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AIRPOWER. Strategic potential of the Cocos Islands and Christmas Island Dr Carlo Kopp The ongoing drift in the global balance of economic and military power toward Asia has brought important policy changes in the United States, with the recent Defense Strategic Guidance document putting the Asia-Pacific region and the associated air-sea battle strategy concept at the top of the long term strategic agenda for Australia’s closest ally. The concurrent Australian Defence Force Posture Review (ADFPR) interim report was released in January, 2012, and the final report is expected this March. The Indian Ocean is now the principal sea route for Cocos (Keeling) Islands is recommended, to support much of Asia’s maritime traffic, carrying energy P-8 Poseidon maritime aircraft, thus exploiting only products from the Middle East and raw materials a small fraction of the actual strategic potential of from Africa into Asia, along with much of Asia’s either location. industrial output to the world. ‘Real estate’ to base Discovered in 1609, the Cocos Islands were initially naval and air assets along the Indian Ocean is at a privately owned asset, granted to the Clunies- a premium, to the extent that China has made Ross family in perpetuity by Britain in 1886, extensive port construction investments in Pakistan with jurisdiction transferred to Australia in 1955, and Burma (Myanmar), and airfield investments and the Clunies-Ross family losing control of in the latter. In the context of this global and the islands by the late 1970s. The economy, regional strategic game of position, Australia’s since initial colonisation, has been based on palm two Indian Ocean offshore territories, the Cocos tree plantations, but more recently eco-tourism, (Keeling) Islands and Christmas Island, are both especially for divers. Image of the Cocos Islands taken in 2009. The best anchorage is off Direction Island at the NE rim of the valuable strategic assets. Both island territories The Cocos Islands are geologically a horseshoe atoll, with excellent deep water access for large logistical are identified as such in the ADFPR interim report, shaped coral atoll situated on top of a volcanic vessels. The central lagoon is too shallow for military but only a modest airfield runway upgrade for the seamount, itself part of a submerged mountain use, and environmentally fragile. 18 DEFENCETODAY range. The central lagoon is very shallow, and waters, and protected during replenishment. This ... the safest strategy for unusable for warships without deep dredging. Like is not feasible if within the reach of hostile land Australia is to properly develop Strategic potential of the other similar atolls, such as Diego Garcia in the based strike aircraft, without unusually heavy British Indian Ocean Territories, average elevation commitment of protective land based Combat Air ‘the military potential of the above sea level is very low, and usable surface Patrols and tankers. Cocos Islands, as a naval area both limited and broken into multiple islands A site such as the Cocos Islands represents a replenishment site, and an air Cocos Islands and Christmas Island and islets. The largest two islands, both inhabited, valuable asset under such conditions, as it can are the West Island or Brown’s West Island, and be used to replenish submarines and surface force ‘Strategic FOB’ along Home Island in the north-east of the atoll. The total warships with munitions and fuel - and if needed, the lines of the British SEAC land area of the atoll is only 14 square kilometres, crew. It also dramatically reduces the demand for effort in 1944 – 1945. It would mostly covered with a former commercial palm tanker aircraft, when tactical fighters need to be demonstrate that Australia tree plantation. deployed. The old adage about ‘unsinkable aircraft Unlike the Cocos Islands, Christmas Island is a carriers’ applies, with the added capability for high has the intent to defend substantial volcanic island with a total land area of volume logistical resupply. its interests and sovereign 135 square kilometres, of which much is elevated If Australia intends to protect its outer Western territories in the Indian Ocean. 200 to 300 metres above sea level, with steep maritime approaches, and perform both maritime cliffs along much of the coastline. Geologically, denial and sea control operations in the Indian the island is a dead volcano covered by substantial Ocean, then the Cocos Islands are ideally located. deposits of limestone formed from dead coral, Moreover, the location offers the potential for air ’ with exposed volcanic rock such as basalt in strikes into South East Asia, Burma, and the South many areas. Much of the island is covered with China Sea, with sufficient tanker support. While rainforest, and the long term geographical isolation the latter may appear “valueless” in the current has led to the evolution of a wide range of unique peacetime regional environment, any major shifts species of plant and wildlife, including a number of in the political