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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT - ABORT PLANNING by Charles T. Hyle? Charles E. Foggatt? and Bobbie D, Weber 4 Mdnned Spacecra, Center , Houston, Texas 77058 ce NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D. C. JUNE 1972 TECH LIBRARY KAFB, NM - ­ 1. Report No. 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No. NASA "I D-6847 5. Remrr natP June 1972 APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 6. Performing Organization Code ABORT PLANNING . -. 8. Performing Organization Report NO. Charles T. Hyle, Charles E. Foggatt, and MSC S-307 - ­ Bobbie D. Weber. MSC 10. Work Unit No. 9. Performing Organization Name and Address 924-22-20-00-72 .-- .. -.. -­ Manned Spacecraft Center 11. Contract or Grant No. Houston, Texas 77058 13. Type of Report and Period Covered 2. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address Technical Note ~__-- __ National Aeronautics and Space Administration 14. Sponsoring Agency Code Washington, D.C. 20546 5. Supplementary Notes The MSC Director waived the use of the International System of Units (SI) for this Apollo Experience Report, because, in his judgment, the use of SI units would impair the usefulness of the report or result in excessive cost. -~. 6. Abstract Definition of a practical return-to-earth abort capability was required for each phase of an Apollo mission. A description of the basic development of the complex Apollo abort plan is presented in this paper, The process by which the return-to-earth abort plan was developed and the constrain­ ing factors that must be included in any abort procedure are also discussed. Special emphasis is given to the description of crew warning and escape methods for each mission phase. ~ .. -__ ­ 7. Key Words (Suggested by Author(s)) 18. Distribution Statement * Contingency Mission Plannfng Lunar Trajectories * Space Flight Safety 9. Security Classif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21. NO. of Pages 22. Price None None 35 $3000' . __ ~ ] *For sale by the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginio 22151 I CONTENTS Section Page SUMMARY ..................................... INTRODUCTION .................................. ABORT PLANNING PROCESS ........................... LAUNCH PHASE .................................. Constraints ................................... Maneuver Monitoring .............................. Return to Earth ................................. TRANSLUNAR INJECTION ............................ 9 Constraints .................................... 9 Maneuver Monitoring .............................. 10 Return to Earth ................................. 12 TRANSLUNAR COAST ............................... 13 Constraints ................................... 13 Return to Earth ................................. 14 Apollo 13 Translunar Coast Abort ....................... 15 LUNAR-ORBIT INSERTION AND LUNAR ORBIT ................. 15 Constraints ................................... 15 Maneuver Monitoring .............................. 16 Return to Earth ................................. 18 LUNAR DESCENT AND ASCENT ......................... 21 Descent-Orbit-Insertion-Maneuver and Powered-Descent- Maneuver Monitoring ............................ 22 Lunar Module Abort to Rendezvous and CSM Rescue ............. 23 Powered Ascent ................................. 24 Section Page TRANSEARTH INJECTION AND TRANSEARTH COAST ............. 25 Constraints ................................... 25 Maneuver Monitoring .............................. 25 Return to Earth ................................. 26 CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................. 26 iv ........11.111111111111111.1111.11.11 ... I I TABLES Table Page I ABORT PLANNING CONSTRAINTS ................... 3 I1 SPACECRAFT DISPLAYS USED FOR ABORTS ............. 6 I11 PRIMARY CONSTRAINTS DURING TRANSLUNAR INSERTION .... 10 IV PRIMARY CONSTRAINTS DURING LUNAR-ORBIT INSERTION .... 16 FIGURES Figure Page 1 Abort planning process ......................... 2 2 Saturn-Apollo vehicle components .................... 5 3 Typical time history of launch-vehicle dynamic variables following an actuator failure ..................... 7 4 Ground-control trajectory limits .................... 7 5 Apollo spacecraft launch abort modes .................. 8 6 Ground-monitoring display of near-insertion abort decisions for Apollo missions .................... 9 7 Apollo mission profile .......................... 9 8 Basic crew-maneuver-monitoring technique .............. 11 9 Malfunctions during TLI ......................... 12 10 Aborts during TLI using an earth-fixed thrust-vector attitude alinement ........................... 12 11 Apollo 11 trade-off display ....................... 14 12 Operational abort plan from launch to TLC ............... 15 13 Visual LO1 attitude check ........................ 