69- 18,470

BUSCH, Gary Kenneth, 1940- PAN-AFRICANISM AND PAN-AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS.

The American University, Ph.D., 1969 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

(C)Copyright by GARY KENNETH BUSCH 1969 PAN-AFRICANISM AND. PAN-AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS

by

Gary Kenneth Busch

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

International Relations

Signatures of Commj.^tee:

Chairman: 7 7 T :---- 77 t U 't / u

Deanrof the Schoo

Date ■ f /U?

1969 AMERICAN (JNiVERS. i library The American University Washington, D.C. MAY 23 196» WASHINGTON. 0. C

3 IS? PREFACE

* This paper will attempt to describe the genesis of Pan-African labor movements in their relationship to the wider, international, Pan-

African political movements. The general format will be to first describe the development of the political institutions of Pan-Africanism in a chron­ ological survey and follow this with the chronology of Pan-African labor developments during the same period. There will be references to the early developments of labor movements in , but the major emphasis of th*is study will be on the period following 1960.

There will be little discussion of the development of the labor movements within African countries. Examples illustrative of general

trends in the development of African trade unionism will be drawn from specific national movements when applicable. However, the scope of the paper is limited to the inter-African relations of political and labor groups.

Another area which will not be covered in this study is the role

of non-African political and labor bodies in the internal affairs of the

African states and labor organizations. The interactions of the ICFTU, the

WFTU, and the International Trade, Secretariats with African unions will not

be discussed. The activities of the AFL-CIO, the Deutsche Gewerkschafts

Bund, the Histadrut and the large number of foundations whose overt and

covert assistance influenced African labor politics will not be discussed

here. These are all areas for fruitful study, but exceed the more narrow

scope of this paper. iii

It is hoped that this study will provide a general framework for the examination of the development of African labor movements in the context of African political pressures and African political movements.

i TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE...... ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS...... iv

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS...... vi

Chapter Page

I. THE ROOTS OF PAN-AFRICANISM: THE PRE-I960 E R A ...... 1 Pan-Africanism Before 1960 The Conference of Independent African States The PAFMECA The All-African Peoples Conference Footnotes

II. THE ROOTS OF PAN-AFRICAN LABOR MOVEMENTS: THE PRE- 1960 ERA ...... 33 The UGTAN The First African Regional Conference of the ICFTU The CASL The UPTC Footnotes

III. THE SEPARATE PATHS: PAN-AFRICANISM FROM 1960-1962 .... 57 The Second All-African Peoples Conference The Second Conference of Independent African States The Brazzaville Group The The Third All-African Peoples Conference The Monrovia Group PAFMECSA Footnotes

IV. RHETORIC AND RESISTANCE: PAN-AFRICAN LABOR 1960-1962 . . . 88 The Third African Regional ICFTU Conference The AATUF The ATUC Footnotes

V. UNITY ACHIEVED ON PAPER: PAN-AFRICANISM 1963-1964 ...... 117 The OAU The The First OAU Heads of State Conference Footnotes V

Table of Contents, cont.

Chapter Page

VI. THE ELUSIVE AGREEMENT: PAN-AERICAN LABOR 1963-1964 .... 143 The Unity Meeting of ATUC-AATUF The UPTC Second Congress The Fourth AFRO Congress The Second AATUF Congress The AFRO Board Meeting Footnotes

VII. THE RESOLUTION OF HOSTILITIES: PAN-AFRICANISM 1965-1966 . . 171 The OCAM The OAU Heads of State Conference at Accra The OAU Summit Meeting at Addis Ababa Footnotes

VIII. MOVEMENTS WITHOUT LEADERS: PAN-AFRICAN LABOR 1965-1966 . . 197 The ATUC Congress in Lagos The AATUF Executive Board Meeting in Dar-es-Salaam Footnotes

IX. THE TURNING INWARD: PAN-AFRICANISM 1967-1968 ...... 221 The OAU Heads of State Meeting at Kinshasa The OAU Summit Meeting at Algiers Footnotes

X. THE DRIFT TOWARD UNITY: PAN-AFRICAN LABOR 1967-1968 . . . 238 The AATUF Executive Board Meeting The Second Dakar Merger Meeting Footnotes

XI. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND SPECULATIONS...... 250 Subversion and Cold War Footnotes

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 267

BIBLIOGRAPHIC N O T E S ...... 275 GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAPC All-African Peoples Conference

AAPO All-African Peoples Organization

AASC Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference

AATUF All-African Trade Union Federation

ACFTU All-China Federation of Trade Unions

AEF Afrique Equatorial Francaise, French Equatorial Africa

AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations

AFRO African Regional Organization of the ICFTU •t ” ANC African National Congress (Zambia)

AOF Afrique Occidentale Francaise, French

ARO Asian Regional Organization of the ICFTU / ASP Afro-Shirazi Party (Zanzibar)

ATUC African Trade Union Confederation

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

BDS Bloc Democratique Senegalaise, Senegalese Democratic Bloc

CA Convention Africaine, African Convention

CASL Confederation Africaine de Syndicats Libres, African Confederation of Free Trade Unions

CATC Confederation Africaine des Travailleurs Croyants, African Confederation of Believing Workers

CATC-B Confederation Africaine des Travailleurs Croyants-Brazzaville, African Confederation of Believing Workers-Brazzaville

CFC Co-ordinating Freedom Council (PAFMECA)

CFOS Comite de Fusion des Organisations Syndicale, Fusion Committee of Union Organizations (Congo-Brazzaville)

CFTC Confederation Francaise des Travailleurs Chretiens, French Confederation of Christian Workers vii

CGAT Confederation Generale Aefienne du Travail, General Confedera­ tion of Labor of the AEF

CGIL Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, Italian General Confederation of Labor

CGT Confederation Generale du Travail, General Confederation of Labor, France

CGTA Confederation Generale des Travailleurs Africain, African General Confederation of Labor

CGT-FO Confederation Generale du Travail-Force Otivriere, General Confederation of Labor-Workers1 Force (France)

CGTT Confederation Generale des Travailleurs Tunisiennes, General Confederation of Tunisian Workers

CIAS Conference of Independent African States

CNTG Confederation Nationale des Travailleurs Guineens, National Confederation of Guinean Workers

COTU Central Organization of Trade Unions ()

CPP Convention Peoples Party ()

CSL Confederazione Somalo del Lavoro, Somali Confederation of Labor

CSLC Confederation des Syndicats Libres du Congo, Congolese Con­ federation of Free Trade Unions (Kinshasa)

EACSO East African Common Services Organization

EAEC East African Economic Community

EA’TUC East African Trades Union Congress

EEC European Economic Community

EUAC Etats Unis de 1'Afrique Central, United States of Central Africa

EXCO Executive Council

FLING Frente de Libertacao de la Independencia Nacional da Guine, National Liberation and Independence Front of Portuguese

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade viii

GEC Groupes d'Etudes Communistes, Communist Study Groups

GPRA Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne, Provisional Government of Algeria

GTUC Ghanaian Trades Union Congress

IAMSO Inter-African and Malagasy Organization (Monrovia Group)

ICATU International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions

ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

ICU Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Africa (South Africa)

IFCTU International Federation of Christian Trade Unions

ILO International Labor Organization

IOM Independants d 'Outre-Mer, Overseas Independents' Party (AEF and AOF)

IWW Industrial Workers of the World (U.S.A.)

JAC Joint Action Committee (Nigeria)

KADU Kenya African Democratic Union

KANU Kenya African National Union

KAWU JCenya African Workers Union

KFL Kenya Federation of Labor

KFPTU Kenya Federation of Progressive Trade Unions

KLM Royal Dutch Airlines

KTUC Kenya Trades Union Congress

LEGCO Legislative Council

LUF Labor Unity Front (Nigeria)

MEOCAM Mouvement d'Etudiants de PCAM. OCAM Students' Movement

MPLA Movimento Popular para Libertacao da Angola. Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola

MSA Mouvement Socialiste Africain, African Socialist Movement (AOF and AEF) ix

NLC National Liberation Council (Ghana)

NTUC Nigerian Trades Union Congress

NUR National Union of Railway and Ports Workers (Nigeria)

NUTA National Union of Tanzanian Workers

NWC Nigerian Workers Council

OAMCE Organisation Africaine et Malgache de Cooperation Economique, African and Madagascan Organization of Economic Co­ operation =

OAU Organization of African Unity

OCAM Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache, African and Madagascan Communal Organization

ORIT Organizacion Regional Interamericano de Trabajadores, Inter- american Regional Organization of Workers (ICFTU)

PAFMECA Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa

PAFMECSA Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa

PAI Parti Africain de 11Independance, African Independence Party ()

PAIGC Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e_ Cago Verde, African Independence Party of Guinea and the Capo Verde Islands (Portugese Guinea)

PFC Parti Communiste Francais,

PDG Parti Democratique de Guinee, Democratic Party of Guinea

PDU Parti Dahomeen de l'Unite, Dahomeyan Unity Party

PRA Parti de Regroupement Africain, African Regroupment Party

RDA Rassemblement Democratique Africain, African Democratic Rally

SFIO Section Francaise de 11Internationale Ouvriere, French (Section of the Second International)

TANU Tanganyika African National Union

TFC Territorial Freedom Committee (PAFMECA) TFL Tanganyika Federation of Labor

TUC Trades Union Congress (U.K.)

UAM Union Africaine et Malgache, African and Malgasy Union

UAMCE Union Africaine et Malgache de Cooperation Economique, African and Malagasy Union of Economic Co-operation

UAMD Union Africaine et Malgache de Defense, African and Malagasy Defense Union

UAMPT Union Africaine et Malgache des Postes et Telecommunications, African and Malagasy Post and Telecommunications Union

UAR United Arab Republic (Egypt, Yemen and sometimes Syria)

UAS Union of African States (Ghana-Guinea-)

UDDIA Union Democratique de Defense des Intereis.' Africains, Democratic . Union of the Defense of African Interests (Congo-Brazzaville)

UDEAC Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Central, Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa

UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Southern Rhodesia)

UGCC United Gold Coast Convention Party

UGTA Union Generale des Travailleurs Algeriens, General Union of Algerian Workers,

UGTAN Union Generale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire, General Union of Workers of Black Africa

UGTD Union Generale des Traveilleurs Dahomeen, General Union of Dahomeyan Workers

UGTS Union Generale des Travailleurs Senegalais, General Union of Senegalese Workers „

UGTT Union Generale des Travailleurs Tunisien, General Union of Tunisian Workers

ULC United Labor Congress (Nigeria)

UMT Union Morocaine du Travail, Moroccan Labor Union

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNFP Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, National Union of Popular Forces (Morocco)

UNIP United National Independence Party (Zambia)

UNOC United Nations Operations in the Congo (Kinshasa)

UNTM Union Nationale des Travailleurs Maliens, National Union of Malian Workers

UNTS Union Nationale des Travailleurs Senegalais. National Union of Senegalese Workers

UPA Uniao das Populacaoes de Angola, Union of Populations of Angola

UPC Union des Populations du Cameroun, Union of Populations of the Cameroons

UPTC Union Panafricaine des Travailleurs Croyants, Pan- of Believing Workers

WAEC West African Economic Community

WFTU World Federation of Trade Unions

ZNP Zanzibar Nationalist Party CHAPTER I

-THE ROOTS OF PAN-AFRICANISM: THE PRE-1960 ERA

Africa today is composed of forty-two independent states and a number of areas still under colonial or settler rule. These forty-two states are joined together in a network of regional and international alliances of various levels of cohesiveness to a degree unprecendented in history. The development of shared institutions in Africa is unique, particularly if compared to the relative lack of such activity among the nations of Asia or Latin America. This commitment to forming associations which transcend national borders is the essence of the Pan-African movement.

Although these African attempts at creating unity are far from complete, these states have created broad associations to carry on the ef­

forts at co-operation and to which they all give, at least, some nominal

allegiance. This is not to say, of course, that there is a highly

structured ideology to which all subscribe. Nor is there a consensus on

the form this Pan-African unity will take. Still less, is there an agreement

on the methods of achieving this unity.

The growth of Pan-African institutions was a response to a number

of factors which related to Africa's presence in world affairs and reflected

common problems and concerns. There are some common threads which run

through all the Pan-African organizations which have developed so far which

provide a useful framework to the study of these institutions.

The first is the notion that there is a quality of uniqueness in

Africa's historical development. Racialism, common colonial experience

and the bond of color have created a unity in spirit among all Africans 2 which identifies them and gives them what some Africans call a separate

African Personality.'*' This African personality includes all Africans

north and south of the Sahara; Moslem, Christian or Animist.

A second theme derives from the concept of the African Personality,

that Pan-African institutions must be universal. Since all partake in this

common ethos, membership in any organization which reflects this ethos must

include all African states. The policy which this concept demands is the

independence of all African states from outside control or dominance. Since

only independent states are free to progress towards their own destinies

unencumbered, all states must be free. An important corollary of this

point is that African states must, if they are to retain their freedom,

remain free from extra-African political rivalries and eschew alignment

with any international bloc or any economic alignment which would expose

them to neo-colonialist pressures.

A third theme reflects the implications of this independence on the

policies of the African states. If African states are to remain free from

external interference, . they themselves must take responsibility for establi­

shing programs which promote mutual development. These programs should

produce co-operation in the fields of economics, science, education, and

foreign policy.

The fourth theme of Pan-Africanism has been the one which has

caused the greatest controversy. In order to express the African Person­

ality to its fullest, to achieve total independence and to promote common

programs the ultimate achievement of this movement would be the unification

of all the states of Africa into one large state. Smaller nationalisms

would be subsumed into a larger macronational entity, which then would

represent all of Africa. These four themes of Pan-Africanism have been pursued by African states since the beginning of the African Reconstruction era following the Second World War. There have been a variety of efforts towards creating federations, regional groups or associations in the postwar period which have been instrumental in preparing the way for the emergence of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, as a Pan-

African group which encompassed virtually all of the African independent states. Nonetheless, the path towards the OAU has not been smooth, nor is the OAU the cohesive Pan-African united state sought by the theorists.

Rather, the interplay of national forces and aspirations has created ideological blocs within the Pan-African movement. These blocs did not disappear with the formation of the OAU, nor did the hostilities between them diminish because of the OAU.

Africa does not exist in a vacuum. The problems which face nations all across the globe are present in Africa. The existence of issues which divided nations were very much present in Africa, and were often the same issues which separated nations elsewhere: Algeria, the Congo, nuclear testing, and others. The Cold War in Africa was as real and vital to national foreign policy considerations as it was to the nations of Asia,

Latin America, and parts of Europe. Because of Africa's extreme vulner­ ability to outside pressure, due primarily to its economic weakness and dependence, the growth of strong institutions was heavily influenced by external forces. Lacking even strong domestic institutions, it is small wonder that these states sought security through association with other

African states and other African elites. 4

Pan Africanism did not develop only on the level of inter-state relations. Similar international activities were taking place among lower- level institutions. The most important of these was the growth of labor

Pan-Africanism. Much as states sought security and strength through as­ sociations with like-minded elites, the trade union movements of Africa sought power and prestige through international activity.

Since the trade unions played such a vital role in the freedom struggles throughout much of Africa, their position in the political spectrum was very close to the power exercised by the parties. They provided a platform for political activity which was often less visable than inter-state activity, and were often used as extensions of party policies. The struggle towards African unity by states can not be separated from the struggle towards African labor unity. In most cases, these were part of the same effort, and often conducted by the same leader­ ship.

Pan-Africanism Before 1960

The year 1960 witnessed the birth of seventeen independent nations o in Africa, the beginning of what was to be called the "African Decade".

This year provides a useful cut-off period for discussing the growth of

Pan-Africanism since earlier efforts at creating unity were often hampered by the fact that African nations were not fully responsible for their own policies but were subject to the pressures of their respective colonial overlords. Nonetheless, this pre-1960 era formed many of the loyalties, affinities and hostilities which were to shape the future Pan-African configurations. 5

Pan African ideology and spiritual values date from the negritude and Back-to-Africa movements which developed at the turn of the century. 3 Yet these were not really an African movement until much later. The first real Pan-African movement on African soil was a creature of colonial policy.

Under the French colonial policy, the areas of (AOF) and French Equatorial Africa (AEF) were treated as separate territorial federations with federation governments. Under the French Constitution of

April 19, 1946 provision was made for territory-wide participation in government.

119. The particular interests of the territories are administered and managed by local assemblies, elected by universal and direct suffrage...Those of the territories which form a group or a federa­ tion elect'an Assembly whose composition and competence is fixed by special laws.^

Not only were there territorial governments set up under French rule, but representatives of these territories held seats in the French

National Assembly and the Council of the Republic. According to the

Constitution of October 28, 1946:

Article 79. The overseas territories elect representatives to the National Assembly and to the Council of the Republic in conditions fixed by law. Article 80. All subjects of overseas territories are citizens, on the same basis as French nationals of the mother country....5

Africans from these areas participated in the same Civil Service as French nationals. The Civil Service was uniform throughout the French

Union, and there was considerable mobility within the AOF and AEF. In many cases the leadership elites of these two federations attended the same secondary schools and participated in representing their areas in the territorial assemblies or, in some cases, in the National Assembly in

Paris. The result of this colonial policy was the development of regional

loyalties, regional political parties, and a regional leadership elite. The

Rassemblement T)emocratique Africain (RDA) was founded in October 1946 and was the major political party in both the AOF and the AEF.*’ It operated

through sections, corresponding to national parties, which were subordinate

in their inter-territorial relations to a comite de coordination which was

composed of:

half-a-dozen party officers, the President (Felix Houphouet-Boigny), four Vice-Presidents, and a General Secretary; a delegation from each of the territories in which RDA possessed a section; and the party's parliamentary representatives, the elus.?

This integration into a large, international political party * greatly strengthened the ties which joined the separate nations which made

up the AOF and the AEF. It also provided the fundamental unity of these

states in their later attempts at forming Pan-African institutions.

Within the French Maghreb, however, unity was not encouraged by

the French. According to the same Constitutions, Algeria was considered

a departement of France, and thus part of metropolitan France. Tunisia and

Morocco were protectorates. France maintained separate "bilatera 1 relations

in trade and administration between the metropole and the North African

countries, the two protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia, and French Algeria.

The result was a disconnection between the neighbors on the southern shore

of the Mediterranean, mitigated merely by overall coordination in Paris most

of the time and by a sense of solidarity against French domination more

recently."®

In the area of shared institutions or common political parties,

the Maghreb was far less organized than the francophone states of the AOF or the AEF. The co-operation which developed among these states was much more an effort to assert common anti-French objectives than it was an ef- 9 fort to create common institutions or nationalisms.

Within the West African territories under British control, virtually all political acvitity was inner-directed, against Governors-General, tribal frictions, and rival parties. Under the British system of Executive Council-

Legislative Council rule, there was really no scope for inter-African

institution building. In Nigeria, for example, the British divided the

territory into three separate entities, and a fourth administrative center.

Tribal divisions were fostered among these territories while the British carried on their policy of divida et impera. The common bonds which united

the leadership elites of the former British territories were the result of

common schooling in British educational institutions or, as was often the

case, common incarceration in British jails for carrying on nationalist

activities.^ Except for some scattered co-operation among political

parties in'. West Africa, most inter-African political unity had to wait for

the attainment of independence in the separate states.

In East Africa, however, a much greater degree of co-operation

between political parties, labor unions and co-operatives developed. Again,

as in the cases of the AEF or the AOF, these inter-African links were forged

as a result of colonial policy rather than solely on African initiatives. As

early as 1899, the white settlers of the Rhodesias and Kenya had advocated

joining together all of East Africa into one massive union which they could

then dominate. In 1931, a Joint Select Committee of the British House of

Commons decided against formal political links, but opted for the develop­

ment of an economic community. The Customs Union, begun in 1927, was expanded into an East African High Commission in early 1948, including the three territories of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda. This High Com­ mission established common planning, common services (such as air, rail and sea transport), and a common currency board. This High Commission also created a Central Legislative Assembly, most of whose members were white settler appointees, but which also included one African and one

Asian from each of the three territories. Gradually, as Africans were elected to the Legislative Council (Legco), they began to explore ties among themselves in the three areas. Groups of Elected Members began to hold meetings and, with labor and other nationalist groups, participated in common planning.^

Similarly, in the Central African territories of Northern Rhodesia,

Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, there was regional planning and, in 1953, actual Federation of these three territories took place. In this Federation, however, unity reflected only the common interests and fears of the white

settler minorities; the role of Africans within this Federation was

severely circumscribed. This Federation was very different from the AEF or AOF federations, in that it was entirely dominated by white settlers.

There were no real inter-territorial political parties or loyalties formed,

nor were there any commitments to independence. In fact, this Central

African Federation was designed primarily to avoid turning over power to

Africans and to delaying independence as long as possible. ^ The nationalist movements were opposed to this federation and sought, in the late 1950's, to

destroy it. In these efforts against the federation they developed rudi­ mentary forms of co-operation among the nationalist movements.

The major difference between the West African federations and the federations of East and Central Africa was that the East and Central

African Federations were multi-racial, in which white settlers, as distinct from European colonialists, held control of the entire apparatus of government while the West African federations, although troubled by a settler problem on a much smaller scale, left a great deal of power in the hands of the new African elites. This made co-operation between the two types of federation much more difficult. In fact, there was little inter­ action or co-operation which developed between the francophone and anglophone states of Africa. The barriers of language, colonial traditions, and accessibility of a common forum between these two groups were seldom breached. There were some contacts developed within the framework of the various Pan-African Congresses held sporadically in Europe, but these were more personal contacts than they were inter-state or inter-party relations.

For the most part, francophone intellectuals dominated the negritude move­ ment and affirmed their African values through their poetry. Anglophone

intellectuals concentrated more on the political kingdom.

In Manchester, England, in 1945, many of the leaders of the

nationalist movements of anglophone Africa met in the Sixth Pan-African

Congress. This Congress, unlike the congresses which preceded it,

brought together representatives of political parties with an African

constituency. Earlier congresses were dominated by North American and

Caribbean representatives of the black cultural nationalist movements which

flourished in Harlem, Haiti, Martinique and Jamaica. Men like DuBois,

Garvey and Padmore had kept the torch of black cultural nationalism burn­

ing through the difficult interwar years. They, too, were present at the

Congress, but took a back seat to the new African leadership represented 10 there. This meeting brought together many of independent Africa's future leadership. Attending this Congress were leaders like Nkrumah, Kenyatta,

Appiah, Abrahams, Makonnen, Wallace-Johnson, and Akintola.

The emphasis shifted from cultural nationalism to political ac­ tivism. The Congress issued a "Declaration to the Colonial Powers" which declared:

We are determined to be free. We want education. We want the right to earn a decent living; the right to express our thoughts and emotions, to adopt and create forms of beauty. We demand for Black Africa autonomy and independence...We are unwilling to starve any longer while doing the world's drudgery, in order to support by our poverty and ignorance a false aristocracy and a discarded imperialism ...We will fight in every way we can for freedom, democracy and social betterment.13

They continued, in a "Declaration to the Colonial Peoples":

We affirm the right of all colonial peoples to control their own destiny. All colonies must be free from foreign imperialist control, whether political or economic....

Colonial workers must be in the front of the battle against imp­ erialism. Your weapons - the strike and the boycott - are invincible. We also call upon the intellectuals and professional classes of the colonies to awaken to their responsibilities. By fighting to form co-operatives, freedom of the press, assembly, demonstration and strike...you will be using the only means by which your liberties will be won and maintained.^

This Congress captured the mood of these young African leaders.

They had witnessed, firsthand, the wholesale destruction of Western Europe during the holocaust of the War. They had seen invincible Britain and proud France crushed under the weight of the Wehrmacht and had realized that their imperial masters had feet of clay. They saw, too, the surge of nationalism which swept Asia as the Japanese retreated and witnessed the changes in the imperial facade which were brought about by the success of the independence struggles in India and Burma. They, too, demanded that 11

Africa must be free. A return to the status quo ante was clearly out of the question.

Nonetheless, the structural changes which grew out of the great dis­ order of the post-war period in the colonial policies of Britain and France were much more influenced by domestic upheavals within the economies and politics of Britain and France than they were a result of African political pressure.^ African resolutions and attempts at forming anti-colonial blocs were dwarfed in comparison to the massive changes which grew from the ouster of Churchill, the establishment of the Fourth Republic, and the violent up­ heavals in France over the^issue of Communist opposition to Marshall Plan aid. Even more important, this immediate post-war period ushered in the

Cold War and its concomitant bi-polarization of the political world. Power was divided between the U.S. and the UYS.S.R., both of whom were pledged to an anti-imperialist foreign policy. The powerlessness of the colonial countries in the face of their own economic situation and their lack of real political power in the face of the two super-powers played a vital role in creating the preconditions for the beginning of the long process of de­ colonization.

One of the primary difficulties experienced by Africa was the re­ establishment of political ties which were disrupted by the war; particularly

in the AOF which had fallen under Vichy control. The establishment of the

Fourth Republic and the French Union was followed by the establishment of

the RDA. However, the tensions and antagonisms which developed in France had a tremendous effect in Africa, where the split of the over

participation in the Marshall Plan created special problems. The Parti

Communiste Francaise (PCF) soon left the French government while the 12

Section Francaise de 1'Internationale Ouvriere (SFIO) remained within the governmental system. The RDA, since its Bamako conference, was closely

linked to the PCF and the SFIO had instructed its African adherents to not join the RDA. Senghor of Senegal, a follower of SFIO policies, led his

Bloc Democratique Senegalaise (BDS) out of the RDA and co-ordinated similar

acts on the part of SFIO adherents throughout the AOF and the AEF. This

led to the formation of the Independants d 1 Outre-Mer (IQM) as a SFIO-

oriented inter-territorial political group in opposition to the RDA in

1948. This split derived from the rivalries in the AOF trade union move­ ments and from the expulsion of the PCF from the French Government, much more than it reflected genuine ideological or political fissure among

African leaders.^ This was evidenced by Houphouet-Boigny's break with the

PCF a mere two years later, and the assertion of RDA1s independence. This

re-establishment of political links among the nations of the AEF and the

AOF, within the framework of inter-territorial co-operation in local self-

government, was to characterize the growth towards independence in this

area before 1960.

Within the Maghreb, the re-establishment of colonial rule was much

more difficult for the French. The Allied promises of independence during

the war had roused nationalist hopes that the end of hostilities would see

a rapid decolonization of French rule.^ French resistance to these

proposals was strong, since they considered this area part of metropolitan

France and were interested in assimilation rather than decolonization. The

struggle for national self-determination in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria

led to initial co-operation among these three countries in attempting to

free themselves from French rule, often with the direct support of the 13 international labor movement. The outbreak of hostilities between France and Algeria, which were to last over eight years, became a major factor in world and, particularly, African political policies. It was to form one of the key issues on which the movement towards Pan-African unity was to falter.

In the British areas of West Africa, there was no need to restore political control, as it had never been lost. However, despite Churchill's famous utterance on not presiding over the dissolution of the Empire, the granting of independence to India set the stage for the gradual de­ colonization of virtually all of the Empire. The immediate postwar years witnessed the formation of parties like Danquah's United Gold Coast

Convention Party (UGCC) in the Gold Coast to counter the more conservative alliance between the traditional chiefs and the African businessmen's political groups. It, too, was opposed by more militant parties, like the

Convention Peoples Party (CPP) of Nkrumah. These parties sought immediate independence for their nations and worked within their countries to achieve this through parliamentary action. The British, although committed to granting gradual changes towards independence, 18 sought to retard this growth by imprisoning the more visible leaders, and working with the more conservative elements. For the anglophone nations of West Africa, there­ fore, the problem became a question of opposing local African conservative forces since it was they whom the British used to retard the progress towards self-determination. To a great degree, this internalization of conflict was responsible for the lack of Pan-African political co-operation among anglophone states. International co-operation became less relevant when it was national elites who opposed self-determination. 14

Throughout East Africa the pattern was essentially the same. Local political forces joined together to combat internal enemies of rapid progress toward self-rule. Occasionally, as in the case of the Kikuyu war­ fare in Kenya during the early Fifties, this was accompanied by open hostilities. The pattern which emerged from this period was the growth of local institutions of self-government in the anglophone areas in which there was little inter-state co-operation, while the French-controlled areas were characterized by regionalism.

The period from 1956 to 1958 marked a radical shift in African political systems. In 1956 the election in the Gold Coast led to a date being established for the independence of the new state of Ghana. It was conclusively proven to the rest of British Africa that the elusive goal of independence could be achieved by militant political activity. In the

French colonies, this lesson was also learned. The Socialist government of

Guy Mollet issued the Loi-Cadre, a law which gave great autonomy within regional groups and permitted the creation of political groups within legislatures. It proclaimed universal suffrage and a single electoral college for the territorial assemblies which were seen as eventually becoming

sovereign entities.^ within the AOF and the AEF political activity reached a very high pitch. A split developed within these areas over the level of continued co-operation which would prevail, since the Loi-Cadre provided for a diminuition of federalism. A real political battle began between the pro-

and anti-federalists in West Africa, a battle which was to have profound

effect on the politics of this area.

Again in 1956, independence was granted to both Tunisia and to

Morocco while hostilities continued against Algeria. The continuing 15 hostilities against Algeria created great problems for both these countries.

Algerian troops sought refuge and sanctuary in Tunisian territory and established a political base in Tunis. Morocco was faced with French inter­ vention if it attempted to aid Algeria and concentrated on establishing strong domestic control through the active pressing of numerous irredentist claims, the most important of which was its claim on the territory of

Mauritania. This involved Morocco in political friction with the other nations of the AOF which supported Mauritania. This gave rise to the second major inter-African conflict which was to divide Africa, the question of the inviolability of colonially-established borders. Indeed, the arbitrary boundaries which were established by colonialism often cut across ethnic lines, dividing tribes and clans. However, the question arose over whether an independent African state could arbitrarily redraw these boundaries to its own convenience. Irredentist claims by Morocco against

Algeria and Mauritania, Ghana against Togo and the , Somalia against and Kenya, and many others were to be a source of great conflict, often involving warfare.

A third conflict which developed grew out of the sense of isolation

and dependence of the new states. Ghana, especially, felt surrounded by countries still under colonial domination which sought to undermine the

success of its independence. It began to take a much more active interest

in the internal affairs of its neighbors and took initial steps toward inter-

vention. 20 Partially out of a sense of mission and partly out of a sense of

its own weakness Ghana began to shelter the opposition elements of its

neighbors and to make irrendentist claims. This prompted an outcry against

the interference in the domestic politics of other states. This interference 16 in another state's internal problems, which were not limited only to Ghana, was to create a third barrier to Pan-African unity.

By the beginning of 1958, the African scene had witnessed some im­ portant changes. New nations were born which conducted their own inter­ national relations. Africans were governing Africans and there was generally accepted the proposition that all Africa would soon be free. Yet, the seeds of Pan-African unity had not created any inter-African unity.2 1

Despite the Pan-African congresses and the links which bound the nations of the AOF and AEF together, Pan-Africanism existed only as an inspired dream in the minds of some young African leaders. 1958 marked the birth of the first organization which was designed to give structure to the idea of

Pan-Africanism, the Conference of Independent African States.

The Conference of Independent African States

In order to discuss common African problems and to explore the ties which bound African states to each other, Nkrumah called together a conference in Accra, in April 1958, which was attended by the leaders of the eight

independent African states (Ghana, Egypt, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, the Sudan,

Ethiopia and Liberia). Meeting in the spirit of Bandung, these leaders sought

to create a framework for common action on common problems.

They called for: adherence to the Bandung principles; the liberation

of all African states; the establishment of exchange programs for cultural,

economic and scientific missions; and the establishment of a common, non-

aligned, African foreign policy. 22 Specific resolutions on Algeria, Togo 2 3 and the Cameroons were also passed. It established a procedure for meetings

among permanent delegates to the United Nations which would co-ordinate their

efforts and create an African voice, or an African bloc to work for common 17 objectives. It also created this Conference of Independent African States

(CIAS) as a permanent body which would meet at least every two years.^

Addressing themselves to some of the problems which were facing them in Africa, and seeking to avoid future difficulties, they resolved that they were determined:

(a) to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of one another.

(b) to co-operate with one another to safeguard their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

(c) to co-operate in their economic, technical and scientific developments and in raising the standard of living of their respective peoples.

(d) to resort to direct negotiations to settle differences among themselves and, if necessary, to conciliation or mediation by other African independent states.25

.What was created at this conference was more than just a high-level formal body, with powers, duties and responsibilities. This conference gave form to an African unity which transcended national, religious, colonial and ethnic loyalties. It was the first real link which spanned the Sahara and joined Black and Arab Africa in a common union. In the words of Nkrumah,

The former imperialist powers were fond of talking about "Arab Africa" and "Black Africa"; about "Islamic Africa" and "non-Islamic Africa"; about "Mediterranean Africa" and "Tropical Africa". These were all artificial descriptions which tended to divide us. At this Accra Conference these tendentious and discriminating epithets are no longer valid. Today, the Sahara is a bridge uniting us. We are one, an entity symbolized by our united African Personality.

This conference was followed by a series of goodwill visits by

Nkrumah to the other seven capitals, where he attempted to follow up on proposals for trade pacts and the exchange of diplomats. Yet, at'the very time this conference was in session, numerous other changes were taking place in other areas of Africa. 18

The Nationalist Party took over total control of the South African government. The Southern Rhodesian prime minister, faced with a massive resurgence of racist sentiment, ordered new general elections. The govern­ ment of Kenya imprisoned the srven major African political leaders. The

Nigerians were in the process of creating a Federal Executive to unite the three regions and proceed to independence and, most importantly, the

Gaillard government fell in France, signaling the end of the Fourth French

Republic.

In the wake of the fall of the Gaillard government and the accession of the De Gaulle-Debre government, politics in the AOF and the AEF were severely shaken. The SFIO-oriented groups had joined together into the

Parti du Regroupement Africain (PRA) as an important inter-territorial party in rivalry with the RDA. 27 The PRA and the RDA were faced with the prospect of a French move towards dissolving the prevailing federations in the two areas and the creation of separate, autonomous states. This culminated in an African showdown over the referendum on the new constitution for the

Fifth Republic.

Briefly, the referendum on the new constitution provided that any

state which voted for the constitution would be given immediate autonomy and

French support in a new . A vote against this constitution would mean the severance of all ties to France and the French Community, and

immediate independence. This posed a number of problems for the two parties.

If they were to maintain the ties which bound them to each other within the

territorial federations, and the vital economic ties which bound them to

France, they would have to vote against independence. Were they to vote

against this constitution, they were threatened with the end of all French 19 assistance and disunity. It was clear that they would be forced to choose between unity or independence.

In fact, both parties were split over this issue. Some wanted independence (Guinea in the RDA and Niger in the PRA), and some wanted federation (Soudan in the RDA and Senegal in the PRA); the rest were divided.

The labor movement and the youth wing of the RDA actively campaigned for independence. In September 1958, only Guinea voted against the constitution and was granted its independence on October second; the rest became members in the new French Community. Guinea's expulsion from French control was followed by the severance of all ties to France. The French civil servants pulled out of Guinea in their entirety, often even taking typewriters, light- bulbs, and destroying everything they-had to leave b e h i n d .

The government of Ghana had become actively involved in the campaign for independence within the AOF and AEF. , to whom Nkrumah had entrusted the newly-formed Bureau of African Affairs, took part in the 29 Cotonou PRA conference and acted as a liaison in assisting the Guinean party and the Sawaba Party of Niger in their efforts to persuade their 30 fellow members to vote against the new constitution.

The granting of independence to Guinea was followed by a meeting between Nkrumah and Sekou Toure in which they pledged each other mutual assistance and formed an initial agreement on a Ghana-Guinea Union. Late in November 1958 these two leaders signed a Ghana-Guinea Joint Declaration which declared that the two governments were submitting to their respective parliaments for ratification, a new constitution which would, "constitute our two states as the nucleus of a Union of West African States."31

Accompanying this proclamation was a $28 million loan from Ghana to Guinea. 20

The Sawaba Party was forced to resign in Niger and some of the leadership took up residence in Accra, where they were aided by the Ghanaians.

It is relatively understandable that Guinea would turn to Ghana for assistance. Abandoned by France, discredited in the West, and opposed by its immediate neighbors, Guinea needed financial assistance and a political ally. For its part, Ghana felt that it had an obligation to aid a fellow independent African state and also that it could use this alliance to build

•*r up its own power base in West Africa, in a Ghana-centered political movement 32 to rival the RDA and PRA.

While this regroupment was taking place in West Africa, there was

important activity in the territories of East Africa. A number of East

African political leaders had traveled to the CIAS conference in Accra as

observers. There they met with the leaders of the independent African states and with other nationalist groups from areas not yet independent. Drawing upon the lessons of the Ghana-Guinea Union, and encouraged by Padmore, the

East Africans laid plans for establishing an . In

September 1958, a meeting was held in Mwanza, Tanganyika where such a

organization was formed, the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and

Central Africa (PAFMECA).

The PAFMECA

At Mwanza, the East African Legco members met to discuss how best to

achieve independence for their territories. Delegates included representatives

from Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Uganda, Nyasaland, and Kenya. Other representatives

from the Rhodesians were invited but they were refused entry into

Tanganyika by the colonial government. The key aim of the meetings was

contained in a Freedom Charter which outlined PAFMECA1s purpose: 21

Freedom is our birthright; self government our heritage as sons and daughters of the free men and women who inherited Africa for the Africans...Therefore we [are] dedicating ourselves to the great task of restoring our freedom, devoting our energies to the case of African Freedom and prosperity, and pledging ourselves individually and collectively to this task and this cause until imperialism is wiped out of our motherland.33

The PAFMECA was not composed of governments, or governmental representatives. It was made up of representatives from the nationalist, labor and co-operative movements and was an attempt to create a Pan-African unity through the co-ordination of independence struggles. A permanent structure of national unity on a federal basis was not envisioned at this time. One of the greatest weaknesses of this type of grouping was that there were often more than one nationalist groups within each territory, which meant that the PAFMECA had to choose which group was the most representative.^^ Often one of the most important roles played by the

PAFMECA was that of conciliator and mediator between rival nationalist movements (particularly in Zanzibar, South Africa, Angola and Mozambique).

This Mwanza Conference approved a constitution for the new organization which had five major aims:

a. To foster the spirit of Pan-Africanism in order to rid East and Central African territories of imperalism, white supremacy, economic exploitation, and social degradation by stepped-up nationalist activities to attain self government and establish parliamentary democracy.

b. To co-ordinate nationalist programs, tactics, projects, and efforts for the liberation of said territories.

c. To assist in the establishment and organization of united nationalist movements in African territories through political education, periodic conferences, encouragement of inter-territorial African endeavors in all fields and by any other means that this organization may determine.

d. To establish a joint East and Central African Freedom Fund. 22

e. To champion non-violence in the African nationalist struggles for freedom and prosperity.35

To control this organization they agreed on an annual general meet­ ing as a supervisory body which would meet every August. The actual governing body of the organization was to be the Co-ordinating Freedom Council (CFC) which was to meet quarterly. Additionally, they created Territorial Freedom

Committees (TFC) which were responsible for the day-to-day activities in each country. The Secretariat was headquartered in Tanganyika, in Dar es

Salaam. •

This PAFMECA was essentially different from the West African insti­

tutions of Pan-African unity. The PAFMECA represented no ideology nor competitive nationalism. It fostered regional integration on a very pragmatic basis and avoided much of the internecine fighting which was to

split the West African groupings in the post-independence years. It was

formed just before the new conference which was called in December 1958 at

Accra, the All-African Peoples Conference, in which it played a leading role.

The All-African Peoples Conference

This conference of political parties and liberation movements was

quite different from the CIAS conference which took place earlier that year.

Most of those who attended were the more radical African leaders who were

engaged in various stages of the anti-colonialist struggle. Among the more

well-known participants were men like , Holden Roberto, Felix

Moumie, and the conference chairman, . As might be expected, they

took a radical position on foreign affairs and declared themselves in support

of all freedom fighters against colonialism. They resolved that the 23 conference declared:

its full support to all fighters for freedom in Africa, to all those who resort to peaceful means of non-violence and civil disobedience as well to all those who are compelled to retaliate against violence to attain national independence and freedom for the p e o p l e . 36

In addition to resolutions condemning racialism and colonialism, this conference took some important stands on issues which were common to virtually all groups. It declared that the artificial frontiers drawn by the imperialist powers which divided ethnic groups among African states should be abolished. It called for the removal of all religious and tribal traditional institutions, particularly the institution of chieftancy. Most importantly, it outlined a plan for Pan-African unity and established a permanent secretariat to carry on this work. 37

The ultimate objective of this Pan-African unity was to be a

Commonwealth of Free African States. This Commonwealth was to be achieved by fostering the growth of regional federations, preferably among contig­ uous states. All passports and all travel restrictions were to be lifted.

French was to be taught in all English-speaking areas, and English in all

French-speaking areas. There was to be reciprocal citizenship and inter­ territorial co-operation in joint projects, such as transport and communica­ tions systems. Most importantly, there was to be military co-operation.

This conference set up a permanent organization in Accra, the All-African

Peoples Organization (AAPO), whose secretariat, in addition to its other functions, would control a Freedom Fighters Fund which would give assistance to the nationalist movements throughout Africa. 38

" In fact, this AAPO and the Freedom Fighters Fund became operating

arms of the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs. Many of the groups which 24 supported these resolutions were splinter groups in their own countries who were in opposition to their own major parties, particularly in non-anglophone areas who were scarcely represented. Much of the work of the AAPO was centered around these splinter organizations. It "attempted to be the alliance center for radical African political organization - Ghana's counterpart to the RDA and PRA headquarters."-^

Meanwhile, two weeks after the AAPO conference, the federalists of

the AOF met together in Bamako to discuss steps towards creating a federal

structure. These preliminary talks were followed by a meeting in Dakar, early in January 1959. At this meeting, the delegates adopted a federal constitution, joining together the states of Dahomey, the Soudan, Upper

Volta and Senegal into a new Federation of Mali.^® When this new consti­

tution was submitted for ratification, however, the government of Dahomey

rejected it and withdrew. Upper Volta pulled out one month later, under

pressure from the Ivory Coast, with whom it formed a less rigid alliance,

the Entente. These two members of the Entente were soon joined by Dahomey

and Niger. This Entente was not a federation, but rather an economic unit

which provided landlocked Niger and Upper Volta an outlet to the sea. It

was largely financed by subsidies from the Ivory Coast.

Other steps towards unity were taken in the AEF, where Central

Africa, Chad and the Congo (Brazzaville) formed a customs union to which

Gabon was loosely associated. It became clear in both the AEF and the AOF

that African, and French, policy was oriented towards economic and fiscal

integration rather than close political union. Unity was to be achieved

through pooling resources and by creating common economic institutions.

This is understandable since both areas had essentially the same organiza- ' 25 tional infrastructure and both depended on loans and grants-in-aid from

France. Their currencies were supported by the franc and budgetary assistance from France often exceeded 50 percent of the national budgets. ^

Having witnessed the chaos which followed Guinea's abandonment by France, it is hardly surprising that they were unwilling to undergo a similar ordeal. Nonetheless, this maintenance of ties to France, made other, more radical states, somewhat suspicious of French neo-colonialism.

What was developing by the middle of 1959 was the creation of two major African blocs, both of whom were making virtues out of their respective neccessities. Unable to operate without French assistance,

the semi-independent francophone states of the AOF and the AEF (with the exception of Guinea) chose to pursue their development by maintaining their

ties with each other and with France. The independent states of Ghana and

Guinea received little outside assistance and sought security and develop­ ment through international activity which played off one major international bloc against the other in the hopes of getting more assistance. Morocco

and Tunisia, situated as they were surrounding a fellow Maghreb state at war with France, were in a difficult position. The French made numerous

claims upon Tunisia, since it was sheltering the Algerian army and political movement, which seemed to suggest that France would carry the war beyond the

territory of Algeria into Tunisia. In order to maintain its own security,

Tunisia had to walk a tightrope between the two positions, as did Morocco.

These schisms between various groups were to develop into major conflicts

within a short period.

In , the governments of Ghana and Guinea ratified their

Joint Declaration of 1958 and declared that the two states had formally merged into a Union of Independent African States. It resolved that this union was designed to be a model for a larger political union to which other

states were invited to join. This new Ghana-Guinea Union was essentially different from the Entente. It was a political union with co-presidents,

a common foreign policy, common ministers, a common bank, common currency,

and common citizenship. It was a program for unity which envisioned

immediate political unity, to be followed by economic and technical co-

operation. 42

The immediate response to this union was a call for a meeting by

Tubman of Liberia to discuss the implications of such a merger. The three

leaders (Tubman, Nkrumah and Toure) met at Sanniquellie, Liberia in July

1959. Tubman was clearly disturbed by the implications of this union

since it threatened most of the ruling elites in West Africa. The ideas

of regional federations or associations which had been discussed at the

CIAS and AAPO conferences clearly did not envision a political union as an

immediate step. Tubman won the support of Toure at this meeting and all

three issued the Sanniquellie Declaration which spelled out a ten-point

program for creating a Community of Independent African States. This

program was to be presented to the next CIAS convention for ratification.

The key sections of this declaration were:

(3) Each State and Federation which is a member of the Community shall maintain its own national identity and constitutional structure. The Community is being formed with a view to achieving unity among independent African states. It is not designed to prejudice the present or future international policies, relations, or obligations of the States involved. (4) Each member of the Community accepts the principle that it shall not interfere in the internal affairs of any other member.^3

Despite this obvious setback to the ambitions of Ghana, all three 27

participants signed the Declaration. Although Ghana was now precluded from using the CIAS structure as a vehicle for political change, it was still

able to utilize the AAPO mechanisms. With Guinea, it set up committees of exiles from the Entente states (such as the National Committee for the

Liberation of the Ivory Coast, or the Committee of Dahomeyans in Guinea) which they financed and supported. These carried on clandestine activities

against Guinea's neighbors. It is claimed that Ghana aided the Ivoirien

Sanwi movement and actively became engaged in a bid for the takeover of bordering Togo.^

There was great turmoil in other areas of Africa. A state of

emergency was in force in Southern Rhodesia and all the prominent African

leaders were arrested. The African leadership of Nyasaland was arrested

and the Zambia Congress of Northern Rhodesia was outlawed. Tribal warfare

broke out between the Tsutsi and the Hutu of Belgian-controlled Ruanda-

Urundi. Guerilla action was taking place in the Portugese colonies of

Angola and Mozambique, and the war in Algeria was taking scores of lives

and involving millions in bloodshed, torture and violence.^

The resentment against French atrocities in Algeria was compounded

by the announcement that France was planning to conduct atomic testing in

the Sahara. In August 1959 the foreign ministers of the nine independent

African states (Ghana, Morocco, Tunisia, Liberia, Egypt, the Sudan, Libya,

Ethiopia, and Guinea) met in Monrovia to discuss the Algerian question and

the announcement of the French intention to test a nuclear device in the

Sahara. They called for recognition of the newly-formed Algerian Provisional

Government in Exile (GPRA) and condemned French testing of the nuclear

device. In addition they passed resolutions calling for self-determination 28

of Uganda, Kenya, Angola, the Cameroons, Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and

Southwest Africa. ^ There were few immediate results of this conference;

the Algerian War continued and the French conducted their tests. However,

the call for the recognition of the GPRA drove a further wedge between the

francophone states and their neighbors. For a number of reasons, the most

important of which was overt French pressure, these states had not

recognized the GPRA nor had they come out for the full independence of

Algeria (in fact, neither had Liberia). Once again, there was concern over

the neo-colonialist machinations of the French in these areas.

The independence of these francophone nations the following year did

little to disabuse the more radical states of their intentions. The cause

of Pan-Africanism was still in its infancy. Although groups like the CIAS

and the AAPO existed, they really had little force. The two West African

experiments in African unity, the Ghana-Guinea Union and the Entente,

emphasized the differences which separated the groups. One sought

immediate political unity and the other economic co-operation. The issue

of Algeria had not been resolved, nor had the question of territorial

inviolability. Interference in the internal affairs of neighboring

countries was a regular occurrence. The lip service to the aspirations

of an African Personality and Pan-African Unity was not matched by a

slackening of personal or national ambitions.

Before 1960, Pan-Africanism was essentially a West African

phenomenon. In the independence explosion which followed, it involved

virtually all of the continent. Yet, the antagonisms which developed

during this early period carried on, exacerbated by the continuance of the

Algerian problem, the new horrors of the Congo, and the thrust of a new 29

Cold War neo-colonialism which swept the continent in the wake of inde­ pendence. These stresses and strains were to develop into a series of blocs of antagonistic African groups in conflict with each other. On the other hand, they also developed large scale organizations of mutual co-operation and unity.

