ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE

IN THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE:

TOWARDS A UNIQUE SOLUTION

Brigadier Peter J. Dunn, AM

Master of Defence Studies

Sub-Thesis

University College The University of New South Wales Australian Defence Force Academy

1994 CONTENTS

PARTS

1 PRINCIPAL CHANGES IN AUSTRALIA'S MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE SINCE THE 1950s 1

2 ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE THEORY AND REVIEWS OF THE ADF 16

3 A CHANGING ORGANISATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FOR THE ADF- THE NEED TO FOCUS ON "CORE BUSINESS" 27

4 ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE FOR MORE EFFECTIVE ADF OPERATIONS 45

5 CONCLUSIONS 68

BIBLIOGR.\PHY 74

FIGURES

1 LOCBI IN THE PRE-BAKER STUDY ADF 32

2 LOCBI IN THE POST- BAKER STUDY ADF 33

3 OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY IN

THE ADF STRUCTURE 42

4 MODEL ONE ADF ORGANISATION 53

5 MODEL TWO ADF ORGANISATION 57

6 MODEL THREE ADF ORGANISATION 66 Ill

ABSTR.4CT

The Australian Defence organisation has been the subject of almost constant review since the 1950s. The first of these major reviews, the Morshead Review was initiated in 1957. This review coincided with the growing realisation that Australia had to become more self reliant in defence matters. The experience of World War Two had shown that total reliance on "great and powerful friends" was a dangerous practice and self reliance dictated that Australia's military forces would have to act together in a joint environment. Australia's system of military command had to be capable of producing effective policies and planning guidance to met the new demands of independent joint operations. Successive reviews aimed at moving the Australian Defence Forces toward a more joint organisation have resulted in major changes to the higher defence machinery. However, fundamental problems, rooted in inter-Service rivalry, still exist.

Over recent years organisational change has been the subject of intense study. Consideration of the results of this research shows that the majority of the Defence reviews undertaken to date have failed to win support for the implementation of the most important of their recommendations because of a failure to appreciate the "organisational culture" of the ADF and then produce specific plans to alter that culture. Factors such as openness, external environment, internal organisational boundaries and the identification of the ADF's "core business" must be taken into account when organisational changes are being developed.

When these factors are considered it is apparent that the major obstacle to effective organisational change in the ADF is the role of the Service Offices vis-a-vis the joint HQ ADF. Paradoxically, the roles of the Service Chiefs of Staff, and therefore their supporting single Service structures, have previously been specifically excluded from organisational reviews. The Australian Defence machinery has therefore continued to operate under the organisational limitation of up to five competing power bases with a consequent dilution of effectiveness.

Having identified the apparent cause of the current organisational change paralysis, three models are presented as options to be considered for the start of a far reaching organisational change. The resulting organisations would ensure that the ADF was closely focussed on its core business: the conduct of joint military operations. PARTI

PRINCIPAL CHANGES IN AUSTRALIA'S MILFTARY

COMMAND STRUCTURE SINCE THE 1950s -2-

The Move Towards Self Reliance

Since the end of World War Two there had been a steady move towards a

more independent defence posture in Australia. The announcement in 1969 of the Guam

Doctrine by US President Richard Nixon continued that evolution. In due course this

fundamental change in defence outlook was reflected in policy.

The 1975 Strategic Basis Paper advanced the "core force concept" and

articulated the need for Australia to be capable of defence operations independent of the direct

support of a major power, namely, the United States. Independent operations were seen as

relevant to Australia's region and this shift did not imply that the value of Australia's defence

alliances, in particular the ANZUS Treaty, had in any way diminshed.

In November 1976 the Minister for Defence, Mr Killen, tabled the

Government's Defence White Paper. The White paper reiterated the need for Australian defence planning to become more self reliant. Additionally, the White Paper clearly stated that the Government anticipated that joint operations would be the norm in most cases. The White

Paper stated that:

" any operations are much more likely to be in our neighbourhood than in

some distant or forward theatre, and that our Armed Services would be

conducting joint operations together as the Australian Defence Force."'

Killen, Australian Defence, p. 10. -3 -

The close link between the move to self reliance and the conduct of joint

operations by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is clear. It is worth noting that this direct

connection is a constant in post World War Two defence policy development.

Earlv Reviews

Change has been a constant feature of the defence landscape since the end of

World War Two. This situation has its origins in the development of Australia's increasing independence from "strong and powerful friends" as the strategic realities of Australia's geopolitical circumstances became clear to Defence and Foreign policy makers.

As early as 1957 the Morshead Review^ recommended a single Department of

Defence and a Department of Defence Supply. The aim of this recommendation was to provide a single, central policy making body. The Review also recommended that the Service boards be abolished, however, the three Chiefs of Staff positions were to be retained to command the Services.

The following year the Minister for Defence was established as the senior person in the development of Defence policy. A four star service position, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, was also created^

^ Morshead, Organisation of the Defence Group of Departments Advisory Committee Report, p. 12. ^ Sanderson, The Report on the Structural Review of Higher ADF Staff Arrangements, p. 17, -4-

The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee did not have command authority over the Services. This led to his position being weakened as consensus was often difficult to achieve between the three single Service Chiefs of Staff This weakness became more evident during the Vietnam War when a national commander was appointed as well as single Service component commanders'^.

In 1967 The Special Committee on Intelligence was formed to "review the present Australian intelligence organisation and activities in the light of developments overseas and of Australia's particular requirements"^ This committee, known as the "Wilton Committee", presented its report in May 1968.

In that report, the Committee expressed a major criticism of the existing intelligence organisation in that an excessive amount of effort was involved in producing objective and useful intelligence. One of the Committee's recommendations was the establishment of the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO). The Wihon Committee proposed that the Service Directorates of Intelligence be amalgamated into the new JIO.

The recommendations of the Wilton Committee were implemented in the face of strenuous opposition from the Services. Discussions on the detailed organisations flowing from the Committee were acrimonious and protracted. Single Service intransigence was the subject of more than one report to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee during the establishment of JIO.

ibid, p. 18. Dunn, The Development of JIO's Relationship with JTVIGP and the Services, p. 3. -5 -

In 1968 the then Minister for Defence, Mr Fairhall, announced a series of

reforms that also were aimed at strengthening the position of the Defence organisation

vis-a-vis the Service organisations. In particular, the "Fairhall Reforms" replaced the joint

service committee structure with permanent joint planning staffs headed by a two-star

Director, Joint Staff^.

Report on the Reorganisation of the Defence Group of Departments (The Tange Review)

The 1972 Tange review was a fundamental and extensive review of Defence

policy making and administrative procedures. The final report covered many areas but

principal among them were the recommendations to amalgamate the separate departments of

Defence, Navy, Army and Air Force and elements of the Department of Supply into a single

Department of Defence. The position of Chief of the Defence Force Staff (CDFS) was also

created as a result of the Tange Report.

The power of the Minister for Defence was increased by passing to him many

of the responsibilities of the old Service Boards. Tange also considered that the previous

position of Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee "lacks statutory powers and is acting by consent"^. To remedy the latter problem Tange recommended that the CDFS be given formal power of command over the Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

^ Defence Report 1968, p. 7. ^ Tange, Report on the Reorganisation of the Defence Group of Departments,?. 34. -6-

When Tange's final report was submitted the majority of the recommendations

were accepted by Government. Not surprisingly, there were many who disagreed with the

thrust and detail of the report and a long and often bitter debate ensued after its publication.

The changes made on this occasion were extensive but the philosophy underpinning the

changes had not altered significantly from that which underpinned the changes in the

1950s and 1960s. Fundamentally, the Defence apparatus was seen as being unable to produce

concise, effective, collective advice to Government and the Services appeared either unwilling

or unable to operate together to produce a "Defence" view or policy. The Tange reforms

were expected to improve the situation.

The 1982 Defence Review (The Utz Committee)

Five years after the Tange Review recommendations were implemented the

Government felt that it was necessary to conduct a further review. This review was designed

to ensure that the previous changes had produced the desired result and to "consider what

fijrther improvements might be made"l

It is significant that the 1982 Defence Review Committee was chaired by an industrialist, Mr John Utz, Chairman of Wormald International Ltd and also included another leading businessman, Sir Eric Neal. Other members were Sir Fredrick Wheller and General

Sir Arthur MacDonald. The presence of leading figures from private enterprise heralded a shift away from allowing the Defence organisation to determine the manner in which it carried

^ Utz, Defence Review Committee, p. 1. -7-

out its business. Perhaps this was prudent corporate planning and it opened the door to an

injection of commercial practice into the necessarily conservative Defence bureaucracy. On

the other hand, it may have been a deliberate step in order to attempt to break through

stubborn resistance to organisational change.

The Utz Committee did not recommend significant or fundamental change.

The establishment of a Department of Defence Support and an appropriate Minister was recommended and subsequently accepted by the Government. Other minor changes were recommended but they were incremental in nature.

Possibly the major contribution made by the Utz Committee was that it acted as a catalyst for more important changes that occurred in subsequent years. In particular, in

1983 the joint staff supporting the CDFS was significantly strengthened by the addition of a further two one star appointments working under the ACDFS. In addition. Headquarters

Australian Defence Force (HQADF) was established from the existing joint staff and CDFS was retitled CDF. These changes established for the first time the primacy of the CDF and

HQADF in the defence process.

Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities (The Dibb Report)

Despite the considerable efforts that had been made to improve the Defence planning process clear dissent still existed^ within the organisation on developmental issues.

