Desperately Seeking Representation: An Investigation into Visible Minority Electability under Vancouver’s At-large Electoral System
by
Matthew G. Smith
A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master’s of Arts in Human Geography Graduate Department of Geography University of Toronto
© 2011
Desperately Seeking Representation: An Investigation into Visible Minority Electability under Vancouver’s At-large Electoral System
Matthew G. Smith Master’s of Arts Degree in Human Geography Department of Geography University of Toronto 2011
Abstract The results of Vancouver’s 2008 municipal election led to critiques that South Asian candidates, and possibly all visible minority candidates, face reduced electability under
Vancouver’s at-large electoral system than they would under a different municipal electoral system. This thesis employs numerous quantitative research methods to assess whether visible minority candidates do face reduced electability under the at-large system compared to a ward system proposed for Vancouver in 2004. The extent that Vancouver’s 2008 election results fulfil three U.S. Supreme Court conditions for establishing minority vote dilution is also assessed as part of this thesis research.
ii
Acknowledgments Profound thanks to my wife, Heather Fussell, who supported me through my doubts and confusion and without whom the completion of this thesis would not have been possible. I am also indebted to my supervisor, Dr. Alan Walks, whose guidance and input was invaluable in helping me plan and execute my research and write this thesis.
I would also like to thank my sister, Annabel Smith, who helped with editing and pep talks and my “coach”, Laurel Jebamani, whose skills and feedback assisted me in successfully applying to the University of Toronto.
I am also grateful for the support my family, friends and in-laws gave me throughout my
Master’s, and lastly thanks to Holden for being born a week late and thereby giving me just enough time to write my thesis draft and ultimately complete my defense and revisions.
iii Tables of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 1 1.1: Multiculturalism in liberal democracies ...... 1 1.2: Problematizing “visible minority” ...... 4 1.3: Vancouver’s 2008 election ...... 7 1.4: State of research ...... 11 1.5: Vancouver’s history of electoral reform...... 12 1.6: Thesis research focus and questions ...... 18 1.7: Electoral geography ...... 18 1.8: Other electoral systems ...... 19 1.9: Positionality and critical reflexivity ...... 21 1.10: Order of operations ...... 22 Chapter 2: Literature Review ...... 24 2.1: Multiculturalism and minorities’ representation rights ...... 24 2.2: American studies of minority electability under at-large systems ...... 31 2.2.1: History of municipal electoral reform in America ...... 31 2.2.2: Assessment of minority electability under American at-large systems ...... 35 2.3: Studies of minority electability in Vancouver ...... 37 Chapter 3: Methodology ...... 40 3.1: Index of representation ...... 40 3.1.1: Justification of index of representation ...... 41 3.1.2: Data and approach ...... 42 3.2: Location quotient ...... 43 3.2.1: Justification of location quotient ...... 44 3.2.2: Data and approach ...... 45 3.3: GIS analysis of visible and non-visible minority residential patterns ...... 47 3.3.1: Justification for GIS analysis of visible and non-visible minority residential patterns ...... 47 3.3.2: Data and approach ...... 48 3.4: Homogenous precinct analysis ...... 49 3.4.1: Justification of homogeneous precinct analysis ...... 49 3.4.2: Data and approach ...... 49 Chapter 4: Research Findings ...... 51 4.1: Assessing representation in Vancouver ...... 51 4.2: Minority electability under the at-large and ward electoral systems ...... 54 4.2.1: Party vote in Vancouver’s 2008 election ...... 54 4.2.2: Deviations from party vote trend and divergences to Mayoral candidates’ LQ scores ...... 64 4.2.2.1: Deviations from party vote ...... 64 4.2.2.2: Significantly diverging LQ scores ...... 73 iv 4.2.3: Overall findings from location quotient analysis of at-large and ward systems ... 76 4.3: Vancouver’s 2008 election results and the three conditions ...... 77 4.3.1: The first condition ...... 78 4.3.2: The second condition ...... 87 4.3.3: The third condition ...... 89 4.3.4: Overall findings of fulfilling the three conditions ...... 99 Chapter 5: Concluding Comments ...... 102 Appendix ...... 108 Works Cited ...... 128
v List of Maps and Tables Map 1.1: The 14 wards proposed by the 2004 Vancouver Electoral Reform Commission ...... 17 Table 4.1 Index of representation for Vancouver ...... 51 Table 4.2: LQ scores for VV Candidates Robertson, Chow, Blyth and Clement ...... 55 Table 4.3: Summary of party vote trend for Vision Vancouver candidates in Downtown and Westside wards ...... 57 Table 4.4: Summary of party vote trend for Vision Vancouver candidates in Eastside wards ...... 57 Table 4.5: Summary of party vote trend for Vision Vancouver candidates in Central wards ...... 58 Table 4.6: Summary of party vote trend in all wards for Vision Vancouver candidates ...... 59 Table 4.7: Summary of party vote trend for NPA candidates in Downtown and Westside wards) ...... 61 Table 4.8: Summary of party vote trend for NPA candidates in Eastside wards ...... 61 Table 4.9: Summary of party vote trend for NPA candidates in Central wards ...... 62 Table 4.10: Summary of party vote trend in all wards for NPA candidates ...... 63 Table 4.11: Deviations by ethnicity of candidates...... 66 Map 4.1: Non-visible minorities residents as % of 2006 Vancouver population with 2004 ward boundaries overlaid ...... 67 Map 4.2: Chinese residents as % of 2006 Vancouver population with 2004 ward boundaries overlaid ...... 68 Map 4.3: South Asian residents as % of 2006 Vancouver population with 2004 ward boundaries overlaid ...... 69 Table 4.12: Candidates with LQ scores that deviate from party vote trend ...... 71 Table 4.13: Summary of significant divergences by non-visible minority, Chinese and South Asian descent ...... 73 Table 4.14 Summary of candidates with significantly diverging LQ scores by ward ...... 75 Table 4.15: Residential concentrations of non-visible minorities, Chinese and South Asians by ward ...... 81 Map 4.4: Renfrew-Collingwood ward as proposed in 2004 and updated for first condition ...... 84 Map 4.5: Sunset ward as proposed in 2004 and updated for first condition ...... 86 Table 4.16: Summary of South Asian and Chinese candidates’ LQ scores in the Sunset and Renfrew-Collingwood wards ...... 88 Map 4.6: Homogeneous precinct analysis polls 131, 98 and 91 ...... 91 Table 4.17 Residential makeup of homogeneous precinct analysis poll 131 ...... 92 Table 4.18 Residential makeup of homogeneous precinct analysis poll 91 ...... 93 Table 4.19 Residential makeup of homogeneous precinct analysis poll 98 ...... 94 Table 4.20: Homogeneous precinct analysis of polls 131, 91 and 98 for City Council candidates ...... 96
vi Table 4.21: Homogeneous precinct analysis of polls 131, 91 and 98 for Parks Board candidates ...... 97 Table 4.22: Homogeneous precinct analysis of polls 131, 91 and 98 for School Board candidates ...... 98 Table 6.1: Location quotient scores for Mayoral candidates in 2008 Vancouver election ...... 108 Table 6.2: Location quotient scores for City Council candidates in 2008 Vancouver election ...... 109 Table 6.3: Location quotient scores for Parks Board candidates in 2008 Vancouver election ...... 110 Table 6.4: Location quotient scores for School Board candidates in 2008 Vancouver election ...... 111 Table 6.5: Candidates with LQ scores that deviate from the party vote trend ...... 112 Table 6.6: Candidates with LQ scores that diverge significantly from their Mayoral candidates’ LQ score ...... 114 Table 6.7: City Council candidates with divergent LQ scores (Downtown wards) ...... 116 Table 6.8: City Council candidates with divergent LQ scores (Westside wards) ...... 117 Table 6.9: City Council candidates with divergent LQ scores (Eastside wards) ...... 118 Table 6.10: City Council candidates with divergent LQ scores (Central wards) ...... 119 Table 6.11: Parks Board candidates with divergent LQ scores (Downtown wards) ...... 120 Table 6.12: Parks Board candidates with divergent LQ scores (Westside wards) ...... 121 Table 6.13: Parks Board candidates with divergent LQ scores (Eastside wards) ...... 122 Table 6.14: Parks Board candidates with divergent LQ scores (Central wards) ...... 123 Table 6.15: School Board candidates with divergent LQ scores (Downtown wards) ...... 124 Table 6.16: School Board candidates with divergent LQ scores (Westside wards) ...... 125 Table 6.17: School Board candidates with divergent LQ scores (Eastside wards) ...... 126 Table 6.18: School Board candidates with divergent LQ scores (Central wards) ...... 127
vii Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1: Multiculturalism in liberal democracies
Multiculturalism is a political concept common in liberal democratic states.
Governments of such states encourage peoples from foreign countries to immigrate, mainly for reasons of population and economic growth. Immigrants to these multicultural states are expected to accept the political and legal systems of their new home society in return for equality of opportunity and the ability to maintain the cultural practices of their homeland.
In order to achieve this balance of equal opportunity and cultural diversity, liberal democratic states that pursue multiculturalism enact legislation guaranteeing all citizens economic, legal and political equality irrelevant of their race, ethnicity, gender and other individual or group differences. Essentially, liberal democratic states encouraging multiculturalism enter into a social contract with those who immigrate to them. The state ensures individual and group rights to equality and cultural autonomy through legislative and legal mechanisms in return for naturalized citizens accepting the state’s laws, political structures and ideology of multiculturalism.
Canada is one such liberal democratic state that has embraced and enshrined multiculturalism. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ Section 27 states that “this
Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians” (Canada 1982). While Section 15 declares that “every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race,
1 national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability” (Canada
1982).
In addition to the Charter, the Canadian Multiculturalism Act “recognize[s] and promote[s] the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of
Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage” (Canada 1985). The Act goes on to commit the government of Canada to “achiev[ing] the equality of all Canadians in the economic, social, cultural and political life of Canada” (Canada 1985).
Together, Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Multiculturalism Act provide the legislative mechanisms by which citizens and the federal government of Canada, along with the provincial and municipal governments within Canada, can legally challenge instances of biased and prejudiced treatment of citizens. Such challenges are essential to the healthy cohesion of Canadian society and the provinces, cities and communities that constitute it. As Canada’s population continues to diversify, it is vital that new Canadians from minority communities believe their new home nation is committed to creating a society where they are not discriminated due to their cultural or ethnic identities. When instances of inequality or unequal access on account of cultural or ethnic difference are uncovered, they must be challenged and overturned or else minority citizens and communities are likely to question Canada’s commitment to multiculturalism, not to mention democracy.
Scholars Jurgen Habermas, Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor theorize that when liberal democratic states allow inequality amongst citizens, those citizens subject to discrimination can experience negative and repressive self-images. Habermas, Kymlicka and Taylor also believe that if such prejudiced treatment of citizens from minority communities are not redressed by the 2 nation pursuing multiculturalism, it can lead to minorities rejecting the nation’s legal and political structures while experiencing increased alienation and negative ghettoisation (discussed further in section 2.1).
Habermas, Kymlicka and Taylor have each contributed greatly to ongoing debates on the history, theory and value of multiculturalism, along with the risks posed by instances of unjust treatment along ethnic and cultural lines within multicultural societies. Other academics have strengthened the conceptual foundations of multicultural societies by empirically studying occurrences and causes of discriminatory treatment within multicultural states. For example,
Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Susan Welch’s work probing the proportionality of ethnic minorities’ political representation within American and Canadian municipal governments have enabled a better understanding of, and solutions to, the causes of unequal political access due to ethnicity
(discussed further in section 2.2 and 2.3).
This thesis is inspired by the work of Habermas, Kymlicka, Taylor, Abu-Laban and
Welch, and aims to contribute to the body of study on minority electability in multicultural societies by empirically interrogating claims that visible minorities experience unequal access to elected office in Vancouver, British Columbia. This thesis employs quantitative research methods to evaluate claims that Vancouver’s 2008 election results demonstrate Vancouver’s at- large electoral system dilutes the votes of visible minority citizens and leads to the reduced electability of South Asian candidates specifically, and visible minority candidates generally.
This evaluation compares the electability of visible minority candidates under Vancouver’s at- large electoral system to a ward system developed and proposed for Vancouver in 2004. The aim in utilizing this proposed ward system in this comparison is not to establish it as the most
3 equitable electoral system for Vancouver, rather the goal is to test if by comparison the at-large system does reduce the electability of visible minority candidates.
1.2: Problematizing “visible minority”
One of the principle data sets employed in this thesis research is the 2006 Canadian census results for the “visible minority” category for the city of Vancouver. Applying a critical lens to this “visible minority” category reveals the terms and groupings within this data set to be problematic. In particular, these terms and groupings result in a homogenization of numerous groups and communities while lacking an understanding of how shared, community identities are formed.
The results within the “visible minority” category most utilized in this thesis are for the groupings non-visible minorities, visible minorities, Chinese and South Asian. The groupings non-visible minorities and visible minorities essentially divide the entire population of
Vancouver into two groups: one containing all those who fall within the tradition Caucasian majority and the other containing all those who are visibly not Caucasian and thereby traditionally the minority. While this division is useful for such research as performed in this thesis, it is important to acknowledging that very few people would actual refer to themselves as a visible or non-visible minority. This is largely due to both of these groupings containing very little – if any – shared history, traditions or beliefs. Group or community identities most commonly develop out of shared experiences, values and cultural traditions and the groupings visible and non-visible minorities lack these. So, while visible and non-visible minorities are useful groupings for data collection there are few, if any individuals who would say they ascribe to either.
4 In addition, while the grouping visible minorities is broken into numerous sub-groups within the “visible minority” census category, non-visible minorities are not which means people of Italian, Germanic, British, French, Portuguese and all other European cultural groups are left as one group. Also merged into this non-visible minorities grouping are those who would describe themselves as Canadian or American – not to mention those who would describe themselves as French Canadian, Acadian, British Columbian and so on.
As for the grouping Chinese, it does not allow for an understanding or appreciation of the differences between those who speak Cantonese compared to those speaking Mandarin, or for the differences between these two language groups and those who identify as Taiwanese Chinese as many in Vancouver do. The grouping South Asian homogenizes those who speak Punjabi with those whose language is Hindi, while also amalgamating followers of Sikhism, Hinduism and Islam. And within both the Chinese and South Asian groupings there is no ability to understand the nuances between those who are more traditional or fundamental so far as their desire to maintain forms of dress, cultural practices and other aspects of their lives as defined by their homeland’s culture or religion compared to those who can be described as more Western or integrated in the sense that they are adopting non-traditional beliefs, clothing and more as a result of deeper integration into their society they have immigrated to.
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to further interrogate the challenges presented by the groupings within the “visible minority” census category, it is important to elaborate on how the already raised critiques affect the issues of representation and recognition. There is a complicated relationship between the concepts of representation and recognition, and this thesis presents that Taylor and Habermass’ belief that multicultural societies must genuinely and positively recognize minorities is somewhat achieved by minority groups who are traditionally
5 under-represented in elected positions seeing the election of someone from their group. Yet, the critiques just raised bout the “visible minority” census category leads to questions about group identity and whether electing a Chinese City Councillor is enough to ensure the numerous
Chinese communities within Vancouver are genuinely recognized. Perhaps only Cantonese and
English speaking Chinese Vancouverites have been elected to City Council, and if that were the case then Mandarin speaking Chinese in Vancouver would be unlikely to feel they are being recognized through the avenue of municipally elected representation.
In addition, the concept of representation needs to be dissected briefly. This thesis exclusively discusses what is referred to as mirror or descriptive representation; meaning that a group is represented when someone from that group or community is elected. Mirror or descriptive representation can be contrasted with substantive representation which is best described as elected officials actively representing the opinions and needs of constituents who have a cultural background, identity or beliefs different from that of the elected official (Andrew,
Biles, Siemiatycki and Tolley 2008, 14 – 15). It is beyond the scope of this thesis and the data it employs to evaluate the extent that Vancouver’s various groups and communities are substantively represented. However, it is not for reasons of scope and data alone that this thesis only deals with mirror or descriptive representation. This thesis is inspired by the ideas of Taylor and Habermass that minorities in multicultural societies should be meaningfully recognized, and as such this thesis looks at the extent that such minorities hold municipally elected office and thereby the degree that those groups are represented by elected officials (in a mirror representation sense). This thesis presents the idea that elected mirror representation of visible minorities is an essential act of recognition by a multicultural society. Such recognition should be understood as a first goal of recognition, and once the first Chinese Canadian man was elected to Vancouver City Council the next goal should be for elected representation (and thereby 6 recognition) of deeper diversity within Vancouver’s Chinese communities. In this sense, once the first Chinese man is elected then the goal should shift towards electing a Chinese women, and if that first elected man was a Cantonese speaker then the goal should be to elect a Mandarin speaker.
Ultimately, elected representation is one avenue for minorities to feel recognized by the multicultural society they are a part of and such recognition must be an ongoing project that starts with the first Chinese or South Asian elected. Once this ‘first’ is achieved that minority group should seek a deeper sense of recognition by having other members of their communities elected who represent the diversity within those communities.
1.3: Vancouver’s 2008 election
The polls closed on Vancouver’s 2008 municipal election at 9pm on the evening of
November 15th. Within minutes ballot counting began and by 9:30pm results starting trickling into Vancouver’s Election Office and onto the City of Vancouver’s website. As the first results were posted, the end result seemed clear. The civic party Vision Vancouver was going to sweep the 2008 election.
Within an hour of polls closing, the Vancouver Sun, CBC and other news outlets were declaring Vision Vancouver mayoral candidate Gregor Robertson the winner. Newspapers over the next few days printed headlines such as “Robertson celebrates landslide; 'This is even better than watching the Canucks rap the Leafs'” (Montgomery and Bermingham 2008), “Vision prevails in landslide victory” (Hunter 2008) and “‘Slaughtered' NPA desperately needs a remake” (Bula 2008). When all the votes were counted Robertson received 67,598 votes to his main competitor, Non Partisan Association (NPA) Mayoral candidate Peter Ladner, who
7 garnered 48,794 votes.
As Vision Vancouver candidates and supporters celebrated, many could not ignore the one blemish on their 2008 election results. Vision Vancouver City Council candidate Kashmir
Dhaliwal was the only candidate out of all twenty-one Vision Vancouver candidates not to win election in the 2008 election.
In the days and weeks that followed election night, activists, candidates and some media pundits began to probe deeper into the 2008 election results of not only Kashmir Dhaliwal and
Vision Vancouver, but all South Asian candidates (Burrows 2008 and 2008b; C. Smith 2008;
Rossi 2008). Articles publicized that all six candidates of South Asian descent received the least amount of votes of their party’s candidates, and that these results were seemingly irrelevant of party as three of these South Asian candidates ran with the NPA, two with Vision Vancouver and one with COPE (the Coalition of Progressive Electors). Even Raj Hundal, the lone South Asian candidate elected in the 2008 election, received the least amount of votes of all Vision
Vancouver Parks Board candidates. Hundal’s results were well behind the next closest Vision
Vancouver Parks Board candidate, Sarah Blyth, who received 56,775 votes to Hundal’s 48,871.
One newspaper article revealed that the 2008 election results for South Asian candidates paralleled Vancouver’s municipal electoral history (Burrows 2008b). In the last six Vancouver elections only one of 17 candidates of South Asian descent did not receive the least amount of votes of candidates on their party’s slate. The one exception received the second lowest number of votes. This trend of South Asian candidates consistently placing last – with one exception – amongst their party’s candidates in municipal elections is in spite of the large size of
Vancouver’s South Asian population. South Asians are Vancouver’s second largest visible minority group and third largest ethnic group overall (Statistics Canada 2007).
8 As media coverage of South Asian candidates’ 2008 election results continued beyond election night, many such candidates in the 2008 election began asking whether Vancouver’s unique at-large electoral system played a role in the trend of South Asian candidates coming in last amongst fellow party candidates (Rossi 2008). Vancouver is the only major Canadian city to employ an at-large electoral system, under which all eligible citizens vote for all municipal positions: one Mayor, ten City Councillors, nine School Board Trustees, and seven Parks Board
Trustees. Just over a week after the 2008 election, failed Vision Vancouver candidate Kashmir
Dhaliwal stated he was considering legal action in Canada’s Supreme Court against Vancouver’s at-large electoral system (Burrows 2008b).
A lawyer and former chair of the Canadian Bar Association’s national administrative-law section said of Dhaliwal’s potential case against Vancouver’s at-large system, “I think it’s an arguable legal case” (Burrows 2008b). While Bill Black, a UBC professor emeritus of law and an international authority on human rights, commented, “you’d have a hard time making the argument that the present at-large system was put in for the purpose of decreasing the representation of different groups. But under our Constitution, if equality is violated unintentionally – if that is the effect – then you can make a challenge based on that” (Burrows
2008b).
Dhaliwal also commented that he believed “a ward system [in Vancouver] would help counter racism against South Asian politicians” (Burrows 2008). Dennis Pilon, Assistant
Professor of Political Science at the University of Victoria, when asked about Dhaliwal’s comments on a ward system said that “if there was a ward system [in Vancouver], it’s fairly obvious that [South Asians] would get some kind of representation, because they would be the majority in a particular geographic riding” (Burrows 2008b).
9 Under such a ward system the at-large electoral area – in this case the City of Vancouver
– would be divided into smaller electoral districts known as wards. In elections eligible voters living within each ward would cast their votes for their local ward Councillor1 and the mayor, who is still elected at-large by all citizens living in the entire electoral area.
Despite seemingly ample evidence to pursue claims of discrimination, Burrows’
November 27 article represented the last media coverage on the issue in 2008, 2009 and 2010.
South Asian candidates’ electability in Vancouver municipal elections receded from the media’s attention and did not appear for debate in the courtroom of Canada’s Supreme Court or for discussion in the chambers of Vancouver’s City Council.
Yet, the gravity of these claims to Vancouver’s identity, social cohesion and international reputation as a successful example of multiculturalism demand attention. Based on Habermas,
Kymlicka and Taylor’s ideas, there is reason for legitimate concern that unequal treatment of visible minority candidates in Vancouver municipal elections could cause psychological damage to visible minority citizens and communities while jeopardizing their faith in Canada’s commitment to multiculturalism and democracy. Comments from one unsuccessful South Asian candidate in the 2008 Vancouver election demonstrate this type of damage has already taken place:
What ran through my head [on election night] was anger because I spent nine years of my life in the Canadian navy risking my life for this country. And I feel like one of those black guys who came back from Vietnam and fought for their country, and then when they get home, they find out they’re still a nigger, despite what they’ve done” (Burrows 2008b).
1 Some cities with ward systems have more than one City Councillor elected per ward, such electoral systems are commonly referred to as multi-member ward systems. 10 1.4: State of research
Despite “visible minorities [being] little better than one-third of the way to being proportionally represented within the local governments” of Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal
(Bird 2004, 183), until “recently, relatively little research in Canada has looked at the electoral – or even political – dimension of the integration of immigrant, refugee or even minority populations” (Andrew 2008, 5). To date, there has been no detailed academic study of the affect
Vancouver’s at-large electoral system has on visible minorities’ electability.
Conversely, American academics have studied the issue of minority representation and electability in municipally elected positions for over forty years (Karnig and Welch 1980, 1982;
Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Heilig and Mundt 1983; Welch and Bledsoe 1988; Grofman,
Hadley and Niemi 1992; Davidson and Grofman 1994; Kemp 1999; Welch 1990; Bowler,
Donovan and Brockington 2003; Behr 2004). Specifically, there has been extensive study of how ethnic minorities fare under U.S. municipal at-large electoral systems and whether such systems create minority vote dilution, which is defined as:
A process whereby election laws or practices, either single or in concert, combine with systematic bloc voting among a identifiable group to diminish the voting strength of at least one other group. The idea is that one group, voting cohesively for its preferred candidates, is systematically out voted by a larger group that is also cohesive (Davidson and Grofman 1994, 22). In addition to defining vote dilution, American academics, activists and politicians have worked to develop ways of measuring whether or not minority vote dilution is occurring (discussed further in section 2.2). These efforts culminated in the precedent setting ruling in the U.S.
Supreme Court case Thornburg vs. Gingles. That ruling established three conditions by which the occurrence of minority vote dilution is determined. Those three conditions are “(1) the plaintiff’s class [is] large and geographical compact; (2) the class is politically cohesive; and (3)
11 the white majority voting bloc usually defeats the minority’s preferred candidate” (Williams
1999, 24).
Not only has the issue of visible minority vote dilution under Vancouver’s at-large electoral system received no academic attention, it has not been a part of Vancouver’s long and vigorous history of debate over whether to keep its at-large system or replace it with a ward- based electoral system. This history is filled with numerous campaigns, three referendums, three plebiscites and instances of both systems being implemented, yet the electability of minorities has never been seriously considered politically or academically when assessing the strengths and weaknesses of Vancouver’s at-large electoral system.
1.5: Vancouver’s history of electoral reform
When the City of Vancouver was incorporated in 1886, the “Vancouver Incorporation
Act provided that 10 Councillors (then called Aldermen) and a Mayor were to be elected at- large” (Berger 2004, 13). One of the first actions of Vancouver’s inaugural City Council was to adopt a ward system “of five wards, each electing two Aldermen” (Berger 13). In 1916, City
Council abolished the multi-member structure of its ward system so that one councillor was elected in each of the city’s then eight wards (Berger 13). In the lead up to the 1920 Vancouver election, a proportional representation system known as Single Transferable Vote (STV) was implemented, but this STV system “was abandoned in 1923 and wards [were] restored” (Berger
13).
In 1935, there was growing anxiety amongst Vancouver’s local and provincial politicians
“over the [city’s] debt and the increasing numbers of unemployed [residents, which] was further heightened by the [socialist] CCF's growing presence in the city” (A. Smith 1982, 51). In the
1933 provincial election the CCF (Co-operative Commonwealth Federation) became the official
12 opposition largely due to its strong support from urban areas like East Vancouver, where it elected two MLAs (A. Smith, 51). The CCF’s 1933 provincial elections results, combined with the CCF establishing a civic wing in 1935, led to the proposal that Vancouver replace its ward system with an at-large electoral system and that Vancouverites should vote on this change in a plebiscite (A. Smith, 51).
Not only did business groups and right-wing provincial and municipal politicians support the move to an at-large system, so too did “labour unions and the local branch of the Cooperative
Commonwealth Federation” (Vogel 2003, 53). The CCF appeared “to have accepted the old urban reform argument that the abolition of corrupt ward interests would lead to better government” (A. Smith 54). In addition, under Vancouver’s then ward system working class areas of the city were not fairly represented as the number of constituents was far greater in wards encompassing working class neighbourhoods than the number of constituents in wards located in more affluent parts of Vancouver (A. Smith 54). Lastly, many CCFers held the belief that “city-wide elections provided the CCF with an opportunity to draw on its growing east-side support and make a consolidated bid for power” (A. Smith 54).