The struggle for African unity often seemed to be doomed to failure in this second period yet, despite its friction and controversy, progress was made towards the creation of a United African State. 30

^-See Alex Quaison-Sackey, Africa Unbound (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 35-58.

^Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Leopoldville, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, and Upper Volta.

^See Abiola Irele, "Negritude or Black Cultural Nationalism" in "The Journal of Modern African Studies" vol. 3 no. 3, 1965 pp. 321-348 and L. S. Senghor, St. Antony's Papers XV (Carbondale: University of Illinois, 1961), p. 12.

^Text in Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, Political Parties in French- Speaking West Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. 379-381.

5Ibid., p. 384.

6Ibid., p. 302.

^Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties.(Baltimore: Penguin, 1961), p. 94. O George Liska, The Greater Maghreb: From Independence to Unity (Washington: Washington Center ^pr foreign Policy, Research, 1963), p. 1.

9Ibid., pp. 6 -1 0 . * l^It became almost a mark of prestige for leaders like Nkrumah and Kenyatta to cite their prison experiences. They used these experiences to rally nationalist support and to prove their bona fides.

llDonald S. Rothchild, Toward Unity in Africa: A Study of Federalism in British Africa (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960), p. 15, n.

l^Ibid. , pp. 73-75.

^Quoted in Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 155.

14ibid.. p. 155.

15xhis is not to say, of course, that colonial problems played no role in the domestic crises in Britain and France, but rather that they tended to be marginal when it came to restructuring domestic priorities.

l^Morgenthau, 0£„ cit.. pp. 90-94.

l^Willard A. Beling, Modernization and African Labor: A Tunisian Case Study (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 50-51. *®See , 1^ Speak of Freedom (New York: Praeger, 1961).

l^Morgenthau, o£. cit., pp. 66-72.

2 0 I. William Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 16-17.

21-Apart from the unity of colonial administration on an area basis.

22Text in Legum, ££. cit., pp. 158-159.

23Ibid., pp. 159-162.

24Ibid. t p. 166.

2 3 Ibid., p. 161.

26"Speeches of the First Conference of Independent African States" (Accra: Government Printer, 1958), p. 2.

27Rodgkin, oj>. cit., p. 187.

28john H. Morrow, First American Ambassador to Guinea (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1968), p. 37.

2^Zartman, op. cit., p. 16.

30lbid., p. 16.

3lText in Legum, op. cit., p. 178.

OO Zartman, 0£. cit., p. 17.

33Richard Cox, Pan-Africanism in Practice (London: Oxford Press, 1964), pp. 81-82.

34Ibid., pp. 18-19.

3 3 Ibid., p. 83.

36"A11-African Peoples Conference: Conference Resolutions on Imperialism and Colonialism," (Accra: Government Printer, 1958), p. 2.

37ibid., p. 9.

38ibid., p. 9.

-^Zartman, op. cit., p. 16.

^ Ibid., pp. 20-24. 32

^■See Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism; The Last Stage of Imperialism (New York: International Publishers, 1965); Pierre Moussa, The Underprivileged Nations (New York: Peter Smith, 1962) ; and Rene Gendarme, L'Economie de Madagascar: Diagnostic et Perspectives de Developpement (Paris: Editions Cujas, 1963).

^Xext in Legum, o£. cit., p. 178.

^•3Ibid ., pp. 180-181.

^Zartman, o£. cit., p. 24.

45Mi.chael K. Clark, Algeria in Turmoil (New York: Praeger, 1959), pp. 363-421.

46xext in Legum, oj>. cit., pp. 183-187. CHAPTER II

THE ROOTS OF PAN-AFRICAN LABOR MOVEMENTS: THE PRE-1960 ERA

The movement towards political unity among African states before

1960 was intertwined with a similar movement among the labor bodies in these states. The frictions, fusions, alliances and compromises which characterized this early period of Pan-Africanism were virtually insep­ arable from the activities of the labor movements. In many of the areas of Africa, the existence of unions pre-dated the growth of nationalist and political parties and provided much of the organizing skills which were instrumental in creating the mass parties.'*'

African unionism extends back to the year 1793, when a group of o Nova Scotian workers struck the port of Freetown for higher wages. The earliest unions in Africa were formed by European workers resident in the

African areas who brought with them the union heritage of their original country. In 1881, the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers set up a union in South Africa; the French Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT) set up a trades council in Algeria in 1885; British Rhodesians set up a union in

1896; Portugese unionists formed a union in Mozambique in 1898; and the 3 CGT created another council in Tunisia in 1910.

Black African unions were rare before 1920. The earliest recorded

African unions date from around 1905 (in Nigeria), which soon disappeared.^

Unions in (of civil servants) were created in 1912. There were other ephemeral union structures in scattered areas, but they were small and insignificant. The most important early African union was the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Africa (ICU) of South Africa which, from 34

1920 to 1929, organized an industrial and political coalition of African workers capable, as in the mine strike of February 1920, of bringing out over 40,000 African workers. Under the leadership of Kadalie (and assisted by two American IWW organizers) the ICU was one of the most im­ portant powers in South African politics at that time. Due to the victory of the more racist politicians, the ICU disbanded in late 1929.3 The history of labor in South Africa is far too complex to enter into here, but it is significant that the ICU was as important as it was. It influ­ enced many other unions in neighboring nations.

In 1924, Tunisian Arab workers formed the Confederation Generate du

Travail du Tunisie (CGTT) against the wishes of the French CGT; it lasted only until 1925.^ For the most part, these African unions were short-lived due to opposition from hostile colonial governments and from hostile white workers. The creation of relatively permanent African unions was the result

of extensive changes in the colonial structures which emerged from important

political shifts in the colonizing country. In 1929, the Labour Party of

Great Britain took office under the leadership of a dedicated group of

Fabian Socialists, among whom was the Secretary of State, Lord Passfield

(Sidney Webb). He headed a Colonial Labour Committee which was responsible

for "the basic formulation of Colonial Office Labour policy, the drafting of

model laws and the effects on dependencies of some of the international

labour conventions."^ Webb issued a directive to all colonial governors in

late 1930, urging them to give trade unions legal rights. The British

Trades Union Council (TUC) sent organizers and union officials to many of

the British colonies as part of this program, where they often helped

organize and direct the formation of indigenous unions. 35

Although the right to organize indigenous unions was granted to

Algeria and Tunisia in 1932, this right was not exteryled to the rest of

French Africa until the formation of the Popular Front Government in 1937.

Even then, membrersTiip in'such unions was restricted to those, who were

literate in French and possessed an elementary school diploma. In 1944, a

further decree abolished literacy requirements and thus opened the way for

large-scale organization

nizing in the French areas among African workers dates from the post-war

period, when labor organizers from the French CGT, the Force Ouvriere

(CGT-FO), and the Confederation Francaise du Travailleurs Chretiens (CFTC)

attempted to form local unions or branches throughout the French Union.

By far the mos uccessful was the CGT which, in its close alliance

with the Parti Communiste Francais (PCF), had established close ties to the

RDA and its elites. The communists were instrumental in establishing cadre

schools throughout the AOF for political and trade union representatives,

called Groupes d'Etudes Communistes. These GECs were created in Dakar,

Abidjan, and Bamako and were staffed by French Communists. They

studied the classics of Marxist doctrine and were exposed to principles of

organization and economic strategy.

The GECs left an imprint on African terminology. By teaching the duties of the vanguard of the revolution, the Communists deepened the sense of mission to lead the masses which many Africans already had... By teaching about Communist forms of organization and political action, they influenced the structural forms of the African parties, partic­ ularly the RDA. By...urging identical policies they hastened the process of consolidation...of the geographically scattered modern African associations.9

Through the influence of the CGT and the GECs, there developed an

inter-territorial collaboration of labor unions affiliated to the CGT. 36

These local branches were united by inter-territorial ties, under direct control of the French union leadership. Similar, but far weaker, structures were created by the FO and the CFTC.^® As in the case of the political parties, Pan-African trade union structures can be traced directly to colonial policies.

Within the British-controlled areas, little Pan-Africanism was fostered by colonial policy. The TUC advisors to Africa cautioned against anti-colonial activities while trying to teach non-political unionism to the new unions.^ In 1940, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act was passed which stipulated that:

no territory might receive aid under its provisions unless-it had in force legislation protecting the rights of trade unions, and unless the works for which the aid was to be used were carried out under a contract which embodied a fair wages clause...12

As a result, territories passed enabling ordinances which fostered union growth. In 1942, the Labor Committee was merged into a new committee, the

Colonial Labour Advisory Committee, which included TUC, employers, academics and civil servants. In 1950 and 1952 two major labor laws were passed for the colonies. The first, the Trades Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement)

Ordinance provided for a general pattern of grievance settlement. The second, the Trades Union Ordinance, provided for the compulsory registration of all unions; this gave the government considerable power over unions. Yet, despite this growth of labor unions within British areas, there was little

inter-territorial activity among unions. 13

Perhaps the strongest of the ties which joined unions in English-

speaking areas was the development of an East African Trades Union Congress

in 1949, in Kenya. The creation of an East African High Commission in 1948 37 led to a pooling of transportation facilities (among others) in which workers from all three East African States travelled back and forth freely. Although the East African Trade Union Congress was principally a Kenyan organization, it did have some membership from Uganda and Tanganyika. However, this union, as were many early East African unions, was founded and led by

Asians although there were African members as well. It was not until around

1956 that there developed a co-operative inter-territorial body which joined

East African unions in a Pan-African labor structure.^

Within the Maghreb, the struggle for anti-colonial unity against the

French resulted in considerable co-operation among the labor movements. In

1924, the nationalist leaders of the Maghreb founded the Etoile Nord

Africaine, as a common workers aid society. The Maghreb states were dis­ tinguished from other French colonies in that there was widespread migration of labor between North Africa and the French mainland where North African workers belonged to the French CGT and to the PCF. The Etoile Nord

Africaine grouped these CGT and P'CF workers as, a bloc within the two orga­ nizations. This Pan-Maghreb unity dissolved under pressure from the nationalist movements which sought autonomous liberation in the post-war period. The founding of autonomous labor movements, particularly the Union

Generale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) contributed to the decline of the

Etoile.

The first major call for Pan-African labor unity came at the fifth

Pan-African Congress in Manchester, in 1945. There, the assembled delegates called for the full assertion of trade union rights, the abolishment of

forced labor, and equal pay for equal work. I** However, this did not directly

involve a call for a Pan-African labor meeting, as unions were still in the 38 process of formation. In the French colonies south of the Sahara, orga­ nizing had been very active through the GECs. In many of the territories in the AEF and the AOF local branches of the CGT had been created, which had considerable effect within the territorial African political bodies. The founding conference of the RDA in October 1946 was largely a result of

CGT and PCF pressure. There was considerable interlocking of RDA and

CGT leadership in the inter-territorial movement.

As a result of this close co-operation, the CGT and the WFTU called a trade union conference in Dakar in 1947, both to strengthen the African

CGT and French CGT ties with each other and to align the African unions with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).^ This conference con­ firmed the ties with the French federation. Pressure was exerted within the French Assembly for better legislation on labor conditions in the over­ seas territories. The African unions sought to compel the French government to apply in Africa the same provisions regarding wages, working conditions and family allowances that obtained in France. The railroad strike of 1948, 18 which originated in Dakar-Thies resulted from this activity. The effect of this co-ordinated pressure was the passage of the Lamine-Gueye Law in

1950, which guaranteed some trade union rights and better working conditions in the Civil Service, and led the way towards more extensive legislation through a broadening of the Code du Travail.

The Code du Travail was amended on December 15, 1952 to extend its coverage to the African territories. It abolished forced labor and generally covered the same ground as the Lamine-Gueye law, but did not limit its effect to the Civil Service. The enforcement of this more liberal code did not follow automatically from its passage. It was to be the subject of 39 extensive strikes and upheaval for the next few years in Africa.

Meanwhile, a radical restructuring of the labor and political movements had taken place within the two territories. On May 5, 1947 the

PCF left the French government and devoted itself to opposition. The

French election of October 1947 confirmed the control of the Center and

Conservative parties, where they were joined by the Socialists. The SFIO joined in supporting this new government and its labor arm, the CGT-FO became actively involved in an anti-CGT campaign in France as well as in

the overseas territories. In 1948, the SFIO African deputies followed the

lead of the Senegalese Bloc Democratique Senegalaise (BDS) in leaving the

RDA and in forming the Independents d 1Outre-Mer (IOM). The IOM became an

independent inter-territorial group and the FO unions attempted to co­

ordinate their activities interterritorially through it.

As a result of the close ties of the RDA with the PCF, official

French pressure was exerted on the RDA. The French falsified elections,

bribed officials, outlawed RDA meetings, and used force against the RDA.^

The French used the IOM to undercut the RDA and assisted the IOM in setting

up branches and co-ordinating their activity. This assistance included

supporting the FO labor unions (as well as the CFTC). Finally, Houphuouet-

Boigny led his followers out of the alliance with the PCF in 1950, and the

official repression stopped. After 1950, the RDA was an autonomous party.

Although the RDA split with the PCF, the African labor movements

retained their affiliation to the CGT. The CGT leadership called for a

number of inter-territorial meetings of labor groups. The first major

meeting of trade unionists was held at Bamako, in October 1951. It was

attended by 144 delegates from 14 countries in French Africa.^0 At this 40 conference the CGT set up two regional co-ordinating committees, in Dakar

(for the AOF) and at Douala (for the AEF). Both committees were still under the control of the CGT, although regionalism was discussed. Through the operation of these committees the Africans attempted to lobby for the passage of the new Code du Travail, and later for its application.

Guinea and its leader Sekou Toure was the center of trade union activity. As a result of the passage of the Code, the Guinean union called

a conference for all trade unions to meet and discuss plans for ensuring that the French would implement the new law. The conference met in Dakar, in

October 1952 and called for "a vigorous and unified action of all African

trade unions, which can alone defeat the forces opposed to the implementation

of the Code du Travail.A f r i c a n workers went on strike to support their

demands on November 3.

The French, although they had passed the Code, now set about

emasculating its effects. They reduced the hours of work, as provided for

in the Code, from forty-eight to forty hours, but also reduced the wages

by twenty percent. Enraged, the African unions called a second conference,

in Bamako in March 1953, where they agreed upon strike action. Following

this conference, strikes spread across all of French Africa. The biggest

strike occurred in Guinea, beginning on September 21 and lasted sixty-six

days until November 25. This strike pushed Toure into national and

territorial prominence and was responsible for the close identification of

the political party (PDG) with the labor movement. This close harmony of

the labor movement with the political party was most noticeable in Guinea,

but it was not absent in the other territories (especially the Union

Soudanaise in the Sudan). 41

By 1955, pressure had been building up among CGT African affiliates to dissolve the ties which bound them to the French parent confederation.

Disappointed by the CGT's lack of support on anti-colonialism and the secondary leadership roles open to Africans, the leaders of the CGT unions in Africa began to talk of disaffiliation from the CGT. In July 1955, the inter-territorial committee of the RDA met in Conakry. This was its first meeting since splitting with the PCF. At this meeting, the Guinean PDG introduced a motion to disaffiliate all African unions and youth movements from French and international ties. It declared that it desired to build:

nationalist trade unionism...joined by two fundamental principles: nationalism and the unity and solidarity of the various social groups in the countries under foreign domination. The original element in this new trade unionism, which clearly differentiates it from Western trade unionism, is a strong determination to back political action in order to hasten the coming of national independence. This preoccupa­ tion with political independence takes precedence over all social preoccupations.22

Following the lead of the Guineans, the various other CGT- affiliated unions began to dissolve their ties with the CGT. In November

1955, the Senegalese and Mauritanian unions disaffiliated from the CGT and the WFTU. A split developed in the CGT over continued affiliation to the French confederation. In January 1956, the Confederation Generale des

Travailleurs Africains was constituted, and appealed to all African unions to cut their ties to the French parent. Toure was expelled from the CGT and the CGTA became an autonomous African confederation. This CGTA was the first autonomous, African-led, Pan-African trade union federation. 23

The pressure for autonomy from French centers was not limited to the CGT affiliates. In July 1956 the Christian workers who had been affiliated to the CFTC met in Ougadougou to form their own autonomous

African labor group, the Confederation Africaine des Travailleurs Croyants 42

(CATC). The following January the CFTC workers of the AEF formed their own

CATC and joined with the CATC of the AOF.^ The formation of the CGTA and the CATC led to a meeting being called for Cotonou in late 1956, which was postponed until January 1957. Attending this meeting were the CGTA, the

CATC, the independent railway workers of the AOF, and the orthodox CGT members who had not disaffiliated from the CGT of France. At this meeting they founded the Union Generale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire (UGTAN).

The Union Generale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire

The UGTAN marks a significant step forward in the search for Pan-

African labor unity. At its Cotonou constituent congress, in January 1957, it dedicated itself to creating:

a united organization of African workers and co-ordinating the ac­ tivities of African trade-union organizations in the struggle against colonialism, and all forms of oppression and exploitation of man by man, for the defence of their economic and social demands, the legitimate affirmation of African workers' human dignity and the complete freedom of African p e o p l e s . 25

It emphasized the independent nature of the organization:

This single African central organization is independent of any political movement. Within the framework of its fundamental inde­ pendence it reserves the right to support any political activities which further the interests of African w o r k e r s . 26

The CATC and the orthodox CGT sections participated in the founding of UGTAN, but were not happy with the decision to disaffiliate from the

International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU) and the WFTU respectively. There was little time to begin an extensive dialogue over

this as a more pressing point arose, the passage of the Loi Cadre of 1956

and its extension to the African territories in 1957.

The Loi Cadre gave great powers to the separate states and less

power to the territorial Grand Assembly. The Senegalese led the formation 43 of the Parti du Regroupement Africain (PRA) to press for a federal govern­ ment for the AOF, in which autonomy would be granted to a single large

West African state. The* RDA, under Houphouet-Boigny pressed for territorial-

ism, in which autonomy would be granted to each separate state. However, as

the law was finally promulgated, neither was satisfied.. Full territorial -

self-government wasn't given and a federal state was disallowed. The

students and the UGTAN, both of whom had created a strong federal movement

and who were more nationalistically oriented than the AOF deputies, pushed

for federalism and independence. The students, represented mainly in the

Convention Africaine, and later the PRA, challenged Senghor's leadership.

The UGTAN, represented by Toure, challenged Houphouet-Boigny within the

RDA. A four-way split developed in the inter-territorial parties.

While all of this turmoil was settling within the francophone

areas, important trade union developments were occurring in other areas of

the continent. In 1956, unions of the Middle East met to form a trade

union section of the Arab League, the International Confederation of Arab

Trade Unions (ICATU). It included affiliates from Egypt, Libya, Jordan, ■ 'J), Lebanon and Syria. The Maghreb unions did not affiliate. Itjwas directly

affiliated to the WFTU, but broke with the WFTU in 1959 and became mainly

a creature of Egyptian foreign p o l i c y . 27 At their independence, the union

•centers of Morocco and Tunisia reaffirmed their affiliation to the Inter­

national Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU); the major Algerian move­

ment was also an affiliate. Within the East and Central African areas,

inter-African policy of the trade unions was co-ordinated through the

ICFTU office in Nairobi. In 1958, the Mwanza meeting which set up the

PAFMECA called for the "recognition of full trade union rights in every 44

OQ country in Africa." It provided a common meeting ground and poliey for the nationalist unions of these nations.

In most of the English-Speaking areas, trade union interaction took place under the aegis of the ICFTU. As early as 1951, the ICFTU held an

African conference, in Douala, which was attended by the representatives of unions from Senegal, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Cameroun, the AEF, Gambia,

Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, and the British Cameroons. The representatives from the francophone states were from Force Ouvriere unions. Subsequently a West African Information and Advisory Center was set up in Accra (1953) as was an East African office in Nairobi, the same year. As a result of growing pressure on the part of African unions, a regional conference was held in Africa, in January 1957, in Accra, the First African Regional

Trade Union Conference.

The First African Regional Conference of the ICFTU

The First African Regional Conference of the ICFTU was held in

Accra, in the newly independent state of Ghana. Represented were many of

the most important union leaders from the Western trade union centers

affiliated to the ICFTU, including the AFL-CIO, the British TUC, and the

Force Ouvriere. The chairman" of the Conference was John Tettegah, who was also a member of the ICFTU Executive Board. Long reports were

delivered on the state of African unionism and there was a good deal of

substantive discussion of the problems which affected various national

labor centers. These discussions led to a manifesto, calling for continued

support of the ICFTU and to a "Declaration of The Rights of Workers of

Africa" which included a fairly detailed description of the rights of 45 organization, collective bargaining, equal pay for equal work, better social 29 security and working conditions, and to recourse through arbitration.

Its resolutions included a commendation of the International Labor

Office (ILO) and the UNESCO for their work in Africa and called for*the establishment of an African Regional Office for the ILO. It deplored racial oppression in South Africa, decried the use of force against

Northern Rhodesian trade unionists, and declared its solidarity with the

Kenyan labor movement. It called for trade union rights in the Belgian

Congo and supported the growth of national union centers. A move to pair a resolution on Algeria condemning the French with a resolution on Hungary condemning the Soviet Union was defeated, and only the resolution on

Algeria passed. This was a relatively strong resolution:

The Conference deplores the restrictive and repressive measures taken by the French Government against the free trade union movement of Algeria. We deplore the arbitrary and unjust arrests of trade union leaders and their detention in concentration camps...The Conference expresses its full support for the ICFTU's declaration that the solution of the Algerian problem cannot be found in a trial of force, that it can only be found in direct and free negotiations between the French Government and the genuine representatives of the Algerian people and that these negotiations should be based on the right of Algerians to self-determination and on the recognition of the need for the establishment of democracy and of safeguards for the equality of rights of all the inhabitants of the country.30

The most important result of this conference, however, was the expressed wish to establish a separate African Regional Office of the

ICFTU, along the lines established by the Latin American Region (ORIT) and the Asian Regional Office (ARO). Initial discussions were begun at this Accra meeting which were to be continued within the ICFTU. The signatories of the meeting included representatives from Algeria, the

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the British Cameroons, Gambia, Ghana, 46

Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia,

Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, Tanganyika, Tunisia and Uganda.

Early in February 1958, the members of the African branches of the

French Force Ouvriere met in Abidjan to counter the thrust of UGTAN towards federalism which had been reaching a peak in the inter-territorial movement.

The parent French organization was the principal instigator of such a m o v e , 3 1 but it backfired. The FO African delegates opted for autonomy along the lines of the UGTAN and the CATC, and formed the Confederation Africaine de

Syndicats Libre-FO (CASL-FO). The suffix FO was soon dropped. The CASL created a Pan-African confederation "limited to sub-Saharan French Africa

(French Equatorial Africa, the Cameroons, French West Africa.and, eventually,

90 Togo)." It adopted three principles:

1. The Confederation is African, gives preponderance to the African personality, it is primarily concerned with problems of African trade unionism, which are very different from those faced by French trade unions.

2. It intends to respect the doctrine of international free trade unionism in the struggle against all totalitarian regimes, all dictatorships and has, as its ultumate aim, man's freedom, the struggle for bread, welfare and liberty.

3. It intends to keep the special cachet which distinguished French trade unionism from any other, the defence of the principles of the Charter of Amiens which makes the words Force Ouvriere a symbol and a program.33

Thus, by early 1958 there were three rival labor Pan-African organizations operating within the French territories, the UGTAN, the CATC and the CASL.

These were all to play an important role in the coming upheaval in the

French colonies which followed the fall of the Gaillard government and the end of the Fourth Republic.

The Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) made passing reference to the trade union movements, but instituted no particular programs supporting anything other than exchanges of information and supporting the

ILO.34 The important changes in labor Pan-Africanism during 1958 derived from the extensive changes which occurred in the francophone areas, in the struggle of the UGTAN for federalism.

When the new constitution was proposed for the French territories the RDA officials pressed for a vote which would support it, causing a split with its own labor and student groups. The PRA also split on the issue. Under Toure the students of both the PRA and the RDA and the UGTAN engaged in a fierce anti-French campaign for a negative vote in the referendum. The UGTAN held a meeting in Bamako, early in September 1958, before the referendum, discussing the new constitution and called for imme­ diate independence. The conference:

Calls upon the trade-union organizations, workers and the people to vote NO on 28 September 1958; Asks political movements, youth and student groups and all democratic organizations to work towards the same.end; Requests the territorial organizations to inform people of the central organization's attitude; Delegates the responsibility for immediate implementation of the measures necessary for the constitution of a united African democratic front to hasten national liberation.35 • In this appeal and campaign for a "No" vote, Toure received financial, and other support from the_J3hanaians through Padmore. However, the

UGTAN failed to create sufficient support in the territories outside Guinea and the referendum resulted in only Guinea receiving its independence. The result of this failure was the eventual dissolution of the UGTAN. Union leaders in the separate UGTAN units in each state were forced to choose between maintaining ties to the UGTAN and thus separating themselves from the ruling parties in their respective states or renouncing UGTAN and seeking 48 centralization and local support within their own states. Most of the unions affected chose to renounce their ties to the UGTAN, while others remained as splinter or opposition groups within the individual states.

When Guinea was granted its independence on October 2, 1958 it used its former allies in the UGTAN as bases in the neighboring states to further Guinean foreign policy aims. As a result of Ghana's assistance and plans for union with Guinea the two states collaborated closely in setting up splinter unions and political groups in exile, located in their two countries. These carried on clandestine activities against their respective states.- - 36

Spurred on by the apparent success of Guinea in achieving indepen­ dence, Ghana encouraged other nationalist movements to join together in common trade union, co-operative, and nationalist political endeavors. It was responsible for calling an international meeting of such groups in December

1958, the first All-African Peoples Organization conference in Accra. This meeting was led by Tom Mboya, head of the Kenyan labor movement and a key supporter of the newly created PAFMECA. He was also an important ICFTU leader. This AAPO conference, in addition to its resolutions and discussion on matters of independence and Pan-African unity, also directed itself to the study of Pan-African labor organization, urging:

...the organisation of regional Conferences respectively of political parties^ trade unions, youth organizations, journalists and writers, women's organisations, etc.37

The AAPO, as it was originally constituted, represented, outside of

the PAFMECA area, mostly splinter and dissident groups from all over Africa.

The UGTAN held its first Congress soon after, in January 1959, in which it engaged in self-criticism and an explanation of its dogma: 49

The essential aim of the UGTAN at present being the elimination of colonialism, its activities are an integral part of the general struggle of the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa for the complete eradica­ tion of colonialism, for independence and national sovereignty...The UGTAN is committed to the anti-colonialist struggle and is therefore revolutiofi^ry...The UGTAN feels that its members or those of political parties Should resolutely and unambiguously fight for the free control and democratic management of our countries' affairs by Africans alone ...If the UGTAN also represented the united workers' movement, it is because the former trade unions had renounced their affiliation to national central organizations to join its r a n k s . 38

Attending this congress were unionists from Guinea, Senegal, Mali, Niger,

Togo, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville),

Gabon, the Central African Republic and Mauritania. Led by a split in the

Senegalese section over the question of local autonomy, the UGTAN split

into orthodox and separatist UGTAN unions. Local governments dissolved

the orthodox groups and UGTAN, as an inter-territorial body disappeared.39

As the moves towards creating a new federalism among the franco­

phone states developed, the CATC unions met to discuss their position. At

their meeting, in January 1959 in Brazzaville, the CATC of the AOF, the

CATC of the AEF, and the other organizations which made up the IFCTU-

affiliated Comite des Organisations Syndicales de 1'Union Francaise

(COSUF), joined together to form a new Pan-African union federation, the

Union Pan-Africaine des Travailleurs Croyants (UPTC) under the leadership

of Gilbert Pongault of the Congo (Brazzaville). The UPTC became the

regional affiliate of the IFCTU.

Responding to similar pressures, the CASL held its congress in

Abidjan in September 1959 where it dropped, officially, the suffix FO and

cut all ties to the French Force Ouvriere. Its members represented unionists

from Mauritania, Soudan, Senegal, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Niger, Dahomey,

Cameroon, Central African Republic and the Congo (Brazzaville). Unlike the 50

UPTC, the CASL did not affiliate en bloc to the ICFTU, but left affiliation open to each constituent national organization. The Mauritanian center was

the first to affiliate directly.

At the first regional conference in 1957 initial steps were made toward creating a separate African regional organization. In talks within the three Area Committees (North, West and East-Central-Southern Africa)

this concept was agreed upon (except by Ghana who joined the UGTAN and had

John Tettegah elected to the UGTAN board). An African Labor College had been set up in Kampala in 1958 to train cadres and showed promise of success. The three groups agreed to hold a meeting in November 1959 in

Lagos, to develop proposals for an African regional office. This meeting confirmed the birth of the new African Regional Organization of the ICFTU

(AFRO) and its rules were submitted to the ICFTU Executive Board in July

1960 which approved them. The Sixth World Congress of the ICFTU met in

Brussels a month later, in December 1959 and Africans were given greater

autonomy and power within the organization.

Following this second ICFTU African conference, trade union repre­

sentatives from Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Morocco,

Algeria, Egypt, Uganda, and South Africa met in Accra in November 1959,

under the auspices of the AAPO and the UGTAN, to discuss the formation of

an All-African Trade Union Federation. This was the secondary preparatory

meeting under AAPO auspices; the first was held in Casablanca in September

1959 where the UGTAN, the ICATU and two small independents met.^® The

delegates to these meetings attacked the CASL and CATC affiliates for their

affiliation to the ICFTU and the IFCTU condemned the' AFRO as imperialist-

oriented . 51

Thus, by the end of 1959 Pan-Africanism had developed to a fairly

high level among African unions. Fostered by the growth of more liberal

colonial policies in their nations, unions arose whose commitment to

national independence was no less than the commitment of the political

parties'. The costs, however, were high. Throughout French Africa the

artificial and often irrelevant divisions of the French labor movement were

reproduced in the African setting. The Christians, the Socialists and the

Communists built unions in their own image in Africa. They brought with

them their own ideological predilections and hair-splitting niceties of true

dogma, most of which was inapplicable to Africa. They were finally

repudiated when their African confreres broke away to form autonomous Pan-

African confederations, but their legacy of suspicion and distaste still

separated the three movements.

The British model of union structuring proved no more viable.

Within Britain the labor movement represented more than a centralized

grouping of trade unions. It was composed of a trade union group, a co­

operative movement, and a labor party. The structure built by the TUC was

successful in the domestic British setting because each of the constituent

parts reinforced the other. What was unattainable through strike action

could be won through political lobbying or other political maneuvering.

Within the colonial areas, this model did not work. A central labor move­

ment in the anglophone areas usually, with the notable exceptions of Kenya

and Ghana, had a somewhat strained relationship with the nationalist party.

Tribal elitism, regional power bases, and factional fighting were the

hallmarks of political parties. A nation-wide union movement was a threat

to the political power structures in the nationalist movements.^ Alliances 52 were made and common programs were developed, but relations between the two groups were usually strained. As was the case in most of the anglophone states, fhe pace of the independence struggle derived from the political action of the nationalist parties who were often divided between con­ servatives and activists. Despite the commonly-held belief that independence was "won" in most African states, in almost every African state (with the exception of Algeria) independence was actually "granted". After 1958, with the success of Ghana and Guinea's independence, it was merely a matter of time before all African states (excepting those with a indigenous white settler government) became free, and most nationalist activities were directed at speeding this process, through "legitimate means".^

This meant that the trade unions could be usefully employed in strikes, boycotts and similar activities. It did not mean that they would be given strong political power. If, in most cases African national union centers were weak politically, they were weaker yet economically. National union centers usually had a poorly developed dues checkoff system and a relatively high turnover. They often depended' on assistance from the over­ seas bodies to which they were affiliated. In the case of anglophone unions,

this was usually the ICFTU and its regional organizations. African unions were, and remain, financially vulnerable to external pressure. This enabled political parties to use the labor movement for their own ends by

playing off one union against the other for control of the national union center, and for rival parties to attempt the same. While this was less

important before independence, it became vitally important when independence was achieved. 53

The parties became governments, and the labor movements became threats to their control. They sought to further weaken the unions by creating one-party states, into which they co-opted many union leaders, and they sought to keep the unions financially weak. Since the unions' major source of financial assistance was the various international labor movements,

* who also provided a political forum for the unions, the call of these

African governments was for disaffiliation. The post-independence growth of the Pan-African labor movements was greatly shaped by the drive of the

African governments to control their own labor movements and to use them in the inter-African milieu as they had used them in the pre-independence struggle nationally. In this period, the inter-African rivalries which grouped African states into competing blocs were mirrored and exacerbated by a similar structuring of the Pan-African labor movements. The labor movements became the battleground for Pan-African divisions, complicated by the active interference of non-African political and trade union bodies. 54

■*-See Elliot J. Berg and Jeffrey Butler, "Trade Unions" in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California, 1965), pp. 371-378 passim.

2charles A. Orr, "Trade Unions in Colonial Africa" in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1966), p. 6 8 .

3Ibid., p. 6 6 .

^■Charles A. Orr, "Early African Trade Unions" (mimeograph copy, no date or publisher), p. 19.

5loan Davies, African Trade Unions (Baltimore: Penguin, 1966), pp. 57-61.

6orr, "Early African...", pp. 6-8.

7b . C. Roberts, Labour in the Tropical Territories of the Common­ wealth (Durham: Duke University, 1964), p. 176.

8Davies, ££. cit., p. 49.

%uth Schacter Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 25-26.

lOOrr, "Early African...", pp. 10-13.

^Davies, ££. cit. , p. 41.

12jbid ., p. 39.

13t . M. Yesufu, An Introduction to Industrial Relations in Nigeria (London: Oxford Press, 1962), pp. 22-23.

14ciement Lubembe, The Inside of in Kenya (Nairobi: Equatorial Publishers, 1968), pp. 69-70 and Roger Scott, The Development of Trade Unionism in Uganda (Nairobi: East African Printing House, 1966), p. 23.

15willard A. Beling, Modernization and African Labor: A Tunisian Case Study (New York: Prapger, 1965), pp. 141-143.

l^Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 153- 155. * l^Jean Meynaud and Anisse Salah-Bey, Trade Unionism■in'Africa (London: Methuen, 1967), p. 57 and pp. 184-185 for text of communique. 55

^®The novel by Ousmane Sembene, God's Bits of Wood (New York: Doubleday, 1962).

l%orgenthau, o£. cit., pp. 188-201.

20Meynaud and Salah-Bey, op. cit.. p. 57.

2lQuoted in Morgenthau, ££. cit., p. 228.

22jbid., p. 242. __

23Meynaud and Salah-Bey, ££. cit., pp. 58-60.

24ibid., pp. 59-61.

^^Ibid., p. 193 (text).

^ Ibid. , p. 194.

^Beling, 0£. cit. , pp. 126-131.

^Richard Cox, Pan-Africanism in Practice (London: Oxford Press, 1964), p. 82.

29iCFTU, Report of the First African Regional Trade Union Conference (Brussels: ICFTU, 1957), pp. 176-177.

30lbid., pp. 182-183.

31]^eynaud and Salah-Bey, oj>. cit. , pp. 61-62. i

32jbid., p. 196.

33ibid., pp. 196-197 (text).

^^Legum, oja. cit., pp. 157-166.

^Meynaud and Salah-Bey, oja. cit. , pp. 194-195 (text).

^1. William Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 17.

37Legum, op. cit. , p. 250.

38j4eynaud and Salah-Bey, op. cit., pp. 197-202.

39ibid., pp. 100-1 0 1 . 40Ibid., pp. 126-127.

4lDavies, op. cit., pp. 135-150.

42Berg and Butler, op. cit.., pp. 340-381. CHAPTER III

THE SEPARATE PATHS: PAN-AFRICANISM FROM 1960-1962

The most important feature of the African scene in the years 1960 to 1963 was the enormous increase in the number of independent states. The success of the independence struggle in many of these lands created almost as many problems as it solved, since the economic and political viability of these states often proved less than was expected in the heady rush towards independence. Indeed, in the case of the Congo (Leopoldville), for example, there was almost total unpreparedness for independence. (Of course, the continuation of Belgian rule might not have prepared the Congo for independence either.) The gaps between promise and reality were often shattering for the new ruling elites. This social and political disloca­ tion which emerged from the independence struggle was to prove a major source of instability in national and inter-African relations. The political activity which was generated internally against the colonial power now had to be blunted or suppressed in the interests of national unity.

The economic dependence of these new states on foreign assistance left them potentially vulnerable to foreign interference in domestic affairs.

While in most cases it was possible for the national governments to maintain a posture of neutralism or non-alignment, lower-level institutions often did not maintain such a neutral status. Frequently there was a number of prom­

inent political figures who were committed to an ideological position which was closely tied to one of the international blocs, and the lack of insti­

tutions which tolerated opposition political parties often led to the 58 repression of these parties. A new government was faced with both the consolidation of national power as well as with maximizing external assistance. In some cases, this was antithetical.

In seeking to preserve control over their national political struc­ ture and to maintain international neutralism, many of these African states sought to build upon previous inter-African contacts a structure of Pan-

African unity which would speak for a united Africa. Yet, the varying struc­ tures of these new African states and their different ideological viewpoints often created hostilities among them. This period was characterized by the growth of a fairly large-scale inter-African co-operation among groups of

African states who shared some common ambitions or who had common fears.

Regional organizations grew, co-operative projects were embarked upon, and some mutual assistance was given within the African context.

However, this period was also characterized by the ideological

split of African groupings into hostile blocs, in which the fissures which had appeared in the Pan-African facade earlier, developed into genuine

chasms. These fissures were widened by the development of important issues

on which African policy was divided. Among these were the Algerian question,

the Congo question, the border question, and the quagmire of neo-colonialism.

These hostilities and rivalries were mirrored in the rise of Pan-African

labor groupings which took on the political coloring of the governmental

groupings and were often the battlefield for inter-governmental wrangling.

The Second All-African Peoples Conference

In late January 1960, the second conference of the All-African

Peoples Conference (AAPC) met in Tunis. This was widely attended by most of the nationalist movements from all over Africa. A particularly large, and cohesive, contingent from PAFMECA attended. They were adamant in supporting Tom Mboya's right to maintain his chairmanship of the AAPC in the face of strong opposition from Nkrumah. As a result of a quarrel between Mboya and Nkrumah three months earlier (over the question of trade union affiliations), Nkrumah sought to oust Mboya in favor of a Tunisian.

This attempt, and the adoption of a moderate line on international union affiliation by the PAFMECA representatives, alienated many of the East and

Central Africans from the Ghana-controlled AAPC.^ The resolutions emerging from this Tunis Conference did not differ substantially from the prior conference. They did, however, take a more specific line on a number of issues. The resolutions called for all African states to recognize the

GPRA; they condemned colonial activities and racism in South Africa, Kenya,

Southwest Africa, Tanganyika, the Portugese colonies, the Central African

Federations, and Somalia; and took a particularly hostile stand against the

French Community, condemning it as:

a new form of imperialist domination, and [an] attempt of the French government to impose upon countries associated with this community and on the threshold of independence, bonds of a kind which would deprive them of true national sovereignty.5

It reaffirmed its dedication to the cause of Pan-African unity, and recommended an eleven point program for economic development, the most im­

portant points of which were:

5. The encouragement of joint enterprises and inter-African companies in order to achieve the maximum result from the development of the resources of Africa...

6 . The removal of customs barriers between the Independent African States. 60

7. The progressive liberalization of commercial exchanges and the conclusion of multilateral payments agreements, with a view to developing economic exchanges and the consequent setting up of an African Common Market, the formation of an African Transport Company (Land, Air and Sea) to promote exchanges among the African territories.

8 . Regular meetings between Economic and Finance Ministers with a view to co-ordinating their economic policies.

9. The setting up of - an to promote develop­ ment projects.

10. The creation of an African institute for Research and Training of the various c a d r e s . 6

In many ways, this second AAPC was a preview of the coming political splits in the Pan-African movement, particularly of the West African ideo­ logical split. These differing views on African unity coalesced at the meeting of the CIAS which followed the Tunis conference, when the CIAS gathered in Addis Ababa for its second conference.

The Second Conference of Independent African States

The Second Conference of Independent African states met in June

1960, in Ethiopia to consider the progress made towards achieving African unity. It witnessed the hardening of ideological lines between the radical and the more conservative states, represented by Ghana and, for the first

time, Nigeria. This conflict arose over the question of the Sanniquellie

Declaration which was presented for consideration by the delegates. These delegates represented fifteen states instead of the eight who had attended

the first CIAS meeting. In line with the discussions held in Monrovia earlier, all states with a fixed date of independence were invited. Those

attending represented the Cameroons, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Egypt, the 61

Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, and the Algerian

Provisional Government (the other two members, Togo and the Congo, did not attend).

The government of Ghana pressed for acceptance of the Sanniquellie

Declaration as a basis upon which African unity could be built. The speech of Adjei, the Ghananian delegate reflected Nkrumah's concern with forming a political union:

It is clear from this declaration of principles that the Union of African States...is intended to be a political Union. Such a polit­ ical Union...will provide the framework within which any plans for economic, social and cultural co-operation can, in fact, operate to the best advantage of all. To us in Ghana the concept of African Unity is an article of faith. It is the cardinal objective in our policy.1

Despite the influence that the Ghanaians commanded, only Guinea, a co-signer of the document, supported acceptance. Speaking on behalf of the opponents of political unity, the delegate from Nigeria, Sule, delivered an address which rejected such unity, criticized the Ghanaian commitment to such unity, and attacked Nkrumah as a messiah. He said:

Pan-Africanism is the only solution to our problems in Africa... No one in Africa doubts the need to promote Pan-Africanism...But we must not be sentimental; we must be realistic...The idea of form­ ing a Union of African States is premature...We must first prepare the minds of the different African countries - we must start from the known to the unknown. At the moment we in Nigeria cannot afford to form union by government with any African States by surrendering our sovereignty.

Any move made to promote co-operation, understanding and mutual help among African countries is indeed welcome. I must warn, however, that . while the whole idea is good and acceptable to us all, individual ambition and greed for power may spoil everything...if anybody makes the mistake of feeling that he is a Messiah who has got a mission to lead Africa the whole purpose of Pan-Africanism will, I fear, be defeated.8

This split between the Ghanaians and the Nigerians emphasized the 62 differences which were to plague further African endeavors. The moderates, led by Nigeria, Liberia and Ethiopia, sought a gradual approach to unity.

The radicals, led by Ghana, Guinea and Algeria, sought immediate political unity. The conference ended by not adopting the Sanniquellie Declaration and by adopting a moderate resolution which called for diplomatic support for, but not recognition of, the Algerian Provisional Government.

Other problems which surfaced at this meeting were not so easily resolved. Before the meeting the Ghanaians and the Tongolese had exchanged bitter arguments over Ghanaian irredentist expansion into Togo prompting

Togo's absence from the conference. The unsettled border area of Ogaden between Ethiopia and Somalia was a source of great friction between them.

Guinea's support of the rebel Cameroonian political party caused a severe K rupture in their relations, and the attempted assassination of Bourguiba of Tunisia at the hands of the Egyptians did little to calm the hostilities between the two nations.^

These problems were aggravated by the rapidly deteriorating sit­ uation in the Congo, where hostilities had broken out, causing the United

Nations to send troops. In August 1960, Lumumba called a special meeting to discuss the situation, which was attended by representatives from Algeria,

Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Liberia, Morocco, the Sudan, Togo,

Tanganyika, Tunisia, Egypt and the Congo. In this rather ineffectual meet­ ing, the delegates endorsed the U.N. peacekeeping activities and condemned

Katangese seccession.*® The Congo's shifting political scene caused great disunity in the following months as the central government gradually dis­ solved and Lumumba was assassinated.

This conference in Leopoldville marked the last effort at wide 63 participation on behalf of Pan-Africanism for the next few years. The emergence of opposing groups within Africa was accelerated by the relatively sudden independence of the thirteen French colonies of the AOF and the AEF.

The addition of this new bloc into the Pan-African talks, and the independence of Nigeria, provided the catalysts for a massive reaction. African unity shattered into new and separate political and economic blocs.

Although the francophone states had not been invited to participate in the Addis meeting, they too, were considering proposals for Pan-African unity. At the meeting of the Entente in August, Houphouet-Boigny made preparations to hold a conference in which all the francophone states would participate. A Heads of State meeting was held in Abidjan in October where delegates from all the francophone states, with the exception of Togo,

Guinea, and the Maghreb, met to discuss a way in which they could act as

"honest brokers" between France and Algeria. They sought a negotiated settlement of the conflict which would also not alienate them from the

French. The communique which emerged from this meeting was relatively non­ committal. It did, however, endorse the independence of Mauritania and called for her admission into the U.N.; it supported the Kasavubu government in the Congo; it sought to mediate the Algerian question; and it called for a full meeting to be held in Brazzaville the coming December of all the attending states.

The francophone states were in a difficult position. They needed

French support economically and, even though they were independent, had signed agreements allowing French troops access to their countries. They had not condemned French nuclear testing in the Sahara, nor had they taken an unequivocal position on Algerian independence. (In fact, Tsirinana of 64 the Malagasy Republic, declared that he considered the Algerian problem an

"internal French matter" and not subject to African discussion.)^ They supported Kasavubu and Tshombe in the Congo. In general, the more radical states considered them to be French "stooges".

Difficulties also developed within the francophone bloc in August

1960. The Federation of Mali, which had united Senegal and the Soudan, dissolved in acrimony and bitterness. Keeping the name of Mali, instead of the Soudan, the radical Malian government sought allies and assistance.

Although it was offered some direct aid from the Entente, the political dif­ ferences between Keita and Houphouet-Boigny were so great that the political 1 o isolation of Mali would not have been resolved. Responding to overtures from Nkrumah and Toure in November and December of 1960, which included a

$11.2 million loan from Ghana, the three leaders met in Conakry and agreed that a commission should proceed to work out the details for an accession of Mali to the Ghana-Guinea Union. In their joint declaration of December 24,

1960, they decided:

1. To establish a union of our three States.

2. To promote a common economic and monetary policy. 13

In addition they re-affirmed their decision to withdraw all their troops from the Congo and condemned the newly-formed Brazzaville Group which had developed out of the Abijan Meeting:

The three Heads of State deplored the attitude taken by certain African Heads of State whose recent stand is likely to jeopardise the unity of Africa and strengthen neo-colonialism. They condemn all forms of African regroupment based on languages of the colonial Powers. They therefore appeal to these Heads of State to follow a higher and more healthy conception of African unity.14

This union of Ghana-Guinea-Mali was confirmed in Accra the following 65

April, where these three drew up their charter for the Union of African

States (UAS). This was to fall into desuetude soon after. ;

Meeting a few days earlier than the Ghana-Guinea-Mali parley, on

December 19, 1960 those states which had met at Abidjan reconvened their meeting at Brazzaville, the capital of the French Congo. At this meeting they formed a relatively cohesive grouping, the Brazzaville Group, which was to be a principal factor in African politics for the next few years.

The Brazzaville Group

The meeting of the representatives of the twelve francophone states and Madagascar which comprised the Abidjan meeting earlier in 1960 confirmed a unity which existed, among them and created a framework for mutual co­ operation and development. Its nucleus was the Entente states and it is not surprising that the policies of the Entente were very much the guide­

lines for the new regrouping. The meeting at Brazzaville was, above all, a pragmatic discussion of common problems and aspirations. They sought a realistic solution to the two pressing problems of the Congo and Algeria, and

to create institutions which would carry on mutual co-operation. They all wished to maintain their vital ties to France, and they all feared the

growth of Communist influence within Africa.All were pro-Western, all were weak, all needed French assistance and French technicians, and all

felt a common historical and cultural bond.^ It was the first time that a

political bloc was formed within Africa that transcended contiguous or

regional groupings.

The communique issued by this conference outlined the future

policies of this group and declared that they were prepared to engage in

long-term political and economic co-operation. They declared that they 66 chose not to take sides in African disputes, but rather wished to act as

"honest brokers" in leading both sides to the negotiating table. Specific resolutions dealt with current problems. Of prime importance was the

Mauritanian question. Mauritania's admission to the U.N. had been vetoed by the U.S.S.R.^ The Brazzaville Group declared that they would solidly support the admission of Mauritania to the U.N. despite the Soviet veto.