^ Sanderson, op cit., p. 21. In an endeavour to obtain an objective review Mr Paul Dibb, an academic, was engaged in

1985 by the Minister for Defence, Mr Beazely. Dibb was required to examine Australia's

defence capability priorities, strategic guidance and command arrangements.

The Dibb Report provided further strategic guidance and again re-aflfirmed that

self reliance and joint operational capability were fundamental to the security of Australia and

that they were inextricably linked'®. Dibb identified the requirement for CDF to be given more

control over military policy and planning and he recommended the strengthening of the ADFs

capability to conduct joint operations. In particular, Dibb recommended the establishment of a

joint headquarters in Northern Australia.

As a result of the Dibb Report a number of ADF command changes were

instituted. The CDF's staff was again strengthened to allow direct involvement in the force

development process. A three star Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) was created with

specific force development and future planning responsibilities. Of note was the subsequent

conversion in 1987 of the three Service functional commands (Maritime, Land and Air

Commands) into joint commands directly responsible to the CDF. Prior to 1987, only the

headquarters of the Service functional commands were directly responsible to the CDF.

10 Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, p. 44. -9-

Report on the Management of Australia's Defence - The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Defence and Trade aCFADT)

The JCFADT's November 1987 Report was very comprehensive, covering all aspects of the management of Australia's defence. In essence the Report proposed a strengthening of the role of CDF and a commensurate build-up of senior staff support for the

CDF to perform his fianctions as a commander. The build-up was to be balanced by an amalgamation of Service fianctions in areas such as capital equipment procurement, operational requirements and policy planning staffs and the centralisation of many functions hitherto located in the civilian side of the Department, into HQADF.

Central to the Report was the splitting of the ADF into two discrete elements, namely, an operational element and an administrative element. In many respects the proposal was similar to the somewhat unpopular arrangement introduced into the New Zealand Defence organisation. The operational element was to comprise HQADF and the Joint Force

Commands. The administrative element was made up of the three single Services whose role it was to provide combat ready personnel and assets to the Joint Force Commanders.

In the event the report was rejected by Government. In rejecting the Report the Government pointed to the significant number of reforms it had initiated within the

Department of Defence in recent times as a result of the many other reviews that had been - 10 - undertaken. Despite the rejection of the Report, it is important to note that yet again, the importance of the joint staff in HQADF was considered to outweigh the relative impoi^ance of the Services. The report stated: "... the present arrangements .... continue to give emphasis to sinde Service interests and activities"

Report of the Study into ADF Command Arrangements (The Baker Study)

In August 1987 Brigadier (now Lieutenant General) J.S. Baker was tasked by the CDF to conduct a study of ADF command arrangements in both high and low levels of operations. This extensive study focussed on the conduct of operations and the structure of the headquarters necessary to plan and prosecute those operations.

As a result of this study the Chiefs of Staff of the Services were removed from the operational chain of command but they still performed a vital role in the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). The Joint Commanders were made responsible direct to the CDF for operational matters and the Chiefs of Staff were excluded from this line of command. In Northern Australia a new joint headquarters, Northern Command (NORCOM), was recommended for establishment (furthering Dibb's previous recommendation). In order to prevent the CDF from becoming too immersed in operational detail Baker also recommended the establishment of a Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) under the CDF. This position was envisaged as being necessary only in the event of high levels of operations.

JCFADT, The Management of Australia's Defence, p 292. -11 -

In preparing the Study, Baker noted that the existing command situation was

unsatisfactory. In particular he stated that: "HQADF staff will have two sources of advice on

Service aspects. Advice will be received from Service Office staff supporting the Joint

Planning Committee (IPC) and the Service Chief of Staff in his single Service and COSC

responsibilities The prospects for conflicting advice are clear.

In considering the role of the single Service Chiefs of Staff in the command

chain for operations Baker observed: "The potential for staff duplication and confusion is

obvious, particularly if there are a number of concurrent operations. The prospect of an

operational commander answering in some cases to CDF and in others to his Chief of Staff could lead to conflicting requirements for the same operational assets, staffs working to different ends and unnecessarily complicated reporting channels.

The recommendations of the Baker Study were largely accepted. NORCOM was established and the single Service Chiefs of Staff were effectively excluded from the operational command chain. The position of C-in-C was agreed but the title was altered to

Commander, Joint Forces Australia (CJFA). To a large degree the rationale behind the recommendations of the Baker Study was the "adoption of a self reliant defence posture"'"^ by

Australia.

^^ Baker, Report on the Study into ADF Command Arrangements, p. 2-14. '' ibid, p. 6-16. ibid, p. 1-1. - 12-

The Report on the Structural Review of Higher ADF Staff Arrangements TThe Sanderson

Review)

In 1989 Major General (now Lieutenant General) Sanderson was directed to

conduct a study of the top echelons of the ADF. The study was designed to achieve a more

effective decision making apparatus and to reduce the large number of senior officer positions

in Canberra.

The results of the Sanderson Review were presented to the COSC in June

1989. After consideration of the Report by the COSC the majority of the recommendations were accepted and an implementation team was formed to carry out the agreed recommendations. Fundamental to the Report's findings was the confirmation yet again of the need for: "greater centralisation of military policy, planning and force development into a joint staff under CDF"^'.

The Sanderson Review implementation did lead to change within both the militaiy and civilian components of the Department of Defence. In particular, the integration of the force development process into HQADF's Development Division has led to the strengthening of HQ ADF at the expense of the Service Offices. However, despite the very significant reduction in the importance and size of the Service Offices, Major General

Sanderson saw fit to report that: "... the Chiefs of Staff have a vital part to play in higher

15 Sanderson, op cit., p. 5. - 13 -

policy development and must remain as the professional heads and commanders of their

Services for all activities other than operations and CDF directed exercises..."'^

In confirming the continuing role and influence of the Chiefs of Staff,

Sanderson's Review did not alter the underlying foundation on which the machinery of the

Department of Defence was anchored. Indeed, the Terms of Reference given to Sanderson by the CDF, General Gration, stated that: "... there is no intention to change fundamentally the existing individual and joint responsibilities of the Secretary, CDF, and Chiefs of Staff as set out in present Ministerial Directives"'^.

This limitation was provided within guidelines that stated: "... no aspect of the

(Departmental) arrangements requiring close Service staff involvement is excluded from the

Review... By implying, however, that the role of certain key Defence individuals was not to be altered, the Terms of Reference severely constrained the Review.

The Defence Force and the Community (The Wrigley Review)

In June 1990 Mr A.K. Wrigley presented to the Minister for Defence a report which examined the relationship between the Defence Force and the civil community. While

'' ibid, p. 6. '' ibid, p. 1. '' ibid, p. 1. - 14-

focussing on the perceived need for "a partnership in Australia's defence"^^ Wrigley also

commented on the existing higher Defence management arrangements.

In discussing public attitudes to defence Wrigley noted that "An Australian

community ... can be forgiven for turning its back on defence issues when there is apparently

such sharp division among politicians and defence experts over what defence is about""®.

Later Wrigley noted that "Different interests in the defence establishment have different

priorities and for different reasons.

Wrigley's Review proposed far reaching changes in the manner in which the

ADF operates and some of his recommendations, such as the Commercial Support Program

(CSP), are now being implemented. While he was not required to examine the higher Defence

management apparatus, it is significant that he saw fit to note that divisions apparently do exist

in the current arrangements.

Further Reviews of the High Defence Machinery

Although the dust has barely settled on the Sanderson Review two more

reviews into the functioning of the higher Defence machinery have been undertaken. The first

was conducted by Mr R. Brown, a special consultant to the Minister and a former Permanent

Head of a government department. The task given to Brown is particularly relevant to this paper as his terms of reference required him to "assess their (other current management

Wrigley, The Defence Force and the Community, Title page, ibid, p. 20. ibid, p. 21. - 15 -

reviews) effectiveness and their rate of progress Put simply, Brown was required to

"review the reviews" and report on the organisation's progress in implementing earlier agreed recommendations. Again, an external consultant had been engaged to conduct an important review.

The second review, entitled "Further Review of Higher Defence Staffs", was conducted by a combined military/civilian team comprising Mr G. Watters and Commodore

Alan Thompson. It is significant that an additional review was seen as being required so soon after the Sanderson Review was completed and before the new arrangements had been running for three years. The results of this review are believed to have favoured fijrther centralisation, however, they have not been released.

A constant process of review now seems to be a feature of the Defence landscape in Australia. The use of external civilian consultants to conduct some of the reviews also seems to have become a norm. Clearly, something is wrong with the defence planning process. As Ross Babbage has stated: "... the only means presently available to guide defence development is the flawed planning process"•^ It would appear that the review process that the Department of Defence has been subject to since the late 1950s has not solved some fiindamental problems.

^ SEC 183/1992, CDF 134/1992, Ministerial Consultant - Mr Ron Brown, p. 3. ^ Babbage, A Coast too Long, p. 207. - 16-

PART2

ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE THEORY AND REVIEWS OF THE ADF - 17-

Organisational Culture and the ADF

Organisational culture exists throughout all organisations. It can be described

in various ways^ however, for the purpose of this analysis it will be described as the

"personality" of an organisation. Personality change is difficult to achieve in almost all

circumstances and it is particularly difficult in large and diverse organisations. It is suggested that a common failing of the many reviews into the higher defence machinery in Australia is that the individuals running the review have consistently failed to develop a comprehensive plan for implementing the "personality" changes required in the defence organisation to allow the full achievement of the benefits anticipated by the review. These reviews have produced recommendations for structural change but they have largely ignored the need to tackle the organisational cultural change that would be required to support the structural change recommended.

