Em: Improving US Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting
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NOVEMBER 2019 If You Can’t See ’em, You Can’t Shoot ’em: Improving US Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting BY SETH CROPSEY AND BRYAN MCGRATH © 2019 Hudson Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. For more information about obtaining additional copies of this or other Hudson Institute publications, please visit Hudson’s website, www.hudson.org ABOUT HUDSON INSTITUTE Hudson Institute is a research organization promoting American leadership and global engagement for a secure, free, and prosperous future. Founded in 1961 by strategist Herman Kahn, Hudson Institute challenges conventional thinking and helps manage strategic transitions to the future through interdisciplinary studies in defense, international relations, economics, health care, technology, culture, and law. Hudson seeks to guide public policy makers and global leaders in government and business through a vigorous program of publications, conferences, policy briefings and recommendations. Visit www.hudson.org for more information. Hudson Institute would like to thank General Atomics for their support of this research and publication, and is grateful for past contributions from Northrop Grumman Corporation and Lockheed Martin Corporation. Hudson Institute 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Fourth Floor Washington, D.C. 20004 +1.202.974.2400 [email protected] www.hudson.org Cover: The guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey (DDG 105) transits the Pacific Ocean. Dewey is underway in the U.S. 3rd Fleet area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Devin M. Langer) NOVEMBER 2019 If You Can’t See ’em, You Can’t Shoot ’em: Improving US Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting BY SETH CROPSEY AND BRYAN MCGRATH AUTHOR Seth Cropsey Bryan McGrath Director, Center for American Seapower Bryan McGrath formerly served as deputy director of Hudson Institute’s Center for American Seapower. Seth Cropsey began his career in government at the Defense Department as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Caspar McGrath is the founding Managing Director of The FerryBridge Weinberger and subsequently served as Deputy Undersecretary Group LLC (FBG), a consultancy specializing in naval and of the Navy in the Reagan and Bush administrations. In the national security issues. Prior to starting FBG, Bryan founded a Bush administration, Cropsey moved to the Office of the national security consulting line of business for Delex Systems Secretary of Defense to become acting assistant secretary, and of Herndon, VA. then principal deputy assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. Cropsey served as a A retired Naval Officer, McGrath spent 21 years on active duty naval officer from 1985-2004. including a tour in command of USS BULKELEY (DDG 84), a guided-missile destroyer homeported in Norfolk, Virginia. In From 1982 to 1984, Cropsey directed the editorial policy of command, he received the “Admiral Elmo Zumwalt Award for the Voice of America on the Solidarity movement in Poland, Inspirational Leadership” from the Surface Navy Association and Soviet treatment of dissidents, and other issues. Returning to his ship earned the USS ARIZONA Memorial Trophy signifying public diplomacy in 2002 as director of the US government’s its selection as the Fleet’s most combat-ready warship. His International Broadcasting Bureau, Cropsey supervised the final duties ashore included serving as Team Lead and Primary agency as successful efforts were undertaken to increase radio Author of the US Navy’s 2007 Maritime Strategy A Cooperative and television broadcasting to the Muslim world. Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Cropsey’s work in the private sector includes reporting for Fortune magazine and as a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and as director of the Heritage Foundation’s Asia Studies Center from 1991 to 1994. The authors would like to thank Harrison Schramm (US Navy, ret.) for the invaluable assistance he provided in preparing this report. 4 | HUDSON INSTITUTE TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 6 Part I: History and Strategy 8 World War II 8 The Cold War 9 Cold War Systems Mature 11 Post–Cold War 12 Renewed Great Power Competition 14 Who is Setting the Pace in Today’s Military Competition? 