On the Algerian question, this group came out strongly against prolongation of the hostilities and asked "France firmly to conclude the war in Algeria in 1961.1,18

This communique also stressed its support of the U.N. action in the Congo, and criticized the attempt of the international cold war blocs to extend their interests in Africa:

Unfortunately the rival blocs have tried and are still trying to re- colonize the Congo (Leopoldville) either directly or indirectly through the intermediary of certain Asiatic and African States. [We] denounce before the conscience of the world this new form of colonization...

The practical solution of the Congolese problem can only be found at a Round Table Conference which would group together the representatives of every party without exception. Outside of this democratic principle, all the rest is a resort to the cold w a r . 19

In fact, the Brazzaville delegates attempted to meet with such a group of representatives from the Congo (Leo.) at the conference. But, due to a variety of circumstances, such a meeting did not take place. The suspicions of the Brazzaville delegates of Soviet aspirations in Africa were made clear in the resolutions on Algeria, the Congo and Mauritania. Indeed, it seemed to them that some African states were actively supporting the Soviet position. Their suspicion of the motives of such countries (Ghana,

Guinea, Mali, Morocco), contributed greatly to the friction between the

two groups. Despite these foreign policy resolutions, the Brazzaville Group was most noted for the long-range structure of Pan-African unity it created for itself. Plans were made for an economic conference to meet in Dakar which would study solutions to the following problems:

1. Problems relating to money and credit seen in the perspective of a policy of developing Madagascan and African economies.

2. Problems relating to the support of the production of Member States, and the organization of the sale of their agricultural and industrial products through the creation of price-stabiliza- tion funds; the reinforcement and enlargement of regional customs unions; the harmonization of fiscal policies; and generally, through the pursuit of better co-ordination in the domain of commercial exchange.

3. Problems of harmonising and financing the different national plans. The Commission will have to study the establishment of an African and Madagascan code of investment, including the granting of guarantees to private investment, and to work out the basis of an African and Madagascan solidarity in economic and social development. Lastly, it will have to study the creation of an African and Madagascan investment b a n k . 20

A further task of this commission was to explore the assistance possibilities

and tariff arrangements possible through accepting an association with the

European Economic Community (EEC).

This Brazzaville Group took a step beyond the traditional rhetoric

on African unity which had been prevalent in the many meetings which had

preceeded it. It formed an economic infrastructure for co-operation. There was, significantly, no mention of any shared political institutions or any

dilution of national sovereignty.

Following the directives of the Brazzaville conference, each of the

participating states sent its economic experts to Dakar in January 1961 to

organize the infrastructural changes necessary to achieve the outlined

goals. These recommendations were presented to the heads of state at

Yaounde, in March, where they agreed on forming an African and Madagascan 68

Organization of Economic Co-operation (OAMCE), to promote economic co­ operation and harmonization. Here, and at the Tananarive Conference in

September, they created the African and Malagasy Union (UAM) which was composed of the OAMCE, the African and Malagasy Post and Telecommunications

Union (UAMPT), Air Afrique, and a joint defense force, the African and

Malagasy Defense Union (UAMD). The UAM settled down to working out the

solutions to the concrete economic and social problems which faced them.

The formation and growth of the UAM did not pass unnoticed by the more radical states. They responded by forming their own Pan-African group, the Casablanca Group in January 1961.

The Casablanca Group

Following the meeting at Abidjan, where the position of the large group of African moderates was made public, the more radical states feared

that they would become isolated. Mali, recently separated from Senegal,

felt politically and financially isolated. The position of the UAM on

supporting Mauritania against Morocco threatened to force Morocco to give up its endeavors. The Algerians (the GPRA) were unhappy about the UAM's

refusal to support the Afro-Asian bloc resolution at the U.N. and sought to

consolidate its alliances, and Ghana and Guinea were unhappy at what they

considered a resurgence of colonial influence among their immediate

neighbors. Egypt continued to press for allies in its holy war against

Israel.

The issue which summoned all of these states to the conference

table, however, was the deteriorating Congolese situation. By late

December 1960, the government of Lumumba was in total disarray. Mobutu

and his Congolese National Army (ANC) had taken control of the government 69 and Belgian advisors and mercenaries had returned to the Congo. The

Western powers in the U.N. supported the seating of Kasavubu's federalist representative, and were supporting pro-Western Congolese politicians. The

U.N. seemed to be ignoring the constitutionally-elected Congolese Parliament which had originally invited the U.N. in. The attempt by Lumumba to get open Soviet support seemed to be bringing the cold war battle to Africa's heartland. It looked as if the West would support Mobutu and Kasavubu against the Soviet-supported Lumumba and Gizenga forces. On December 5,

1960 Patrice Lumumba was captured by Mobutu's men and taken into custody.

To many African leaders, it seemed that neo-colonialism had succeeded in the Congo.^1

Following the arrest of Lumumba, invitations were sent out to all the non-UAM states of Africa and to leading Asian neutralists to attend a summit conference of non-aligned states in Casablanca. The less radical states did not attend the meeting. Represented there were delegates from

Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Egypt, Libya, the GPRA, and a representative from

Ceylon. These delegates addressed themselves to creating an African

Charter for African unity, and to explaining their positions on some pressing issues. Its resolutions reflected many of. the individual prefer­ ences of the participating states. Under pressure from the Egyptians, they resolved that Palestine belonged to the Arabs and:

Notes with indignation that Israel has always taken the side of the imperialists each time an important position had to be taken concern­ ing vital problems about Africa, notably Algeria, the Congo and nuclear tests in Africa, and the Conference, therefore, denounces Israel as an instrument in the service of imperialism and neo­ colonialism not only in the Middle East but also in Africa and A s i a .

Under pressure from the Moroccans, the conference denounced the

state of Mauritania as a French effort to create a "puppet state" out the 70 southern portion of Moroccan territory, and as typical of the neo­ colonialist attempt at encircling Africa with satellites. The conference approved, in advance, "any action-taken by Morocco on Mauritania for the restitution of her legitimate rights."^

The resolution on Algeria was equally broad. It called for more aid to Algeria, in every form, and for the cessation of NATO assistance to

France. It called for the immediate withdrawal of all African troops serving under French command, and for the universal recognition of the

GPRA. It denounced any unilateral/French moves towards a change in the

A( Algerian situation.

Other resolutions called for the independence of Ruanda-Urundi, the

total banning of nuclear testing in the Sahara, and a condemnation of apartheid and racial discrimination. The preceding resolutions were essentially pro forma statements on the foreign policy questions which burdened the delegates. The key issue, the Congo, was dealt with in a

special communique. It declared that it was the intention of these states

to withdraw their troops from United Nations Operational Command (UNOC) control, and confirmed the support for the Lumumba government and its

operational arm under Gizenga in Stanleyville. It urged the U.N. to act

immediately to:

(a) Disarm and disband the lawless bands of Mobutu;

(b) Release from prison and detention all members of the Parliament and legitimate government of the Republic of the Congo;

(c) Reconvene the Parliament of the Republic of the Congo;

(d) Eliminate from the Congo all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel not belonging to the United Nations Operational Command whether operating as such or in disguise; 71

(e) Release to the legitimate Government of the Congo all civil and military airports, radio-stations and other establishments, now unlawfully witheld from that Government;

(f) Prevent the Belgians from using the United Nations Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi as a base to commit agression - direct or indirect ■ _ to launch armed attacks against the Congolese R e p u b l i c . 25

These proposals clearly went much further than those of the UAM and supported a policy which was more radical than the moderate suggestions of the francophone states.

In addition to making their positions on these issues clear, the assembled delegates took important steps to create institutions for future co-operation. They made elaborate plans for achieving African Unity and for eradicating all vestiges of colonialism. To achieve these goals they created an African Consultative Assembly in which all African states were to have representation. Additionally, they created four special committees:

(a) The African Political Committee, comprising Heads of State, or their duly-accredited representatives, will meet periodically with a view to co-ordinating and unifying the general policy of the various African States.

(b) The African Economic Committee, comprising the Ministers of Economic Affairs of the Independent African States, will meet periodically with a view to taking decisions with regard to African Economic Co-operation. One of the most urgent tasks of this Committee will be to establish postal and telecommunication links among the various African capitals.

(c) The African Cultural Committee, comprising the Ministers of Education of the Independent African States, will meet period­ ically with a view to preserving and developing African culture and civilization and intensifying African cultural co-operation and assistance.

(d) A Joint African Hi"h Command, comprising Chiefs of Staff of the Independent African States, will meet periodically with a view to ensuring the common defence of Africa in case of aggression against any part of this Continent, and with a view to safe­ guarding the independence of the African S t a t e s . 26 72

This African Charter was designed to provide a concrete framework

for the political unification of all the African states and envisioned a much wider membership than the seven participating states. It called for

a strict policy of non-alignment (defined in very rigid terms) which would

include the withdrawal of all foreign military bases and all co-operation with foreign armed services. This policy automatically excluded a great

number of fellow African states.^7 Although the actual text of the

resolution on African unity made no reference to an immediate political

union, the speeches of Nkrumah and Toure indicated that this was merely a

tactical device and that the desire for such a political union was merely

muted, not abandoned.

Following the formation of the Casablanca Group, in January 1961,

the All-African Peoples Conference called its third meeting. This meeting

was important in identifying the AAPC with the Casablanca Group in terms of

leadership and policies.

The Third All-African Peoples Conference

The third AAPC meeting took place in Cairo, late in March 1961. It

was characterized by very radical political pronouncements, coupled with a

frontal attack on the francophone nations. Specific, almost pro forma

resolutions, were passed condemning colonialism in South Africa, the

Portugese territories, Cameroons, Kenya, Ruanda-Urundi, Southwest Africa,

the Central African Federation, and the High Commission territories, none of

which were essentially different from previous resolutions, except in

virulence of tone. The French had begun negotiations with the GPRA, thus

removing a traditional cause of friction, although the resolutions called

for the support of the GPRA. In the Congo resolution the AAPC still 73 supported the Gizenga forces and condemned the U.N. for the deterioration of the Congolese situation. Also to blame were the "puppets at Tananarive"

(the UAM, who had just had a meeting in Madagascar) for assisting the imperialists "to apply their classical method of 'Divide and Rule'."28

This attack on the UAM was strongest in the resolution on neo-colonialism.

The attack on the West was no less strong. The resolution echoed the press statements and speeches of the Casablanca leadership. It:

Considers that neo-colonialism, which is the survival of the colonial system in spite of formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries which become the victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, military or technical means, is the greatest threat to African countries that have newly won their independence or those approaching this status...

This is done by imposing unequal economic, military and technical conventions; by creating puppet governments following false elections, or by inventing some so-called constitutional formulae of multi­ national existence...

Considers that such countries as the United States, Federal Germany, Israel, Britain, Belgium, Holland, South Africa and France are the main perpetrators of neo-colonialism.29

This long diatribe was followed by an explanation of how neo­ colonialism works and how it can be countered. It was the most explicit anti-Western statement at that time and clearly established, publicly, the ideological split between the radicals and the moderates. Other resolutions on African unity re-iterated the calls of the previous conferences.

Following this AAPC conference, the Casablanca powers met in Cairo, early in May 1961 where they signed the Protocol of the African Charter which ratified the results of the Casablanca meeting. It was signed by representatives of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the UAR, Morocco, and the GPRA.

Libya, although it had attended the Casablanca meeting, did not sign.

The creation of the militant Casablanca Group and the francophone Brazzaville Group left out a number of West African states from both groups. The coastal states of Togo, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone were equally interested in Pan-Africanism but were isolated from both the

Casablanca and Brazzaville Groups. They had experienced great hostility and subversion from the Casablanca states, particularly the UAS, and shared little of the enthusiasm for Gaullism exhibited by the UAM members. They wished to be part of an African alliance system, but wanted to avoid the ideological conflict which was taking place. Tubman of Liberia met with

Senghor (of Senegal), Balewa (Nigeria) and Olympio (Togo), and issued a call for an African summit meeting in which the representatives of both the

Casablanca and Brazzaville Groups would take part, and to which the non­ allied states would send delegates.

This was not originally designed to create a new group, but rather to provide the two groups a forum for working out their difficulties. It sought to bridge the gulf between the two blocs. It seemed at first that such a meeting would be likely to take place.^0

However, the Casablanca Group refused to attend. The newly-consti­ tuted UAS (which was confirmed at the April 1961 meeting which joined Mali to the Ghana-Guinea Union) followed Nkrumah's decision not to attend.

Morocco refused to attend since Mauritania would be a participant. The rest of the Casablanca Group refused the invitation because Algeria was not invited to participate. Thus, when the meeting actually did take place, in

Monrovia in May 1961, it was attended by all the non-Casablanca states of

West Africa and all the members of the UAM. Libya, Ethiopia and Somalia also took part. These formed a new group, the Monrovia Group. 75

The Monrovia Group

At Monrovia, the conference officially regretted the absence of the

Casablanca powers in a resolution. It then adopted a code of six principles which were to guide relations among African states:

1. Absolute equality of African and Malagasy States whatever may be the size of their territories, the density of their populations, or the value of their possessions;

2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States;

3. Respect for the sovereignty of each State and its inalienable right to existence and development of its personality;

4. Unqualified condemnation of outside subversive action by neighbor­ ing States;

5. Promotion of co-operation throughout Africa, based upon tolerance, solidarity, and good-neighbor relations, periodical exchange of views, and non-acceptance of any leadership;

6 . The unity that is aimed to be achieved at the moment is not the political integration of sovereign African States, but unity of as­ pirations and of action considered from the point of view of African social solidarity and political identity.

Additional sections which dealt specifically with African unity included

creating a technical commission for economic, cultural, scientific, technical

and educational co-operation. It called for a resurgence of African

culture and requested that the French and English languages be jointly

taught throughout Africa.

Addressing themselves to some of the substantive foreign policy

questions, the delegates welcomed the decision of the Algerians and the

French to sit down and negotiate, but refused to make any recommendations

on the recognition of the GPRA. It supported a resolution on the Congo

which backed the central government, but deleted a paragraph which con­

demned Lumumba's assasination. It did not condemn French nuclear testing in 76 the Sahara but welcomed French assurances that all such testing had ceased.

It took very strong positions against colonialism and passed strong resolutions condemning racism in Angola and South Africa.^ Most importantly, it created a new organization which would have the power to intervene in disputes between African states. The new organization formed at Monrovia was called the Inter-African and Malagasy States Organization (IAMSO); it was more familiarly known as the Monrovia Group.

The Monrovia Group, under the leadership of Nigeria's Balewa, dedicated itself to maintaining a functional approach towards African unity.

Following the basic structure outlined earlier by the UAM, the Monrovia

Group sought to create economic and social bonds which would unify states while still allowing them to retain their sovereignty. They called a meet­ ing for Dakar in July 1961 to discuss the technical details of this co­ operation. ‘

At the same time the Casablanca Group, in response to the forma­ tion of the Monrovia Group, called for a meeting in Conakry, also in July

1961, to strengthen their alliance. In the interim, the press of both groups concentrated on the vilification of the other group. The Ghanaian press launched a full-scale attack on the Monrovian Group and the legit­

imacy of its members:

The very moment the BBC and other imperialist braodcasting brass bands began their phoney adulation of the so-called virtues of the Monrovia slave-mentality operated slogan of "unity without unification", students of African history suspected with considerable concern the genesis of this new brand of His Master's Voice, just to discover that it was only the hand that was of E s a u . 33

The Nigerian press, speaking on behalf of the Monrovia Group,

attacked Nkrumah directly, particularly on his domestic politics: 77

One single parliament for all Africa would be the ideal thing but, unlike Dr. Nkrumah, we would not strive to attain the unattainable... Dr. Nkrumah launched a blistering attack on the Monrovia Conference the other day. He was not there and yet this was an opportunity for all leaders of Africa to get together. Dr. Nkrumah says Pan-Africanism means nothing unless it transcends the artificial barriers and boundaries imposed by colonialism. Ghana is in union with Guinea. They do not yet have one parliament or currency. Ghana is a very dif­ ferent country indeed from Guinea, and the so-called union remains a scrap of paper. The Ghanaian Messiah has not yet succeeded in remov­ ing "artificial barriers imposed by colonialism."

As an advocate of unity, Dr. Nkrumah has failed to rally the Ashanti region of Ghana behind him. The lash of the Preventive Detention Act has created an artificial unity...Yet this is the man who goes before the world, preaching unity. Dr. Nkrumah chooses to believe that the Monrovia powers do not represent the majority of African States. Twenty-one States were represented at Monrovia. There are only five countries in the Casablanca bloc. THE TRUTH IS THAT DR. NKRUMAH MUST BE AT THE HEAD OF ANYTHING OR OUTSIDE IT, because he must always lead. He is the Messiah and no camp follower, his ambitions for expansion will lead him nowhere. His real aim is to swallow up little Togo and chew off parts of the Ivory Coast. This talk of an African parliament and an Africa without boundaries is merely a cloak to conceal his aims.

Early in July 1961 the five Casablanca states met in Conakry to discuss a basis for economic integration. The Moroccan delegate submitted a detailed plan for a customs union among the five. There would be prog­ ressive lowering of duties and a gradual abolishment of quotas and preferential treatment. This was agreed upon and scheduled to go into effect on January 1, 1962. Also discussed were plans for a Permanent

Council on African Economic Unity (CUEA) and an African Development Bank.

They scheduled another conference for Tangier in November to confirm plans for the CUEA and the Bank.

Later that month, the Monrovia powers met in Dakar, Senegal to discuss similar projects. They discussed the removal of trade barriers through regional customs unions and the creation of common external tariffs.

They included many of the recommendations of the OAMCE proposals, including 78 an African Development Bank, the harmonization of development plans, an investment guarantee plan, a common internal price system for export crops, and even common driving licenses.35 These recommendations:

cover the whole field of co-operation: a network of roads, a joint shipping company, amalgamation of existing airways, joint educational schemes and institutions, standardization of medical practices, definition of minimum qualifications, and the establishment of veterinary training institutions.36

In fact, despite the rhetoric and ideological conflict between the two groups, there was a striking similarity between the Conakry and Dakar conferences. This similarity did not go unnoticed among the African states. Indeed, although the relations between the two groups were still quite hostile, amity between some of the countries in both groups in­ creased. Houphouet-Boigny paid official visits to Mali and Guinea following the Dakar meeting. Ghana and Upper Volta, in June 1961, announced a customs union between themselves, with Nkrumah and Yameogo knocking down

o 7 a specially-constructed wall at Paga symbolizing their unity. This never actually resulted in a customs union since the Voltaic relations with the

Entente improved soon after and the Bamako Conference of the UAS (the last of such meetings) in June 1961 repudiated such a union. Nonetheless, such interchanges and amities balanced the hostilities which existed between the two groups.

Under the guidance of Balewa, another attempt was made to join the

Casablanca and Monrovia Groups. A meeting was called for January 1962, at

Lagos, where both sides agreed to discuss sixteen proposals for economic co-operation which emerged from the Dakar Conference and to consider an

African charter, submitted by Liberia. This charter was essentially the same as the Casablanca Charter with all mention of supra-national 79 institutions removed. Initially, all promised to attend. Invitations were sent out to all members of the Monrovia Group and to all members of the

Casablanca Group except the GPRA. Additionally, Tanganyika (newly inde­ pendent) and the Congo (Leopoldville) were invited. The Algerians were originally invited by Balewa but, after a meeting of the UAM foreign ministers objected, the invitation was withdrawn.

Although all the delegations were present in Lagos for a preliminary foreign ministers meeting, the Casablanca Group withdrew from the meeting, because Algeria was not invited to participate. The Arab bloc (Tunisia,

Libya, the Sudan, and Morocco) insisted upon Algerian participation. The

UAM states insisted that Algeria was not yet independent and thus should not be invited. They felt that if Algeria took part, they should have to invite insurgent movements from every African country. The Casablanca

Group had already recognized the GPRA and has seated them at the CIAS conference in 1960 and at the Casablanca Conference in 1961. This made it very difficult for them to meet without Algeria. Additionally, important changes in the Naghreb, following the death of Mohammad V of Morocco in 1961 and the Bizerte crisis, had led to a lessening of tensions among the three

Arab states and the formation of an interministerial committee for Maghreb unity in January 1962. Although tensions between Morocco and Tunisia still existed over the Mauritanian issue, there was considerable co-operation between them on the question of Algeria.All these factors led to the walkout of the Casablanca Group and the Arab states from the Lagos conference.

The twenty states of the Monrovia Group (Tunisia and Libya’s with­ drawal was made up by Tanganyika and the Congo) met at Lagos to discuss the 80 previously-announced agenda. Although there was general hostility against

Ghana (whom they all viewed as being responsible for the Casablanca walk­ out) and Arab States in particular, these states did not vote at Lagos on the proposed agenda. They decided to take home the proposals for study but they did make a decision to ratify the Charter of the IAMSO proposed by the Liberians. They had not abandoned the hope of unity. In June 1962, these twenty states met again in Lagos and ratified the IAMSO charter (a

UAM meeting at Bangui had proposed some minor changes which were accepted at the Libreville meeting in September 1962). Late in December 1962, the

IAMSO met again in Lagos and decided to call another meeting for early

1963 in Addis Ababa, for final signature.

Following the walkout of the Casablanca Group, the five states decided to meet in Cairo for a heads-of-state conference, which took place in June 1962. At Cairo, they postponed the planned common market and customs union until 1963. Toure of Guinea was designated to act as liaison between the Monrovia and Casablanca Groups. He met with Balewa and

Selassie, and the three reached an agreement to hold an African summit meeting in Addis Ababa in 1963.

During all these reorganizations and reorientations in West

Africa, significant steps towards creating effective regional Pan-

Africanism in Eastern Africa were made, culminating in the expansion of the

PAFMECA into a new, and broader union.

Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa

Following the Tunis conference of the AAPO in 1960, there was considerable estrangement between the PAFMECA and the AAPO. PAFMECA 81 concentrated most of its energies and aspirations towards creating viable inter-territorial co-operation in the period from 1960 to 1962. It engaged in a successful South African boycott-^ and strengthened its ties with the nationalist movements of Central and South Africa. Plans were put forward by Nyerere of Tanganyika for creating a federation of East Africa before independence which would seek independence simultaneously; he was seconded in this by Mboya. At the Mbale Conference of PAFMECA in 1960, Mboya warned:

African unity is not going to come about just because we are all black...We have to ask ourselves whether it is in our interests now to discuss an East African Federation, agree upon it, plan it and determine the various steps to implement it, or wait until after independence - when people will be too busy with their own domestic problems to pay any attention to it.40

Despite this warning, federal planning progressed slowly. Yet, although plans for a federation were not fully explored, mutual co-operation in the field of common services progressed rapidly as did co-operation in efforts to achieve independence for the territories.^ This struggle involved a great deal of peaceful negotiation by the PAFMECA between rival nationalist groups. Its successes included the formation of united, if short-lived, freedom movements in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, South­ west Africa and Ruanda-Urundi.^ Among its more difficult tasks was the attempt to breach the chasm between KANU and KADU in Kenya, between the

ASP and the ZNP in Zanzibar, and between Obote's Federalists and the

Bugunda separatists in Uganda.^ In many of these conflicts, PAFMECA found itself supporting different groups than those supported by the AAPO.

Plans for unity before independence were dropped after the announce­ ment that Tanganyika would be granted full independence on December 9, 1961

(although Nyerere offered to delay this independence until all could be free). This independence of Tanganyika caused the PAFMECA to revise its 82 statutes which limited membership to trade unions, co-operatives and nationalist movements. Additionally, following the announcement of

Tanganyika's impending independence, the Raisman Commission's recommendations to the Crown were accepted and the East African High Commission (which controlled the common services operated among the territories) was formally changed into the East African Common Services Organizations

(EACSCO) which would continue operating in the same way.

By the end of 1961, PAFMECA extended beyond the three territories of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda. Its membership included the nationalist movements from Zanzibar, Mozambique, Nyasaland, Northern and Southern

Rhodesia, South Africa, Southwest Africa, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and

Burundi. In late 1961, these were joined by Somalia and, to everyone's astonishment at such a reversal of policy, Ethiopia. Clearly there was a need to review PAFMECA's structure to make it expand its activities com­ parable to its responsibilities. The addition of sovereign states

(Ethiopia and Somalia) and the achievement of Tanganyikan independence called for a summit meeting. Accordingly, the fourth PAFMECA Annual Confer­ ence was scheduled for Addis Ababa in February 1962.

Meeting at Addis Ababa were sixty delegates and fiften observers

from the states of East, Central and South Africa. They joined together to

form a new organization, based on the PAFMECA. This new organization was

named the Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern

Africa (PAFMECSA). Its constitution reiterated the aims and objectives of

PAFMECA, with the addition of Southern Africa to its resolutions; its aims were: 83

(a) To foster the spirit of Pan-Africanism;

(b) To unite the people of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa in order to rid these countries of imperialism, white supremacy, exploitation and social degradation by stepped-up nationalist activities to attain self-determination and establish democratic governments for the social and economic well-being of the people;

(c) To co-ordinate nationalist programs, tactics, projects and efforts for the speedy liberation of the said countries;

(d) To assist in the establishment and organization of united nationalist movements in African countries within the PAFMECSA area through political education, periodic conferences, encourage­ ment of African endeavors in all fields and by any means this orga­ nization may determine;

(e) To establish a joint Eastern, Central and Southern Africa Freedom Fund;

(f) To promote the union of independent African states of the PAFMECSA area as a step towards the realization of a great unity of African states.^

In addition, the PAFMECSA adopted a fee and subscription plan, in which each member government was obliged to pay $140 joining fee and annual

dues of $2,800; each member organization (as distinct from governments) was

obliged to pay $70 joining fee and a $140 annual membership fee.^ The

organizational structure was essentially the same as that of the PAFMECA

and the headquarters were located in Dar es Salaiam.

The initial response to the forming of PAFMECSA on the part of

other Africans was warm, from the Monrovia powers, but quite hostile from

Ghana. John Tettegah, a Ghanaian observer (and an official of the AAPO)^

called a press conference where he objected to the PAFMECSA on behalf of

Nkrumah:

It is our President's view that local associations, regional com­ monwealths and territorial groupings will be just another form of balkanization, unless they are conceived within the framework of a larger union...47 84

This split between the AAPO and the PAFMECSA was smoothed over, but not resolved. The difficulties between the two groups derived from a number of factors, among which the split in the African labor movement played no

small part. Ghanaian hostility to PAFMECSA was reflected in continued

support for splinter nationalist groups outside PAFMECSA and support for rival nationalist parties, such as Oginga Odinga's KADU.

The immediate result of the PAFMECSA meeting was the calling of a

special conference in Mbeya, in May 1962, to support a freedom march on

Northern Rhodesia. It was decided to concentrate on one area at a time, and

Northern Rhodesia was the target. Due to internal difficulties created by

KADU and Harry Nkumbulah's African National Congress (ANC) this march fizzled out.^® A subsequent meeting in the Congo (Leopoldville) in

December 1962 supported the Adoula government and further solidified the

ties among the PAFMECSA members.^

Yet, in spite of the great success in creating a strong PAFMECSA

and relatively unified Monrovia and Casablanca Groups by the end of 1962, the

events and unities of the coming months radically altered inter-African

relations. In 1963, the Organization of African Unity was born, which

formally united all the different strains of Pan-Africanism under central

leadership and control, making many of the past divisions obsolete and

unnecessary. 85

■'"Particularly since both major international power blocs seemed to use aid and assistance as a method of rewarding "friends" and punishing "enemies".

^See below Chapter Four.

^Richard Cox, Pan-Afr ic an ism In Practice (London: Oxford Press, 1964), p. 34. See below, Chapter Four, p. 4.

^Ibid. ~ pp. 34-35.

^Text in Colin Legum, Pan-Afr ic an i sm (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 254-265.

^Ibid.. pp. 256-257.

^Quoted in Legum, ££. cit., p. 46.

8Ibid., pp. 46-47.

^Immanual Wallerstein, Africa, The Politics of Unity (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 40-41. "="

10Legum, op. cit., p. 48n.

11-Waller stein, op. c i t ., p. 46.

I. William Zartman, International Relations In The New Africa (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 21-23.

13Quoted in Legum, ££. cit., p. 193.

14Ibid., p. 193.

l^Fritz Schatten, Communism in Africa (New York: Praeger, 1966), and John K. Cooley, East Wind Over Africa (New York: Walker, 1965). Both these books seem to rather overstate the case for communist infiltration into Africa in the post-war world.

l^Wallerstein, ■££* P*

^Ibid., p. 46.

18iext in Legum, op. c i t ., pp. 197-200.

l^Ibid., p. 198.

20Ibid., p. 199.

21See particularly Rwame Nkrumah, Challenge of the Congo (New York: International Publishers, 1967), pp. 28-55. 86

22Text in Legum, op. cit., p. 206.

23ibid., p. 207.

24Ibid., p. 209.

^^Ibid., p. 210.

28Ibid., pp. 205-206.

^All the francophone states, Nigeria, and all of Central and East Africa had arrangements of this sort.

28Text in Legum, op. cit., p. 275.

2^Ibid.. pp. 272-275.

~^Ibid., p. 52. At one point Guinea and Mali were both co-sponsors of the conference but, after Nkrumah withdrew, they also dropped their sponsorship and withdrew.

31-Ibid., p. 216.

82Ibid.. pp. 217-219.

33ibid., p. 54. (From "Ghana Evening News".)

34ibid., pp. 54-55. (From "West African Pilot" May 18, 1961.)

35David Williams, "How Deep The Split in West Africa" in "Foreign Affairs Quarterly" vol. no. 1963 p. 118.

36Ibid.. p. 119.

37Legum, op. cit., pp. 76-77 and Zartman, o£. cit., pp. 25-26.

OO Zartman, op. cit., p. 33.

■^Cox, ££. cit., p. 40.

40Ibid.. p. 3.

41-Carl G. Roisberg, Jr. with AAron Segal, "An East African Federation", in "International Conciliation" no. 543, May 1963, pp. 24-40.

42Cox, 0£. cit., p. 66 passim.

43Ibid., p. 66 passim.

44Ibid., p. 86.

43Ibid., p. 87. 46He was also head of the Ghanaian TUC.

^Cox, oj>. cit., p. 57.

^Ibid. , pp. 59-62.

^•^Ibid., pp. 64-66.

^®See below, Chapter Five, page 1.20. CHAPTER IV

RHETORIC AND RESISTANCE: PAN-AFRICAN LABOR 1960-1962

The emergence of separate ideologically-grouped organizations which developed in the 1960 to 1963 period among Pan-African political institutions was matched by a similar fractioning of the Pan-African labor movement. The success of the independence struggles in most of Africa put the trade unions in a more awkward position than they had been in under colonial rule. Now the nationalists whom they had supported were the governments with whom they had to negotiate. Since most of the wage in African nations is in some way tied to the government (as civil servants, transport workers, etc.) the relations Between the labor movements and the govern­ ments underwent an important change.'*' It is interesting to note that in countries which achieved their independence first (Ghana, Morocco, Guinea,

Ethiopia, Egypt, Tunisia and the Sudan) the unions soon tended to be swallowed up into the ruling political party apparatuses, and their inde- 2 pended rights were severely circumscribed. The effects of such a loss of independence on union policies domestically are outside the purview of this study, but the effects of such a loss of maneuverability on the unions' foreign policies are very important to the understanding of the ideological conflicts which emerged in this period.

It is a general rule that in most African countries the existence

of a single unified trade union center means that this center will follow

a foreign policy line close to, if not identical with, tte foreign policy

of the national government. If there is more than one trade union center

tolerated by the government, the second or third union center usually 89 differs with the government-sponsored union center primarily on foreign policy issues. In many cases, particularly in the face of domestic up­ heaval, the ideologically separate unions have joined together for a common purpose domestically but split again later on foreign policy issues.

In Nigeria, for example, there were three union centers, divided along ideological lines (a pro-West, an anti-West, and a neutralist) which joined together in a common in 1964. In Dahomey, Upper

Volta, and many other African countries, rival African unions joined together to topple their own governments, yet split again into their ideo­ logical components afterwards.^ For many of these African labor movements, the search for Pan-African unity has been an attempt at forming alliances for mutual protection. For those unions which are under strict govern­ mental control, the search for Pan-African unity has been an extension of governmental policies into the labor field, to manipulate the Pan-African organizations towards the foreign policy ambitions of the state.

The most important point in the development of these centers is that African unions are financially weak. In those states in which the government has almost absolute control of the labor movement, the finances are supplied through governmental channels.*’ In those states which tolerate multi-union centers, financial support is often not available from the govern­ ment. It must come from membership contribution (which is often too small or irregular to permit attendance at international meetings on any major scale) or from outside sources (mainly from the trade union internationals to which they are affiliated). The controversy over disaffiliation from the labor internationals which split the labor movement in Africa derives from this point. 90

In the eyes of the non-affiliated centers, the financial support given to African affiliates of the internationals seemed like neo­ colonialism. However, since the mass disaffiliation of the CGTA and UGTAN group from the WFTU in 1956, the WFTU has had little or no direct member- ship in Africa. It has contented itself with supporting the Pan-African labor institutions which have emerged on the continent. The call for dis­ affiliation then, has meant disaffiliation from the IGFTU and the IFCTU.

This has injected the whole issue of the Cold War into African labor politics. The growth of Pan-African labor organizations in this post-1960 period has been the result of the conflicting pressures of the Casablanca vs. Monrovia Group split, compounded by the issue of Cold War alignment within the international labor movement.^ Each of these is important in understanding the nature of the split in the Pan-African labor search for unity.

The Ghanaian Trades Union Congress (TUC) withdrew its affiliation from the ICFTU and simultaneously issued a call for a Pan-African Trade

Union Conference at the UGTAN Conference of January 1959 (where it joined the UGTAN). The first Pan-African Trade Union Conference was held in

September 1959 at Casablanca. Attending the conference were the rump

UGTAN (mainly the Guinean and Ghanaian centers), the ICATU, the UGTA (of

Algeria) and the UGTT (of Tunisia).® The conference achieved little in

terms of unity, but rather cemented relations among the union groups from the more radical independent states. Following the conference, the Executive

Committee of the AAPO met in Accra, in October 1959, and voted for "the

immediate convocation of a conference of all representative African trade unions with the aimi of creating a united African trade union movement."9 91

This was especially interesting as, within a month from this meeting, in

November 1959 the 1CFTU affiliates met in Lagos for their important second

Regional Conference, where they set up the AFRO.

The AAPO called for the Second Pan-African Trade Union Conference to meet at the same time as the ICFTU meeting, November 1959. This meant that the affiliates of the ICFTU could not attend. Nkrumah, chief sponsor of the AAPO call, declared that membership in the ICFTU and in a

Pan-African union were mutually exclusive. Tom Mboya, a former Chairman of the AAPO, as well as an important leader of the ICFTU in Africa objected strongly to the AAPO's maneuver. This split in the AAPO which derived from the call for a second Pan-African trade union meeting led to the estrange­ ment of the PAFMECA from the AAPO.^ The ICFTU affiliates did not object to holding a Pan-African meeting; they said:

We see no conflict between this attitude and our continued support of the ICFTU. On the contrary, we see this as an opportunity to project the African Personality.il

Despite the objections of Mboya and the ICFTU affiliates, the second Pan-African conference took place in November 1959, at Accra. Trade unions from Morocco, Tunisia, Kenya, Togo, the Nigerian TUC, Rhodesia,

Uganda, South Africa, Algeria, the UGTAN and the ICATU took part. These groups created a provisional secretariat headed by Ben Seddick of the

Moroccai UMT, which called for a full All-African Trade Union Federation to be formed at Casablanca, in a meeting to be held in May 1960.

The conflict between the two groups came to a head in the second

Congress of the AAPO which opened in January 1960 in Tunis. Tom Mboya, whom Nkrumah had been attempting to oust from the chairmanship of the AAPC in favor of a Tunisian, did not attend.1^ The second major reason for the 92 non-attendance of Mboya was the creation of the Kenya Trade Union Congress

(KTUC) under Ochwada as a splinter group from Mboya1s Kenya Federation of

Labor (KFL); this was financed and directed by Nkrumah's aide, John

Tettegah. 13 The PAFMECA leadership were understandably annoyed by this blatant interference in the domestic politics of Kenya. The other ICFTU- affiliated unions were annoyed by the previous November meeting from which they were excluded.

At the AAPO meeting, the Ghanaian delegation pressed for a resolution which would require all unions who wished to participate in the upcoming Casablanca union meeting to disaffiliate from all international bodies before the meeting. Under the leadership of Tlili (of Tunisia) and

Diallo Seydou, a compromise was reached. The AAPO passed two resolutions on African trade unionism. The first called for African labor unity; it:

Appeals to the Governments of all the independent countries of Africa and to all the democratic and popular forces of Africa to recognize the existence of trade union rights.

Hails and supports unreservedly the convocation in mid-May 1960 at Casablanca of an African Trade Union Congress, in the service of the African cause, open to all the authentic national trade unions who are sincerely working for the political and social emancipation of the laboring masses.

The Conference fully supports the efforts towards unity of the workers of Africa and of their trade union organizations.

It invites them forthwith to redouble their ardor and to work with a view to assuring a resounding success for the Casablanca Conference, which should mark a decisive step in the realization of the unity of the African Trade Union movement.14

The second resolution stressed that unions should be free and

independent. There was no mention of the question of disaffiliation, although,

in a press conference held after the conference, Abdoulaye Diallo (of the

UGTAN and former vice-president of the WFTU) stated "that Africa should 93 not involve itself in the ideological struggles which divided the rest of 15 the world." The Tunis AAPO conference delayed action on any final decision on disaffiliation.

Although no decision was reached in Tunis, the Ghanaian press unleashed a series of polemical articles against Tom Mboya, calling him an

ICFTU stooge and attempting to discredit him as a legitimate trade union leader.^ Open support was given to Ochwada in Kenya in an attempt to undermine Mboya's power base. Similar splinter movements were fostered in other countries, the most important of which was Imoudu's split of the

Nigerian movement. Imoudu was openly accused of receiving funds from

Tettegah (over $15,000) as aid in this effort.^ Tom Mboya, in a reply to these criticisms, denied that ICFTU affiliation meant being pro-West:

There is no conflict between the principles which govern the free trade union movement and the new countries' desire to consolidate and safeguard their independence.

However, if a choice has to be made between democracy and a totalitarian regime, to choose anything but democracy would be a betrayal of the very struggle in which these countries have been engaged. Here again the free trade union movement has a fundamental role to play; trade union organizations and democracy seem, there­ fore, to be complementary.18

The AAPO responded by putting Ochwada on the payroll of the Bureau of African Affairs in Ghana and by sponsoring a worldwide trip for him and

Mamadou Jallow of Gambia. He explained the purpose of this trip in a letter, dated April 4, 1960:

We look to America and the Scandinavian countries to be neutral towards the establishment of the Africa's Trade Unionism and that is why the African trade Unionists had chosen me and Mr. Jallow...to come to America and Scandinavia to explain to you of the stand on Trade Unionism. The African people are frankly and openly against the so called Mastership of the Metropolitan cities of Brussels and London- Paris which control the ICFTU. We are determined to break away from it and build our own Trade Unionism independent of any tie with colonial 94

cities and communism...We have defeated Tom Mboya every where in Africa and he has just come to our leader Dr. Kwame Nkrumah to whom he has apologized his mistake of trying to divide A f r i c a . 19

In May of 1960, the proposed African trade union conference which was to have been held in Casablanca was postponed for a year. This resulted from a proposal by Ghana, since it felt it had not won sufficient support for an all-out ban on unions affiliated to the internationals. In a letter on this subject Mboya declared:

The Casablanca Conference was postponed at the request of Ghana. Dur­ ing my recent visit to North Africa and West Africa I found that, apart from Ghana, none of the other countries really supported the demand for complete disaffiliation from International Organizations. In addition I found out that Ghana was not as popular with her neighbors as some people would have us believe. In fact even in Guinea there is little sympathy or support for Ghana. In the circumstances Ghana felt they needed more time to canvass support in other parts of Africa and to this effect, Tettegah was being asked to make a tour of all other parts of Africa. He says he intends to come to East Africa...20

The postponing of the Casablanca conference was followed by the first Congress of the UPTC in May 1960 at Cotonou. The Christian unions had been invited to the Casablanca conference but had taken a stand in

favor of maintaining affiliation to the IFCTU. In its resolution on African

labor unity, it was somewhat more circumspect than the AFRO affiliates; it

stated:

That trade union unity is the ideal of all workers of the world, but that unity for unity's sake is worthless;

that unity obtained when confusion and contradictions still exist would unquestionably lead to the weakening of African trade unionism;

that the preparatory conference of African trade unions should be preceded by discussions between leaders and activists; that trade- union unity should not be based on superficial agreements;...21

After the UPTC meeting, the ICFTU-affiliated organizations

gathered in Nairobi, at the invitation of the KFL, to attend the KFL annual 95

congress. There they discussed the common problems facing them and took a united position on the question of African labor unity. They reaffirmed

their desire to maintain their affiliation to the ICFTU and made a formal

declaration to that effect at the end of the KFL Congress in June 1960.

This declaration called for the maintenance of free trade unionism:

we reaffirm our complete faith in a free and independent trade-union movement. For us there is no contradiction between our belief in free and independent trade unionism and the growth of independence and freedom in Africa....We believe then, in African unity in the struggle against colonialism, racialism and imperialism and we ask Africans to unite...We emphasize our faith in a policy of non- alignment in the struggle between East and W e s t . . . 22

The declaration denounced the provisional Pan-African Trade Union

secretariat which had been set up in Accra. It had been a unilateral act

of the AAPO leadership without consultation with any union group. This was

to have been the subject of the postponed Casablanca conference and this

sudden creation of the Pan-African Trade Union Federation was called

illegal and capricious. The signers also took a strong stand on the

question of disaffiliation:

In trade union matters we favor African unity. We think, however, that it would be going against reality and, moreover, impossible in the light of previous experience, to refuse each organization the right to decide on its policy in a given situation. We are, there­ fore, of the opinion that each national central trade-union orga­ nization should have the right to decide on its choice of affiliation to an international organization...23

In addition to this strong statement by the assembled delegates,

the KFL and Mboya issued its own declaration, reaffirming the united decla­

ration, and giving a brief history of all the intrigue which had preceded

it. The KFL reaffirmed its affiliation to the ICFTU, and Mboya pressed

for mutual tolerance and respect: I respect the decision of some unions in Africa not to affiliate with either the ICFTU or the WFTU and I know that they have very sincere reasons for doing so. But equally I expect them to respect our decision and sincerity in remaining in the ICFTU.24

At the same time this conflict between African unions was develop­

ing, the Second CIAS Conference was being held in Addis Ababa. There, the

conflict between the moderates (led by Nigeria) and the radicals (led by

Ghana) reached a high level. The split between the two groups was widened

by the trade union conflict. Many African states were concerned over the attempts to undermine other African states through covert subsidies of dis­

sident elements and through manipulations of the labor movement. The

breakup of the and the subsequent union of Mali with the

Ghana-Guinea Union confirmed many fears in West Africa that Ghana was

succeeding in its designs. The success of independence struggles in the

francophone states led to their becoming more actively involved in Pan-

African political movements in mid-1960. This was confirmed by their

calling a conference at Abidjan in October to discuss the formation of an

organization to Represent them. In November 1960, the ICFTU held its

regional meeting in Tunis to discuss common inter-African problems as well

as the pressure of African states for a more important voice in inter-ICFTU

affairs.

The Third African Regional ICFTU Conference

Meeting in Tunis in the early weeks of November 1960, thirty-two

representatives from nineteen affiliated national centers, along with

observers from ten other countries, met under the auspices of the AFRO to

create an organizational structure for the AFRO and to discuss common

problems. Massive documentation on wages, working conditions, social 97 welfare benefits, and trade union education in Africa were prepared and discussed. The organization committee, under the leadership of Borha

(of Nigeria) was empowered to make a presentation on current developments in Pan-African labor unity. This committee condemned the continuance of colonialism and strongly condemned the policy of African governments "which have in recent years embarked upon arrangements as a matter of policy to convert the trade unions into an arm of government administration."^

The most important section of its report, however, was that section which dealt with Pan-African unity:

25. In this great process of change, the African trade union movement is being pressured and infiltrated by state-operated trade unions from inside and outside Africa...

28. The Committee holds that the idea of Pan-African Trade Union Federation is not basically inconsistent with the free trade union movement of Africa, and that it would be injudicious to ignore the spiritual and emotional appeal which Pan-Africanism generates in the political and social institutions of 20th century Africa. But there is reason to be concerned that unless the free trade unions participate in its creation and direction, it may quite easily fall into the hands of other forces and be used for political ends by certain African states and thereby cause a split in the African Labor Front.26

This committee report was accepted by the AFRO and became an offi­ cial policy. Other resolutions were passed on Algeria, the Congo, etc., but were not essentially different from other resolutions passed earlier.

The substantive problem of creating a functioning mechanism for the AFRO led to adoption of a constitution for the organization. Although an elaborate system of regional offices, regional secretaries, dues, fees, etc. was agreed upon in the constitution, the implementation of these provisions fell far behind the aspirations. The constitution provided for a Regional Executive Board which was to consist "of two members nominated by each of the three areas, i.e. the North, the West, and the East, 98

Central and Southern Africa area."27 In fact, the regional offices for the

North and West African areas were never created.

Elections for officers of the three regional offices were held.

The North African area was to be represented by M. Ben Ezzedine and M.

Suessi; West Africa by H. P. Adebola and J. Amouhou; and the East, Central and Southern African region by T. Mboya and L. Katilungu. The elections for the Executive Board placed Adebola as Chairman and Ben Ezzedine as Vice-

Chairman. Unfortunately there were no nominations made for the post of

Regional Secretary so this election was postponed until December 18, 1960 when the AFRO Executive Board was to hold its meeting in Lagos. Still there were no nominations, so the ICFTU Representative McDonald Moses was appointed to take over the job temporarily. 28

Although the AFRO was now formally established in Lagos and had a budget and officers, it was still looked upon as not really being a representative body. It was clearly dominated by the union leaders from formerly-British colonies. The francophone states had only five national centers affiliated to AFRO and were in a very inferior position relative to the anglophone states. This was to prove the AFRO's greatest weakness.

In the wake of the AFRO conference, John Tettegah visited Kenya, as part of his tour around Africa. He was travelling as an official delegate of the Ghanaian TUC. In Kenya he met with Mboya, and the two dis­ cussed many of their common concerns. These discussions resulted in a

"Joint Declaration on Behalf of the Ghana TUC and the Kenya Federation of

Labor" of November 21, 1960, which outlined a joint position on African unity: ) 99

2. Both organizations reaffirm their belief that the African trade union movement cannot be an importation of the American, French, British or Russian systems. The movement in Africa must reflect African problems and conditions and respond-to Africa's specific needs and personality...

3. Both organizations want to state their complete support for the formation of the All-African Trade Union Federation...The setting up of the Federation must in rrcr-manner encroach- upon- the autonomy of each trade union national center in'the different states and territories.

4. Both organizations subscribe to the policy of positive independence and non-alignment as between power blocs...It is agreed that AATUF should not be affiliated to any of the international trade union centers - ICFTU, WFTU or CHRISTIAN INTERNATIONAL.

The Kenya Federation of Labor and the Ghana TUC both recognize the right of each National Center to decide on its international rela­ tions. We find nothing in the present position that would make it difficult for both centers to participate fully in the formation of the AATUF.29

This declaration was signed by both Tettegah and Mboya. On the face of it, this declaration seemed to be a resolution of all the major dif­ ferences which had divided the two groups. It signalled the end of the open hostilities between the two major antagonists. However, this camraderie was short-lived. Two days after the signing of the joint declaration, and co­ inciding with an African International Labor Office (ILO) meeting, a booklet was passed out throughout Africa, called "The Great Conspiracy in Africa".

It was put out by the breakaway Nigerian TUC, and had an introduction by

Gogo Chu Nzeribe (who had recently returned from the WFTU council meeting in

30 Peking in June 1960).

This pamphlet outlined a great conspiracy of the ICFTU against

Africa, to return the continent to the former imperial masters. In par­ ticular, it singled out Mboya as the chief architect of this conspiracy and accused him of attempting to overthrow Kenyatta. Copies had been circulated earlier at the CIAS conference in Addis Ababa and the Tunis 100

AAPO conference, secretly, but was given wide distribution only in late

November. On behalf of the ICFTU-affiliated unions, and the KFL, Mboya

issued a lengthy press statement on December 15th, 1960 on this document.

