Retrospectivity and the Constitutional Validity of the Bali Bombing and East Timor Trials
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Retrospectivity and the Constitutional Validity of the Bali Bombing and East Timor Trials Ross Clarke* This article discusses two instances of retrospective prosecution currently under way in Indonesia: the trials of those accused of perpetrating the Bali bombing and the trials of Indonesia’s ad hoc Human Rights Court for East Timor. Both sets of trials have been clouded in uncertainty due to a recent constitutional amendment which prohibits retrospective prosecution. The prosecution of crimes against humanity is a widely acknowledged exception to the principle of non-retrospectivity. Despite this, uncertainty over the validity of the Bali and East Timor trials has not been authoritatively resolved. The issue of retrospectivity will be central to any appeals; and of critical import to the outcome of such cases is the proposed Con- stitutional Court and the emergence of judicial review in Indonesia. A ruling on the constitutional validity of retrospective prosecution could potentially exonerate those responsible for grave human rights violations in Bali and East Timor; whatever the outcome, these cases will likely prove defining moments for the Indonesian judiciary. Introduction On 12 October 2002, terrorists bombed two nightclubs in Bali causing the loss of over 200 lives. A special court in Denpasar is now going through the painstaking task of prosecuting those accused of perpetrating the bombing. Lawyers for Amrozi bin Nurhasyim and Imam Samudra – two of the main defendants – argue that the trials are invalid on the grounds of retrospectivity.1 Specifically, they argue that the anti-terrorism legislation under which the two have been charged is invalid, as it breaches a recent constitutional amendment prohibiting retrospective prosecution. The judges of the Bali Court rejected this argument and upheld Indonesia’s anti-terrorism legislation. The retrospectivity of the Bali bombing trials will probably be a key issue on appeal and, given recent constitutional reforms that establish a Constitutional Court, it is unclear how the matter will be resolved. A similar situation has unfolded in the trials conducted by Indonesia’s ad hoc Human Rights Court for East Timor (the East Timor trials). These were convened to try senior military, police and civilian officials in con- nection with serious human rights violations committed in Timor during 2 Asian Law [2003 1999. In these cases, the retrospectivity of the prosecuting legislation has also been in issue. Those convicted have already indicated they will appeal on constitutional grounds. This article has two aims. The first is to analyse Indonesia’s recent constitutional prohibition on retrospective prosecution and determine whether the Bali bombing and East Timor trials are a justifiable excep- tion to the principle of non-retrospectivity. A brief survey of different approaches on the retrospectivity issue suggests that both sets of trials are justifiable, notwithstanding their apparent illegality under Indonesian constitutional law. The second aim is to discuss Indonesia’s proposed Constitutional Court and examine its potential impact on the projected appeals from the Bali and East Timor trials. The Constitutional Court, if implemented successfully, will represent a major development for Indonesia’s legal system and appeals from either the East Timor or Bali trials on the constitutional validity of retrospective prosecution would represent the first major instance of judicial review since the fall of Soeharto’s New Order regime in 1998. The political importance of both sets of trials for the Megawati Government has attracted much attention (International Crisis Group, 2002; Parkinson, 2002; Reuter, 2003). On the other hand, the legal issues – in particular the constitutional validity of retrospective prose- cution – have been largely overlooked. There is, however, no doubt that once one of the East Timor or Bali cases is appealed to either the Supreme Court or the proposed Constitutional Court, the issue of retrospectivity will have to be resolved. This should prove a defining moment for Indonesia’s fledgling post-reformasi legal system. Background to Constitutional Reform On 18 August 2000, Indonesia’s Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) or People’s Consultative Assembly passed the Second Amendment to Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution.2 In a 12-day sitting, the 700-member MPR significantly reformed the Constitution, particularly in the area of human rights. The Second Amendment was the culmination of nine months of preparation by the Ad Hoc Committee (PAH 1) of the MPR’s Working Committee, which included provincial consultation meetings and international study missions (International Crisis Group, 2001: 15). Throughout the drafting process, PAH 1 engaged in intense negotiation with representatives of the MPR’s political blocs3 and the final draft tabled for debate was considered the result of political deals and compromise – a situation common to all of Indonesia’s recent constitutional amendments (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2000: 3). Vol 5] Constitutional Validity of Bali and East Timor Trials 3 The Second Amendment included the addition of a Bill of Rights – Chapter XA of the Constitution. It is the first meaningful protection of human rights in Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution and it represents a radical shift in Indonesia’s constitutional philosophy from essentially authori- tarian to a more liberal–democratic model. Chapter XA was drawn substantially from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and it provided a far more extensive constitutional protection of human rights than that offered by many developed states (Lindsey, 2002: 254). Thus, the Second Amendment was made in the spirit of widespread reform, with the MPR focused on using constitutional amendments to stimulate Indonesia’s transition to democracy and to guarantee the protection of human rights. Included in Chapter XA is art 28I(1) which provides that: [T]he right not to be prosecuted on the basis of a retroactive law [is a] human right … that cannot be diminished under any circumstances. This provision is based on art 11(2) of the UDHR which prohibits prose- cution on the basis of retrospective legislation (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2000: 13). The inclusion of this pro- vision was extremely controversial. On the one hand, it protected an important human right – the right not to be prosecuted for an act that was legal at the time it was performed – while, on the other, it appears to be a significant impediment to the prosecution of past human rights violations. Evaluation of Article 28I(1) An Appropriate Constitutional Provision? Protection from prosecution on the basis of retrospective legislation is an important individual right worthy of significant protection – so much so, that it is enshrined in art 11(2) of the UDHR and art 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Further, the Constitutions of countries as diverse as South Africa, France, India, Argentina and the United States either expressly prohibit retrospective prosecution or do so via a more general prohibition on retrospective legis- lation (Edinger, 1995: 17). Such substantial protection exists due to the severe breach on personal rights that retrospective prosecution entails and the effect retrospectivity has on the provision of a fair trial (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 2000: 20). Given such widespread consensus on the importance of protecting against retrospective prosecution, an innocent observer might have expected little objection to the inclusion of art 28I(1) in Indonesia’s Consti- tution. Yet, the inclusion of art 28I in the Bill of Rights was met with 4 Asian Law [2003 severe criticism from international and domestic human rights activists. Amnesty International described the amendment as a potential ‘backdoor’ for those responsible for massive human rights violations (Amnesty Inter- national, 2000: 1), while the Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association called the amendment ‘disturbing’ (Chandrasekaran, 2000: 1). Further, it was generally agreed that the inclusion of the principle of non- retrospectivity in the Constitution was inappropriate. For instance, Pro- fessor Muladi, a former Minister of Justice and Human Rights, stated that: [A]lthough non-retroactivity is a general principle of the law, it would be better not to include it in the Constitution. (Susantri, 2001: 1) The importance of the right not to be subject to retrospective prosecution did not draw much attention, especially when compared to the international and domestic furore concerning the amendment’s potential impact on human rights trials (Amnesty International, 2000: 1). Similarly, little mention was made of the need to restrain government from arbitrarily prosecuting past acts. However, it was the words, ‘cannot be diminished under any circumstances’, that seemed to explain the contro- versy. This appeared to make the right against retrospective prosecution absolute. If this interpretation is correct, art 28I(1) poses a significant barrier to the prosecution of past human rights violations. Implications for Prosecuting Past Human Rights Violations Until 23 September 1999, when Law 39/1999 on Human Rights was enacted, crimes against humanity were not incorporated into Indonesian domestic law. As countless human rights violations allegedly occurred before this date, many human rights activists believed that art 28I(1) prevented the creation of retrospective