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ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE in the AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE: TOWARDS a UNIQUE SOLUTION Brigadier Peter J. Dunn, AM Master of Defence S

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ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE in the AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE: TOWARDS a UNIQUE SOLUTION Brigadier Peter J. Dunn, AM Master of Defence S ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE IN THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE: TOWARDS A UNIQUE SOLUTION Brigadier Peter J. Dunn, AM Master of Defence Studies Sub-Thesis University College The University of New South Wales Australian Defence Force Academy 1994 CONTENTS PARTS 1 PRINCIPAL CHANGES IN AUSTRALIA'S MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE SINCE THE 1950s 1 2 ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE THEORY AND REVIEWS OF THE ADF 16 3 A CHANGING ORGANISATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FOR THE ADF- THE NEED TO FOCUS ON "CORE BUSINESS" 27 4 ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE FOR MORE EFFECTIVE ADF OPERATIONS 45 5 CONCLUSIONS 68 BIBLIOGR.\PHY 74 FIGURES 1 LOCBI IN THE PRE-BAKER STUDY ADF 32 2 LOCBI IN THE POST- BAKER STUDY ADF 33 3 OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY IN THE ADF STRUCTURE 42 4 MODEL ONE ADF ORGANISATION 53 5 MODEL TWO ADF ORGANISATION 57 6 MODEL THREE ADF ORGANISATION 66 Ill ABSTR.4CT The Australian Defence organisation has been the subject of almost constant review since the 1950s. The first of these major reviews, the Morshead Review was initiated in 1957. This review coincided with the growing realisation that Australia had to become more self reliant in defence matters. The experience of World War Two had shown that total reliance on "great and powerful friends" was a dangerous practice and self reliance dictated that Australia's military forces would have to act together in a joint environment. Australia's system of military command had to be capable of producing effective policies and planning guidance to met the new demands of independent joint operations. Successive reviews aimed at moving the Australian Defence Forces toward a more joint organisation have resulted in major changes to the higher defence machinery. However, fundamental problems, rooted in inter-Service rivalry, still exist. Over recent years organisational change has been the subject of intense study. Consideration of the results of this research shows that the majority of the Defence reviews undertaken to date have failed to win support for the implementation of the most important of their recommendations because of a failure to appreciate the "organisational culture" of the ADF and then produce specific plans to alter that culture. Factors such as openness, external environment, internal organisational boundaries and the identification of the ADF's "core business" must be taken into account when organisational changes are being developed. When these factors are considered it is apparent that the major obstacle to effective organisational change in the ADF is the role of the Service Offices vis-a-vis the joint HQ ADF. Paradoxically, the roles of the Service Chiefs of Staff, and therefore their supporting single Service structures, have previously been specifically excluded from organisational reviews. The Australian Defence machinery has therefore continued to operate under the organisational limitation of up to five competing power bases with a consequent dilution of effectiveness. Having identified the apparent cause of the current organisational change paralysis, three models are presented as options to be considered for the start of a far reaching organisational change. The resulting organisations would ensure that the ADF was closely focussed on its core business: the conduct of joint military operations. PARTI PRINCIPAL CHANGES IN AUSTRALIA'S MILFTARY COMMAND STRUCTURE SINCE THE 1950s -2- The Move Towards Self Reliance Since the end of World War Two there had been a steady move towards a more independent defence posture in Australia. The announcement in 1969 of the Guam Doctrine by US President Richard Nixon continued that evolution. In due course this fundamental change in defence outlook was reflected in policy. The 1975 Strategic Basis Paper advanced the "core force concept" and articulated the need for Australia to be capable of defence operations independent of the direct support of a major power, namely, the United States. Independent operations were seen as relevant to Australia's region and this shift did not imply that the value of Australia's defence alliances, in particular the ANZUS Treaty, had in any way diminshed. In November 1976 the Minister for Defence, Mr Killen, tabled the Government's Defence White Paper. The White paper reiterated the need for Australian defence planning to become more self reliant. Additionally, the White Paper clearly stated that the Government anticipated that joint operations would be the norm in most cases. The White Paper stated that: " any operations are much more likely to be