He forcefully denied all the charges contained in it:

I have serious doubts about its authenticity. There is no doubt that it is the work of a very clever person whose purpose is obviously to blackmail any person with any connections with the ICFTU through character assassination and malicious falsehoods.31

Mboya tied this booklet to the campaign against him which had been waged by the Ghana TUC. He referred to the recent Joint Declaration to show

that the two had been in agreement on the formation of the AATUF. He then went on to discuss the question of disaffiliation:

I see that India which is well known for her neutralist policy has a labor movement affiliated to the ICFTU. Similarly I find that where­ as there is an Arab Confederation of Trade Unions which is not affiliated to any international body some of the unions affiliated to it are members of the ICFTU.

Even before this declaration was released in Kenya, Mboya had sent

a letter to Tettegah, on November 25, 1960, asking if the AATUF were

responsible for the "Great Conspiracy" document and enquiring why Ochwada

(whom Mboya and Tettegah had agreed should reaffiliate to the KFL) was

invited to attend the preparatory AATUF meeting in Accra in November.

Tettegah replied to this letter on December 14, 1960. His letter stated

that the invitation of Ochwada was done by the AATUF people before

Tettegah returned to Accra, and was an oversight. He announced that the

preparatory meeting had decided that the AATUF would meet in mid-May 1960

at either Cairo or Casablanca.33 Tettegah emphatically disassociated the

AATUF from the "Great Conspiracy" pamphlet:

Your cable complaining of Gogo's pamphlet is duly in hand and I could well imagine your feelings. As you are no doubt aware, the document 101

has been in circulation in Africa for a considerable time* now and its origin is beyond my knowledge. If I have any personal detestation, it is expressly registered against Gogo's preface to the document and to present it as being sponsored by the All-African Trade Union Federa­ tion. I think that this is ill-advised and could bring the AATUF into unecessary controversy. I would nevertheless implore your sober and patient consideration not to be provoked to retaliation unworthy of the spirit that has ever kept us united in diversity.34

Accompanying this letter was a copy of the press release issued by

Tettegah, on December 13, 1960, as the First Secretary of the Preparatory

Secretariat of the AATUF, denying responsibility for the "Great Conspiracy" pamphlet:

I wish to state that the Federation has not as yet been formed nor has this document officially been brought up for discussion at the meeting of the Secretariat or the Preparatory Committee itself, and there can be no question of this publication being sponsored by the All-African Trade Union Federation.35

These denials did little to dissolve the hostilities and tensions which were developing within the Pan-African labor movement. At the same time that these tensions were developing, the activities in the political arena revealed their own dissensions.

In December 1960, the francophone states met at Brazzaville to form their own Pan-African union, the Brazzaville Group. This group sought to develop economic and social organizations which would strengthen the exist­ ing ties among them. This spurred on the states of Ghana, Guinea, Mali,

Morocco, Algeria, and the UAR to found their own group at a meeting in

January 1961, the Casablanca Group. This new group was implacably opposed

O to the Brazzaville Group for a variety of reasons and attempted to form

itself as the nucleus of a Pan-African union. The split between the two groups was almost inevitable.

At the third AAPO meeting, in Cairo, during late March 1961, the conflict between Casablanca and the Brazzaville Groups led to the AAPO 102 taking a strong line against the francophone states. It called them

"French puppets"^? and colonialist stooges. The AAPO also made repeated references to the AATUF and called for "the immediate launching of the

All-African Trade Union Federation as an effective means of counteracting neo-colonialism"P® It clearly identified the Casablanca Group with the

AATUF and pledged the support of the AAPO.

Preparations were made at Cairo for the holding of the AATUF meet­ ing in Casablanca in May 1961. Also scheduled for May was a meeting of the

Pan-African political movements, to be held in Monrovia. This was designed to see if a common unity could be found between the Brazzaville States, the non-bloc states, and the Casablanca powers. Ultimately, the Casablanca powers did not attend and the assembled delegates formed the Monrovia

Group, which comprised the Brazzaville and non-bloc groups (such as Nigeria,

Liberia, and others).

The press organs of the Casablanca powers opened a massive barrage of propaganda against the Monrovia states, which was countered by a similar barrage from the Monrovia powers.

In the midst of this great turmoil of accusation and counter­ accusation, much of which was aimed at Ghana's search for dominance in inter-

African affairs, the first meeting of the All-African Trade Union Federation took place in Casablanca, in May 1961, after a stormy preparatory meeting in Conakry in April.

The All-African Trade Union Federation

Assembled at Casablanca, from May 25 to 30th, 1961 one hundred and sixty-two trade union representatives from forty-two countries attended the 103 first meeting of the AATUF. In addition to African delegates, foreign guests included representatives from the ICFTU, French CGT, the Italian

CGIL, the Chinese ACFTU, the Czechoslovak and Polish union centers, as well as a number of other foreign unionists. The meeting opened with a floor fight over the absence of a Credentials Committee. Many of the unions attending represented only splinter groups in their own countries and no

Credentials Committee screened the legitimacy of these groups. A further bone of contention was that the Steering Committee, which had been formed at Conakry earlier, gave its union centers six delegates each, while other union centers were allowed only two delegates each. In reality, this was not important, as there was no voting at the conference. A Charter was sub­ mitted at the last session of the meeting which was passed by acclamation.

This AATUF Charter was passed only after over one-third of the invited delegates had already walked out of the meeting and had gone home.

Delegates from Kenya, Uganda, Nyasaland, Nigeria, Southern Rhodesia, Tan­ ganyika, Tunisia, Somalia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cameroons, Mauritius, and

Madagascar all had departed the meeting after the Steering Committee refused to consider their proposal to compromise on the question of international affiliation. They had offered to disaffiliate nationally from the inter­ nationals if the AATUF would affiliate as a single unit to the internationals.

This was refused. Instead, the AATUF demanded that "trade union centers affiliated to other Internationals should, within ten months break their affiliations and join AATUF."39 This Casablanca Charter called for unity and independence for unions, as well as for their independence from govern­ ments and political parties. In fact, the major unions behind the AATUF (Ghana, Guinea, Mali and the UAR) were probably the least independent unions on the continent of

Africa. This hypocritical stand did not pass unnoticed by the other union centers; it formed the basis of some of the critical attacks on AATUF in the following months.

The AATUF Charter provided for headquarters to be located in

Casablanca, as well as creating six regional offices. The presidency went to Majoub Ben Seddick of Morocco. Other officers included: Maachou of

Algeria; Tettegah of Ghana; Kaba of Guinea; Sissoko of Mali; Awab of

Morocco; and Salema of the UAR. Tom Mboya was given a vice-presidency in absentia, which he subsequently refused. As can be seen from the list of officers, the AATUF was composed of the same states as the Casablanca

Group. Its foreign policy orientations were essentially the same, and the pressures it attempted to exert through the three major components of the

Casablanca powers (the AAPO, the AATUF and the Casablanca Group) were virtually identical.

The ICFTU-affiliated organizations roundly condemned the AATUF meet­ ing. Tlili declared:

We left the conference having rejected all proposals that at this first congress the principle of disaffiliation should be accepted, and we have proposed that this question should be referred to a later meeting which would be more valid and more representative.^1

Other speeches were made by Nigerian and Senegalese delegates, denouncing

AATUF as unrepresentative. Articles appeared in the ICFTU press which rejected the call for disaffiliation of its members within ten months.

They contrasted the control exercised over the Casablanca labor movements with the democratic labor principles which they said guided their affiliates 105

Labor leaders of the caliber of Kenya's Tom Mboya, Tunisia's Ahmed Tlili, Nigeria's Lawrence Borha and Sierra Leone's H. N. Georgestone, any more than many other prominent and representative African trade unionists such as Senegal's Cisse Alioune, whose organization follows a genuinely neutralist line, are not going to be pushed around by any self-appointed continental directorate. In their own countries they believe in and practice the principles of free trade unionism - which include democratic procedures and freedom from government control; they are not, therefore, likely to surrender those principles at the continental level. ^

Mboya was less condemnatory than most of the others and seemed

interested in supporting a genuine AATUF, an organization which would represent African labor fairly. As an important leader in PAFMECA, he found the pressures of the Casablanca and Monrovia split less important

than they might have been to the West African states. Additionally, none of the PAFMECA states were as yet independent. The unions, who made up an

important part of the PAFMECA organization, were interested in maintaining

as many friendly contacts as possible. They needed allies in their inde­

pendence activities. In his speech following the AATUF meeting, Mboya

asked:

Who will finance the AATUF, especially now that two political blocs are emerging among the African States; and whether, if financed by either bloc, AATUF will be used as a political weapon against some States in A f r i c a ? ^

Having just been through a major battle inside Kenya between the KFL and

Ochwada's KTUC, he found this an important question. It was going to be

even more important if the AATUF and the Casablanca powers were going to

openly intervene in the internal politics of the non-independent states.

Divisive forces were already emerging in Kenya, between KANU and KADU, in

Uganda, between Obote and the Kabaka of Buganda, in Northern Rhodesia,

between UNIP and the ANC, to mention only a few. If the AATUF were to back

one group against the rival group, independence could be delayed and civil 106 strife would be fostered.

On June 6 , 1961 Tettegah gave Mboya his answer. He said that the

AATUF would certainly interfere in the internal policies of other union bodies who refused to disaffiliate from the internationals:

We shall isolate them and enter their countries and form AATUF unions there. It is as simple as that - total war.

The lines were clearly drawn. The UPTC groups, who had not been invited to Casablanca, made overtures to the ICFTU groups as a matter of self protection. Discussions on Pan-African labor unity were begun at the

ILO meeting in Geneva in June 1961. Initial agreement was reached for'.call­ ing a conference which would examine:

in a democratic manner and in conditions of tolerance, all the trade union, social, economic, and political problems of Africa, and which will seek solutions based on unanimity and eschew all points which may tend to create divisions.45

The technical details of the conference were left to the repre­ sentatives of the UGTS of Senegal. The UGTS scheduled a meeting for July 30,

1961 in Dakar but, due to the Bizerta crisis, this meeting was postponed for a month. However, this proved to be too short a notice for the orga­ nizations who were to attend and the meeting was again put off. A prepara­ tory meeting was informally held in Nairobi, in October, when eleven organizations joined the KFL in celebrating Kenya Labor Day. It was decided there to invite the AATUF to meet with the organizers of the Dakar conference in order that they might participate. Ben Seddick said that the

AATUF would participate if there was prior agreement on accepting all the principles enunciated in the AATUF Charter.^ The AATUF did not meet with the Dakar sponsors.

To prepare for the Dakar meeting, the UGTS invited Lawrence Borha 107 of the Nigerian TUC, Clement Lubembe of the KFL, Alphonse Kithima of the

Congolese (Leopoldville) CSLC, Mahmoud Ben Ezzedine of the UGTT, and

Gilbert Pongault, head of the UPTC to Dakar on December 4, 1961. Abdoulaye

Ba, of the UGTS, headed the meeting and reported that initial response to the call for a Pan-African labor meeting was very good.

They issued a communique which incorporated a call for a con­ ference, to be held in Dakar from the ninth to the fourteenth of January

1962:

After having noted with regret the hesitation of the leaders of the All-African Trade Union Federation in Casablanca in spite of the appeals to unity issued, notably in Geneva, Dakar, Nairobi and in spite of the approaches made to the President of the AATUF by the Senegalese delegation commissioned for that purpose, Believing that the fight of the African people to recover and re­ inforce national independence and the battle of the workers to conquer and protect basic liberties, among which are included trade union freedom and economic and social well-being, can only be effectively supported by the complete unity and solidarity of the African labor movement, The undersigned delegates have decided to launch a solemn new appeal to all African trade union organizations and particularly to all those belonging to the AATUF in order that they might contribute to the complete success of the conference. ^

The delegates to this meeting decided that no representatives from any of the internationals would be invited and that only bona fide free and independent trade unions would be invited. It was decided that the Ghanaian

TUC was not one of these free and independent organizations, and it was not invited.

In early January 1962, the conference met in Dakar, to form a new

Pan-African labor group, the African Trade Union Confederation (ATUC).

The African Trade Union Confederation

On January 9, 1962 eighty-four representatives of forty-one African 108

labor organizations from thirty countries met in Dakar to form a new Pan-

African union, the African Trade Union Confederation (ATUC). Twenty-one

of the organizations at this meeting were affiliated to the ICFTU, twelve were IFCTU-UPTC affiliates, and eight were not affiliated to any inter­

national. The ICFTU affiliates represented unions in: Angola, Cameroons,

Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Gabon, Gambia, Kenya, Liberia,

Libya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Nigeria, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia,

Southern Rhodesia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanganyika, Tunisia and Uganda.

UPTC members came from: Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Ivory

Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Mauritania, Senegal, and

Togo. The independents came from: Cameroons, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Niger,

Central African Republic, and Senegal.

Labor movements from Ruanda-Urundi, Chad, the Sudan and South

Africa were unable to attend, but sent messages of solidarity. This list of

countries is virtually identical with the list of countries which participated

in the formation of the Monrovia Group.

The conference elected five chairmen for the sessions, each of whom

took a turn at heading the meeting (Tlili, Borha, Lubembe, Pongault, and Ba).

This was done to avoid the conflict over the leadership positions which had

developed early in the AATUF meeting at Casablanca. The ATUC heard long

reports on Doctrine and Direction, Status and Organization, Political,

Economic and Social Affairs, and others. It adopted a lengthy constitution

and passed a number of resolutions, including the usual ones on Algeria,

Portugese Guinea, South Africa, the Central African Federation, Angola, the

Congo (Leopoldville), etc.

The two key resolutions were on African Unity and African Trade 109

Unionism. The resolution on African Unity stressed the dangers of cold war

activism in Africa:

(a) Upon the realization that a dangerous cold war that has divided the great powers into the East and West exists;

(b) Upon the recognition that powers interested in Africa are working to introduce the cold war into Africa in order to further their imperialistic designs; and

(c) upon the understanding that the unity of the working peoples of Africa can provide a force to hamper imperialist designs...

(d) this Conference of African Trade Unionists is resolutely determined to strive for the achievement of unity of Africa...48

The resolution on African Trade Unionism praised the joining of the labor movement with the struggle for national liberation and severely condemned

"state incorporated unionism in any shape or form in or outside Africa."49

These aspirations were reaffirmed in the preamble to the ATUC Constitution."^

The Constitution itself created the ATUC with headquarters in Dakar

and gave a detailed list of aims and objectives. Among these were:

Article 6 - The ATUC is independent of all Governments, all political parties, all religions and all associations of financial interests... Article 7 - ...National labor organizations belonging to the ATUC may freely decide on their individual relationships with outside associations... Article 10 - The ATUC is independent of all International Labor Orga­ nizations and of all African organizations which do not belong to it... Article 12 - Only one National Organization for each country... are recognized. Article 13 - ...The ATUC does not intervene in the internal affairs of States.51

The ATUC created seven Regional Unions to serve as intermediate

organizations between the central body and the individual national unions,

corresponding to geographical areas.The administration of the ATUC was

to be controlled by a General Council, composed of five representatives

from each of the seven regions, which elects the officers (1 President, 110

7 Vice-Presidents, 1 Permanent Administrative Secretary, 1 Treasurer-

General, 1 Assistant Treasurer-General and 1 Secretary each for Organization,

Education, Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, Press, and Propaganda).^3

Tlili of Tunisia was elected the first President of the ATUC, and

David Soumhah, the Senegalese president of the UPTC became the first administrative secretary. In fact, the UPTC, despite their smaller size, demanded equal representation on the Council with the ICFTU affiliates.

This was granted, but it emphasized the divisive tendencies already present in the ATUC at its inception. The UPTC and the PAFMECA-ICFTU affiliates sought to create, with the ATUC, a loose Pan-African body to co-ordinate their activities. The independent unions, mainly from the former French territories, sought a much tighter union. The creation of the seven regional councils was a victory for the former. A far more serious problem developed out of the controversy over Article 12, which stated that only one national union could be affiliated. In fact, there were multiple affiliations from the Cameroons, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville),

Ivory Coast, Gabon, Madagascar, Mauritania, and Senegal. An original charter provision which put a time limit of six months for achieving national unity was rejected.-^ Articles 28 and 29 set no time limit for this unity. The controversy over affiliating single national centers illustrates the fragile nature of African unity, since many of the unions which supported African labor unity internationally were quite unwilling to support such unity at home.

One of the first acts of the ATUC leadership was to fly to Lagos to attend the Monrovia Chiefs of State Conference as official observers. They were refused this special status, illustrating that although the ATUC was 111 composed of representatives from the same states as the Monrovia Group and

that they faced the same opposition from Casablanca-AATUF Group, there was a considerable gap between the Pan-African labor and Pan-African political movements. Unity and solidarity were important concepts on a continental level; when this meant unity and solidarity at home, African governments refused to practice these concepts. This split between govern­ ments and unions was to grow even wider in the next few years. It would be far from true to assert that the unity which existed between the

Casablanca Group and the AATUF had a parallel in the Monrovia-ATUC

Group.

However, the formation of the ATUC did not go unnoticed. A long

series of attacks against the ATUC was mounted in the AATUF press. The

AATUF Secretariat held a meeting on February 3, 1962 to discuss the

formation of ATUC. They issued a communique entitled "AATUF WILL RESIST

ALL INTRIGUES AND MANEUVERS" which damned the ATUC:

The Secretariat considers the recent Dakar Conference as the work of external intrigues and maneuvers which do not respond to any African needs but was engineered to divide the African labor front...

The Secretariat will launch a vast program to educate the African masses by printing monthly journals which will be reproduced in three principal languages. It will open labor colleges in Morocco, Ghana, Guinea and the United Arab Republic to African trade unionists who wish to undergo a course in trade unionism. The Secretariat has also created a solidarity fund to assist weak African trade union movements.

Articles began appearing in all the AATUF-affiliated press organs,

particularly in the "African Worker" of Ghana and "L'Avant Garde" of

Morocco. A full-scale propaganda barrage began on both sides. The first

ATUC Executive meeting took place in Tunis, on December 11, 1962 where it

was decided to resist the AATUF attacks. This-meeting was followed by an 112

AFRO Executive Board meeting, also in Tunis, on December 16, 1962, which called a full conference of the AFRO for the following July in Nairobi.

There was discussion on finding a Secretary-General for AFRO, but this was postponed until the Nairobi meeting. Ese of Nigeria was appointed to

c/: remain as administrative officer until a Secretary-General could be found.

By the end of 1962 the labor movement in Africa was split along the same lines as the political movement. Hostilities and rivalries between the ATUC and the AATUF led to great acrimony and bitterness between them.

The greatest weakness of the ATUC was the fact that all its officials were full-time national union leaders who could spare little time on ATUC duties. The AFRO was in a state of mild disorder and there was little cohesion in it. Only the AATUF, which was well funded and well staffed, was active, particularly in the area of propaganda.

The pressures for Pan-African labor unity had spawned two hostile groups. The unity which was to be soon achieved in Addis Ababa at the formation of the OAU did not come to the labor movements. The pressures of ideology and foreign interference were to keep the Pan-African labor unity an unrealizable goal. 113

Throughout the history of unionism in Africa, the largest single employer in every state has been the local government. See G. St.J. Orde-Browne, The African Labourer (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1967); J. I. Roper, Labour Problems in West Africa (London: Penguin, 1958). For a more current study see, inter alia, T. M. Yesufu, An Introduction to Industrial Relations in Nigeria (London: Oxford Press, 1962).

^G. E. Lynd, The Politics of African Trade Unionism (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 36-46; Willard A. Beling, Modernization and African Labor: A Tunisian Case Study (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 100-118; Saad Ed Din Fawzi, The Labor Movement in the Sudan (London: Oxford Press, 1957), pp. 79-92,inter alia. Morocco is a special case, however. Its leadership has often been in direct conflict with the government. See Douglas E. Ashford,-Political Change in Morocco (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 270-301.

^Lynd, o£. cit., pp. 117-130.

^See below Chapter Six.

^In most cases, the government acts as the dues-collecting agent and then apportions these funds to the unions at its discretion. See especially Lester Trachtman, "The Labor Movement in Ghana", Reprint Series no. 127, New York School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Ithaca 1962.

^Hans Gottfurcht, Die Internationale Gewerkschaftsbewegung von den Anfaengen bis zur Gegenwart (Koeln: Bund Verlag, 1966), pp. 96-97.

^George E. Lichtblau, "African Trade Unions and the Cold War" in Willard A. Beling (ed.) The Role of Labor in African Nation-Building (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 139-169.

®Jean Meynaud and Annise Salah Bey, Trade Unionism in Africa (London: Methuen, 1967), pp. 124-125.

9Ibid., pp. 125-126.

IQlbid., p. 126.

Hjohn Riddell, "Free Trade Unions in the Fight for African Freedom", (Brussels: ICFTU-AFRO, 1961), p. 34.

l^Richard Cox, Pan-Africanism in Practice (London: Oxford Press, 1964), pp. 34-35.

^element Lubembe, The Inside of Labour Movement of Kenya (Nairobi: Equatorial Publishers, 1968), pp. 127-128. Tom Mboya in "East African Standard" (Nairobi), September 29, 1959. 114

^"Minutes of the Tunis Meeting" - (Accra: AAPO), January 1960.

Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 84.

l^Meynaud and Salah-Bey, 0£. cit., p. 128.

^Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa, the Politics of Unity (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 190 n.

l^Tom Mboya. "Free Trade Unionism and Democracy" in "Free Trade Union News" (Washington: AFL-CIO) January 1960.

19()chwada letter to American Committee on Africa, April 4, 1960 (sent from Accra).

2®Mboya letter to American Committee on Africa, May 17, 1960 (sent from Nairobi).

2lMeynaud and Salah-Bey, op. cit., p. 205 (text).

2 2 Ibid., pp. 202-205.

23 lbid., p. 203.

2^Appendix "AV to KFL Policy Statement, Nairobi June 1960, p. 4.

25Riddell, op. cit., p. 35.

2^Appendix - 28EB/9 (a) (i) p. 17. (Minutes of ICFTU Twenty-Eighth Executive Board.)

2?Appendix I-3ARC/7 (Minutes of the Third AFRO Congress) Article 11c. p. 6 . See also, Report on Activities 1960-1962 and Financial Reports (Brussels: ICFTU 1962), pp. 50-52. The ICFTU Regional Offices in West and East Africa had been in operation for many years. There was no Regional Executive Board, however.

^3 Ibid., p. 51.

2^Text of declaration, p. 1 .

3®It was purported to be a secret British Cabinet Paper. It was denied by the British Government.

31-Kenya Federation of Labour Press Statement, "The Great Conspiracy Against Africa", December 15, 1960, p._.l.-

3 2 Ibid., p. 2 .

33Tettegah letter to Mboya, "Ref:TUC/B.11/SF.1/273(3)60" December 14, 1960. 115

34ibid., p . 2.

35iext of press statement, p. 1.

36See above Chapter Three, pp.: 68-.72.

37Legum, ££. c i t . , p. 265.

3 8I b i d . . p. 275.

39ibid., p. 240.

40i b i d . . pp. 239-240.

4libid., pp. 87-88.

42"Free Labour World" (Brussels: ICFTU), July, 1961.

43Legum, op. cit., p. 88.

44john Tettegah, Press Statement of June 6 , 1961, quoted in Riddell, op. cit., p. 64.

45Meynaud and Salah-Bey, op. cit., p. 134.

46Legum, op. cit., p. 89.

47press statement, Dakar, December 4, 1961.

48"Minutes of ATUC Meeting", Dakar, June 10, 1962, p. 14.

4 9 i b i d .. p. 16.

^Ofieling, op. cit., pp. 230-231.

5 1 i b i d . . pp. 233-234.

5 2 i b i d .. p. 234.

5 3 Ibid., p. 235.

54Meynaud and Salah-Bey, op. cit., p. 36.

35AATUF Communique, Accra (undated), p. 1. 116

^Clement Lubembe, "Report by C. K. Lubembe, Deputy General Secretary on Tunis Meeting of AFRO" (mimeographed), Nairobi, December 21, 1962, p. 2. CHAPTER V

UNITY ACHIEVED ON PAPER: PAN-AFRICANISM 1963-1964

For most African nations, the period 1963 to 1964 marked an important bhift in their political relations. For those nations that had won their independence in the pre-1963 period, the changeover to African rule was relatively peaceful. The new African- governments were able to attempt to formulate national policies in the same aura of a large reservoir of good­ will. The ruling elites were, to a large degree, allowed to establish

African-run institutions with a modicum of violence or hostility. The citizens of these new states were willing to give their leaders a chance to establish themselves.

However, by 1963, some of the glamor of independence had worn off.

The failures of independence to vitiate pressing economic and social problems were compounded by the development of an unresponsive and often corrupt civil service. The tasks of development, education, social welfare, health and administration which had been operated by their former colonial power fell upon the new African leadership. In a large number of cases, these administrators were incapable of achieving domestic priorities quickly or effectively.

Throughout much of Africa, this conflict between promise and reality led to a disillusionment with the national leadership. In the post-1963 period, these domestic pressures often flared up into coups, counter-coups and assassinations.^ Added to the fundamental vulnerability of African states in the area of economic assistance, was the specter of domestic political upheaval. Frustrated by the tremendous task of attempting 118 rapidly to develop an agrarian economy while, at the same time, looking over their shoulders for domestic rebellion, many African leaders modified their national political structures away from the "Westminister" model of a multi-party state and formed the one-party, one-elite state in whom all

O power was concentrated.

These factors had a profound effect on the search for Pan-African unity. Pan-Africanism became a movement towards economic interaction as well as its more traditional political relations. The movement which was developed within the UAM at its Dakar Conference of January 1961, towards creating common economic institutions among African states provided much of the groundwork for the development of Pan-African economic institutions.

Trade areas, development ffanks, riparian treaties, transportation grids, and similar economic programs became vital adjuncts to Pan-Africanism's 3 political thrust.

At the same time, many of the problems which had divided Africa into politically antagonistic blocs were disappearing. The perennial issue over Algeria and the recognition of the GPRA was settled by the Evian agreement which granted Algeria its independence on July 2, 1962. The end­ ing of this tragic and- brutal war made it much easier to integrate the francophone states into a common union with the more militant states which had demanded a much tougher policy towards France. In addition, the shift in French policy towards reducing their overseas assistance to Africa in

1963, gave added impetus to these states to seek to expand their inter-

African contacts.^

Late in December 1962, the United Nations forces in the Congo occupied the last strongholds of Katangese separatism, thus ending, for a 119 while, the Congolese problem. The long controversy between the Monrovia and Casablanca Groups over whom to support in the Congo ended when Adoula took over political control of a re-united state. The other major problem which had divided the two blocs was less easily resolved.

The Ghanaian-sponsored exile groups still operated against fellow

African governments.^ The acceptance of subversion as a tactic of foreign policy, although not limited exclusively to the Casablanca Group, was often cited as a principal stumbling block to African unity. Ghana, in particular, was often singled out for the most criticism. In January 1963, the assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo brought this problem of subversion into sharp focus and contributed greatly to the political isolation of Ghana, even from her closest allies.

On January 13, 1963 a group of military officers assassinated

President Olympio and seized control of the Togolese government. A group of political leaders, headed by Grunitsky, who had been resident in Ghana, returned to Togo to take control of the state. Ghana promptly recognized the new regime. The other nations of Africa were appalled at Olympio's assassination and were more than a little suspicious of Ghana's role in the coup. They withheld recognition of the new regime, and called for a full investigation of Olympio's death.

Even Guinea, a fellow member of the Union of African States and

Ghana's closest ally, expressed its disapproval. In a telegram to Nkrumah

on January 22, 1963, Sekou Toure said:

The recognition of the new Togolese government before the opening of an inquiry into the events of 13 January and before the assurance that the guilty people will be punished risks acting as a new spring­ board to subversive intrigues in Africa.6 120

- Various other African states condemned Ghana. Houphouet-Boighy accused

Ghana of a plot to overthrow his government through Ghana's aid to Camille

Adam's National Committee for the Liberation of the Ivory Coast.7 The

Nigerians condemned Ghanaian aid to the Nigerian Action Group, and recalled

the official support Ghana gave to Meatchi's trips to Togo.®

In March, the governments of the UAM met in Ouagadougou and passed 9 a resolution condemning Ghana by name for the assassination in Togo. By

the end of March 1963, Ghana was effectively isolated.

Other, smaller issues which had divided the two groups also dis­

appeared. Among these was the hostility which had divided Mali from

Senegal in the wake of the dissolution of the Mali Federation in August

1960. In December 1962, the governments of the two states entered into

negotiations to restore the Dakar-Niger rail link, Mali's lifeline to the

sea.^® In fact, most of the key issues which had separated the two groups

had disappeared by early 1963.

The series of exploratory talks between the two groups, led by

Toure, Balewa and Hailie Selassie, were supported by the members of the

PAFMECSA. Agreement was reached on holding a conference on African unity

in May 1963, in Addis Ababa. Preceded by a Foreign Ministers Conference a

few days earlier, the two groups met and formed a new, united Pan-African

organization, the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

The Organization of African Unity

Following a Foreign Ministers meeting on May 15, 1963 the represent­

atives of thirty-two African states met in Addis Ababa on May 22, 1963.

Every African state, except Togo and Morocco, was represented by its Head 121 of State (Morocco did not wish to sit at the same table as Mauritania and

Togo's Grunitsky was discreet enough not to annoy those states who had not yet recognized his government). Ghana was almost totally isolated and her traditional call for immediate political unity was supported by only one other delegate, Obote of Uganda.^ Clearly, the more numerous and more moderate states controlled the conference. Selassie set the tone of the conference in his opening speech:

While we agree that the ultimate destiny of this continent lies in political union, we must recognize that the obstacles to be overcome in its achievement are numerous and formidable. Africa’s people did not emerge into liberty in uniform conditions...Further, no clear consensus exists on the "how" and the "what" of this union...

The union we seek can only come gradually. A period of transition is inevitable...There is nonetheless much that we can do to speed this transition. There are issues on which we stand united and questions on which there is unanimity of opinion. Let us seize upon those areas of agreement and exploit them to the fullest...If we act where we may, in those areas where action is possible, the inner logic of the programs which we adopt will work for us and inevitably impel us still further in the direction of ultimate u n i o n . 12

Following this 'functionalist' approach, the leaders of these

thirty-two states agreed upon a Charter which incorporated the Lagos

Charter of the IAMSO with a draft charter prepared for Ethiopia by the

former Chilean Secretary General of the Organization of American States,

Senor Trucco. This Charter gave form to and created an organization to

promote and maintain African unity.

One of the most important sections of the Charter was Article III, which outlined the seven principles which were to guide the OAU:

1. The sovereign equality of all African and Malagasy States.

2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence. 122

4. Peaceful settlements of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.

5. Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assas­ sination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighboring States or any other States.

6 . Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent.

7. Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.13

The OAU created a structure which included an Assembly of Heads of

State, augmented by a semi-annual conference of Foreign Ministers. It also created a permanent Secretariat, headed by a Secretary-General. It provided for a separate treaty to be appended which would create an arbitration and conciliation commission, and made specific allowance for the creation of special commissions on economic, social, educational, cultural, health, sanitation, nutrition, defense, and scientific and technical research.^

An important facet of the OAU meeting was the commitment to support the liberation movements in the not yet independent areas of Africa. Ben

Bella, of Algeria, made his famous speech recalling the struggles he had faced in Algeria in the fight against colonialism:

African brothers agreed to die a little so that Algeria might become an independent state. So let us all agree to die a little, or even completely, so that the peoples still under colonial domination may be freed and African unity may not be a vain w o r d . 15

Accordingly, the OAU agreed to set up a special Committee for National

Liberation, composed of nine states (Tanganyika, Uganda, Guinea, Egypt,

Ethiopia, Congo-Leopoldville, Algeria, Nigeria and Senegal). This Com­ mittee of Nine had its headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam and was to be financed by a "Fighting Fund". This Committee of Nine was charged with training nationalist leaders in the arts of guerrilla warfare and in seeing 123

to their logistical needs. It was also responsible for trying to reunite

the fissiparous groups from Southern Africa whose internecine conflicts

•threatened the success of the liberation movements.

Equally important in the area of anti-colonialism was the effort made on the OAU's behalf to use the United Nations as a vehicle for obtain­

ing sanctions against South Africa and Portugal, and to wrest Southwest

Africa from South Africa's control.

Despite the careful wording of the OAU Charter on the points of com­ mon interest for African unity, one major area was omitted, the question of

the disposition of existing regional or other groupings. The Charter provided

no clear statement of what was to be done with these groups. The controversy

and discussion on this point came to a head at the Dakar OAU Foreign

Ministers' Conference in August 1963.

Although the formation of the OAU effectively did away with the

Monrovia and Casablanca Groups as political entities, the constituent parts

of the Monrovia Group did not disappear. Following the Addis Ababa Con­

ference establishing the OAU, the PAFMECSA abandoned its scheduled conference

which was to have been held in Kampala.^ However, this did not mean that

the PAFMECSA had ceased to exist. On June 1, 1963 Kenyan leaders flew to

Arusha, in Tanganyika, to meet with Sekou Toure and Nyerere to discuss a

common effort to get the British to agree to a definite date for Kenyan

independence. While at Arusha, Nyerere suggested that they call a meeting

of East African leaders to discuss Kenyan independence and, while they were

there, to also discuss plans for creating an East African Federation.

After notifying Obote of Uganda, the leaders of the three East

African states met on June 5, 1963 and agreed to federate by the end of the 124 year. A Working Party was established to discuss a Constitution which would be presented by the third week in August.^ Four days later, in Dar-es-

Salaam, the representatives of the three states met to process initial steps towards achieving the Nairobi Declaration.They declared that they had reached agreement on every issue and that they would meet again at the end of the month in Kampala. They moved the date for the Constitutional Con­ ference from August to July.-^

When the Working Party met in Kampala at the end of June, some of the enthusiasm for federation had worn off, partly under internal pressures from Uganda between the Kabaka and Obote. 20 Another meeting was scheduled to iron out some of the difficulties for mid-July in Nairobi; this was no more successful.

Following this Nairobi meeting, the European Economic Community accepted eighteen independent African states as associate members of the

EEC. The agreement was concluded in the Convention of Association signed at Yaounde on July 20, 1963. Fourteen of the associated states were members of the UAM. The continuance of the ties with France was expanded to include

formal ties with France's five other partners in the EEC. Development aid, preferential price treatment, and a system of quotas was established in the

Yaounde Convention, tying the economies of these African states directly to

the economies of Western Europe.21-

Following the signing of the Yaounde Convention, the Heads of State

of the UAM met for their regular semi-annual meeting in Cotonou, Dahomey,

from July 27-30, 1963. There they reaffirmed the existence of the UAM as

a separate group. Responding to criticism of maintaining the UAM after the

formation of the OAU, Senghor replied: 125

At no time did we renounce collaboration with Europe or with Asia or with France. Also in Africa, we do not envisage the disappearance of the Union of African and Malagasy States which constitutes a regional group. I have the same idea of African unity as General DeGaulle has of European unity. It is necessary to build an Africa of the Fatherlands.22

President Maga, of Dahomey echoed this:

far from being eclipsed, as some people have thought, by the charter of the OAU, the UAM is on the contrary one of its best guarantees. With the Maghreb and the East African Federation the UAM will constitute the framework of a new Africa.23

As a gesture to their critics, however, the Heads of State agreed to end their separate collective representation at the United Nations.

They also gave official acceptance to the new Togo government, by accept­ ing Togo's membership in the UAM.2^

The first real discussion of this continuance of regional groupings by the OAU came at the Dakar Council of Ministers meeting from August 2-11,

1963. Led by Jaja Wachuku, who called the UAM's decision to continue "an enterprise of sabotage", and Sekou Toure, who attacked "an insolent 25 resurgence of UAM activities", many African leaders discussed the role of regional groupings within the OAU. They agreed to a face-saving resolution which expressed a wish that regional groupings would "melt gradually" away and become part of the OAU.26 The UAM agreed to discuss this at its next

Heads of State meeting scheduled for February 1964.

The real issue at stake in the OAU-UAM controversy was not really regionalism. The UAM was far more than a regional grouping of contiguous

states, joined together for economic co-operation. It was a political

grouping of former French colonies, transcending regional alliances whose major cohesive force was their continuing economic and political ties to

France. This continuing relationship with France was always a sore point 126 in inter-African relations, particularly among the former Casablanca states, but not limited to them. The adherence of this group en masse to the EEC.revived the discussion on neo-colonialism. The former British territories had previously rejected association with the EEC and sought, rather, to create an African Common Market. However, this concern over the economic ties with Europe soon lost much of its sting as the Maghreb states, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the proposed East African Federation also began exploratory talks on their own association with the EEC. The issue of a foreign state still retaining important ties, including the station­ ing of military garrisons on African soil, was less easily smoothed over.

The difficulties over OAU tolerance of regionalism were not the only problems which the OAU faced at the Dakar Foreign Ministers' Con­ ference. The Council of Ministers agreed to accept the membership of

Morocco and Togo, but this was about the only thing they did agree on.

They could not agree on where the headquarters of the OAU was to be located.

They could not agree on who was to be appointed Secretary-General of the

OAU, and they could not get full agreement on which liberation group to

support in each state. 27

Earlier, in July, the Committee of Nine had held its first meet­

ing in Dar-es-Salaam where it ran into the same difficulties which had

plagued the PAFMECSA; which of the many African liberation movements should

receive the support of the Fighting Fund. In almost every Southern

African country there were two, or more, rival nationalist organizations,

often quite hostile to each other. At Dar-es-Salaam, the Committee decided

to support the' UPA group in Angola and not to support the MPLA. 28 Since

the split between MPLA and the UPA roughly paralleled the split between 127

Monrovia and Casablanca groups, this meant choosing the Monrovia-supported group. At Dakar, all the African states except Ghana and the Congo

(Brazzaville) agreed to this decision.

On the other hand, the Committee also gave formal recognition to the

PAIGC in Portugese Guinea. The PAIGC, led by Cabral, was the Casablanca- supported liberation movement. This was accepted at Dakar, but most reluctantly, by the UAM states, particularly Senegal.^9 The Committee of

Nine prepared a budget which was submitted to the Dakar meeting which called for $4 ,200,000 to be spent in support of liberation movements in eighteen different territories. A subcommittee of Algeria, Egypt and Guinea also made recommendations on the allocation of military aid and training. By the

Dakar meeting, the liberation fund had received $675,000 of which more than two-thirds had been contributed by Nigeria and Algeria. A call was made for more contributions.

Following the Dakar meeting, independent Africa was shocked by the success of a coup in Congo (Brazzaville). The President of the Congo

(Brazzaville) had announced that he would announce the formation of a single-party state on August 15, 1963 the third independence anniversary.

The government sought to unite the two Bacongo and Moshi tribal parties into a single party which would exclude smaller tribes. It also attempted to force the unions together. The three national centers (a fourth did not participate) affiliated to the ICFTU, the ICFTU and the WFTU banded together to form a Comite de Fusion des Organisations Syndicales to press for an end to the widespread corruption and for a voice in national politics. Youlou refused the unions' demands and arrested four key leaders.

On August 12, the unions led a general strike which soon led to violence. 128

By August 14, Youlou gave in and acceded to the unions' demands, but the unions refused to talk to Youlou. They met with the army leaders,

Mouzabakany and Moutsaka, who agreed to ousting Youlou and installing on Massemba-Debat as Head of State.

Following the coup in the Congo (Brazzaville) a siihilar coup took place in Dahomey. President Maga announced the formation of a single-party state in September 1963 which did little to assuage the violent tribal dif­ ficulties which had plagued Dahomey. Corruption was rife. The leadership of the newly-united Union Generate des Travailleurs du Dahomey (UGTD) handed in a long list of grievances, complaining about wages, an austerity cut, and the slow of management in the private sector. These were forwarded to the National Assembly which did nothing. When Maga returned from Paris on October 25, 1963 the unions demonstrated at the airport. Trade union leaders were arrested. The following day, the union called a general strike. After much bitterness the army stepped in and attempted to farm a coalition government headed by Maga, but also including

Ahomadegbe and Apithy. The unions were not satisfied, and continued to strike. The tense situation was further increased when northern tribal elements invaded the capital in support of Maga and fought with the strikers and with the army. The army chief of staff, Soglo, set up a new provisional government, with himself as the President. The unions called off the s tr ike. ^ ^

Both these coups gave increased impetus to African movements to try and create domestic stability. There were coup attempts in the Ivory Coast, in August 1963, and in Senegal, early in D e c e m b e r . 32 Most of independent

Africa was finding great difficulty in controlling the domestic problems 129 which they were responsible for solving. The OAU provided these ruling

elites a common meeting ground to discuss these problems and a potential

source of support in the event of a coup. In fact, one of the principal

strengths of the OAU and one of the prime reasons for its survival has been

that it recognized the individual sovereignty of each state and the ruling

elite and provided a form of stability which was often less developed

domestically. The OAU was never really a threat to an African government,

but was almost always a bulwark of the status quo.

Other problems developed. On October 25, 1963 the Ghanaian weekly

Spark launched a strong attack against the Committee of Nine. Ghana had

always resented not being included on this committee and had often chastised

its efforts for their lack of dynamism. In the Spark, which was the official

publication of the Bureau of African Affairs, the Ghanaians criticized a

secret report of the Committee of Nine on its initial meeting in Dar-es-

Salaam. It listed three areas of complaint:

First, it had exceeded its responsibilities by setting up a commission for propaganda aimed at 12 colonial territories and had allocated £300,000 (or most of six months' budget) to this purpose - money which should have been used for military purposes. Second, it had planned, as major strategy, to negotiate with the colonial powers after orga­ nizing sufficient action to create an atmosphere of insecurity in those territories; this was "unrealistic and futile". Third, it had acted "entirely outside its mandate" by transferring the major role in help­ ing liberation movements to the "neighboring countries". This, said Spark, was unwise because it gave colonial powers easy targets to attack and also damaged African unity by encouraging regional groupings.33

This attack by Ghana, while not in itself surprising, began to

recreate the fissures of the past since it came at a time when the situation

in Africa was rapidly deteriorating. Again, in Accra, where the first meet­

ing of the African Defense Commission took place late in October, the 130

Ghanaians opted for a High Command and a "strike f o r c e " 3 4 to operate against colonial governments, in opposition to the UAM states. The UAM was able to postpone discussion for a year. The full import of the beginning fissure within the OAU was obscured by an important OAU victory.

On October 30, 1963 the war which had broken out earlier that month between Algeria and Morocco over their common border was taken to the mediation table at Bamako, Mali. Under the good offices of Ethiopia, Ivory

Coast, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Tanganyika the combatants agreed

to a cease-fire. Ethiopia and Mali, being the two states most responsible for achieving the cease-fire were also responsible for sending military observers to maintain the p e a c e . ^5 The conflict was to be submitted to a

special Council of Ministers meeting on November 15, 1963 at the request of

Algeria. This meeting ratified the Bamako Agreement and ended the first

inter-African war. Similar mediations were carried out in the Ogaden area between Somalia and Ethiopia.^

Despite this success, the OAU was facing an even more difficult

period. On September 29, 1963 the Congolese Parliament (Leopoldville) was

dissolved by President Kasavubu. Former Lumumbist parties joined together

to form a Conseil National de Liberation (CNL) which then emigrated across

the river to Brazzaville. Hostilities began in Kwilu province shortly

after, spreading throughout other areas of the Congo under the guerrilla

leadership of Pierre Mulele. By the end of the year, the OAU was faced by

a second Congo crisis.^7

In addition to the outbreak of violence in the Congo, another civil

war began on the Congo's border. In neighboring , late in December

1963, some Tutsi guerrillas infiltrated Rwanda from Burundi and attempted 131 to overthrow the ruling Hutu leadership. The coup failed, and a wholesale slaughter of Rwanda's Tutsis began. Hundreds of bodies chocked the rivers and a war between Rwanda and Burundi seemed imminent. On January 28, 1964 the Premier of Burundi appealed to the OAU and to the U.N. to intervene.

No direct action was taken but both organizations appealed for a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

One of the principal reasons no action was taken by the two orga­ nizations was that insurrection had broken out in many other areas of

Africa. On January 12, 1964 the Sultan of Zanzibar was overthrown in a bloody coup. Wholesale slaughter of Arabs and Indians began on the island and neighboring Pemba, under the leadership of "Field Marshall" John Okello.

On January 20, an army mutiny broke out in Tanganyika, followed by similar army mutinies in Kenya and Uganda on January 23, The following day,

January 24, the governments of Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda requested

British troops to put down the rebellions. They also requested an emergency session of the OAU Council of Ministers.

The emergency session of the Council of Ministers met during

February 12-15, 1963 in Dar-es-Salaam to discuss the disturbances and the ordering-in of British troops. According to Nyerere:

The presence of British troops in Tanganyika is a fact which is too easily exploited by those who wish to d ivide Africa or to dominate Africa. Already it is clear that there are some people who will seize upon this opportunity to play upon natural fears of neo­ colonialism in the hope of sowing seeds of suspicion between the dif­ ferent African States.39

Nyerere announced that he would like to see the British troops out of East

Africa as soon as possible and that he felt that African troops should replace them. The Council of Ministers agreed to this and provision was 132 made for stationing African troops there.In fact, the use of British troops to put down a domestic uprising was intensely embarrassing for the

East African states, and the OAU provided a face-saving solution. It seemed as if the OAU condoned the use of foreign troops. However, this resolution was soon to be put to the test.

Two days after the conclusion of the Dar-es-Salaam Council meeting, a coup took place in Gabon, successfully ousting the regime of Mba. On

February 18, 1964 French paratroopers landed in Gabon and restored the Mba government to power. Six of the UAM states (Chad, Ivory Coast, Central

African Republic, Niger, Upper Volta, and Madagascar) applauded the French action. Most of the other UAM states supported the French action (except

Dahomey and the Congo-Brazzaville, for obvious reasons). The rest of the

OAU, and particularly the more activist Casablanca states, could really say nothing as they had just met to condone similar British action in East

Africa.

On February 24-29, 1964 the regular meeting of the OAU Council of

Ministers took place at Lagos, where the coup was not officially mentioned.

At Lagos, the ministers agreed to the appointment of Diallo Telli to the

Secretary-Generalship of the OAU and the location of the OAU's headquarters in Addis Ababa. It also accepted the Protocol of the Commission for Con­ ciliation, Mediation and Arbitration. The problem of refugees (particularly from Rwanda) was brought up and the OAU set up a ten-member commission to study this problem. Preparations were made for the first African Heads of State OAU meeting scheduled in July, in Cairo.^

By the time of. the-Cairo meeting one major obstacle to African unity had disappeared. The meeting of the UAM states, which had been postponed 133 from February, met in Dakar on March 7-10. The UAM decided to dissolve itself as a political entity and to keep the common economic functions in a new organization called Union Africaine et Malgache de Cooperation

Economique (UAMCE). Political activities among themselves were dropped.

As Ould Daddah said, "The political domain ought to be left to the OAU".^

However, this step towards promoting African unity was almost ignored in the face of the new difficulties in the Congo (Leopoldville), and the controversy over the future of Southern Rhodesia.

Following the dissolution of the Congolese Parliament in September

1963 and the outbreak of violence in Kwilu province, the situation in the

Congo rapidly became worse. By early February, the Congolese Army (ANC), with U.N. support was engaged in counter-insurgency warfare throughout large areas of the state. Belgium and the United States aided the Adoula government with military supplies and planes.^ June 30, 1964 was the target date for ending the Congo uprising since on this day the U.N. military presence in the Congo (now down to only 900 Nigerian soldiers in

Leopoldville) would cease. Rumors were circulating in early 1964 that

Tshombe was training an assault force in Angola, with direct Purtugese assistance, to take over the Congo (or at least, Katanga).

On June 26, 1964 Tshombe returned to the Congo, at the invitation of Kasavubu and Adoula, in a desperate attempt by them to include Tshombe in a governmental role to enlist his support for the Congolese government and to avoid a secession by Katanga. On June 30, the Adoula government resigned and Tshombe formed a transitional government, becoming Prime

Minister on July 10. African states were outraged.^

At the same time, the African Commonwealth members were attending 134 a meeting in London where the threat of Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence was raised.^ initial agreement was reached with the British in which the British would oppose any unilateral declaration which the Southern Rhodesians might declare.

Following the accession of Tshombe and the Commonwealth Prime

Ministers conference, the OAU's first Heads of State meeting began in

Cairo.