and military alignment of regional endangered species. In geological terms Christmas nations away from the US Alliance could change Island is similar to Guam, but about one quarter of that literally overnight. the size of the latter. Therefore, the safest strategy for Australia is to properly develop the military potential of the Cocos the strategic dimension Islands, as a naval replenishment site, and an air Australia has made little use of the strategic force ‘Strategic FOB’ along the lines of the British position of either Indian Ocean offshore territory SEAC effort in 1944 – 1945. It would demonstrate since it gained control of them a half century ago. that Australia has the intent to defend its interests Cocos Island has been used on a regular basis as and sovereign territories in the Indian Ocean. a Forward Operating Base (FOB) for refuelling P-3 Christmas Island could play a similar role, although Orion Long Range Maritime Patrol (LRMP) aircraft, it is within 260 nautical miles of Jakarta, and thus especially during the late Cold War period when highly exposed in any military situation where Soviet fleet movements needed to be closely Indonesia is occupied by another power, or an monitored. adversary in its own right. Contemporary tactical Central Intelligence Agency map of the Cocos The great circle distances (Refer map) range ballistic missiles, ground launched cruise missiles (Keeling) Islands. between 600 nautical miles and 1,500 nautical and even the smallest tactical fighters can easily miles, which is well within the capabilities of LRMP reach Christmas Island from any number of sites in aircraft, tanker supported tactical fighters, and Java. The reciprocal dimension of such proximity naval surface and subsurface assets. Attempting is that Christmas Island would easily permit high to cover the same geographical footprint from the tempo air operations into Indonesia’s heartland, a Pilbara or Kimberley mostly doubles the required reality which will not be lost upon the TNI leadership distances, which doubles transit times, doubles in Jakarta. Any significant development of the fuel burn, and mostly halves achievable sortie military potential of Christmas Island would require rates. some very adept diplomacy, and possibly the offer This is true for aircraft, but is an even greater of training facilities and weapons range access on problem for naval assets, be they surface fleet or the island for the TNI-AU. If Indonesia becomes submarines, as their transit speeds are less than embroiled in a regional conflict to its north, a major 10 per cent of aircraft. Fuel aside, replenishment basing facility on Christmas Island for ADF and US of expended munitions is a major issue, especially Air Force assets could be invaluable – the critical for the Navy. While the Navy has the option of political dimension is whether Indonesia wishes underway replenishment from logistical ships, to remain aligned with the US and Australia in the these must be escorted in and out of contested long term. Central Intelligence Agency map of Christmas Island. B-52 Stratofortress heavy bombers queueing up for takeoff at Andersen AFB, Guam, during Operation A US Navy SSN entering Apra Harbor, Guam. Linebacker II in 1972. DEFENCETODAY 19 AIRPOWER. Diego Garcia in the BIOT, the airfield and wharf is shown under construction. These considerations apply to Australian strategic basing deveLopment of the cocos needs in the context of defending Australia’s eeLing sLands immediate interests in the region, during a period (K ) i of increased strategic competition across the As the Cocos Islands are very similar in most key region. They take on an additional dimension, if we respects to Diego Garcia, the islands could be consider the strategic needs of our principal ally, developed in a similar fashion to Diego Garcia, the United States. using identical or similar construction techniques, The US had a robust basing network across the albeit on a smaller scale. The Diego Garcia base Pacific during the Cold War, including multiple is a logistical Main Operating Base (MOB) hosting bases in Japan, South Korea, the Philipines, the prepositioning ships, POL (Petroleum Oil Lubricant) Marianas and Hawaii, with leased access to storage, and an airfield which has been used for USS Saratoga berthed at Diego Garcia. Britain’s Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Two heavy bomber strike operations since 1991, but decades after the Cold War, the Philipines bases especially during the initial air campaign against are gone, and the North Asian bases are arguably the Taliban and Al Qaeda in 2001. indefensible against Chinese air assets, cruise The principal limitations of the Cocos Islands when missiles and ballistic missiles. While Diego Garcia compared to Diego Garcia are threefold. The first and Guam have become central basing ‘hubs’, two are that their land area is only one half of Diego the remaining bases are problematic due to their Garcia, imposing practical limits on the scale of any locations.

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