in our neighbourhood than in some distant or forward theatre, and that our Armed Services would be conducting joint operations together as the Australian Defence Force."' Killen, Australian Defence, p. 10. -3 - The close link between the move to self reliance and the conduct of joint operations by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is clear. It is worth noting that this direct connection is a constant in post World War Two defence policy development. Earlv Reviews Change has been a constant feature of the defence landscape since the end of World War Two. This situation has its origins in the development of Australia's increasing independence from "strong and powerful friends" as the strategic realities of Australia's geopolitical circumstances became clear to Defence and Foreign policy makers. As early as 1957 the Morshead Review^ recommended a single Department of Defence and a Department of Defence Supply. The aim of this recommendation was to provide a single, central policy making body. The Review also recommended that the Service boards be abolished, however, the three Chiefs of Staff positions were to be retained to command the Services. The following year the Minister for Defence was established as the senior person in the development of Defence policy. A four star service position, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, was also created^ ^ Morshead, Organisation of the Defence Group of Departments Advisory Committee Report, p. 12. ^ Sanderson, The Report on the Structural Review of Higher ADF Staff Arrangements, p. 17, -4- The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee did not have command authority over the Services. This led to his position being weakened as consensus was often difficult to achieve between the three single Service Chiefs of Staff This weakness became more evident during the Vietnam War when a national commander was appointed as well as single Service component commanders'^. In 1967 The Special Committee on Intelligence was formed to "review the present Australian intelligence organisation and activities in the light of developments overseas and of Australia's particular requirements"^ This committee, known as the "Wilton Committee", presented its report in May 1968. In that report, the Committee expressed a major criticism of the existing intelligence organisation in that an excessive amount of effort was involved in producing objective and useful intelligence. One of the Committee's recommendations was the establishment of the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO). The Wihon Committee proposed that the Service Directorates of Intelligence be amalgamated into the new JIO. The recommendations of the Wilton Committee were implemented in the face of strenuous opposition from the Services. Discussions on the detailed organisations flowing from the Committee were acrimonious and protracted. Single Service intransigence was the subject of more than one report to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee during the establishment of JIO. ibid, p. 18. Dunn, The Development of JIO's Relationship with JTVIGP and the Services, p. 3. -5 - In 1968 the then Minister for Defence, Mr Fairhall, announced a series of reforms that also were aimed at strengthening the position of the Defence organisation vis-a-vis the Service organisations. In particular, the "Fairhall Reforms" replaced the joint service committee structure with permanent joint planning staffs headed by a two-star Director, Joint Staff^. Report on the Reorganisation of the Defence Group of Departments (The Tange Review) The 1972 Tange review was a fundamental and extensive review of Defence policy making and administrative procedures. The final report covered many areas but principal among them were the recommendations to amalgamate the separate departments of Defence, Navy, Army and Air Force and elements of the Department of Supply into a single Department of Defence. The position of Chief of the Defence Force Staff (CDFS) was also created as a result of the Tange Report. The power of the Minister for Defence was increased by passing to him many of the responsibilities of the old Service Boards. Tange also considered that the previous position of Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee "lacks statutory powers and is acting by consent"^. To remedy the latter problem Tange recommended that the CDFS be given formal power of command over the Chiefs of Staff of the Services. ^ Defence Report 1968, p. 7. ^ Tange, Report on the Reorganisation of the Defence Group of Departments,?. 34. -6- When Tange's final report was submitted the majority of the recommendations were accepted by Government. Not surprisingly, there were many who disagreed with the thrust and detail of the report and a long and often bitter debate ensued after its publication. The changes made on this occasion were extensive but the philosophy underpinning the changes had not altered significantly from that which underpinned the changes in the 1950s and 1960s. Fundamentally, the Defence apparatus was seen as being unable to produce concise, effective, collective
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