The First OAU Heads of State Conference

From July 17-21, 1964 the leadership of the OAU met in Cairo at the first Heads of State Conference. The meeting of the Council of Ministers which had taken place a few days earlier sent a telegram to Kasavubu, specifically asking that Tshombe not be included in the Congolese delega­ tion. In fact, the Congo (Leopoldville) did not participate at all. At the Heads of State conference, Tsiranana of Madagascar objected to this as an unwarranted interference in the internal politics of a state:

We all deplored the death of Patrice Lumumba, but that doesn't give us the right to interfere in Congolese affairs. Have we not all signed an execution warrant against one of our compatriots? We are not all angels and if Mr. Tshombe goes to hell, there shall be others among us who shall go with him.

The Heads of State meeting confirmed Diallo Telli as Secretary-

General of the OAU and officially established headquarters in Addis

Ababa. Nkrumah attempted to get his thesis of immediate political unity accepted by the meeting, but it was referred to committee. The attack against the Committee of Nine, begun in the Spark article nine months earlier led to a verbal attack on Nkrumah by Nyerere. ^ As might have been expected in a meeting in Cairo, various Maghreb leaders spoke out on the 135 question of Israel, but no resolution was proposed.

The remaining resolutions, in addition to the one which gave formal recognition to the Committee on Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, dealt with denuclearization of Africa, a denunciation of apartheid and racial discrimination in the U.S., and a variety of similar subjects. An

interesting resolution on "Good Neighborliness" was passed, in it was resolved:

1. That, in the conduct of their foreign policies, the Member States shall avoid all commitments, alliances, undertakings and agreements which would tend to inject into Africa foreign rivalries or bloc politics, or would tend, directly or indirectly, to create tension, conflicts or dispute in Africa or between African States.^

A concomitant part of this motion was the affirmation of the

UAMCE position of alliance with any state that does not interfere in

African politics or upon whom an African state depends for economic support.

Nonetheless, the vital issues of the Congo and Southern Rhodesia were not solved at this meeting. There was no clear OAU position which

developed on the Congolese problem which was getting more serious daily.

Following the accession of the Tshombe government in July, fighting broke

out all over the Congo. The rebels succeeded in capturing Stanleyville on

August 4, 1964 and declared a government in exile there, headed by

Soumialot. Tshombe responded by recruiting mercenaries to fight against the

Congolese. These mercenaries were white soldiers-of-fortune recruited from

South Africa and the dregs of the former French Foreign Legion. The press

of the world was full of their atrocities and barbarous behavior, as well

as the terrible tribal warfare which broke out among the Congolese tribes.

Tshombe asked for African troops to fight with him against the

rebels; these troops were requested from Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, 136

Senegal, Madagascar, and Ghana.^ These nations refused. Under considerable pressure, the OAU Foreign Ministers called a conference to be held in Addis

Ababa during September 5-10, 1964 to discuss the Congo.

Although protesting against the OAU's intervention, Tshombe went to Addis Ababa to attend the OAU meeting. The OAU discussed the situation for four days and came up with an important compromise resolution. There were three draft resolutions submitted to the committee. The first draft resolution was Mali's which requested an unconditional and immediate with­ drawal of all mercenaries and foreign troops. Mali was supported by Ghana,

Guinea, Algeria and Egypt. The second draft was by Senegal, Nigeria and

Sierra Leone, requesting the formation of an OAU commission to investigate the Congo situation. They were supported by Ethiopia and Liberia. The third draft came from Uganda, who requested an immediate cease-fire, the removal of all mercenaries and the intervention of a special OAU police force.

The final resolution was a compromise of these three. In part, the resolution:

1. Appeals to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to stop immediately the recruitment of mercenaries and to expel as soon as possible all mercenaries of whatever origin who are already in the Congo so as to facilitate an African solution.

2. Notes the solemn undertaking of the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to guarantee the security of combatants who lay down their arms; and requests especially all those now fighting to cease hostilities so as to seek, with the help of the Organization of African Unity, a solution that would make possible national reconciliation and the restoration of order in the Congo...

4. Decides to set up and to send immediately to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) and the Kingdom of Burundi an ad hoc commission consisting of Ethiopia, 137

Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, Cameroon, Somalia, Upper Volta, Tunisia and the UAR and placed under the effective chairmanship of Jomo K e n y a t t a . . .50

This commission under Kenyatta investigated the situation and called a meeting on September 18, 1964 in Nairobi. Both Tshombe and the rebel leaders showed up for the meeting, but Tshombe left soon afterward after having refused to speak to the rebels. The rebels told Diallo Telli that they would agree to a cease-fire only if the U.S. would pull its planes out of the Congo. In support of this, the commission decided to send a special mission to the United States to meet with President Johnson, declaring:

It is the feeling of the Ad Hoc Committee that without the with­ drawal of all foreign military intervention in the Congo the Ad Hoc Commission cannot find the right atmosphere which fits the high mission of reconciliation entrusted to its members.51

Washington refused to meet the five-member commission, saying that any discussion of U.S. aid to the Congo was impossible unless the 52 Congolese government took part in the discussions. The same day,

September 23, 1964 the Congolese government sent a telegram to Diallo

Telli announcing that the Congo was pulling out of the OAU. Kasavubu accused the OAU of "manifest interference in the Congo's internal affairs."53

Following this the Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned Nations took place where the same request was made to Kasavubu, to keep Tshombe home.

However, this time Tshombe came, although he was not allowed to take part

in the.conference. He was kept in confinement until the Egyptian and

Algerian embassies in Leopoldville were besieged, and Tshombe went home.

Despite the activity of the Ad Hoc Committee, the situation in the

Congo became worse. The fall of the Sudanese government in October allowed 138 large amounts of supplies to flow directly into the Stanleyville area.-^

Gbenye, the head of the Stanleyville regime, made an open appeal to the former Casablanca Group members for recognition of his rebel government on October 29, 1964. The Stanleyville rebels announced that all Belgians and Americans in their control were put under house arrest until hostilities ended. They sought negotiations with the U.S. over pulling out American assistance in the Congo. On November 23, Kanza and the American Ambassador

Attwood met to discuss an immediate cease-fire, since the mercenary column, which had just captured Kindu and was moving towards Stanleyville, seemed likely to attack Stanleyville.

The following day, November 24, 1964 Belgian paratroopers in

American planes landed in Stanleyville and routed the rebels. The reaction among the states of the OAU was dramatic. They introduced a Security

Council resolution calling for condemnation of the U.S. and Belgium. This was signed by: Algeria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo

(Brazzaville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Mali,

Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, UAR, Uganda and Zambia. However, not all the OAU states agreed. To smooth over the differences, a special

Council of Ministers meeting was held in New York on December 16-21, where 5 S a form of compromise was reached. J

At the end of 1964, the OAU was in some disarray. The threads of unity which had joined the nations in 1963 had proven much stronger than was expected, but they were not strong enough to proceed to any closer union than that conceived of at Addis Ababa. The primary reason for the lack of cohesiveness was the resurgence of the national spirit and a turning inwards of political consciousness. During this period there were 139 numerous trade agreements signed between various states, customs unions and a variety of other types of economic agreements. Yet, these were functional agreements and reflected pragmatic national needs more than any political desire for co-operation.

The rash of coups and civil wars in Africa had just begun, and

African states needed all the allies they could muster. In the following years, the OAU became almost a defensive alliance.

\ “X . 140

^It is difficult to find a single African nation which, since 1963, has not witnessed a coup, an abortive coup, or a political assassination. In some states, like Dahomey, coups have been regular occurrences.

^See Gwedolen M. Carter (ed.) African One-Party States (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1962), Five African States: Responses to Diversity (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1963), National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1966), and James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. (ed.) Political Parties and National Integration In Tropical Africa (Berkely: University of California, 1966).

^Reginald H. Green and Ann Seidman, Unity or Poverty (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 132-190 passim, and Catherine Hoskyns "Pan- Africanism and Integration" in Arthur Hazlewood (ed.) African Integration and Disintegration (New York: Oxford University, 1967), pp. 354-393.

^Ken Post, The New States of West Africa (Baltimore: Penguin, 1968), pp. 179-181.

^1. William Zartman, International Relations in The New Africa (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 98-103.

^Quoted in Post, op. cit., pp. 174-175.

^Zartman, o£. cit., p. 98.

®IbLd., p. 98.

9Ibid.. p. 132.

Ibid., p. 133.

llColin Legum, Pan-Africanism (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 136 and Clyde Sanger, "Toward Unity In Africa" in "Foreign Affairs Quarterly" vol. 42, no. 2, p. 272 where Obote is quoted as saying: "However nice one may feel as complete master in one's own house, the time has come for African independent states to surrender some of their sovereignty in favor of an African central legislative and executive body."

12Sanger, o£. cit., pp. 271-272.

l^OAU Charter, printed in Abdul A. Said, The African Phenomenon (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), pp. 168-169.

14-Legum, o£. cit,., pp. 281-302.

l^Ibid., p. 136.

l^Richard Cox, Pan-Africanism in Practice (London: Oxford University, 1964), p. 69. 141

^Ibid., p. 72.

^Ibid., p. 72.

l^Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa, The Politics of Unity (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 118.

20cox, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

21-Arnold Rivkin, Africa and the Common Market (Denver: Social Science Foundation Monograph No. 2, 1964).

22wallerstein, oja. cit., p. 68.

23ibid., p. 69.

2^Ibid.. p. 69.

25sanger, o£. cit., p. 274.

2bLegum, oj>. cit. , p. 139.

27xbid., pp. 138-139.

^The Movimento Popular para Libertacao de Angola (Movement for the Liberation of Angola-MPLA) was, however, weaker than the Unioa das Populacaoes da Angola (Union of Angolan Populations-UPA) which had been instrumental in forming an Algerian-type government-in-exile, the Governo Revolucionario de Angola em Exilio (Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile-GRAE).

29xhe Partido Africano de Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Capo Verde--PAIGC) was based in Conakry while its rival, the Frente de Libertacao de la Independencia Nacional da Guine (Liberation Front for National Independence of Guinea— FLING) was based in Senegal.

30William Friedland, "Organizational Chaos and Political Potential" in "Africa Report" June 1965, p. 10.

3■'•Ibid., pp. 10-12.

32wallerstein, op. cit., p. 74.

33Sanger, op. cit., p. 278.

3^Wallerstein, o£. cit., p. 72. 142

•^Ibld., p. 73.

^^Ibid., p. 73.

^Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 83-108.

-^"Africa Diary" vol. IV, no. 9, p. 1614; Wallerstein, o£. cit., p. 76.

■^Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 75.

40Ibid., p. 75.

41Ibid.. p. 77.

42ibid.. p. 79.

43Kwame Nkrumah, Challenge of the Congo (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 248. —

44see Kasavubu's speech to the Congolese Parliament on October 13, 1965 quoted in Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 82.

45por a useful study of the "African 'Conquest' of the British Com­ monwealth" see Ali A. Mazrui, The Anglo-African Commonwealth (London: Pergamon Press, 1967), pp. 27-41.

46wallerstein, op. cit., p.84.

47"Africa Diary" vol. IV, no. 35, p. 1915; Legum, op. c i t . , p. 141.

48Legum, op. c it., pp. 304-305.

4^Ibid., p. 142.

50"Resolutions of the OAU Emergency Meeting on the Congo", Addis Ababa, September 5-10, 1964.

Slwilliam Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 216.

52ibid.. pp. 216-218.

53"Africa Diary", vol. IV, no. 43, p. 1993.

-^Wallerstein, op.cit., p. 89.

55ibid., p. 90. The compromise resolution of the OAU Ministers "deplored" the events in the Congo and "encouraged" the OAU to continue its efforts to find reconciliation. Only twenty states (the eighteen states which had signed the Security Council Resolution, plus Chad and Sierra Leone) voted in favor, the rest abstained or refused to vote. CHAPTER VI

THE ELUSIVE AGREEMENT: PAN-AFRICAN LABOR 1963-1964

For most of the African labor movements, the shift inward of

political activity on the part of African governments was a source of great

difficulty in the period 1963-1964. The newly independent African states were faced with actually running governments and were forced to confront

domestic demands and priorities with concrete programs and policies. For many of these governments, this task was far more difficult than the

struggle for independence.

Corruption was rife, institutional hierarchies were entrenched,

and colonial priorities often conflicted with domestic needs. For many of

these nations, the labor movements were the most obvious threat. These

represented the small fraction of the population who were urban, orga­

nized and totally integrated in the money economy. They were often the

civil servants whose job it was to carry on the policies of the govern­

ments. In almost every case, the^ were the highest skilled and highest

paid citizens.

Governments were faced with the problem of integrating union

aspirations with national aspirations. Most felt that their countries

could not afford a sector of the nation's labor force which was very highly

paid, while the vast majority struggled at a subsistence level. In order

to reallocate national revenues, pressure was brought to bear on the

labor movement to keep down wage demands and, often, to reduce the wages

of organized workers from the levels which had applied during the colonial

period 144

However, to many in the labor movements, this seemed to be unrea­ sonable. While they were willing, in most cases, to work for national development, they saw government officials receiving very high salaries, expense accounts, free housing, and a variety of perquisites which they felt was hardly contributing to national growth. Quite logically, they asked why they, who were actually producing goods and services, were being asked to receive lower compensation than those whom they considered parasites. This conflict expanded during 1963-1964 and led to social dis­ order.

Unlike the examples of Asia and Latin America, the ally of the labor movements in Africa was often the army. The armies, too, were usually urban, organized and resentful of governmental excesses. The natural alliance of labor and the military led to the rash of coups and countercoups in this period. Neither could successfully wage a coup on its own, or without the support of the other. When their interests meshed, a

2 coup often followed.

The governments were not unmindful of the potentialities or threats this implied. The threat of domestic upheaval was very real and pressing.

Governments responded by attempting to limit the powers of the labor bodies. They co-opted the leadership into the political hierarchies. They O made union membership contingent upon membership in the ruling party. They exiled, banned or imprisoned union leaders. They created splinter labor groups which they supported against older, established union centers.

They created one-party, one-elite states in which the only legal activity of the labor movements was to serve as a transmission belt of government policy. They disallowed the checkoff system, except where such funds came 145 directly through government hands. Most importantly, they sought to quash outside support from international or Pan-African labor bodies.

It is small wonder then that, although inter-governmental African unity was achieved at Addis Ababa, no such unity was reached in the Pan-

African labor movements. On the one hand governments sought to further national aspirations through the medium of labor manipulation in other countries,^ and on the other, they were very careful that no such manip­ ulation took place at home. The Monrovia and Casablanca Groups were sub­ sumed into the OAU at Addis Ababa, but their ghosts survived in the ATUC and AATUF organizations.

It was no accident that those unions which made up the leadership of the AATUF (Ghana, Guinea, UAR, Morocco, Algeria and Mali) were, with the exception of Morocco occasionally, the most tightly controlled, government- dominated unions.-* The union centers which made up the ATUC were often those in which the governments had considerably less control, although this was to become less and less true. The ATUC membership, as witnessed £. in the controversy over Article 29 of its charter, often represented two or three unions from each country.7 The ATUC unions were divided at home, financially weak, and often in conflict with their governments.

For these smaller and weaker unions, the question of disaffiliation was often a question of survival. They had little funds and were constantly in danger of being taken over by their governments. Outside sources often provided resources and prestige for union leaders which bolstered their

O domestic positions. For the unions already under government control, this was unnecessary. The money these unions received often went directly to the AATUF which used it for political intrigue.^ This is not to say that 146

ATUC and AFRO did not engage in political intrigue, but rather that their scope was more limited.

The ATUC unions were in a more difficult situation than the members of AATUF. The governments of the ATUC-affiliated unions, as well as the

AATUF opposed ATUC activities. ATUC fought a war on two fronts. While

the Casablanca Group welcomed and recognized the AATUF, the Monrovia Group would not even give observer status to the ATUC.^® It was a combination of

all these factors which kept Pan-African labor unity an unachievable goal, even when Africa was united against the outside world to an extraordinary degree during the second Congo crisis.

The early months of 1963 were spent in anticipation of the upcom­

ing meeting of African Heads of State in Addis Ababa. The AATUF Congress,

scheduled for March 1963 at Bamako was postponed so as not to interfere with the Addis Ababa meeting. The formation of the OAU in May 1963 led to wide speculation that a similar unity would be formed in the Pan-African

labor movement. After all, the two ideological and political groups had

ostensibly dissolved their differences and joined together. Their 'labor

arms' seemed likely to also find common cause. In an important resolution

on Social and Labor Matters at the OAU meeting, the convening states:

Considering that co-operation amongst the African States in the social and labor field is vital and will contribute to the realization of a sound solidarity amongst their peoples... Believing further that co-operation in the labor field amongst African States is vital for our continent...[We call for] (f) The establishment of an African Trade Union.ll

The initial overture to the AATUF was made in Geneva, on July 4,

1963 when ten prominent African unionists, who had been attending an ILO

meeting in Geneva, issued a statement calling upon the Secretariats of 147 both the ATUC and the AATUF:

to take steps to convene, at an early date, a meeting of represent­ atives of all bona fide and democratic African national trade-union centers with a view to set up an All-African Trade Union Action Committee and to determine a "positive action program" aimed at the complete eradication of apartheid and other forms of racial dis­ crimination on the African continent. ^

Following this appeal, the leadership of the AFRO announced, on

July 25, 1963 that the Fourth Regional Conference of the AFRO was being

postponed from its scheduled date of July 29th to August 2nd of 1963.

Mr. S. I. Ese, speaking for the AFRO, declared that the delay of this meeting was specifically directed at removing a possible obstacle from merger between ATUC and AATUF. He said:

there has been the renewed attraction toward unity at all levels and on all fronts among democratic organizations in Africa, in partic­ ular the trade union organizations. Those friends who attended the recent session of the International Labor Conference in Geneva in June will bear witness to the fact that this new trend led, in fact, to the contemplation of a possible unity conference of all African trade union centers in the near future under the joint sponsorship of the ATUC and AATUF.13

This communique was well timed, since the AATUF was meeting in

Bamako at the same time. The following day, July 26, 1963, the Secretariat

of the AATUF issued an appeal for a joint meeting with the ATUC. The

ATUC agreed and the two scheduled a joint meeting for October 17, 1963 in

Dakar.

However, the developments toward a united African labor movement

were all but obscured under the crises which developed as a result of

labor movements flexing their muscles domestically. The first shock

resulted from the coup which ousted Abbe Fulbert Youlou in Congo

(Brazzaville).^ As stated in the previous chapter, the Youlou govern­

ment sought to increase its control over the potentially dangerous 148 elements in the society - the students, labor, and others - by proposing to create a one-party state as of August 15, 1963. This coalition of the

UDDIA and MSA^^ included the political leadership of the two largest tribal elements, the Bacongo and the Mo'shi, respectively. To form a united single-party state out of the two tribal parties would automatically exclude all non-Moshi or Bacongo from governmental patronage. The unions, which were not tribally oriented, did not object to the formation of a single-party state, as long as they (and other non-tribal groups) had a voice in the government. They sought to insure that the Moshi-Bacongo union did not merely entrench the corruption and mismanagement which had long plagued the Congo. They asked for a voice in national policies through the creation of a Cabinet post for the labor movement. Youlou objected and the unions formed a Comite de Fusion des Organisations

Syndicales. uniting Christian, Social-Democratic and Communist unions.

The chief leadership of the Comite was Pongault, head of the UPTC and the

CATC, and Boukambou of the CGAT. The Comite led protest demonstrations and its leaders were jailed. Striking workers stormed the prisons and freed the leaders. The leadership of the Comite met with the Army leadership

(the other major non-tribal group) and formed an alliance. These two, together, met with Youlou and demanded his resignation. On the recom­ mendation of the Comite, the President of the Assembly, Massemba-Debat, was installed as President by the Army.

In September 1963, a similar pattern was unfolding in Dahomey.

President Maga formally established the Parti Dahomeen de 1'Unite (PDU) as the single state party in Dahomey. He had already unified the labor movement earlier. The corruption and mishandling of funds became 149 entrenched in the PDU leadership. Earlier, in 1962, following the con­ solidation of the unions, the Dahomeyan government had reduced wages accross the board nationally, and had applied a wage freeze, as part of an austerity program which left many jobless, although French nationals were still in high-salaried positions in private industry. The unions, led by Theophile Paoletti, General Secretary of the UGTD,^ petitioned for a hearing on the workers' grievances.

The Minister of Labor, Degbey, made only vague promises of change.

At the same time the famous "Bohiki affair"^ gripped the nation and threatened tribal warfare. When Maga returned from his trip to Paris, union demonstrators greeted him at the airport, and were summarily jailed. The UGTD called a general strike to call for the release of the demonstrators. 1 ft The Army attempted to mediate the dispute by creating a coalition government of Maga, Apithy and Ahomadegbe (thus uniting the three major tribes) but the unions were not satisfied since they would still have no voice in government, and they continued their strike. Maga's northern tribal supporters invaded Cotonou in his behalf, precipitating an arrangement between Paoletti and the Army to support Colonel Soglo as Head of State. On October 21, 1963 Soglo took power and the unions temporarily ceased striking. 19

In Nigeria, the unions, too, joined together into a Joint Action

Committee (JAC) in September 1963 to press wage claims against the austerity measures of the Northern (Hausa)-dominated government. They threatened a nationwide general strike for October 1, which was only averted by the creation of a Wage Commission to study their grievances.20 150

Trouble occurred in Algeria, Morocco and Tanganyika-Zanzibar. In July

1963, all three disaffiliated from the ICFTU.^

It was in this atmosphere of unrest and upheaval that the leader­ ship of the ATUC and the AATUF met in Dakar to explore the paths towards unity of the Pan-African labor movement.

The Unity Meeting of ATUC and AATUF

On October 17-19, the Secretariats of AATUF and ATUC met in Dakar to discuss unity in the Pan-African labor movement. Just prior to this meet­ ing, on October 7 and 8, 1963, the AFRO Executive Board met in Tunis to discuss the ICFTU-affiliated unions' position on unity. Their statements indicated that the Dakar meeting was viewed as an ideological conflict as well as conflict over affiliation between the two organizations. They stated that, even if unity was achieved on paper, this might not really be a proper unity. They said:

Despite the fact that the workers of Africa, organized in the two labor fronts ATUC and AATUF, want to unite it must not be forgotten that the underlying factor that has been dividing them is not only the issue of international affiliation but ideology. The issue of affiliation has been the scapegoat of the independent status of African trade unions, but it is not the decisive factor. Will the mere unification of these two labor fronts solve the persistent and undeniable ideological difference between them? Events in the African labor front in the very near future will prove the truth or falsity of whether.there exist ideological differences or not.22

In this spirit, the AFRO instructed its representatives to participate in the ATUC-AATUF meetings.

In Dakar, seven representatives of AATUF and seven representatives of ATUC met and agreed to join together into a continent-wide Pan-African labor organization, "to tackle the problem of the progress of the African 151 economy, the welfare of the workers and the strengthening of democracy".^3

In a joint communique they resolved the affiliation question by declaring that the new organization was to be "independent of any world trade union organization"Also, "the new movement will maintain friendly relations with all national and international organizations on the basis of equality

O C and mutual non-interference in international affairs. This communique was signed by Tlili for the ATUC and Tettegah for the AATUF. A fourteen- member preparatory committee was created to plan the steps towards unity and scheduled a meeting for January 1964 to arrange the founding congress of the new organization.

The exultation was short-lived. The AFRO-affiliated unions raised an outcry against this apparent agreement to force disaffiliation on its members as part of the bargain in forming the new unity. The journal of the AFRO ran long editorials condemning the role of communist subversion in

Africa (perhaps the ideological differences they referred to at Tunis, supra):

It is necessary to sound a note of warning that if Africa and its peoples do not take care a worse form of imperialism will swallow the continent. It is a fact that when one refers to imperialism, people at once look for it from either Washington or London but it is neces­ sary to tell the bitter truth that imperialism can also come from Moscow...The aim of international communism is to dominate the world and Klemlin [sic] is tactically working towards this aim. One can therefore, see that the hullaw ballow [sic] of the communists about the rights of the African peoples and their fight against colonialism and neo-colonialism is deliberately-inspired, false and pre­ determined strategy...The Pan-Africanist hot-heads must realize that the African workers also have a say on the vital issues facing the continent and so when they point out some of the dangers Africa can and must avoid it does not mean they are enemies of Africa.26

The AFRO also ran long editorials condemning the rise of one- party states and the co-optation of the trades unions. They equated this 152 with the emulation of "the communist system of government and its autocratic as well as terrorist method s."^7 It is small wonder then that

Tlili, under pressure from AFRO and his own national UGTT (which he no longer led, following his defeat in the March 1963 UGTT elections) issued a statement on November 1, 1963 saying that he had not agreed, on behalf of the ATUC, that disaffiliation was part of the unity arrangement.

He said that this would be an infringement on the rights of each national affiliate to determine its own policy:

Unfortunately, on the other side they seemed only to be interested in one question, which in our opinion, should never have been raised, that of international disaffiliation. To force disaffiliation as a pre-requisite to reunification is not in accordance with the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each national center.

Such an attitude would, as a consequence, restrain the freedom of each national organization and on these conditions the activities of our future Confederation would probably fail, especially during the first phase, to reach the objective originally fixed...The question of disaffiliation remains on the agenda of the future founding congress of the United African Trade Union Organization which will decide sovereignly through a democratic vote..With the great majority of African trade unions being grouped within the ATUC, I am convinced that the decision of the congress will be for freedom of affiliation.^9

Tlili asked that the proposed fourteen-member preparatory meeting be post­ poned until March 1964.

By the end of 1963, African labor unity seemed to be closer than

ever to real unity, if only on paper. There was a commitment to meet and

to unite, agreed upon by both the ATUC and the AATUF. However, this was

not to be the case. The euphoria of unity created in the formation of the

OAU in early 1963 had worn a bit thin. The recreation of the Congo crisis

in late 1963, the rise of coups throughout Africa, often led by labor movements, and the re-assertion of the freedom to maintain affiliation to 153 the internationals by Tlili boded ill for labor unity. The states which were members of the OAU began to become disunited during the growth of

tensions over the Congo and more fearful of internal unrest after the events in the Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Nigeria, Congo (Leopoldville) and Rwanda. Labor unity maneuvers were too late to cash in on the Addis

Ababa spirit. The events of 1964 reopened the old wounds which divided

ATUC from AATUF, and unity remained an illusion.

Despite a call for trade union unity issued at the first meeting of

the OAU's Economic and Social Committee in Niamey, the last week in

December 1963, Tlili asked the AATUF to postpone the meeting of the four-

qr\ teen-man preparatory committee scheduled for January until February 24.

Meeting from January 6-9, 1964 the UPTC held its second Congress in

Brazzaville, where it examined the moves toward unity of the previous year.

The key report was delivered by the UPTC President, Pongault in which he

stated four preconditions for the UPTC's support of labor unity in Africa.

He demanded the continuance of the type of autonomy for the UPTC that he

had wrested from the ATUC as a condition of affiliation. The unified labor

movement must recognize the following conditions:

1. Each tendency ought to have the right to continue to go into its reasons for carrying on and preparing its programs.

2. The representatives of each tendency, in the person of the directors of these organizations ought to be assured of parity.

3. The general decisions concerning the program of the whole group are to be decided on by unanimous action.

4. On divergent points the organizations should conserve the totality of their autonomy of action.^ *

Pongault continued with a critique of the AATUF and ATUC in which

he pointed out: 154

The UPTC is the only Pan-African central organization which really exists. It is also the oldest...It is alone in having a structured organization and a real Secretariat. Even more, it is the only orga­ nization which collects dues.32

The UPTC pointed out the inherent difficulty in any form of merger between the two rival groupings:

There is not the slightest doubt that everyone is in favor of a Pan-African trade-union structure in the image of Addis Ababa. But it is the doctrinal problem which leads to serious reservations. The nub of the problem, we should have the courage to admit, is not that of international disaffiliation, but rather that of the conception of the new trade-union structure that would be created. The truth is that in the discussion of Pan-African trade-union unity, the partners trained in different schools each wish to achieve unity around and behind their ideological conception.^3

Following the UPTC meeting and the postponement of the joint pre­ paratory meeting of the AATUF and ATUC leadership, the pressures for unifying the labor movements were increased by the OAU. At the foreign ministers meeting late in February 1964, the resolutions of the Economic and Social Committee came up for review. Since one of these resolutions dealt with African labor unity, the AFRO felt that the foreign ministers were going to add their voices to the unity call. They sent a message to the foreign ministers meeting which urged the ministers not to take any action on labor unity since this action might prejudice current negotiations between ATUC and AATUF. It posed, to the ministers, the problem of affiliation:

The trade unions face problems similar to those which have not yet been fully resolved by the States constituting the membership of the Orga­ nization of African Unity - with particular reference to the existence of the African and Malagasy Union and membership in the British Com­ monwealth. .. .Depsite complications involved, the need for continental African trade union unity is fully appreciated by all of us.^

By this time, however, the foreign ministers were too involved with the crises and revolts across Africa to pay very much attention to the 155 problems of labor unity.

On March 9-14, 1964, the AATUF met in Accra where the Secretariat discussed the strategy for the planned March 23 joint meeting with the ATUC.

However, on March 9 the AATUF received a telegram from Tlili asking, for

the third time, that the meeting be postponed,- since the AFRO was holding

its Fourth Conference in Nairobi in April and the dates might conflict.

"This was a somewhat curious excuse since the AFRO conference, originally

scheduled for July 1963, had itself been postponed in order not to prejudice

the unification plans. A more likely reason for Tlili's telegram is that groups within the ATUC, confused over Tlili's ambiguous position at the

October meeting, feared compromise on the affiliation i s s u e . "^5 p0r the

AATUF, this was the final straw. They decided to go on with their own

AATUF Congress immediately following the AFRO Congress in April.

With Tlili's postponement of the meeting all real hopes for labor

unity died, although there was to be considerable verbal activity in the

future. It had become clear that the AFRO affiliates and the UPTC

affiliates were opposed to any move which might compel them to disaf­

filiate from the ICFTU and the IFCTU. Without the support of AFRO and the

UPTC the ATUC was non-existent. The AATUF was in favor of unity under the

Dakar formula since it clearly called for disaffiliation of all parties.

By this time as well, the events occurring throughout political Africa had

shaken the foundations of sufficient governments. They served to mute the

OAU's call for labor unity. As the rest of Africa again split into rival

fractions in the wake of the Congo crisis, labor unity held a low priority

on the scales of urgency. The various congresses of mid-1964 split apart 156 the Pan-African labor movements even farther. The first of these was the

Fourth AFRO Congress.

The Fourth AFRO Congress

The AFRO held its Fourth Regional conference in Addis Ababa during

April 8-12, 1964. Attending were trade union leaders from 24 countries.

There were 39 official delegates and six observers who met in the Africa

Hall where the OAU was born. It adopted the slogan "Free Labor in a Free

Africa" and spent a great deal of its time discussing the methods of maintain­

ing independence from political control. It was important in that it created a much stronger structure for AFRO. Humphrey Luande, President of the Uganda

Trades Union Congress and Member of Parliament was elected as chairman of

AFRO in place of Adebola of Nigeria. Finally, AFRO appointed a full-time

Regional Secretary, Mamadou Jallow, of Gambia. Prior to this congress

almost all of AFRO's activities took place in Nigeria, through pro tem

Nigerian staff, although regional representation was maintained on paper.

This creation of a more representative Secretariat and the filling of the

post of Regional Secretary was welcomed as confirming the strength of the

AFRO.

The resolutions passed at Addis Ababa reflected the AFRO's

principal areas of concern. Like every other African group it passed

strong resolutions against the apartheid policy of South Africa, oppres­

sion in Portugese Guinea, unilateral independence for Rhodesia, the state

of emergency in Aden, colonialism, neo-colonialism, etc. Its views on

labor problems were particularly interesting. The AFRO viewed "with

great concern and apprehension the tendency in some countries of Africa 157 to control by legislative or administrative action, trade union organiza­ tions."^ It pledged co-operation with governments and, somewhat in­ consistently, demanded that governments institute laws to "prevent the development of splinter groups which sprout up to harass established orga­ nizations."^ xhe AFRO position on international affiliation was made most clear. Chairing the conference was Adebola who stated:

Efforts made in the past to achieve unity haVe been hampered by the controversial question of international affiliation. This issue has been made the scapegoat. It is not affiliation that has brought about the present controversy in the trade union movement. The friction rather centers around whether the trade union leaders are prepared to accept international principles and standards entrenched in the ILO Conventions and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, before moving toward the desired unity. We believe that unity can be found in the good-will of the labor leaders towards one another and respect for the fundamental rights and autonomy of each national center, however large or s m a l l . 3 7

In another much-quoted statement, the AFRO declared that the con­ tinuance of affiliation to the ICFTU was not a form of neo-colonialist

Western control, but that "the fact that the policies and decisions of the

ICFTU are made without regard to the policies and interests of any partic­ ular power bloc enables the trade unions in the vast majority of non- aligned countries in the world to be affiliated to the ICFTU...affiliation to it is not contrary to the policy of non-alignment of African states which the conference fully endorses."^9

The primary result of the AFRO Congress was a further break in the unity efforts. Despite proposals by the Algerians, Tunisians and the

Senegalese for continued joint talks in Algiers in May 1964, the com­ munication between the ATUC and the AATUF deteriorated.^® In June 1964, the AATUF held its second congress alone in Bamako. 158

The Second AATUF Congress

On May 15, 1964 the ATUC issued an official warning to all its affiliates not to participate in the AATUF Congress meeting in Bamako in

June since ATUC stated that the AATUF refused to meet with the ATUC to dis­ cuss unity on May 12.^ Despite this warning individuals from twenty-four

ICFTU-affiliated unions attended the AATUF Congress. Among these were unionists from ICFTU-affiliated states which had just splintered off from the ICFTU unions because of domestic political pressures and manipulations.1^

This contributed to the general confusion, usually present at AATUF meet­ ings, over credentials and representation. Following the AATUF meeting, numerous unions (in Uganda, Upper Volta, Chad, Somalia, Kenya and Nigeria) protested that they were not participants in the Bamako meetings although they were listed as participating there.

The key issue at Bamako was affiliation. In passing the official charter for the AATUF, they included a section which specifically dealt with the affiliation issue:

The All African Trade Union Federation is independent from all inter­ national trade union organizations. Its members may not affiliate with international trade union organizations. No foreign interference, therefore, will be allowed to modify or influence the concepts and methods of African trade unionism.43

The leadership of AATUF claimed that AATUF was the Pan-African labor body called for by the OAU in its many resolutions on African labor unity.

Ben Seddick, President of the AATUF, demanded that the ATUC members dis­ affiliate from the ICFTU and IFCTU and join the AATUF:

It is our task to oppose the maneuvers of our enemies with the real Addis Ababa program which excludes all imperialist or neocolonialist interference .4-4 159

He distinguished between three types of African states, attacking the less radical states, and the ATUC, as "Tshombist stooges". These types are:

that of the struggle for national independence and against racism; that which is setting out increasingly firmly on the revolutionary and popular road; that which is politically liberated but which is still linked with a neo-colonialist development characterized above all by the political and military domination on the part of back­ ward national elements supported by outside neo-colonialist forces .4-5

This declaration, and a similar declaration by John Tettegah, is particularly important. It is important in that it represents a condemnation of various African states and the OAU in particular. The AATUF, as opposed to the UPTC, AFRO or ATUC was the only labor group to openly take a polit­

ical stand on inter-African political relations. The AATUF took on the same political coloration as the former Casablanca Group at its inception and, despite the demise of the Casablanca Group, carried on the same rhetoric even after the creation of the OAU. John Tettegah's speech emphasized this thrust in his denunciation of the policies of the OAU:

The Charter signed at Addis Ababa is only a document no matter how sacred its contents, how solemn and sincere were the intentions of its signatories. A document alone cannot unite a continent of two hundred and fifty million people...The difficulties of the [African Liberation Committee], the open hostilities over border disputes, the lack of co­ ordination on major issues of African foreign policy, underestimation of the neo-colonialist policy of former Metropolitan powers and the existence of foreign military bases on African soil have offered enough evidence on the inadequacy of the OAU for the needs of Africa and African Unity...The corollary of this view is that the rallying ground for African Unity is above all the common ideology. We have learned only too well that any close association of African States, one of which follows the path of socialism and the other is a client state of imperialism, would break down whenever and wherever it comes to the test of real African Unity. This has been exactly the case of the OAU, which is too fragile then to withstand the trend of the African Revolution, the main stream of which is still to c o m e . ^ 6

As in the statements issued at the previous AATUF Cqngress, when

Tettegah called for "total war", the AATUF charter demanded that the labor 160 movements of the countries dominated by neo-colonialist or colonialist powers bring down the political leadership of these states through boy­ cotts and strikes and through co-operation with "the political apparatus responsible for revolutionary action in the independent countries."^7

Among the other decisions taken at Bamako was the passage of control of the organization to Ghana. The headquarters of AATUF were moved to Accra and John Tettegah was named full-time Secretary-General of the organization. The vice-presidents represented: Algeria, Congo

(Brazzaville), Guinea, Mali, Tanganyika, Nigeria and the U.A.R., The inclusion of the Tanganyikan vice-president was a major coup for the

AATUF, reflecting the new militancy and control of the Tanganyikan unions imposed by the Tanganyikan government as well as the rapprochment between

Tettegah and Kamaliza (of Tanganyika) during their April 29, 1964 meeting

AO in Dar-es-Salaam. °

At the conclusion of the Bamako Congress the AATUF Charter was signed by representatives from: Algeria, Ghana, Mali, Tanganyika,

Zanzibar, Guinea, United Arab Republic, Congo (Brazzaville) and Morocco.

Togo subsequently joined, as did the Nigerian Trades Union Congress. The delegates who did not sign represented: Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Rwanda,

Mauritania, Kenya, .Uganda, Upper Volta and Zambia. 49 The AATUF demanded recognition and consultative status at the OAU and the United Nations.^®

The challenge posed by the AATUF declaration of strikes and boy­ cotts against countries still under neo-colonialist rule was answered by

Humphrey Luande of the AFRO in a press conference in Lagos:

In the first place this organization AATUF, which preaches non­ affiliation, maintains covert relations with the communist World Federation of Trade Unions whose membership is mostly concentrated in the Soviet Union and communist China. 161

Instead of promoting pan-African labor unity, the AATUF spends lots of money received from communist sources to create splinter groups in Africa, thus confusing the African scene...Any pan-African trade union movement which aims at subversion, subjugation, and interference in the internal and external relations of properly constituted indi­ vidual national centers can neither be tolerated or supported by AFRO ...The free trade union movement of Africa throws down an open challenge to the communist-controlled AATUF that we shall fight them tooth and nail in countering their nefarious and subversive activities against Africa and her institutions.

We shall now go to countries like Ghana and help the national centers in their struggle for democratic trade unionism. This is our reply to Tettegah's threat that AATUF would declare "total war" against other trade unions in A f r i c a . 50

In practice, the immediate response on all sides was a denunciation of the others' objectives and the creation of further tensions in those areas in which the national labor movements were split. 52

While the Bamako Congress was taking place and the accusations and counter-accusations were filling the air, a major strike of great importance to the labor movements in all of Africa was taking place in Nigeria.

Following the appointment of the Morgan Commission in September 1963 the

Joint Action Committee (JAC) had agreed to postpone their general strike which had been scheduled for October 1. This JAC was made up of three major and two minor groups. The United Labor Congress (ULC) was the AFRO and ATUC-affiliated center; the Nigerian Workers Council (NWC) was the UPTC and ATUC-affiliated center; the Nigerian Trades Union Congress (NTUC) was affiliated with the AATUF, as was the Railway and Ports Workers Union

(NUR); the Labor Unity Front (LUF) was independent. Despite many previous efforts, the Nigerian unions had been unable to join together. They were national unions whose memberships extended into every region and, although they were ranged against the Northern Region's political domination of the

Federation, no tribal aspirations were involved. 53 162

The Morgan Commission submitted its report to the government on

April 30, 1964 but the government refused to publish the findings. The

JAC was worried that the government would falsify the report before publishing it, and threatened to strike on May 15 if the report was not issued. Although the government promised to release the report on May 25, the report was not issued. On May 31 the JAC called a national strike which paralyzed the entire nation until June 13. Three days after the strike began, the government issued the Morgan report, but refused to go along with its findings, offering the JAC far less than the Morgan Commission had found just.

Over 800,000 workers were on strike across all Nigeria. Despite ultimata by the government and private employers, the strike continued.

Only after the chatis had persuaded many political leaders that a new govern­ ment might be necessary, did the government begin to negotiate in earnest.

A settlement was finally reached, which raised wages to only slightly below the Morgan Commission's figure, while the various non-wage demands (such as the creation of a National Industrial Council, a Wage Board, a Labor

Advisory" Committee, etc.) were accepted as written. It was a major victory 54 for the Nigerian unions.

The success of the Nigerian strike was illustrative to many through­ out the rest of Africa. Unions which had been split for years along factional lines, bitter rivals, AATUF and ATUC affiliates, could effectively co-operate domestically when their interests merged. The political rami­ fications of this strike (which were to have a profound effect on subsequent

Nigerian political developments) were apparent to other African political leaders. The Nigerian unions succeeded in achieving through a general 163 strike what the Dahomeyan, Congolese and other unions had achieved through political coups. Following the success of the Nigerian strike, various

African governments bore down even harder on their labor movements and made a substantial effort to keep them from following the Nigerian example.

At their Cairo meeting the OAU Heads of State again called for the formation of a united Pan-African labor body, but took no action on its behalf. This renewed call evoked a number of declarations by AFRO, ATUC and AATUF on African unity (ATUC and AATUF each claiming to be the Pan-

African labor:body referred to). On November 1-2, 1964, the AFRO held an

Executive Board meeting in Lagos.

The AFRO Executive Board Meeting

On November 1 and 2 the Executive Board of AFRO held an important meeting in Lagos. It was attended by representatives from: Nigeria,

Tunisia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ethiopia, Malagasy, Libya, Congo 56 (Leopoldville), Angola, Mauritius, and Uganda. The meeting involved a general discussion of the trade union situation in Africa and some internal housekeeping problems (particularly the controversy over the ICFTU school in

Uganda) . ^ It pledged continued support to the OAU and made the usual con­ demnations of Portugal, South Africa, Rhodesia. It did pass two particularly interesting resolutions on African labor unity. The AFRO Executive Board:

...RECALLS its many previous statements in full support of Pan-African Cooperation within the framework of the Organization of African Unity;

HAVING learned that the OAU has been requested to study and pronounce upon the policy regarding trade unions and the problem of trade union cooperation at the Pan-African level; 164

CONSIDERING the obligations of any government deriving from their status as members of the ILO;

CALLS UPON the OAU, in line with its own Charter, to affirm the national autonomy of trade unions and federations of trade unions, and to endorse all the provisions of the ILO Conventions on Freedom of Association and the Right to Bargain Collectively as the inter­ nationally recognized standards and practices in the field of Labor relations.58

The second resolution called for a "common front with AFRO" to strengthen labor Pan-Africanism. 59

Following this meeting, the ATUC held an extraordinary meeting in

Lagos on November 5, 1964, where they discussed the recent OAU initiatives towards labor unity. It protested the jailing of union leaders in the

Cameroon and the detention of union leaders in Rhodesia and resolved to put these questions before the upcoming ILO meeting scheduled for Addis

Ababa later in November.^ The ATUC also announced that it was holding a general council meeting on November 27.

The UPTC suffered a major setback early in November when Biyaoula,

President of the CATC in Congo (Brazzaville) was arrested. The CATC was the major influence in the UPTC and was increasingly pressured by the

Congolese government to merge with the government-supported CSC. The UPTC met in Lagos and said they were creating a new headquarters for its

Secretariat in Lagos. However, with most of the UPTC Congolese leadership

exiled or imprisoned in the Congo (Brazzaville) much of the leadership and 61 cohesiveness of the organization dissolved. Much of the control over the

UPTC passed into the hands of the Christian unions of Senegal.

The Second African Regional Conference of the ILO met in Addis

Ababa from November -30 to December 12, 1964. Thirty-three African states were represented. Both AATUF and ATUC were accorded observer status, but 165 efforts to unite the two organizations at the conference proved of little avail. A seven-page resolution on wage policy and a long resolution on the "Africanization" of jobs were passed as well as other economic sug- W) gestions. It was essentially a non-political meeting, as are most ILO meetings since representation consists of labor, government and employer delegates.

Following the conference, the ATUC announced that it was going to hold its first triennial conference in Lagos on February 19-21, 1965. As often happened with the ATUC, this conference was postponed a number of times.

The period 1963-1964 was a troubled period for Pan-African labor.

The reactivation of the Congo crisis had again split Africa along ideological lines. The hostility towards outsiders, which reached its peak during the

Stanleyville rescue operation, intensified the drive among the political leadership against foreign domination and foreign forces operating in

Africa. The revolts of January 1964 in East Africa and Gabon severely shattered African illusions of self-sufficiency, as did the coups and various civil disorders. The antagonisms which lay only slightly below the surface of OAU unity were exacerbated by Ghanaian hostility and propaganda efforts, and by the insularity of many of the francophone leadership to the problems which the more ideological African states considered important. The creation of Rhodesia, after its Unilateral Declaration of Independence, and the lack of any effective action taken against Rhodesia by Britain and the West con­ firmed many of the fears of the Africans that racism was a cornerstone of

Western policy. The success of Tshombe and his white mercenaries, with the open support of the Belgians and the U.S., did little to ease these feelings. 166

For the labor movements, action against entrenched bureaucracies would have been difficult enough under normal circumstances. In a period of instability and fear, it was almost impossible. Except for Nigeria,

the concerted actions of labor movements led them into alliances with the military, often toppling governments as a result. For most, this proved only a temporary palliative.

With the strong identification of the AFRO with the West and the

Western-dominated ICFTU, and the UPTC with the Western-dominated and ultra­ montane IFCTU, ideological differences which had little relevance to domestic African needs were introduced as a wedge to the unity which was desired by many. The AATUF, receiving support from the communist WFTU, became increasingly identified with the Eastern bloc. This split was maintained by the introduction of Cold War policies and rhetoric into the

African setting.

These difficulties did not decrease, but rather the confluence of

a variety of unexpected circumstances led to an abatement of some of the major hostilities in the next few years. The prospects for labor unity which seemed at its brightest glow in October 1963, soon faded to a dim

spark. The glow remained, but unity grew less and less a realistic

prospect. f

167

^In many of these countries, the wages set for various positions had been set at a rate high enough to attract expatriate workers. As more of these positions were filled by local workers after independence, African governments sought to reduce the wage levels to be more in line with generally prevailing rates in other industries. This was one aspect of the serious problem of finding a role for a labor movement in a production, as opposed to a consumption-oriented economy. When the bulk of national activity is being directed towards maximizing output, a potential hindrance, like an independent labor movement, is often seen as a threat to the national interest. See: Everett M. Kassalow, "Labor Development And Economic Modernization" in Willard A. Beling (ed.) The Role of Labor in African Nation-Building (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 41-72; Jacob Oser, Promoting Economic Development (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967); C. C. Onyemelukwe, Problems of Industrial Planning and Management in Nigeria (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); and Rene Dumont, False Start in Africa (New York: Praeger, 1966), inter alia.

^The military elites in Africa are far different than the wealthy scions of important families which characterize Latin American military "gorillas". The military in Africa are often better educated than the general level of education in the country. They are functionally and emotionally distinct from the rest of their societies by the discipline and order which pervades their activities. They are truly national militaries in the sense that tribal conflicts do not, or are not allowed to play a role in military affairs. A good reason for this is that African armies are new and, almost without exception, have been trained and equipped by foreign military powers. The tradition of military intervention to quell domestic disturbances has a long history in Africa, dating from earliest colonial days. Viewing the growth of domestic turmoil, often based on tribal rivalries, within their nations they made a natural alliance with the only other major non-tribal organization, the labor movement. Through this, they attempted to restore order. See the special issue of "Africa Forum", vol. 2, no. 1, Summer 1966, "The Military in Africa", particularly Belmont Brice, Jr., "The Nature and Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa", pp. 57-67.

■^George Lichtheim, "New Leader", May 5, 1965, p. 24. See also, Lester N. Trachtman, "The Labor Movement of Ghana", Reprint Series no. 127, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations (Ithaca, 1962), pp. 194-195 and G. E. Lynd, The Politics of African Trade Unionism (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 36-47.