In a 1935 plebiscite the question was: “Are you in favour of abolishing the ward system and electing aldermen at-large?” (Berger 14). The voter turnout was 19 percent with 69 percent of those casting a ballot doing so in favour of reform and the adoption of an at-large system
(Berger 14). At the time of implementing the at-large system the number of councillors was also reduced from twelve to eight (Berger 14).
Over the next three decades there was a growing belief that Vancouver’s at-large electoral system worked “to the advantage of the largest cohesive voting group, allowing it to take all, or nearly all, of the positions even if the group itself is a minority among actual voters”
(Tennant 1980, 16). This winner-take-all scenario led to the dominance of Vancouver City
13 Council for three decades by one party, the NPA, who garnered the support of Vancouver’s
West-side, middle class neighbourhoods where voter turnout was often 20 to 30 percent higher than East-side, working class neighbourhoods (Tennant 18).
By 1968, the NPA’s dominance in at-large elections due to their West-side voting block led to “a campaign for wards … [and] the emergence of two new political forces: The Electors
Action Movement (TEAM) and the Committee of Progressive Electors (COPE), [later renamed the Coalition of Progressive Electors]” (Berger 14). In the 1972 Vancouver election, TEAM campaigned on its support for a partial ward system, whereby some Councillors would be elected in wards and others elected at-large along with the Mayor. TEAM “promised to hold a plebiscite on the issue” if elected (Tennant 29). In the 1972 election, TEAM elected a majority to
Vancouver City Council and in 1973 another plebiscite was held on whether to reform
Vancouver’s at-large electoral system. Twenty percent “of eligible voters voted in the plebiscite
… [and] of those who did cast valid ballots 59 percent favoured the existing at-large system; 41 percent favoured a change to either the partial or ward system” (Tennant 30).
The ward issue was rejuvenated in “1977 when a group called the Area Representation
Electors’ Alliance (AREA) began to campaign for a change, and even drew up proposed ward boundaries” (Berger 15). In response to AREA’s campaign, Vancouver City Council authorized a referendum be conducted during the 1978 civic election on whether to move to a full ward system or retain the at-large system. The 1978 referendum resulted in 51.7% of votes being cast in favour of a full ward system (Berger, 15). In response to the 1978 referendum results,
Vancouver City Council struck a Commission that recommended a specific ward system to implement. However, Council did not act upon the Commission’s final recommendations
(Berger 15).
Vancouver’s 1980 municipal election resulted in the election of a majority of councillors
14 favouring a ward system, which led to a 1982 referendum on whether to adopt such a system and in which 57 percent voted in favour of wards (Berger 15 - 16). The provincial government of the time was opposed to a ward system and enacted legislation following the 1982 referendum that a
60 percent majority must be in favour of electoral reform in Vancouver in order for such reform to be implemented (Berger 16).
In 1988 Vancouver City Council established another Electoral Reform Commission, and its final report included a recommendation to move to 10 wards (Berger 16). In a referendum held the same year, 56 percent voted yes to adopting these wards, but no reform was implemented as the requirement of a 60 percent majority set by the province was still in effect
(Berger 16).
Prior to a 1996 referendum on electoral reform, the provincial government removed the
60 percent requirement, but as the majority of councillors at the time were opposed to wards City
Council “draft[ed] a confusing multi-question referendum that produced a 59 per cent majority in favour of retaining the at-large system, with a 54 per cent margin favouring wards if the existing system were to be changed” (Berger 16). As a result of the confusing questions and contradictory results, no electoral reform was pursued by Vancouver City Council after the 1996 referendum.
In Vancouver’s 2002 municipal election, the Coalition of Progressive Electors (COPE) elected a majority to Vancouver City Council (City of Vancouver, December 18, 2008). COPE had “consistently called for the implementation of a ward system to provide more equitable and accountable political representation” (Vogel, 72), and once it held a majority on city council, it established an Electoral Reform Commission which recommended that Vancouver adopt a ward system consisting of fourteen wards. The Commission developed boundaries for the fourteen wards based on “respect for local area and other community boundaries; keeping total eligible
15 voters within +/- 10 per cent of the average (26,000 to 32,000); and anticipated planned population growth” (Berger 2004, 68) (map 1.1 presents these 14 recommended wards).
Vancouver City Council decided to hold a plebiscite on whether to adopt these fourteen wards, and 54% of votes cast in that 2004 plebiscite were against adopting a ward system (City of
Vancouver, May 25, 2011). As a result, no further action was taken on electoral reform in
Vancouver.
Throughout Vancouver’s long and contentious history of debating electoral reform and the merits and disadvantages of the at-large and ward systems, there has been little attention given to either systems’ affect on the electability of visible minorities. The most recent 2004 plebiscite on electoral reform was no different in that “both the Yes and No camps – and electoral reform commissioner Thomas Berger, for that matter – have overlooked the core issue of the debate. That is that the at-large system is the only electoral system ever to have been struck down for violating the constitutional rights of minorities” (Stewart 2004).
This distinct lack of attention during the numerous campaigns, plebiscites and debates to minority electability under Vancouver’s at-large electoral system, combined with the lack of academic attention to the topic, has led to the development of the following thesis focus and research questions.
16
Map 1.1: The 14 wards proposed by the 2004 Vancouver Electoral Reform Commission (Berger 71)
17 1.6: Thesis research focus and questions
This thesis has been developed as an exploratory investigation of visible minority electability under Vancouver’s at-large electoral system. The specific research questions guiding this thesis are:
1. Does Vancouver’s at-large electoral system reduce the electability of visible minority
candidates?
2. Would a different electoral system in Vancouver increase the electability of visible minority
candidates?
3. Do the 2008 Vancouver election results meet the three conditions established in Thornburg
vs. Gingles to determine minority vote dilution?
1.7: Electoral geography
As “many aspects of elections are inherently spatial in their form,” the study of electoral systems within human geography is known as electoral geography (Johnston 2000, 205). This sub-discipline of electoral geography has evolved mainly since the 1960s and has focused on the spatial organization of elections, spatial variations in voting patterns and the influence of local factors on political attitudes and voting decisions (Johnston, 205). The most widely recognized geographer practicing electoral geography is Ron Johnston, while a prominent Canadian geographer working in the sub-discipline is Alan Walks who recently investigated growing divergences in voting patterns between urban, inner suburban and outer suburban residents in
Canada (Walks 2004, 2005). This thesis research is within this sub-discipline of electoral geography.
18 1.8: Other electoral systems
Before engaging in this thesis analysis of Vancouver’s 2008 election results under the instituted at-large electoral system and a proposed ward electoral system, it is appropriate to discuss municipal electoral systems generally and their differences. The most commonly referenced municipal electoral systems besides the at-large and ward systems are mixed systems, runoff and instant-runoff systems, single transferable vote systems and cumulative and limited vote alternative systems.
A mixed system refers to an electoral system that has some number of candidates elected in districts – or wards – while others are elected at large. At election time voters cast one vote for their preferred local candidate in their ward and one vote for each of the at-large positions along with one vote for the mayor who is also elected at-large. Supporters of such mixed systems often say a more balanced government results from having local councilors and at-large councilors, while detractors claim a mixed system produces two classes of councilors with the ward councilors being subordinate to the at-large councilors (Tennant 1980). Critics of the mixed system also raise that, similar to straight at-large systems, the at-large council positions can be swept by the largest, unified voting bloc even if they are not a majority (Berger 2004).
A runoff electoral system entails each voter casting one vote in a first round and if a candidate gains a majority of votes in that first round then that candidate is elected. If no candidate earns a majority in the first round that the top two candidates advance to the second round and voters cast their votes for their preferred candidate out of the two remaining.
An instant-runoff electoral system is different from a traditional runoff system in that the
“voters in the instant runoff can rank candidates in order of choice: a first choice for their
19 favorite candidate, a second choice for their next favorite, and so on” (Bouricius, Kleppner and
Richie 101). Ranking candidates allows voters to indicate which candidates they would support if their top choice were defeated and this in turn allows for candidates to be eliminated one at a time.
The main advantage of both types of runoff systems is they result in a winner who has attained a majority of votes, as compared to ‘first past the post’ electoral systems (such as the at- large and ward systems) where those elected only need attain a plurality of votes. The weaknesses of a traditional run-off system include the need for a second round of campaigning and voting and the financial resources that requires for the candidates who must campaign and the government that must administer two rounds of voting – essentially two elections (Bouricius,
Kleppner and Richie 99). Instant-runoff systems do not have this second round of voting and therefore does not suffer from this weakness.
Single transferable vote (STV) systems are very similar to instant-runoff electoral systems, except that STV systems consist of multi-member districts. Winning candidates in an
STV election are those whose votes equal or exceed the “Droop quota” which is determined by the following formula:
Total Votes ______+ 1 (Engstrom, 787) (Number of Seats) + 1 The most commonly cited advantage of the STV system is that “no votes are wasted” (Engstrom,
785), while a common critique is that the system is too hard for the average voter to understand.
Cumulative voting electoral systems consist of multimember districts where voters are given as many votes as there are seats along with the ability to distribute those votes however they see fit amongst the candidates (Bowler, Donovan and Brockington, 23). Meaning that in a 20 five-seat district a voter could give all five votes to one candidate, give one each to five separate candidates, or give three votes to candidates A and one each to candidate B and candidate C.
A limited vote electoral system similarly entails multimember districts in which voters are allowed fewer votes than there are seats available, for example if there were five candidates voters could have only two votes. The end result, and considered by some a strength and others a weakness of cumulative and limited voting systems, is to lower the proportion of votes that a candidate needs to win a seat (Bowler, Donovan and Brockington, 23). Essentially, it is possible in these elections for candidates who receive less than a plurality of votes cast to nevertheless win election.
Another advantage of the cumulative and limited electoral systems is the claim they
“produce more minority representation in the United States than the majoritarian systems they replace” (Bowler, Donovan and Brockington 3).
1.9: Positionality and critical reflexivity
Geographers, particularly feminist geographers, have been advancing positionality as the
“notion that where we are located in the social structure as a whole and which institutions we are in have effects on how we understand the world” (Jackson 2000, 603). Sayer’s concept of 'lay normativity' adds to ideas of positionality by asserting that “our values and moral/ethical standards shape the way in which we look at the world, our selection of research topics, the conduct of our research and what we do with the findings” (Wills 2007, 131). Essentially, positionality can be understood as meaning “our field sites, like our research questions, invariably reflect pre-existing interests and biographies” (Tickell 2007, xiv).
21 In the case of this thesis, my positionality looms large on the landscape of motivations and decisions made. From 2002 to 2009 I was involved in Vancouver’s municipal, provincial and federal political arenas in numerous capacities and roles. Municipally, I have worked both during and between election campaigns for the political parties COPE and Vision Vancouver. In particular, I was Vision Vancouver’s Voter Contact Manager in the 2008 municipal election, the results of which triggered the discussions and debates reviewed in section 1.2 on whether
Vancouver’s at-large system hinders South Asian candidates’ electability.
At the onset of developing this thesis topic I decided to include a statement of positionality as part of a my commitment to “critical reflexivity” that is defined by Dowling as “a process of constant, self-conscious, scrutiny of the self as researcher and of the research process”
(2005, 22). As I engaged in the research for this thesis I was always aware that such a section on my positionality would be included in the final thesis. This knowledge ensured a continuous process of self-reflection in order to reduce bias while also striving for a high level of rigour in all research methods employed so that the final thesis would stand up to academic and partisan political scrutiny.
1.10: Order of operations
Section 2 of this thesis consists of a literature review beginning with an exploration of the ideas of Jurgen Habermas, Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor on the topics of multiculturalism in liberal democracies, the role of legislation and courts in defending the rights of citizens and the justification for electoral reform to ensure minority candidates and citizens equal opportunity to be elected and elect their preferred candidates. Then reviewed is literature detailing the history and academic study of minority electability under municipal at-large electoral systems in
22 America. Following which, studies of minority electability in Vancouver municipal elections are reviewed.
Section 3 presents the research methods employed in answering the research questions guiding this thesis investigation. These methods are an index of representation analysis, location quotient analysis, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) modelling of ethnic residential concentrations in Vancouver and a homogeneous precinct analysis.
Section 4 details the findings of this thesis research in three sub-sections. The Assessing representation in Vancouver sub-section presents the proportional extent that visible and non- visible minorities are represented amongst those elected in Vancouver’s 2002, 2005 and 2008 elections. While the sub-section Minority electability under the at-large and ward electoral systems presents the findings from the location quotient analysis and GIS analysis of ethnic residential concentrations in order to assess minority electability under Vancouver’s at-large system compared to a 14 ward electoral system proposed for Vancouver in 2004. The last findings sub-section, Vancouver’s 2008 election results and the three conditions, assesses the extent to which Vancouver’s South Asian and Chinese communities fulfil the three conditions established in Thornburg vs. Gingles to determine the occurrence of minority vote dilution.
Section 5 of this thesis contains concluding comments, section 6 is an appendix and section 7 contains the works cited in this thesis.
23 Chapter 2: Literature Review
This literature review examines three bodies of academic work. First theories on the rights of minorities in multicultural societies, with particular focus on minorities’ electoral representation rights, are presented. Second reviewed are American studies of political and legal challenges to municipal at-large systems along with academic assessments of minority electability under municipal at-large systems in America. Canadian academic work on minority electability in Vancouver is reviewed last.
2.1: Multiculturalism and minorities’ representation rights
Jurgen Habermas, Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor are noted scholars on the topics of multiculturalism in liberal constitutional democracies and the rights of individuals and minorities in such nations. This section reviews these three scholars ideas in these areas in order to provide a theoretical context for looking at the issue of visible minority electability in Vancouver, BC.
German sociologist and philosopher Jurgen Habermas argues that Western democracies exist as a result of individuals voluntarily coming together to form a legal community of free and equal citizens (1994, 107). Such societies involve a constitution (and often bill or charter of rights) that puts “into effect precisely those rights that those individuals must grant one another if they want to order their life together legitimately by means of positive law” (107).
By Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor’s account, Canada’s adoption of its Charter of
Rights and Freedoms in 1982 was the last step towards joining this western liberal democratic tradition (1994, 52). Canada’s Charter firstly,
defines a set of individual rights that are very similar to those protected in other charters and bills of rights in Western democracies, for example, in the United States and Europe. Second, it guarantees equal
24 treatment of citizens in a variety of respects, or, alternatively put, it protects against discriminatory treatment on a number of irrelevant grounds, such as race and sex (Taylor 53). As is the case in the United States and many European nations, these rights form the basis by which Canada’s judiciary reviews and rules claims of discrimination and infringement of citizens’ rights. In all nations with such a system of rights constitutionally enshrined and judicially regulated, Habermas asserts that the courts must continuously interpret these rights in new ways based on the unique contexts, needs and interests of an evolving citizenry (108). For both Habermas and Taylor, the rise of multiculturalism in western liberal democracies has presented numerous opportunities and challenges for this exact kind of reinterpretation.
The twentieth and twenty-first centuries have seen a dramatic increase of immigration of peoples from widely diverse cultures to western democratic societies. For Habermas, “all that needs to be expected of immigrants is their willingness to enter into the political culture of their new homeland, without having to give up the cultural form of life of their origins by doing so”
(139). Essentially, Habermas is describing the core of how many scholars and nations define multiculturalism; when a nation encourages people to join its citizenry, so long as they accept the political and legal structures of the nation they are welcome to maintain the cultural practices and beliefs of their birthplace. Habermas goes on to elaborate that “the right to democratic self- determination does indeed include the right of citizens to insist on the inclusive character of their own political culture; it safeguards the society from the danger of segmentation - from the exclusion of alien subcultures and from a separatist disintegration into unrelated subcultures”
(139). Habermas is arguing for the importance of immigrants and new citizens in multicultural societies to legitimately participate in the democratic processes of their new home nation and that the lack of such inclusion presents a very real danger to multicultural societies in the form of segmentation and alienation.
25 Taylor spends a great deal of effort presenting arguments for the importance of recognition of immigrants and minorities in a multicultural society, and the risks he sees should this not occur mirror those of Habermas. For Taylor, our “identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people of the society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves” (25). Taylor goes on to make it clear that it is “not only contemporary feminism but also race relations and discussion of multiculturalism [that] are undergirded by the premise that the withholding of recognition can be a form of oppression” (36).
While neither Habermas nor Taylor tackle directly the issue of minority political representation in a multicultural liberal democracy and the effect a lack of such representation can have on minority communities, they both argue strongly for a need in multicultural societies for new and minority communities to be genuinely recognized and allowed to engage in real political participation. It is no great leap to apply their arguments to the context of minority electability. For a minority culture in a multicultural society there would be few richer expressions of the inclusive character of the society’s political culture than the ability of members from the minority community to hold elected positions within the society’s government(s). Likewise, the politics of recognition that Taylor espouses passionately for must certainly include the ability for minorities to see members of their community contest political office on a level playing field with candidates from the majority community.
Based on Habermas and Taylor’s arguments for the political inclusion and genuine recognition of minorities, I argue they both would agree with what Will Kymlicka describes as an “increasing concern” found “throughout the Western democracies … that the political process
26 is 'unrepresentative', in the sense that it fails to reflect the diversity of the population” (Kymlicka
1996, 32). Kymlicka sees many western democracies being “dominated by middle-class, able- bodied, white men” and for such democracies to be more representative they need to “include members of ethnic and racial minorities, women, the poor, the disabled, etc” (32).
Before delving into more of Kymlicka’s specific ideas and arguments for how to create more representative governments in Western democracies, it is important to enquire into how the rights of minority groups can be understood (and actualized) in societies built on the rights of individuals. For this line of questioning Habermas, Taylor and Kymlicka all have opinions.
Taylor certainly sees a tension growing in western democracies between two sets of rights; universal rights and individual rights. For Taylor, the first set of rights can be traced back to the eighteenth century philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau and “the move away from honour to dignity [from which] has come a politics of universalism, emphasizing the equal dignity of all citizens, and the content of this politics has been the equalization of rights and entitlements” (37).
While the second group of rights has evolved from “the development of the modern notion of identity, [which] has given rise to a politics of difference” (37). This politics of difference has led to the belief that “everyone should be recognized for his or her unique identity” (38). The tension exists because “the politics of universal dignity fought for forms of non-discrimination that were quite "blind" to the ways in which citizens differ, the politics of difference often redefines non-discrimination as requiring that we make these distinctions the basis of differential treatment” (40). While Taylor does not directly address the idea of group rights generally, or the right of minorities to representation specifically, his ideas can easily be employed to bolster the case for unique electoral rules and reform of electoral structures if they enable an individual the
27 ability to overcome barriers to election they might face on account of cultural or ethnic differences.
Habermas carefully makes the point that constitutions are based on individuals coming together and establishing rights for “legal subjects who are in every case individuals” (107). As such, he directly asks: “can a theory of rights that is so individualistically constructed deal adequately with struggles for recognition in which it is the articulation and assertion of collective identities that seems to be at stake” (107)? Habermas’ answer to his own question is yes, as he believes that “a constitution can be thought of as an historical project that each generation of citizens continues to pursue” (107), which is in line with his comments that the courts must continue to reinterpret rights and laws as the context, needs and interests of the citizenry changes
(108). Habermas goes on to state that,
a correctly understood theory of rights requires a politics of recognition that protects the integrity of the individual in the life contexts in which his or her identity if formed. This does not require an alternative model that would correct individualistic design of the system of rights through other normative perspectives. All that is required is the consistent actualization of the systems of rights. There would be little likelihood of this, of course, without social movements and political struggles. We see this in the history of feminism, which has had to make repeated attempts to realize its legal and political goals in the face of strong resistance (113). Habermas is presenting the idea that western constitutional democracies can address individual rights that are unique to individuals or groups of individuals, such as the right to equal political participation, from the perspective of an individual’s ethnic identity that is shared with a group of other individuals. In addition, Habermas clearly points to the role of social movements in ensuring that this perspective on individual rights is understood and accepted (by courts and society).
Kymlicka’s thinking is relatively in line with Habermas, for he sees a false dichotomy between the idea of individual rights and collective rights:
28 Collectivists and individualists disagree about whether communities can have rights or interests independently of their individual members. This argument over the primacy of the individual or the community is an old and venerable one in political philosophy. But it should be clear, I hope, how unhelpful it is for evaluating most group-differentiated rights in Western democracies. Most such rights are not about the primacy of communities over individuals. Rather, they are based upon the idea that justice between groups requires that the members of different groups be accorded different rights (47). By group differentiated rights Kymlicka means “at least three forms of group-specific rights: (1) self-government rights; (2) polyethnic rights; and (3) special representation rights” (27). For the purposes of this literature review and thesis special representation rights are of most interest.
Kymlicka, echoing Taylor and Habermas, argues, “citizens who do not see themselves reflected in the legislature may become alienated from the political process and question its legitimacy. If not the only route to representation, legislative representation is a uniquely important one, and the desire to be adequately represented in it must be taken seriously” (150).
In situations of sustained under-representation Kymlicka advocates for “group representation rights” that “are often defended as a response to some systemic disadvantage or barrier in the political process which makes it impossible for the group's views and interest to be effectively represented” (32). Kymlicka sees the “demand for representation rights by disadvantaged groups
[as] a demand for inclusion. Groups that feel excluded want to be included in the larger society, and the recognition and accommodation of their difference is intended to facilitate this” (176).
In addition, Kymlicka directly raises the scenario that many of the critiques of
Vancouver’s 2008 election are based on. That a “majoritarian democracy can systematically ignore the choices of minorities” and that in such cases, and “where minorities are regionally concentrated, democratic systems have responded by intentionally drawing the boundaries of federal units, or of individual constituencies, so as to create seats where the minority is in a majority” (176). To some extent Kymlicka is referring to the American tradition of redistricting with the explicit goal of creating minority-majority districts, to be discussed in section 2.1.1. But
29 he also presents that in Canada the “practice of promoting the representation of such communities of interest is widely accepted, and is required by law under the Electoral
Boundaries Readjustment Act (1964) and the Representation Act (1985)” (136). When Canadian federal ridings are created and redistributed on account of population change, the process of drawing boundaries must specifically take into account “communities of interest” and aim to define a riding’s boundaries in such a way as to empower that community to participate electorally by means of increasing the likeliness they can elect a member of their community.
For Kymlicka, these kinds of electoral practices that are aimed at addressing the under- representation of minorities within a liberal democracy should not be seen as “a threat to national unity – on the contrary, it is rightly seen as promoting civic participation and political legitimacy” (176). In line with Kymlicka’s thinking, the critiques levelled against Vancouver’s at-large system following the city’s 2008 election (reviewed in detail in section 1.2) are best understood as a healthy and essential part of Vancouver and Canada’s democratic process.
Both Taylor and Habermas’ ideas presented here recognize the need for multicultural, liberal democracies to have legislative mechanisms and legal processes by which citizens can challenge discriminatory practices and the lack of recognition within their society. And while there was talk of such legal action post the 2008 Vancouver election on the issue of South Asian electability, it has not occurred. Given this inaction, this thesis sets out to test the claims that
Vancouver’s at-large electoral system erects barriers to the electability of South Asian candidates specifically, and visible minority candidates generally. As such, this thesis attempts to contribute new knowledge to the body of literature on minority electability under at-large electoral systems that is reviewed in the remainder of this literature review.
30 2.2: American studies of minority electability under at-large systems
Within America, “academic debates … over the impact of electoral systems have been matched by a ‘real world’ and often highly contentious interest in the representation of ethnic and racial minorities” (Bowler, Donovan and Brockington 15). As such, this literature review will first examine historical studies of the ‘real world’ debates, followed by a review of academic studies assessing minority electability in at-large elections.
2.2.1: History of municipal electoral reform in America
There is a wide breadth of work on the history of American municipal governmental reform, minority vote dilution under the at-large system and the legal and political fights to replace at-large systems with ones deemed more equitable (Karnig and Welch 1980, 1982;
Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Heilig and Mundt 1983; Welch and Bledsoe 1988; Grofman,
Hadley and Niemi 1992; Davidson and Grofman 1994; Kemp 1999; Welch 1990; Bowler,
Donovan and Brockington 2003; Behr 2004).
Most American cities had ward or district-based municipal electoral systems until the turn of the twentieth century when “this form of representation came under attack from a group of structural reformers, which consisted of individuals from the business community and upper- middle class” (Williams 1999, 19). These reformers were part of a larger movement known as the “Progressive Era” and were motivated by the perceived corruption and ineffectiveness of ward councillors and party officials along with a bias against the political clout of lower classes and ethnic minorities under the ward system (Welch and Bledsoe 1988, 6). The main municipal structural objectives of these “Progressive reformers” were non-partisan ballots in order to diminish the power of political parties and at-large elections due to the belief that this would
31 greatly reduce lower class and minority group influence over election results, eliminate “ward bosses” and lead to more “professionalized” city councils (Welch and Bledsoe 1988, 7). From
1910 on, these reforms spread quickly throughout America and by the 1960s a large majority of cities elected their city councils at-large, although roughly half of the largest American cities
(with population greater than 100,000) employed either a ward or mixed system (Welch and
Bledsoe 1988, 9).
Beginning in the 1970s there were growing criticism of the at-large system, which often led to legal challenges (Williams 1999, 20). At the centre of at-large system critiques were minority group and community leaders claiming that,
the [at-large] system enables council persons to be elected who do not represent the interests of minority groups. Also, they argue[d] that the system works against minority council candidates. Their most serious charge deals with the legal issue of vote dilution - they claim that the system dilutes the voting strength of minority groups (Williams 1999, 20). In 1976 a group of black plaintiffs, including Wiley L. Bolden, filed a class action suit against the City of Mobile, Alabama (Welch and Bledsoe 1988; Williams 1999; Zimmerman 1999). In
Bolden vs. Mobile the plaintiffs claimed the at-large system was diluting the votes of black citizens who were a minority in Mobile and thereby preventing the election of black candidates.
They asserted that this vote dilution contravened Section 2 of the 1965 U.S. Voting Rights Act that states: "No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or colour" (Williams 1999, 21).
The judge in the case ruled that the at-large system “was unconstitutional because it diluted the voting strength of its black citizens” and ordered Mobile to replace the at-large system with a district-based electoral system (Williams 1999, 23). The City of Mobile appealed
32 the ruling, which was first upheld by the Appeals Court, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the two lower courts rulings because the plaintiffs failed to prove intent to discriminate in the development and implementation of an at-large system in Mobile (Zimmerman 1999, 57).