Fundamentally, the main issue tackled by each of the reviews examined is the bringing together of the three Services and the civilian members of the Department of Defence into a cohesive body at the national level. This theme appears in the Morshead Review^ and constantly reappears in the subsequent reviews. The latest review, the Thompson-Watters

Review still reveals this theme. If tri-Service and civilian cohesion at the

' Kanter, The Challenge of Organisational Change, p. 11. Organisational Culture is usually described as the "character" or "personality" of an organisation. Personality has been used in this paper. ^ Morshead, Organisation of the Defence Group of Departments Advisory Committee Report, p. 4 and Second Report, p. 20. - 18- national level is required but yet proves so elusive after repeated structural change, perhaps the previous reviews have expected too much from simple, structural change.

Organisational cultures are shaped by many things and two very important factors are the environment^ in which the organisation exists and the boundaries'* that exist within organisations and between organisations. These two factors do much to shape the

"personality" of an organisation, in this case, the Department of Defence.

The Environmental Factor

The environment in which the three Services have been operating since the end of World War Two has been characterised by joint operations. Of the evolutionary changes in warfare that have occurred over the years the focus on joint operations has been the most significant. Conflicts are no longer fought in one medium. Ground forces rely on effective air and maritime support, air forces rely on ground forces to protect their installations and maritime forces for targeting information, navies rely on ground forces for protection of their bases and air forces for air cover. The move by Australia towards defence self reliance highlights this shift.

In this sense the environment in which the three Services operate has changed.

Operations can no longer be planned in single Service isolation and as a consequence, national defence policy and strategies cannot be developed by one Service in

Kanter, op cit., p. 15. ibid, op cit., p. 221-224. - 19-

isolation of the others. The external environment in which the three Services plan operations

and develop policy has taken on a distinctively joint character.

The environment in which the Services operate has also been affected by

changes in political factors. In the early fifties four ministers held portfolios that were directly

related to defence, namely the Ministers for Navy, Army and Air Force and the Minister of

Munitions^ In 1985 the position of Minister for Defence was established thus drawing into

one senior officer the responsibility for national defence policy. Subsequently, the number of

ministers directly involved in the defence policy making process has expanded to two plus the

additional support of a parliamentary secretary.

Although defence related ministerial responsibility has now been expanded to two ministers supported by a third parliamentarian, the nature of the roles of the ministers is vastly different from those of the single Services ministers of several years ago. Today's ministers for Defence and Defence Science and Personnel both have joint service responsibilities and responsibility for the civilian members of the Department.

This "environmental" change should be very important to any person contemplating structural change within the Department of Defence. The Parliamentary/ military interface on matters of national defence policy can only be conducted on a joint basis.

Therefore, it is fundamental to the well being of the Services and the Department as a

Morshead, op cit., p. 1. -20-

whole that the advice provided by the higher machinery of the Department of Defence be joint

and of the highest quality.

Currently, the single Services Chiefs have the ability to go direct to the

Minister for Defence on single Service matters^. This right is exercised quite frequently and is

seen as a "safety valve" through which single Service pressures that build up as a result of a

perceived lack of understanding at HQ ADF can be vented. It would also be natural for

Service Chiefs to use such one-to-one occasions with the Minister to increase their own

Service's standing vis-a-vis the other Services.

In a similar way, the civilian head of Department of Defence, the Secretary,

maintains a close personal contact with the Minister. In the Westminster tradition the

Secretary occupies a unique position that allows him to maintain the status accorded other permanent heads of departments in respect to the Minister, that is, a position of the most

senior bureaucrat. The diarchy that exists in the national defence arena has been the subject of considerable discussion over the years and indeed was strained by the recommendation of the

Tange Review which appeared to tilt the power in favour of the civilian head rather than the military^.

The "environment" in which the Secretary of the Department of Defence operates is identical to that of the uniformed Service Chiefs. The addition of his advice to that of the three Service Chiefs generates the potential for confusion and even possibly

^ Ministerial Directive to the CGS, p. 2, sub-para 2g. ^ JCFDAT, The Management of Australia's Defence, p. 34. -21 -

conflict. It is of concern, however, that the organisational culture of the higher Defence machinery has not really changed as a result of a changed parliamentary "environment". In the case of the Department of Defence three cultures are running simultaneously. Firstly, the uniformed Service Chiefs are conscientiously maintaining open channels to the Minister in the traditional way and secondly, and equally traditionally, the Secretary of the Department of

Defence is required to maintain the direct access required of senior bureaucrats in other government departments with their respective ministers. Simultaneously, the CDF is providing the dominant source of advice to both Ministers.

Viewed from an organisational and cultural change perspective, the many reviews into the higher defence machinery in Australia have consistently failed to recommend structural changes at the highest level that would allow a true alignment between the environment created by the Minister, now dealing only with a joint (including civilian) approach, and up to five separate sources of potentially conflicting advice. The driving force behind the need for joint advice is the reality that military operations are themselves now invariably joint. The core business of an organisation must direct its structure and culture.

Both the Baker Study and the Sanderson Review identified the pre-eminence of joint operations over single-service operations. In doing so they recommended structural changes that should have impacted directly on the culture of the uniformed services. The effect of these changes has the potential to impact enormously on the overall organisational culture of the defence organisation and will be dealt with separately. The changes proposed, - 99 - however, have not been implemented easily because at the highest level, environmental change has not been accompanied by organisational cultural change.

Organisational Boundaries

Organisational culture is affected by the presence of boundaries which serve to contain organisations in particular areas^ If meaningful cultural change is to occur then boundaries have to be removed or at least made permeable otherwise the original culture will continue. If major change is threatened then boundaries may be reinforced as resistance to the change intensifies. To implement change, existing boundaries must be identified and a methodology developed to remove or minimize the impact of those boundaries.

The importance of recognising this second major organisational change factor is evident in many of the larger corporate mergers that have occurred in recent years. Kanter discusses the effect as follows: "Even modest boundary changes may cause unanticipated changes that gradually alter an organisation's identity.... One new set of relationships can lead to others. New interorganisational relationships can change internal processes."^

In the defence arena organisational boundaries are very clear. The most obvious boundaries are those marked by physical appearance, that is by uniforms. Clear

Kanter, op cit., p. 212. ibid., p. 220 -23 -

boundaries exist between each of the three Services and also the civilian, "grey suited" members of the Department. Those boundaries run from the chief executive, the Service Chief of Staff, all the way down to the most junior recruit. With such clear cut organisational boundaries any change that is imposed and does not attempt to lower those boundaries will be unlikely to achieve anything more than minor alterations.

The nature of the changes imposed in several of the past reviews into the higher defence machinery reflect a desire to impose large scale changes on the organisation. Typically, however, the changes imposed do not contain any visible attempt to accompany the structural change with any of the "personality" cultural changes that are necessary to actually achieve change. The net result of the structural changes is simply that "the same old things are done a different way".

This has been particularly evident within the Service Offices where for many years structural changes in "central office" were "contained" by maintaining the existing organisational boundaries^®. The intention of structural changes could have been used as a catalyst to reduce Service Office bureaucratic overheads and lower the boundaries between the organisations.

The concept of organisational boundaries can also be used to prevent an unwanted organisational culture from penetrating and "polluting" another culture. In the context of this paper, the postings of middle ranking officers to HQ ADF appointments are

Cheeseman and Ball "Australian Defence Force Decision-making : Actors and Processes", Security and Defence: Pacific and Global Perspectives, p. 259. -24-

not considered to be as career progressive as other single Service appointments. At senior

levels joint postings serve to provide a 'tick in the box' with regard to a necessary exposure to

joint procedures and hopefully subsequent promotions. If the most capable middle ranking

officers are retained by the single Services the organisational boundary between HQ ADF and

the Services is hardened to the point of outright competition. This is hardly the means by

which an effective and efficient organisation would operate.

Methodology for Implementing Change

Change is most successfully implemented when maximum participation is

obtained from the chief executive officer down to the lowest level worker. People will resist

change if they are kept out of the change process'^ . If groups or individuals feel threatened

and insecure they can quickly become a dominant factor in strengthening resistance to change.

The reviews conducted to date into the organisation of the higher defence

machinery have been carried out by Ministerial or CDF nominees. Given that all of the reviews were seen by their terms of reference (TOR) to favour the centralisation of power in

HQ ADF, it is understandable than the Service Offices felt threatened. More energy was expended defending the Service Office than genuinely contributing towards finding the most efficient and effective solution.

Luthans, Organisational Behaviour, p. 573-574. ^^ Kanter, op cit., p. 370. -25 -

Such defensive practices are possible whenever important components of an organisation are exempt from scrutiny. In the case of the more recent reviews, the Chiefs of

Staff of the single Services have been specifically exempt from examination. In the case of the most recent Thompson-Watters Review, the TOR specifically states;

"The present formal roles of the CDF, the Secretary and the

Service Chiefs are to remain.'^

Such exclusions almost beg the question of "why conduct a review in the first place?" If the roles and functions of the leadership are to remain unaltered then ergo, their supporting structures must remain as is.

The methodologies used by previous review teams have been flawed in two organisational cultural change areas. Firstly, by excluding the single Service Chiefs of Staff from the review process the very existence of the various reviews has strengthened, rather than reduced, the boundaries that exist between the different organisations that together comprise the national defence machinery. This is not to say that this automatically means that the roles, etc, of the Chiefs of Staff should be changed. Rather it means that organisational boundaries must be examined if major organisational cultural change is required as opposed to simple structural change. The roles and functions of the Service Chiefs of Staff should be examined by any fijture review into the higher defence arrangements in Australia.