^G. E. Lynd, op. cit., p. 167 indicates that the Ghanaian "labor attaches" in foreign embassies served as contact men for Tettegah and •Nkrumah. See also Benjamin Bentum, Trade Unions in Chains (Accra: Liberty Press, 1966).

^Morocco is a special case. The UMT was an important force in the struggle for national independence, but remained separate and distinct from the Istiqlal political party. The UMT continued to assert its independence 168 from political control after Morocco became an independent nation, often finding itself in conflict with the Ministers of Labor and the Government. It was responsible for the split in Istiqlal in November 1958 and formed the UNPF as a separate party later, led by Beb Barka and Ben Seddick. See: Douglas E. Ashford, Political Change in Morocco (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 270-301; Werner Plum, Gewerk- schaften Im Maghreb (Hannover: Verlag fuer Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1962), pp. 49-53; and Jean Meynaud and Anisse Salah-Bey, Trade Unionism in Africa (London: Methuen, 1967).

6 ..."Article 29. When there are several national trade union organizations in one country, they should take steps towards amalgamation", quoted in Meynaud and Salah-Bey, ££. cit., p. 46.

^Dorothy Nelkin, "Pan-African Trade Union Organization", Reprint Series no. 221, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations (Ithaca, 1967), p. 46.

®Bentum, ££. cit., p. 16.

9Ibid., p. 2 1 .

lONelkin, oj>. cit. , p. 48.

Hcolin Legum, Pan-Afr ic an ism (New York: .Praeger, 1965), p. 300. (Text)

12"African Labour News" (ALN), Lagos, July 18, 1965, p. 1.

> l^ALN, July 25, 1965, p. 2. *

l^William H. Friedland, "Organizational Chaos and Political Poten­ tial" in "Africa Report", June, 1965, p. 10.

l^The UDDIA (Union Democratique pour la Defense des Interests Africaines) was Youlou's party, made up mainly of Bacongo. The MSA (Mouvement Socialiste Africain) was the Moshi party led by Jacques Opongault.

l^Friedland, 0£. cit., pp. 1 0 -1 1 .

l^xhe'Bohiki Affair" arose out of the murder of a politician, Daniel Dossou, by National Assembly member Christophe Bohiki. Bohiki was a supporter of Maga and Maga's party. After some confusion, and obvious connivance, the Assembly voted to drop the prosecution of Bohiki for the murder. This aroused the members of Dossou's tribe and they rioted in Porto Novo, forcing the government to declare martial law.

l^Friedland, ££. cit. , p. 1 1 .

19Ibid., p. 1 1 . 20Ibid., p p . 7 - 8 .

21lmmanuel Wallerstein, Africa, The Politics of Unity (New York: Random House,- 1967), pp. 202-203.

22ALN, October 16, 1963, p. 2.

23a l N, November 13, 1963, p. 5.

24From the French text of the communique, Dakar, October 19, 1963.

^"Tanganyika Standard", Dar-es-Salaam, October 22, 1963, p. 3.

26a l N, October 23, 1963, p. 1.

^^ALN, October 30, 1963, p. 2.

28xhe Bourguiba Regime had often intervened in the internal affairs of the UGTT, with Ben Salah, Tlili, and later, Achour. See Clement Henry Moore, "The Era of Neo.-Destour" in Charles A. Micaud (ed.), Tunisia, The Politics of Modernization (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 69- 130.

^ALN, November 20, 1963, p. 5.

30ALN, January 20, 1964, p. 4.

31"Formation : Revu^ des Militants De L'U.T.C.", Brazzaville, no. 17-18, 1964, pp. 5-6 (text in French).

32ibid., p. 5.

-^Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 204-205.

-^ALN, March 4, 1964, p. 3.

35jjelkin, op. cit. , pp. 49-50.

36"The Resolutions of the Fourth African Regional Trade Union Con­ ference" in "ICFTU Bulletin", Brussels, April 1964, p. 8 .

-^Ibid., p. 13.

38wallerstein, op. c i t ., pp. 205-206.

^"Resolutions of Fourth African...", op. cit., p. 3.

40wallerstein, op. c i t . , p. 206.

^■*-The ALN May 20, 1964, p. 1 ran an article reprinting an ATUC warning to its affiliates on May 15 which "pointed out that the AATUF had 170 failed to respond to an earlier invitation to meet ATUC representatives in Algiers on May 12 to discuss the question of unity among trade unions in Africa".

42ibid., p. 1 .

43AATUF Charter, preamble.

44"World Trade Union Movement" (WFTU), Prague 7/8:17-18, 1964.

^Wallerstein, ££. cit., p. 206.

46ibid.. p. 207.

^"Africa Report" July, 1964, p. 34.

“^"Tanganyika Standard", Dar-es-Salaam, April 30, 1964, p. 5.

^Nelkin, op. cit., p. 51.

50»Africa Diary", vol. IV, no. 29, p. 1849.

51"Free Labour World" (ICFTU), Brussels, September 1964, p. 23.

^Especially Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya.

-^Friedland, op. cit., pp. 7-10, and Lynd, op. cit., pp. 121-138.

^Friedland, op. cit., p. 10.

-’-’Particularly in francophone West Africa.

5*>ALN, November 5, 1964, pp. 1-6.

5?Ibid., p. 2 .

^®Ibid., p. 3.

39jbid., p. 3.

6^ALN, November 12, 1964, p. 2.

^^ALN, November 26, 1964, p. 7.

62"R.eport of the ILO", December, 1964 (Geneva). CHAPTER VII

THE RESOLUTION OF HOSTILITIES: PAN-AFRICANISM 1965-1966

The period 1965-1966 marked an important turning point in the

search for Pan-African unity. The schisms which had long split African

nations along ideological lines reasserted themselves. The natural con­

servatism of the francophone states which had been assuaged by compromise within the structure of the OAU was shocked by the renewal of the Congolese war and the resurgence of subversion on the part of the more militant

African states. The rash of coups and assassinations which had become

endemic in Africa severely frightened many of the ruling elites. The

states which had undergone changes of government sought to create

alliances among themselves for self-preservation and recognition.

The threat of internal upheaval was always present, prompting many

states to proceed farther down the road to one-party, one-elite states.

The key factor in this period was fear. Afrieans turned to the OAU as

almost a defensive measure. The conservatives hoped that the OAU could

dim the revolutionary fervor of the militant nations. The more radical saw

the OAU as a legitimizer of their status and policies. The moderates saw

the OAU as a meeting ground for the extremes in which conflict could be

avoided. Virtually all the nations felt they had a vested interest in main­

taining the OAU.

However, the OAU structure was incapable of providing all things

to all viewpoints. The commitment of the African states to the OAU did not

prevent them from seeking other alliances among themselves on a smaller

scale. This period witnessed the resurgence of regional political groupings 172 and international ideological blocs. This ebb and flow of affinities and blocs took place outside the narrow arena of economic co-operation. During this period, many new and expanded forms of economic co-operation, trade agreements, customs agreements, and mutual development schemes were agreed upon. Various committees of the OAU developed and took shape.

In the early days of 1965 many of the OAU constituent subcommittees held their second meetings. On January 18-23 the Social and Economic Com­ mission met in Cairo, where it adopted a four-point program calling for: an examination of the UNCTAD 1964 proposalsthe creation of a special group to examine the prospects of economic integration; the maintenance of 2 the South African boycott; and the uniting of ATUC and AATUF into one movement.^

On January 21-26 the Scientific, Technical anc. Research Com­ mission met in Lagos to approve the committee's report. Following this, on January 26-31, the Educational and Cultural Committee met in Lagos where the delegates agreed to set up a Pan-African news service and a

Bureau of Information within the OAU structure.^

On January 29-30 the OAU special Ad Hoc commission on the Congo met in Nairobi. At this meeting it was evident that many of the African states who had been most vehement against the Tshombe government were hav­ ing some second thoughts. They were faced by a situation in which Tshombe1s forces (aided by the white mercenaries) were gradually winning control of the country. President Nasser had announced on December 23, 1964^ that his government was supplying arms and material to the rebel forces. It was also well known that Algeria, Ghana, Uganda and the Sudan were also supplying aid to the rebel forces of Gbenye. For many of these states, particularly the 173

East Africans and francophone states, the idea of supporting an anti-

Tshombe policy which would applaud open outside subversion of a fellow

African state seemed to have obvious risks.

The Ad Hoc commission postponed any decision on the Congo and

called for a meeting of both sides to be held in Nairobi in February 12 to

discuss "national reconciliation". It also created a sub-committee of

Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria to visit Leopoldville, Brazzaville and Bujumbura

to discuss things with the rebels.^ One of the principal difficulties in

resolving the Congolese question was that the rebels themselves disagreed

on the optimal solution to the problem. There were three major fighting

areas with three major political leaders on the side of the rebels, all of

whom spoke only for themselves: Gbenye, Soumialot and Mulele. If these

were united, of if a rapprochement could be brought about with Adoula, then

perhaps the OAU could have acted decisively. As it was, the OAU had only

the common enemy, Tshombe, to fight against and many of these states felt

that Tshombe was, at least, the legitimate government.

A further issue introduded into the OAU at the meeting on

February 2-5 of the OAU Defense Commission in Freetown, the issue of a

united African army. They drafted a plan for submission to the Council of

Ministers which would set up an African Defense Organization to which each

member state would allocate one military unit. Many of the African states

feared such a move, but put off discussion of the plan until the Council

of Ministers meeting.

As a result of the strong pressures on many of the African states

and the fears that they shared in common, there was a movement back to the

abandoned idea of the political UAM. During February 10-12, 1965 the 174 thirteen heads of state of the Union Africaine et Malgache de Cooperation

Economique (UAMCE) met in Nouakchott to form a new organization.

The Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache

The genesis of the February meeting of the OCAM has three sources.

On January 15, 1965 Pierre Ngendandumwe, Premier of Burundi was assassinated.

The Chinese Communists were named as the principal instigators of this assassination and Burundi broke diplomatic relations with the Peoples

Republic of China. Reaction among the other African states was no less vehement. The Presidents of the Ivory Coast, Niger and the Malagasy

Republic openly denounced the Chinese and there was great fear of further

Chinese plots.^

A second source of cohesion was the rapprochement between Niger and Dahomey which had been brought about by the January 17, 1965 meeting of the Entente. After the problem of the disputed island of Lete was O disposed of by creating dual citizenship for its residents, tranquility existed between the four Entente members, providing them with a re­ established unity.

The third source of cohesion was the growing fear of Ghana-based

subversion. On January 21, 1965 a Togo border official was killed at

Segbe by shots which came from a Ghanaian customs officer. Togo protested

to the OAU. This incident provoked a major dispute with Ghana which led to

a closing of the border between the two nations. It also re-affirmed, in

the minds of the UAMCE leadership, the dedication of Ghana-based exile

Q groups to the disruption and overthrow of many of their governments. Much

of the criticism leveled at Ghana claimed that Ghana was abetting Chinese

Communist policies. 175 Because of the growth of subversion, by Ghana and the Chinese, these states felt particularly vulnerable. The fighting in the Congo, and the failure of the OAU to come up with an adequate solution, further fed their fears. If Congolese rebels could openly get support from Ghana,

Egypt and Algeria they felt it was likely that the Sawaba Party, the UPC, or the PAI'*'® would receive the same assistance.

Accordingly, they retreated to the unity which had been subsumed into the OAU. They re-formed the UAM. In the final communique which emanated from this meeting, they created an organization "to strengthen cooperation and solidarity among the African and Malagasy states, in order to speed up their political, economic, social, technical and cultural development"^ The headquarters were to be at Yaounde under the direction of a secretary-general. It remained within the framework of the OAU.

They took particular exception to many of the current problems which plaugued Africa and severely criticized the OAU:

Considering that the malaise from which the OAU is suffering derives essentially from the lack of respect given to its Charter;

Considering that the respect for the sovereignty of the states and non-interference in their internal affairs constitute the sine qua non conditions for peace and development in.Africa;

Considering that the situation in’ Congo-Leopoldville and the intensification of the cold war between the two blocs in Africa constitute a permanent threat to the existence of the OAU and the independence of the African countries;

Considering that covetous designs from abroad are increasing in Africa,

The Chiefs of State recommend prudence and vigilance to all.l^

The other major operative passage denounces Ghana by name:

They energetically condemn the action of certain states, notably Ghana, which harbor agents of subversion and organize training camps on their national territory.13 176

Tsiranana put it even more bluntly in a news interview:

Ghana must give guarantees that it will cease its nonsense, because now our timidity is at an end. We've begun to have enough of these affairs. We're tough enough to retaliate against anybody...Those who assist rebels are against African unity.14-

The meeting and creation of the OCAM affirmed the links which bound them together. It provided the first major recognition by African states for the Tshombe regime in the Congo and pressed for a boycott of the upcoming September meeting of the OAU scheduled to take place in Accra.

Most importantly, it posed a threat to the OAU aversion to smaller group­ ings along regional or ideological lines. However, far more pressing problems faced the OAU than the resurgence of regionalism. Assassinations continued, wars between neighboring states broke out, and civil wars con­ tinued. On February 18, 1965 three top government officials of Congo

(Brazzaville) were found assassinated. Six days later Pio Pinto of

Kenya was gunned down while taking his daughter shopping. The civil war in

Malawi was temporarily quiet following a major battle between government troops and the rebels. The Congolese situation continued unchecked and war between Uganda and the Congo seemed imminent when Congolese planes attacked rebel supply lines through Uganda. The civil war in: the Sudan took on larger proportions and mass killing began in the southern region. Chinese influence grew in Burundi; there was continued raiding along the Malawi-

Tanzanian border; and rioting killed hundreds in Nigeria.^ In many other areas of Africa disorder and disturbance prevailed.

In this generally tense period, the OAU Council of Ministers met in Nairobi for a twelve-day meeting during February 26 to March 9. The

Council heard the report of the Ad Hoc Commission on the Congo and listened to various arguments on how to resolve the crisis. Tshombe flew 177 into Nairobi to participate in the deliberations and made a strong plea for non-interference in the internal affairs of the Congo. He was opposed by the more radical states, particularly the Sudan. No agreement on the

Congo could be reached at this meeting, although the compromise resolution introduced by the Cameroonian delegate seemed most acceptable to all parties. In fact, the OAU Ministers voted not to hear the representatives of the rebel Stanleyville government, which was a blow to the more radical cause. It also voted to keep the Ad Hoc Committee functioning, which was a blow to the moderates. The major result of the Ministers meeting was to leave the solution of the Congolese problem to the Heads of State meeting scheduled for September in Accra. They did, however, unite behind reso­ lutions condemning South Africa and calling for the exclusion of South

Africa from the International Commercial Air Organization. They also, under strong OCAM pressure, refused to take any action on the proposals of the

African Defense Committee's resolution which called for a common OAU

Defense force.^

The response to the OCAM strength was a series of meetings between

the old Casablanca partners. On March 14, 1965 the presidents of Ghana,

Guinea, Mali and Algeria met in Bamako. This was followed by a meeting of

the presidents of Guinea, Mali and Algeria in Conakry the following day.

There was no official statement from either of these two meetings. The

presidents discussed the resurgence of francophone unity and the threat

this implied to Ghana's hosting of the Heads of State Conference. Guinea

and Mali promised to help. On the question of the Congo it soon became

obvious that there was little these states could do in the face of

Tshombe's recent successes. These discussions did mark a return to open 178 » co-operation among the former Casablanca states, although they created no permanent organization to- carry on mutuali • activity. • • 17 •

The meeting of the Conseil de 1 'Entente further aggravated the split between the francophones and the radicals when it issued another strong condemnation of Ghana's training of rebels at its Mapong training 18 . center and at the Ideological Institute at Winneba. Following the

April 9, 1965 Entente meeting there was an attempt on the life of Hamani * Diori of Niger on April 13. The assassin was a member of the Ghana- sponsored Sawaba Party of Bakary Djibo.\^ He was trained in Ghana and

China. This further enraged the OCAM states which began planning in earnest for a boycott of the Accra conference. On April 27, 1965 President Yameogo of Upper Volta and Diori- of Niger visited Balewa of Nigeria to enlist his support. This support was not forthcoming. Like the francophone states,

Nigeria had many rebels training in Ghana, many of whom, like Ikoku, held important positions in Ghana. However, Nigeria's aim was to preserve the

OAU not to fragment it. It hoped that the meeting-ground the OAU provided would keep open hostilities from breaking out in West Africa. If felt particularly vulnerable at this time since there was a resurgence of tribalism cum regionalism within Nigeria itself. It needed OAU support for 90 continuing its legitimacy in the face of regional separatism. u Balewa suggested that, instead of breaking up the OAU, they should hold a special meeting of the Council of Ministers in Lagos.

Responding to these pressures, the Ghanaians created another vehicle by which they could wield some influence. Since the death of the

AAPO (All-African Peoples Organization) there was no organization which

grouped all the "liberation fronts" or rebel groups of Africa into a single 179 body. Instead, the Ghanaians moved to use the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity

Conference (AAPSC) as such a group. During May 9 to May 16, 1965 the

AAPSC held its fourth meeting at the Ideological School at Winneba, Ghana.

Represented at the AAPSC meeting were Asian communist movements, the radical African governments (Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania and the UAR), and the rebel nationalist movements (Sawaba-Niger; UPC-Cameroon;

PAI-Senegal; UNFP-Morocco, etc.). The AAPSC passed a resolution calling

O i for a Pan-African continent-wide political union. L

At the same time as the AAPSC meeting, Houphouet-Boigny and Modibo

Keita were meeting at their common frontier. They discussed the recent goodwill visits of the Congolese emmissaries and pledged that the Congo

(Leopoldville) would be accepted into OCAM. They also discussed the announce­ ment that there would be an Afro-Asian Summit Conference in Algiers at the

9 9 end of June, the so-called 'second Bandung'. They confirmed that neither state would attend.

Following the AAPSC meeting, Houphouet-Boigny called for an extra­ ordinary meeting of the OCAM on May 26, 1965 at Abidjan. This was rather unusual for Houphouet-Boigny to call this meeting, since Ould Daddah was actually the head of the OCAM. The delegates to the OCAM meeting voted to

admit the Congo (Leopoldville) to the OCAM and applauded Tshombe for his

leadership. The final communique stressed other important points of OCAM

policy:

In the light of the recent and tragic events in Niamey we confirm, unanimously, the position of Nouakchott condemning the Ghanaian orga­ nization of subversion and decide not to participate in the Accra summit; we decide, on the contrary, still unanimously, to participate in the Foreign Ministers Conference of the OAU called on the initiative of the Federal Nigerian Prime Minister. We hereby launch a solemn and brotherly appeal to all member-states of the OAU in the interest of peace and African unity, to avoid henceforth all hostile acts against the republic of the C o n g o . 23

Further discussions at Abidjan indicated that most of the OCAM states were planning to boycott the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference as well. In a speech following the meeting, Senghor indicated that the

OCAM states were contemplating a new regional grouping for West Africa which would include both anglophone and francophone states. ^

This conference was followed by a great deal of diplomatic activity throughout Africa. The Entente states continued lobbying for a boycott of the Accra meeting; the Ghanaians continued lobbying for a successful Accra meeting; and the Algerians and Egyptians continued lobbying for a wide attendance at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference (AASC).

All this activity tended to polarize the situation. By the time of the Lagos Foreign Ministers Conference on June 10-13, 1965 it seemed that the OAU was ready to dissolve into two or more blocs. It was only the strong leadership manifested by the Nigerians which held the opposing factions together, plus the new issue of Rhodesia. The Nigerians insisted that there should be no free-form discussion of Ghanaian intrigue, but rather that a five nation committee (Ethiopia, Cambia, Mali, Nigeria and

Tunisia) be empowered to hear the francophone complaints and the Ghanaian rebuttal.

The Ghanaians expressed their willingness to expel all foreign rebel elements from Ghana and to allow the OAU to inspect the various

training centers to ascertain that these elements had left. In the end,

a compromise was reached. The final communique read, in part:

We resolve unanimously: (1) To ask all member-states of the OAU to do everything possible to ensure the success of the Accra conference... 181

(2) Notes with satisfaction the guarantees and assurances given by the host government and all practical steps already taken and those it has decided to take...particularly the measure reaffirmed by that govern­ ment to send away from its territory before the conference all those persons whose presence is considered undesirable to countries of their choice...

(7) Finally recommends all member-states effectively to participate in the next meeting of Heads of States and Governments... 25

It was not certain however if the OCAM states would abide by the OAU action, but it was clear that they were certainly mollified. No real mention of the AASC was given prominence.

This problem of the AASC conference was resolved a few days later.

Ten days before the AASC conference was due to take place in Algiers, the government of Ahmed Ben Bella was overthrown by the military leader

Boumedienne. The conference was postponed until later in the year, and

then adjourned sine die. This removed another obstacle between the two

factions and made open co-operation much easier. It also embarrassed the more radical states.^6

The failure of the AASC and the compromise reached at Lagos helped

a great deal to relieve many of the fears of the OCAM states. There was

some disunity within OCAM ranks; Congo (Brazzaville), the Central African

Republic, Mauritania and the Cameroons were still unhappy about the OCAM's

acceptance of Tshombe (they did not attend the previous meeting which

arranged this). There was pressure to break away from OCAM over this,

augemented by a resolution of many of the fears which had prompted them to

join the OCAM in the first place. On July 6 , 1965 Mauritania announced that

it had disaffiliated from the OCAM. The others did not join Mauritania in

its disaffiliation.^7

The rest of the summer of 1965 was spent in a flurry of diplomatic

activity concerning the Accra conference and the budgetary problems of the 182

OAU.^® The problem of the anticipated Rhodesian move towards a Unilateral

Declaration of Independence (UDI) was a great bone of contention at the

Commonwealth Conference and subsequently. There were continued plans for an East African Common Market and association with the EEC. Nigeria and the Maghreb states also conducted discussions with the EEC. There were a number of meetings between Nkrumah and the various Heads of State of the francophone states to iron out differences. 29 Despite these meetings and assurances, the leaders of the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Togo and Dahomey met in Ouagadougou on October 18, 1965 and decided not to go to the Accra summit. They were joined by Chad, Gabon and the Malagasy

Re publie.30

The rest of the African states sent their representatives to Accra;

to the OAU Heads of State Conference.

The OAU Heads of States Conference at Accra

The OAU Heads of State meeting opened with favorable news. On

October 13, 1965 President Kasavubu of the Congo (Leopoldville) dismissed

Tshombe as Prime Minister and invited Kimba to form a government. By this

act, the Congo question lost most of its sting for the radical OAU members

and made it much easier for them to recognize the Congo as a fellow OAU member. By now, a reasonable peace had been restored in the Congo and many,

if not most, of the mercenaries had returned home. Tshombe was the last

obstacle to the recognition of the Congo, and his ouster removed the Congo

question, finally, from the OAU docket.31

The conference was preceded by a marathon 26 hour session of the

foreign ministers who voted approval to a 22-point agenda. President

Nkrumah of Ghana was voted chairman of the conference and gave an 183 impassioned plea for an immediate African Union government. This was voted down, but a seven-nation committee was agreed upon to study this proposal. OO

The major business of the conference was the impending Rhodesian

UDI, the question of the work of the Liberation Committee and subversion.

In a secret session of the conference, the Heads of State passed a strong resolution on Rhodesia which called for: 1. the United Nations to declare that the UDI would be a threat to international peace; 2. Britain to release all political prisoners now in detention and to call a constitu­ tional conference guaranteeing universal suffrag e' in Rhodesia and independence; 3. Britain to suspend the 1961 Constitution and use all measures, including force, to take over control of the territory; 4. all nations to refuse to recognize a white minority regime and to break diplomatic relations with Britain if UDI was allowed; and 5. all African states to give full support to the people of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and press their case in the United N a t i o n s . ^3

The question of the Liberation Committee revolved primarily around the refugee problem. The OAU urged its members to ratify the U.N. Con­ vention on Refugees and to "prevent refugees living on their territories from carrying out by any means whatsoever any acts harmful to the interests of member states of the Organization of African Unity.

The resolution on subversion was more explicit in terms of what was required of member states than any such resolution in the past, but made no accusations or denunciations of particular states. It pledged its members:

■ (1) Not to tolerate...any subversion originating in our countries against another member state of the Organization of African Unity. 184

(2) Not to tolerate the use of our territories for any subversive activity directed from outside Africa against any member State of the Organization of African Unity...

(5a) Not to give any cause for dissension within or among member states by fomenting or aggravating racial, religious, linguistic, ethnic or other differences...35

Additionally, it pledged the members to utilize the OAU's mediation and arbitration facilities to settle questions among members. The final long resolution severely condemned South Africa for a variety of offences, and

O £ called for immediate sanctions on arms.

This Heads of State meeting reunited the various factions within the OAU and provided a healthy self-critical assessment of the prospects and progress of African unity. The delegates examined the works of the various sub-committees and found that they were functioning rather well.

The important political schisms which had plagued the OAU at the leadership level had not had such a deleterious effect on the various constituent bodies. Economic agreements were spreading; common projects, like the

Senegal River project seemed assured of success. Although no major achieve­ ments could be noted, it seemed to the delegates that progress was certainly being made. To oversee the work of the committees, and to consolidate

their functions, a special committee was formed'(Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana,

Guinea, Nigeria, UAR, Sudan, and Tanzania are on it). It reports directly

to the Secretary General of the OAU.

The immediate aftermath of the Accra meeting was a lessening of

tensions among the various African blocs, aided by the adjournment sine

die of the AASC meeting.^7 The need for a common front against the

Rhodesian UDI of November 11, 1965 helped foster this co-operation. How­

ever, internal pressures still troubled Africa. There was another abortive 185 coup in the Sudan, and a similar coup attempt in Burundi. The Nigerian elections in the West threatened to disrupt the nation. There were severe political disturbances in Kenya between the two political factions. There was an embarrassing embezzlement scandal in Senegal, a plot against the government of Guinea, skirmishing between Ethiopia and Somalia, and a repetition of the 1963 coup in Dahomey when Soglo stepped in to take over 38 the government. Mobutu ousted Kasavubu in the Congo.

Despite these disturbances, African unity seemed to have weathered

the severe shocks of 1965. The efficacy of maintaining the OAU as a common

forum and defensive alliance seemed to have worked. Its value became even more obvious in the events of the next year.

The year 1966 was the year of the military in Africa, when to

assuage domestic difficulties the army stepped in and took control of the

civilian establishments in a number of countries. The first hint of this

trend came in late 1965, on November 25, when Mobutu siezed control of the

Congolese government, ousting Kasavubu. The coup of Soglo in Dahomey

followed four days later. On January 4, 1966 Lieutenant Colonel Lamizana

overthrew the government of Upper Volta and put the Army in’ charge of the

government. This followed on the heels of the January 1, 1966 overthrow

of the government of the Central African Republic by Colonel Bokassa.

These coups were followed by a pledge by the military leaders to keep

their ties to the OAU and the OCAM. A meeting of the heads of state of OCAM,

which was set for January 15 was postponed. However, the foreign ministers

of OCAM met and included the new military governments.^ it also recognized

the adherence of Togo to the Entente as of December 29, 1965. 186

Despite the anxieties caused by the coups, there was little worry about the new stability of the military governments. However, on

January 15, 1966 a dramatic coup shattered the complacency of Africa and, indeed, the world. The military uprising in Nigeria left the major leaders of the nation dead or in prison. The Sardauna of Sokoto, Tafewa Balewa,

Samuel Akintola, Festus Okotie-Eboh, were slaughtered. The military government of General Ironsi set up a Supreme Military Council to rule

Nigeria.^® The major reason for their action was ostensibly to put down the corruption and political strife which had beset Nigeria for years. The military in Nigeria, as in the Central African Republic, Dahomey, and the

Congo were principally reformist in orientation. They saw the dangers which internal bickering and corruption brought and were spurred on by dissident elements in the labor movements.^ They sought to reunite the various factions within the nation under strong military rule and then return power to the civilian officials. Nonetheless, the coup in Nigeria frightened many of the other African states. For many years Nigeria had been the model of a developing state. The severe internal problems which had been overlooked in the world press nonetheless were felt internally. It caused many of the African ruling elites to look inward again to see if they would be likely candidates for coups in the near future.

Following the Nigerian coup many African leaders moved towards con­ solidating their power through the introduction of the one-party state.^

Cabinet reshuffles removed many doubtful political allies.^ in Some cases, like Uganda, the ruling president siezed the levers of power, suspended the constitution and arrested his opponents.^ However, the Nigerian coup was only a prelude to the severest shock to the African political scene; on 187 .

February 24, 1966 the government of Nkrumah was overthrown in a military and police coup, which took over control of Ghana.^

This coup, unlike most of the other coups which had preceded it was hailed in Africa and throughout the world as a major step towards harmony and co-operation. The instigator and planner of so many other coups was now himself overthrown, sartor resartus. The Liberation Council of Ankrah and Kotofca speedily attempted to control the violence in Ghana and far fewer lives were lost than in Nigeria. Nkrumah, who was out of the country at the time of the coup, was invited to Guinea, where he was hailed as a co-President.^ Not all the governments were happy about Nkrumah's ouster however. The radical bloc of Guinea, Mali and others had their chance to vent their complaints openly. On March 1, the Foreign Ministers meeting of the OAU in Addis Ababa provided a forum for the debate on the

Ghana coup.

The first question to be settled was the legitimacy of the dele­ gation sent by the Liberation Council to represent Ghana. A compromise suggested by the Ethiopians which would allow the Ghanaians to represent

Ghana, while at the same time stating that this did not imply recognition, was rejected by the radical bloc. Osman Ba, Foreign Minister of Mali, resigned as a conference official; However, the failure of Quaison-

Sackey (former Ghanaian Foreign Secretary) to appear made it much easier to allow the Ghanaians to participate. The Ministers from Guinea, Mali and

Tanzania walked out of the meeting in protest of the seating of the

Ghanaians. Following their walkout, the Egyptians proposed postponing

the meeting. It was only after the Ethiopian Minister, Yifru, intervened

that the meeting went on. By the end of the conference, eight nations had 188

walked out (Mali, Guinea, Tanzania, UAR, Somalia, Kenya, Algeria and

Congo (Brazzaville).^

o This had little effect, since most of the other African states

AO soon recognized the Liberation Council. Toure of Guinea announced on

March 10 that he was sending troops to Ghana to restore Nkrumah to power,

but these troops never appeared (they would have had to march across the

whole length of the Ivory Coast to do so, so the Liberation Council was

not particularly worried)Despite the pleas of the radicals, the

Liberation Council was accepted as the jure government.

By March, many other problems were facing African states. The

abduction of Ben Barka from Morocco, and the complicity of a variety of

intelligence services in the maneuver, led to a hardening of positions

within Morocco as well as creating fears of foreign activity within other ’• African n a t i o n s . ^ In Kenya, the split between Kenyatta and Oginga

Odinga led to his ouster from the party and government and further / fragmented the Kenyan political scene.Kenya had called a "little

summit" in Nairobi early in April 1966, where the leaders of the East and

Central African states met to discuss common problems. On April 2, 1966

the leaders of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zambia, Congo (Leopold-

’ville), Sudan, Somalia, and the representatives of Malawi, Rwanda and

Burundi met to declare themselves in favor of total sanctions against the

breakaway government of Rhodesia. It also succeeded in legitimizing the

Mobutu government in the Congo and led to the expulsion of Kanza and Gbenye

who had been sheltered in Kenya.52

A similar meeting took place in francophone West Africa on April 6,

when the leaders of the Entente met in Abidjan. They spent some time 189 reviewing their common economic aspirations and they declared that they:

studied the situation created by the fall of Ghana President Dr. Kwame Nkrumah arid by the provocative statements of President Sekou Toure. It reached complete agreement on all questions concern­ ing these events and decided to strengthen co-operation with the new Ghanaian regime...the Council decided to work effectively to achieve true African unity within the framework of the OCAM and the O A U . 5 3

They also decided to form a mutual military security pact to combat any

future military acts against them.

For most of the states in Africa, the period following the rash

of coups was a time of consolidation. More and more emphasis was placed

on domestic concerns and on economic growth. Nigeria completed its negotiations with the EEC and became an associate member.In May, the

seven East African states joined in an agreement which would provide a

transitional period before the creation of an East African Economic Com­ munity (EAEC)."’"’ There was a general easing of tensions among states,

particularly along the lines of the re-opening of the Ivory Coast-Ghana

border. The border clashes between Somalia and her two neighbors, Kenya

and Ethiopia, did not abate however.

There was some further progress towards Pan-African unity, but

based mainly on the pragmatic self-interest of less developed countries.

In addition to the EAEC moves, the West African Customs Union (UDEAC) met

in June to further the removal of tariff barriers among the seven member

states (Ivory Coast, Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, Dahomey and Upper

Volta).The major problems were not those of unity, they were problems of

security and development.

This was evident at the second summit conference of OCAM, held at

Tananarive during June 25-27, 1966. There, the fourteen member states

signed the charter and pledged themselves to respect the sovereignty of each 190

state and to meet regularly to discuss political questions. The major business on the agenda was the proposal made by the President of Tunisia

to create a French-speaking Commonwealth. They agreed to examine an enlarged common customs and monetary zone, a common educational system, and other common organs. No decision was reached on this, however.^7 No decision was reached on creating a common defense pact among OCAM members. The one major item they did agree upon was the creation of an OCAM-led Afro-

Malagasy Sugar Market which would be located in Chad to co-ordinate sugar

CO pricing and production. They set the next summit meeting for November

1967. An abortive coup in Congo (Brazzaville) greeted its leaders when

they returned.

The concept of a Francophone Commonwealth was immediately attacked

by Toure, who said, "Francophonie is a new package put up by French impe­

rialism and its agents to foist on the African peoples the degrading concepts

of the French Union, the French Commonwealth and the new-look commonwealth."60

He went on to attack the OCAM leadership as a "Joint Organization of Mediocre

African Liars". This was disputed by Bourgiba and other leaders.

There was an abortive coup in Uganda on May 24, 1966 when the

Kabaka.'s supporters attempted to take over the government.^ The tran­

quility which had followed in the wake of the rash of coups earlier in the

year was disturbed again when, on July 29, 1966 there was a military counter­

coup of Northerners against the Ibo military leaders in Nigeria. Lieutenant

Colonel Gowon took over control of the government on August 1, after the

deaths of Ironsi and others. Ojukwu, the military governor of the Eastern

Region was the only first-coup leader to survive. This was later to be a

principal cause of the civil war which broke out in Nigeria. 62 Another 191 coup displaced the Mwami of Mwambatusa on July 18 in B u r u n d i . ^3

The crisis in Nigeria did not abate. There were strong revivals of tribal clashes, culminating in a massacre of Ibos in Northern Kaduna on October 2. This led to the final break between Gowon and Ojukwu.^

The rest of Africa concerned itself with putting domestic problems in order and preparing for the OAU summit meeting on November 5.

The OAU Summit Meeting at Addis Ababa

The long-awaited summit meeting of the OAU took place in a climate of great disruption. The Council of Ministers meeting, which decided on an agenda for the conference, met on October 31 with a large number of countries unrepresented. The same day, the plane flying the Guinean delegation to the

Addis Ababa meeting was detained in Ghana as a protest against Ghanaians being held in Guinea. The crisis this presented almost ruined the summit meeting.

Only eighteen Heads of State showed up for the meeting and most of the time was spent trying to hold the conference together. The questions of

Rhodesia and South Africa were discussed and voted on, but they were the only two issues on which any agreement could be r e a c h e d . ^5 The remainder of the time was spent trying to get a release of the Guineans.

In a press conference following this debacle, President Nyerere blamed the lack of success on France and Britain. He said:

It is really up to Africa to be truly independent or to remain colonies of France and Britain. Some delegates came to Addis Ababa with their letters of credence signed by foreign powers. This is sad for Africa. Africa is in a mess. There is a devil somewhere. I am a good superstitious African and I believe in devils.66

Africa was indeed in a mess. Following the return home of the

OAU participants, another coup was attempted; this time in Togo. It failed, but it left the Grunitsky government even weaker than it had been.

The two years 1965 and 1966 weakened Africa and Pan-Africanism.

The steady progress towards unity which had developed at Addis Ababa in

1963 was broken. Regional organizations like OCAM reasserted themselves.

The OAU was not even able to manage to attract more than eighteen of its constituent members to a summit meeting. Coups, civil wars, imminent civil wars and strife weakened almost all of the African leaders. The post-independence euphoria had worn off, leaving the internal conflicts unsolved. National unity seemed to be falling apart. Pan-African unity seemed even further away. 193

^•The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

^By the whole OAU, not only the East Africans.

^"Africa Diary" (AD), vol. V, no. 9, pp. 2205-2206.

^AD, vol. V, no. 10, p. 2227.

%asser speech on Cairo radio, quoted by Tshombe. See AD vol. V, no. 16, pp. 2277-2278.

6AD vol. V, no. 16, pp. 2277-2278.

^Victor T. LeVine, "New Directions for French Speaking Africa" in "Africa Report", March 1965, pp. 7-10.

' I . Q On January 17, 1965 the four Heads of State met in Abidjan and issued a communique which indicated that all Niger-Dahomey difficulties had been settled. The island of Lete would be freely open to both states. See AD, vol. V, no. 8 , p. 2186.

9 AD, vol. V, no. 7, pp. 2179-2180, and LeVine, 0£. cit., p. 8 .

' lOThe Sawaba Party was the opposition party in Niger; the UPC (Union des Populations du Cameroun) was the opposition party in the Cameroons, outlawed in 1955; and the PAI (Parti Africain de 1 1Independance) was the opposition party in Senegal, outlawed in 1960. All three parties had offices in Accra.

l^LeVine, ££. cit., p. 10.

l^Ibid.t p. 1 0 .

l^ibid., p. 1 0 .

14p. Tsirinana in "Le Monde", February 15, 1965, p. 4.

15a d , vol. V, no. 13, p.- 2241; no. 14, p. 2252; no. 16, p. 2273; no. 17, p. 2286; no. 32, p. 2449; no. 21, p. 2324; no. 5, p. 2159; no. 13, p. 2243.

l^AD vol. V, no. 11, p. 2227.

l^Xmmanuel Wallerstein, Africa, The Politics of Unity (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 92-93.

18Both of these institutions were used by Ghana-based exile groups for training and propaganda purposes against neighboring states. A good example of their information output and an example of their emphasis is r 194

Kwedu Dadson, "How American Secret Agents Operate in Africa1', Victory Press, Winneba 1966.

■*-^AD, vol. V, no. 19, p. 2306.

20 The recurring political crises between the regions in Nigeria threatened Northern hegemony of the Federation and led to rioting in every region, boycotts of elections and the jailing of political leaders.

^AD, vol. V, no. 25, pp. 2375-2377.

22xhis Afro-Asian Summit never took place. It was postponed a few times and, following the ouster of Ben Bella, was called off sine die.

23a d , vol. V, no. 26, p. 2386. See also Phillip M. Allen, "Madagascar and OCAM; The Insular Approach to Regionalism" in "Africa Report", January 1966, pp. 13-18.

24a d , vol. V, no. 26, p. 2386.

33AD, vol.’ V, no. 31, p. 2440.

26a d , vol. V, no. 32, pp. 2441-2442.

27i. William Zartman, "Mauritania's Stand on Regionalism" in "Africa Report", January 1966, pp. 19-37, and AD vol. V, no. 32, p. 2445.

28At the Council meeting in Lagos, Diallo Telli circulated a con­ fidential memo showing that the OAU had no money to continue or even pay for the cost of the Lagos meeting. Only four states (Cameroons, Ghana, Kenya and Zambia) had actually paid their full dues. Telli strongly urged all states to pay their shares as soon as possible. The Nigerians under­ wrote the costs of the Lagos meeting.

29jt was obvious that Nkrumah wanted to have the Accra meeting a success and was willing to make concessions. In fact, as indicated in supra, he agreed to cease supporting all the dissident African groups operating in Ghana and ordered them out of the country. See Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 101.

3 0 Ibid. , p. 101..

3 ^AD, vol. V, no. 45, pp. 2577-2578.

32aD, vol. V, no. 47, p. 2605.

3 3 Ibid., pp. 2603, 2606.

3^Ibid., p. 2606.

35ibid., p. 2606.

36ibid., p. 2606. 195

37a d , vol. V, no. 48, pp. 2601-2614.

38a d , vol. VI, no. 1, p. 2659.

39a d , vol. VI, no. 7, p. 2730.

40AD, vol. VI, no. 9, pp. 2745-2749.

4 1 Ibid., p. 2746.

42This was not, of course, a new political thrust but rather a calculated hastening of the process already in progress in many states.

4 3Most notably Ivory Coast, Zambia, Morocco and the Central African Republic.

4 4 AD, vol. VI, no. 13, pp. 2787-2788.

45AD, vol. VI, no. 14, pp. 2791-2797, "Africa Report", April 1966, pp. 10-21, and Kwame Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana (New York: International Publishers, 1968). For a more detailed study of the Ghanaian coup, see Davie E. Apter, "Nkrumah, Charisma, and the Coup" in "Daedalus", Winter 1967, pp. 757-792.

4 ^AD, vol. VI, no. 14, p. 2795.

4 7"Africa Report", April 1966, p. 25, and AD, vol. VI, no. 14, p. 2795.

4 ^AD, vol. VI, no. 14, p. 2796.

4 ^AD, vol. VI, no. 16, pp. 2813-2814.

50ad, vol. VI, no. 8 , pp. 2734-2736; no. 11, pp. 2767-2768.

51AD, v o L VI, no. 15, pp. 2805-2807.

52"xhe 11-Nation Good Neighbor Summit" in "Africa Report", May 1966, p. 15.

53a d , vol. VI, no. 20, pp. 2861-2862.

54a d , vol. VI, no. 33, p. 2988. P. N. C. Okigbo, Africa and The Common Market (Evanston: Northwestern Press, 1967), pp. 90-130.

35^rthur Hazlewood, "Economic Integration in East Africa" in Arthur Hazelwood (ed.), African Integration and Disintegration (New York: Oxford Press, 1967), pp. 69-115.

56a d , vol. VI, no. 28, p. 2939. See also Peter Robson, "Economic Integration in Equatorial Africa" in Hazlewood, op. cit., pp. 27-68 and Roland Julienne, "The Experience of Integration in French-Speaking Africa" in Hazlewood, op. cit., pp. 339-353. < •

196 »

57a d , vol. VI, no. 31, p. 2971.

58ibid.. p. 2971.

59xbid., p. 2963.

60a d , vol. VI, no. 32, p. 2975.

6 lAD, vol, VI, no. 26, pp. 2919-2920.

^2AD, vol. VI, no. 45, pp. 3113-3115.

63a d , vol. VI, no. 33, pp. 2985-2986.

64ad, vol. VI, no. 45, p. 3114.

65a d , vol. VI, no. 51, pp. 3172^3174.

66AD, vol. VI, no. 51, p. 3173.

^AD, vol. VI, no. 52, pp. 3189-3190. CHAPTER VIII

MOVEMENTS WITHOUT LEADERS: PAN-AFRICAN LABOR 1965-1966

The period 1965-1966 was particularly difficult for the proponents of African labor unity. In 1965, ?'he tensions and the hostilities renewed by the Congo crisis and the recrudescence of francophone regionalism within

the OAU caused further divisions within the labor organizations. Fearful of the Ghana-based subversion and covert infiltration into their domestic politics, many of the francophone states exerted great pressure on their

labor movements to eschew any contact with the Ghana-based AATUF. The relocating of the AATUF Secretariat in Accra and the appointment of John

Tettegah as Secretary-General of the AATUF led most moderate states to

assume that AATUF was merely an extension of Ghanaian foreign policy into a Pan-African organization. The AATUF did little to disabuse these

African leaders of this idea, concentrating more on the political side of

Pan-Africanism than on labor-related activities.'*' The OCAM effort to boycott the Accra Conference was matched in the virulent opposition against

AATUF waged by the ATUC.

The differences which separated AATUF from ATUC were exacerbated by

the ever-increasing effort on the part of governments to gain some control

over their national labor movements. Many of the strongest and most

successful of the African labor movements became dominated by government-

sponsored centers. By the time of the ATUC Congress late in 1965 the union

centers of Kenya, Tanganyika, Congo (Brazzaville), the Cameroons, Mauritania

and Rhodesia, all of whom were founding members of ATUC, had disaffiliated

due to government takeover. Other national centers, such as Uganda, were \

198 split and manipulated by the dominant political powers for domestic political ends, playing the AATUF and ATUC loyalties off against each other.^

' * The 1966 coups in Ghana and Nigeria left both ATUC and AATUF in v disarray/ The. Ghanaian coup left AATUF headquarters in hostile hands,

John Tettegah in prison, and the AATUF itself s'plit over whether to recognize the new Ghanaian Trades Union Council and the National Liberation

Council as the legitimate successors to Nkrumah's CPP-dominated government and labor movement. The Nigerian coup posed difficult problems for the

ATUC and AFRO since both these organizations were Lagos-run (although

ATUC headquarters were in Dakar;) and staffed largely by Nigerians. The internal frictions which had developed in the wake of the dissolution of the Joint Action Committee (JAC) in mid-1964 mirrored the African labor controversy between AATUF and ATUC.^ The tribal frictions unloosed by the coup shattered even further the hopes of labor unity. Both these coups, on the surface, seemed to remove the obstacles which had blocked the path to

Pan-African labor unity. In fact, this proved not to be true. The resultant chaos and uncertainty which pervaded the African labor movements following

the cataclysmic events of 1966 served to impede the progress towards unity.

During January 16-22, 1965 the OAU's Economic and Social Commission met in Cairo. This meeting investigated the progress towards common markets,

the boycott of South Africa, a common position for African governments in

GATT and, most importantly, the need for a unified African labor movement.

After the Economic and Social Committee had submitted its report to the

Secretariat a year earlier, the Secretary-General had examined the problem

of the ATUC-AATUF split and issued a report calling for the unity of the 199

two organizations. The core of the Secretary's report was that the only issue which seemed to be in dispute between ATUC and AATUF was that of international affiliation. The resolutions of both groups on African problems were quite similar, according to the Secretary, as were their positions on trade union autonomy. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to assume that the affiliation issue was the nub of the problem. Convinced

that only a unified labor movement could bear the "heavy responsibilities in caring for the workers interests" the Commission asked the OAU Secretariat

to "provide all facilities for the African Trade Union Confederation

(ATUC) and the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) to meet, under the aegis of the OAU., to seek a joint definition of unity and independence in the African trade union movement.They urged that the unity follow the principles of non-alignment enshrined in the OAU Charter, saying "the exist­ ing split in the African trade-union movement is due solely to the problems of affiliation to the trade-union organizations outside Africa."6 They

added that the same logic which called for unity of the international labor bodies also posed the question of national unity of the labor movements.

The OAU was instructed to encourage Pan-African labor unity and domestic

labor unity. For the AATUF this was a great diplomatic coup. Since the key national centers affiliated to AATUF were already unified nationally

(under political control) this call posed no problem. Still less were they disturbed by the OAU's support on the disaffiliation issue. It was clear

that the aspirations of AATUF and the OAU coincided, perhaps for different

reasons, and the ATUC was likely to be in for a hard time. The immediate

result was that the ATUC postponed the date of their Congress, scheduled for

Lagos from February 19-21, 1965 to an unspecified date in April. 200

Seeking support for their position, the ATUC saw a natural ally in their struggle in the more conservative francophone states which were meeting in Nouakchott to form the OCAM. The OCAM fears of Ghanaian intrigue had been developing from the assassinations of the Premier of

Burundi, and the Togolese border officer, as well as the Ghana-based Ide­ ological Institute at Winneba. A major portion of the OCAM meeting con­ sisted of condemnation of Ghana and the Chinese for their intrigues in

Africa.^ The ATUC sent a long memorandum to this OCAM meeting, soliciting the support of the OCAM within the OAU to blunt the move towards pressuring

ATUC to unite with AATUF. No official response was received.

At the same time, the Executive Board of AATUF held its first meet­ ing in Accra during February 10-13. This meeting issued a long communique supporting the OAU and its efforts to remove the barriers to unity and for

"the liquidation of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and their lackeys".® The AATUF commended the progressive forces in Africa for their struggles and expressed their satisfaction that these progressive forces supported AATUF, "in whose ranks African Trade Union organizations are becoming increasingly mobilized and consciously keen on the need for q African unity." AATUF noted the opposition of the imperialists to African

Unity and sounded "a warning to all African governments and entreat[ed] them to do all in their power to defeat the colonialists and their agents."1®

In response, the ATUC issued another long memorandum, this time to the Nairobi Council of Ministers meeting on February 18. In it, the ATUC reviewed its relations with AATUF and attempted to hedge its bets by asserting that disaffiliation was not an issue of contention between the two organizations. ATUC claimed that the joint declaration of October 1963 201

(which it had denied for the past two years as valid) had

recommended to all African trade-union organizations to free them­ selves from [the] tutelage [of international trade-union orga­ nizations] as soon as the new single pan-African trade-union organization shall have been constituted.H

No action was taken by the Nairobi Ministers meeting, whose principal con­ cern was over the rapidly worsening situation in the Congo.