In response to this Supreme Court ruling the U.S. Congress in 1982 amended Section 2 of the U.S. Voting Rights Act by removing the requirement for plaintiffs to prove that the electoral system was established with intent to discriminate (Zimmerman 1999, 57). The amended Voting
Rights Act of 1982 went on to state that:
Proof of a violation of Section 2 in a given jurisdiction might include “a variety” of the following factors:
1. The extent of any history of official discrimination … that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. The extent to which voting in elections … is racially polarized;
3. The extent to which the state of political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. If there is a candidates slating process, whether the members of the minority groups have been denied access to that process
5. The extent to which members of the minority group … bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. Whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. The extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. (Grofman, Handley and Niemi 1992, 40) The opening language of this passage made it clear that a “litigant need not prove all, or even a majority, of the[se] factors to establish a Section 2 violation” (Grofman, Handley and Niemi
1992, 40).
These amendments cleared the way for renewed legal challenges to at-large systems and
“the first case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court involving allegations of a Section 2 violation following the 1982 amendments was Thornburg vs. Gingles” (Davis 1999, 72). The town of
33 Thornburg, North Carolina had developed a plan for reforming its electoral system to one single- member district and five multi-member district, which members of Thornburg’s black community claimed violated Section 2 of the amended Voting Rights Act as “the plan concentrated blacks into a majority-white multi-member district [which] resulted in vote dilution” (Davis 72). The Court “reasoned that although all of the factors listed (in the amended
U.S. Voting Rights Act) may be relevant to a vote dilution claim challenging a multimember districting scheme, they will not be dispositive unless plaintiffs can first show a conjunction of three circumstances” (Grofman, Handley and Niemi, 49). Those three being:
First, the minority group must be … sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority of a single-member district … Second, the minority group must be …politically cohesive … Third, … the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it … usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate. (Grofman, Handley and Niemi, 49) While the Court’s ruling in Thornburg vs. Gingles did greatly clarify how to assess claims of minority vote dilution by establishing the three conditions, it also “resulted in numerous unresolved questions, which have catalyzed additional debate over voting rights” (Davis 73).
Two years later, in 1987, the judge in McNeil vs. Springfield used the three conditions established in Thornburg vs. Gingles to find in favour of the plaintiff that black citizens’ were experiencing vote dilution under Springfield, Illinois’ at-large system (Williams 1999, 24).
Since Thornburg vs. Gingles and McNeil vs. Springfield numerous other U.S. court cases have utilized these three conditions to establish whether at-large electoral systems violate Section 2 of the U.S. Voting Rights Act by creating minority vote dilution.
Throughout the late 1980s and into the early 1990s numerous U.S. cities faced legal challenges to their at-large system that resulted in similar rulings to Thornburg vs. Gingles and
McNeil vs. Springfield. This led to more and more cities implementing district (or ward) systems and the creation of “minority-opportunity districts” where the boundaries of some wards were 34 drawn with the specific intent of creating districts where minority groups were the majority and thereby had a better chance of electing one of there own (Behr 2004).
In the 1990s the growing trend of creating these minority-opportunity districts came under increased scrutiny by the courts, partially because of the “bizarre shapes” of these districts and partially because districts were being drawn based on “race [and] in substantial disregard of customary and traditional districting practices” (Bowler 2003, 17). All of this climaxed with the
Supreme Court ruling “that when race is found to be the ‘predominant factor’ in districting, the court will apply the strict scrutiny test for the equal protection clause” (Bowler 2003, Donovan and Brockington, 17). While to date there has been no reversal on the political and legal belief that at-large electoral systems lead to minority vote dilution, the trend of replacing at-large electoral systems with multi-district electoral systems with some districts’ boundaries drawn to encompass as many of a minority group as possible, has slowed down.
2.2.2: Assessment of minority electability under American at-large systems
For as long as there has been political and legal challenges to American municipal at- large systems due to minority candidates reduced ability to win elections, there has been academic assessment of these claims (Karnig and Welch 1980, 1982; Engstrom and McDonald
1981; Heilig and Mundt 1983; Kemp 1999; Welch 1990; Behr 2004). The results of these studies have overwhelmingly concluded that at-large systems do indeed reduce the electability of minorities.
There were three academic articles in the 1970s that disagreed with the majority of academic studies as they did not find at-large elections created conditions that restricted minority electability. Welch states that these “three studies that failed to show differences between black
35 representation in district and at-large cities were special cases” (1990, xx). For all three Welch claims there were issues in scope, focus or methodology that resulted in the results being unique to the case studies and anomalies compared to what was later established as the consensus opinion that at-large elections hinder minority electability (Welch 1990, xx).
Welch goes on to show though statistical analysis of a large sample of American cities that minorities have far greater electability under systems other than the at-large system. In cities with district representation, “blacks achieve a little more than proportional representation … [and] do not do as well in cities with at-large elections, achieving only an
82% parity ratio in cities with a 5% black population floor and a 75% parity ratio in cities with larger black populations” (Welch 1990, 1057).
These results support earlier work by Engstrom and McDonald (1981), Heilig and
Mundt (1983) and later work by Behr (2004), all of who also conducted statistical analysis. In the case of Heilig and Mundt (1983) they employed Karnig’s indicator of equity, which is a ratio measure “calculated by dividing percent of blacks on council by percent of blacks in the population” (395). Their findings “strongly support the argument that the southern movement to districts is linked to increases in black representation equity … [and] cities which underwent a structural change experienced enormous increases in equity; those which changed from at-large to mixed systems show a .54 increase in the equity score, while those which adopted district systems had an ever greater increase of .72” (395).
Interestingly, Welch’s findings do demonstrate that there are differences in electability between the two main American minority groups, blacks and Hispanics. The relative lack of
“residential segregation of Hispanics compared to blacks made district elections less crucial to their representation” (1990, 1065). Hispanics were found to be more electable in “cities with 36 both at-large and district elections than in either of the pure types … [and] within mixed election systems, Hispanics are considerably more likely to be elected in the district seats than the at-large ones” (1065). Welch admits that these findings were not expected or easily explainable, although they do support the academic consensus that minority electability is greatly reduced under at-large electoral conditions.
2.3: Studies of minority electability in Vancouver
In stark contrast to the wealth of academic work on minority electability under American municipal electoral systems, there is a distinct lacuna of work within the Canadian context. In
1997, Yasmeen Abu-Laban authored a chapter in Politics of the City: A Canadian Perspective entitled “Ethnic Politics in a Globalizing Metropolis: The Case of Vancouver.” Through interviews with citizens, activists and city councillors, along with transcripts from neighbourhood forums and a keynote address at a civic conference about race relations, Abu-
Laban clearly established that in Vancouver there is “a particular concern about the lack of access to, and representation in, the political arena by racial minorities, despite their considerable numbers” (86). This is not surprising, given that the results of a 1993 survey of 11 Vancouver- area municipalities presented a picture of the average municipal candidate as “a 49-year-old
Canadian-born white male, who has resided in the community where he now lives for nearly half his life” (Abu-Laban 1997, 86).
Abu-Laban eloquently presents the importance of more studies on minorities and political representation in Vancouver and other Canadian cities. For Abu-Laban, the under-representation of minorities in elected positions within Vancouver raised issues of power, exclusion, discrimination and stereotyping, while presenting challenges to the notion of a multicultural
37 society so embraced through Canadian policy (1997, 81). Abu-Laban mobilises an especially compelling quote from Harney that bears repeating:
No great North American city can be understood without being studied as a city of immigrants, of newcomers and their children, as a destination of myriad groups and individual migration projects. Describing city government of municipal politics, the building of an urban economy and the evolution of a city as a polity obviously has value. To do so without understanding ethnicity in the city seems a bit like analysing the captain and crew of an ocean liner but not noticing the passengers, what they expect of the vessel and why they are travelling (1997, 81). Despite this compelling quote within a well-researched and presented chapter, the issue remained under-examined and not receive academic attention for over ten years.
In 2008 the results of a much-needed project was released in the form of Electing a
Diverse Canada: The Representation of Immigrants, Minorities and Women. The goal of this project was to assess the state of electoral representation for women and minorities in the
Canadian cities of Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Regina, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Toronto,
Hamilton, Ottawa, Montreal and Halifax. The project was a response to “relatively little research in Canada [that] has looked at the electoral – or even political – dimensions of the integration of immigrant, refugee, and minority populations in Canada” (Andrew 2008, 5).
While each of the cities within Electing a Diverse Canada received its own treatment within the project, there was the application of a standard proportionality index to each city.
This index was “calculated by taking the proportion of a particular demographic group within elected office and dividing that by the proportion of that demographic group in the general population” (Andrew 2008, 10). While there is validity to this statistical approach to assessing representation, its application to all elected officials at all scales of government in Vancouver is misleading, and while there is some value overall to the chapter detailing Vancouver’s electoral diversity, it is missing a key analysis of the at-large electoral structure and resulting diversity – or lack thereof – at the municipal level. 38 In the chapter “Diversity and Elected Officials in the City of Vancouver” Irene
Bloemraad presents a detailed and thorough picture of the ethnic and gender make up and dynamic of almost all elected representatives in Vancouver. Included were City Councillors,
Members of the Legislative Assembly and Members of Parliament. However, such an approach homogenises the municipal, provincial and federal electoral system and prevents analysis of whether one system is particularly lacking when it comes to representation of minorities and women. Bloemraad’s approach results in her conclusion that, “Vancouver stands out among
Canadian cities as the place with the largest proportion of visible minority elected representatives” (2008, 46). Because she aggregates all scales of government together,
Bloemraad goes on to draw attention to the fact that two elected officials are of South Asian descent and that “those with origins in India are over-represented in politics: only 5 percent of the general population reports some East Indian ancestry, while 8 percent of the representatives are of Indian (Punjabi) background” (2008, 57).
Bloemraad’s analysis overlooks that one of those elected officials of South Asian heritage is elected provincially and the other is elected federally, and in both cases they are elected in essentially the same provincial and federal district: South Vancouver. This area of Vancouver and its neighbourhoods are where the vast majority of Vancouver’s population of South Asian descent reside. Municipally, and under the at-large system, there were and are no Vancouver city councillors of South Asian descent. Unintentionally, Bloemraad’s results can be understood as indirectly demonstrating both the potential affects that different types of electoral systems can have on minority electability, and the need for further research specifically into Vancouver’s municipal at-large system and minority electability. Bloemraad does not make any of these points, however, and closes the chapter with praise for Vancouver’s elected diversity.
39 Chapter 3: Methodology
Four research methods are utilised in this thesis research to answer the following three research questions:
1. Does Vancouver’s at-large electoral system reduce the electability of visible minority
candidates?
2. Would a different electoral system in Vancouver increase the electability of visible minority
candidates?
3. Do the 2008 Vancouver election results meet the three conditions established in Thornburg
vs. Gingles to determine minority vote dilution?
The four research methods employed are an index of representation analysis, location quotient analysis, GIS analysis of ethnic residential concentrations in Vancouver and homogeneous precinct analysis.
3.1: Index of representation
As this thesis seeks to interrogate claims that Vancouver’s at-large electoral system reduces the electability of South Asian candidates specifically, and visible minority candidates generally, it is useful to first determine if South Asians and other visible minorities in Vancouver are under-represented in elected municipal positions. Establishing the extent that Vancouver’s major visible minority groups are proportionally represented in municipally elected positions is achieved through an index of representation analysis.
40 3.1.1: Justification of index of representation
There is a rich U.S. academic tradition, and a burgeoning Canadian academic interest, in studying ethnic elected representation under municipal electoral systems. Such studies commonly use an index of representation analysis to statistically present the extent that groups are proportionally represented within municipally elected positions.
Karnig and Welch appear to be the first to use such an approach in their 1980 study of black representation and electoral system structure in U.S. cities (70). Karnig and Welch named this technique a “black council equity ratio.” Heilig and Mundt also employed this method in their 1983 study (395). Beginning in the late 1980s the term “index of representation” began to be used by academics employing this ratio technique to measure the ethnic proportionality of elected representatives (Welch and Bledsoe 1988; Welch 1990; Davidson and Grofman 1994;
Kemp 1999; Behr 2008).
In the late 2000s index of representation analysis was employed in a Canadian academic study looking at women and minority representation in major Canadian cities. The resulting publication, Electing a Diverse Canada: The Representation of Immigrants, Minorities and
Women (Andrew, Biles, Siemiatycki and Tolley 2008), applied an index of representation analysis to major Canadian cities to better understand the extent to which these cities were electing candidates from visible minority communities. The chapter “Diversity and Elected
Officials in the City of Vancouver” in this publication is reviewed in section 2.3.
Given this wide spread use of index of representation analysis to measure the proportionality of ethnic minorities in municipally elected positions in American cities, and its recent application to the Canadian context, it is a justifiable research method for this thesis.
41 3.1.2: Data and approach
The data used to calculate the index of representation presented in section 4 includes the
2001 and 2006 non-rounded2 Canadian census totals for the following visible minority groups within the City of Vancouver: visible minorities, South Asians, Chinese, Blacks and non-visible minorities3 (Statistics Canada 2002, 2007). In addition, the election results for Vancouver’s
2002, 2005 and 2008 municipal elections were employed in developing this index of representation analysis, as is the ethnicity of candidates elected in each of those three municipal elections4 (City of Vancouver May 23, 2008; City of Vancouver December 18, 2008; City of
Vancouver December 19, 2008).
The first stage in calculating this index of representation is establishing the percentage of officials elected in Vancouver’s 2002, 2005 and 2008 elections that belong to each of the visible minority groups listed above. Then, Statistics Canada’s 2001 and 2006 visible minority census results for Vancouver are used to calculate the percentage of Vancouver’s total population each of these groups constitutes.
2 Statistics Canada’s website provides non-rounded totals in its community profiles, whereas the raw census data accessed through the University of Toronto’s Map and Data Library has been subjected to a process of random rounding that reduces the possibility of identifying individuals within the tabulations and leads to different totals to the non-rounded totals (Statistics Canada November 1, 2002).
3 These visible minority groups are the only ones included in this index of representation analysis as they are the only visible minority groups from which a member was elected in at least one of the three Vancouver elections being analysed.
4 Determining the visible or non-visible minority status of those elected in 2002, 2005 and 2008 was achieved by firstly drawing on personal and professional knowledge of Vancouver’s recent municipal elections, the visible or non-visible minority status of candidates and those elected. In addition, archived candidate profiles on the City of Vancouver’s website were accessed as they include candidates’ photos along with candidate write ups which often contain a candidate’s ethnic identity, family history, involvement in ethnic and community groups and other information that assists in establishing the visible or non-visible minority status of candidates (City of Vancouver May 23, 2008; City of Vancouver December 18, 2008; City of Vancouver December 19, 2008).
42 Once these two percentages are established, it is then possible to calculate the index of representation for each administration by dividing the percent of elected officials from each visible and non-visible minority group by that group’s percentage of Vancouver’s overall population. The resulting ratio for each group in each administration will be either 1.00, above
1.00 or below 1.00. A ratio of 1.00 means the group is proportionally represented (i.e. that grouping constitutes 23% of Vancouver’s population and 23% of those elected to municipal office), a ratio above 1.00 indicates that group is over-represented and below 1.00 denotes under- representation. The larger or smaller the ratio is above or below 1.00 indicates a greater extent of over or under-representation.
3.2: Location quotient
Engaging in a location quotient analysis assists in answering research questions one and two. A location quotient analysis generates a ratio score for each candidate by dividing their percentage of all ballots case in the at-large 2008 election by the percentage of votes cast in the
2008 election within the areas of Vancouver encompassed by each of the 14 wards proposed by the 2004 Vancouver Electoral Reform Commission. Once this location quotient analysis has been performed, the results can reveal trends along with deviations and divergences from these trends that assist in understanding whether certain candidates, and certain groupings of candidates, experience strong support in certain geographic areas of the city compared to their citywide support. In section 4.2, the results of this locations quotient analysis are presented along with the results of GIS analysis of ethnic residential patterns (explained further in section
3.3) in order to assess the electability of visible minority candidates in the at-large electoral system compared to the ward system proposed in 2004.
43 3.2.1: Justification of location quotient
Location quotient analysis is common in economic studies comparing national economic indicators to local or regional economic indicators (such as employment levels in Bogart 2011).
While location quotient analysis is not as prevalent in studies of election results, there are examples of location quotient analysis being used to compare a candidate or party’s election results overall with their results in sub-regions. One such study is Muthien’s examination of
South African election results, in which a location quotient analysis was mobilized to establish
“the degree to which support for a party in each of the nine provinces exceeds or is less than the national average. Relative provincial strongholds for each party are thereby easily identifiable”
(2000, 354).
For the purposes of this thesis, a location quotient analysis allows for a statistical measurement of how each candidate fared in the at-large 2008 Vancouver election compared to how their share of 2008 votes cast within the polls contained in each of the 14 wards proposed in
2004. Given that research question one asks whether the at-large system reduces minority candidates electability and research question two seeks to know if minorities would stand increased electability under a different question, this location quotient analysis is a justifiable method to pursuing answers to research questions one and two.
In regards to choosing a ward system as the comparator electoral system used in this location quotient analysis5, the justification for this decision include:
5 Neither a proportional representation electoral system nor an Alternative Vote electoral system was chosen as comparator systems for this location quotient analysis because Single Transferable Vote and Mixed Member Proportional Representation systems, as well as Alternative Vote systems, allow voters the ability to allocate more than just one vote per elected position (Farrell 2001). For example, under an Alternative Vote system voters can rank candidates numerically from most to least favourite, while a Mixed Member Proportional system allows voters to cast a ballot for a candidate and a for party. As the data used in generating this location quotient analysis is the 44 • Critiques of Vancouver’s at-large electoral system from South Asian candidates
following the 2008 Vancouver election included commentary that a ward system
would be an effective means to address the barriers to their electability they perceive
to be erected by the at-large system (see section 1.2).
• There is a long tradition in America of academic research findings, and judges’
ruling, that the at-large system reduces minority electability by enabling minority
citizen vote dilution. In addition, many academics have discovered, and judges have
ruled, that such minority vote dilution is greatly reduced, and often eliminated, under
ward systems (see section 2.2).
• Vancouver’s long history of debates, campaigns, plebiscites and referendums on
whether to reform its electoral system has always hinged on whether to move first
from a ward system to an at-large system, and then whether to abolish the at-large
system and return to wards (see section 1.4)
3.2.2: Data and approach
The City of Vancouver has available to the public poll-by-poll results for every candidate in the 2008 election (City of Vancouver December 19, 2008), along with ArcGIS shapefiles of the 2008 Vancouver election polls (City of Vancouver, May 25, 2011). Also available to the public on the city of Vancouver’s website is the Vancouver Electoral Reform Commissioner’s final report (Berger 2004). Within this report is a detailed PDF map of the 14 ward boundaries proposed by the Commission (map 1.1). In addition, the University of Toronto’s Map and Data
Library allows access to the 2006 Canadian census visible minority results for the Vancouver poll-by-poll results for the 2008 at-large Vancouver election, and under such a system voters are only able to cast one vote for each position, it is not possible to infer from this data how voters would have voted if they could have casts their votes under a proportional or Alternative Vote electoral system. As such, it is not possible to include such electoral systems in this location quotient analysis.
45 Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) (Statistics Canada 2006) and shapefiles of the census tracts within the Vancouver CMA (Statistics Canada 2006b).
The first step to performing this location quotient analysis is reparsing the 2008
Vancouver poll-by-poll results into the proposed 2004 wards, which involves firstly ensuring all data is in the correct format for ArcGIS6. It is then necessary to create a new shapefile of the 14 proposed wards that can be used in ArcGIS during the reparsing process7. Then all data sets and shapefiles are compiled into one ArcGIS Geodatabase, relevant dBase and shapefiles joined together and the ArcGIS Identity tool is used to reparse the Vancouver poll-by-poll results into the 14 wards8. Once the poll-by-poll results are reparsed, each wards’ newly created 2008 poll- by-poll election results are exported so they can be used along with the original at-large 2008 poll-by-poll results in the location quotient analysis9.
6 The 2008 Vancouver election poll-by-poll results, which are in excel format, are imported into Microsoft Access and converted into dBase format so as to be useable in ArcGIS.
7 A new feature class titled VANWARDS is created within the Geodatase containing the 2008 poll-by-poll results and poll shapefile. Then the PDF map of the 14 proposed wards developed by the 2004 Vancouver Electoral Reform Commission is converted into JPEG format in Adobe Photoshop and imported into the active Geodatabase with ArcMap. Using the Georeference toolbox, the JPEG of the wards is brought into view over top of the feature class VANWARDS and the shapefile of Vancouver’s 2008 polls. The Georeference toolbox is then used to created geographical reference points between these three layers so that these layers are “tied together” by georeferencing the JPEG to the VANWARDS based on the 2008 Vancouver polls shapefile’s projection system. Following which, the Editor tool in ArcMap is used to trace each wards and thereby create a new polygon for each ward in the feature class VANWARDS. Once completed the feature class VANWARDS is exported as a shapefile useable in other ArcGIS models.
8 It should be noted that most Vancouver polls fit completely within a ward. For those polls that do not fit completely within a ward a process of determining the percentage of those polls shape area that does fits within each ward is engaged in. Following which, these polls election results are divided by the percentage of their shape area that fits within the ward in order to allot a proportion of votes cast equal to the portion of the poll’s shape area that is contained within the ward. As voters are not distributed evenly throughout a poll this process of dividing a poll’s 2008 election results by the percentage of that poll’s shape area contained in a ward cannot result in a completely accurate re-distribution of votes to polls that are subdivided due to their original area falling into more than one ward. It is possible that polls have an area (or areas) of high voter density and in such cases this process would lead to a margin of error in the number of votes allotted to the portion of the polls that fall within more than one ward. However, as this process was only undertaken for a handful of polls, and in general the polls are small enough that uneven density of voters is limited, it is deemed to be the most acceptable process to achieving as accurate as possible re-allotment of votes cast in polls that fall within more than one ward.
9 These exports are in dBase format and are then converted into Excel format. 46 Generating location quotient scores entails dividing each candidate’s percentage of votes cast at-large by their percentage of votes cast in each ward. The result of this division of two percentages is a ratio that is referred to in this thesis as a location quotient, or LQ, score. If the resulting LQ score for a candidate in a ward is 1.00 it indicates the candidate received the same percentage of votes cast at-large as they did the percentage of votes cast in that ward. However, a candidate receiving an LQ score of more than 1.00 (i.e. 1.17) indicates that candidate received a higher percentage of the votes cast in the ward than they did of the votes cast at-large. The opposite is also true, candidates who received an LQ of less than 1.00 (say 0.87) received a lower percentage of the votes cast in that ward than their percentage of the total votes cast at-large in the 2008 election.
3.3: GIS analysis of visible and non-visible minority residential patterns
ArcGIS and Excel are utilized in this thesis research in order to establish, and present in the form of maps and tables, the visible and non-visible minority makeup of Vancouver and each of the 14 proposed wards. The specific Statistics Canada visible minority groups engaged in this method are non-visible minorities, South Asians and Chinese. This analysis of these groups residential patterns assist in answering all three research questions.
3.3.1: Justification for GIS analysis of visible and non-visible minority residential patterns
There is a growing body of literature in urban geography studying visible and non-visible minority residential concentrations in Canadian cities in order to probe the relationship such residential patterns have to other phenomenon (White, Kim & Glick 2005; Walks & Bourne
2006). In the context of this thesis, GIS analysis of visible and non-visible minority residential
47 patters assist in understanding candidates’ LQ scores, trends observed when assessing candidates’ LQ score collectively (along with deviations and divergences to these trends) and in establishing if Vancouver’s 2008 election results fulfil the three conditions established in
Thornburg vs. Gingles.
3.3.2: Data and approach
Calculating the visible and non-visible makeup of Vancouver as a whole, along with each ward, requires the 2006 Canadian census visible minority results for the Vancouver Census
Metropolitan Area (CMA) (Statistics Canada 2006) and shapefiles of the census tracts within the
Vancouver CMA (Statistics Canada 2006b). Also involved in establishing visible and non- visible minority makeup of each ward is the newly created shapefile of the 14 wards proposed in
2004 by the Vancouver Electoral Reform Commission10. Once these necessary data files and shapefiles are collected, they are loaded into an ArcGIS Geodatabase.
Next, maps are generated depicting the concentrations of Vancouver’s non-visible minority, South Asian and Chinese populations. Then the 2006 census results for visible minorities, non-visible minorities, Chinese and South Asians are re-parsed into the fourteen wards11. After which the re-parsed visible minorities, non-visible minorities, Chinese and South
10 This process of creating a shapefile of the 14 wards is described in section 3.2.
11 First a dBase file containing the 2006 census results for the relevant visible minority groups (Chinese and South Asian) and the non-visible minority group is created. These census results are at the census tract (CT) level. This dBase file is then imported into ArcMap and joined to a shapefile of the 2006 CTs in the Vancouver CMA. All the CTs within the Vancouver CMA, but not within Vancouver (i.e. in the cities of Burnaby, Surrey, etc) are deleted from the shapefile so all that remains are the CTs within the city of Vancouver. At this point ArcGIS is used to produce maps of residential patterns for all three groups. Following which, a duplicate of the Geodatabase is created and the ArcGIS Identity tool is used in this duplicate to reparse the census results into the ward shapefiles. Similar to when this process was undertaken with the Vancouver 2008 poll-by-poll results, some CTs do not fit completely within one ward. In those cases, a process of calculating the percentage of the CT’s shape area that falls within a ward allows for the census results of that CT to be divided by that area percentage. As with when this process was undertaken for the reparsing of 2008 poll-by-poll results into the 14 wards, the margin of error involved in calculation what percentage of census results to allot to portions of CTs based on shape area percentage was deemed acceptable. 48 Asians census data for each ward is exported12 so the total population of non-visible minorities,
South Asians and Chinese residents in each ward can be totalled and calculated as a percentage.
3.4: Homogenous precinct analysis
Homogeneous precinct analysis entails the comparison of election results in two or more precincts (known as polls in Vancouver) where one precinct has a high concentration of citizens from the majority community and the other precinct(s) contain high concentrations of citizens from the minority community. Comparing election results in such precincts assist in revealing whether racial vote polarization is occurring.
3.4.1: Justification of homogeneous precinct analysis
Homogeneous precinct analysis is considered acceptable evidence in U.S. court cases attempting to determine the existence of racial vote polarization (Grofman, Handley & Niemi
1992, 74). In such court cases one plaintiff is usually attempting to prove a specific election result meets the three conditions for establishing minority vote dilution developed in the
Thornburg vs. Gingles ruling. As the third research question in this thesis research asks whether
Vancouver’s 2008 poll-by-poll election results fulfil the three conditions of Thornburg vs.
Gingles, it is justifiable to employ homogeneous precinct analysis in this thesis research.