Department of Defence, DEFGRAM No 92/92. -26-

Secondly, previous reviews have been flawed by the confidential manner in

which they have been conducted. Organisational efficiency and effectiveness is the goal and

with only minor exception, national security would be unlikely to be jeopardised by conducting

open reviews with input from a wider variety of sources. The more people that participate in

reviews which strive for major change the better. It is acknowledged that several of the

previous reviews allowed submissions from outside sources however wide involvement of

various groups must be planned rather than calling for submissions and relying on individual

motivation to generate inputs.

The exclusion of the Service Chiefs of Staff from review also contradicts the

external environment in which all Services now operate. Failure to clearly identify and

articulate that new environment limits the amount of change that can be achieved as

components of the organisations being reviewed will fail to understand the need for change.

The most important aspect is still, however, to ensure that key elements of any organisations are n^ excluded from the review process. This is fundamental to implementing major organisational cultural change. Incremental change that is constantly resisted is debilitating to organistional strength. In some sections of an organisation it can seriously affect the morale of those that work within it. Organisational change is best effected by an appreciation of the environment in which the organisation is operating, careful and open planning spanning the entire organisation followed by swifl implementation. -27-

PART3

A CHANGING ORGANISATIONAL ENVmOISnVTENT FOR THE ADF - THE NEED TO FOCUS ON "CORE BUSINESS" -28-

Has the Impact of Impending Change Been Appreciated?

The final 'product' or core business of the large organisation known as the ADF

is the conduct of joint military operations. Everything else is secondary to this aim. If the

capability to conduct joint operations is lost, or no longer required, the ADF would find itself literally out of business. Joint operations then should drive the organisational structure.

Until 1987 the single Service Chiefs retained direct control over operations in which their Service was involved. Fully functioning operations centres were maintained at the

Service level as well as the Defence Central organisation manned by permanent operations staffs. As a result of the Baker Study, the single Service Chiefs were removed fi'om the operational chain of command. The commanders of Maritime, Land and Air Commands became joint commanders and were made responsible direct to CDF for the conduct of operations.

This change is possibly one of the most significant changes to have occurred to the ADF in recent times. For the first time in their history the Service Chiefs lost direct control over their 'core business' - military operations. The Service Chiefs are still able to extend influence on operational matters through their membership of the COSC, however, the power of the Service Chiefs was significantly reduced with the implementation of the recommendations of the Baker Study. -29-

The Baker Study recommendations received far less publicity and debate than

many of the other reports and reviews into Australia's higher defence machinery. For example, the subsequent Sanderson Review attracted significant media publicity and excitement within the ADF even during its preparation.

The Baker Study, however, was unique. It represented a change that genuinely accommodated the organisational environment in which the ADF now operates, namely, the need to always conduct joint operations. The Baker Study is unique also in the manner in which it forced a crossing over of all organisational boundaries that exist between the three

Services. Baker introduced fundamental organisational change to the ADF and this was largely ignored in many areas of the Services. One good example of the lack of understanding of the importance of the Baker Study is Army's retention of the previously mentioned operations centre and staff until 1992 when it was effectively removed as a result, not of an appreciation of its lack of utility in the new environment (now some 4-5 years old), but rather as part of an overall manpower reduction process.'

The main focus of change in the Baker Study was the emphasis placed on the operational chain of command. Under Baker's recommendations, three joint operational level headquarters were required. These were:

^ Army still retains an 'Army Activities Centre' which provides the Chief of the General Staff with updates on the many activities in which his Army is participating, including operations, however, the Activities Centre is not an operational headquarters in any sense. -30-

a. Maritime Headquarters,

b. Land Headquarters, and

c. Air Headquarters.

Importantly, the commanders of these joint headquarters were to report direct

to the CDF. The Service Chiefs of Staff were excluded from this operational chain except for

their involvement in the Chiefs of Staffs Committee (COSC). These recommendations have

been implemented and the three Chiefs of Staff have reluctantly given up their former key role

in operational planning and execution and instead now focus on raising, training and sustaining

the force provided to a joint commander. The Chiefs of Staff have become 'suppliers' of

forces rather than 'utilisers' of forces.

Additionally, Baker recommended the establishment of a Commander, Joint

Force Australia (CJFA) (formerly termed Commander-in-Chief) and an appropriate headquarters when the level of operational activity reached a tempo that overloaded the staff at HQ ADF and distracted them from their strategic level focus. CJFA, it was proposed, would be established above the three joint force commanders and below HQ ADF. CJFA was recommended to be a 3 star officer, that is, equivalent in rank to the three Service Chiefs of

Staff. -31 -

Core Business

The Baker Study identified the ADF's "core business" as the conduct of joint operations. From an organisational perspective this is a critical step in developing the correct corporate structure of any organisation. By identifying the ADF's "core business" Baker opened the door for a reorganisation of the ADF. The final organisation that is evolved can then be tested against its ability to support the ADF's ability to perform its core business.

Lines of Core Business Influence rLOCBI)

In any organisation effective power and control can be measured from an individual or sub-organisation's position relative to the LOCBI. The closer an individual or sub-organisation is to the LOCBI, the greater the power and control they can exert.

Conversely, as individuals and sub organisations move away from LOCBI so their power and control decreases.

Prior to the reorganisation resulting from the Baker Study LOCBI relative strengths were as shown in Figure 1. -32 -

HQ ADF

' k LOCBI

\ r ARMY OFFICE

/"'^VAL J ARMY AIR^^ ^ERATION "^OPERATION OPERATIOr^

Figure 1.

Figure 1 illustrates two fundamental weaknesses in the pre-Baker Study ADF organisation. Firstly, the strongest LOCBI were split into three and passed from HQ ADF to the single Services. While LOCBI can be split, it is essential that if this is the case, the core business function of the organisation must be capable of being carried out independently by the sub organisation at the end of the LOCBI. In the pre-Baker organisation the sub-organisations (single Services) were NOT capable of conducting operations independently. That is, all ADF operations carried out in the context of the ADF operating alone would be joint. This is a fundamental shift from providing single Service 'add-ons' to an allied or coalition force.

Secondly, Figure 1 illustrates the complexity of the LOCBI pattern within the pre-Baker ADF organisation. LOCBI were split vertically and horizontally. Importantly, vertical and horizontal LOCBI, albeit at different strengths, intersect at every level down to

the elements actually undertaking the operations. This should be compared with the

post-Baker organisation which now allows the operational elements to respond to and report

through one LOCBI that has clear focus and strength. Figure 2 shows the LOCBI after

implementation of Baker's recommendations.

Figure 2.

Effect of Organisational Distance From LOCBI

Any organisational sub-element or individual trying to exert control/power over core business matters from an organisational position distant from LOCBI will potentially suffer enormous frustration and possibly total failure. No matter how experienced an individual is, or how capable an organisational sub-element is, unless they have legitimacy in -34-

their responsibility to inject their skills into the undertaking of core business they will not likely

be heard.

The tensions that were generated within the ADF over the Defence Regional

Support Review (DRSR) are a case in point. This Review dragged on inexorably while the

single Services dug-in over rank levels, staffing limits and mess allocations. Indeed, the whole

Review was, at times, in danger of stalling as parties argued incessantly over points of detail.

Many of the adversaries were, however, not located close to the strong LOCBI that had been

established. As a result, the basic aim of the then CDF and Secretary, to establish joint

regional support centres, was achieved. In the aftermath of the fruitless debates, the Services

are now reviewing the results of the fight. Given the trenchant resistance offered the amount

of actual influence exerted was minimal and the limited apparent successes gained by resisting

change have become liabilities. Army now queries the number of personnel it has remaining in

these joint centres as generally their numbers exceed the numbers of the other two Services.

The Chiefs of Staff and LOCBI

The three single Service Chiefs of Staff have been moved to a position of weakness relative to the LOCBI that are now running through the ADF. This is despite the fact that the COSC is still an extremely important committee in the Defence process. The reduction in effectiveness is directly attributable to the fact that the Chiefs do not find themselves actively participating in the ADF's core business of joint operations. All three -35 -

Chiefs are clearly in the role of suppliers of forces to environmental commanders and thus to the CDF.

This point is not to in any way denigrate the importance of the supplier function. Indeed, it can be argued that the notion of the supplier function being a relatively unimportant one compared to operations is a weakness in the current ADF structure. The supplier function is critical to the successful prosecution of ADF operations. However, it is not an end in itself, it is a means.

The current organisational design of the higher ADF organisation provides a structure where the professional heads of the three Services have full control of the supplier function, they provide input to the core business function without control and they have the responsibility to lead their respective Service. Such a confused organisational design will lead to conflicting views of where the priority of effort is to be placed and a consequent lack of focus on the LOCBI. For example, the Service Chiefs can exert full control over their respective personnel functions with the exception of "star rank" officers. Promotion can therefore be made to suit Service needs rather than aiming at maximum operational effectiveness of the ADF's forces. An officer whose loyalties are towards joint organisations may be disadvantaged when competing for promotion against an officer who has remained focussed solely on employment in his or her parent Service. The supplier function could receive higher quality officers than the core business components.

The problem confronting the current ADF structure has had parallels in the USA. It is insightfiil to note some of the American experiences of the problems Service -36-

Chiefs faced when deciding where their power bases really were. That the problem is not new

is the first point. Eisenhower tried to pare Service responsibilities from the Service Chiefs but

failed because, as Hartmann and Wendzel point out: "The chiefs of service often regarded

their service roles as their more important roles, even though they may have highly valued

being JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) members. To express the point another way, the chiefs of

service saw the JCS and the JCS arena primarily one in which they could enhance overall

national security while preserving the roles and missions and position and responsibility of

their own services. Their attitude was that the overall national security of the United States is

ordinarily best served by blending together the strengths and capabilities of the several services

rather than looking at problems in the abstract. What was needed was coordination and

cooperation, but not subordination.""