Following the Nairobi meeting, the AATUF set up an information center in Dar-es-Salaam. John Tettegah traveled to Tanzania to open the center and made a major policy speech denouncing the ICFTU and its stooges.

He also declared full support for the National Union of Tanzanian Workers

(NUTA), an organization which was formed by the complete takeover of all

labor activity by the TANU political party, the outlawing of the former

Tanzania Federation of Labor (TFL), the jailing of many union leaders, and

the imposition of Kamaliza as both head of the NUTA and Minister of Labor.^

Kamaliza was also a Vice-President of AATUF. Tettegah's speech was directed

primarily at the political conflicts in Africa and touched only briefly on

labor problems:

We can proudly claim great successes in our anti-imperialist and anti- neo-colonialist struggle in our bid to establish a united African Trade Union Movement as the logical basis for a Continental Union Government.

We have entered into a period when we are called upon to perfect our methods of anti-colonialist struggles...We want the anti-imperialist struggle to be carried into the territory of the enemy and break the basis on which it operates...

The workers of Africa will uphold their revolutionary gains, achieve further remarkable successes and overcome all the difficulties and obstacles standing in their way. There is no power capable of hinder­ ing the revolutionary progress of the African people. There is no force capable of obstructing the historic mission and victory of the African working class.^

In mid-April, the leaders of ATUC met again in Lagos and again post­

poned the ATUC triennial congress, this time from May 13-16 to a date in 202

October or November. Attending this council meeting were Tlili (Tunisia),

Borha (Nigeria), Malick (Mauritania), Pongault (Congo-Brazzaville), and

Soumah (Senegal). No reason was given for the postponement.^

The conflict between ATUC and AATUF spilled over into the regular meeting of the forty-sixth session of the ILO in Geneva during June- 2-24,

1965. At that meeting the credentials of a number of worker delegates were challenged. The ATUC-AFRO-supported Uganda Trades Union Congress challenged the AATUF-supported Federation of Uganda Trade Unions. The Ugandan govern­ ment also supported FUTU in an internal fight for control of the unions.

The Somali Workers Confederation (CSL), the labor group opposed by the

Somali government and AATUF, challenged the credentials of the anti-CSL delegates. The credentials of the Congolese (Brazzaville) labor delegation were also challenged by the Christian movement of Pongault which had been exiled from the Congo.15 These controversies illustrated, to the inter­ national labor movement, the continuing battleground of African labor.

John Tettegah, a government delegate to the ILO meeting, visited

Yugoslavia soon after and sought the assistance of the Yugoslav unions in

the development of exchanges between AATUF and the Yugoslav unions. He was questioned about the ILO meeting. He defended the credentials of the AATUF-

supported delegates and spoke of the AATUF's opinion of ILO and its role:

What we consider most important is that the International Labor Orga­ nization should, to the full extent, be a reflection of the new composition of its members and of the state of mind of the majority. I take this to mean that it must turn itself towards problems and interests of the developing countries. If it should fail to take an orientation towards that direction, there will"be a danger of the Federation's becoming an instrument of imperialistic policy, similar to what is shown by the alarming trends in the UN.

Despite Tettegah's avowal of a continuing struggle for AATUF

dominance and the AATUF's lack of concern over political involvement with 203 the various labor movements, the President of AATUF took a very different line. Mahjoub Ben Seddick granted an interview with the newspaper "Jeune

Afrique" in which he stated that his Union Mococaine du Travail (UMT) was

"organically independent of all political parties. We have always refused, even before independence, to turn trade unionism into nationalism. In other words we are opposed to nationalism in trade union matters."-^ It seems clear, however, that these sentiments were designed for domestic consumption in the continuing struggle between Ben Seddick and Hassan.

There were other reasons for Ben Seddick's concern over the image of the UMT within the Maghreb. The AATUF had signed a six-point accord with the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU) in May

1965, specifying that they agreed:

(1) to co-ordinate their international activities and efforts within the ILO and all international bodies;

(2) to do all within their power to give material and support to the anti-neo-colonialist forces fighting for national liberation in all parts of the world;

(3) have expressed identical views in their condemnation of imperialist aggression in Vietnam, the Congo, Aden and the Dominican Republic as a threat to world peace;

(4 ) each to invite a representative of the other to take part-in all conferences and meetings;

(5) to give full publicity to the activities of each organization in areas covered by each;

(6) to encourage the exchange of delegations, and to consult on all matters of common interest to both.18

This agreement reinforced the position of Morocco and the UAR as a link between the Arabs and Africa, particularly between AATUF and the ICATU, and

strengthened Ben Seddick as a leading figure, since the UAR labor leadership

remained rather colorless. The ouster and imprisonment of Habib Achour in 204

Tunisia and the radical reorganization of the UGTA following the ouster of

Ben Bella, made his position quite insecure. 19

This feeling of insecurity was compounded by the example of Dahomey.

Despite its coup in 1963, the Dahomeyan government proved incapable of solv­

ing the economic demands put before it. It had instituted a rigid austerity

program in 1963 which had totally deflated the economy. Instead of the

ten-percent wage cut which had sparked the 1963 coup, the new government

had created a five-percent wage and salary cut. Paoletti, the union leader

of the 1963 strike had been made Minister of Labor, and co-opted into the

role of the government's defender. The result of two years of financial

difficulties provoked a call for a nationwide general strike on July 5, 1965

which failed to materialize due to the fear of persecution. The resultant

chaos this provoked, however, renewed the fear among African political

circles of their domestic union bodies. 20 u

Following the imprisonment of Achour in July, the President of

Tunisia called the UGTT into session where they named Bellagha as the new

head of the UGTT. In a long speech to the assembled delegates, Bourguiba

denounced Tlili and Achour as "like the worst form of nineteenth century

capitalists" since they felt that the unions were above the law. Bourguiba

claimed that "If we are to win the battle for development, there has got to

be a certain limitation of individual freedom." 21 In line with this

thought, the UGTT voted a charter which proclaimed that the Tunisian labor

movement had to be controlled by the government's planning policy. The next

day, the Upper Volta's Labor Minister, Ouedraogo, was imprisoned for fraud,

on charges similar to those brought against Achour in Tunisia. 22

By far the most consequential governmental maneuver against the 205

national labor movement took place in Kenya. The labor movement had been

split between the Kenya Federation of Labor (KFL) and the Kenya Federation

of Progressive Trade Unions (KFPTU) as well as a Kenya African Workers

Union (KAWU) . The KFL was originally the only national center. The

KFPTU split from the KFL on the issue of the KFL's continued affiliation to

the ICFTU and in response to the formation of the Oginga Odinga-led KADU.

In November 1964, the KFL disaffiliated from the ICFTU but this did not heal

the domestic rift. Since, in accordance with the Industrial Charter of 1962,

Kenyan law prohibited more than one national union, the case was brought

before the Minister of Justice, Tom Mboya (long-time leader of the KFL) who

ruled that the KFPTU was operating illegally. The political opposition moved

to have the KFL suspended, but to no avail. The Kenyan political leadership,

perhaps resentful of Mboya's continued power in the labor movement, and fear­

ful of the Oginga Odinga forces gaining control, finally moved to create a

single national center, called the Central Organization of Trade Unions

(COTU) on September 1, 1965. COTU was placed under the control of forces

loyal to Kenyatta. The Kenyan labor movement did not participate in any 23 further Pan-African or international labor activities (except the ILO).

Similar internal difficulties were taking place in Nigeria. The

rise of the government-supported United Labor Congress (ULC) was opposed

by the Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC). The ULC was the key AFRO

affiliate and was a source of support to the ATUC. The NTUC, on the other

hand, was the AATUF affiliate and generally opposed by the government. The

moves towards unity of the Nigerian labor movement proved fruitless follow­

ing the breakup of the JAC in 1964. In July 1965, the Labor Minister,

Prince Adeleke Adedoyin, announced that he would "now deal with and consult 206 without discrimination all national central labor organizations on all matters affecting the interest of workers generally.The stir this caused among the ULC stalwarts was tremendous. Finally, the Prime Minister personally intervened in September to restore the governments blessing to

the ULC.

Following the solution of the Nigerian problem, the ATUC finally arranged to hold its first triennial congress in Lagos, during October 5-7,

1965.

The ATUC Congress in Lagos

The ATUC held its first triennial Congress in Lagos during October

5-7, 1965. Attending the congress were representatives from the founding

organizations: Angola, Cameroons (2), Congo (Leopoldville) (2), Dahomey,

Gambia, Liberia, Madagascar (2), Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal

(2), Somalia, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda and Upper Volta. Founding members which

could not attend but sent messages of solidarity and affiliation included:

Angola, Gabon, Central African Republic,..Libya, Mauritius, Sierra Leone,

Zambia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria. The ATUC also listed

a number of unions which were formerly affiliated to ATUC but which no longer

existed: Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Kenya, Mauritania, Southern Rhodesia

and Tanganyika.^5 Observers came from the ICFTU, the IFCTU, the ILO and a

" o C. variety of interested national unions from around the world.

The tone of the conference was set in the opening address, delivered

by Lawrence Borha, General-Secretary of the ULC of Nigeria:

Some of the great trade unions which were Charter Members of the African Trade Union Confederation are not here today. They are not here today because they have been as it were, decreed out of existence by their governments. They have been replaced by different institutions 207

which, we fervently hope, are still trade unions and are still dedicated to the will and the way of the workers - but which are, to greater or lesser extent, under the sway and direction of their governments...

I come now to an old question. It is the question of unity and brotherhood. I speak of our divided movement with sadness. The echoes of noble sentiments on this subject ring in our ears. The sub­ stance of unity, however eludes us. We know as a fact that our program to unite with the AATUF has so far not prospered because the latter would not have unity...27

The prospects for unity were assessed, and Borha condemned the AATUF for its

"endless offensive against every move towards u n i t y . "28 H e cited the recent

case in Kenya as an example:

We need only look eastward to Kenya to see how strife, recrimination and dissention, plotted and hatched by the AATUF, lead to unhappy results. There, with AATUF and foreign support, a breakaway splinter trade union center was set up by some misguided men. They fought the great national center, the KFL of Tom Mboya and of Clement Lubembe. Innocent workers died. The Government stepped in. The heroic KFL ceased to be, just as the mischievous outfit of AATUF there was dismantled...This sort of mischief makes unity difficult.29

Borha then officially welcomed the efforts of the OAU to achieve unity and

promised the co-operation of the ATUC.

The general tone of the meeting confirmed the ATUC hostility

towards a program of unity with AATUF, however. The resolutions passed at

the Congress included the usual denunciations of the Portugese, the neo­

colonialists and imperialists, South Africans, and the arms race. In two

resolutions ("On Economic and Social Problems" and "On Working Conditions in

Africa") the ATUC praised the ILO, UNESCO, the African Development Bank, and

the OAU for their efforts to develop Africa and called for adherence to the

basic ILO conventions which safeguarded the rights of workers. Along these

lines, the ATUC also resolved that trade union leaders should enjoy freedom

from political arrest and deportation. The ATUC "condemns, consequently, all

arbitrary measures: principally the stifling of liberty and the arrest and 208 deportation of trade unionists."30

The key resolutions, however, dealt with the unity of the Pan-

African labor movement. The main theme was that of the October 1963 joint resolution between AATUF and ATUC. In its resolution on unity, the ATUC:

Reaffirms its faith in African unity and its conviction that authentic trade union unity must be founded on the independence and liberty of each organization member to determine its own policies...

Recommends to the new officers of the African Trade Union Confederation to initiate all measures and make all necessary contact with the secretariat of the All-African Trade Union Federation with a view to achieving pan-African trade union unity on the basis of the joint communique of Dakar dated 19 October 1963, taking into account the wish expressed by the Economic and Social Commission of the Orga­ nization of African Unity meeting at Cairo in January 1964.-^

In another resolution, the ATUC leadership was empowered to change the status of ATUC in event of the success of unity talks. The ATUC:

Considering the necessity to preserve and to reinforce the African Trade Union Confederation's cohesion in order that it may attend the meeting of continental trade-unions in the best conditions of effec­ tiveness and representivity.

Warrants the Bureau to make, together with the national appropriate statutory organizations, the changes which will be submitted for ratification during the next Congress, according to the resolution taken by the O.A.U. and of the joint statement by A.T.U.C. and AATUF, signed in Dakar in October 1963-which recommends the uni­ fication of national trade union organizations and the realization of the independence Forward [sic] international Unions.32

The 105 delegates from 27 countries elected a new Executive Com­ mittee to carry on these negotiations. Of the eighteen officers elected, seven came from Senegal. This reflected the fact that the ATUC head­ quarters were in Dakar as well as that virtually all of the thirty-five members of the Executive Committee were full-time union leaders in their own countries (four also held national political functions). Between

Congresses, the running of the ATUC was left in the hands of the

Senegalese. 33 209

There was no immediate response to the ATUC resolutions by the

AATUF, except in Nigerian newspapers in which the NTUC attacked the

Congress.^ The rest of 1965 was spent in attempting to consolidate the domestic positions of unions in the face of general African upheaval (such as two more coups in Dahomey). On paper, at least, it seemed that African labor unity had taken a major step forward with the ATUC agreement to live with the Dakar formula. The events of 1966, delayed any effective unity talks.

The coups which ushered in 1966 had an important effect on the

labor movements in the countries involved. In Upper Volta, Dahomey, the

Central African Republic, the unions were interdicted from public activity;

09 in Burundi, trade union leaders were publicly executed. J In Nigeria, the military takeover was, at first, welcomed by the ULC as a force which would

"canalize the struggle of all true patriots against economic and social

injustice, political fraud, tribalism, nepotism and anti-national excesses

of a few power-drunk politicians."36 However, in order to consolidate their

power, the military intervened in Nigerian labor politics, calling upon the

rival federations to unite into a single labor body. The ULC rivals joined

into the Nigerian Trade Union Federation and received the military govern­ ment's support for unity between the NTUF and the ULC. On the initiative of

the military government a number of meetings were arranged to bring about this

unity between the two groups. These meetings were boycotted by the ULC. No

immediate action was taken by the government, but the ULC leadership (who

were also leaders of the AFRO and the ATUC) were forced to be cautious in

their activities. This resulted in a major decrease in both AFRO and ATUC

activities and support. In fact, they held no major meetings throughout the 210 year.J'37

Meeting during January 31-February 4, 1966 twenty-five Labor

Ministers of various African nations attended an ILO-sponsored conference in Accra. There they discussed, in addition to a variety of economic subjects, the progress of African labor unity talks. The ATUC, fearful that a specific commitment would emerge from the meeting, sent a message to the assembled ministers saying that the ATUC was in favor of "African progress, not alien polemics; African solidarity, not imported sub­ version."^® They said:

We believe that unity is a goal to be achieved through honest nego­ tiations, sacrifice and devotion to common African objectives expressed in the OAU Charter. It will not be forced upon us any more than it will be forced upon the States of Africa.39

Following the Labor Ministers meeting, the military and police ousted the Nkrumah government in Ghana. This was the single most important event in Pan-African labor relations between AATUF and ATUC. Since

Bamako, the headquarters of AATUF had been in Accra. All the AATUF files, receipts and other papers were impounded by the new National Liberation

Council (NLC) and examined closely. The various activities of AATUF were

exposed to public view, some of which were profoundly shocking even to

AATUF affiliatesJohn Tettegah, the Secretary-General of AATUF was

captured by the NLC and imprisoned for eight hours. He was released when

he issued a statement which strongly condemned Nkrumah. His lengthy state­ ment was particularly interesting for the light it shed on Ghanaian and

AATUF labor relations. In part, Tettegah said:

Kwame Nkrumah as I know him is one of the worst frauds ever known in recorded human history. An imposter second only to "" of the Back to Africa movement in the early eighteen hundreds. A political rascal and trickster and a rogue who thought he would 211

bamboozle all people, all the time. Rwame Nkrumah from all his actions was very dishonest and insincere in every venture that he has under­ taken. His verbose plea for African Unity was never motivated by any sincere or genuine desire to free and unite the African race. The African Personality he saw as only reflecting the person "Kwame Nkrumah"...

Since independence, Ghanaians have lived through a regime of terror and infamy, and one needs to have to experience it, to know the debt of gratitude we owe our Armed Forces and the Police for our Liberation...

While professing adherence to the noble ideals of trade union freedom and the well-being of the worker, Kwame Nkrumah was the master actor in destroying the rights of the worker. When this was resisted, he smashed every opposition under the pretext that the Ghana TUC was being converted into a Labor Party in opposition to his Party..

Despite this confession, Tettegah defended the AATUF and denied any

AATUF wrongdoing. He advocated that AATUF recognize the NLC as the legitimate government of Ghana. This was rejected by the AATUF, who called a special emergency session in Casablanca on March 4-10 to discuss the Ghanaian coup.

Led by the AATUF President Ben Seddick, the AATUF secretariat met in Casablanca where they heard Ben Seddick's report of an investigative mission he had conducted to Ghana. The meeting was attended by delegates from Algeria, Morocco, Tanzania, Uganda and the UAR. The Guineans and the

Malians cabled their approval of the meeting. The secretariat resolved that the AATUF urge its affiliates "to get mobilized against the new pro­ imperialist puppet regime" and to "give all indispensable support to

Ghanaian workers and the people and to the great leader, President Kwame

Nkrumah, in their struggle to free Ghana from the grip of reactionaries, neo­ colonialism and imperialism."^ They called an Executive Board meeting of

AATUF for April 4-8, 1966 in Dar-es-Salaam.

In response to the Guinean sheltering of Nkrumah, and Toure's threat of invading Ghana to restore Nkrumah to power, the newly re- 212 organized Ghanaian TUC, under Bentum, cabled Toure:

We want to make it emphatically clear that we do not want Kwame Nkrumah or anything of him. If you and the people of Guinea want him, take him, only to regret it at a later stage...No force in the world can decide who should be our head of state, or what government we should have...We, the workers of Ghana, want to inform you that it is not rebellion; it is a victory; it is freedom; it is salvationJ43

The AATUF Executive Board meeting in Dar-es-Salaam was a very tumultous affair. It was attended by the AATUF officers from Morocco,

Tanzania, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, Dahomey, Uganda, Zambia and the UAR. In addition, John Tettegah, who had been allowed to attend the meeting by the

NLC, was accompanied by a delegation of unionists representing the new

Ghanaian TUC. The first two days of the meeting proved uneventful, as they dealt solely with some housekeeping operations. The fireworks came on the

third day, when the Ghanaian coup was debated. The Guinean delegation was wholly committed to opposing the coup and the NLC, since it was "imperialists and their stooges who took power."44 The Algerians and the Moroccans asked

that the Ghanaian delegation be allowed to speak to explain the situation

in Ghana, in order that the AATUF could determine if the coup represented

the will of the Ghanaian workers. The Guineans and the Zambians refused to

allow the Ghanaians to speak, and threatened any delegate who voted to hear

the Ghanaians. The debate raged all day when, finally, Kamaliza prevailed upon the Guineans to allow John Tettegah to have the floor.

In his speech, Tettegah rehearsed the whole history of the Ghanaian

TUC and its subversion by the CPP. He spoke frankly of Nkrumah as "the Arch

Fraud" and deceiver and generally reiterated his condemnation of the

Nkrumah regime. The Guineans, logically, demanded to know why Tettegah had

kept these facts a secret for the past years. Tettegah did not answer, but 213 assured the AATUF that the NLC had agreed to allow the AATUF to continue to1 function in Ghana, and that Tettegah felt that the NLC was the legitimate government in Ghana. The Guineans demanded that, since Tettegah had recognized the NLC, he should be removed as Secretary-General of AATUF and that the headquarters of AATUF be moved to Dar-es-Salaam. In this, they were seconded by the Zambians, Tanzanians and Malians.

The meeting adopted a declaration (without John Tettegah as a

Secretariat member) which approved of the actions of the Casablanca meeting, denounced "energetically all imperialist-inspired coups d'etat", considered

some of the recent military takeovers "as being purely reactionary and anti- popular", and called for an Extraordinary AATUF Congress for later in 1 9 6 6 . ^

While the AATUF Executive Board was meeting, goodwill delegations from Nigeria and the ATUC visited Ghana to explore the renewal of ties, i The

team of David Soumah, Allassane Sow and Lamine Diallo of the ATUC visited

Ghana and held discussions with the Ghanaian TUC, followed by their travelling

to Nigeria to report to Borha.^ Bentum, the new head of the Ghanaian TUC, also visited Nigeria and restored rapport with the Nigerians. The Ghanaian

TUC held its Congress on June 5th and 6 th, 1966 which was attended by

representatives of the ICFTU and the ATUC but not by AATUF or WFTU members.

The Ghanaian labor movement seemed to be backing away from its former role.

On October 7, 1966 the break with AATUF finally came. Bentum

issued a communique on behalf of the Ghanaian TUC, disaffiliating from the

AATUF. He wrote:

The Executive Board [of the GTUC which had held its first meeting from September 9th through October 1st] observed that immediately after our glorious February 24 Revolution which toppled the dictator Kwame Nkrumah and his corrupt government, the AATUF Executive Secretariat called on all African workers to get mobilized against what they 214

termed "the new pro-imerialist puppet regimeIt was further noted by the Board that the protest issued on the 14th March, 1966 by the Secretariat of TUC (Ghana) to the AATUF to take immediate steps to correct the erroneous impression created and to make the stand of the Ghanaian workers known to the outside world as to its complete support of the revolution was never heeded to by the Executive Secretariat of the AATUF.

The Executive Board noted that the protest from the TUC (Ghana) further demanded that unless that was done by the AATUF, the TUC (Ghana) "shall be forced to regard the AATUF as an agent of external force which does not speak or act in the interests of its affiliated organizations"^7

Since the AATUF did not issue any such statement, the GTUC formally dis­ affiliated from AATUF "which has its headquarters in Accra, Ghana.The

GTUC decided to wait before affiliating to any other trade union inter­ national .

Along with this disaffiliation, the NLC refused to allow the

AATUF to continue operations in Ghana. Tettegah was refused permission to return to Ghana, after having made a trip to Guinea to see Nkrumah.

All the AATUF records were impounded. The AATUF demanded that these papers be returned.

On December 2, 1966 the special Congress of the AATUF took place' in Dar-es-Salaam. John Tettegah was voted out as Secretary-General of the organization and replaced by Mamady Sissoko. Two Assistant Secretaries-

General were elected: D. B. S. Zimbihile of Tanzania and Amadou N'Diaye of Mali. Ben Seddick was retained as President, while the seven Vice-

Presidents elected were: Mamady Kaba (Guinea), Augustino Ntamagala

(Burundi), Hamad Ahmed (Algeria), Ahmed Fahim (UAR), Michael Kamaliza

(Tanzania), Wahab Good luck (Nigeria) and Miakassissa Diendome (Congo-

Brazzaville).49

The Congress voted to move the headquarters of AATUF from Accra to Dar-es-Salaam and appealed to the Secretary-General of the OAU "to use his good offices in persuading Ghana to return the federation's property in Accra.This was to have an important effect later when the UPTC, whose property had also been impounded in Brazzaville, used the AATUF example for an appeal to the OAU. 51 The AATUF also demanded that the OAU establish a single trade union center for Pan-African labor unity. The

AATUF took comfort in the speech of Kamaliza, who said:

We have all watched with profound regret the forces of reaction over­ taking some of our colleagues and the withdrawal of their national centers from AATUF membership. While we note these developments with great disfavor and disappointment, this should be no cause for despair.52

Despite the brave words, AATUF ended 1966 in great disarray.

AATUF's largest affiliate and only regular contributor had broken away from the organization and was now lining up as part of the opposition.

The complete files and records of AATUF were in hostile hands. The leader­ ship of the organization had passed to new hands, located on the opposite

side of Africa from the administrative center, and prospects for unity

seemed as far away as ever.

For its part, the ATUC seemed not much stronger. The coups of

early 1966 had severely weakened the ties among ATUC affiliates, partic­

ularly the Nigerian coup. The AFRO was virtually abandoned and totally

decrepit following the ATUC's return to the Dakar 1963 formula of dis­

affiliation. Even the AFRO's last foothold in Africa, the College at

Kampala, was threatened with immediate takeover by the Ugandan government.

The UPTC was exiled from Brazzaville, and its leadership banned from the

country. The military governments which had sprung up across Africa were

strenuously attempting to control national unity and were wary of inter­ 216 national activities over which they had no real control. Even the Nigerian unions, perhaps the strongest of the unions in Africa, following the destruction of the Tanzanian and Kenyan organizations, were forced to tread carefully along the path of international contacts.

In general, Pan-African labor unity was no more a success than the political unity of the OAU. The fissiparous pressures of political stress were felt by both movements, and were compounded by the rise of inner-directed military pressures. The overthrow of Nkrumah lessened tensions for the moderates but increased these tensions for most of Nkrumah's former allies. In the next two years, these tensions were to subside some­ what and another start at Pan-African labor unity would be made. w

217

lln fact, much of the time spent at AATUF Congresses, discussed r the growth of neo-colonialism, national foreign policy objectives and rarely, except for proposals of unity, did their deliberations deal with collective bargaining or economic goals.

^Dorothy Nelkin, "Pan-African Trade-Union Organization," page 62. ILR Reprint, Series No. 221, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Ithaca, New York, 1967. For more detailed study of the situation in Tanzania and Kenya, see The Politics of African Trade Unionism, G. E. Lynd, Praeger, New York, 1968. O The complicated history of Ugandan trade unionism, and the govern­ ment's role in the various inter-union disputes is, as yet, not well documented. Early studies, such as The Development of Trade Unionism in Uganda. Roger Scott, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1966; Tanzania. Party Transformation and Economic Development. H. Bienen, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1967; and "Co-operation, Conflict and Conscription: TANU-TFL Relations, 1955-1964", W. H. Friedland, ILR Reprint Series No. 222, Ithaca, 1967, give a detailed background of these conflicts, up until around 1964. More current information has been derived through discussions with TFL officials.

^Lynd, op. c it., p. 121, passim. Also useful is "Paradoxes of African Trade Unionism" by W. Friedland in "Africa Report", June, 1965, pp. 6-13.

^"Africa Diary", February 20, 1965, p. 2205.

^Resolution of the OAU Economic and Social Commission, Cairo, January 17, 1965, quoted in I. Wallerstein, The Politics of African Unity,(New York: Random House, 1967), p. 209.

?See Chapter 7 above, p.

Q Communique of AATUF, issued at Accra on February 14, 1965. Also see "Africa Diary", March 13-19, 1965, p. 2239.

9 Ibid.

10l. Wallerstein, 0£. cit., p. 210.

Hlbid., p. 209.

l^The TANU political party changed its bylaws in 1961 which permitted the TFL leadership to hold office in TANU, The left wing of TFL, led by Victor Mkello and Alfred C. Tandeu, took part in a WFTU Congress in 1961 and, with the support of Tettegah and Kamaliza, led the TFL to disaffiliate from AFRO and ATUC. The moderate TFL leadership, led by Tumbo, opposed the three new pieces of TANU labor legislation which were designed to control union activity, and called a series of major strikes in 1962 and 1963. The pro- 218

TANU forces coupled their drive for TANU control of the TFL with support for the proposed East Africa Federation. Following the upheavals in Tanganyika and Zanzibar in January, 1964, TANU jailed more than 200 trade union leaders of the anti-TANU faction. The TANU then passed the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (Establishment) Act in February, 1964, which dissolved the TFL and made Kamaliza, as Minister of Labor, General- Secretary of the NUTA. See G. E. Lynd, o£. cit., pp. 54-57.

13"Ghanaian Times," Accra, March 26, 1965.

^"African Ld>our News," May 13, 1965.

15"African Labour News," June 17, 1965. The difficulty in the opposition of ILO delegates is that they are government-appointed. ILO membership and participation are government prerogatives. For ATUC to oppose ILO participants as unrepresentative was purely a political act, and not based upon any real hope of changing the situation.

16"Borba," Belgrade, June 12, 1965, p. 4, c. 7.

l^Quoted in "African Labour News," July 15, 1965.

IS'tyest Africa," London, quoted in "Africa Diary," June 12-18, 1965, p. 2377.

■^Following the ouster of Tlili as head of the UGTT in 1963, Habib Achour was elected to the General-Secretaryship of the organization. He opposed the ruling Neo-Destourian Socialist Party's efforts to create a 15-month wage freeze in the spring of 1965. As a result, ostensibly, of the accidental sinking of a union-run ferryboat, Achour was charged with fraud and contempt of court, and sentenced to a prison term. The govern­ ment also took over control of the co-operative movement. The ICFTU, among others, registered a formal complaint with the Tunisian Government. See "Africa Diary", August 7-13, 1965, p. 2462. For good background studies, see W. Beling, Modernization and African Labor, New York, Praeger, 1965; W. Plum, Gewerkschaften in Maghreb, Verlag Fuer Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, Hannover, 1962, and "Maghreb Digest" issues, for 1965.

20"Africa Diary", July 31-August 6 , 1965. "West Africa," London. See also W. Friedland, "Organizational Chaos and Political Potential" in "Africa Report", June, 1965, p. 10.

21"Times," London, quoted in "Africa Diary," August 28-September 3, 1965, p. 2493.

22"west Africa," London, quoted in "Africa Diary," August 28- September 3, 1965, p. 2493.

23por a fuller discussion of the problems of the Kenya Labor movement, see G. E. Lynd, op. cit., p. 39, passim. 219

24"A.frican Labour News," July 15, 1965.

25«>ATU0 Congress Proceeding," Lagos, October 1965. See Dorothy Nelkin, "Pan-African Trade Union Organization," ILR Reprint No. 221, Ithaca, New York, 1967, p. 62.

o r °"Trade Union Africa," Dakar (Post-Congress Special Edition) (no date).

^7Ibid., p. 3.

28xbid., p. 5.

29ibid., p. 5.

80Ibid., p. 2 0 .

3 1 Ibid.. p. 23.

3 3 ibid., p. 23.

■^3As Dorothy Nelkin points out (op. cit. , p. 59), "of thirty-five General Council members, eight are from Senegal, where the headquarters are located, in spite of the fact that the charter states that the General Council is to consist of five members from each of seven regions. All eight Senegalese hold significant positions in the Union Nationiale des Travailleurs du Senegal (UNTS). Of general interest is the fact that six out of the ten secretaries, that is those in charge of organization, economic affairs, etc., are from Senegal. As a practical matter, they are functionally distributed so that they are either in charge of every task or back up the individual who is in charge."

84"African'Labour News," No. 176, October 7, 1965.

33"Africa Diary," Vol. 5, No. .49, November 27-December 3, 1965, p. 2617. They were executed not as unionists, but as political leaders.

8 6 »African Labour News," Vol. 2, No. 187, January 19, 1966.

87see "L1Action", Tunis, January 21, 1966, for the Executive Board Meeting.

38"African Labour News", Vol. 2, No. 193, March 2, 1966.

89ibid.

^®The most important of these studies was B. Bentum, Trade Unions In Chains (Liberty Press, Accra, 1966), which documented "How Kwame Nkru'inah destroyed free trade union movement in Ghana and attempted to extend this on the African Continent -- True, Documented Narrative with Names, Dates and Places." 220

^Tettegah press conference, March 10, 1966. Reprinted in "African Labour News," Vol. 2, No. 195, March 16, 1966.

^"Africa Report", May 1966, p. 29.

^"Africa Diary," Vol. VI, No. 16, April 11-17, 1966, p. 2814.

^AATUF Executive Bureau Minutes, April 6, 1966.

^Ibid., pt g an(j "Africa Report," May 19£6, p. 29.

46"Africa Labour News," Vol. 2, No. 198, April 6, 1966.

4?b . Bentum, Communique, Accra, October 7, 1966, p. 1.

48Ibid.. p. 2.

^Minutes of AATUF Congress, Dar-es-Salaam, December 2, 1966, p. 4.

^"Africa Diary," Vol. VII, No. 3, January 12-19, 1967, p. 3222.

51-See below, Chapter 10, Note # 3.

52"Africa Diary," Vol. VII, No. 3, January 19, 1967, p. 3222. CHAPTER IX

THE TURNING INWARD: PAN-AFRICANISM 1967-1968

In the period 1967-1968 much of the drive towards achieving African unity virtually disappeared. The grandiose plans of political unity faltered on the fragmentary nature of inter-African relations. The major impetus towards the unity of Africa was manifest in the fields of economics and development, where new common markets and various forms of riparian arrangements furthered nationalist aspirations. The focus of African politics shifted dramatically away from its traditional locus in West

Africa and moved to the newer states of East and Central Africa. The military coups and domestic upheavals in many of the West African states had forced many of the new ruling elites to turn inward. They realized that domestic unity was, for them, a prime concern. Inter-African activity, when it could assist domestic growth or control, was utilized, but when it threatened domestic unity it was eschewed.

The problems which faced African nations had not really changed since independence; rather, they now had to be heeded and not buried under anti-colonialist rhetoric. Corruption, communal violence, civil wars, coups, and foreign subversion were quite common throughout Africa. The unifying resolutions condemning Rhodesia, South Africa, Portugal, and Spain bought time for diplomacy on inter-African disputes, but these resolutions did not solve the problems which underlay these resolutions.

Africa faced a severe crisis in the period 1967-1968, the crisis of world indifference. • What had started out as a "Decade of Development"1 had turned into a "Decade of Disillusionment". The promises of aid and 222 the massive programs of development had faltered. The problem of rapidly changing a traditional society into a modern industrial society involved far more changes and time than had been so optimistically awaited.

Capital was in short supply. It was poorly allocated when it reached the recipient nation. The political frictions which developed within states frightened away many potential private investors. The decline in the terms of trade for the products and resources eliminated much of the expected return on capital already invested. Added to this was a rising birthrate, exceeding three percent per year, and the growing inter-African conflicts provoked by rival nationalisms. Rapid progress proved elusive.

Political progress towards stability seemed equally as elusive.

One of the major discoveries emanating from the Congo crises was that the major powers began to be more reluctant to let African allies shape their foreign policies. Neither the U.S., the USSR or China seemed to be too interested in investing arms and prestige behind an unreliable African ally. The turmoil and rapid shifting of political fortunes in Africa made it difficult to ascertain or maintain a clear ideological position relative to Africa. The allies of the Americans might tomorrow be their enemies, or conversely, depending on the internal African situation. The danger of a major Cold War clash between the Great Powers in Africa was a real danger 2 as long as a major power backed a rival domestic faction.

As the major powers recognized the dangers of supporting rival domestic groups in Africa, it became more difficult for African governments to use the threat of political blackmail as a means of increasing the aid and assistance revenues from the competing major powers. In fact, for

O Africa as a whole, foreign assistance decreased markedly. 223

Another casualty of the post-1966 era in Africa was the notion of

African ideology. Indeed there was still a notion of an African Personality and, more importantly, an . The Tanzanian "Arusha

Declaration" gave spirit and meaning to much of the shared concepts of

African Socialism. Yet, these ideologies were internal; they reflected the primary concern of African states to achieve domestic growth. The ideological identification of African states as "pro-Chinese", "pro-

American", etc. became less meaningful in the African context, as states turned inward in their labors.^ It would be very difficult to identify a clear African ideological position, even on neo-colonialism. Indeed, to maintain and support domestic priorities, states like Malawi and the

Malagasy Republic made public treaties with the arch-enemy of much of

Africa, South Africa, and even with Rhodesia. The foreign policies of

African states consistently reflected the pragmatic needs of the society, irrespective of their appellations as "radical" or "moderate".^

By 1967 it had become clear that whatever was going to be achieved in Africa would have to come from the concerted efforts of the Africans themselves. The principal result of this realization was the tightening of domestic controls by African ruling elites on most areas of the economy and politics. Unitary parties, unitary trade union centers, and a unitary ruling elite became commonplace throughout Africa.^ This obviated much of the drive toward Pan-African unity and Pan-African institutions.

The OAU entered into a new phase as the result of this shift. It became a service organization, providing member states with a forum to discuss common problems and an intervening African agency which could reduce inter-African tensions. Much of the importance of the OAU passed 224

from the Heads of State and Foreign Ministers meetings to the operating

agencies (such as the African Bank or the Educational Committee), and to

Ad Hoc committees to relieve crucial inter-African disputes (such as the border clashes of East and North Africa, or the Nigerian civil war). It

did not supercede regional or sub-regional unities or alliances but

stabilized and assisted them.

1967 opened with a series of meetings among francophone African

states designed to further co-operation among them. UDEAC met in Yaounde

and agreed to set up an English-speaking unit to co-operate with the UN;^

on January 4 the Mouvement d'etudiants de 1 'organisation commune Africaine

et Malgache (MEOCAM) was set up to co-ordinate student activities among Q OCAM nations; and a committee on "Francophonie" met in January to discuss

plans for an expanded French Commonwealth. Following this meeting, a coup

took place in Togo, on January 13, where the army, under Eyadema, deposed

Grunitsky. The Entente leaders met to discuss this coup but came to no 9 conclusions, other than to allow Togo continued membership.

The situation in Nigeria was worsening. On January 4-5 the

military leaders of the various regions, including the East, met in Aburi

(Ghana) to hold secret talks on reunification. Although a breakthrough

seemed imminent after these talks, the conflicting press conference of

Ojukwu and Gowon and their disagreements over just what had been agreed at

Aburi led to a worsening of relations. A break seemed likely.'*'®

There was little progress in other talks between African rival

organizations. The tenth session of the OAU's Liberation Committee, meet­

ing in Kinshasa during January 30-February 5, witnessed accusations and

open hostilities between the rival Angolan liberation movements. 225

Following this Liberation Committee meeting in Kinshasa, the Congolese were also hosts to the follow-up East African and Central African Heads of

State meeting (similar to the Nairobi summit of March 1966). During

February 12-14, the leaders of Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville), Sudan,

Uganda, Zambia, Central African Republic, Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania met and issued the Kinshasa Declaration. Most of the sections of the "' declaration were predictable (support of liberation movements, condemnation of British action in Rhodesia, support of the Congo in its current struggle with the Union Miniere, etc.), but there was also a call for two commissions

to be created "to examine security problems and the other to economic,

I O transport and communications problems." These commissions were to provide some groundwork for creating an inter-regional level of co­ operation which would complement the current efforts to create an East

African Common Market.

On March 3, the regular OAU Council of Ministers meeting took place in Addis Ababa. Budgetary problems claimed most of their attention, as did plans for the Heads of State meeting scheduled for Kinshasa in

November. They heard reports on the mediation and arbitration efforts between Algeria and Morocco, Kenya and Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi,

Ethiopia and Somalia, and on the current crisis in French Somaliland.^

Once again, pro forma resolutions were passed on Rhodesia, South Africa,

et al. It was becoming very apparent at these meetings that the limits of

African policies prohibited them from having any real impact on these

questions, however. Yet, rather than provoking a sense of frustration,

these problems produced a sense of unity. Even if there was no unanimity

on current budgetary or political questions, disunity could be avoided by 226 discussing African perennials like South Africa's apartheid or Rhodesian intransigeance.

This unity did not guarantee stability. On March 23, 1967 follow­ ing the election of the former opposition All People's Congress in Sierra

Leone to the government, the army, under Lansana, took over control of the state. It placed a seven-men National Reformation Council in charge of the government with Lt.-Col. Juxon-Smith as its head. Yet another

African government was controlled by the military.^ 1 In response to riot­ ing in Djibouti over the referendum the French announced a policy for its force d'intervention (the French troops who are sent in' to prevent coups, e.g. in the Mba restoration in Gabon). They announced that these troops will be used:

to reinforce or assist isolated garrisons in an overseas department or territory, or a friendly country in difficulty; or in offensive action to protect French interests, or the interests of an allied country, in a country that is hostile or plunged into a n a r c h y . 15

This action tended to strengthen the francophone leaders in their domestic politics, but seemed to demonstrate to other African nations that they were still tied to France. It is some measure of the changes wrought in Africa by the disappearance of the "radical bloc" that no state or group publicly condemned them for such a "neo-colonialist" position.

The remainder of what once was the "radical" states of Africa held their own "revolutionary summit" in Cairo during April 4-6. Nasser,

Boumedienne, Nyerere, Ould Daddah and a representative from Guinea met to discuss common problems. Although Toure of Guinea had instigated the meet­

ing, he claimed that anti-revolutionary and colonialist forces were attempting

to oust him from Guinea so he did not leave the country. As all five had broken diplomatic relations with Britain over the Rhodesian issue, it was 227 expected that they would announce a resumption of these relations. On the contrary, they resolved that they should maintain their break with Britain and they renewed their criticism of the handling of Rhodesia. These leaders were careful to announce that their meeting was not meant as a separatist movement within the OAU, but merely a meeting of interested states. As Nyerere viewed the African scene, the OAU had outlived its optimistic beginnings but that this should not call for pessimism:

Africa is one, but it is also 38 and more. Only a recognition of this fact and its limitations will allow progress...likemindedness even on major economic and social questions among all African states is not likely to be achieved even after unity; it will never be achieved before. To imagine that a merger of sovereignties will automatically solve inter-African conflicts is to invite disaster - unity will simply change the context in which these problems can be tackled...The OAU is a geographical, not an ideological grouping...It is only after unity that we can begin the work of trying to convert Africa as a whole to one ideology or the other...it is the only institution for all-African discussion, consultation, and possibly some time in the future, action.16

Later that month, on April 30, the ministers from Kenya, Uganda and

Tanzania met in Nairobi to sign the draft treaty which would provide for

the long-awaited . This followed continued negotiation

with the EEC on affiliation.

The signing of the East African Cooperation Treaty was formally held

in Kampala on June 6 , 1967 and was scheduled to come into force on December 1,

1967. This treaty forms an East African Economic Community (EAEC) which

supercedes the EACSO. It provides for a common external tariff, no internal

tariffs, the maintenance of all the functions previously carried on by

EACSO, the creation of an East African Development Bank, and a somewhat

elaborate system of transfer taxes by which infant industries are protected.

Running the EAEC is an East African Authority, composed of the three heads

of state, and five councils (Common Market, Finance, Communications, Plan- 228 ning, and Research and Social). There iS also an East African Legislative

Assembly of nine members, three from each state.^ Additionally, Ethiopia indicated its interest in joining EAEC, and Zambia agreed to integrate its transport grid with that of the three nations.

A far less ambitious scheme was embarked upon in May, when thirteen

West African nations met in Accra to plan for a West African Common Market.

Ghana offered its services and a temporary headquarters for the planning secretariat. The West African Economic Community (WAEC) which was envisioned as an organization to remove customs barriers among West African states and to provide mutual economic assistance grew out of the Economic

Commission for Africa of the U.N. which had suggested such a community at its W.iamey meeting in October 1966. These thirteen states (all of West

Africa except Guinea and Gambia) represented far different, and often competitive, economies. They had greater difficulty in setting up an extensive common market than the three East African states which have had a continual common services tradition, and a common language. Additionally, some of the West African states are affiliated to the EEC through the

Yaounde Convention and thus have a special relationship to maintain in their external trade. Nonetheless, the May 1967 meeting set up a provisional

secretariat to draw up articles of association.

Despite this spirit of co-operation, tensions remained in the area.

On May 30, 1967 the Eastern Region of Nigeria seceded from the Federation

and declared itself the independent state of Biafra. Biafra claimed membership in the United Nations and in the OAU. The announcement of

Biafra's independence was met by a full mobilization on the part of the military government and civil war began. 19 229

The full impact of this civil war was lost to the consciousness of the world a few days later, when the Six-Day war broke out between Israel and her Arab neighbors. Interestingly, the votes in the UN on the crisis showed that the African states were far from united on a common policy; both francophone and anglophone states divided. 20 Within African states, the war proved more difficult to handle, particularly in the North African states with a large Jewish resident population. In Morocco, the labor federation called an unofficial boycott of Jewish shops, in contravention of government policy. The head of this federation was thrown into prison,culminating a long history of protest against the king through the UNFP and the UMT.

A minor contretemps developed when the Guinean Foreign Minister was again detained in transit, this time in the Ivory Coast. In retaliation,

Toure kept some Dutch nationals as hostages (because the Foreign Minister was taken off a KLM plane).^2 Another kidnapping took place on July 1, 23 when Tshombe was taken to Algeria, which kept him in captivity, thus provoking another mercenary invasion in Kinsangani (Stanleyville). Despite this, Mobutu announced that the OAU summit meeting would still take place in Kinshasa.

The Council of Ministers meeting which preceded the Heads of

State meeting, took place on September 4-10. They passed thirty-five resolutions for submission to the Heads of States. In the words of its chairman, Justin Bomboko:

It was a record session by virtue of the atmosphere of frankness, comradship, and truly African brotherhood, active and dynamic throughout our debates.24 230

The OAU Heads of State Meeting at Kinshasa

On September 11, 1967 the fourth OAU summit meeting opened at

Kinshasa. It was attended by only eighteen Heads of State, with repre­

sentatives of the other twenty states, except Malawi, taking part. One

of the principal tasks facing the conference was the civil war now in

progress between Nigeria and Biafra. Despite the strenuous lobbying of the

Nigerians, a consultative commission of six heads of state (Ahidjo of

Cameroons, Mobutu of the Congo, of Ethiopia, General

Ankrah of Ghana, Tubman of Liberia, and Diori of Niger) was created to

serve as an ad hoc commission to resolve the dispute.

The presence of the mercenaries, now headquartered in Bukavu, was

deplored by the participants who pledged their aid to the Congo to aid in

the removal of these mercenaries. On the sensitive question of the Middle

East, the African leaders were most circumspect. Rather than press a

strong resolution supporting fellow-OAU member, Egypt, they adopted a

resolution which expressed their sympathy for Egypt's loss of territory.

They also promised to work in the U.N. for the restoration of this lost

land.

They adopted a modest budget, down ten percent from the previous

year and decided to carry on with the work of the Liberation Committee.

The most promising activity at the meeting took place in the corridors

where, under the guidance of Kaunda of Zambia, the Kenya-Ethiopia-

Somalia border feud was discussed and de-escalated. It was a calm con­

ference, excited only in the division over the referendum of French . •

Somaliland, where the francophone states again lined up in a solid bloc

against the rest of Africa in their support of the French. ^ 231

Following the conference, on September 21, Guinean Foreign

Minister Beavogui was released from the Ivory Coast after three months of detention. Guinea freed a number of Ivory Coast hostages whom it had captured earlier off a coastal trawler, however still denouncing

Houphouet-Boigny as "a malevolent ally of imperialism and neo-colonialism".^

Early in December, perhaps the most significant conference of West

African states in their history took place. At Dakar, the representatives of fourteen West African nations (Dahomey, Gambia, Guinea, Ivory Coast,

Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta) met to form the West African Economic Community (WAEC).

Building upon the co-operation developed within the Interstate Committee for Senegal River Development, founded in 1963 (grouping Senegal, Mali,

Guinea and Mauritania), these heterogeneous and politically opposed states found that they would all benefit through economic co-operation.^

This fourteen-state economic community plans:

to increase economic harmonization. They intend to organize common transport and communications facilities to replace the present competing air, shipping and cable networks. Joint electricity development is also envisaged. The community's charter looks to eventual fiscal standardization.28

Since many of the states of WAEC are already associate members of the EEC, it is likely that the rest will join. At the time of the forma­ tion of WAEC there were nineteen African states associated with the EEC

(all eighteen of the Yaounde Convention states plus Nigeria). The EAEC * was negotiating for association, as was Sidrra Leone, Algeria, Morocco,

Tunisia and Ghana. Even Guinea, long the strongest foe of the 'neo­ colonialists' has indicated that it was thinking of rejoining the franc

OQ zone, as Mali already had done. 232

During 1968, the principal thrust of African diplomacy and the Pan-

African movement was to foster further economic co-operation and to

alleviate internal African ruptures. The Nigerian civil war and its tragic

toll of life occupied much of the principal attention in the African

political scene. This did not mean that there was peace in other areas,

but rather they attracted much less attention. The overthrow of Soglo in

Dahomey, and attempted coups elsewhere did not prove as divisive to the 30 unity as previous unrest. One major success was the elimination of much

of the hostility accompanying the border clashes of East Africa.

