War Crimes in Sri Lanka
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WAR CRIMES IN SRI LANKA Asia Report N°191 – 17 May 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. THE WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH.............................................................................. 3 A. THE DEFEAT OF THE TAMIL TIGERS .............................................................................................3 B. THE AFTERMATH .........................................................................................................................6 III. ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT ............................................................................ 9 A. ATTACKS ON HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS...............................................................................10 B. ATTACKS ON HOSPITALS ...........................................................................................................15 1. PTK hospital ..............................................................................................................................16 2. Ponnambalam Memorial Hospital .............................................................................................18 3. Putumattalan hospital.................................................................................................................18 4. Mullivaykkal hospitals...............................................................................................................19 C. ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS.............................................................................................................20 1. First “No Fire Zone” ..................................................................................................................21 2. Second “No Fire Zone”..............................................................................................................22 3. Final “No Fire Zone” .................................................................................................................23 IV. ACTIONS OF THE LTTE ............................................................................................. 24 A. MURDER AND CRUEL TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS ......................................................................25 V. THE CASE FOR INVESTIGATIONS.......................................................................... 27 A. THE LEGAL CASE.......................................................................................................................27 B. THE POLICY CASE......................................................................................................................28 1. The vicious cycle of impunity....................................................................................................28 2. The risks of renewed conflict.....................................................................................................29 3. The Sri Lankan model: assault on international humanitarian law............................................29 4. Undermining the United Nations ...............................................................................................29 C. THE POLITICS OF ACCOUNTABILITY...........................................................................................30 1. Domestic dead-ends...................................................................................................................30 2. International action ....................................................................................................................31 VI. THE OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE .................................................................................... 33 A. INTERNATIONAL INQUIRY ..........................................................................................................33 B. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ....................................................................................34 C. FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS ............................................................................................................34 1. Criminal prosecutions ................................................................................................................34 2. Civil suits ...................................................................................................................................35 VII. THE POLICY RESPONSE ......................................................................................... 36 VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 37 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SRI LANKA .........................................................................................................................38 B. MAP OF THE VANNI AND FRONT LINES OF BATTLE AS OF 2 JANUARY 2009 .....................................39 C. MAP OF THE FIRST “NO FIRE ZONE”................................................................................................40 D. MAP OF THE SECOND AND THIRD “NO FIRE ZONES”........................................................................41 E. MAP OF HOSPITALS IN THE VANNI FROM LATE 2008........................................................................42 F. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................43 G. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2007.........................................................44 H. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................47 Asia Report N°191 17 May 2010 WAR CRIMES IN SRI LANKA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Sri Lankan security forces and the Liberation Tigers precise locations and functions. During these incidents, of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) repeatedly violated international medical staff, the United Nations, the International humanitarian law during the last five months of their 30- Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and others con- year civil war. Although both sides committed atrocities tinually informed the government and security forces of throughout the many years of conflict, the scale and na- the shelling, yet they continued to strike medical facili- ture of violations particularly worsened from January 2009 ties through May forcing civilians to abandon them. to the government’s declaration of victory in May. Evi- dence gathered by the International Crisis Group suggests The intentional shelling of humanitarian operations. that these months saw tens of thousands of Tamil civilian Despite knowing the exact location of humanitarian men, women, children and the elderly killed, countless operations and food distribution points, the security more wounded, and hundreds of thousands deprived of forces repeatedly shelled these areas, which were adequate food and medical care, resulting in more deaths. crowded with humanitarian workers, vehicles and sup- plies, and civilians. Many were killed or wounded try- This evidence also provides reasonable grounds to believe ing to deliver or receive basic humanitarian assistance, the Sri Lankan security forces committed war crimes with including women, children and infants. top government and military leaders potentially responsi- The consequences of the security forces’ shelling were ble. There is evidence of war crimes committed by the made substantially worse by the government’s obstruc- LTTE and its leaders as well, but most of them were killed tion of food and medical treatment for the civilian and will never face justice. An international inquiry into population, including by knowingly claiming the civil- alleged crimes is essential given the absence of political ian population was less than one third its actual size will or capacity for genuine domestic investigations, the and denying adequate supplies. need for an accounting to address the grievances that drive conflict in Sri Lanka, and the potential of other governments The government declined to respond to Crisis Group’s adopting the Sri Lankan model of counter-insurgency in request for comment on these allegations. their own internal conflicts. There is also strong evidence that the LTTE engaged in: Crisis Group possesses credible evidence that is sufficient to warrant an independent international investigation of The intentional shooting of civilians. The LTTE fired the following allegations: on and killed or wounded many civilians in the con- flict zone who were attempting to flee the shelling and The intentional shelling of civilians. Starting in late cross into government-controlled areas. January, the government and security forces encour- aged hundreds of thousands of civilians to move into The intentional infliction of suffering on civilians. ever smaller government-declared No Fire Zones (NFZs) The LTTE refused to allow civilians to leave the con- and then subjected them to repeated and increasingly flict zone, despite grave danger from shelling and lack intense artillery and mortar barrages and other fire. of humanitarian supplies, even when the civilians This continued through May despite the government were injured and dying. The LTTE also forcibly re- and security forces knowing the size and location of cruited many civilians to fight or serve as labourers the civilian population and scale of civilian casualties. and beat some family members who protested the re- cruitment. The intentional