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Kant on Nothing Nothing: Kant’s analysis and the Hegelian critique Tolga Güngör A thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D. Department of Philosophy & Art History University of Essex February 2017 ABSTRACT This thesis aims to throw an illuminating light on the as yet neglected concept of nothing in Kant’s system, a concept which is taken into consideration, by Kant, in accordance with the guiding thread of the categories of the understanding. My main argument is that Kant has a fourfold division of nothing and each has a transcendental function in his system. This function is basically a limiting one; setting up negative determinations without which Kant’s system would have never been constituted as it is now. It is shown in the thesis that the concept of nothing is divided basically into four: first, nothing as ens rationis that limits and thereby protects knowledge, secondly nothing as nihil privativum that defines the boundaries of phenomenal reality, thirdly nothing as ens imaginarium that makes possible the unity of experience and finally, nothing as nihil negativum that draws the lines of logical thinking. All make, in the last resort and by being the concepts of the opposite, experience possible. The thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter is an exposition of all four divisions of nothing, the second is the display specifically of the concepts of ens rationis and nihil negativum, and the third is of the concepts of ens imaginarium and nihil privativum. The auxiliary argument of the thesis is that while Hegel makes a strong charge of externality against and thereby severely criticizes the Kantian concept of the thing-in-itself, - the concept of which I propose to be contained under the concept of ens rationis- Kant has equally convincing arguments against such a charge. This is the topic of the fourth and final chapter which has an implicit aim of creating the image of a powerful critical Hegel but on the other hand an equally enduring and war-like Kant. Kant is presented as a philosopher who has powerful responses to institute a balance between himself and his opponent. When Kant’s differing concepts of nothing are taken into account, Hegel’s attack of externality, it is maintained, appears not to have taken into account the full measure of the resources of the Kantian position. Even when it is said that the attack is against one specific concept of the thing-in-itself alone, Kant still seems to have enough resources for toleration and defence indeed. 1 Contents A NOTE ON SOURCES AND ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................... 3 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 4 CHAPTER I: Kant on the Division of the Concept of Nothing: An Exposition ........................ 16 1. Introduction 16 2. A Clarification on Negative, Negation, and Nothing 23 3. The Concept of an Object in General and the Division of the Concept “Nothing” 30 4. Divisions of the Concept of Nothing under the Guidance of the Table of Categories 35 4.1. First division: nothing according to quantity, as ens rationis ........................ …. 36 4.2. Second division: nothing according to quality as nihil privativum .................... 43 4.3 Third division: nothing according to relation as ens imaginarium ................... 48 4.4 Fourth division: nothing according to modality as nihil negativum .................. 57 5 Conclusion: Adumbrating the Main Lines of a Possible Argument of the Transcendental Function of Nothing in Kant’s Critical System 62 CHAPTER II: Transcendental Function of Nothing from Nihil Negativum to Ens Rationis ... 67 1. Introduction 67 2. Kant’s Critique of the Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge and Nothing as Nihil Negativum 73 2.1. Nihil Negativum and the Doctrine of Possibility in Kant’s the Only Possible Argument ............................................................................................................................ 74 2.2. Nihil Negativum under the Guidance of the System of Categories ................... 85 3. Nothing as ens rationis in the Context of the Transcendental Dialectic 91 3.1. The Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion, and the System of Ideas .................. 92 3.2. Transcendental Ideal and the Principle of Complete Determination…. 101 4. Concluding Remarks: Problematic Nature of Ideas and Unity of Reason 106 CHAPTER III: Kant’s Analysis of Nothing as Nihil Privativum: Reality, Negation, and Limitation....................................................................................................................................... 109 1. Introduction 109 2. Space and Time as Ens Imaginarium 114 2.1. Substance 121 2.2. The Law of Continuity 124 2.3. Ether-Deduction 129 2 3. Nihil Privativum: Reality, Negation, Limitation 132 3.1. Reality as Intensive Magnitude 132 3.2. Negation 137 3.3. Limitation 143 Chapter IV: Hegel’s Critique of Externality and the Possible Kantian Responses ................ 147 1. Introduction 147 2. Immanence of Nothing and Hegel’s Critique of Kant 151 2.1. Hegel versus Kant on the Limits of Knowledge: Hegel’s Critique of the Thing-in- itself 151 2.2. Being and Nothing: Dialectic 160 2.3. In-itself and Being for consciousness of this in-itself 172 3. Kantian Nothing as External 182 3.1. Matter-in-itself and Externality 182 3.2. Ideas and Complete Determination 189 3.3. Kant’s Affirmation of Externality over against Immanency 194 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 204 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 208 3 A NOTE ON SOURCES AND ABBREVIATIONS References to Kant’s works are given according to the volume and pages that the cited passages are in the Academy Edition: Immanuel Kant (1910). Gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin: Reimer; later DeGruyter. The first Arabic numerals indicate the volume, the second Arabic numerals indicate the page numbers. All references to the Critique of Pure Reason, in keeping with current practice, are shortened to the pagination of the original edition indicated by A for the 1781 edition, and B for the 1787 edition. English translations are from Kant, Immanuel (2003), Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, first published 1929, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. For Kant’s other works, all English translations are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. All references to Hegel’s work are to the English translations of his Logic, part one of the Encyclopaedia; Science of Logic and the Phenomenology of Spirit. I list them below as follows: Hegel, G. W. F. (1969). Science of Logic. Translated by A. V. Miller. Edited by H. D. Lewis. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books; Hegel, G. W. F. (1975). Logic: Being a Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830). Translated by William Wallace. Oxford: Clarendon; Hegel, G. W. F. (1977). Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford and New York: Oxford University. I used few abbreviations for both Kant’s and Hegel’s works. Here is the list of those: Ak. Akademie der Wissenschaften Enc. Hegel’s Logic: Being a Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830). L. Hegel’s Science of Logic. Phen. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit Refl. Reflexionen. (These Reflexionen are quoted according to the numbering and pagination of the Akademie edition. English translations are from Immanuel Kant (2005), Notes and Fragments. (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant). Edited by Paul Guyer. Translated by Curtis Bowman, Paul Guyer, and Frederick Rauscher. Cambridge: Cambridge University.) 4 Now God can annihilate the world with the same facility with which he called forth Being from Nothing [...] But could he remove Nothing altogether? It would be horrible blasphemy to say so [...] For if Nothing were absent and insofar as it is lacking, it would no longer be possible for the power of God to produce new creatures. Lacking Nothing, neither would there be divine omnipotence (G. Castiglione, 1632, quoted from Ossola (1977: 79) by Heisig, 2012: 27). Alice: “I see nothing.” Cheshire Cat: “My. You have good eyes.” (Lewis Caroll, Alice in Wonderland) Introduction In the Western philosophical tradition it is possible to distinguish various approaches concerning nothing. For some it has a positive connotation whereas for others negative. However, as it is often acknowledged, nothing in its long history has been considered inferior to something. It would be a mistake though to take this line of thought as a uniform pattern, for there is an alternative view that has instead taken non-being and nothing as superior to being and something. Plotinus (c. 205-270) is a representative of this line of thought. He places the One beyond being, grounding being in non-being. This differentiation in attitudes does not obscure the fact that from Parmenides on the Western metaphysics has been dominated by the principle of ultimate something. Since Plato and Aristotle this principle has constituted the standard outlook of and become point of departure for metaphysical thought. For Parmenides all was one, and one was being. Nothing was completely excluded from the category of the one, it was accepted by him as simply ‘not’. Plato took over
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