3.4.2: Data and approach
The data utilized in this homogeneous precinct analysis are the 2006 Canadian census visible minority results for the Vancouver CMA (Statistics Canada 2006) and shapefiles of the dissemination areas within the Vancouver CMA (Statistics Canada 2006b), both accessed
12 Initially exported as dBase files and then converted to Excel format.
49 through the University of Toronto’s Map and Data Library. In addition, the poll-by-poll results for the 2008 Vancouver election (City of Vancouver December 19, 2008) along with ArcGIS shapefiles of the 2008 Vancouver polls (City of Vancouver, May 25, 2011) are utilized in developing this homogeneous precinct analysis.
The first step in conducting a homogeneous precinct analysis is determining the ethnic makeup of polls in order to establish polls where 80% or more of the population belong to the majority ethnic group and other polls where 80% or more of the population belong to the minority ethnic group13. For the purposes of this thesis the goal is to identify a poll where 80% of the population are non-visible minority (the majority population in Vancouver), a poll where
80% of the population are of South Asian descent and a poll where 80% of the population are of
Chinese descent.
Once these polls are identified it is possible to assess if the poll with 80% South Asian residents and the poll with 80% Chinese residents voted overwhelmingly for candidates from their community, while the poll with 80% non-visible minority residents overwhelmingly voted against non-visible minority candidates. If this dynamic of minority communities voting overwhelmingly for their preferred candidate while the majority community voted against those candidates is found to be the case, then Vancouver’s 2008 election results would meet the criteria for being an example of racial vote polarization (Grofman, Handley and Niemi 85).
13 As Vancouver’s 2008 polls are smaller than CTs, and as census disseminations areas (DAs) are smaller than CTs, census results for DAs are utilized in this homogeneous precinct analysis. First, the 2006 census results for visible minority status are converted into dBase files and imported into ArcMap along with the shapefile of Vancouver CMA DAs. Then the visible minority results are linked to the DA shapefile and all DAs outside of the City of Vancouver are deleted. Next the shapefile of Vancouver’s 2008 polls are imported into ArcMap and the Identity tool is used to reparse the DA visible minority data into the poll shapefiles that the DAs fall within. When a DA only partially falls within a poll a process of determining the shape area of the DA that falls within the poll is engaged in so that the visible minority status results of those DAs can be divided by the percentage of the shape area that falls within the polls.
50 Chapter 4: Research findings
The research findings from the four research methods engaged in as part of this thesis research are presented in the following three sub-sections: Assessing Representation in
Vancouver, Minority electability under the at-large and ward electoral systems and Vancouver’s
2008 election results and the three conditions.
4.1: Assessing representation in Vancouver
In Vancouver municipal elections there are 27 positions that all eligible voters can vote for: one mayor, 10 city councillors, nine school board trustees and seven parks board commissioners. As such, the following index of representation was generated by dividing the percentage of these 27 elected officials in each administration from the relevant Statistics
Canada’s visible and non-visible minority groups14 by the percentage of Vancouver’s overall population that fall within these visible and non-visible minority groups.
Table 4.1 Index of representation for Vancouver
% of 2001 2001 of % Vancouver 2006 of %
municipal o municipal o municipal o municipal % of 2002 elected elected 2002 of % elected 2005 of % elected 2008 of % 2001 p 2001 p 2006 r r r 2002 index of of index 2002 of index 2005 index 2008 epresentation epresentation epresentation p population opulatio opulation opulation Vancouver Vancouver fficials fficials fficials fficials n of of
Non-visible 264,495 49.00% 88.89% 1.81 77.78% 1.59 279,860 48.96% 74.07% 1.51 minorities Visible minorities 275,135 51.00% 11.11% 0.22 22.22% 0.44 291,740 51.04% 25.93% 0.51 Relevant visible minority groups Chinese 161,110 29.86% 11.11% 0.37 22.22% 0.74 168,215 29.43% 14.81% 0.50 South Asian 30,655 5.68% 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 0.00 32,515 5.69% 3.70% 0.65 Black 4,780 0.89% 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 0.00 5,290 0.93% 3.70% 3.98
14 Only the visible minority groups from which a member was elected to Vancouver municipal office in at least one of the three elections being assessed are included in this index of representation. 51 This index of representation reveals a consistent trend of visible minorities, collectively and the relevant sub-groups, being under-represented in municipally elected positions within
Vancouver in three successive administrations (2002 – 2005, 2005 – 2008, 2008 – 2011). It is clear from this index of representation that the makeup of Vancouver’s 27 elected positions after the 2002, 2005 and 2008 elections were heavily skewed towards non-visible minorities, over and above their proportion of Vancouver’s population.
A trend can be observed over these three administrations of more proportional representation of visible minorities as a collective group, as the index results for visible minorities increased from 0.23 in 2002 to 0.45 in 2005 to 0.51 in 2008. Over those same administrations the index results for non-visible minorities went from 1.74 in 2002 to 1.53 in
2005 to 1.51 in 2008.
In table 4.1, the index of representation results for the visible minority groups Chinese,
South Asian and Black are also presented as there was at least one elected official from each of these groups in at least one of the three administrations being examined. It should be noted that the index results for the group Black are skewed due to that group constituting such a small percentage of the overall Vancouver population. Black residents make up only 0.92% of
Vancouver’s population according to the 2006 census results (Statistics Canada 2007).
Therefore, having one Black elected official in the 2008 to 2011 administration creates an index result denoting dramatic over-representation. As has been noted in the literature, index results are usually only considered valid if the group being assessed constitutes 5% or more of the total population (Welsh 1990; Behr 2004).
Looking specifically at the Chinese and South Asian groups, the two largest visible minority groups in Vancouver, each are under-represented across the three administrations. The 52 Chinese group saw its high water mark of proportionality in the 2005 to 2008 administration when six Chinese candidates were elected to municipal office. This resulted in Chinese elected officials constituting 22.22% of all municipally elected positions in that administration. At the time of the 2006 census, Vancouver’s Chinese population constituted 29.90% of the overall
Vancouver population. The resulting index of representation score for Chinese in the 2005 to
2008 administration is 0.74.
Of the three administrations included in this index of representation there is only one with an elected official of South Asian descent. In the 2008 election Raj Hundal was elected to the
Vancouver Parks Board, and his election resulted in an index of representation score for South
Asians in the 2005 to 2008 administration of 0.65. This is a large increase over the index of representation score of 0.00 for the 2002 to 2005 and 2005 to 2008 Vancouver administrations.
Clearly, these results confirm that Vancouver’s municipal government is falling well short of proportionally representing its South Asian residents. In fact, this analysis establishes that visible minority under-representation in Vancouver’s civically elected positions spreads beyond the South Asian group. The Chinese in Vancouver, along with all visible minorities assessed collectively, are under-represented in Vancouver’s municipally elected positions15.
15 It should also be noted that there has never been a municipally elected Vancouver official of Filipino descent. As a result of no Filipino being elected in the three administrations examined, Filipinos are not included in the index of representation analysis. If Filipinos had been included they would have received scores of 0.00 for all three administrations. This under-representation of Filipinos is almost as concerning as the under-representation of South Asians as the 2006 Canadian census results numbered Vancouver’s Filipino population at 28,605 (Statistics Canada 2007). Therefore, Filipinos are Vancouver third largest visible minority group at 5.00% of the total population. It is also notable that no candidates of Filipino descent ran for municipal office under the banner of any of the three major political parties in the 2002, 2005 or 2008 Vancouver municipal elections. Given the size of Vancouver’s Filipino population it is worth exploring the reasons why no Filipinos sought election with one of the Vancouver’s major political parties, and whether there are barriers to Filipinos (and potentially other minorities) winning the nomination to stand as a candidate with one of the three major parties. Such an inquiry is beyond the scope of this thesis. 53 4.2: Minority electability under the at-large and ward electoral systems
A location quotient analysis is employed to determine if the South Asian and Chinese candidates who ran in the 2008 Vancouver election would have experience increased electability under the ward system proposed by the 2004 Vancouver Electoral Reform Commission.
Tables 6.1 through 6.4 in the appendix present the LQ scores for all Mayoral candidates,
City Council candidates, Parks Board candidates and School Board candidates who ran in
Vancouver’s 2008 election. In each table the results of candidates of Chinese descent are shaded light grey and the results of candidates of South Asian descent are shaded dark grey. While these tables of raw LQ scores are informative, they are most revealing when assessed by the extent that
City Council, Parks Board and School Board candidates’ LQ scores in a ward are similarly above or below 1.00 to their party’s Mayoral candidate’s LQ score, which candidates’ LQ scores are deviations to the notable trend of party voting and which candidates’ LQ scores diverge from their party’s Mayoral candidate’s LQ score by more than 0.10. The findings for these three analyses are presented in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 and are followed by concluding comments on the findings of this location quotient analysis.
4.2.1: Party vote in Vancouver’s 2008 election
One of the first observations that can be made based on this location quotient analysis is that the LQ scores of a vast majority of non-Mayoral candidates running with Vision Vancouver and the NPA are above or below 1.00 in wards where their Mayoral candidate’s LQ score is similarly above or below 1.0016. That a majority of candidate’s LQ scores are similarly above or
16 A score above 1.00 denotes that candidate received a greater share of votes cast in the 2008 polls contained within the proposed ward than that candidate’s share of all votes cast in the 2008 at-large election. A score below 1.00 indicates the candidate received a smaller share of votes cast in the ward than they did at-large. 54 below 1.00 as their Mayoral candidate’s LQ score indicates that most voters in Vancouver’s
2008 election cast their ballot along party lines. Essentially, eligible Vancouverites in the 2008 election voted for their preferred Mayoral candidate and voted for a majority of the other candidates running with that Mayoral candidate’s party.
To demonstrate this party vote trend, table 4.2 presents Vision Vancouver Mayoral candidate Gregor Robertson’s LQ scores along with the LQ scores of the Vision Vancouver candidates who received the third most votes of all candidates running for City Council (George
Chow), Parks Board (Sarah Blyth) and School Board (Ken Clement). Shaded in grey in table 4.2 are the LQ scores of Chow, Blyth and Clement that are above or below 1.00 in the wards where
Robertson’s LQ scores are similarly above or below 1.00.
Table 4.2: LQ scores for VV Candidates Robertson, Chow, Blyth and Clement Victoria Kensington Strathcona Renfrew Dunbar Riley Park Riley Point Grey Point Kerrisdale Kitsil Hastings - Mt. Pleasant Pleasant Mt. Fraserview/ Downtown Downtown West End End West ano Sunset Sunset - - Shaughnessy Shaughnessy Candidate - Collingwood Collingwood Cedar Cottage Cottage Cedar - - - - Grandview Grandview Fairview Fairview - - Sunrise Sunrise Oakridge Oakridge Kitsilano Kitsilano Marpole Ward Marpole Ward Ward Killarney Killarney Ward Ward
Ward
Ward Ward Ward Ward
Ward
Ward
Ward
Ward
Robertson 0.90 0.62 1.14 1.12 0.60 1.10 1.27 0.94 1.03 1.01 1.32 0.94 0.86 1.26 Chow 0.84 0.68 1.16 1.17 0.70 0.97 1.12 0.88 1.14 1.03 1.26 1.02 1.05 1.06 Blyth 0.88 0.61 1.17 1.14 0.60 1.07 1.30 0.97 1.01 1.02 1.37 0.92 0.89 1.20 Clement 0.87 0.67 1.17 1.15 0.66 1.04 1.23 0.95 1.04 1.01 1.32 0.95 0.92 1.16
Comparing the LQ scores of these three candidates to Robertson’s LQ scores reveals that all of Blyth and Clement’s LQ scores are above or below 1.00 in wards where Robertson’s LQ scores are likewise above or below 1.00. Therefore, 28 out of 28 times Blyth and Clement’s LQ
55 scores parallel Robertson’s. As for George Chow, his LQ scores are similarly above or below
1.00 with Robertson’s scores in 11 out of 14 wards, with the three exceptions being the wards of
Kitsilano-Fairview (Robertson 1.10, Chow 0.97), Sunset (Robertson 0.94, Chow 1.02) and
Victoria-Fraserview/Killarney (Robertson 0.86, Chow 1.05).
Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 present the number and percentage of Vision Vancouver candidates’ whose LQ scores correspond with Mayoral candidate Gregor Robertson’s LQ scores so far as being above or below 1.00. In these tables, the results are organized and grouped by location17.
In the wards of Downtown, West End, Dunbar-Shaughnessy, Hastings-Sunrise,
Kensington-Cedar Cottage, Strathcona-Grandview, Victoria-Fraserview/Killarney and Mount
Pleasant all 16 Vision Vancouver candidates’ LQ scores are above or below 1.00 similar to
Robertson’s LQ score. Out of 14 wards there are only five where some number of Vision
Vancouver candidates’ LQ scores do not parallel Robertson’s score so far as being above or below 1.00.
17 The wards of Downtown and West End are grouped together under the heading Downtown as they are contained in Vancouver’s downtown peninsula. The wards Dunbar-Shaughnessy, Kerrisdale-Marpole, Kitsilano-Fairview and Point Grey-Kitsilano are all located on the west side of Vancouver, and as such they are grouped under the heading Westside. The wards Hastings-Sunrise, Kensington-Cedar Cottage, Renfrew-Collingwood, Strathcona-Grandview, Sunset and Victoria-Fraserview/Killarney are all grouped under the heading Eastside. The last two wards, Mt. Pleasant and Riley Park-Oakridge, are grouped together under the heading Central because they straddle the east- west divide of Vancouver, which is divided at Ontario Street . 56 Table 4.3: Summary of party vote trend for Vision Vancouver candidates in Downtown and Westside wards
Downtown Westside Shaughnessy Point Grey Point Downtown Kerrisdal Kitsilano West End West Kitsilano Fairview Dunbar Marpole ward ward ward ward ward ward
- -
e
-
Candidates with LQ score similarly above or below 1.00 as Robertson’s LQ score Number of VV candidates fielded # % # % # % # % # % # % City Council 8 8 100% 8 100% 8 100% 8 100% 7 88% 5 63% Parks Board 4 4 100% 4 100% 4 100% 4 100% 4 100% 4 100% School Board 4 4 100% 4 100% 4 100% 4 100% 4 100% 3 75%
Table 4.4: Summary of party vote trend for Vision Vancouver candidates in Eastside wards
Eastside Collingwood Sunset Kensi Strathcona Grandview Fraserview Fraserview Hastings Killarney Renfrew Victoria Cottage Sunrise Cedar Cedar ward ward ward ward ward ngton
ward
-
- -
- -
Candidates with LQ score similarly above or below 1.00 as Robertson’s LQ score Number of VV candidates fielded # % # % # % # % # % # % City Council 8 8 100% 8 100% 5 63% 8 100% 5 63% 8 100% Parks Board 4 4 100% 4 100% 3 75% 4 100% 3 75% 4 100% School Board 4 4 100% 4 100% 4 100% 4 100% 4 100% 4 100%
57 Table 4.5: Summary of party vote trend for Vision Vancouver candidates in Central wards
Central Mt. Pleasant Mt. Riley Park Riley Oakridge ward ward
-
Candidates with LQ score similarly above or below 1.00 as Robertson’s LQ score Number of VV candidates fielded # % # %
City Council 8 8 100% 5 63% Parks Board 4 4 100% 2 50% School Board 4 4 100% 3 75%
58 Table 4.6 shows the cumulative results for all wards of Vision Vancouver candidates’ LQ scores being similarly above or below 1.00 to Robertson’s scores. As Vision Vancouver fielded eight City Council candidates and there are 14 wards being analysed, there are 112 opportunities for a Vision Vancouver City Council candidate’s LQ score to be above or below 1.00 in a ward where Robertson’s score is likewise. Of these 112 opportunities there are 98 instances of Vision
Vancouver City Council candidates’ LQ scores paralleling Robertson’s score. Thereby, 88% of the time Vision Vancouver City Council candidates LQ scores are similarly above or below 1.00 to Robertson’s score. As for Vision Vancouver Parks Board candidates, their LQ scores paralleled Robertson’s 52 of 56 times, or 93% of the time. Vision Vancouver School Board candidates’ scores are similarly above or below 1.00 to Robertson’s score 53 out of 56 times, or
95% of the time.
Table 4.6: Summary of party vote trend in all wards for Vision Vancouver candidates
Candidates with LQ scores above or below 1.00 in wards
where Robertson’s score is likewise Number of VV Total # Out of Total % candidates fielded City Council 8 98 112 88% Parks Board 4 52 56 93% School Board 4 53 56 95%
NPA candidates’ LQ scores adhere to this party vote trend established through analysis of
Vision Vancouver candidates’ LQ scores. Tables 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9, present the extent that the
NPA’s 25 non-Mayoral candidates’ LQ scores are above 1.00 in wards where Mayoral candidate
Ladner’s score are above 1.00, or below 1.00 in wards where Ladner’s LQ score is likewise. In the wards of Downtown, West End, Dunbar-Shaughnessy, Kerrisdale-Marpole, Hastings-
Sunrise, Kensington-Cedar Cottage, Strathcona-Grandview, Victoria-Fraserview Killarney and
Mt. Pleasant 100% of NPA candidates’ LQ scores parallel Ladner’s score. As with Vision
Vancouver, out of the 14 wards there are only five in which some number of NPA candidates’ 59 LQ scores diverge from the trend of candidate’s scores being similarly above or below 1.00 as their party’s Mayoral candidate’s LQ score.
60 Table 4.7: Summary of party vote trend for NPA candidates in Downtown and Westside wards
Downtown Westside Shaughnessy Point Grey Point Kerrisdale Downtown Kitsilano West End West Kitsilano Fairview Du Marpole wards wards wards wards wards wards nbar
- -
- -
Candidates with LQ score similarly above or below 1.00 as Ladner’s LQ score Number of NPA candidates fielded # % # % # % # % # % # % City Council 10 10 100% 10 100% 10 100% 10 100% 8 80% 8 80% Parks Board 7 7 100% 7 100% 7 100% 7 100% 7 100% 7 100% School Board 8 8 100% 8 100% 8 100% 8 100% 8 100% 6 75%
Table 4.8: Summary of party vote trend for NPA candidates in Eastside wards
Eastside Collingwood Kensington Strathcona Grandview Fraserview Fraserview Hasting Killarney Renfrew Victoria Cottage Sunrise Sunset Cedar Cedar wards wards wards wards wards wards
s
-
-
-
- -
Candidates with LQ score similarly above or below 1.00 as Ladner’s LQ score Number of NPA candidates fielded # % # % # % # % # % # % City Council 10 10 100% 10 100% 8 80% 10 100% 4 40% 10 100% Parks Board 7 7 100% 7 100% 6 86% 7 100% 4 57% 7 100% School Board 8 8 100% 8 100% 6 75% 8 100% 8 100% 8 100%
61 Table 4.9: Summary of party vote trend for NPA candidates in Central wards
Central Oakridge Pleasant Park Riley Riley Mt. Mt. -
Candidates with LQ score similarly above or below 1.00 as Ladner’s LQ score Number of NPA candidates fielded # % # % City Council 10 10 100% 5 50% Parks Board 7 7 100% 1 14% School Board 8 8 100% 3 38%
62 Table 4.10 presents the cumulative totals for all NPA candidates in all 14 wards. In the case of NPA City Council candidates, 123 out of 140 times (88%) their LQ scores are likewise above or below 1.00 to Ladner’s score. NPA Parks Board candidates’ scores match Ladner’s score 88 out of 95 times (90%), and NPA School Board candidates’ score are similarly above or below 1.00 to Ladner’s 102 out of 112 times (91%).
Table 4.10: Summary of party vote trend in all wards for NPA candidates
Candidates with LQ scores above or below 1.00 in wards where
Ladner’s score is likewise # of NPA Total # Out of Total % candidates fielded NPA Council 10 123 140 88% NPA Parks 7 88 98 90% NPA School 8 102 112 91%
The cumulative results for both parties are that 516 out of 574 times City Council, Parks
Board and School Board candidates’ LQ scores are above 1.00 in wards where their mayoral candidate is above 1.00 or below 1.00 in wards where their Mayoral candidate is below 1.00.
Therefore, 90% of the Vision Vancouver and NPA non-Mayoral candidates’ LQ scores presented in this thesis parallel their party’s Mayoral candidate’s LQ scores so far as being above or below
1.00. These location quotient analysis results strongly suggests a vast majority of Vancouverites in all areas of the city voted along party lines in the 2008 municipal election.
This trend of Vancouverites voting along party lines supports other academics’ conclusions about Vancouver’s at-large electoral system; that the party whose Mayoral candidate receives the most votes is also the party that most often elects the majority of its non-Mayoral candidates (Tennant 1980; Vogel 2003). Essentially, Vancouver’s at-large system "works to the advantage of [a] large cohesive voting group, allowing it to take all, or nearly all, of the positions even if the group itself is a minority among actual voters" (Tennant 16). This trend of “winner take all” party politics in Vancouver’s at-large elections are clearly present in recent election 63 results. In “1996 the NPA, with 51.1 percent of the Council vote, won all 10 seats, while COPE, with 28.7 per cent, won none. In 1999, the NPA, with 45.3 percent of the vote, won eight seats, while COPE-Green with 28.1 per cent (COPE 18.4 per cent, Green 9.7 per cent), only [won] two seats” (Berger 45).
4.2.2: Deviations from party vote trend and divergences to Mayoral candidates’
LQ scores
This section investigates instances in which Vision Vancouver and NPA candidates’ LQ scores deviate from the party vote trend, as well as instances in which candidates’ LQ scores diverge significantly from their Mayoral candidate’s LQ scores.
A candidate’s LQ score is considered to have deviated from the party vote trend when their score in a ward is below 1.00 while their party’s Mayoral candidate’s LQ score in that ward is above 1.00, or vice versa. For the purpose of this thesis, candidates’ LQ scores that diverge from their Mayoral candidate’s LQ score by more than 0.10 are considered significant. These significant divergences are analysed in three groups; scores that diverge from their Mayoral candidate’s by between 0.10 and 0.19, those that diverge by between 0.20 to 0.29 and LQ scores that diverge by over 0.30.
4.2.2.1: Deviations from party vote
Before examining the specific candidates whose LQ scores deviate from the party vote trend, it is worth noting that the wards where these deviations occur had such occurrences for candidates from Vision Vancouver and the NPA. These wards are Kitsilano-Fairview, Point
Grey-Kitsilano, Renfrew-Collingwood, Sunset and Riley Park-Oakridge.
64 In assessing these deviations it should be recognized that in some cases the individual candidate’s history, profile or achievements, along with other local factors, could have influenced their share of votes cast in polls contained with the 14 wards. For example, at the time of the 2008 election a candidate might have lived in, or supported a bylaw change that was popular in, the area of Vancouver proposed to be with a ward where their LQ score is above 1.00 compared to their Mayoral candidate’s score being below 1.00. There are numerous other unique and individual potential factors affecting candidates LQ scores and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to interrogate how such factors may have affected the results of each candidate whose score(s) deviated from the party vote trend.
One potential factor influencing these deviations that is within the scope of this thesis is a candidate’s visible or non-visible minority status. The first step to assessing the affect a candidate’s visible or non-visible minority status has on their LQ score(s) deviating from the party vote trend is determining the extent that this occurred for each visible and non-visible minority group. Table 4.11 presents numbers and percentages for candidates whose LQ scores deviate from the party vote trend based on their visible or non-visible minority status. This summary table reveals that the share of measurable candidates18 with LQ scores that deviate from the party vote trend by visible and non-visible minority category are roughly in line with the number of measurable candidates from these groups.
18 Measurable candidates are Vision Vancouver and NPA candidates. COPE candidates are not considered measureable candidates as there was no COPE Mayoral candidate in the 2008 elections and therefore it is not possible to establish if COPE candidates’ LQ scores deviate from their party’s Mayoral candidate. Independent candidates are also not measurable candidates as there is no Mayoral candidate whose LQ score their LQ score can be compared to. 65 Table 4.11: Candidates whose LQ score deviate from party vote trend
Visible or non-visible # of measureable % of measureable # of times LQ % of total deviated minority group candidates candidates scores deviated LQ scores Non-visible minority 29 71% 37 68% Chinese 6 15% 8 15% South Asian 5 12% 8 15% Black 1 2% 1 2%
Total 41 100% 54 100%
In evaluating whether the visible or non-visible minority status of a candidate affected their LQ score deviating from the party vote trend, this thesis employs an analysis of relevant visible and non-visible minority residential patterns in Vancouver. This analysis entails choropleth maps and tables detailing the makeup of each ward by relevant visible or non-visible minority groups. These maps depict the boundaries of the 14 proposed wards overlaid on top of the Vancouver residential patterns of non-visible minority residents (map 4.1), Chinese residents
(map 4.2) and South Asian residents (4.3).
66
Map 4.1: Non-visible minorities residents as % of 2006 Vancouver population with 2004 ward boundaries overlaid
67
Map 4.2: Chinese residents as % of 2006 Vancouver population with 2004 ward boundaries overlaid
68
Map 4.3: South Asian residents as % of 2006 Vancouver population with 2004 ward boundaries overlaid
69 Table 4.12 presents the five proposed wards in which non-Mayoral candidates’ LQ scores are opposite to their Mayoral candidates’ scores so far as being above or below 1.00. Also included in this table are the percentage of each ward’s population that are non-visible minorities, Chinese and South Asians, as well as the two major party’s Mayoral candidates, their
LQ scores and the number of candidates from each party whose LQ score deviated from the trend of party vote.
Table 4.12 reveals that in proposed wards where a significant proportion of the local population are Chinese, South Asians or non-visible minorities, then candidates from that dominant group are more likely to have an LQ score greater than 1.00 when their Mayoral candidate’s LQ score is below 1.00. Also, in these wards it is common that candidates from the non-dominant group(s) receive an LQ score below 1.00 when that candidate’s party’s Mayoral candidate LQ score is above 1.00.
70 Table 4.12: Candidates with LQ scores that deviate from the party vote trend19
Candidates with LQ scores Residential makeup Mayoral Mayoral deviating from party vote trend Ward candidate Non- South candidate Non-visible South Chinese LQ score Chinese visible Asian minorities Asian Kitsilano Robertson 1.10 0 1 0 69% 17% 2% Fairview Ladner 0.94 3 0 0 Point Grey- Robertson 0.94 3 0 0 68% 20% 2% Kitsilano Ladner 1.51 0 3 0 Renfrew- Robertson 1.03 2 0 1 22% 47% 7% Collingwood Ladner 0.88 2 3 0 Robertson 0.94 0 1 2 Sunset 17% 37% 26% Ladner 1.02 10 0 0 Riley Park- Robertson 1.01 4 0 2 20 42% 32% 7% Oakridge Ladner 1.02 13 0 3
For example, in the wards of Kitsilano-Fairview and Point Grey-Kitsilano non-visible minorities constitute the majority of the ward’s population (69% and 68% respectively) while
Chinese residents compose 17% and 20% respectively and South Asian residents compose 2% of each ward’s population. In Kitsilano-Fairview Vision Vancouver Mayoral candidate
Robertson’s LQ score is 1.10 and NPA Mayoral candidate Ladner’s is 0.94, while in the Point
Grey-Kitsilano ward Robertson’s score is 0.94 and Ladner’s score is 1.51. Looking at the breakdown of candidates’ whose LQ scores deviated from the party vote trend in these wards reveals that the candidates whose LQ scores are greater than 1.00 when their Mayoral candidate’s score is under 1.00 are all non-visible minorities. While the only candidates in
19 Table 6.5 in the appendix presents the names and LQ scores of each candidate whose score deviates from the party vote trend by ward in addition to the data presented in table 4.12.