In the USA the Service Chiefs were also seen as being removed from the

operational chain of command. They too were "suppliers", in this case to Commanders in

Chief (CINCs). The widespread concept that the Service Chiefs were actually generating

tension in trying to increase their influence on operations and preserve their own Service's

pride of place comes from the dilemma caused by placing the professional head of a Service,

the Service icon, in a position where he does not control the LOCBI. These leaders are not

able to shape their world. Korb explains the cause of this dilemma in personal terms rather

than organisational: "The problem of the service chief is not that he cannot divest himself of

his service duties. The real problem is he does not want to. The man who spends nearly forty years of his life as a follower in his service sees his appointment to the JCS as the

F. H. Hartmann, R. L. Wendzel, Defending America's Security, pi73. -37- opportunity to remake his service in his own image. He does not view it as an opportunity to serve as a principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense."^

Such an assessment grossly underestimates the integrity and intellectual capabilities of those distinguished servicemen that have reached the pinnacle of their particular

Service career. After nearly forty years of service these leaders would have a clear understanding of what is required to maximise operational outputs. They would see clearly the areas in which their particular Service would be best able to contribute to operational goals.

Rather than being a personality based problem it is an organisational design problem. Instead of being structured into an organisation which works cooperatively, the Australian Service

Chiefs are forced constantly to compete with each other for scarce resources and influence because of a deficient organisational design.

Organisational deficiencies permeate the attitudes of all members of an organisation at all levels. Unless there is visible benefit to be gained from "hitching a wagon" to the joint arena, individuals will simply not oblige. Enthoven explains the view from the perspective of a "victim" of the current system: "Picture if you will a man who has spent his entire aduh life in the Air Force, flying bombers and leading bomber forces. Bombers are his professional commitment and his expertise. His chances for promotion, public recognition, and success, and those of the officers serving under him, are largely tied to the continued importance of bombers.""^ Again, given an inadequate organisational structure, such personal experiences can have a deleterious effect on force structure.

^ Lawrence J. Korb, The Joint Chiefs: The First Twenty Five Years (Bloomington Ind. Indiana University Press 1976) p. 20. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? (New York Harper and Rowe, 1971), p.5. -38-

Jordan and Taylor observe that: "Organisational growth implies increasing

capabilities and greater importance in decision making and implementation. Morale is tied to

these measures of organisational success because career personnel perceive their own chances

for influence, promotion, and "success" augmenting as the size of their agency increases...

Organisations seek autonomy; that is, they seek to be as independent as possible from higher

authority and safe from threats to their missions and capabilities."^ The current ADF

organisation is characterised by five "centres of power", namely, the CDF and the three

Service Chiefs and the Secretary, Department of Defence. Given Jordan and Taylor's

observations the organisational dynamics operating in the ADFs higher management echelons

are diametrically opposed to generating a cohesive, joint approach to the defence of Australia.

The source of this pull away from the common goal is, it is argued, the three Service Chiefs of

Staff and their distance from the LOCBI that are operating in the ADF.

The United States 1986 Defence Reorganisation Act

The problem of inter-Service rivalry in the United States was considered to be so disruptive to national security that in 1986 the Defense Reorganisation Act

(Goldwater-Nichols Act) was passed by Congress. The most important aspect of this Act was to strengthen the position of the Chairman, JCS and to provide him with a vice chairman

(however, the Chairman, JCS was not given command of the Services). The legislation

^ A.A Jordan and W.J. Taylor, Jr., American National Security-Policy and Process (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1985) p. 210. -39-

specified that: "... the Joint Staff would be subject to the authority, direction and control of

the chairman, not the JCS (ie. the Service Chiefs of Staff) corporately"^. That Congressional

action was necessary to break an impasse is an indication of how strongly organisational

boundaries can be defended.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act contained, among other aspects, two very

important requirements. Firstly, the Chairman was given the statutory duty to perform net

assessments^ and prepare fiscally constrained strategic plans. These aspects of the Act have

received less attention than those parts dealing with the "personality" aspects, that is the

power of the Chairman, JCS vis-a-vis the Service Chiefs and the establishment of a joint

officer personnel policy which gives special career recognition to officers in joint service

postings.

Of particular interest is the duty to prepare fiscally constrained strategic plans

as, from an organisational design perspective, the linking of fiscal control directly to core

business is fundamental to ensuring a clear organisational focus for the total structure. The

implementation of Program Management and Budgeting (PMB) in the ADF set out to achieve

this linkage but has not been totally successful because program structure is Service oriented

and not function oriented. For example, there is no single, ADF budget allocation for the

"reconnaissance and surveillance function" as each Service determines what amount of

^ F. H. Hartmann and R.L. Wendzel, op cit., p. 181. ^ The Chairman's Net Assessment for Strategic Planning (CNASP) primarily assesses the recommended strategy, forces, and military options, including a force capabilities assessment comparing U.S. and allied forces with those of potential adversaries, during the defence planning period. -40-

its program allocation it will provide to this function separately. Concern is frequently

expressed that lines of financial control must not be allowed to interfere with the established

"chain of command".

Just how effective the Goldwater-Nichols Act is in reducing the competition

between the Services and in building the required "jointery" will have to be analysed over time.

However, two post 1986 outputs, Operation Just Cause and Operation Desert Shield/Storm,

can be commented on. Both of these operations were successfijl, especially the latter. Of

particular note was the very effective manner in which the National Command Authority

(NCA) comprising the President, the Secretary of Defence and the Chairman JCS dealt

directly with General Schwarzkopf with the Service Chiefs filling the role of "suppliers" by

providing the requisite personnel and equipment through the mobilisation process.

In some respects the organisation of the ADF is well advanced on that of the

defence forces of the United States. The establishment of the Chief of Defence Force Staff

(CDFS) in 1975 with a separate joint staff and subsequently the Chief of Defence Force

(CDF) in 1984 who has the statutory authority to command all three Services, moved the

ADF rapidly towards the goal of an organisation focussed on outputs rather than power bases.

Notwithstanding these very positive changes, the ADF, like the United States military, cannot shake off the leaden weight of inter-Service rivalry. An examination of the major LOCBI running through both organisations shows that the focus on producing joint forces capable of conducting effective and efficient military operations is still nowhere near sharp enough -41 -

The Establishment of Commander Joint Force Australia fCJPA)

In considering Australia's response to higher level contingencies Baker concluded that a case existed for the appointment of an operational Commander-in-Chief (C in

C)^ Since the report was written this concept has increased in strength and in late 1993

LTGEN J. Sanderson was formally appointed to the position (now known as CJFA) and given the task of establishing his new headquarters, initially in Canberra. Baker also observed that:

"...the creation of a C in C is likely to be practicable only with the collocation of existing joint force headquarters"^. Australia has not faced a high level contingency since the Baker Study was completed and the three joint headquarters have not yet been collocated, however, the appointment of CJFA has occurred. From an organisational perspective the creation of this appointment makes exceedingly good sense regardless of the type of contingency faced by

Australia.

By establishing CJFA and his headquarters a structure is produced that will allow for a very smooth transition through peacetime activities, low level, or short notice contingencies, to dealing with major military operations, that is, higher level contingencies. It is important that the ADF be structured to carry out its core business. It is dangerous to knowingly maintain an organisation that is unsuitable for periods of high activity and therefore vulnerable to problems and confijsion as it tries to deal with a deteriorating situation.

® Baker,J.S, .Report of the Study into ADF Command Arrangements, HQ ADF, Canberra, March 1988, p. 8-29. ' Baker, J.S., op cit., p. 8-26. -42-

The appointment of CJFA was made with virtually no comment from the

Services as a group. The planning work to collocate the three environmental headquarters has, however, been another drawn out, acrimonious business which is still some distance from decision let alone solution. This is not surprising since the posting of a three star rank officer is difficult for a single Service to influence yet the collocation plan is being managed through the full existing ADF committee process. While collocation is a "bricks and mortar" issue,

CJFA's appointment is a true organisational design issue and the one that will have by far the greatest effect on the existing Service Chiefs.

With the CJFA operating with the existing joint commanders (including

Commander NORCOM) the influence previously exerted by the Service Chiefs of Staff will be further reduced. The core business function of operations has been strengthened and the

LOCBI even more clearly defined. The new organisation is well suited to its core business of conducting joint military operations at all levels of military conflict. The operational flexibility inherent in the developing ADF structure is illustrated in Figure 3.

Fisiire 3. -43 -

In situations with little or no warning CJFA is able to readily work with HQ NORCOM and hopefully deal with the threat that has been presented. Should a large threat to Australia's security or interests develop the CJFA is able to operate with the three environmental joint commanders and bring the maximum ADF force required to bear in defeating that threat. A transition from one scale of threat to another, in either direction, can be accomplished without any organisational restructuring.

Administrative benefits could also flow from this new organisation. In particular, it would allow for a more complete introduction of PMB into the core business areas of the ADF. Programs could be easily structured to cater for functions rather than be restricted by "chain of command" arguments. Using the previously mentioned "reconnaissance and surveillance" example, the CJFA would be the commander of all of the force elements of each of the three Services that are employed in that functional area. As a Program Manager the CJFA would be able to take full and total responsibility for that functional area - something that is not possible in many cases at the moment.

