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Abstract Building on a detailed philosophical basis, this thesis offers visitor orientation as an alternative perspective on human-computer interaction with a focus on visitors and places. In our modern world we see that computers are no longer exclusively used as tools, but they also allow for the experience of being visitors in a large variety of places. Some examples of such places are online chat sites, web sites, online communities and 3D games. The work builds on Visitor Orientation in Human- Computer Interaction [Hedman ‘01] where the visitor oriented perspective was first established and a series of studies were performed in 3D digital environments. Here the main task is to further refine visitor orientation against the background of an extended examination of the history of philosophy and an ethnographic study of a mixed reality museum exhibition, Re-tracing the Past, which was conducted as part of the SHAPE project funded by the European Community. Against this background, a design philosophy is developed that suggests sensitivities for visitor oriented design in human-computer interaction. The thesis also provides many discussions of topics related to human-computer interaction in relation to positions discussed in the history of philosophy, in particular with respect to questions of place. It serves as a guide for anyone interested in understanding visitors and places within human-computer interaction in a philosophically informed way. Acknowledgements As this is a book about place it seems only fitting to start out this section with expressing my appreciation for the place, where this work was made possible: the Centre for User Oriented Design (CID), within the Department of Numerical Analysis and Computer Science (NADA) at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH). Throughout my time at CID I have come to know a great group of people in a warm and friendly atmosphere. It has been a most rewarding and stimulating experience to do my doctoral work in a truly interdisciplinary research atmosphere with creative and talented people that are at the same time pretension-less and easy going. I take this opportunity know to thank you all. The people I have worked most closely with at CID on this thesis are my advisors John Bowers and Yngve Sundblad. There are several things that impress me about John’s work and I am just going to mention a couple of the many possible things. John writes with a clarity and philosophical incisiveness that sets a standard on its own. He is also able to define his own frame of reference and tackle new problems and in this sense he reminds me of philosophers. I have come to think of Socrates, because John is truly a gadfly that has stung human-computer interaction in a variety of sensitive places. However, it is not enough to characterize John in this way, because he is of course widely known as a researcher who has applied his thinking to concrete problems in the real world through empirical investigations. To find both a philosopher and an empirical researcher in the same person is something extraordinary and in my view John is one of the best examples that I know of. But in the end it is not these extraordinary qualities of John that I am the most grateful for. It is our friendship that I value the most. I am equally grateful for having had the opportunity to have had Yngve as my advisor. He has been a key figure in the development of human-computer interaction, not only in Sweden, but in the world at large. To work with Yngve within the field of human-computer interaction has been very stimulating and inspiring partly because of his excellent command of the field at large, but also because of his genuine dedication to the field and he is a very good example of what one would call “the real Mc Coy”. He has throughout his career struggled to make human-computer interaction become a field of research that can benefit people and make for positive changes. As with John what I value the most is our friendship. Together John and Yngve have given me the best possible feedback and guidance with my thesis that I can imagine. I would like to thank all the members of the SHAPE project (part of the European Community’s research initiative on “The Disappearing Computer”) and I am grateful for having been able to do research within this project. Without them my empirical research for this thesis would not have been possible. I would also like to thank Bill Stewart who read and commented on this thesis at an early stage. Bill is the person who awakened me to philosophy when I had him as a philosophy teacher at San Diego City College and a very dear and close friend of mine. I think of him as my brother and my life would be very different without him. Throughout my time in philosophy I have never met a more outstanding philosopher and Bill could no doubt become a professor at any one of the most prestigious universities in the world. This is not what he wants, however, Bill works where he can be most useful and make the most positive changes in this world and he sure does bring about such changes. With respect to the development of my thesis I would also like to thank Sören Lenman, with whom I worked from early on at CID and have written many research papers with. The times when we worked together on research papers were for me invaluable. Sören is an outstanding researcher and has a remarkable capacity for identifying the essence of research problems and he is also very creative. I am happy to be Sören’s friend and he has always been a source of inspiration for me. I would also like to thank my very close friend Gary Guttenberg who also read and commented on parts of this thesis. I met Gary at Berkeley and he later came to visit me in Sweden were he found his wife. When Gary moved to Sweden I was overjoyed and I hope now that when I am done with my thesis that we can find more time to hang out together. I think of him as part of my family here in Sweden. I would also like to thank all of my friends who I have not been able to see as much as I would have liked to during the past six months or so. Lastly, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my parents and my sisters, who have given me so much warmth and love in this life. Anders Hedman Stockholm, Jan 8, 2004 Glossary ACCOMMODATION How a person finds himself (feels at home) in a place. AUGMENTATION An extension of one’s capacities, either mental or physical or a combination thereof, through technology. AVAILABLENESS Used to describe smooth coping with tools as part of background coping without conscious reflection. Originally from Heidegger. CORPOREAL Having to do with the body or tangible things. CYBERNETICS Field of research that examines process and control structures in biological, mechanical or electronic systems or any combination of such systems. DESIGN SENSITIVITY A concept to keep in mind and reflect upon when engaging in research and design. DIALECTIC 1. A truth seeking conversation (Socratic method). 2. A way of looking at the unfolding of history as evolving through conflicting forces (Hegel). DIRECT MANIPULATION Interface style allowing a person to directly manipulate objects that are represented graphically such as folders and files. EPISTEMOLOGY Branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of knowledge. ESEMPLASTIC The capacity to combine widely different elements into a unified whole. INCORPOREAL Refers to elements that are not of the body or tangible. LANGUAGE GAME A way to look at communication through language as a game, invented by Wittgenstein. METAPHYSICS Branch of philosophy that deals with the nature of reality. NEGATION How consciousness transforms what is encountered in individual and dynamic ways. Originally from Sartre. OCCURENTNESS Used to describe a way of encountering things reflectively. Originally from Heidegger. ONTOLOGY About what exists or the nature of being. PARSIMONY Adoption of the simplest assumption in order to explain or interpret something. PHENOMENOLOGY Philosophy that concerns itself with how we experience thing. PLACE GAME A way of looking at visitor activities in a place in terms of games similar to language games. SOFT PLACE A place produced through human-computer interaction. SUB SPECIE AETERNITATIS A perspsective from eternity, detached without human involvement. UNAVAILABLENESS Used to describe a breakdown in our coping with tools. VERACITY Conformity to fact or truth, truthfullnes. Stylistic note: I follow the advice of feminist sociologist Dorothy Smith and gender my text as I myself am gendered. Abstract i Acknowledgements iii Glossary v 1. Place and space in human-computer interaction 13 A time for place Questions investigated in the thesis 16 2. Overview and reading directions 17 Thesis disposition 3. Place in the Western intellectual tradition 19 A brief historical guide Preliminary investigations concerning the question of place 19 Modernity and place 22 The incorporeal turn 23 Tracing out world-pictures 24 Place in the Western world-picture 26 Plato (428-348 BC) 26 Aspect-seeing and place 29 Aspect-seeing and soft place 29 Aristotle (384–322 BC) 31 Aristotle's philosophy 32 Aspect-seeing and place 33 Aspect-seeing and soft place 34 Early Christianity 35 Aspect-seeing and place 35 Aspect-seeing and soft place 37 Middle Ages (500-1500) 37 Aspect-seeing and place 38 Copernican revolution 39 Aspect-seeing and place 39 René Descartes (1596–1650) 40 Aspect-seeing and place 41 Aspect-seeing and soft place 41 John Locke (1632-1704) 43 Aspect-seeing and place 43 Aspect-seeing and soft place 44
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