20 Riley Park-Oakridge is somewhat of an anomaly as Robertson’s LQ score is 1.01 and Ladner’s is 1.02 in this ward. This indicates that both Mayoral candidates received a slightly higher share of votes cast in the ward of Riley Park-Oakridge than they did of total votes cast at-large in the 2008 election. This is a result of a smaller number of voters in this ward voting for Mayoral candidates other than Robertson or Ladner than was done in the 2008 at-large election. Combined, Robertson and Ladner received 94.66% of total votes cast in Riley Park-Oakridge compared to garnering 93.65% of the votes cast for Mayoral candidates in the 2008 at-large election. As a result of more residents in this ward voting for the two main Mayoral candidates, Robertson received 54.69% of the vote in Riley Park-Oakridge compared to 54.39% of the at-large vote while Ladner received 39.96% in the ward compared to 39.26% at-large. 71 Kitsilano-Fairview and Point Grey-Kitsilano to have LQ scores below 1.00 when their Mayoral candidate score is above 1.00 are candidates of Chinese descent.
Table 4.12 reveals similar findings for the wards of Renfrew-Collingwood and Sunset. In these wards non-visible minorities makeup 22% and 17% of the total population respectively, while Chinese residents compose 47% and 37% respectively and South Asians residents compose 7% and 26% of those wards populations. Four out of eight occurrences where a candidate’s LQ score are higher than 1.00 while their Mayoral candidate’s score is lower than
1.00 are attributed to candidates of Chinese descent in these wards, and two of the other four occurrences (not attributed to Chinese candidates) belong to South Asian candidates in the
Sunset ward where South Asians constitute the second largest residential group at 26%.
Comparing the visible and non-visible minority status of candidates with LQ scores that deviate from the party vote trend in the context of a proposed ward’s relevant visible and non- visible minority populations clearly suggests a trend of ethnic voting. Candidates of Chinese descent represent the majority of candidates with negatively deviating LQ scores in wards where non-visible minorities compose a large majority of the residents. Wards where the largest segment of the population are Chinese have Chinese candidates accounting for 50% of the candidates with LQ scores above 1.00 when their party’s Mayoral candidate’s score is below
1.00. In those same wards where Chinese residents are the largest group, non-visible minority candidates are more likely to be the ones whose LQ scores deviate negatively from their Mayoral candidate’s score. As for the Sunset ward, which is the only ward where South Asian residents constitute a large segment of the population at 26%, all candidates of South Asian that have deviating LQ scores have them above 1.00 when their Mayoral candidate is below 1.00.
72 4.2.2.2: Significantly diverging LQ scores
Candidates with significantly diverging LQ scores are those whose scores diverge from their Mayoral candidate’s score by 0.10 and 0.19, 0.20 and 0.29 or more than 0.30. As Vision
Vancouver and the NPA were the only major parties to run a Mayoral candidate in the 2008 election, only their non-Mayoral candidates’ LQ scores can be assessed for the extent that they diverge from their Mayoral candidate’s score. As such, tables 6.7 to 6.18 in the appendix contain only Vision Vancouver and NPA candidates’ total votes, LQ scores and the extent that their scores divergence from their Mayoral candidate’s score.
An initial analysis of significantly diverging LQ scores involves assessing them collectively to establish the extent that non-visible minority, Chinese and South Asian candidates the LQ scores diverge significantly. Table 4.13 presents this analysis, and it is clear that non- visible minorities make up a considerably smaller proportion of the incidences of significantly diverging LQ scores, at 38%, than their percentage of measureable candidates, which is 71%.
Chinese candidates makeup only 15% of measureable candidates, yet they constitute 48% of the total number of significantly diverging LQ scores. South Asian candidates makeup a relatively proportional amount of measurable candidates compared to their share of the total number of significantly diverging LQ scores, at 12% to 14%.
Table 4.13: Summary of significant divergences by non-visible minority, Chinese and South Asian descent
Visible minority # of measured % of measurable # of significant % of total significant category candidates candidates divergences divergences Non-visible minority 29 71% 28 38% Chinese 6 15% 35 48% South Asian 5 12% 10 14% Black 1 2% 0 0%
Total 41 100% 87 100%
73 To further understand how a candidate’s non-visible minority, Chinese or South Asian status affects whether their LQ scores diverge significantly, table 4.14 presents the number of candidates in each ward with significantly diverging LQ scores by their non-visible minority,
Chinese and South Asian status.
There are a total of 70 instances of a candidates’ LQ scores diverging significantly from their Mayoral candidate’s LQ scores. Of these 70 significant divergences, 26 are attributed to non-visible minority candidates, 34 to Chinese candidates and 10 to South Asian candidates. All
26 incidences of a non-visible minority candidates’ LQ score diverging significantly are within the range of 0.10 to 0.19. Of the 34 incidences of Chinese candidates’ LQ scores diverging significantly, 21 were in the range of 0.10 to 0.19, 11 are in the range of 0.20 to 0.29 and two diverged by over 0.30. There are 10 incidences of South Asian candidates’ LQ scores diverging significantly, and of these five are in the range of 0.10 to 0.19, two are between 0.20 and 0.29 and 3 diverge by over 0.30. This distribution of significantly diverging LQ scores reveals a picture of visible minority candidates being much more likely to have their LQ score diverge by a greater margin from their mayoral candidate’s score than non-visible minority candidates.
74 Table 4.14: Summary of candidates with significantly diverging LQ scores by ward21
Residential concentration Range of Number of candidates Ward Non- South LQ score Non-visible South Chinese Chinese visible Asian divergence minorities Asians 0.10 - 0.19 1 2 0 Downtown 58% 20% 3% 0.20 - 0.29 0 0 0 0.30 or more 0 0 0 0.10 - 0.19 2 2 0 West End 66% 12% 2% 0.20 - 0.29 0 1 0 0.30 or more 0 0 0 0.10 - 0.19 4 3 1 Dunbar- 55% 33% 2% 0.20 - 0.29 0 1 0 Shaughnessy 0.30 or more 0 0 0 0.10 - 0.19 4 1 1 Kerrisdale- 43% 37% 7% 0.20 - 0.29 0 0 0 Marpole 0.30 or more 0 0 0 0.10 - 0.19 2 3 0 Kitsilano- 69% 17% 2% 0.20 - 0.29 0 1 0 Fairview 0.30 or more 0 0 0 0.10 - 0.19 1 1 2 Point Grey- 68% 20% 2% 0.20 - 0.29 0 2 0 Kitsilano 0.30 or more 0 0 0 0.10 - 0.19 0 1 1 Hastings- 40% 41% 3% 0.20 - 0.29 0 0 0 Sunrise 0.30 or more 0 0 0 Kensington- 0.10 - 0.19 0 1 0 Cedar 25% 44% 8% 0.20 - 0.29 0 2 0 Cottage 0.30 or more 0 0 0 0.10 - 0.19 4 1 0 Renfrew- 22% 47% 7% 0.20 - 0.29 0 1 0 Collingwood 0.30 or more 0 2 0 0.10 - 0.19 3 0 0 Strathcona- 56% 25% 2% 0.20 - 0.29 0 0 0 Grandview 0.30 or more 0 0 0 0.10 - 0.19 1 1 0 Sunset 17% 37% 26% 0.20 - 0.29 0 2 2 0.30 or more 0 0 3 Victoria- 0.10 - 0.19 2 3 0 Fraserview/ 26% 47% 7% 0.20 - 0.29 0 1 0 Killarney 0.30 or more 0 0 0 0.10 - 0.19 1 2 0 Mt. Pleasant 60% 17% 2% 0.20 - 0.29 0 0 0 0.30 or more 0 0 0 0.10 - 0.19 1 0 0 Riley Park- 42% 32% 7% 0.20 - 0.29 0 0 0 Oakridge 0.30 or more 0 0 0
21 Table 6.6 in the appendix presents the names of candidates, their visible or non-visible minority status and the exact extent that their LQ scores diverges significantly from their Mayoral candidate’s LQ score. In table 6.6 scores that diverge by between 0.20 and 0.29 are outlined, while scores that divergence by more than 0.30 are shaded grey. 75 Comparing the candidates with significantly divergent LQ scores in a ward by that ward’s residential makeup of non-visible minorities, Chinese and South Asians also reveals that wards with high concentrations of one group have an increased number of candidates from the less concentrated group(s) receiving negatively significant diverging LQ scores22. For example, in the proposed wards of Downtown, West End, Kitsilano-Fairview and Mt. Pleasant the majority of residents are non-visible minorities, and in these wards the only candidate’s with LQ scores diverging significant and negatively are of Chinese descent. The wards of Dunbar-Shaughnessy and Point Grey-Kitsilano also have majority non-visible minority populations and in the wards the candidates with the largest negatively diverging LQ scores are of Chinese descent.
Meanwhile, in the wards of Kensington-Cedar Cottage, Renfrew-Collingwood, Sunset and
Victoria-Fraserview/Killarney, where the majority of the populations are of Chinese and South
Asian descent, the only negatively significant divergent LQ scores belong to non-visible minority candidates.
4.2.3: Overall findings from location quotient analysis of at-large and ward systems
This location quotient analysis clearly establishes that in the 2008 Vancouver election many voters cast their ballots along both party and ethnic lines. Candidates of Chinese and
South Asian descent were far more likely to either positively deviate from their party’s Mayoral candidates’ LQ score or receive a positively significant diverging LQ score in wards that encompass areas of Vancouver where a large percentage of voters share their visible minority status. In addition, a large number of Chinese candidates in the 2008 election suffered
22 Table 6.6 presents the makeup of each ward along with the visible or non-visible minority status of each candidate whose LQ score diverges significantly as well as the extent their score divergences positively or negatively. 76 consistently lower LQ scores, deviated negatively from their Mayoral candidates’ LQ score and had LQ scores that were significantly diverging negatively in wards dominated by non-visible minority voters.
Given that there are areas of Vancouver with high concentrations of both Chinese and
South Asian residents (as depicted in maps 4.2 and 4.3), and that the wards proposed in 2004 were developed with awareness of these residency patterns and many proposed wards encompass a significant portion of those visible minority groups’ population, it can be concluded that visible minorities in Vancouver would have experienced increased potential for electability under the ward system proposed in 2004 than they did under the at-large system employed in Vancouver’s
2008 election.
4.3: Vancouver’s 2008 election results and the three conditions
Following Vancouver’s 2008 municipal election, non-elected South Asian candidates argued that Vancouver’s at-large electoral system reduced their ability to win election. These claims echoed similar critiques against at-large electoral systems by minority candidates and activists in America over the last 30 years. In America, these claims have led to legislative and legal decisions aimed at clarifying when and if such claims are legitimate. In 1986 the U.S.
Supreme Court established precedent through its ruling in Thornburg vs. Gingles that there are three conditions by which minority vote dilution can be determined.
The similarity of claims following the Vancouver 2008 election to the U.S. tradition of challenging at-large electoral systems on the basis of minority vote dilution led to the development of the third research question of this thesis. That research questions asks whether
Vancouver’s 2008 election results meet the three conditions established in Thornburg vs. Gingles
77 and thus prove minority vote dilution. These three conditions are: “(1) the plaintiff’s class constitute a large and geographical compact; (2) the class is politically cohesive; and (3) the white majority voting bloc usually defeats the minority’s preferred candidate” (Williams 1999,
24).
Determining the extent to which Vancouver’s 2008 election results fulfil these three conditions will enhance understanding of whether, and how, the visible minority status of candidates and voters reduces the electability of visible minorities under Vancouver’s at-large system. Should the vote dilution of South Asians be determined to have occurred in the 2008 election, it will lend weight to the claims that Vancouver’s at-large system reduces the electability of South Asian candidates.
In addition to interrogating whether South Asian candidates’ 2008 election results fulfil the three conditions, this section will also probe whether the 2008 election results of Chinese candidates meet the three conditions. Chinese candidates’ results are examined due to the index of representation analysis results23 (section 4.1) and the results of comparing Vancouver’s at- large system to a ward system using a locations quotient analysis in conjunction with residency patterns and concentrations24 (section 4.2).
4.3.1: The first condition
The first condition of Thornburg vs. Gingles is that the plaintiff’s group be large and geographically compact. What is meant by “large and compact” has been a point of debate in
23 Index of representation analysis results revealed that Chinese citizens were consistently under-represented in three consecutive Vancouver administrations (2002 – 2005, 2005 – 2008, 2008 – 2011).
24 LQ analysis and visible and non-visible minority residency patterns revealed that Chinese candidates LQ scores most often deviate from the party vote trend while consistently having significant negatively diverging LQ scores in wards where there are high concentrations of non-visible minorities. 78 numerous court cases following Thornburg vs. Gingles (Grofman, Handley & Niemi, 62). The ruling in Thornburg vs. Gingles stated that “large” should be taken to mean the minority group can form a majority of the population in one or more single-member district(s). However, arguments have been made that an absolute majority should be acceptable, that a majority of voting age residents meets the condition and that if there are two minority groups that together make up a majority of a single member district’s population they should be considered collectively to fulfil the first condition by (Davis 1999; Grofman, Handley & Niemi 1992). One judge in such a case did comment in her ruling that “so long as the potential exists that a minority group could elect its own representative in spite of racially polarized voting, that group has standing to raise a vote dilution challenge under the Voting Rights Act” (Grofman, Handley &
Niemi, 63). In general, these and other debates on the first condition have been resolved on a case-by-case basis, and in the majority of cases the standard set in Thornburg vs. Gingles has been maintained; that fulfilling the first condition entails a minority group constituting a majority in one or more single-member district(s).
The second part of the first condition states that the minority group must be geographically compact. Ever since Thornburg vs. Gingles, “courts have tended not to separate the question of geographic compactness from the question of whether the minority group is numerous enough to constitute a majority; if the plaintiffs are able to draw a (contiguous) plan in which they comprise a majority in at least one district, then they have met the first prong, regardless of the shape of the district” (Grofman, Handley & Niemi, 64).
In the 2006 Canadian census there were 168,215 residents of Chinese descent and 32,515 residents of South Asian descent (Statistics Canada 2007). Therefore, Chinese residents constitute 29.43% of Vancouver’s total population compared to the 5.68% of the total population
79 made up of South Asians. This means that Chinese residents form the largest visible minority group in Vancouver and South Asian residents constitute the second largest visible minority group. At the time of the 2006 Canadian census the largest segment of Vancouver’s population by visible and non-visible minority classifications was the non-visible minority population at
279,860, or 48.96% of Vancouver’s total population (Statistics Canada 2007).
In order to fulfil the first condition of Thornburg vs. Gingles the minority group(s) being assessed – in this case the Chinese and South Asian residents of Vancouver – must be large enough, and geographically concentrated enough, to comprise a majority of the population in one single-member district or ward. Map 4.2 shows that Chinese residents are concentrated in
Vancouver’s East and South Central neighbourhoods, while map 4.3 depicts South Asian residents as overwhelmingly concentrated in South East Vancouver. Both maps 4.2 and 4.3 have been overlaid with the boundaries of the 14 wards proposed in 2004. An assessment of these maps reveals that the wards most likely to fulfil the first condition for Chinese residents are
Hastings-Sunrise, Kensington-Cedar Cottage, Renfrew-Collingwood and Victoria-
Fraserview/Killarney. While the one ward where South Asian residents may fulfil the first condition is the Sunset ward.
Table 4.15 adds to the information depicted in maps 4.2 and 4.3 by presenting the total number of residents in each ward, along with the makeup up of each ward by non-visible minority, Chinese, South Asian and other visible minority status. The plurality population in each ward is shaded light grey, and in wards where one group forms a majority of the local population that group’s population figure and percentage are shaded dark grey.
80 Table 4.15: Residential concentrations of non-visible minorities, Chinese and South Asians by ward
Residential concentration Total Non-visible Ward Chinese South Asian Other population minorities Pop. % Pop. % Pop. % Pop. % Downtown 64,369 37,561 58% 12,740 20% 1,668 3% 12,399 19% Dunbar-Shaughnessy 76,402 41,739 55% 24,860 33% 1,358 2% 8,446 11% Hastings-Sunrise 65,075 25,792 40% 26,956 41% 1,757 3% 10,570 16% Kensington-Cedar 74,039 18,561 25% 32,658 44% 5,724 8% 17,096 23% Cottage Kerrisdale-Marpole 70,922 30,446 43% 26,197 37% 4,754 7% 9,526 13% Kitsilano-Fairview 69,099 47,782 69% 11,414 17% 1,351 2% 8,552 12% Mt. Pleasant 79,956 47,977 60% 13,441 17% 1,896 2% 16,642 21% Point Grey-Kitsilano 68,692 46,712 68% 13,618 20% 1,165 2% 7,197 10% Renfrew-Collingwood 55,754 12,449 22% 26,258 47% 3,654 7% 13,393 24% Riley Park-Oakridge 97,571 40,916 42% 31,237 32% 6,948 7% 18,470 19% Strathcona-Grandview 61,624 34,596 56% 15,164 25% 0,992 2% 10,872 18% Sunset 50,701 8,745 17% 18,686 37% 13,342 26% 9,928 20% Victoria- 59,340 15,444 26% 27,908 47% 3,895 7% 12,094 20% Fraserview/Killarney West End 67,968 44,570 66% 8,052 12% 1,592 2% 13,754 20%
There are nine wards in which the non-visible minority population compose a plurality of residents, and in seven of those nine wards non-visible minorities account for a majority of residents. As for wards with a plurality or majority of Chinese residents, five of the 14 wards proposed have Chinese residents form a plurality and in none of the 14 wards do they constitute a majority (although there are two wards in which Chinese residents makeup 47% of the ward’s population). As for South Asian residents, in none of the 14 2004 are South Asians either a plurality or a majority of the local population.
Therefore, none of the 14 wards proposed in 2004 fulfil the first condition of Thornburg vs. Gingles. However, it is worth noting that no one group forms a majority in the Sunset ward, where Chinese residents makeup a plurality and South Asian residents constitute the second largest group of the ward’s population. Also, in the wards of Hastings-Sunrise, Kensington-
81 Cedar Cottage, Renfrew-Collingwood, Victoria-Fraserview/Killarney there is no one group that forms a majority, although Chinese residents do form a plurality in all of those wards.
Given the makeup of these five wards, it is worth revisiting some of the arguments raised earlier that have been made in U.S. court cases facing similar scenarios. For example, there have been minority vote dilution cases in the U.S. where the argument was made that if two minority groups together make a majority in a single-member district they should collectively be considered fulfilling the first condition (Grofman, Handley & Niemi, 66). Judges have ruled both affirmatively and dismissively towards this argument, depending on the case. The majority of the cases where judges have accepted this argument involved the establishment that the two minority groups held enough in common (socio-economic status, community issues, etc), and voted along similar lines, that they could be considered a majority for the purpose of the first condition (Grofman, Handley & Niemi, 66). Based on table 4.15 it is clear that Chinese and
South Asian residents together form a majority in the wards of Kensington-Cedar Cottage,
Renfrew-Collingwood, Sunset and Victoria-Fraserview/Killarney. And while it is beyond the scope of this thesis to interrogate whether any of these four wards’ Chinese and South Asian residents share enough in common to plausibly make the argument that they should be viewed as together constituting a majority in the ward, it is worth recognising that such a scenario is possible.
A second argument used in U.S. court a case is that the first condition is considered fulfilled were the minority group being assessed is able to constitute an “effective voting majority” (Blackman and Luschei 1999, 127). When this argument has been made it is usually argued that “effective” means the minority group can constitute a majority of voting age citizens even if they do not form a total population majority in the district or ward (Blackman and
82 Luschei 1999, 127). It is worth noting that table 4.15 presents total population numbers for the
14 wards proposed for Vancouver, and it is possible that in one of these wards the number of residents belonging to one visible minority group who are eligible to vote could constitute a majority of eligible voters25.
In addition, the argument could be made that in a ward where no one ethnic group forms a majority then the “effective voting majority” is the group that votes cohesively enough, and with a high enough voter turnout, to deliver a majority of votes cast and thereby elect their preferred candidate. Without data on individual voter’s ethnicity and voting preference it is not possible to prove or disprove whether the Chinese community in one of these five wards, or the
South Asian community in the Sunset ward, voted in enough numbers and with enough uniformity that they delivered a majority of votes in that ward. It is worth noting however, that the LQ results for Renfrew-Collingwood and Sunset clearly present a picture of strong and disproportionate support for all Chinese candidates in Renfrew-Collingwood and all South Asian candidates in Sunset, irrelevant of party or slate (tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4).
Before moving on to the second condition, it is also worth investigating whether the boundaries of the Renfrew-Collingwood and Sunset wards can be redrawn to create a Renfrew-
Collingwood ward with a majority of Chinese residents and a Sunset ward with a majority of
South Asian residents. Map 4.5 present a redrawn Renfrew-Collingwood ward where the majority of the population are of Chinese descent. In this new Renfrew-Collingwood ward
Chinese residents total 21,275 (55% of the re-drawn ward’s population), and there are 8,090 non- visible minority residents (21%), 1,970 South Asian residents (5%) and 2,405 Filipino residents
(6%).
25 It is beyond the scope of this thesis, and beyond the scope of the data available for this research, to determine the actually number of eligible voters and their visible minority or non-visible minority makeup. 83
Map 4.4: Renfrew-Collingwood ward as proposed in 2004 and updated for first condition
84 Map 4.6 presents a redrawn Sunset ward where the majority of the population are of
South Asian descent. In this new Sunset ward South Asian residents total 10,405 (51% of that re-drawn ward’s population), and there are 3,530 Chinese residents (17% of the population) and
2,780 non-visible minority residents (14% of the population).
85
Map 4.5: Sunset ward as proposed in 2004 and updated for first condition
86 4.3.2: The second condition
The second condition of Thornburg vs. Gingles is that the plaintiff’s group is politically cohesive, which the U.S. Supreme Court defined as “(1) there is a distinct group interest and (2) enough members of the group can be expected to vote together to be able to elect candidates of their choice” (Grofman, Handley & Niemi, 67).
Determining if Chinese residents within the Renfrew-Collingwood ward are politically cohesive is achieved by revisiting the LQ scores of Chinese candidates in the Renfrew-
Collingwood ward, which are summarized in table 4.16. All Chinese candidates in the Renfrew-
Collingwood ward have LQ scores above 1.00, meaning that irrelevant of party all Chinese candidates received larger shares of 2008 votes cast in the polls encompassed by the Renfrew-
Collingwood ward than their shares of all votes cast at-large in the 2008 election. In the
Renfrew-Collingwood ward, Vision Vancouver candidates of Chinese descent scores are 1.04
(Louie), 1.14 (Chow), 1.09 (Jang), while NPA candidates of Chinese descent scores are 1.12
(Lee), 1.20 (Wong) and 1.18 (Woo).
Establishing if South Asian residents within the Sunset ward are politically cohesive is also achieved by revisiting the LQ scores, in this case the LQ scores of South Asian candidates in the Sunset ward are re-examined which are summarised in table 4.16. All South Asian candidates that ran in the 2008 Vancouver election had LQ scores above 1.00 in the ward of
Sunset, irrelevant of party. Vision Vancouver South Asian candidate’s Dhaliwal and Hundal’s
LQ scores are 1.17 and 1.22 respectively, and NPA South Asian candidates Sidhu scored 1.73,
Shukla 1.59 and Singh 1.65. The only COPE South Asian candidate, Singh, score is 1.07 in the
Sunset ward. Five of these six South Asian candidates (COPE’s Singh being the exception) are
87 considered significant divergences in section 4.2.2.2, with Sidhu garnering the LQ score with the largest divergence of all candidates in all wards at 0.71.
Table 4.16: Summary of South Asian and Chinese candidates LQ scores in the Sunset and Renfrew-Collingwood wards
Renfrew-Collingwood ward Sunset ward Candidates Party Slate LQ score Extent LQ score LQ Score Extent LQ score divergences divergences Louie VV Council 1.04 0.01 N/A N/A Chow VV Council 1.14 0.11 N/A N/A Jang VV Council 1.09 0.06 N/A N/A Lee NPA Council 1.12 0.24 N/A N/A Wong NPA Council 1.20 0.32 N/A N/A Woo NPA School 1.18 0.30 N/A N/A Dhaliwal VV Council N/A N/A 1.17 0.23 Sidhu NPA Council N/A N/A 1.73 0.71 Hundal VV Parks N/A N/A 1.22 0.28 Shukla NPA Parks N/A N/A 1.59 0.58 A. Singh CPE School N/A N/A 1.07 N/A L. Singh NPA School N/A N/A 1.65 0.63
Essentially, the LQ scores and extent that they diverge presented in table 4.16 demonstrate that the voters in Renfrew-Collingwood and Sunset voted en mass for Chinese candidates and South Asian candidates, irrelevant of party. As these wards are the only ones where this happened, and these are the wards with the highest concentrations of Chinese and
South Asian residents, it can be concluded that the Chinese community of Renfrew-Collingwood overwhelmingly voted for Chinese candidates and the South Asian community of Sunset overwhelmingly voted for South Asian candidates. This demonstrates a political cohesiveness within those communities, and as such it can be said that the South Asian community of Sunset, and the Chinese community of Renfrew-Collingwood, fulfil the second condition of Thornburg vs. Gingles.
88 4.3.3: The third condition
The third condition established in Thornburg vs. Gingles is that the “majority vote sufficiently as a bloc to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate” (Davis, 72). The Court in
Thornburg vs. Gingles, and subsequent courts, consider the establishment of racial vote polarization as fulfilment of this third condition. Courts have often also expressed that establishing racially polarized voting patterns fulfils the second condition, or fortifies fulfilment of the second condition if it has already been established (Grofman, Handley and Niemi, 84).