Awareness of the Changing Environment

This section of the paper sought to examine whether the magnitude of impending change in the ADF has been appreciated and prepared for. So far, some of the changes proposed in the Baker Study have been examined and these have been related to the -44 -

concept of LOCBI. Consideration was then given to the position of the Ser\'ice Chiefs of Staff in relation to the LOCBI that exist within the ADF. A comparison was made to the situation that has prevailed in the United States military. Lastly, the establishment of CJFA and his headquarters was considered. The question now remains as to whether the single Services are sufficiently alert to their rapidly changing organisational environment. As shown in Part 2, the environment in which an organisation operates forces certain structural changes. To ignore those changes causes the nugatory expenditure of energy that should be focussed into the core business of the organisation.

Organisational changes are required to ensure that all components of the ADF are working in the same direction. Of particular importance is the relationship of the Service

Chiefs to the operational function of ihe ADF. In essence they should either be moved into the mainstream LOCBI or replaced by a totally new "supplier" organisation. The next section discusses three options that are available. -45 -

PART 4

ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE FOR

MORE EFFECTIVE ADF OPERATIONS -46-

Introduction

The organisational catalyst behind the need for change is the requirement for a

structure that facilitates joint operations. In this context joint operations are taken to mean

somewhat more than just two or more Services working together, which is often the practical

result of such activities as they are currently conducted. Joint operations in this context are

operations in which command is exercised over two or more single Service components and

the training, planning, administration and conduct of the operation are carried out within that

framework of command.

Only by developing such an organisational structure will the ADF realise its full potential and move forward from the plethora of organisational reviews that have consistently failed to address the core issue in a substantive manner, namely, inter-Service rivalry which has been tackled in a limited fashion only. The current financial and structural pressures on the

ADF highlight the critical need to move forward past these old barriers and achieve a truly joint organisation.

The preceding Parts of this paper have attempted to add a theoretical parallel to the practical problems currently being experienced by the ADF. Thus far, three key organisational change factors have been identified as being directly applicable to the ADF's organisational situation. These three factors are the environment in which the ADF now operates, the boundaries present within the current organisation and the position of the

Service Offices in relation to the lines of core business influence that run through the ADF. -47-

Reviews seeking to attain a degree of organisational change in the ADF should address these

issues thoroughly before proposing a revised structure for any part of the organisation.

Reviews should begin by looking outside the ADF and then proceed to full internal

examination. The majority, if not all, of the reviews to date have only conducted a limited,

internal examination. Having now identified the problem, the question is: how to solve it?

Drucker's Five Elements of Decision Making

In 1966 Peter F. Drucker, a leading management theorist, presented his "Five

Elements of Decision Making"'. The five elements are shown below and are related to the

current organisational situation in the ADF":

*Is the ADF Facing a Truly New and Permanently Changed Situation ? The

answer to this question is, unequivocally, yes. Australia will not return to the era of "great and

powerful fnends". The ADF will continue to seek greater self reliance and therefore

independent, joint operations will be the norm.

* What Does the Decision Have to Accomplish? Any subsequent ADF review

should aim at producing a truly joint organisation that is both efficient and effective.

'^Develop the Ideal Solution. To date all ADF reviews have begun with a compromise as key organisational elements have been excluded from scrutiny. Future

^ Drucker, P.F., The Effective Executive, p. 103-117. ^ Faith, J.C., "The Joint Challenge-and Opportunity", Parameters, Vol XXI No. 3, p. 44. Faith uses a similar treatment of Drucker's "Five Elelments of Decision-making" in his essay. -48-

reviews should begin with an "ideal solution" and proceed from there, ensuring that every organisational element is examined.

* Implement the Decision. The findings of future reviews must be implemented as quickly as possible after they are confirmed. If this is not achieved the original aim can be lost and the results can be overtaken by other changes leading to a mire of confused organisational changes.

*772^ Solution Must be Evaluated, The new organisation must be implemented, run and regularly tested to ensure that the change process has produced the desired result.

This Part of the paper will concentrate on the third of Drucker's Five Elements of decision making. Three possible "ideal" organisational structures ( models) that would meet the ADFs current and fixture needs are proposed. All Three models take cognisance of the environment in which the ADF is now operating, the boundaries that exist between the military components of the organisation and the existing LOCBI that run through the ADF.

Model One attempts to achieve a more effective joint organisation by a physical move

(transfer) of single Service power bases. Model Two attempts to achieve the aim by an amalgamation of those power bases. Model Three achieves its aim by eliminating some power bases altogether. It is proposed that one or all of these "ideal" solutions should form the basis upon which future reviews of the ADF are conducted. -49-

MODEL ONE ORGANISATION

POWER BASE TRANSFER

In June 1984 the author published a short article in the Defence Force JoumaP which proposed an organisational structure for the ADF based on the establishment of three joint commands namely, Joint Maritime Forces, Joint Land Forces and Joint Air Defence

Forces, and a much strengthened "central" staff with full operational responsibilities working under the then CDFS. At that time there was considerable debate about the ability of the existing Service operational commands to fulfil their primary task of the defence of Australia and there was a strong body of opinion that argued for changes similar to those proposed. The deficiencies in the existing ADF operational structure were well recognised and Fleet

Command, Field Force Command and Operational Command were transformed into Maritime

Command, Land Command and Air Command respectively over the 1985-87 period.

This change was significant for it raised the profile of joint operations to new heights. The change was however "transactional" rather than "transformational". Transactional change is change that allows the same things to be done a different way. Transformational change, however, requires a fundamental re-examination of what needs to be carried out and why and how best to achieve those goals regardless of the existing system. Initially, the establishment of the new joint commands resulted in a business-as-usual approach. The Baker

Study introduced the concept that the joint commanders should report

^ Dunn, P.J., The Next Step in Australia's Defence Evolution, Defence Force Journal, No 46, May June 1984, Canberra, p. 35-39. -50-

directly to HQ ADF bypassing the Sen/ice Chiefs. The Service Chiefs would then.concentrate on "command of their service, for training, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling the Service or for participation in the COSC"^ This was the beginning of a transformational change, however, its effect was limited by the strong links that remained between the Service

Offices and the joint commanders.

One key point in the Defence Force Journal proposal, however, received scant attention and was not seen to be an issue at the time. The proposal called for the elevation of the commanders of the new joint commands to 3 star rank with the existing Chiefs of Staff of the single Services being downgraded to 2 star rank as compensators. Significant advantages could be gained by such a transfer of positions. Firstly, these new positions would be practical command positions rather than staff positions and secondly, by placing these 3 star rank officers in command of joint forces , existing single Service parochialism would be ameliorated.

Model One therefore is based on the existing joint command structure but with the significant variation of placing the senior 3 star rank position in each Service in command of Maritime, Land and Air Commands respectively. It is proposed that the single Service elements that are required to "raise, train and sustain" the forces allotted to the joint commanders would be commanded by a 2 star rank officer. The respective organisational power bases would therefore be reversed. The "supplier" function described in the previous

Baker, J.S., op cit., p. 6-16. -51 - section would clearly be ascribed to the junior commander, in this instance a single Service commander. The senior commander would be in all respects the "utiliser" and be directly involved in the core business of the organisation. This would be actioned in a joint environment.

The "raise, train and sustain" function of the 2 star rank single Service commanders requires elaboration. To ensure that a power base transfer actually occurs the full operational requirements of the joint commanders must be met. If the single Service commanders conducted all recruiting, all training (that is individual and collective) and controlled all logistic support, a transformational change would not be achieved. Rather conflict would most likely result as the joint commander would not have control over many key aspects of preparing his forces for operations. The single Service commanders should be required to input to a joint recruiting effort as is the case now. It is important that the joint commanders also provide a major input to recruiting plans if imbalances are to be avoided.

Clearly, any joint commander would want to train his forces. In this regard the single Service commanders would be responsible for individual training but collective training would be tightly controlled by the joint commanders. The joint commanders would require a much greater involvement in logistics than is currently the case. They must control the supply of the materiel they need to fight and win.

The recent trend in the logistic arena is towards joint facilities such as the new

Defence National Storage and Distribution Centre (DNSDC) in Sydney. While this would assist the proposed joint commanders it does not remove the need for them to totally control their operational logistic support. In essence the change must be total; or regardless of -52- relative ranks, the Service commander will tend towards being a "utiliser" in competition with the joint commanders. In such a situation the experience of retired United States Air Force

General David C. Jones could be repeated here: "I received all of my money, all of my airplanes, all of my people, my people got promoted and were reassigned by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. I received nothing in the way of money and equipment from my Joint

Commander (the CINC); therefore, my Service chief had much more influence on me and my command than did the joint system"^

The establishment of the position of CJFA prevents the new organisational structure from becoming a replica of the previous single Service based organisation that

Model One is designed to replace. Without the unifying effect of CJFA the joint commanders could very easily revert to a parochial single Service position that would impede the development of the required joint capabilities. The fact that the CJFA and the three joint commanders are of the same rank is not of any consequence. Military personnel frequently operate in a subordinate role to an officer of the same rank as it is the appointment that determines the superior/subordinate relationship. The current 2 star rank Land Commander and his equivalent rank divisional commanders is an ADF example. Similarly, in the United

States the Chairman, JCS, the Service Chiefs of Staff and all CINCs are 4 star rank officers.

Hartmann, F.H. and Wendzel, R.L., Defending America's Security, p. 174. -53 -

In the case of the respective materiel procurement divisions of each of the single Services, it is proposed that they be centralised vvithin the Department of Defence and formed into a single joint procurement agency. This concept has been examined separately and will not be dealt with in detail in this paper, suffice to say that with the very clear focus on core business provided by this model, the creation of a Defence Procurement Agency becomes an essential component of the proposed reorganisation.