17 14 Effects of attitude-reference failures on pericynthion altitude ..... 17 V Figure Page 15 Premature LO1 shutdown trajectories .................. 18 16 Premature LO1 shutdown trajectory classes .............. 18 17 Abort AV requirements for a stable ellipse .............. 19 18 Minimum AV requirements for LO1 mode I aborts .......... 19 19 Summary of minimum-fuel abort capability as a function of LO1 burn time ............................ 21 20 The LO1 mode I1 first-burn AV as a function of LO1 burn time ............................. 21 21 Time between burns and the pericynthion altitude following a nominal first burn for an LO1 mode I1 abort ............. 21 22 The AV for midcourse corrections as a function of TEI burn time at crew takeover for various pitch drifts .......... 25 23 Operational abort plan from lunar arrival to TEC ............ 26 vi ACRONYMS AGS abort guidance system APS ascent propulsion system CDH constant differential height rendezvous maneuver CM command module cSI coelliptic sequence initiation rendezvous maneuver CSM command and service module DO1 descent orbit insertion DPS descent propulsion system AH altitude difference between PGNS and LR altitude determinations Ah differential height AV characteristic velocity change EDS emergency detection system EMS entry monitoring system EPO earth parking orbit g load factor (force divided by weight) G&N guidance and navigation GTC guidance-determined thrust command IMU inertial measurement unit LES launch escape system LM lunar module LO1 lunar-orbit insertion LPO lunar parking orbit LR landing radar MCC midcourse correction vii MSFN Manned Space Flight Network PDI powered descent initiation PGNCS primary guidance, navigation, and control system PGNS primary guidance and navigation system P37 command module computer program number 37, abort program RCS reaction control system RR rendezvous radar RTCC real-time computer complex s-IC Saturn IC, first stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle S-II Saturn 11, second stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle S-IVB Saturn IVB, third stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle SPS service propulsion system L burn time B TEC transearth coast TEI transearth injection TLC translunar coast TLI translunar injection viii APOLLO EXPER IENCE REPORT ABORT PLANNING By Charles T. Hyle, Charles E. Foggatt,* and Bobbie D. Weber Manned Spacecraft Center SUMMARY To attain the high confidence level required of the safety aspects of the Apollo Program, a practical return-to-earth abort capability was provided for each of the various mission phases. The development of such an abort capability is especially complex because of the myriad of potential mission contingencies that can be identified. Trajectories that satisfy the requirements and constraints of a safe return to earth and that extend to all possible preabort conditions are analyzed. The spacecraft system capabilities, ground-support -equipment capabilities, flight-crew performance, and other operational considerations and limitations are then superimposed. The resultant interaction has led to the development of several distinct abort techniques and powered- flight monitoring procedures. These techniques and procedures ensure that a safe return-to-earth capability exists throughout the spectrum of anticipated off -nominal mission conditions. INTRODUCTION Although the major objectives of the Apollo Program are to land men on the moon, explore the lunar surface, and return the men safely to earth, the safety of the flight crew has always been of paramount importance. The stringent requirement for crew safety dictates the necessity of as much or more contingency planning for abort situa­ tions as is provided for the nominal mission. The contingency planning to ensure that the crew can always abort the mission and return safely to earth is accomplished when an adequate crew warning technique and a method of escape have been defined. An ade­ quate crew warning technique is difficult to achieve during powered flight but has been accomplished by having the crew or ground-control personnel (or both) monitor critical spacecraft systems and parameters. The method of escape from a contingency situa­ tion is often determined by the amount of parameter deviation from the nominal allowed by the monitoring techniques and parameter-deviation limits. A method of escape is referred to as an abort mode. *Presently a management trainee with the Wicks Corporation, Saginaw, Michigan. Definition of a practical monitoring technique and abort mode for the realm of potential contingencies is the result of an iterative analysis cycle in which the effects of various constraints are considered. Such constraints may be caused by either hard­ ware or operational limitations. The characteristics of earth or moon
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