In the Thornburg vs. Gingles ruling the U.S. Supreme Court “asserted that racial polarization can be established in terms of observed correlations between the racial composition of election districts and candidate choices in those units, at least insofar as a correlation between the race of a voter and the way in which the voter votes implies differences in the voting behaviour of minority and nonminority voters” (Grofman & Chandler 1992, 211). Based on this description, the recent electoral results of South Asians in Vancouver municipal elections appear to demonstrate that Vancouver’s majority, non-minority population consistently votes against for
South Asian candidates. As reviewed in section 1.2, in the last six Vancouver elections only one of seventeen candidates of South Asian descent did not receive the least amount of votes amongst candidates on their party’s slate. The one exception received the second least amount of votes (Burrows 2008b).
In U.S. court cases, numerous statistical analysis methods have been utilized to prove the existence of racial vote polarization. One such technique, homogenous precinct analysis, in combination with a location quotient analysis, are employed in this thesis in order to establish whether racial vote polarization occurred in the 2008 Vancouver election.
89 Homogenous precinct analysis is based on the “fundamental assumption … that voters in homogeneous precincts will mirror the preferences expressed by the minority groups as a whole.
If minority voters in homogeneous precincts are cohesive, it is inferred that the minority group is cohesive in the jurisdiction as a whole” (Blackman and Luschei 1999, 128). As it is rare that cities have precincts where 100% of the population is from one ethnic group, homogeneous precinct analysis aims to utilize precincts where one ethnic group constitutes 80% or more of the population.
If we accept this criteria, then in order to establish the existence of racially polarized voting patterns using homogeneous precinct analysis it is necessary to locate three precincts
(referred to as polls in Vancouver) that fulfil the criteria of homogeneous precinct analysis. In the case of this thesis, the three polls needed to perform the homogeneous precinct analysis include one poll having a population of 80% or more non-visible minorities, another poll with
80% or more of its population of Chinese descent and a third poll with 80% or more of residents being of South Asian descent. Once these three polls have been identified it is possible to assess if the polls with 80% Chinese and 80% South Asian residents voted overwhelmingly for candidates from their community while the poll with 80% non-minority residents overwhelmingly voted against candidates of Chinese and South Asian descent.
The three polls selected as most appropriate for this homogeneous precinct analysis are polls 131, 98 and 91 (map 4.6). Poll 131 is located in the Point Grey-Kitsilano ward, poll 98 is located in the Kerrisdale-Marpole ward and poll 91 is located in the Sunset ward.
90
Map 4.6: Homogeneous precinct analysis polls 131, 98 and 91
91 Table 4.17 presents 2006 census data, by dissemination area, for the relevant visible and non-visible minority populations of poll 131. As poll 131 has a non-visible minority population of 3,220, which is 90.78% of the population living in poll 131, it has over 80% of its population belonging to the majority population of Vancouver and therefore poll 131 is a valid poll for homogeneous precinct analysis.
Table 4.17 Residential makeup of homogeneous precinct analysis poll 13126
DA Total Chinese South Asian Filipino Non-visible minority Poll number population population population population population 59150598 131 525.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 505.00 59150599 131 232.58 16.48 0.00 0.00 203.28 59150600 131 520.00 25.00 40.00 0.00 450.00 59150601 131 685.00 45.00 15.00 0.00 610.00 59150602 131 420.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 395.00 59150603 131 420.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 410.00 59150604 131 317.84 23.84 0.00 0.00 270.16 59150605 131 192.04 14.94 0.00 0.00 172.84 59150883 131 169.66 16.07 5.36 3.57 142.87 59150885 131 3.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.15 59150886 131 62.00 1.94 0.00 0.00 58.12 3547.49 153.27 70.36 13.57 3220.42 4.32% 1.98% 0.38% 90.78%
Poll 91’s residential makeup of relevant visible and non-visible minority groups is presented in table 4.18. Poll 91 is the poll with the highest concentration of South Asian residents, however they only makeup 52.62% of the poll’s population, followed by Chinese residents constituting 16.23% of the population, non-visible minorities at 10.24% and Filipinos at
7.62%. Therefore, poll 91 does not have 80% of residents of South Asian descent as is required for the homogeneous precinct analysis. However, as poll 91 has the highest concentration of
South Asian residents of all 2008 polls, it is appropriate to complete a homogeneous precinct analysis with it.
26 Some of the figures in this table have a decimal value, which is a result of a re-parsing process that was undertaken for DAs that did not completely fit within the poll. 92
Table 4.18 Residential makeup of homogeneous precinct analysis poll 9127
DA Total Chinese South Asian Filipino Non-Visible Minority Poll number population population population population population 59150459 91 204.43 91.39 55.32 14.43 21.65 59150460 91 520.00 75.00 235.00 75.00 105.00 59150461 91 350.00 110.00 180.00 10.00 45.00 59150462 91 425.00 115.00 105.00 0.00 75.00 59150463 91 521.84 161.95 283.41 26.99 17.99 59151202 91 515.00 75.00 350.00 35.00 45.00 59151203 91 605.00 60.00 270.00 20.00 45.00 59151204 91 600.00 30.00 315.00 55.00 25.00 59151205 91 300.00 40.00 205.00 10.00 0.00 59151206 91 645.00 120.00 470.00 0.00 20.00 59151207 91 550.00 40.00 345.00 10.00 75.00 59151208 91 620.31 20.54 336.86 73.94 102.70 59153084 91 585.00 75.00 255.00 135.00 75.00 59153085 91 515.00 115.00 255.00 65.00 60.00 6956.58 1128.88 3660.59 530.37 712.34 16.23% 52.62% 7.62% 10.24%
Table 4.19 presents the makeup of poll 98, which was chosen for this homogeneous precinct analysis because it is the poll with the highest concentration of Chinese residents in
Vancouver. It is interesting to note that poll 98 is not in any of the five wards mentioned earlier as having the highest concentrations of Chinese residents (Hastings-Sunrise, Kensington-Cedar
Cottage, Renfrew-Collingwood, Victoria-Fraserview/Killarney). This is due to a dense pocket of
Chinese residents in the South Central area of Vancouver that are divided between the wards of
Kerrisdale-Marpole and Riley Park-Oakridge.
Poll 98, while having the highest concentration of Chinese residents in Vancouver, does not have 80% of its population of Chinese descent. Rather, 73.98% of poll 98’s residents are
Chinese, 18.63% are non-visible minorities, 2.52% are of South Asian descent and 1.95% are
Filipinos. As with poll 91, it is still worth conducting the homogeneous precinct analysis with poll 98.
27 Some of the figures in this table have a decimal value, this is a result of a re-parsing process that was undertaken for DAs that did not completely fit within the poll. 93
Table 4.19 Residential makeup of homogeneous precinct analysis poll 9828
DA Total Chinese South Asian Filipino Non-Visible Minority Poll Number Population Population Population Population Population 59150514 98 514.34 464.88 9.89 0 14.84 59150516 98 342.02 242.6 43.75 15.91 55.68 59150515 98 415 265 10 15 85 59150513 98 510 380 0 0 135 59153271 98 373.41 262.62 8.21 8.21 77.96 59153269 98 376.1 267.23 0 9.9 84.13 59153272 98 32.8 21.42 0 0.67 5.69 59153268 98 282.08 201.49 0 5.76 71.96 2845.75 2105.24 71.84 55.44 530.26 73.98% 2.52% 1.95% 18.63%
One justification for completing this homogeneous precinct analysis with polls 91 and 98
(even thought neither have a minority population of over 80%) is a recent study by Alan Walks and Larry Bourne that established it is highly uncommon for Canadian cities to exhibit the level of racial residential concentration found in U.S. cities (2006). As such, it is reasonable to mobilize the polls that come the closest to having 80% residential concentration of the minority populations being studied in this homogeneous precinct analysis.
Table 4.20 presents the results of this homogeneous precinct analysis for City Council candidates in polls 131, 91 and 98. Each candidate of South Asian descent is shaded in light grey in table 4.20, while candidates of Chinese descent are in dark grey. Looking firstly at the results of South Asian candidates in poll 131 compared to poll 91 does reveal racially polarized voting patterns. For example, Vision Vancouver candidate Dhaliwal received 373 votes in poll
131 and placed 11 out of 20 candidates, while in poll 91 Dhaliwal received 610 votes and placed first out of 20 candidates. Dhaliwal came in last amongst all Vision Vancouver city Council candidates in poll 131 and first amongst all Vision Vancouver candidates in poll 91.
28 Some of the figures in this table have a decimal value, this is a result of a re-parsing process that was undertaken for DAs that did not completely fit within the poll. 94 As for NPA City Council Candidate Sidhu, his results are more disparate than Dhaliwal’s as Sidhu garnered 187 votes in poll 131 and placed twentieth out of 20 candidates compared to receiving 543 votes in poll 91, meaning he came in second out of all 20 City Council candidates in poll 91. Like Dhaliwal, Sidhu placed last amongst all NPA candidates in poll 131 and first amongst his fellow NPA candidates in poll 91.
Results of Chinese City Council candidates in poll 131 appear to reveal less of a racially polarized voting pattern. For example, Vision Vancouver candidates Louie came in second overall in poll 131 with 525 votes, Chow came in fifth with 489 votes and Jang seventh with 477 votes. In ward 98, Chow placed eleventh (142 votes), Louie twelfth (134 votes) and Jang thirteenth (111 votes). It should be noted that Chow, Louie and Jang were the top three Vision
Vancouver vote getters in poll 98, but given how well they did in poll 131 it would appear that they were not as effected by racially polarized voting patterns as was Dhaliwal.
Assessing the results of the NPA’s two City Council candidates of Chinese descent reveals far more polarized results than was evident with the Vision Vancouver Chinese City
Council candidates. Lee placed seventeenth in poll 131 and second in poll 98 and Wong placed nineteenth in poll 131 and third in poll 98. Certainly these results are polarized, and perhaps an indication that Vision Vancouver’s candidates of Chinese descent were assisted by the Vision
Vancouver party vote in the poll of 131 where their Mayoral candidate commandingly won the poll.
95 Table 4.20: Homogeneous precinct analysis of polls 131, 91 and 98 for City Council candidates
Poll 131 Poll 91 Poll 98 Mayoral Votes Mayoral Votes Mayoral Votes Party Rank Party Rank Party Rank Candidates Received Candidates Received Candidates Received G. Robertson VV 529 1 G. Robertson VV 587 1 P. Ladner NPA 286 1 P. Ladner NPA 375 2 P. Ladner NPA 314 2 G. Robertson VV 86 2 City Council Votes City Council Votes City Council Votes Party Rank Party Rank Party Rank Candidates Received Candidates Received Candidates Received H. Deal VV 570 1 K. Dhaliwal VV 611 1 S. Anton NPA 289 1 R. Louie VV 525 2 D. Sidhu NPA 544 2 D. Lee NPA 276 2 A. Reimer VV 509 3 R. Louie VV 522 3 K. Wong NPA 259 3 D. Cadman CP 497 4 K. Jang VV 492 4 M. Geller NPA 255 4 G. Chow VV 489 5 G. Chow VV 483 5 K. Capri NPA 247 5 T. Stevenson VV 479 6 H. Deal VV 455 6 E. Ball NPA 244 6 K. Jang VV 477 7 T. Stevenson VV 451 7 L. Copeland NPA 213 7 G. Meggs VV 423 8 A. Reimer VV 427 8 K. Houghton NPA 209 8 E. CP 409 9 G. Meggs VV 416 9 S. Bickerton NPA 197 9 Woodsworth S. Anton NPA 410 10 D. Cadman CP 369 10 D. Sidhu NPA 180 10 K. Dhaliwal VV 373 11 D. Lee NPA 332 11 G. Chow VV 142 11 M. Geller NPA 362 12 K. Wong NPA 335 12 R. Louie VV 134 12 K. Capri NPA 308 13 S. Anton NPA 325 13 K. Jang VV 111 13 E. Ball NPA 303 14 E. Ball NPA 295 14 H. Deal VV 104 14 K. Houghton NPA 259 15 E. CP 281 15 D. Cadman CP 95 15 Woodsworth L. Copeland NPA 253 16 K. Capri NPA 269 16 T. Stevenson VV 87 16 D. Lee NPA 248 17 K. Houghton NPA 210 17 A. Reimer VV 73 17 S. Bickerton NPA 238 18 M. Geller NPA 209 18 G. Meggs VV 63 18 K. Wong NPA 205 19 S. Bickerton NPA 203 19 K. Dhaliwal VV 56 19 D. Sidhu NPA 187 20 L. Copeland NPA 192 20 E. CP 54 20 Woodsworth
As for South Asian Parks Board candidates, Vision Vancouver candidate Hundal came in sixth of 15 Parks Board candidates with 373 votes in poll 131 compared to first of 15 candidates with 660 votes in poll 91. Hundal was also last amongst Vision candidates in poll 131 and second amongst Vision candidates in poll 91. NPA Parks Board candidate Shukla received 170 votes in poll 131, placing 14 out of 15 candidates compared to placing fifth of 15 candidates with
454 votes in poll 91. Similar to City Council candidates of South Asian descent, both Hundal and Shukla’s 2008 election results were remarkably better in poll 91 than in poll 131.
96 Table 4.21: Homogeneous precinct analysis of polls 131, 91 and 98 for Parks Board candidates
Poll 131 Poll 91 Poll 98 Mayoral Votes Mayoral Votes Mayoral Votes Party Rank Party Rank Party Rank Candidates Received Candidates Received Candidates Received G. Robertson VV 529 1 G. Robertson VV 587 1 P. Ladner NPA 286 1 P. Ladner NPA 375 2 P. Ladner NPA 314 2 G. Robertson VV 86 2 Parks Board Votes Parks Board Votes Parks Board Votes Party Rank Party Rank Party Rank Candidates Received Candidates Received Candidates Received C. Barnes VV 524 1 R. Hundal VV 661 1 M. De Genova NPA 264 1 S. Blyth VV 489 2 A. Jasper VV 507 2 M. Zlotnik NPA 247 2 A. Jasper VV 470 3 C. Barnes VV 483 3 I. Robertson NPA 240 3 L. Woodcock CP 455 4 S. Blyth VV 483 4 L. McDiarmid NPA 224 4 S. Mackinnon NPA 450 5 N. Shukla NPA 455 5 C. Richardson NPA 210 5 R. Hundal VV 392 6 A. Romaniuk CP 356 6 S. Urton NPA 208 6 A. Romaniuk CP 386 7 L. Woodcock CP 310 7 N. Shukla NPA 175 7 M. Zlotnik NPA 307 8 I. Robertson NPA 291 8 C. Barnes VV 107 8 I. Robertson NPA 293 9 M. De Genova NPA 286 9 A. Jasper VV 84 9 M. De Genova NPA 280 10 L. McDiarmid NPA 252 10 S. Blyth VV 81 10 C. Richardson NPA 268 11 M. Zlotnik NPA 223 11 S. Mackinnon GRN 79 11 L. McDiarmid NPA 255 12 S. Mackinnon NPA 221 12 L. Woodcock CPE 72 12 S. Urton NPA 212 13 S. Urton NPA 220 13 R. Hundal VV 67 13 N. Shukla NPA 170 14 C. Richardson NPA 203 14 A. Romaniuk CPE 65 14
South Asian School Board candidates continue the trend of excelling in poll 91 compared to poll 131. NPA candidate L. Singh went from last place amongst School Board candidates in poll 131 to first place in poll 91, receiving 218 votes in poll 131 and 613 votes in poll 91. The only COPE candidate of South Asian descent to run in 2008 was School Board candidate Alvin
Singh, and he received 365 votes in poll 131 and placed ninth out of 17 School Board candidates compared to fifth place with 521 votes in poll 91.
The two School Board candidates of Chinese descent have very different results from each other in polls 131 and 98. COPE candidate Wong did better in poll 131 (placing seventh) than he did in poll 98 (placing ninth), while NPA candidate Woo came in sixteenth in poll 131 and first in poll 98.
97 Table 4.22: Homogeneous precinct analysis of polls 131, 91 and 98 for School Board candidates
Poll 131 Poll 91 Poll 98 Mayoral Votes Mayoral Votes Mayoral Votes Party Rank Party Rank Party Rank Candidates Received Candidates Received Candidates Received G. Robertson VV 529 1 G. Robertson VV 587 1 P. Ladner NPA 286 1 P. Ladner NPA 375 2 P. Ladner NPA 314 2 G. Robertson VV 86 2 School Votes School Board Votes School Board Votes Board Party Rank Party Rank Party Rank Received Candidates Received Candidates Received Candidates P. Bacchus VV 525 1 L. Singh NPA 632 1 S. Woo NPA 274 1 K. Clement VV 506 2 P. Bacchus VV 557 2 K. Denike NPA 263 2 S. Gregson VV 505 3 K. Clement VV 526 3 C. Gibson NPA 253 3 M. Lombardi VV 503 4 S. Gregson VV 524 4 H. Holden NPA 253 4 A. Blakey CP 436 5 A. Singh CP 522 5 C. Hansen NPA 235 5 J. Bouey CP 418 6 M. Lombardi VV 499 6 E. Le Gallas NPA 224 6 A. Wong CP 401 7 A. Wong CP 428 7 M. Nance NPA 201 7 B. Bargeman CP 369 8 S. Woo NPA 385 8 L. Singh NPA 201 8 A. Singh CP 365 9 C. Gibson NPA 381 9 A. Wong CPE 150 9 K. Denike NPA 326 10 H. Holden NPA 350 10 K. Clement VV 98 10 H. Holden NPA 304 11 A. Blakey CP 337 11 P. Bacchus VV 96 11 C. Gibson NPA 288 12 B. Bargeman CP 334 12 M. Lombardi VV 93 12 E. Le Gallas NPA 266 13 J. Bouey CP 307 13 S. Gregson VV 91 13 C. Hansen NPA 263 14 K. Denike NPA 299 14 B. Bargeman CPE 71 14 M. Nance NPA 240 15 C. Hansen NPA 290 15 A. Blakey CPE 67 15 S. Woo NPA 239 16 M. Nance NPA 261 16 J. Bouey CPE 67 16 L. Singh NPA 218 17 E. Le Gallas NPA 249 17 A. Singh CPE 62 17
The second method utilised in assessing the extent that Vancouver’s 2008 election results fulfil the third condition of Thornburg vs. Gingles is the location quotient analysis presented in tables 6.1 through to 6.4. This location quotient analysis reveals that all South Asian in the
Sunset ward scored above 1.00, meaning they each received a greater share of 2008 votes cast in the polls encompassed by that ward than was their share of all votes cast in the 2008 at-large election. And these South Asian candidates’ LQ scores are dramatically above 1.00, with NPA candidate Sidhu scoring 1.73, Singh 1.65 and Shukla 1.59, while Vision Vancouver South Asian candidate Hundal’s score is 1.22 and Dhaliwal’s is 1.17. The lone COPE candidate of South
Asian descent, Alvin Singh, who ran for School Board has an LQ score in Sunset of 1.07. These
LQ scores demonstrate residents of the Sunset ward, of which 26% are of South Asian descent, voting en mass for South Asian candidates, irrelevant of party.
98 Reviewing Chinese candidates election results in the Renfrew-Collingwood ward reveals similar results to those of South Asians in the Sunset ward. Irrelevant of party, all Chinese candidates in Renfrew-Collingwood have LQ scores above 1.00, with Vision Vancouver candidate Louie’s score 1.04, Chow’s 1.14 and Jang’s 1.09. The NPA candidates of Chinese descent have LQ scores in Renfrew-Collingwood of 1.12 for Lee, 1.20 for Wong and 1.18 for
Woo. The lone COPE candidate of Chinese descent, Wong, has an LQ score of 1.14 in Renfrew-
Collingwood.
The results of this homogeneous precinct analysis and location quotient analysis establish that there is a trend in polls and wards with high concentrations of non-visible minorities that non-visible minority candidates fair disproportionately better than they do at-large. In addition, many of those non-visible minority candidates, in particular candidates of South Asian descent, did far worse in the polls and wards where non-visible minorities the largest group. While there were some exceptions to these results, there is a strong enough trend to state that Vancouver’s
2008 municipal election results exhibit signs of racially polarized voting.
4.3.4: Overall findings of fulfilling the three conditions
The results are inconclusive of the various research methods engaged in as part of testing whether Vancouver’s 2008 election results fulfil the three conditions established in Thornburg vs. Gingles. However, the results do present evidence that support claims made after the 2008
Vancouver election that South Asian candidates experience reduced electability in Vancouver elections compared to other candidates.
The first condition was not met by the Sunset ward or the Renfrew-Collingwood ward as they were defined by the 2004 Vancouver Electoral Reform Commission. This is due to neither
99 the South Asian community of Sunset nor the Chinese community of Renfrew-Collingwood forming a majority of the respective wards’ population. However, it was established that the boundaries of the Sunset and Renfrew-Collingwood wards can be redrawn to result in a majority of the residents being of South Asian descent in Sunset and Chinese descent in Renfrew-
Collingwood. Given this, it can be concluded that Vancouver’s 2008 election results potentially meet the first condition if ward boundaries were redrawn to ensure that at least one ward has a majority South Asian population and another a majority Chinese population.
Vancouver’s 2008 election results do meet the second condition of Thornburg vs.
Gingles. A review the LQ scores of South Asian candidates in the Sunset ward and Chinese candidates in the Renfrew-Collingwood ward, along with the extent that those LQ scores diverge, clearly demonstrates that all candidates of South Asian descent received overwhelmingly larger proportions of the votes cast in the Sunset ward than they did at-large while Chinese candidates received greater shares of the votes cast in Renfrew-Collingwood than they did at-large. These results are irrelevant of candidates’ parties in both wards. Based on these findings, it can be clearly stated that Vancouver’s South Asian community in the Sunset ward, as well as Renfrew-Collingwood’s Chinese community, demonstrated political cohesion in the 2008 election.
A homogeneous precinct analysis and location quotient analysis reveal that there is some degree of racially polarized voting patterns in the 2008 Vancouver election. It must be stated that both methods do not establish a clear benchmark or measurement by which to conclude definitively that racially polarized voting has occurred, but the results of both methods certainly appear to establish that candidates of South Asian descent in the 2008 election experienced strong racially polarized voting patters. As for Chinese candidates, the evidence from these
100 methods is not as compelling. The three Vision Vancouver City Council candidates of Chinese descent and one COPE School Board candidate of Chinese descent all received better results in the poll dominated by non-visible minorities than would be expected if voting was heavily polarized along racial or ethnic lines. It is worth noting that in the case of these four candidates it is reasonable to expect that factors other than their Chinese descent could have positively affected their results in poll 131. Such factors include the strength of their party’s support in that poll along with three of the four being incumbents standing for re-election in the 2008 election.
Whether Vancouver’s 2008 election results fulfil the three conditions of Thornburg vs.
Gingles requires further research. The methods conducted as part of this thesis research certainly establish the potential for Vancouver’s at-large electoral system to fulfil these three conditions, but it cannot be concluded at this time that the three conditions are absolutely fulfilled by
Vancouver’s 2008 election results. In addition, the evidence suggest that if the criteria outlined in Thornburg vs. Gingles were to be used to challenge the results of the Vancouver 2008 election in court, there are grounds to expect the challenge could be successful.
101 Chapter 5: Concluding Comments
Following Vancouver’s 2008 municipal election one newspaper ran an article titled “Is
Vancouver’s Voting System Racist?” (Burrows 2008b). This article reported on questions raised by South Asian candidates in the Vancouver 2008 election. These candidates were searching for, some demanding, answers to whether Vancouver’s at-large electoral system reduced the ability of South Asian candidates to win election.
The seriousness of this question cannot be overstated as Vancouver is seen by many as an example of a successful multicultural city. The potential existence of systemic barriers to elected office of Vancouver’s second largest visible minority community, and possibly all visible minorities, could cause dramatic damage to both the self-image of visible minorities in
Vancouver and the social cohesion between Vancouverites from different visible and non-visible minority groups, as well as call into question the basis of local democracy and its ability to truly respects its citizens.
This thesis explored the validity of the claim that Vancouver’s at-large system reduces the electability of visible minority candidates. The first step was to establish whether South
Asians, Chinese and visible minorities collectively are under-represented in municipally elected position in Vancouver. Through an index of representation analysis it was determined that all these groups are under-represented in the Vancouver administrations of 2002 to 2005, 2005 to
2008 and 2008 to 2011. In these three administrations non-visible minorities are over- represented, and while there was a slight decline in the extent of non-visible minority over- representation across the three administrations, it was minor.
These index of representation results evoke the cautions of scholar Charles Taylor, who wrote of the fundamental necessity of individuals and groups to be recognized within their 102 society. For Taylor, an essential component of such recognition is that a person or group see themselves reflected in their society, and that this reflection be accurate and not one based on negative stereotypes. Such genuine recognition is extremely important for minorities within societies, and as Taylor and Jurgen Habermas warn, there is real danger when this does not happen. A lack of recognition can lead to minority citizens disengaging from the society they feel excluded from, whether this is through increased residential isolation or a lack of engagement with the structures and institutions of their society. If there are barriers to South
Asian and other visible minority candidates’ electability in Vancouver municipal elections, and should those barriers continue to impede, it could lead to these visible minority citizens disengaging from Vancouver’s municipal political process by not running as candidates or voting in civic elections.
With the sustained under-representation of Vancouver’s visible minorities determined, a location quotient analysis of the 2008 election results employing 14 wards proposed by a 2004
Vancouver Electoral Reform Commission was undertaken along with a GIS analysis of residential patters in Vancouver. These research methods sought to determine if a ward electoral system in Vancouver would increase the electability of South Asian and other visible minority candidates, which in turn could determine whether Vancouver’s at-large electoral system plays a role in reducing these candidates’ electability. This thesis did not set out to determine if the ward system proposed for Vancouver in 2004 is the most equitable or unbiased electoral system for
Vancouver, rather this proposed ward system was employed only to test whether the at-large electoral system reduces visible minority candidates’ electability in comparison.
An initial finding revealed a strong trend of party voting in Vancouver’s 2008 election.
Areas of the city encompassed in the 14 wards where voters disproportionately voted for one of
103 the two main Mayoral candidates voted likewise for other candidates from that Mayoral candidate’s party. However, candidates most likely to deviate positively from this trend by receiving a larger share of votes in a ward that they did at-large when the opposite was true for their Mayoral candidate were: non-visible minority candidates in wards where non-visible minorities are the majority; Chinese candidates in wards where Chinese were the dominant group; and South Asian candidates in the one ward where South Asians are most concentrated.
These findings showed that Vancouver’s 2008 election results exhibited signs of ethnically motivated voting that was at times strong enough to overcome the party voting trend.
In addition, the location quotient and GIS analysis revealed that Chinese and South Asian candidates were more likely to have LQ scores with the largest positive or negative divergence from their party’s Mayoral candidates’ LQ scores. While significant divergences did occur for non-visible minorities, they were all in the range of 0.10 to 0.19, whereas Chinese and South
Asian candidates received divergences in the ranges of 0.10 to 0.19, 0.20 to 0.29 and of 0.30 and more. The largest divergences of all candidates’ scores were positive and attributed to Chinese and South Asian candidates in the wards where their respective groups are most concentrated.