Outline Model One Organisation

The main features of the Model One organisation are illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4. -54-

The 2 star rank Chiefs of Staff would primarily be responsible for individual

training and those logistic matters that did not represent direct war fighting capability. For

example, naval clearance divers would be trained initially at an establishment run by the

organisation responsible to the Navy Chief of Staff. Once qualified in their trade, they would

be posted to a joint commander who would be responsible for their integration into the

operational forces and their further training.

In the logistic field, an example of what is envisaged is the provision of air

safety engineering support. While this is a very important matter to all three of the new joint

commanders, it is not something that should distract them from the achievement of operational

goals. Rather, this form of engineering support should be provided constantly and at a very

high standard "behind the scenes". As is the case for individual training matters, the joint

commanders should only become involved in such logistic support matters when they directly

affect operations, for example, when air safety engineers make a determination that restricts

the safe flight envelope of combat aircraft.

Modifications Required to the Defence Committee Structure

The most significant change to the existing committee structure that would be required should a Model One reorganisation be undertaken would be the abolition of the

COSC as it is currently known. In its place would be a Joint Commanders' Advisory -55-

Committee (JCAC). It is proposed that this committee be comprised of the following military officers: CDF, VCDF, CJFA, the Assistant Chief of Defence Force - Operations (ACOPS) and the three Joint commanders. Because of the command relationship that would exist between the CJFA and his joint commanders, they would necessarily have less influence than CJFA.

More importantly, their function in the Committee would be to represent their Command, not their Service. The JCAC would primarily focus on operational matters and on determining operational requirements.

The single Service organisations would be required to be members of another key committee known as the Joint Support Advisory Committee (JSAC). It is proposed that the military membership of this committee be: VCDF, a senior officer from CJFA's HQ the three 2 star rank Service Chiefs of Staff. This committee would be directly focussed on the provision of support to the joint commanders. Should the JSAC be required to discuss matters that impinged on support to the strategic level of operations, then the Assistant Chief of

Defence Force- Logistics (ACLOG) would also attend.

Resource Management Issues

Existing Portfolio and Program structures would require extensive overhaul however the final product would be functionally oriented and more effective than existing arrangements. CJFA would become the Program Manager for the "Joint Operations" Program while VCDF should be the "Joint Support" Program Manager. The appointment of -56-

the VCDF as the Joint Support Program Manager may seem too heavy a burden given his

current extensive responsibilities for such things as Force Development, however, the

introduction of the Model One organisation would see many of these responsibilities shared

with CJFA thus spreading the workload. The continued introduction of PMB would be greatly

facilitated by a Model One organisation.

MODEL TWO ORGANISATION

POWER BASE AM.ALGAMATION

The key organisational design problem within the current Defence structure is

the presence of five separate power bases. The bases exist in each of the Service offices, HQ

ADF and the Secretary's organisation. A solution could be the amalgamation of these separate power bases and simultaneously retaining the unique positions of the Chiefs of Staff.

. It is possible that each of the Service Offices, as they are currently organised, could be significantly reduced and incorporated into HQ ADF. The three Chiefs of Staff could become Vice Chiefs of Defence Force, Sea, Land and Air (VCDF(S), VCDF(L) and

VCDF(A)) and still retain their responsibilities as the professional heads of their respective

Services. In this way the existing Service Chiefs would become an integral part of the joint

ADF structure and therefore have ownership of the outputs of the organisation. Figure 5 illustrates the proposed Model Two organisation. -57-

Outline Model Two Organisation

CDF****

VCDF(S)*** VCDF(L)*** VCDF(A)*** NAVY ^ ARMY ^ AIRFORCE

CJFA***

MARITIME ' LAND COMMAND** COMMAND**

Figure 5.

By moving into HQ ADF the three new VCDFs would be in a far better position to monitor the output of the joint staff officers from their own Service. The consequent reduction in requirements for high quality staff officers would allow a better distribution of the best officers to critical areas in the joint arena. The competition for resources that currently exists between HQ ADF and the Service offices would be eliminated.

The existing position of VCDF would be available for relocation or disbandment. -58-

The CDF would gain through the development of a truly joint approach to

Defence development and policy making. Each member of the newly created executive would

be a stakeholder in the results of the organisation rather than a competitor. Most importantly,

each member of the executive would be able to involve himself in the process of force

development and policy making to whatever degree was deemed necessary. Rather than

debate a proposed policy after it has been produced, the three environmental VCDFs would be party to its production and assume a degree of ownership of the product.

Single Service Responsibilities of the VCDFs

The success of joint operations lies in the melding together of well developed single Service skills into a multi-environment plan under a single command structure.

Joint training should be directed at teaching the Services to understand the principles under which each of the other Services operates. It is impossible to create totally

"inter- changeable" Service officers. It is possible, however, for the three environmental

VCDFs to retain those single Service responsibilities that ensure the requisite level of professionalism is maintained in their Service.

This quality control mechanism can be maintained by a discrete single Service staff working directly to each of the three VCDFs. These staffs could be quite small compared to the existing Service offices as there would no longer be the need to duplicate functions currently found in HQ ADF, for example. Service Conditions, some logistic functions, capital -59-

equipment acquisition and strategy and concepts staffs. A reduction in the single Service

staffs would also be facilitated by the fact that under the proposed structure, the three VCDFs would be central to the joint staffs carrying out those functions in HQ ADF rather than peripheral as is now the case. Staffs whose function it is to review policies emanating from

HQ ADF would no longer be required.

Single Service functions that could be retained include individual training and doctrine development as these require constant and close supervision to ensure that they maintain pace with technological change, policy shifts and changes in the international environment (for example, UN commitments). An ability to control single Service logistic support would also be necessary. Personnel management should, however, be centralised within a separate agency within HQ ADF.

The single Service Chiefs would be required to execute their financial obligations and responsibilities under Program Management and Budgeting. They would still retain their positions as Program Managers as they must be responsible for the allocation and expenditure of funds to maintain Service capability in accordance with Portfolio guidance.

They would also be involved in functional PMB through their joint responsibilities.

Given the single Service functions that still must be carried out by the new

VCDFs, their titles could be adjusted. The traditional titles of Chief of the Naval Staff -60-

(CNS), Chief of the General Staff (CGS) and Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) could be added to

the respective VCDF title, for example, VCDF(S)/CNS. VCDF(S)/CNS and his counterparts

are only responsible to one superior, CDF, which retains unity of command.

The Higher Level Committee Structure

The establishment of the three environmental VCDFs would necessitate a

change in the higher level Defence committee structure. The present focus of the Chiefs of

Staff Committee (COSC) on decision making based on single Service perspectives would no

longer be relevant, as, the focus would shift to the joint arena. Ownership of decisions would

be spread between the CDF and his three VCDFs as they would truly be the higher, uniformed

executive.

A single Joint Defence Executive Committee (JDEC) would be a possible

solution. The JDEC would be the appropriate forum for the discussion of matters that

currently are put before the COSC. Such an executive arrangement would see a significant

reduction in preparatory staff work as members of the JDEC would have direct involvement in

the development of the issues that are put before them for decision. As only one staff, the joint staff, would be involved in the production of agenda items being placed before the JDEC, the overall supporting staff effort under the proposed Model Two system would be significantly less than that which is the present case. -61 -

The Relationship Between the VCDFs and the Joint Staff

The management of ADF matters would require a different system from that required to make executive decisions. The creation of three VCDFs has the potential to generate three different management requirements being imposed on the joint staff. This would be unworkable. The three VCDFs must, however, be intimately involved in line management functions if the benefits of the proposed re-organisation are to be realised. If the three VCDFs are placed to one side they will not be able to constantly bring their professional Service experience to the Defence management process and an amalgamation of power bases will not be achieved.

Placing the three VCDFs directly in the management chain in lieu of the existing VCDF would not produce the desired result unless a single line of management direction could be assured. The formation of a management committee would provide the solution. The three VCDFs could provide management direction through the Joint Defence Management Committee (JDMC). This committee would be subordinate to the JDEC and include senior Defence civilian managers as well. Other members could be co-opted as necessary. The purpose of the JDMC would be to ensure the smooth management of the Defence process in accordance with the directions and guidance issued by the JDEC.

The chairperson of the JDMC should rotate, probably on an annual basis. This would serve a number of important purposes. Firstly, by establishing a chairperson, the -62-

responsibility for the day to day management of processes could have a single focus. Three

VCDFs would not all be trying to give directions to the joint staff simultaneously. Secondly, more functional balance could be maintained within HQ ADF by rotating VCDFs such that the

Chairperson of the JDMC is generally from a different Service to the incumbent CDF.

MODEL THFLEE ORGANISATION

POWER BASE ELIMINATION

Models One and Two provide for a relocation of power bases. It is possible that with the retention of these power bases, the Chiefs of Staff of the single Services, at whatever rank level, could work as a brake to the fijrther development of a truly self reliant

ADF. Consideration therefore needs to be given to developing a model that ehminates a number of the existing power bases altogether.

A common feature of Models One and Two is the basic structure of CJFA's organisation. The only real organisational difference being the rank levels of the joint commanders under CJFA ( although there are significant differences in the organisational dynamics of each of model). Model Three also adopts the existing CJFA structure and retains the rank level of the joint commanders at 2 star rank. The major organisational changes relate to the "supplier" function. -6 J -

Model Three proposes the establishment of a Joint Support Command that

comprises the training and logistic functions currently located in the single Services

(specifically the individual training and the base logistic functions). This new joint organisation would be commanded by a 3 star rank officer and provided with three 2 star rank officers as subordinates who would be responsible for the single Service aspects of the "supplier" function. The joint commander of this new organisation would be known as the Commander,

Joint Support Command ( CJSC).

