a ‘culture of impunity;’ INGOs in the Northern Province, as well as to accelerate are rigorously scrutinized, with any hint of foreign a program of immediate immigration for Tamils objection roundly scorned by Sinhala nationalists. who have family connections in Canada. For its part, Colombo has made it abundantly clear CANADIAN CEYLON TAMIL IDENTIFICATION WITH that it will not accept any Canadian, or other THE LTTE foreign involvement as it sets out on its own path to reintegrate its war-torn regions into the state For some countries, including Canada, there is the polity. Liberal Party foreign affairs critic Bob challenge of understanding the crisis in Sri Lanka as Rae, long involved in seeking a resolution to the it presents itself through the needs and anxieties of Sri Lanka conflict, was escorted across Colombo the Tamil diaspora. Although many Canadian Ceylon airport and put on the next plane out on June 10 Tamils likely detest the LTTE, they remain largely when he attempted to visit to gain some on-the- silent, intimidated by years of LTTE infiltration into the ground insight into the treatment of Tamils in the community. Activists agitate for Canadian government wake of the LTTE defeat. intervention in Sri Lanka’s political process, even after the May, 2009 defeat of LTTE forces. Mass protesters, CONCLUSION such as those who closed down Toronto’s Gardiner Expressway on 10 May 2009, brandish gaudy LTTE It is argued, firstly, that Sri Lanka has suffered banners (with its swirl of rifle bullets around a tiger’s the most grievous of all civil wars because the head, the latter a symbol of ancient Tamil warrior kings) conflict has been based largely, though not and continue to urge lifting the 2006 proscription against entirely, on ethnicity. The sad irony here is that the LTTE. They press for the Canadian government the Sinhala majority and Tamil minority

DO YOU WANT TO KNOW MORE?

Tamil Net.com, a news and feature service that focuses on providing reliable information on issues concern- ing the Tamil people in Sri Lanka.

Centre for Policy Alternatives, a Colombo-based think-tank respected for balanced assessment of Sri Lanka’s affairs. < http://www.cpalanka.org/>

The Daily News, Colombo, a government newspaper with occasional useful commentary.

The Sunday Leader, Colombo. Sri Lanka’s best news analysis in English.

Steven Kemper, The Presence of the Past: Chronicles, Politics, and Culture in Sinhala Life. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.

H.L.Seneviratne, The Work of Kings: The New Buddhism in Sri Lanka. Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1999.

A.J. Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: its origin and development in the nineteenth and twentieth centu- ries. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000.

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share so much, culturally, sociologically and historically. Finally, the central question is whether the Sinhala Both communities have roots, however far removed, majority can, in its triumph, also ask for reconciliation in India, and in fact both look even now to India as a and recognize the legitimate and peaceful requests of source of moral support. How to build on these strengths the Ceylon Tamils for cultural recognition in a Sinhala- has always eluded the dominant Sinhala polity, whose dominated state. Ethnic exclusivism has always been a leaders since independence in 1948 have lacked the problem for the Sinhalese, and its bitter consequences imagination and nerve to give the Tamils an appropriate, flowed over into the equally exclusivist LTTE. Both honourable place in the structure of the state. It will take examples are deadly for any mature pluralist state, decades of thoughtful political leadership to bring healing which Sri Lanka surely deserves to become. ‘Long- to these communities, neither of which is currently in an distance Ceylon Tamil nationalism,’ however, will be a exonerating mood. Although the LTTE as a political and phenomenon, and a force to which Canada will be military force with territorial control has been defeated, the exposed for years to come. Canadian government policy cause for which thousands of Tamils have so unflinchingly has been to endorse all humanitarian efforts to ease fought will not be quickly by-passed. Security experts the suffering of civilians caught in the vice of war, but to (including Sri Lanka’s armed forces chief) predict years of refrain from becoming embroiled in any political actions asymmetric warfare. A seething Tamil resentment could against the state of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka’s president has well continue to undermine a productive economy and made it very clear that there is no chance Canada (or cause a chaotic social environment in many locations. any other Western country) will soon be invited to provide The question is whether the diaspora can constructively advice to the Sri Lankan state – as Bob Rae discovered engage in helping a ‘new’ state emerge from the ruin of to his discomfort. For the time being, Sri Lanka will bask this war. Much will depend on whether the government in the euphoria of victory5. State building will come later. is prepared to reach out to this vast and still powerful overseas constituency.

1 Independent of the indigenous Ceylon Tamils are the Indian Tamils, sometimes referred to as Plantation Tamils because most are associated with the tea industry in the south-central regions of the island. Their forbears were brought to Ceylon as far back as the mid-19th century, and the community now numbers about one million. They have so far not been involved in the civil war. A third important minority are the Tamil-speaking Ceylon Moors or Muslims, also about one million, and who generally cooperate with the Sinhalese-dominated polity.

2 See Narayan Swamy, Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran, First Profile of the World’s Most Ruthless Guerilla Leader. Colombo: Vijitha Yapa. 2006. This was only comprehensive and reliable biography of Prabhakaran available at the time of his death.

3 “This battle has reached its bitter end…we have decided to silence our guns. Our only regrets are for the lives lost and that we could not hold out longer.” LTTE information spokesman , TamilNet, 17 May, 2009.

4 The cost of maintaining an armed force of about 160,000 with modern weapons and equipment reached US$1.6 billion in 2008. Defence expenditures will continue to be high for several more years to guarantee security of former LTTE-controlled territory. If and when the armed forces are demobilize, it will have to be done slowly and with great care so as not provoke widespread unemployment.

5 In his 18 May 2009 ‘victory speech’ to Parliament, President Mahinda Rajapakse said that a new political solution for Tamil rights could not be dictated from abroad. “We do not have time to be experimenting with the solutions suggested by other countries.” Somini Sengupta, New York Times, 19 May 2009.

The opinions expressed in Canada-Asia Agenda are those of the author and are published in the interests of promoting public awareness and debate. They are not necessarily the views of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. While every effort has been taken to verify the accuracy of this information, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada cannot accept responsibility or liability for reliance by any person or organization on the use of this information. This Canada-Asia Agenda issue may be copied whole or in part and/or re-distributed with acknowledgement to “the Asia Pacific Foundation, Canada’s leading independent resource on Asia and Canada-Asia issues”. Archive issues of Canada Asia Agenda, and its predecessor, Asia Pacific Bulletin, may be found at . APF Canada is funded by the Government of Canada and by corporate and individual donors.

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