The candidates whose LQ scores had the greatest positive divergence were South Asians in the ward of Sunset, which is the ward with the highest concentration of South Asian at 26%.
Based on these results it was concluded that visible minorities would stand increased electability under a ward system in Vancouver compared to the at-large system. As Vancouver exhibits patterns of residential concentration of its visible minority population, the Chinese and
South Asian populations, under a ward system these residential concentrations would increase the effectiveness of ethnically motivated voting in wards where visible minority communities are most concentrated. These findings should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the ward
104 systems proposed in 2004, as there are numerous other electoral systems that would need to be tested before claims could be made as to which one would best reduce unjust barriers to election for visible minority candidates.
It should also be noted that if ward system was adopted in Vancouver with ward boundaries developed to explicitly concentrate the different populations of Vancouver this mirror
U.S. electoral policy of defining some number of wards or ridings as “minority-majority” districts in an electoral system. It would also be in line with the mandate of Canadian federal
Electoral Boundary Commissions to specifically take into account “communities of interest” when re-drawing federal ridings. It is important to note that developing wards to have concentrations of visible and non-visible minority populations must not be the only factor taken into account should a ward system be developed for Vancouver. Just as “communities of interest” are not the sole consideration of Canadian Boundary Commissions and U.S. courts have ruled against “minority-majority” districts that too dramatically sacrifice continuity and other aspects of community identity by only focussing only on how to ensure a minority is a majority.
Finding a balance of factors is essential when developing what Will Kymlicka calls special representation rights. And as Kymlicka writes, such special representation rights should not be seen as contributing to the segregation of a society, but rather as necessary measures to ensure that minority citizens and communities are able to legitimately and meaningfully engage in their society’s political system.
In Vancouver, former municipal South Asian candidates have clearly expressed their desire to participate in their city’s political process by standing for office despite what many of them perceive to be an electoral system that disenfranchises them. Following the 2008 election results some of these candidates raised the possibility of a Supreme Court challenge to
105 Vancouver’s at-large system on the grounds that it violates their rights enshrined in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As similar claims have been brought to the U.S. Supreme
Court and resulted in the establishment of three conditions by which the existence of minority vote dilution is determined, the final part of this thesis set about investigating whether
Vancouver’s 2008 election results meet these three conditions.
The first condition, that a minority population be able to constitute a majority in at least one district, was not met by the ward system proposed in 2004. However, it was established that this condition could be met under a re-drawn set of wards and thereby efforts to re-draw a
Vancouver ward system that takes into account residential concentrations along with other elements should be engaged in, but is beyond the scope of this thesis. The second condition is that a minority population is politically cohesive, and it was determined that the South Asian population in the Sunset ward and the Chinese population in the Renfrew-Collingwood ward do exhibit strong signs of political cohesion in so far as their pattern of voting for candidates from their own visible minority status irrelevant of party. The third and final condition was that the majority population consistently votes against the preferred candidates of a minority population, which is often proven by establishing the existence of racially polarized voting patterns. In the case of Vancouver’s 2008 election results, South Asians were determined to be recipients of more racially polarized voting than Chinese candidates, and that in general there seemed to be racially polarized voting in Vancouver and that more research on the matter should be conducted.
While the findings of the three conditions were not conclusive, this research does lend weight to the claim that visible minorities suffer from reduced electability under Vancouver’s at- large system. And despite U.S. legal precedent not being admissible to Canadian legal cases, the three conditions do offer encouragement and a possible avenue of argument should there be a
106 court case against Vancouver’s at-large system on the grounds that it violates the rights of visible minority citizens as set out in the Canadian Charter.
Habermas, Taylor and Kymlicka all agree that multicultural nations, their constitutions and the bills and charters that enshrine the rights of their citizens cannot be static. Rather, there must always be encouragement and acceptance of challenges and reform to the nation’s identity and its political and legal structures. As such, the multicultural state of Canada must recognize the importance of minority participation in the political process that includes the ability of minorities to win election without facing barriers. If the electoral systems and rules of Canadian governments do not allow minorities an equal opportunity to be elected they need to be reformed.
In the case of Vancouver, it is disturbing that despite its robust history of electoral reform there has rarely been attention given to the electability of visible minority citizens. This must change, even if Vancouver’s electoral system does not, as anything less will convey to the visible minority citizens and communities of Vancouver that they are not full citizens and do not need to participate in the electoral system of their home city.
107 Appendix
Table 6.1: Location quotient scores for Mayoral candidates in 2008 Vancouver election Shaughnessy Ward Shaughnessy Collingwood Ward Collingwood Mt. Pleasant Ward Pleasant Mt. Kitsilano Kensington Grandview Ward Grandview Hastings West End Ward End West Oakr Killarney Ward Killarney Kitsilano Ward Kitsilano Marpole Ward Marpole Cottage Ward Cottage Sunset Ward Sunset Strathcona Fraserview/ Fraserview/ Point Grey Point Riley Park Riley Kerrisdale Candidates Downtown Downtown Renfrew Victoria Dunbar Mayoral Mayoral Ward Ward Ward Party idge Ward idge - - Fairview Fairview Sunrise Sunrise -
Cedar Cedar ------
ROBERTSON VV 0.90 0.62 1.14 1.12 0.60 1.10 1.27 0.94 1.03 1.01 1.32 0.94 0.86 1.26 LADNER NPA 1.16 1.61 0.74 0.77 1.59 0.94 0.64 1.15 0.88 1.02 0.41 1.02 1.16 0.68 KRAWCZYK WLP 0.94 0.36 1.46 1.34 0.48 0.91 1.30 0.93 0.79 0.92 2.78 0.78 0.54 1.00 EMERY 1.34 0.61 1.28 0.99 0.67 0.94 1.16 0.70 0.97 0.74 2.06 0.61 0.67 1.44 YEE 0.37 0.30 1.60 1.87 0.87 0.15 0.44 0.15 2.45 1.04 1.32 1.83 1.89 0.22 BRITTEN NGP 0.59 0.33 1.69 1.49 0.48 0.45 0.98 0.48 1.66 0.93 2.03 1.95 1.48 0.45 KUAH 0.88 0.64 0.98 1.27 1.06 0.40 0.76 0.28 1.81 0.82 1.31 1.79 1.70 0.25 HANSEN 0.50 0.33 1.37 1.75 0.61 0.28 0.71 0.43 1.14 0.85 1.40 1.88 1.63 0.77 JIMENEZ 0.62 0.28 1.44 1.77 0.63 0.35 1.21 0.25 2.23 0.72 1.66 1.69 1.02 0.43 KAPLAN 1.15 0.53 1.41 1.08 1.34 0.48 0.52 0.51 1.13 0.72 1.33 1.28 1.46 0.72 RITCHIE 0.99 0.28 1.18 1.21 0.48 0.49 0.99 0.47 1.77 0.65 2.41 2.35 0.68 0.52 HATOUM 1.43 0.40 0.93 1.23 0.59 0.54 0.82 0.29 1.71 0.76 2.20 1.75 1.28 1.13 BUDAY 1.00 0.31 1.34 1.71 0.46 0.08 0.61 0.67 1.79 0.56 2.77 1.53 0.75 0.73 CAISSY 0.64 0.10 1.61 1.43 0.58 0.37 0.83 0.11 1.88 0.67 3.51 2.09 1.29 0.29 MAXWELL 1.42 0.76 1.15 1.83 1.50 0.45 1.34 0.36 1.12 0.58 2.50 2.42 1.14 1.38
108
Table 6.2: Location quotient scores for City Council candidates in 2008 Vancouver election Grandview Ward Grandview Downtown Ward Downtown Hastings West End Ward End West Oakridge Ward Oakridge Killarney Ward Killarney Kitsilano Ward Kitsilano Cedar Cot Cedar Fairview L.Q. L.Q. Fairview Marpole L.Q. L.Q. Marpole Sunset Ward Sunset Shaughnessy Shaughnessy City Council Council City Collingwood Collingwood Mt. Pleasant Pleasant Mt. Kensington Strathcona Point Grey Point Riley Park Riley Kerrisdale Candidates Fraserview Fraserview Kitsilano Renfrew Victoria Dunbar Ward Ward Ward Ward Ward Party - Sunrise Sunrise
tage tage ------
LOUIE VV 0.88 0.74 1.14 1.11 0.70 1.03 1.15 0.95 1.04 1.02 1.23 0.91 0.95 1.12 DEAL VV 0.92 0.71 1.11 1.07 0.65 1.13 1.26 1.03 0.94 1.00 1.27 0.84 0.88 1.22 CHOW VV 0.84 0.68 1.16 1.17 0.70 0.97 1.12 0.88 1.14 1.03 1.26 1.02 1.05 1.06 JANG VV 0.88 0.66 1.14 1.14 0.66 1.04 1.19 0.96 1.09 1.02 1.26 0.95 0.97 1.16 REIMER VV 0.88 0.68 1.12 1.10 0.62 1.12 1.29 1.02 0.96 1.03 1.30 0.82 0.86 1.23 STEVENSON VV 0.91 0.69 1.11 1.08 0.65 1.09 1.20 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.21 0.87 0.90 1.29 CADMAN CPE 0.84 0.77 1.16 1.10 0.71 1.05 1.19 1.03 0.95 1.02 1.30 0.81 0.96 1.09 ANTON NPA 1.11 1.54 0.74 0.83 1.47 1.00 0.76 1.19 0.88 1.01 0.51 0.94 1.07 0.75 MEGGS VV 0.88 0.64 1.14 1.09 0.60 1.11 1.26 0.96 1.01 0.99 1.28 0.87 0.89 1.25 WOODSWORTH CPE 0.80 0.69 1.21 1.12 0.63 1.05 1.23 1.00 0.92 0.99 1.47 0.75 0.93 1.17 DHALIWAL VV 0.83 0.56 1.14 1.13 0.55 1.07 1.25 0.93 0.98 0.98 1.35 1.17 0.86 1.21 GELLER NPA 1.21 1.63 0.67 0.69 1.52 1.09 0.76 1.25 0.77 1.02 0.51 0.81 1.00 0.81 CAPRI NPA 1.18 1.55 0.78 0.78 1.50 0.97 0.70 1.11 0.86 1.01 0.49 0.95 1.08 0.74 BALL NPA 1.13 1.55 0.73 0.80 1.51 0.95 0.72 1.08 0.91 0.98 0.49 1.02 1.11 0.74 LEE NPA 1.07 1.46 0.83 0.93 1.54 0.80 0.60 0.97 1.12 1.02 0.50 1.18 1.29 0.60 WONG NPA 1.00 1.44 0.84 0.98 1.57 0.74 0.55 0.90 1.20 1.07 0.47 1.29 1.37 0.54 HOUGHTON NPA 1.23 1.67 0.68 0.71 1.61 1.00 0.67 1.17 0.79 0.98 0.42 0.94 1.03 0.74 COPELAND NPA 1.22 1.70 0.67 0.70 1.60 0.99 0.68 1.17 0.79 0.97 0.41 0.93 1.04 0.72 BICKERTON NPA 1.29 1.63 0.71 0.74 1.53 0.99 0.72 1.14 0.79 0.97 0.48 0.94 1.02 0.81 SIDHU NPA 1.12 1.60 0.60 0.76 1.56 0.87 0.58 1.06 0.84 0.94 0.36 1.73 1.11 0.63 SHAW WLP 0.95 0.62 1.33 1.30 0.65 0.99 1.43 0.95 1.07 1.05 1.75 0.97 0.82 1.19 JOHNSON 1.14 0.83 1.04 1.12 0.95 1.09 1.01 0.92 1.08 0.94 1.03 1.02 1.05 1.07 GREGSON WLP 0.91 0.54 1.45 1.35 0.58 0.90 1.42 0.84 1.05 1.02 1.91 0.93 0.76 1.21 TRAMUTOL WLP 1.06 0.54 1.39 1.27 0.53 1.19 1.73 1.02 0.77 1.08 2.03 0.72 0.54 1.22 BOYCHUK 1.39 0.67 1.07 1.06 0.79 0.88 1.09 0.61 1.07 0.79 1.14 1.02 0.89 1.93 WISDOM WLP 1.02 0.47 1.38 1.33 0.52 0.97 1.54 0.78 0.96 1.00 2.02 0.98 0.74 1.23 BOYER 0.99 0.49 1.33 1.46 0.78 0.67 0.93 0.54 1.69 0.86 1.36 1.50 1.19 1.05 LAFERRIERE 1.11 0.66 1.28 1.11 0.91 0.85 1.14 0.78 1.20 0.85 1.48 1.12 0.97 1.18 109 WENDYTHIRTEEN 0.91 0.41 1.39 1.46 0.54 0.84 1.62 0.56 1.11 1.03 2.11 1.07 0.80 0.96 WANSLEEBEN 1.06 0.72 1.26 1.26 0.95 0.85 0.89 0.77 1.22 0.83 1.24 1.40 1.24 1.07 ORACLE 1.22 0.51 1.45 1.40 0.74 0.81 1.05 0.62 1.36 0.97 1.52 1.26 1.05 0.94 KADIOGLU 1.18 0.71 1.22 1.30 0.93 0.71 0.84 0.61 1.34 0.89 1.17 1.82 1.05 0.89
Table 6.3: Location quotient scores for Parks Board candidates in 2008 Vancouver election Grandview Ward Grandview Downtown Ward Downtown Hasti West End Ward End West Oakridge Ward Oakridge Killarn Kitsilano Ward Kitsilano Cedar Cottage Cottage Cedar Fairview L.Q. L.Q. Fairview Marpole L.Q. L.Q. Marpole Sunset Ward Sunset Shaughnessy Shaughnessy Parks Board Board Parks Collingwood Collingwood Mt. Pleasant Pleasant Mt. Kensington Strathcona Point Grey Point Riley Park Riley Kerrisdale Candidates Fraserview Fraserview Kitsilano Renfrew Victoria Dunbar ngs Ward Ward Ward Ward Ward Party ey Ward ey - Sunrise Sunrise
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BARNES VV 0.90 0.69 1.13 1.09 0.65 1.09 1.24 0.98 0.97 1.02 1.27 0.88 0.89 1.22 JASPER VV 0.95 0.63 1.13 1.10 0.61 1.07 1.24 0.94 1.00 0.99 1.28 0.91 0.90 1.34 BLYTH VV 0.88 0.61 1.17 1.14 0.60 1.07 1.30 0.97 1.01 1.02 1.37 0.92 0.89 1.20 WOODCOCK CPE 0.83 0.72 1.20 1.12 0.66 1.01 1.19 1.02 0.93 1.01 1.41 0.77 0.96 1.11 HUNDAL VV 0.85 0.57 1.13 1.11 0.55 1.06 1.23 0.94 1.01 0.99 1.35 1.22 0.89 1.19 MACKINNON GRN 0.94 0.79 1.08 1.04 0.70 1.12 1.25 1.11 0.79 1.04 1.37 0.65 0.85 1.21 ROBERTSON NPA 1.08 1.49 0.68 0.74 1.41 0.84 0.59 1.00 0.85 0.89 0.39 0.91 1.02 0.65 ROMANIUK CPE 0.72 0.61 1.27 1.16 0.60 0.99 1.25 0.95 0.94 1.05 1.48 0.89 0.96 1.08 ZLOTNIK NPA 1.13 1.70 0.68 0.72 1.61 1.05 0.69 1.20 0.77 1.01 0.42 0.88 1.05 0.71 DE GENOVA NPA 1.09 1.52 0.83 0.84 1.51 0.93 0.67 1.06 1.01 0.99 0.48 1.02 1.14 0.70 MCDIARMID NPA 1.12 1.54 0.77 0.79 1.51 0.95 0.69 1.08 0.92 0.99 0.48 0.99 1.10 0.78 RICHARDSON NPA 1.15 1.61 0.67 0.75 1.54 0.99 0.71 1.20 0.85 0.99 0.46 0.92 1.07 0.76 URTON NPA 1.11 1.72 0.69 0.77 1.62 0.93 0.62 1.12 0.89 0.96 0.40 1.01 1.12 0.69 SHUKLA NPA 1.09 1.62 0.65 0.77 1.56 0.86 0.55 1.01 0.91 0.93 0.39 1.59 1.18 0.60 HAMILTON 0.97 0.58 1.30 1.34 0.78 0.83 1.09 0.70 1.35 0.97 1.38 1.19 1.09 1.20 ANDALIS 0.83 0.56 1.15 1.63 0.83 0.63 1.12 0.55 1.75 1.00 0.96 1.63 1.22 0.75 MAYENCOURT 1.12 0.86 1.10 1.01 0.91 1.12 1.06 0.90 1.06 0.96 1.07 1.04 1.02 1.09 DOUMENC WLP 0.96 0.51 1.33 1.28 0.56 0.99 1.50 0.86 0.97 1.06 1.89 0.91 0.75 1.20 LOCKHART 1.13 0.61 1.17 1.32 0.85 0.80 1.00 0.73 1.39 0.85 1.17 1.30 1.25 1.04 HASKELL 0.87 0.65 1.38 1.51 0.85 0.68 0.91 0.57 1.60 0.94 1.13 1.51 1.38 0.81
110
Table 6.4: Location quotient Scores for School Board candidates in 2008 Vancouver Election Grandview Ward Grandview Downtown Ward Downtown Hastings West End Ward End West Oakridge Ward Oakridge Killarney Ward Killarney Kitsilano Ward Kitsilano Cedar Cottage Cottage Cedar Fairview L.Q. L.Q. Fairview Marpole L.Q. L.Q. Marpole School Board Board School Sunset Ward Sunset Shaughnessy Shaughnessy Collingwood Collingwood Mt. Pleasant Pleasant Mt. Kensington Strathcona Point Grey Point Riley Park Riley Candidates Fraserview Fraserview Kerrisdale Kerrisdale Kitsilano Renfrew Victoria Dunbar Ward Ward Ward Ward Ward Party - Sunrise Sunrise
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BACCHUS VV 0.89 0.72 1.15 1.12 0.66 1.06 1.20 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.27 0.94 0.93 1.16 LOMBARDI VV 0.89 0.75 1.16 1.12 0.66 1.06 1.23 0.96 1.02 1.01 1.28 0.89 0.88 1.17 CLEMENT VV 0.87 0.67 1.17 1.15 0.66 1.04 1.23 0.95 1.04 1.01 1.32 0.95 0.92 1.16 GREGSON VV 0.90 0.69 1.15 1.12 0.66 1.03 1.22 0.95 1.05 0.99 1.27 0.93 0.94 1.16 WONG CPE 0.79 0.70 1.24 1.23 0.74 0.88 1.11 0.87 1.14 1.04 1.33 1.00 1.13 0.95 BLAKEY CPE 0.81 0.70 1.22 1.15 0.64 1.01 1.22 1.00 0.94 1.03 1.44 0.82 0.91 1.13 BOUEY CPE 0.84 0.65 1.26 1.17 0.61 1.02 1.25 0.98 0.95 1.01 1.49 0.81 0.92 1.16 DENIKE NPA 1.06 1.56 0.77 0.81 1.51 0.95 0.69 1.14 0.93 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.11 0.72 GIBSON NPA 1.08 1.49 0.79 0.86 1.46 0.91 0.71 1.06 1.02 0.97 0.51 1.08 1.16 0.72 BARGEMAN CPE 0.80 0.64 1.24 1.22 0.62 0.99 1.22 0.94 0.98 1.02 1.48 0.86 0.93 1.10 HOLDEN NPA 1.08 1.50 0.75 0.84 1.47 0.95 0.73 1.08 0.95 1.02 0.52 1.07 1.11 0.74 SINGH CPE 0.83 0.61 1.20 1.14 0.57 1.01 1.25 0.96 0.92 1.00 1.50 1.07 0.90 1.13 WOO NPA 1.01 1.39 0.86 0.98 1.48 0.78 0.63 0.92 1.18 1.05 0.52 1.27 1.32 0.61 HANSEN NPA 1.10 1.59 0.73 0.81 1.54 0.91 0.67 1.07 0.92 0.99 0.46 1.03 1.22 0.69 LE GALLAIS NPA 1.10 1.56 0.76 0.79 1.53 0.94 0.67 1.12 0.92 0.97 0.48 1.03 1.13 0.71 NANCE NPA 1.13 1.60 0.75 0.76 1.54 0.97 0.69 1.11 0.87 0.98 0.47 1.03 1.08 0.70 SINGH NPA 1.09 1.49 0.68 0.78 1.48 0.91 0.64 1.03 0.87 0.95 0.44 1.65 1.11 0.67 STARK 1.03 0.88 1.12 1.18 1.04 0.92 0.95 0.80 1.28 0.88 1.03 1.23 1.06 1.07 HASKEL 0.91 0.79 1.15 1.34 0.95 0.80 0.90 0.70 1.43 0.94 1.00 1.52 1.20 0.96
111 Table 6.5: Candidates with LQ scores that deviate from the party vote trend
Residential Make-Up Deviant Candidates Mayoral Mayoral Visible Ward Non- South Party Candidate Candidate LQ Chinese Candidate Minority Visible Asian LQ Score Name Score Group VV Robertson 1.10 Chow Chinese 0.97 Kitsilano Anton Non-Vis 1.00 69% 17% 2% Fairview NPA Ladner 0.94 Geller Non-Vis 1.09 Houghton Non-Vis 1.00 Deal Non-Vis 1.03 VV Robertson 0.94 Reimer Non-Vis 1.02 Point Grey- Bacchus Non-Vis 1.01 68% 20% 2% Kitsilano Lee Chinese 0.97 NPA Ladner 1.51 Wong Chinese 0.90 Woo Chinese 0.92 Deal Non-Vis 0.94 Reimer Non-Vis 0.96 VV Robertson 1.03 Dhaliwal South Asian 0.97 Barnes Black 0.97 Renfrew- 22% 47% 7% Collingwood Lee Chinese 1.12 Wong Chinese 1.20 NPA Ladner 0.88 De Genova Non-Vis 1.01 Gibson Non-Vis 1.02 Woo Chinese 1.18 Chow Chinese 1.02 VV Robertson 0.94 Dhaliwal South Asian 1.17 Hundal South Asian 1.22 Anton Non-Vis 0.94 Geller Non-Vis 0.81 Capri Non-Vis 0.95 Sunset 17% 37% 26% Houghton Non-Vis 0.94 Copeland Non-Vis 0.93 NPA Ladner 1.02 Bickerton Non-Vis 0.94 Robertson Non-Vis 0.91 Zlotnik Non-Vis 0.88 McDiarmid Non-Vis 0.99 Richardson Non-Vis 0.95 Riley Park- 42% 32% 7% Stevenson Non-Vis 0.99 Oakridge Meggs Non-Vis 0.99 Dhaliwal South Asian 0.98 VV Robertson 1.01 Jasper Non-Vis 0.99 Hundal South Asian 0.99 Gregson Non-Vis 0.99 NPA Ladner 1.02 Ball Non-Vis 0.98 Houghton Non-Vis 0.98 Copeland Non-Vis 0.97 Bickerton Non-Vis 0.97 Sidhu South Asian 0.94 112 Robertson Non-Vis 0.89 De Genova Non-Vis 0.99 McDiarmid Non-Vis 0.99 Richardson Non-Vis 0.99 Urton Non-Vis 0.96 Shukla South Asian 0.93 Gibson Non-Vis 0.97 Hansen Non-Vis 0.99 Le Gallis Non-Vis 0.97 Nance Non-Vis 0.98 Singh South Asian 0.95
113 Table 6.6: Candidates with LQ score diverge significantly from their Mayoral candidate’s LQ score
Residential Concentration Divergent Candidate Candidat Divergence Ward Non- South Party Candidate Chinese Ethnicity e Slate Score Visible Asian Name