The question of whether the residual individual training and base logistics functions would require a 2 star rank officer from each Service has not been addressed in this study and would need to be examined closely prior to implementation. This point does not affect the overall organisational design proposed in Model Three since the 2 star rank officers are subordinate to CJSC and the basic structure is unaltered by the numbers of subordinate positions.

A possible argument against the establishment of a Joint Support Command is the span of command of both the CJSC and his principals. This argument is rejected given the large advances made in firstly, the joint logistics arena with the opening of the DNSDC in

Sydney in December 1993 and secondly, with the moves towards joint individual training, best exampled by the success of the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA). Rather than create problems, the proposed Joint Support Command could clear away many obstacles and -64 -

achieve significant reductions in costs and overheads. For example, the three single Service

Staff Colleges could be amalgamated into one thereby ensuring a solid exposure to joint staff procedures for middle ranking officers of the three Services.

The creation of the position of CJSC as a 3 star rank officer would be compensated for by the elimination of one of the existing Service Chiefs positions. It is important to note that over the last seven years there has been a net increase in the number of

3 star rank positions by two, namely, the establishment of the VCDF's position and most recently, the establishment of the CJFA. These increases have taken place against a background of a shrinking ADF and organisationally this should be corrected to prevent an imbalance in command positions occurring and a consequent dilution of the relevance of less senior positions. It is proposed that the VCDF's and CJFA's positions be compensated for by using the remaining two 3 star rank Service Chiefs' positions thereby restoring the previous rank balance.

As was the case in Model One the materiel procurement flinction is moved in this model to HQ ADF. It is envisaged that a joint procurement agency would be established as a stand alone organisation within the Department of Defence. -65 -

Model Three Outline Organisation

The main organisational design features of this model are its emphasis on "jointery" and structural balance. Regardless of where a member of the ADF was posted, he or she would be a member of a joint formation. This model has some similarity to that offered previously by Dr Graeme Cheeseman as an alternative command structure^ for the ADF. The similarity is, however, only superficial as the organisational dynamics of the two models are entirely different. Cheeseman's model proposes, for example, a complete reorganisation of the ADF's combat elements into geographic commands whereas Model 3 retains the current CJFA structure. Model 3 is preferred as it requires less organisational change to achieve and, more importantly. Model 3 facilitates the introduction of functional PMB programs.

Unification is not proposed in the Model Three organisation although, as can be seen in Figure 6, it would be a possibility at a later date should that course of action be desired. The proposed structure for the Model Three organisation is illustrated in Figure 6.

^ Cheeseman, "An Alternative Approach to Structuring the Army", Reshaping the Australian Army, pi 88. Cheeseman has proposed the establishment of a "Home Command" and a "Support Command". While the Home Command structure is not fully supported because of its complexity, the proposals for Support Command are agreed in all but minor detail. -66-

Fisure 6.

Higher Defence Committee Structure

Like Model One, the COSC would cease to exist as the senior militaiy committee. Instead a Joint Commanders' Committee (JCC) would be formed with military -61 - representation comprising CDF, VCDF, CJFA and CISC. Model Three offers the most simple solution to the required military representation in higher committees as it provides a balanced, senior joint command group that is not wracked by split loyahies. Typically, a Service balance would need to be maintained between VCDF, CJFA and CISC and this would ensure knov/ledgable and experienced input to the deliberations of the JCC.

Several other subordinate committees would naturally also be required to ensure the smooth running of the ADF. These are not covered in this paper as they form as a direct consequence of the senior military committee arrangements and would be determined by the Secretary, CDF and possibly the Minister for Defence.

Resource Management Issues

A particular strength of the proposed Model Three organisation is its suitability for the establishment of a functionally oriented financial management system. Under this organisation CJFA would be the program manager for joint operations and the CJSC program manager for joint support. Functions, such as officer training for example, could then be identified and sub-program structures established in a most effective manner. -68-

PART 5

CONCLUSIONS -69-

Background to the Study

For some thirty five years now the Australian defence planning and policy

making machinery has been subject to almost constant review. The issue for concern is not

that the reviews are continuing; this can ensure a healthy and vibrant organisational structure.

The concern is that the reviews all point to the urgent need to address the issue of joint

structures vis-a-vis single Service structures. Babbage has noted: "In total, the defence

organisation's approach to its planning process problems gives the impression of being patchy

and rudderless. It is time that the serious flaws in the planning system identified by the succession of external reviews were overcome."^

The failure of these successive reviews to resolve the key issue of joint versus single Service domination prompts the search for a theoretical reason for lack of effective results. In examining the succession of reviews a common feature can be discerned. Namely, the reviews did not tackle the thorny issue of the roles of the single Services in any detail and in some reviews, the TOR specifically excluded them from review. The cursory examination or total exclusion from review of the Service Chiefs of Staff has had a major impact in lessening the ability of the various reviews to come to a complete picture of the organisational dynamics that operate within the Department of Defence. As a consequence, the change achieved through this review process has been slow and incremental. If an organisational review is to be conducted then no part of the organisation to be reviewed should be excluded.

Babbage, A Coast Too Long, p. 211. -70-

This requirement assumes major importance when the area excluded is the chief executive and

his direct supporting staff and infrastructure.

Application of Organisational Change Theory to Defence Reorganisation

When conducting reviews, cognisance must be taken of the impact that the

chosen methodology will have on the actual implementation of the reviews' recommendations.

Frequently, organisational reviews into the higher defence machinery in Australia have been

cloaked in secrecy. This is counterproductive to implementation as organisational areas

excluded from detailed knowledge of the progress of the review will exercise a normal

organisational response of erecting or reinforcing boundaries to ensure their organisational

survival.

Reviews must also take cognisance of the external environment in which the

organisation under review is operating. Most members within organisations who have taken an

active interest in the external influences on their parent organisation will be quick to see the

shortfalls of any review that fails to take account of changing external environments. Should a

review fail in this regard, those same individuals will be unlikely to be convinced by its

findings. Operating environment and organisational boundaries are key components of

organisational culture and therefore must be taken into account when commencing any review

of organisational structure. Most of the reviews of Australia's higher defence machinery undertaken to date have failed to adequately consider the existing organisational culture and therefore they have had little hope of actually changing it. -71 -

The Baker Study, however, stands out as one which shows a good appreciation of the organisational culture of the Defence organisation. As a consequence, his most far reaching recommendations are already in place. Namely, the Service Chiefs have been removed from the operational chain of command, NORCOM has been established and CJFA appointed. The effect of these important changes does not, however, appear to be fully appreciated by the single Services. Baker's changes have served to significantly strengthen the joint environment in which the single Services must now operate.

The Baker Study allows the clear identification of the "core business" of the ADF. This business is the conduct of joint operations and therefore everything else should be subordinate to the attainment of a successful joint operational outcome. Once the "core business" is identified the flinctional "lines of core business influence" can be identified. Personnel who are not organisationally located close to these LOCBI actually have very little influence on the direction taken by the core business. Should organisational power bases exist in areas where LOCBI are weak those power bases should be moved to coincide with the LOCBI or be eliminated. The single Service offices represent organisational power bases that need to be redefined organisationally to place them closer to the existing LOCBI "post Baker" or to remove them. -72-

Three Alternative Organisational Models For Defence

Three organisational models have been outlined in this paper, namely, Model

One-Power Base Transfer, Model Two-Power Base Amalgamation and Model Three-Power

Base Elimination. Each of these models would produce a more efficient and effective

organisation for the defence of Australia. As illustrated in Part 4 of this paper, Model One

places the 3 star rank Service Chiefs of Staff into the three environmental commands under

CJFA. Model 2 moves them into HQ ADF as "environmental" VCDFs and Model Three

eliminates the Service Chiefs of Staff altogether in favour of the existing VCDF, CJFA and a

new appointment known as the Commander, Joint Support Command (CJSC).

All three of these models acknowledge the strengthened joint environment

following the implementation of the recommendations of the Baker Study. The three models

also remove, or substantially reduce, existing organisational boundaries between the single

Services and the growing joint organisations within the ADF.

The organisational change process in Defence should be continued by the wide circulation of these three models throughout the organisation for comment. Circulation removes the secrecy under which previous reviews laboured. Hidden agendas are then difficult, if not impossible to maintain. After comments have been received, the Review Team can begin its analysis to determine the most suitable organisation for the ADF. -73 -

The Future Challenge of Organisational Change

The challenge that lies ahead for the ADF is to continue to move towards a

unique solution to the organisation of our higher defence machinery. The continuing need to

become truly self reliant drives the development of an organisational structure for the ADF

that is specifically tailored to a modest, modern defence force capable of operating

independently either within Australia or in our region. The ADF cannot afford components

that are not directly focussed on succeeding in the core business of joint operations.

The extent of this challenge should not be underestimated. As Sir William Cole

observed: "The Defence machine finds it very difficult to handle contentious issues, especially

those involving new concepts. This is not because the people concerned lack the necessary

knowledge or ability. On the contrary, there are a great many extremely talented people in

Defence both on the military and civilian sides. Rather, it is because, where authority is divided, as it is in an organisation containing five major elements, and the matter concerned is contentious, stalemates too easily develop. To the outside observer the Defence decision-making machine wears down those wanting progress by delay and attrition".^

^ Cole, W., A New Approach to Defence: The Wrigley Report and After. Australian Institute for Public Policy Policy Paper No. 19 ,1990, p. 23. BTBLIOGRAPHY

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