17 Current State of Maritime ISR/T 17 Part II: Technology 20 National Technical Means 20 Analysis 21 Assumptions 23 Approach 25 Impact of Revisit Rate 25 Analysis and Insights 25 Combined Area / Focused Search 26 Summary 26 Next Steps 26 Recommendations 27 Japan’s Role in Western Pacific Security 29 Current Japanese ISR/T 31 Recommendations for Japanese ISR/T 32 Conclusion 34 Endnotes 35 IF YOU CAN’T SEE ’EM, YOU CAN’T SHOOT ’EM: IMPROVING US INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE, AND TARGETING INTRODUCTION The United States today faces the greatest challenge to Of course, there has been a noticeable, necessary, and its international stature since the mid-twentieth century. welcome increase in discussion of America’s operational and America’s adversaries, despite their differences, threaten to theater strategies in the Pacific, alongside a military and civilian come together in a coalition that can dominate Eurasia and focus on responding to renewed great power competition. by extension, jeopardize American strategic interests and values globally. Of several potential flashpoints for confrontation, the Western Pacific has the potential to be the most decisive. Photo caption: Chinese guided-missile frigate Yueyang sails in waters The most powerful of the three US rivals is Asian, and it is the during China-Thailand Joint Naval Training 'Blue Commando-2019' at a only adversary with the economic and political power to field a military port on May 6, 2019 in Shanwei, Guangdong Province of China. technologically sophisticated, quantitatively superior military force. (Visual China Group via Getty Images) 6 | HUDSON INSTITUTE But there is a current lack of appreciation for the critical role of Finally, the report concludes with several key recommendations intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR/T) to naval policymakers, civilian and military, including the following: capabilities in naval combat success. This operational blind spot has concrete ramifications for the balance of power in the • Congress should direct a Federally Funded Research and Western Pacific and the ability of the United States to force a Development Corporation to perform a classified evaluation political settlement without conflict. and analysis of Navy ISR/T analytical efforts and report the results. This report tracks the development of naval and maritime • The Department of Defense should consider redeploying ISR/T from the Cold War to the present day. It reveals land-based unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), specifically the fluctuating relationship between ISR/T and weapons the MQ-9 Reaper remotely piloted vehicle (RPV), from ranges that have adversely impacted the US Navy’s combat the Middle East to the Pacific, modifying them for capabilities. While the United States developed longer-range maritime ISR. weapons throughout the Cold War and revised tactics and fleet composition to better employ those weapons offensively, • The Navy should assess accelerating the current MQ-4C the gap that remained between weapons range and targeting program of record. information had a negative effect on US Navy combat power. • The Navy should consider acquiring a medium-altitude, Following the Cold War, ISR/T capacity and capability rose, long-endurance (MALE) UAV that can be launched and allowing for precision strikes against ground targets at short recovered onboard surface combatants and deliver targeting and medium range. Finally, the contemporary fleet, facing data directly, which would efficiently and effectively negate renewed great power competition, is increasingly receiving a portion of the ISR/T coverage gaps. The Navy should long-range strike weapons. However, it lacks the ISR/T modify the MQ-25 Stingray UAV to carry its own ISR/T data- complex to identify and hit targets at those ranges in most gathering suite to provide the carrier air wing (CVW) with over-the-horizon combat situations. organic ISR/T, and rely less on non-traditional ISR, currently being conducted by F/A-18E/Fs and EA-18Gs. Second, this report reviews the current ISR/T capabilities to which the US Navy has access, primarily in the Pacific • DoD should work to encourage key allies and partners theater, and performs first-order sufficiency analysis to gain an to increase their own maritime surveillance capabilities, understanding of the impact the current program of record has including advocating for foreign military sales of the MQ-4C on operational requirements. Triton and the MQ-9B SeaGuardian/Protector. IF YOU CAN’T SEE ’EM, YOU CAN’T SHOOT ’EM: IMPROVING US INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE, AND TARGETING PART I: HISTORY AND STRATEGY World War II keeping his main force out of sight and thereby tempting the To understand the gaps and inadequacies in the US Navy’s French into battle at Trafalgar. During the Great War, the Battle of current ISR/T complex, we must review the ISR/T techniques Jutland was marred by ISR inadequacies on both sides. Neither Navy employed in the past and examine their strengths and Britain’s Grand Fleet nor Germany’s Hochseeflotte knew that it weaknesses. was approaching a fleet action.1 Only sheer luck encouraged A dedicated ISR complex is critical in naval combat. Without eyes, a fleet cannot fight. Athenian statesman