NPA Wong Chinese Council -0.17 Downtown 58% 20% 3% NPA Bickerton Non-Vis Council 0.12 NPA Woo Chinese School -0.16 VV Louie Chinese Council -0.14 VV Chow Chinese Council -0.20 West End 66% 12% 2% NPA Geller Non-Vis Council 0.13 NPA Wong Chinese Council -0.14 NPA Bickerton Non-Vis Council 0.13 VV Louie Chinese Council 0.12 NPA Lee Chinese Council -0.15 NPA Wong Chinese Council -0.17 NPA Robertson Non-Vis Parks -0.12 Dunbar- 55% 33% 2% Shaughnessy VV Lombardi Non-Vis School 0.13 NPA Gibson Non-Vis School -0.13 NPA Holden Non-Vis School -0.11 NPA Woo Chinese School -0.22 NPA Singh South Asian School -0.12 NPA Anton Non-Vis Council -0.12 NPA Robertson Non-Vis Parks -0.18
Kerrisdale- NPA Gibson Non-Vis School -0.14 43% 37% 7% Marpole NPA Holden Non-Vis School -0.12 NPA Woo Chinese School -0.12 NPA Singh South Asian School -0.11 VV Chow Chinese Council -0.13 NPA Geller Non-Vis Council 0.16 Kitsilano- NPA Lee Chinese Council -0.14 69% 17% 2% Fairview NPA Wong Chinese Council -0.20 NPA Zlotnik Non-Vis School 0.11 NPA Woo Chinese School -0.16 NPA Lee Chinese Council -0.18 NPA Wong Chinese Council -0.25 Point Grey- NPA Robertson Non-Vis Parks -0.15 68% 20% 2% Kitsilano NPA Shukla South Asian Parks -0.14 NPA Woo Chinese School -0.24 NPA Singh South Asian School -0.13 Hastings NPA Sidhu South Asian Council -0.14 40% 41% 3% Sunrise NPA Woo Chinese School 0.12 114 NPA Lee Chinese Council 0.16 Kensington Cedar 25% 44% 8% NPA Wong Chinese Council 0.21 Cottage NPA Woo Chinese Council 0.21 VV Chow Chinese Council 0.11 NPA Geller Non-Vis Council -0.12 NPA Lee Chinese Council 0.24
Renfrew- NPA Wong Chinese Council 0.32 22% 47% 7% Collingwood NPA Zlotnik Non-Vis Parks -0.11 NPA De Genova Non-Vis Parks 0.13 NPA Gibson Non-Vis School 0.14 NPA Woo Chinese School 0.30 VV Stevenson Non-Vis Council -0.11 Strathcona 56% 25% 2% NPA Holden Non-Vis School 0.11 Grandview NPA Woo Non-Vis School 0.11 VV Dhaliwal South Asian Council 0.23 NPA Lee Chinese Council 0.16 NPA Wong Chinese Council 0.27 NPA Sidhu South Asian Council 0.71 Sunset 17% 37% 26% VV Hundal South Asian Parks 0.28 NPA Zlotnik Non-Vis Parks -0.14 NPA Shukla South Asian Parks 0.58 NPA Woo Chinese School 0.25 NPA Singh South Asian School 0.63 VV Chow Chinese Council 0.18 NPA Lee Chinese Council 0.13 Victoria- NPA Wong Chinese Council 0.21 Fraserview/ 26% 47% 7% Killarney NPA Robertson Non-Vis Parks -0.14 NPA Zlotnik Non-Vis Parks -0.11 NPA Woo Chinese School 0.16 VV Louie Chinese Council -0.13 Mt. Pleasant 60% 17% 2% VV Chow Chinese Council -0.16 NPA Geller Non-Vis Council 0.12 Riley Park- 42% 32% 7% NPA Robertson Non-Vis Parks -0.13 Oakridge
115 Table 6.7: City Council candidates with divergent LQ scores (Downtown wards)
Downtown Wards
Downtown West End City Council Council City Candidates Party Divergence Dive Votes Votes LQ LQ rgence
ROBERTSON VV 2418 0.90 N/A 4944 1.26 N/A LADNER NPA 2248 1.16 N/A 1924 0.68 N/A LOUIE VV 2307 0.88 -0.02 4295 1.12 -0.14 DEAL VV 2292 0.92 0.01 4477 1.22 -0.04 CHOW VV 2069 0.84 -0.06 3833 1.06 -0.20 JANG VV 2098 0.88 -0.03 4075 1.16 -0.10 REIMER VV 2062 0.88 -0.02 4221 1.23 -0.03 STEVENSON VV 2108 0.91 0.01 4364 1.29 0.03 ANTON NPA 2323 1.11 -0.06 2304 0.75 0.07 MEGGS VV 1722 0.88 -0.02 3591 1.25 -0.01 DHALIWAL VV 1467 0.83 -0.08 3135 1.21 -0.06 GELLER NPA 2124 1.21 0.05 2090 0.81 0.13 CAPRI NPA 2074 1.18 0.02 1909 0.74 0.06 BALL NPA 1911 1.13 -0.03 1824 0.74 0.06 LEE NPA 1786 1.07 -0.09 1476 0.60 -0.08 WONG NPA 1454 1.00 -0.17 1142 0.54 -0.14 HOUGHTON NPA 1686 1.23 0.07 1488 0.74 0.06 COPELAND NPA 1674 1.22 0.06 1449 0.72 0.04 BICKERTON NPA 1707 1.29 0.12 1576 0.81 0.13 SIDHU NPA 1278 1.12 -0.05 1060 0.63 -0.05
116 Table 6.8: City Council candidates with divergent LQ scores (Westside wards)
Westside Wards
Dunbar-Shaughnessy Kerrisdale Marpole Kitsilano-Fairview Point Grey-Kitsilano City Council Council City Candidates Party Divergence Divergence Divergence Divergence Votes Votes Votes Votes LQ LQ LQ LQ
ROBERTSON VV 3094 0.62 N/A 2825 0.60 N/A 5267 1.10 N/A 4231 0.94 N/A LADNER NPA 5809 1.61 N/A 5392 1.59 N/A 3260 0.94 N/A 3754 1.15 N/A LOUIE VV 3618 0.74 0.12 3220 0.70 0.10 4864 1.03 -0.06 4210 0.95 0.01 DEAL VV 3288 0.71 0.09 2830 0.65 0.04 5082 1.13 0.04 4343 1.03 0.09 CHOW VV 3141 0.68 0.06 3037 0.70 0.10 4286 0.97 -0.13 3635 0.88 -0.06 JANG VV 2953 0.66 0.04 2782 0.66 0.06 4493 1.04 -0.05 3886 0.96 0.02 REIMER VV 2963 0.68 0.06 2539 0.62 0.02 4720 1.12 0.03 4008 1.02 0.08 STEVENSON VV 2965 0.69 0.07 2635 0.65 0.05 4531 1.09 0.00 3762 0.97 0.03 ANTON NPA 6022 1.54 -0.07 5406 1.47 -0.12 3769 1.00 0.06 4189 1.19 0.03 MEGGS VV 2360 0.64 0.03 2069 0.60 0.00 3900 1.11 0.01 3157 0.96 0.02 DHALIWAL VV 1856 0.56 -0.06 1711 0.55 -0.05 3405 1.07 -0.03 2772 0.93 -0.01 GELLER NPA 5346 1.63 0.02 4679 1.52 -0.07 3452 1.09 0.16 3700 1.25 0.10 CAPRI NPA 5081 1.55 -0.06 4611 1.50 -0.09 3044 0.97 0.03 3284 1.11 -0.04 BALL NPA 4905 1.55 -0.06 4464 1.51 -0.09 2875 0.95 0.01 3087 1.08 -0.07 LEE NPA 4566 1.46 -0.15 4499 1.54 -0.06 2399 0.80 -0.14 2726 0.97 -0.18 WONG NPA 3917 1.44 -0.17 3996 1.57 -0.03 1925 0.74 -0.20 2210 0.90 -0.25 HOUGHTON NPA 4268 1.67 0.06 3852 1.61 0.01 2458 1.00 0.06 2689 1.17 0.01 COPELAND NPA 4347 1.70 0.09 3836 1.60 0.01 2427 0.99 0.05 2696 1.17 0.02 BICKERTON NPA 4024 1.63 0.01 3552 1.53 -0.06 2369 0.99 0.05 2548 1.14 -0.01 SIDHU NPA 3405 1.60 -0.02 3134 1.56 -0.03 1787 0.87 -0.07 2042 1.06 -0.09
117 Table 6.9: City Council candidates with divergent LQ scores (Eastside wards)
Eastside Wards
Kensington-Cedar Renfrew- Strathcona- Victoria-Fraserview Hastings-Sunrise Sunset City Council Council City
Candidates Cottage Collingwood Grandview Killarney Party Divergence Divergence Divergence Divergence Divergence Divergence Votes Votes Votes Votes Votes Votes LQ LQ LQ LQ LQ LQ
ROBERTSON VV 4832 1.14 N/A 4955 1.12 N/A 3962 1.03 N/A 4580 1.32 N/A 3566 0.94 N/A 5135 0.86 N/A LADNER NPA 2253 0.74 N/A 2453 0.77 N/A 2451 0.88 N/A 1025 0.41 N/A 2787 1.02 N/A 1859 1.16 N/A LOUIE VV 4731 1.14 0.00 4803 1.11 -0.01 3926 1.04 0.01 4169 1.23 -0.09 3399 0.91 -0.03 3950 0.95 0.08 DEAL VV 4368 1.11 -0.04 4430 1.07 -0.05 3379 0.94 -0.09 4118 1.27 -0.05 2959 0.84 -0.10 3477 0.88 0.01 CHOW VV 4518 1.16 0.02 4777 1.17 0.05 4056 1.14 0.11 4020 1.26 -0.06 3574 1.02 0.08 4106 1.05 0.18 JANG VV 4319 1.14 0.00 4540 1.14 0.03 3776 1.09 0.06 3910 1.26 -0.06 3233 0.95 0.01 3693 0.97 0.10 REIMER VV 4155 1.12 -0.02 4263 1.10 -0.02 3219 0.96 -0.07 3937 1.30 -0.02 2734 0.82 -0.12 3188 0.86 -0.01 STEVENSON VV 4058 1.11 -0.03 4128 1.08 -0.04 3340 1.00 -0.02 3632 1.21 -0.11 2855 0.87 -0.07 3302 0.90 0.03 ANTON NPA 2438 0.74 0.00 2875 0.83 0.06 2639 0.88 -0.01 1395 0.51 0.10 2795 0.94 -0.08 3560 1.07 -0.09 MEGGS VV 3535 1.14 0.00 3525 1.09 -0.03 2842 1.01 -0.02 3243 1.28 -0.04 2427 0.87 -0.07 2765 0.89 0.02 DHALIWAL VV 3207 1.14 0.00 3320 1.13 0.01 2500 0.98 -0.05 3113 1.35 0.03 2954 1.17 0.23 2432 0.86 0.00 GELLER NPA 1861 0.67 -0.07 2003 0.69 -0.08 1936 0.77 -0.12 1155 0.51 0.10 2021 0.81 -0.21 2794 1.00 -0.16 CAPRI NPA 2161 0.78 0.04 2255 0.78 0.01 2156 0.86 -0.03 1114 0.49 0.08 2356 0.95 -0.07 3008 1.08 -0.08 BALL NPA 1960 0.73 -0.01 2238 0.80 0.03 2223 0.91 0.03 1067 0.49 0.08 2446 1.02 0.00 2994 1.11 -0.05 LEE NPA 2199 0.83 0.09 2569 0.93 0.16 2701 1.12 0.24 1073 0.50 0.09 2786 1.18 0.16 3420 1.29 0.13 WONG NPA 1935 0.84 0.10 2358 0.98 0.21 2508 1.20 0.32 880 0.47 0.06 2669 1.29 0.27 3163 1.37 0.21 HOUGHTON NPA 1471 0.68 -0.06 1597 0.71 -0.06 1560 0.79 -0.09 744 0.42 0.01 1834 0.94 -0.07 2242 1.03 -0.13 COPELAND NPA 1454 0.67 -0.07 1585 0.70 -0.07 1558 0.79 -0.09 719 0.41 0.00 1804 0.93 -0.09 2254 1.04 -0.12 BICKERTON NPA 1478 0.71 -0.03 1613 0.74 -0.03 1512 0.79 -0.09 820 0.48 0.07 1760 0.94 -0.08 2154 1.02 -0.14 SIDHU NPA 1086 0.60 -0.14 1429 0.76 -0.01 1381 0.84 -0.04 540 0.36 -0.05 2798 1.73 0.71 2019 1.11 -0.05
118 Table 6.10: City Council candidates with divergent LQ scores (Central wards)
Central Wards
Mt. Pleasant Riley Park-Oakridge City Council Council City Candidates Party Divergence Divergence Votes Votes LQ LQ
ROBERTSON VV 5135 1.27 N/A 4678 1.01 N/A LADNER NPA 1859 0.64 N/A 3418 1.02 N/A LOUIE VV 4528 1.15 -0.13 4652 1.02 0.01 DEAL VV 4743 1.26 -0.01 4355 1.00 0.00 CHOW VV 4154 1.12 -0.16 4407 1.03 0.02 JANG VV 4299 1.19 -0.08 4254 1.02 0.01 REIMER VV 4535 1.29 0.01 4185 1.03 0.02 STEVENSON VV 4186 1.20 -0.07 3958 0.99 -0.02 ANTON NPA 2387 0.76 0.12 3690 1.01 -0.01 MEGGS VV 3734 1.26 -0.01 3390 0.99 -0.01 DHALIWAL VV 3331 1.25 -0.03 3026 0.98 -0.03 GELLER NPA 2012 0.76 0.12 3124 1.02 0.01 CAPRI NPA 1860 0.70 0.07 3090 1.01 0.00 BALL NPA 1822 0.72 0.08 2886 0.98 -0.04 LEE NPA 1508 0.60 -0.04 2954 1.02 0.00 WONG NPA 1216 0.55 -0.08 2700 1.07 0.05 HOUGHTON NPA 1379 0.67 0.03 2329 0.98 -0.04 COPELAND NPA 1407 0.68 0.04 2305 0.97 -0.05 BICKERTON NPA 1436 0.72 0.08 2235 0.97 -0.05 SIDHU NPA 1006 0.58 -0.05 1865 0.94 -0.08
119 Table 6.11: Parks Board candidates with divergent LQ scores (Downtown wards)
Downtown Wards
Downtown West End Parks Board Board Parks Candidates Party Divergence Divergence Votes Votes LQ LQ
ROBERTSON VV 2418 0.90 N/A 4944 1.26 N/A LADNER NPA 2248 1.16 N/A 1924 0.68 N/A BARNES VV 2253 0.90 0.00 4443 1.22 -0.04 JASPER VV 2186 0.95 0.04 4522 1.34 0.08 BLYTH VV 1974 0.88 -0.03 3945 1.20 -0.06 HUNDAL VV 1636 0.85 -0.06 3378 1.19 -0.07 ROBERTSON NPA 1886 1.08 -0.08 1833 0.65 -0.03 ZLOTNIK NPA 1908 1.13 -0.03 1767 0.71 0.03 DE GENOVA NPA 1807 1.09 -0.08 1711 0.70 0.02 MCDIARMID NPA 1683 1.12 -0.04 1704 0.78 0.10 RICHARDSON NPA 1635 1.15 -0.01 1577 0.76 0.08 URTON NPA 1462 1.11 -0.05 1317 0.69 0.01 SHUKLA NPA 1178 1.09 -0.05 949 0.60 -0.08
120 Table 6.12: Parks Board candidates with divergent LQ scores (Westside wards)
Westside Wards
Dunbar-Shaughnessy Kerrisdale Marpole Kitsilano-Fairview Point Grey-Kitsilano Parks Board Board Parks Candidates Party Divergence Divergence Divergence Divergence Votes Votes Votes Votes LQ LQ LQ LQ
ROBERTSON VV 3094 0.62 N/A 2825 0.60 N/A 5267 1.10 N/A 4231 0.94 N/A LADNER NPA 5809 1.61 N/A 5392 1.59 N/A 3260 0.94 N/A 3754 1.15 N/A BARNES VV 3206 0.69 0.07 2849 0.65 0.05 4875 1.09 -0.01 4135 0.98 0.05 JASPER VV 2723 0.63 0.01 2475 0.61 0.01 4428 1.07 -0.03 3676 0.94 0.01 BLYTH VV 2579 0.61 0.00 2369 0.60 0.00 4306 1.07 -0.03 3659 0.97 0.03 HUNDAL VV 2067 0.57 -0.05 1855 0.55 -0.06 3698 1.06 -0.03 3064 0.94 0.00 ROBERTSON NPA 5337 1.49 -0.12 4738 1.41 -0.18 2910 0.84 -0.09 3243 1.00 -0.15 ZLOTNIK NPA 5348 1.70 0.09 4761 1.61 0.02 3175 1.05 0.11 3410 1.20 0.05 DE GENOVA NPA 4739 1.52 -0.09 4404 1.51 -0.08 2770 0.93 -0.01 2962 1.06 -0.10 MCDIARMID NPA 4318 1.54 -0.07 3965 1.51 -0.08 2565 0.95 0.01 2731 1.08 -0.07 RICHARDSON NPA 4275 1.61 0.00 3819 1.54 -0.06 2516 0.99 0.05 2865 1.20 0.04 URTON NPA 4199 1.72 0.10 3711 1.62 0.02 2186 0.93 -0.01 2466 1.12 -0.04 SHUKLA NPA 3267 1.62 0.01 2965 1.56 -0.03 1672 0.86 -0.08 1844 1.01 -0.14
121 Table 6.13: Parks Board candidates with divergent LQ scores (Eastside wards)
Eastside Wards
Kensington-Cedar Renfrew- Strathcona- Victoria-Fraserview Hastings-Sunrise Sunset Parks Board Board Parks
Candidates Cottage Collingwood Grandview Killarney Party Divergence Divergence Divergence Divergence Divergence Divergence Votes Votes Votes Votes Votes Votes LQ LQ LQ LQ LQ LQ
ROBERTSON VV 4832 1.14 N/A 4955 1.12 N/A 3962 1.03 N/A 4580 1.32 N/A 3566 0.94 N/A 5135 0.86 N/A LADNER NPA 2253 0.74 N/A 2453 0.77 N/A 2451 0.88 N/A 1025 0.41 N/A 2787 1.02 N/A 1859 1.16 N/A BARNES VV 4440 1.13 -0.02 4480 1.09 -0.03 3491 0.97 -0.06 4106 1.27 -0.05 3098 0.88 -0.06 3535 0.89 0.03 JASPER VV 4108 1.13 -0.02 4212 1.10 -0.02 3334 1.00 -0.03 3830 1.28 -0.04 2980 0.91 -0.03 3303 0.90 0.04 BLYTH VV 4162 1.17 0.03 4247 1.14 0.02 3251 1.01 -0.02 3990 1.37 0.05 2935 0.92 -0.02 3165 0.89 0.02 HUNDAL VV 3442 1.13 -0.02 3550 1.11 -0.01 2817 1.01 -0.02 3393 1.35 0.03 3341 1.22 0.28 2721 0.89 0.02 ROBERTSON NPA 2043 0.68 -0.06 2338 0.74 -0.03 2339 0.85 -0.03 969 0.39 -0.02 2479 0.91 -0.11 3107 1.02 -0.14 ZLOTNIK NPA 1807 0.68 -0.06 2012 0.72 -0.05 1872 0.77 -0.11 908 0.42 0.01 2098 0.88 -0.14 2815 1.05 -0.11 DE GENOVA NPA 2174 0.83 0.09 2325 0.84 0.07 2420 1.01 0.13 1044 0.48 0.07 2417 1.02 0.01 3015 1.14 -0.02 MCDIARMID NPA 1826 0.77 0.03 1950 0.79 0.02 1973 0.92 0.03 931 0.48 0.07 2106 0.99 -0.03 2614 1.10 -0.06 RICHARDSON NPA 1499 0.67 -0.07 1767 0.75 -0.02 1727 0.85 -0.04 847 0.46 0.05 1850 0.92 -0.10 2417 1.07 -0.09 URTON NPA 1436 0.69 -0.05 1659 0.77 0.00 1683 0.89 0.01 672 0.40 -0.01 1886 1.01 0.00 2341 1.12 -0.04 SHUKLA NPA 1112 0.65 -0.09 1374 0.77 0.00 1414 0.91 0.03 548 0.39 -0.02 2448 1.59 0.58 2032 1.18 0.02
122 Table 6.14: Parks Board candidates with divergent LQ scores (Central wards)
Central Wards
Mt. Pleasant Riley Park-Oakridge Parks Board Board Parks Candidates Party Divergence Divergence Votes Votes LQ LQ
ROBERTSON VV 5135 1.27 N/A 4678 1.01 N/A LADNER NPA 1859 0.64 N/A 3418 1.02 N/A BARNES VV 4652 1.24 -0.04 4435 1.02 0.02 JASPER VV 4304 1.24 -0.04 3976 0.99 -0.02 BLYTH VV 4389 1.30 0.02 3986 1.02 0.01 HUNDAL VV 3581 1.23 -0.05 3330 0.99 -0.02 ROBERTSON NPA 1713 0.59 -0.05 2960 0.89 -0.13 ZLOTNIK NPA 1752 0.69 0.05 2955 1.01 -0.01 DE GENOVA NPA 1686 0.67 0.03 2878 0.99 -0.02 MCDIARMID NPA 1562 0.69 0.05 2575 0.99 -0.03 RICHARDSON NPA 1519 0.71 0.07 2434 0.99 -0.03 URTON NPA 1225 0.62 -0.02 2198 0.96 -0.05 SHUKLA NPA 892 0.55 -0.09 1760 0.93 -0.08
123 Table 6.15: School Board candidates with divergent LQ scores (Downtown wards)
Downtown Wards
School Board Board School Downtown West End Candidates Party Divergence Divergence Votes Votes LQ LQ
ROBERTSON VV 2418 0.90 N/A 4944 1.26 N/A LADNER NPA 2248 1.16 N/A 1924 0.68 N/A BACCHUS VV 2253 0.89 -0.02 4317 1.16 -0.10 LOMBARDI VV 2206 0.89 -0.02 4250 1.17 -0.09 CLEMENT VV 2128 0.87 -0.04 4180 1.16 -0.10 GREGSON VV 2167 0.90 -0.01 4130 1.16 -0.10 DENIKE NPA 1963 1.06 -0.10 1939 0.72 0.04 GIBSON NPA 1966 1.08 -0.09 1912 0.72 0.04 HOLDEN NPA 1957 1.08 -0.09 1952 0.74 0.06 WOO NPA 1728 1.01 -0.16 1530 0.61 -0.07 HANSEN NPA 1771 1.10 -0.07 1632 0.69 0.01 LE GALLAIS NPA 1632 1.10 -0.07 1541 0.71 0.03 NANCE NPA 1557 1.13 -0.04 1425 0.70 0.02 SINGH NPA 1442 1.09 -0.08 1312 0.67 -0.01
124 Table 6.16: School Board candidates with divergent LQ scores (Westside wards)
Westside Wards
School Board Board School Dunbar-Shaughnessy Kerrisdale Marpole Kitsilano-Fairview Point Grey-Kitsilano Candidates Party Divergence Divergence Divergence Divergence Votes Votes Votes Votes LQ LQ LQ LQ
ROBERTSON VV 3094 0.62 N/A 2825 0.60 N/A 5267 1.10 N/A 4231 0.94 N/A LADNER NPA 5809 1.61 N/A 5392 1.59 N/A 3260 0.94 N/A 3754 1.15 N/A BACCHUS VV 3397 0.72 0.10 2948 0.66 0.06 4822 1.06 -0.04 4325 1.01 0.07 LOMBARDI VV 3456 0.75 0.13 2853 0.66 0.06 4719 1.06 -0.03 4026 0.96 0.03 CLEMENT VV 3079 0.67 0.05 2816 0.66 0.05 4567 1.04 -0.06 3923 0.95 0.01 GREGSON VV 3128 0.69 0.07 2791 0.66 0.06 4504 1.03 -0.06 3874 0.95 0.01 DENIKE NPA 5385 1.56 -0.05 4875 1.51 -0.09 3161 0.95 0.01 3553 1.14 -0.01 GIBSON NPA 5034 1.49 -0.13 4640 1.46 -0.14 2976 0.91 -0.03 3239 1.06 -0.10 HOLDEN NPA 5062 1.50 -0.11 4673 1.47 -0.12 3081 0.95 0.01 3294 1.08 -0.07 WOO NPA 4449 1.39 -0.22 4445 1.48 -0.12 2407 0.78 -0.16 2649 0.92 -0.24 HANSEN NPA 4799 1.59 -0.03 4346 1.54 -0.06 2642 0.91 -0.03 2901 1.07 -0.09 LE GALLAIS NPA 4327 1.56 -0.05 3965 1.53 -0.07 2495 0.94 0.00 2793 1.12 -0.04 NANCE NPA 4127 1.60 -0.02 3730 1.54 -0.05 2408 0.97 0.03 2594 1.11 -0.04 SINGH NPA 3700 1.49 -0.12 3443 1.48 -0.11 2163 0.91 -0.03 2296 1.03 -0.13
125 Table 6.17: School Board candidates with divergent LQ scores (Eastside wards)
Eastside Wards
Kensington-Cedar Renfrew- Strathcona- Victoria-Fraserview
School Board Board School Hastings-Sunrise Sunset
candidates Cottage Collingwood Grandview Killarney Party Divergence Divergence Divergence Divergence Divergence Divergence Votes Votes Votes Votes Votes Votes LQ LQ LQ LQ LQ LQ
ROBERTSON VV 4832 1.14 N/A 4955 1.12 N/A 3962 1.03 N/A 4580 1.32 N/A 3566 0.94 N/A 5135 0.86 N/A LADNER NPA 2253 0.74 N/A 2453 0.77 N/A 2451 0.88 N/A 1025 0.41 N/A 2787 1.02 N/A 1859 1.16 N/A BACCHUS VV 4616 1.15 0.00 4710 1.12 0.00 3671 1.00 -0.03 4171 1.27 -0.05 3388 0.94 0.00 3745 0.93 0.06 LOMBARDI VV 4533 1.16 0.01 4575 1.12 0.00 3639 1.02 -0.01 4101 1.28 -0.04 3131 0.89 -0.05 3475 0.88 0.02 CLEMENT VV 4504 1.17 0.02 4668 1.15 0.03 3669 1.04 0.01 4193 1.32 0.00 3284 0.95 0.01 3596 0.92 0.06 GREGSON VV 4405 1.15 0.00 4499 1.12 0.00 3648 1.05 0.02 3980 1.27 -0.05 3196 0.93 -0.01 3601 0.94 0.07 DENIKE NPA 2237 0.77 0.03 2469 0.81 0.04 2458 0.93 0.04 1190 0.50 0.09 2621 1.00 -0.02 3262 1.11 -0.05 GIBSON NPA 2255 0.79 0.04 2593 0.86 0.09 2658 1.02 0.14 1196 0.51 0.10 2793 1.08 0.07 3341 1.16 0.00 HOLDEN NPA 2144 0.75 0.01 2501 0.84 0.07 2477 0.95 0.07 1210 0.52 0.11 2736 1.07 0.05 3193 1.11 -0.05 WOO NPA 2321 0.86 0.12 2769 0.98 0.21 2912 1.18 0.30 1157 0.52 0.11 3082 1.27 0.25 3591 1.32 0.16 HANSEN NPA 1859 0.73 -0.01 2153 0.81 0.04 2131 0.92 0.04 958 0.46 0.05 2365 1.03 0.02 3121 1.22 0.06 LE GALLAIS NPA 1771 0.76 0.01 1932 0.79 0.02 1964 0.92 0.04 918 0.48 0.07 2166 1.03 0.01 2669 1.13 -0.03 NANCE NPA 1642 0.75 0.01 1725 0.76 -0.01 1734 0.87 -0.01 837 0.47 0.06 2015 1.03 0.01 2362 1.08 -0.08 SINGH NPA 1434 0.68 -0.06 1717 0.78 0.01 1658 0.87 -0.01 757 0.44 0.03 3107 1.65 0.63 2335 1.11 -0.05
126 Table 6.18: School Board candidates with divergent LQ scores (Central wards)
Central Wards
School Board Board School Mt. Pleasant Riley Park-Oakridge candidates Party Divergence Divergence Votes Votes LQ LQ
ROBERTSON VV 5135 1.27 N/A 4678 1.01 N/A LADNER NPA 1859 0.64 N/A 3418 1.02 N/A BACCHUS VV 4610 1.20 -0.07 4461 1.01 0.00 LOMBARDI VV 4603 1.23 -0.04 4353 1.01 0.01 CLEMENT VV 4553 1.23 -0.04 4317 1.01 0.01 GREGSON VV 4466 1.22 -0.05 4167 0.99 -0.02 DENIKE NPA 1919 0.69 0.05 3221 1.00 -0.01 GIBSON NPA 1954 0.71 0.08 3065 0.97 -0.05 HOLDEN NPA 1978 0.73 0.09 3203 1.02 0.00 WOO NPA 1633 0.63 -0.01 3133 1.05 0.03 HANSEN NPA 1619 0.67 0.03 2780 0.99 -0.03 LE GALLAIS NPA 1503 0.67 0.03 2512 0.97 -0.04 NANCE NPA 1444 0.69 0.06 2350 0.98 -0.04 SINGH NPA 1278 0.64 0.00 2193 0.95 -0.07
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