Following upon the discussions at Kinshasa, the leaders of Kenya

and Somalia met on January 27, 1968 at Mogadiscio where they resumed

diplomatic relations and abandoned their long hostilities. In his speech,

President Kenyatta gave much of the credit to Kaunda for his initiatives 31 in bringing the two nations together.

Despite considerable rhetoric to the contrary;, the states of

Africa were no closer to Pan-African unity than they had been at the found­

ing of the OAU. The OCAM, meeting in late January, found little to agree

u p o n . 32 Some of its members (Congo-Kinshasa, Chad, and the Central African

Republic), announced on February 5, 1967 that they had formed a new regional

grouping, the Etas Unis de 1'Afrique Central (EUAC) which roughly paralleled

the WAEC and EAEC efforts of 1967. Although other African states were f

_ . invited to join, none seemed eager to do s o . 33

The proliferation of common markets and regional groupings led to a

lack of interest in the OAU. It held meetings on the Nigerian civil war

and actively attempted to bring hostilities to a close. On the question of

Rhodesia, the OAU was powerless, almost as powerless as its efforts in 233 behalf of. the African population of South Africa. In fact, the OAU was most successful in providing a forum for negative debate. Speakers criticized, deplored, objected, condemned, and rejected much of the current world situation but found themselves powerless to act, except internally.

Within their domestic policies, they centralized control, outlawed oppo­ sition, repressed the labor movements, and defended themselves against coups or elections. The greatest successes of the OAU were in the fields of reduction of tensions on border crises. The success of the Kenya-

Ethiopia-Somalia border arrangement was matched by a similar defusing of the long-standing feud between Morocco and Algeria. 34

Despite the activities of the OAU Ad_ Hoc Commission on Nigeria the war took on frightful proportions. Thousands died and starved as the result of this war. Despite peace talks at Kampala, no agreement could be 35 reached. In this period of frustration and disillusionment, the OAU held its fifth summit meeting in Algiers.

The OAU Summit Meeting at Algiers

In mid-September 1968 the heads of state of Ethiopia, Zambia,

Liberia, Mali, Cameroon, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Rwanda, Somalia, Nigeria,

Mauritania, Congo (Kinshasa), Central African Republic, and the Sudan met with the Foreign Ministers of the other OAU states in Algiers for the

fifth OAU Heads of State meeting.

They were faced with three major problems: the war in Nigeria, the war in the Sudan (which Uganda claimed was spilling over into its territory),

and the Rhodesian crisis. The Nigerian situation was complicated by the

fact that four African states (Zambia, Tanzania, Gabon and the Ivory Coast)

had officially recognized the government and the state of Biafra. The 234 resolution put to the meeting supported Nigeria. It

Appeals for the cessation of hostilities; recommends that, the above being fulfilled, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria declare a general amnesty and co-operate with the OAU in assuring the physical security of all Nigerians alike, until mutual confidence is restored; Appeals again to all parties to co-operate in ensuring speedy delivery of humanitarian relief supplies to the needy; Calls upon all member States of the UNO and the OAU to refrain from any action detrimental to the unity, territorial integrity and peace of Nigeria...36

This resolution was objected to on the part of the four nations who had recognized Biafra, but the motion carried by a thirty-three to four majority.

A mild resolution was passed on the Middle East which did not criticize Israel in the same terms as an earlier OAU resolution. 37 The

Sudan civil war was not discussed, and there was no progress on the

Rhodesian question. By a narrow majority, Diallo Telli was re-elected to his post. The principal debate covered the issue of adopting an emblem for the OAU. This question could not be agreed upon so it was referred ±.o .the next Council of Ministers meeting.

By the late months of 1968, the OAU still survived. It was not the

Pan-African united movement which its founders had envisioned. It was replete with regional groups and common markets, and without a great deal of power even on purely inter-African problems. Nonetheless, it served the purpose of bringing the various leadership elites together to discuss problems of mutual concern. If it was less than the founders had envi­

sioned, it was still more than its critics had hoped for. The leadership of Africa had found, as it had discovered earlier in the U.N., that a multi-national group cannot create unanimity on controversial issues, but can, when there is unanimity, exploit this advantage to the mutual good. * I *

235 s ^■See Robert K. Gardiner, "The Decade of Discouragement" in "Africa Report", December 1967, pp. 17-19. *

One important result of the Congolese War was that the two major Cold War powers learned that the domestic forces in Africa, through whom they were forced to conduct th%ir activities, were essentially unreliable and unstable. Their constant tergiversations of policy and shifts in strategy often made the major powers unsure of their loyalty or dependence. In some cases, the larger power became the pawn of the smaller and weaker ally who created the circumstances in which the major pow.er would have to act. A good example, is the famous Stanleyville raid by U.S. planes full of Belgian paratroopers which attacked the rebel stronghold to rescue U.S. and Belgian prisoners. The Gbenye government had agreed to release these hostages if Tshombe would cease his bombing of Stanleyville. Tshombe refused and the Gbenye government b^gan living up to its threats, precipitating the U.S.-Belgian raid. See Richard J. Barnet, Intervention * and Revolution (New York: World, 1968), pp. 243-251

^The levels of foreign*assistance fell dramatically after 1966 as a result of the U.S.'s adoption of the "Korry Report" which favored regional assistance and a fixed number of recipient governments. East bloc assistance fell, too, as a result of the resumption of the arming of the Middle East, problems within Comecon, and a general lack of interest. » ^These terms became much less relevant when the assisting powers were not interested or able to provide the levels of assistance to warrant the open support of African nations. Increasingly, too, ideological pronounce­ ments had become a somewhat.devalued curreney. 'An important factor in this decrease in the conflict of ideology dates from the Soviet testing of nuclear devices during the "Second Bandung" Conference which severely embarrassed some of the Third World* leadership.

5See Abdul 4* Said, The African Phenomenon (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), pp. 137-142, and Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., The Elephants and the Grass . (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 134-197.

^See Gwendolen M. Carter, African One-Party States (Ithaca: Cornell, 1964).

^"Africa Report", March 1967, p. 24 “.' 'Among other subjects discussed at the UDEAC meeting was the difficulty these states were having in reduc­ ing customs and duties among themselves. See also Arthur Hazlewood (ed.), African Integration and Disintegration (New York: Oxford Press, 1967),' pp. 29-68, and Reginald H. Green and Ann Seidman, Unity or Poverty (Baltimore: Penguin, 1968), p. 56 passim.

^"Africa Report", March 1967, p. 21. The MEOCAM was a conservative . challenge to already existing FEANF (Federation of Black African' Students in France). See William John Hanna, "Students" in James S. Coleman and Carl G. 236 I* Rosberg, Jr. (eds.), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California, 1966), pp. 413-443, and Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa, the Politics of Unity (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 212-216.

^Eyadema had intervened in the power struggle between Grunitsky and Meatchi by creating a National Reconciliation Committee and promised to hold elections within three months. It was largely this promise which assuaged the Entente leadership.

10'iAfrica Diary" (AD), vol. VII, no. 6, p. 3247; vol. VII; no. 15, p. 3338.

ll"Agence France Presse", February 5, 1967. In fact, each group was holding hostages from the other group. See "Africa Report", April 1967, p. 29.

12"Kinshasa Declaration", quoted in "Africa Report", April 1967, p. 21.

13AD, vol. vii, no. 13, p. 3320.

l^AD, vol. vii, no. 17, pp. 3358-3360.

15"Le Monde", Paris, March 19, 1967. See "Africa Report", May 1967, p. 2 1 .

16" A f r i c a Report", June 1967, p. 34.

1?AD, vol. vii, no. 29, p. 3486. See also Arthur Hazlewood, "Economic Integration in East Africa", in Hazlewood (ed.), o£. cit., pp. 69-115.

l^AD, vol. vii, no. 24, p. 3437.

19"Africa Report", February 1968 (Special issue on Nigeria).

20Dorothy Dodge, "African Voting Cohesion in the U.N.", in "Africa Report", October 1967, pp. 58-59.

21-AD, vol. vii, no. 32, p. 3515. The UMT head, Ben Seddick, was President of AATUF.

22a d , vol. vii, no. 30, p. 3491.

23ad, vol. vii, 1no. 32, pp. 3509-3512.

24a d , vol. vii, no. 42, p. 3619.

2^The French held a referendum in French Somaliland on March 19, 1967 in which they received a sixty percent majority in favor of continued French rule. The peculiar demographic balance among Afars, Issas and *

237

Somalis made this result somewhat suspect outside of "Francophonie". See- I. M. Lewis, "Prospects in the Horn", and Harold G.*Marcus, "A 'Danzig Solution1" in "Africa Report", April 1967, pp. 37-46. « 26a d , vol. vii, no. 43, p. 3624. ’

27Russell Warren Howe, "fchristian Science Monitor", December 4, 1967, p. 8 . * *

28ibid., p. 8 .

29ibid., p. 8 . See also Arnold Rivkin,' "Africa and the Gommojj Market: A Perspective" (Denver: University of Denver, 1964), Monograph no. 2 .

• ^ G e n e r a l christophe Soglo was overthrown ,and put under hpuse arrest on December 16, 1968. See AD, vol. viii,-no. 3, pp. 3747-3748.

31"Africa Report", March 1968, p. 21. * 32a d , vol. viii, no. 7, pp. 3796-3797.

33"Africa Report", April 1968, p. 21.

34a d , vol. viii, no. 15, p. 3868. • . * % 35Neither the peace talks at Kampala nor at Addis Ababa brought about any abatement of hostilities. See AD, vol. viii, no. 39, pp. 4111-‘ 4114.

36AD, vol. viii, no. 43, p. 4152.

'37ibjd., p. 4152. CHAPTER X

THE DRIFT TOWARD UNITY: PAN-AFRICAN LABOR 1967-1968

The movement towards Pan-African labor unity in the period 1967-

1968 culminated in an agreement to join the ATUC and the AATUF in a single

Pan-African trade union center. However, the two labor bodies which united were far different bodies than those created at the founding con­ gresses of either the ATUC or AATUF. Their union was as much an admission of weakness as it was the culmination of years of fruitless endeavor. The pressures of domestic' governments on labor bodies, the lack of funds for current activities, and the general world disinterest in African affairs played a very important role in creating this unity.

Following the disaffiliation of the Ghanaian TUC, the AATUF was left without much of the dynamism which had characterized its prior activities. The move to Dar-es-Salaam protected AATUF from Ghanaian control, but left the running of the organization to the Tanzanian unionists who were completely controlled by the local government. The next blow to fall on AATUF fell as a result of the Six-Day War between

Israel and her neighbors. On July 7, Majoub ben Seddick, General-Secretary of the Moroccan UMT and President of the AATUF, led his union in an unof­ ficial boycott of Moroccan Jewish merchants, in clear defiance of the official Moroccan Government's distinction between Jews and Zionists.

According to the Information Ministry, the UMT boycott was

"against the national interest" because it endangered the economy and contravened government policy. It also was sponsored by the Istiqlal

Party which was in opposition to the government, a party which had caused 239 the government severe embarrassment during the recent Ben Barka case.-*-

On July 11, 1967 Ben Seddick was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment for failing "to respect the authority of the government" and for creating

"a grave threat to the country's prestige and the King's p o l i c y . "2 The imprisonment of Ben Seddick left the AATUF without a leader.

Following the imprisonment of Ben Seddick the UPTC held its third congress in Ouagadougou during September 5-7, 1967. This congress confirmed

the fact that the UPTC was virtually dead. In a long report to the meeting,

PongauIt(living in exile from his center in Congo-Brazzaville) described how the governments of Congo-Brazzaville and Burundi had crushed the

UPTC organizations and how the records, files and equipment of the UPTC 3 were impounded by the Congolese government. Within this report, Pongault

also stated the well-known fact that "In a practical sense, the AFRO has no importance in Africa."^ He went on to say that some organizations, not

affiliated to either ATUC or AATUF were attempting to form a genuine Pan-

African labor organization. He did not elaborate further.^

Meeting the next week, the AFRO representatives travelled to Addis

Ababa to attempt to revive AFRO. They called for a second preparatory meet­

ing in Kampala, two months later. The Kampala meeting was attended by

representatives from: Ethiopia, Upper Volta, Tunisia, Ghana and Uganda.

They agreed to call a conference for early 1968 to discuss "Labor in a

Developing Africa", in particular, "Trade Union Participation in Economic

and Social Reconstruction".^ The meeting never took place.

By the end of 1967, the major African internationals were in

desuetude. The AFRO and UPTC have virtually ceased to exist (except in

their journals) and both AATUF and ATUC maintained inoperative secretariats / I a

' 4* • . - 240 suffering from an absence of futtds? The conditions were ripe for unity talks. ■

# * - The first move towards the renewal of ties came at the meeting of l the AATUF Executive Board in their three-day meeting in Algiers during * February 14-16, 1968.

The AATUF Executive Board Meeting r

Fourteen delegates attended the AATUF Executive Board meeting in

Algiers, representing: Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, UAR, Upper Volta,

Tanzania and Zambia. The primary reason for the meeting was the "lethargy of the African trade-union movement".The resolutions passed at the meet­ ing included support of liberation movements in Africa, support of the

Moroccan unionists, support of the Dahomeyan unionists (after their suppres­ sion following a recent coup), opposition to the U.S. war in Vietnam, opposition to Zionism, and a variety of similar resolutions including celebrating March 20 as an International Day of Solidarity'with Ben

Q Seddick who was still in prison.

The important resolution, however, called upon the AATUF to "make contact with the ATUC with a view to examining conditions and ’working out

Q. principles to achieve African trade union unity." The other important resolution gave AATUF support for the OAU trend towards regional,groupings since it would "accelerate the process of liberation, economic and social development of our peoples and the realization of African Unity."10 They warned, however, that Africa must be vigilant to ensure that these regional groupings do not become "breeding grounds of imperialism.

Following the AATUF meeting, the deathblow was delivered to the

AFRO. On April 27, 1968 the government of Uganda's Minister of Internal 241

Affairs, Mr. Bataringaya, intervened into the perpetual leadership crises of the Uganda Labor Congress and closed down all its operations pending an official enquiry.^ The government also closed down the ICFTU's African

Labor College in Kampala, promising to make a full accounting of the property to the ICFTU headquarters. The closing of the college left only the newspaper in Nigeria and a small Research Office in Kampala as the

AFRO's toeholds in Africa.

This event had been awaited for almost a year by ICFTU unionists, and it came as no shock. Under the guidance and support of the government of Senegal, a meeting was called in Dakar on May 21-22, 1968 in which the

AATUF and ATUC once again agreed to merge.

The Second Dakar Merger Meeting

On May 21, 1968 the representatives of AATUF and ATUC met in Dakar to discuss merger. Representing the ATUC were: Andre Bo-Boliko (Congo-

Kinshasa), Malick Fall and Elimane Kane (Mauritania), Bechir Bellagha

(Tunisia) and Alioune Cisse, David Soumah, Jean Diallo, Lamine Diallo,

Allasane Sow, Bassirou Gueye and Charles Mendy (Senegal). Representing

AATUF were: Sekou Kaba, Mamady Kaba, Habib Ba, Mrs. Loffo Hadja Camara

(Guinea), Famady Sissoko, Lazare Coulibaly, Dialimady Koite, Fousseynou

Diabate (Mali), Abdelkader (Morocco), Wahab Goodluck (Nigeria) and

D. B. S. Zimbihile (Tanzania). The presiding officer was Doudou N'Gom of Senegal.

Doudou N'Gom, representing the UNTS (Senegal) gave the opening address. He thanked the secretariats of both ATUC and AATUF for being in attendance and remarked that it was only proper that they should meet in

Dakar since it was here, in October 1963, where they had agreed to unite 242 the two movements. N'Gom read from the 1963 Dakar communique, which said:

Having examined the trade union situation in Africa and throughout the world an? believing that it is imperative to construct the African society, [We] decide to create a single united African trade union center, democratic, anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist, independent of all international labor bodies, and dedicated to the struggle of the African peoples for decolonization and true democracy.13

N'Gom continued:

The delay in achieving the realization of the unification of the African labor movement has kept us from the fulfillment of our role as the avant-garde and motive force in the battle for economic and social development of the continent and for giving stability to the OAU.

This delay has only benefitted the dividers of Africa and the neo­ colonialists who are substituting economic dominance for political domination and who are diverting us from our real mission which is the struggle for the complete liberation of all of Africa, for a real economic development and for more well-being and social justice.14

N'Gom was followed by the representative of the ATUC, who agreed that the choice of Dakar was a wise decision. He stressed the common problems which faced Africans (South Africa, Portugese domination,

Rhodesia, Israel, etc.) and called for a united effort to combat these problems and to contribute to development:

The workers of Africa have been in the front lines of the fight for liberation. It has not ended nor has it resulted in success for all Africans. But they must continue to be the spearhead of economic independence, progress, and well-being for all.

The resolution of October 19, 1963 adopted by our two organizations defined the practical tasks to bring about the unification of the African labor movement.

The ATUC is convinced that our meeting here today will accomplish the tasks which we have imposed upon ourselves.

The representative of AATUF spoke next:

In effect, comrades, the international and African competition is marked on one side by an imperialist offensive attempting to reconquer our countries and, on the other, by a fierce determination 243

by the peoples of Africa in general, and the workers in particular, to finally liquidate colonialism, neo-colonialism, feudalism and reaction. The struggle of our brothers in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, South Africa, Rhodesia, Southwest Africa, the aggression against the people of Vietnam, the Israeli provocations against the Arab peoples, the powerful movement of Afro-Americans, the grave deterioration of the terms of trade between the Third World and those countries called developed, are evident signs of this competition, which takes the wealth of the African populations and accentuates the pauperization of the laboring masses.16

The AATUF representative reiterated the calls for unity of Dakar in 1963,

in Algiers and Bamako in 1964, and the 1968 Algiers call for unity by the

AATUF and proposed six points for unity:

a. National trade union unity.

b. Disaffiliation of national Pan-African centers from all inter­ nationals .

c. Systematic struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo­ colonialism, feudalism and their agents.

d. Direct and coherent struggle of the working class against all forms of exploitation of man by man and for a true socialist society.

e. The reinforcement of the principle of international proletarian solidarity in the struggle of the workers of the world for peace.

f. Total support for all peoples who struggle for liberty, independence and sovereignty of their land, notably the heroic people of Vietnam, the courageous Afro-American fighters and those in Rhodesia, South Africa and South West Africa.17

After long discussions, the African labor leadership agreed on a

final resolution and communique in which they stated that the two Pan-

African Secretariats had examined the variety of problems which faced

Africa and had decided that they must form a united Pan-African labor

center. They invited all unions to unite at home and to disaffiliate

from all internationals and condemned the South Africans, Rhodesians,

Portugese, Israelis, etc. The operative section of the final communique

stated that they: 244

Decide to create a Preparatory Commission of 16 members (8 from each Pan-African organization) charged with:

(a) Fixing the schedule for the planned constituting Congress of the future single Pan-African center.

(b) Writing reports on the orientation, doctrine and other aims of the organization.

(c) Determining the modalities for the participation of national union centers and for solving the material and financial problems. (There will not be more than one delegation allowed for each country.)

They fixed January 1969 as the date for the Congress and September 1968

for the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee. ^ They then made

their report of unity to the President of Senegal and to the Senegalese

Cabinet.^®

This presentation of the report to the Senegalese political leader­

ship was particularly significant. It was presented as not only the

fusion of two Pan-African labor bodies but also as the fusion of the four major union centers representing the Senegal River Community States. 21 In

an article which appeared following the conference, it was stated that the

four organizations (CNTG-Guinea, UNTM-Mali, UTM-Mauritania, and UNTS-

Senegal) had agreed to support the Senegal River Authority and had created

a co-ordinating commission to do so. 22 This, in fact, was the major reason

for the ATUC-AATUF talks.

The ruling bodies in ATUC were clearly the Senegalese; the ATUC

headquarters were in Dakar; most of the staff was Senegalese; the funds .

were provided mainly from Senegal. Additionally, they were particularly

vulnerable to Senegalese governmental pressure. On the other hand, the

AATUF, with the disaffiliation of Ghana, was left with the Guineans,

Malians, the Tanzanians and Zambians. The interests of Guinea and Mali 245 were clearly in regularizing relations among their neighbors, while the

Tanzanians and Zambians could have no objections since unity was being achieved on their terms. At that time, it was not clear if any other 23 major ATUC affiliates would sympathize with the Senegalese position.

The September meeting did not take place and the Congress was post­ poned from January 1969 to February 1969. The unity of the two movements, however, was noted by the OAU, at their heads of state meeting in September

1968. They resolved that since the OAU had called for the unity of the labor movement, and that a united labor movement had much to contribute to national and Pan-African development, they

Recommend to the African Unions, notably the two existing African centrals, to undertake the necessary efforts to surmount all their difficulties and achieve Pan-African labor unity.

Engage the General Administrative Secretariat of the OAU to examine the necessary means to bring about that end...24

The other major trend which developed in late 1968 seemed to be directed against the forces of unity in the Pan-African labor movement.

This was the increasingly close identification of the AATUF with the communist WFTU. There had always been a rather close working relationship between the two organizations and, in some cases, there were leaders who

shared roles in both organizations. Yet, the relationship was always kept

separate. On May 17 and 18, 1968 the Secretariats of AATUF and WFTU met

in Prague (a few days besfore the ATUC-AATUF merger meeting) . At the meet­

ing were: Sissoko (Mali); Goodluck (Nigeria); Awab (Morocco); Hajjib Ba

(Guinea); Diaye and Zimbihile (AATUF). For the WFTU, the participants

included: Saillant, Podzerko, Cheleboun, Zakaria, Dragoi, Sen, Vondras,

Toilet, Aliage and Tehle. 246

The conference regretted the incarceration of Majoub Ben Seddick.

They worked together to examine some of the common problems which they felt faced both movements:

The two delegations examined the possibility of developing the common struggle of workers and their trade union organizations in Europe and Africa against the monopolies, neo-colonialism and imperialism in the present situation which is characterized by international imperialism's great aggressiveness. 25

The most important result of the meeting was that they agreed to hold a conference in January 1969 in Conakry to bring the union representatives of Europe and Africa together to study a common plan for the struggle against imperialism: Also:

The WFTU and AATUF Secretariats moreover decided to strengthen the constant collaboration of the two organizations and to meet periodically to jointly and in the best conditions prepare this Conference...The two Secretariats also decided to strengthen their co-operation on the training of trade union officials, in their work with the ILO, in the field of information and the exchange of documents.

The two Secretariats are very pleased with the friendship and fraternity that has permeated their meeting and which is proof of the identity of their i d e a l s . . . 26

Following this joint meeting and joint statement, the AATUF went off to Senegal to prepare the way towards unity. On January 3, 1969 the

AATUF and the WFTU published a Special Bulletin "Common Action in Common

Interest" which included a call, signed by Mamady Kaba (for the AATUF) and Pierre Gensous (for the WFTU), for all trade union organizations to participate in the Solidarity Conference of Trade Unions from Africa and

Europe (which had been postponed twice before and was now scheduled for

March 18-21, 1969).

An interesting section of the call was the rhetoric of the two groups against monopoly : 247

We note the presence, in capitalist Europe, of certain trusts and monopolies benefitting from concessions in many African countries and which exploit African workers just as they do exploit European workers. From this, follows the urgent need for the trade unions in African and European countries to act jointly...

With regard to the trade union organizations in the Socialist countries, the character of their relations and co-operation with trade unions in African countries is d i f f e r e n t . 27

The letter says that there will be no discrimination made between Socialist and non-Socialist unions, but rather that they all have a useful role to play. Despite the elaborate plans, the meeting was again postponed from the March date to a date later in 1969.

It seems then, that there may have been a second reason for the

AATUF-ATUC meeting in May. It may be that the WFTU asked the AATUF delegates to accept the hand of friendship proferred by the Senegalese in an effort to restore WFTU influence in Africa. It does seem that whatever the reason for this action, no real unity was achieved and that no real commitment on the part of the other ATUC affiliates was made. Both AATUF-

ATUC and AATUF-WFTU conferences were postponed. Perhaps there will be unity in Pan-African labor. If history is a guide, however, this unity seems far away. 248

Mehdi Ben Barka, Moroccan opposition leader, was abducted in the Fall of 1965 and has never been found since. The French intelligence system and Colonel Dlimi and General Oufkir of Morocco were involved in the abduction. The facts of the Ben Barka affair, which we're publicly made known as the result of the trial in France, severely embarrassed both the French and the Moroccan governments.

2"London Times", July 2, 1967, p. 3.

^Following a decision of the Congolese (Brazzaville) government to unite the CATC with the CGAT and CSSL in November 1963, the revolutionary government took important steps to see that the merger took place. The CATC held a special congress in November 1964 to protest this demand. The government closed the CATC and UPTC offices and all their properties were impounded.

^Pongault, G. "Le condizioni della lotta dei lavorati in Africa", reprinted in "Azione Sociale" Rome, October 1967, p. 1104.

Ibid., p. 1105.

^'.'African Labour News", Lagos, December 12, 1967.

^"Algerie Actualite", Algiers, February 18-24, 1968.

®AATUF. 'Tin des travaux du bureau executif de l'u.s.p.a.: resolutions et appels." Algiers, February 16, 1968..

^Ibid.

10ibid.

H lbid.

l^"East Africa Standard", Nairobi, March 3, 1968. The UTUC faction, led by Eriabu Kibuka, had formed a revolutionary council in the UTUC and had led two raids on the headquarters. See also "Africa Diary", June 30-July 6 , 1968, p. 39.

l^N'Gom, Doudou, "Declaration de L'U.N.T.S." Dakar, May 21, 1968, p. 1 .

l^Ibid., p. 2 .

15"Declaration De La C.S.A." Dakar, May 21, 1968, p. 1. (No speaker was listed).

16"Declaration De l'U.S.P.A." Dakar, May 21, 1968, p. 1. (No speaker was listed). 249

17Ibid.

^'Resolution General" of the Secretariats of the AATUF and ATUC, Dakar, May 22, 1968, p. 1.

19ibid., p. 2.

20"Dakar-Matin", Dakar, May 24, 1968, p. 1.

21lbid., p. 1.

22"Dakar-Matin", Dakar, May 25, 1968, p. 1.

^ A t this time the only other major ATUC affiliate was the Nigerian ULC which was preoccupied with the civil war between Nigeria and Biafra.

24-Resolution of the OAU Council of Ministers Meeting, September 1968.

25"Trade Union Press", WFTU, Prague, Vol. 9, June 1968, p. 2.

^ Ibid. , p. 2.

27"Trade Union Press", WFTU, Prague, Vol. 10, January 1969, p. 6. CHAPTER XI

SOME CONCLUSIONS AND SPECULATIONS

By the end of 1968, the movement towards Pan-African unity in both the political and trade union spheres was far from clear. The African states had created for themselves a fairly complex series of interlocking economic agreements which appeared, on paper, to be a major step towards building a genuine African community. The political differences among them were under the jurisdiction of various OAU committees and open hostilities were supposed to be avoided through their mediation and arbitration efforts. A blanket unity in the OAU organization presupposed a fundamental agreement of purpose if not of structure. Unfortunately, much of this unity and co-operation seemed a great deal less real than it appeared from the resolutions or charters.

The Pan-African labor bodies, too, had worked out macro-national unities incorporated into AATUF and ATUC structures. The unity agreement of 1968 seemed to indicate that there might be a movement toward a genuine

All-African labor unity. In the first months of 1969, the unity congresses and the joint AATUF-WFTU meetings were postponed again and again. No less than in the political arrangements, Pan-African labor unity appeared as difficult to achieve as it ever had been. The problems of achieving unity in the political and labor spheres revolved around a few central points common to both movements.

The first point common to both types of organization is weakness.

The weakness and vulnerability which initially compelled nations and unions to combine into Pan-African organizations was also a prime factor in the 251 failure of these organizations. The African states, as less-developed nations, with fragmentary economies based upon one or two primary products whose international value in terms of trade were constantly decreasing were in no position to assert themselves internationally to achieve greater economic stability. In most cases, their products were discretionary items for the major industrialized countries. As producers of cocoa, coffee, copra or sisal, for example, they were in direct competition with less- developed states throughout Asia and Latin America. In addition, they were often in competition among themselves for European and U.S. markets. The major industrial states could purchase these items on the world market and the exclusion of various commodities from the world market by individual

African states as a matter of policy would have little impact. For most of the products produced in Africa, there is nearly perfect elasticity of supply.

In order to diversify and industrialize their nations, African states were forced to accept the realities of the marketplace. They had to have a stable and exchangeable currency; they had to utilize external assistance and the foreign technicians and planners who were sent as part of this assistance; they often had to accept foreign private direct assistance.

The difficulties faced by Guinea in attempting to eschew these policies are well-known, and provided a striking lesson to many of the other African states.

For the unions, too, the weakness which prompted Pan-African unity movements was also a cause of its lack of success. The strength of the national labor movement domestically was often in direct relation to the ties it had with the ruling party. If a national union, such as in Ghana 252 during Nkrumah, appeared strong and self-sufficient this was primarily because it was virtually totally controlled by the CPP and its leadership.

In fact, its domestic options were.-very limited because of this co-optation and its strength was primarily financial. For the many other weak national union centers,. Pan-African labor unity was a vehicle towards gaining some power and prestige which they were denied at home. However, their partic­ ipation in these Pan-African bodies served to further estrange them from their domestic ruling parties who then acted to further weaken the unions.

Without funds from affiliated members Pan-African labor bodies could not function. When the necessary funds were provided by the ICiTU, WFTU or the IFCTU the Pan-African labor bodies became suspect to their rival unionists and caused further repression on the part of the ruling govern­ ments over their national unions.

A second point common to both Pan-African political and labor groups derives from their individual weaknesses, the problem of the priority of self-interest. One of the most important questions ever brought up in any meeting of either the political or labor Pan-African organizations was the question of how these unities would be of direct benefit to the participating states or unions. Despite much of the rhetoric to the contrary, African states seem to function along the lines of self-interest and national priorities common to all nation states since the formation of the early Mesopotamian kingdoms. It would be foolish to assume that the qualities of uniqueness in Africa extended to the political realm to a degree which set off African systems from any other on earth.

In fact, it seems that a state, once created and identified in the minds of its citizens and the community of other states, behaves within some 253 relatively fixed parameters. The most important of these is self- preservation- and aggrand izement.

With the struggles for national self-determination only recently in the past, the strong nationalist feelings within individual African states did not suddenly disappear. Indeed, they were harnessed to the new task of national unity. Territorial conflicts which greatly con­ cerned states like Morocco, Mauritania, Ghana, Togo, Ethiopia, Somalia,

Kenya, Uganda, to name but a few, were important indicators of the con­ flict of national priorities with Pan-African objectives. Additionally, the economies of African states were often directly competitive. For many commodities, the international market, with a relatively inelastic demand curve, functioned like a zero-sum game. The cocoa which Ghana could not produce would be supplied by Nigeria. Ghana's loss was Nigeria's gain. The attempts to create international cocoa, groundnut, sugar or other commodity agreements often faltered on the national self-interest perceived by African states. This phenomenon is equally true in the political sphere.

The francophone nations, tied by a variety of economic and military

treaties to France received, in return, a guaranteed market, a stable exchangeable currency, and massive budgetary support. Despite the neo­ colonialist overtones this policy entailed, it was clearly in the self-

interest of each of these states to maintain these ties. With formation

of uhe Brazzaville Group it became clear that these states were not willing

to forego the economic underpinnings of their economies for the chimera of

an African unity which offered no immediate substitute for their national

economies. Those states which supported such a move were the same states 254 which were ineligible for similar assistance. It was in the direct economic interest of Guinea, for example, to have the Entente states dis­ continue their assistance pacts with France. Then Guinea would be on the

same level as the Entente in the competition for assistance and investment and the Entente would not have the added attractions which the large body

of subsidized expatriate technicians gave them in attracting new capital.

The states of East Africa were loath to choose between Monrovia and Casablanca groupings, not only because of their maintaining the

PAFMECSA as a separate group but also because they needed assistance from both sides in mobilizing pressure to achieve independence. Still less did

they fear the bugbear of neo-colonialism when they called in British troops

to quell the uprisings of January 1964. When it became an issue of self-

preservation, the ruling powers of every African state were not unwilling

to utilize every policy at their disposal to maintain themselves in power.

If self-interest was important in understanding the nature of the

policies which shaped the Pan-African political movement, it was no less

important to the understanding of the Pan-African labor movement. One

must in fact ask why it is that labor movements engage in international

activities and why, in particular, did African labor movements attempt to

form a Pan-African labor center. Starting from the premise outlined above,

that unions were either weak or under government control, some reasons

became apparent. Unions sought, through international activities, to

achieve ends not achievable domestically. Among these were prestige,

money, an international forum where they would be heard, and information

which they could use in their domestic activities. In most African states,

the labor movements were as dominated by a small elite as the government. V

255

During the struggle for independence these union leaders often played an

important role in the councils of the nationalist movements. With the accession of self-government, they were pushed into the background and

often into opposition. Their finances dwindled and their prestige

suffered. Many left to become government officials. 1 The very real conflict between national development and the

toleration of special interest groups like the labor movements created much of the turmoil in African political organizations. Seeking a forum

for an airing of their grievances, many labor movements took an active role in the internationals, particularly in the ICFTU. In most cases,

their membership in this organization predated the - independence of their

states.

They demanded assistance to train their cadres, to provide

services to their members (such as medical clinics and libraries), and to

provide travel grants to participate in labor meetings around the world.

Ostensibly this travel was to build solidarity with other unions and to

get training in union matters. In many cases, however, it was an expensive

form of junketing which contributed little or nothing to the development of

African unionism. The allies of these African unions were often the trade

unionists from those states most closely identified with imperialist foreign

policies--Britain, France, Belgium and the U.S. In the same way as the

Brazzaville Group maintained its ties to France in order to gain economic

advantage, the labor movements of the ATUC maintained their ties to the

ICFTU and IFCTU. In both cases, the more radical states attacked these

policies as neo-colonialism. The problem for the trade unionists from the

Brazzaville-Monrovia states was that if they broke their relations with the 256 two labor internationals, they would then receive no assistance from any­ one. Their governments would not allow them to get financial or other aid from the USSR or China in the manner in which the Ghanaians, Guineans,

Malians, Algerians and Egyptians received such aid. Nor would they receive assistance from their own governments with whom they were often in conflict. It became a matter of great self-interest to maintain their ties with external labor influences.

The self-interest which maintained this activity clearly mitigated against unity. Despite government allegations to the contrary, most

African unions and trade unionists are extremely nationalistic, taking justifiable pride in the nations they helped create. With few exceptions they resisted any foreign pressure to subvert their own governments. They , were not so reluctant to interfere in the labor movements of other states and often found allies within these states with whom they could co-operate.

The AATUF unions actively waged "total war" on ATUC national centers, often splitting national labor movements. For many African union leaders, the way to power in union affairs was to attach oneself to AATUF or ATUC subversion efforts in one's own country to exacerbate domestic rivalries.

This was often not a question of any ideology or political preference, but rather a domestic power play. The>:AATUF and ATUC faltered primarily on this point. If there were, in fact, to be unity between the two movements, there would be a number of national labor leaders of opposing sides who would be left without patronage. In many ways, the national domestic labor problems or rivalry and fear were determining factors in^AATUF-ATUC relations. 257

Subversion and Cold War

There is one aspect of international relations which is especially important in understanding the development of Pan-African institutions, sub­ version. In virtually every country in Africa since 1960 there have been efforts made to assassinate political leaders or to force them to resign through a coup. The AAPO and the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs are most famous for these efforts, but they are, in no way, the only perpetra­ tors. In fact, in this effort at subversion, the close ties between Pan-

African labor and Pan-African political movements become the most clear.

The United States and the USSR have both used their financial might and povert power to bolster various Pan-African labor movements to achieve their desired political aims in Africa. The Cold War in Africa has been fought through the Pan-African labor movements. Of course the

French, British, Chinese and other nations have been involved in this effort as well, but the principal contenders have been the U.S. and the

USSR.

The USSR has traditionally worked through the WFTU in its labor activities outside the territory of the USSR. It is a communist-led, communist-staffed and communist-financed labor confederation, headquartered in Prague. One of its principal Western affiliates has always been the

French CGT. The CGT, as has been stated, was for many years the chief labor organization in francophone Africa. The WFTU and the CGT were the sponsors of the training schools in Conakry and Bamako, as well as the

GEC's which sponsored cadre training throughout the AEF and the AOF. The

UGTAN break with the CGT and the French Communists in 1956 left the WFTU virtually without affiliates in Africa. The WFTU encouraged this: ✓

258

Pro-Communist federations directly affiliated to the WFTU were dis­ couraged in favor of close co-operation with non-aligned national and Pan-African centers...Between 1957 and 1962, the WFTU came out strongly in favor of the two major non-aligned federations operating in Africa - the Confederation of Arab Trade Unions, based in Cairo and covering North Africa and the Middle East, and the All-African Trade Union Federation.1

The WFTU concentrated on giving support to the ICATU and the AATUF

through covert financing of the Egyptian and Ghanaian governments. The

ICATU is outside the scope of this study, but an examination of the AATUF

gives a fairly good picture of both. As a result of the coup which deposed

Nkrumah, many of the AATUF records were opened by the Ghanaian government

and their contents published. Some interesting facts were brought to light.

The Ghanaian TUC had a mysterious third.account which was unre­

ported to the GTUC membership. The money which came through WFTU auspices

was received by the Government of Ghana and transferred to the account of

the Bureau of African Affairs. The supervision of this Bureau was con­

ducted by a special President's African Affairs Committee. When the money

was to be used for labor purposes, the secret third account of the GTUC

was used. The vehicle for the GTUC African labor initiatives was the

AATUF. On June 22, 1964 John Tettegah wrote to Kwame Nkrumah outlining

this:

There can be no doubt that Ghana will now give AATUF its political direction. Our Accra-based headquarters will only serve as a sub­ terfuge apparatus subservient to the will of Osagyefo [Nkrumah], but this must be kept secret. In order to achieve this most im­ portant prerequisite, three major factors are involved: (a) ideological coherence of the movement; (b) an organizational apparatus which can be effectively con­ trolled and manipulated at any given moment by Ghana... Ghana's pressure apparatus for effective continental action; (c) Our reliance not only on the financial subscriptions by member organizations, etc., but more substantially from grants in aid by the Governments of Ghana and the USSR... If the above conditions are fulfilled internally and the material

> requirements placed at our disposal there is no doubt that the future United African trade union movement will be a progressive one that will toe Osagyefo's line.2

In fact, the Government of Ghana allocated approximately 30,000

Ghanaian pounds annually for covert AATUF assistance. These funds were used for a variety of purposes. The AATUF financed agents who attempted

to infiltrate the Nigerian United Labor Congress. Similar agents were sent

to the national centers of Sierra Leone, Gambia, Senegal, Dahomey and

Congo (Brazzaville). The correspondence between Tettegah and Kamaliza of

Tanzania indicates AATUF financing of Tanzanian labor intrigues. The AATUF

financed Ben Barka's activities against Hassan in Morocco and the dissident

UNFP party there. They attempted to use WFTU funds to purchase the ICFTU

school in Kampala and, failing this, they financed the FUTU splinter movement there. Similar splinter groups were financed in Kenya and

Somalia."^

Ghana set up a variety of labor attaches in its embassies through­

out Africa who co-ordinated these subversion efforts. John Tettegah, some­

times head of the GTUC was also Ambassador Plenipotentiary of the Ghanaian

Government. He travelled frequently in both capacities to keep track of

AATUF progress. This assistance for this came directly from the WFTU.

The WFTU was not always prompt, however. It might be illustra­

tive to trace one specific WFTU sponsorship to understand the mechanics of

subversion. The AATUF was very interested in holding a major congress in

1965. Tettegah wrote to the WFTU in mid-1964 requesting 100,000 Ghanaian

pounds to set up an African Trade Union Solidarity Fund to finance the

meeting. On November 30, 1964 Tettegah flew to Geneva to meet with WFTU

leaders (who were attending an ILO meeting there). He requested the 260

100,000 Ghanaian pounds from them (12,000 pounds to cover the Bamako conference expenses, and the rest to finance AATUF activities). The WFTU was somewhat reluctant to send such a large sum, but promised that at least some money would be forthcoming. Satisfied that his request was being processed, Tettegah flew off to an OAU meeting in Addis Ababa.

On February 19, 1965 Tettegah cabled the WFTU requesting, "Infor­ mation about the matter that AATUF and WFTU discussed in Geneva on

30th November 1964".^ On February 22, 1965 he received a cable from the

WFTU headquarters in Prague stating the 9,000 Ghanaian pounds had been deposited in his name with Czechoslovak Airways and could be picked up at* their office in Accra. Tettegah was unhappy with this sum and reported this news to Nkrumah. Nkrumah instructed Tettegah to contact the Chinese ambassador to Ghana and see if the Chinese would not pick up the remain­ ing financial request. Tettegah met with the Chinese ambassador and was offered 50,000 Ghanaian pounds only with the condition attached that

Tettegah would have to go to Peking to pick up the money publicly. Since

the AATUF's non-aligned image would be impaired by this, Tettegah had to refuse.

On June 15, 1965 Tettegah met with Saillant (head of the WFTU) in

East Berlin where he pressed his request for the remaining sum. Saillant

informed Tettegah that the important WFTU affiliates (Russians, Czechs,

Italians, French, Yugoslavs and East Germans) had agreed to send the remaining money but that they had to contact their own Foreign Ministries

for the foreign exchange. On July 19, 1965 Saillant sent his Administrative

Assistant, Maurice Boye to Ghana to caution Tettegah against impatience. The 261

larger sum was further delayed and, on November 10, 1965 Tettegah again wrote Saillant for the money. In mid-December most of the money was sent.'’

These sums sent to AATUF were only part of the covert Soviet

financing of African labor movements. In cases of real conflict, money was sent directly for special projects. One such project has recently come to light in Nigeria. The Nigerian Trades Union Congress (NTUC), a bitter opponent of the Western-oriented United Labor Congress (ULC) was

exposed as being secretly affiliated to the WFTU. In a secret document

dated July 21, 1965 the NTUC is shown to have received financial assistance

totalling 90,000 pounds at the rate of 30,000 pounds annually from the

WFTU. In a press conference in Lagos on August 26, 1968 Eded Bassey

Etienam, Vice President of NTUC announced the facts behind the financing

and the expulsion of Wahab Good luck and S. U. Bassey from their positions in

NTUC (they are also AATUF officials).

Good luck and Bassey denied the allegation that the NTUC was secretly affiliated to the WFTU, but admitted having received about 5,000 during the past two years besides Motor Cars, Motor Cycles, Bicycles, Office Equipment and other accessories as solidarity gifts from fraternal organizations in the communist countries.6

Etienam continued his allegations and mentioned the role of the NTUC

political party in national affairs:

He alleged that in 1964 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union sent a sum of 50,000 (Fifty Thousand Pounds) to the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party (SWAFP) as a "solidarity support" for the Federal election and a further 25,000 (Twenty-five Thousand Pounds) for Party organization in twenty-five Federal Constituencies and each candidate was to be given- 2,000 (Two Thousand Pounds) for the electioneering campaign...

He alleged that after the Federal Elections, a secret program for a sum of 5QO,000 "On the Nigerian Road to Socialism" was submitted to the CPSU by a clique of Lagos based elements in the Party leadership...? 262

This is only one of a number of examples which can be drawn from the rich lode of documentation available on Soviet penetration in the internal affairs of African nations. Through the WFTU, the USSR has been attempting to control the political affairs of a wide variety of African states through covert subsidies and influence.

As strong a case against U.S. subversion of African labor and political movements can easily be made. In fact, it has been alleged that without "Exercise Daybreak" (the code name for the U.S.-supported coup against Nkrumah) much of the information of Soviet penetration would never

Q have come to light. The activities of the government-run operations against Africa are outside the scope of this study, but the strictly labor activities of the U.S. labor organizations were vital adjuncts to this policy of subversion. The AFL-CIO and a number of AFL-CIO dominated Inter­ national Trade Secretariats have been actively involved in the same type of subversion in Africa as that conducted by the WFTU and, in both cases, the money to carry on these programs came directly from government sources.

The role of the AFL in utilizing CIA money in France and North

Africa is already well-documented in a variety of journals, particularly the submission of Mr. Thomas Braden in the "Saturday Evening Post" of May 20,

1967. Through the flurry of newspaper articles which appeared in U.S. newspapers following the disclosure of a whole group of CIA financed non­ governmental organizations, more facts relative to Africa became clear. To illustrate this covert financing, Nigeria provides a useful subject. The

United Labor Congress (ULC) is the principal pro-Western labor federation in Nigeria. The National Journal of the ULC was financed by the CIA- funded Center for Labor and Social Studies in Italy. The League for Inter­ 263 national and Social Co-operative Development of Denver, Colorado (a spinoff of the International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers-

IFPCW) was a major CIA recipient. This League gave over $8,000 annually to ULC school. The IFPCW itself, a recipient directly of CIA money, provided the ULC oilworkers union with money and other assistance. It is small wonder then that the President of the ULC was head of AFRO, and the q General-Secretary of the ULC was head of ATUC.

Despite these covert subsidies, far more money and assistance has been reaching Africa through the quasi-labor African-American Labor Center

(AALC). The AALC is the African assistance arm of the AFL-CIO, founded in

1964. Its head is Irving Brown, the man to whom Thomas Braden (assistant

to Allen Dulles of the CIA) passed the CIA funds to combat communism in

Europe and North Africa. The AALC is a combination of the AFL-CIO. and the

U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). Officially, it is a

"Private US labor organization, founded by the US labor movement, working with financial support from private and public funds.In fact, over ninety percent of AALC funds are AID monies, although the impression is

given that this is a purely labor activity. An AID document recently

opened to public scrutiny says that AID support "must be acknowledged, at

least to the host government. It-'continues, saying that AALC technicians

"will consult with USAID mission officers, but they should not become

identified as AID contractors."12 ihe ^ID officials, "will work with the

AALC technicians discreetly and tactfully to retain the union-to-union

image. Site visits, when required, will be arranged with the AALC

technician and will be as unobtrusive as possible.AALC's expenditures

in Africa are well into the millions of dollars. 264

The AFL-CIO also rendered assistance to African unions through its participation in the ICFTU and the International Solidarity Fund (ISF) of the ICFTU. Most of the contributions and disbursements given through the

ICFTU and the ISF were decided upon by ICFTU Board or committee action.

There was, however, provision made within the ISF to give "earmarked con­ tributions", in which the ISF would serve as a distributing agent for the donating labor group. One such "earmarked" contribution is particularly interesting relative to Nigeria. The AFL-CIO made available large con­ tributions to aid "Operation Truth", a ULC anti-NTUC operation in Nigeria.

Some idea of the size of this contribution can be seen in the funds available for calendar year 1962. Earmarked contributions to the ULC in

1962 totaled $30,856.48 for an organizing program, $23,184,00 for

"Operation Truth", $727.10 for the ULC newspaper, and an additional AFL-

CIO organizing transfer of $15,000 from the Congolese (Leopoldville) account. This $80,000 total was not all given in one year, but allocated over a period of years.^ It does not compare unfavorably with WFTU contributions.

The other major form of assistance to African unions has been the

U.S. Government's financing of trips to AFL-CIO conventions. The invi­

tations come to the African unionists from the AFL-CIO, but the money comes from the U.S. Government. Great sums of money have been and are currently spent in Africa to support those unions which the U.S. Government

likes. There have been numerous interferences in the domestic union and

political relationships in Africa through the agency of U.S.-sponsored

labor groups. 265

This type of Cold War conflict in Africa carried on by the U.S. and the USSR through the medium of the labor movements has been, in part, an influence in the domestic upheavals which have plagued new African states. The tragedy is that, despite all this money and all this effort, the plight of African workers has improved very little. The tragedy of

African labor is that all the attention given to Africa has been to carry on the Cold War battle. The African who seeks from his union a represent­ ative in the economic struggle for social justice finds that his union is more interested in fighting the communists or the capitalists, depending" upon who is financing the union. The worker has no voice.

With this type of conflict raging, it is small wonder that there is little real progress towards Pan-African unity in labor or politics.

There is truth in the African saying that when elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers. There seems little hope that any of this will change in the near future. 266

^Ion Davies, African Trade Unions (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), p. 200.

^b . Bentum, Trade Unions in Chains (Accra: Liberty Press, 1967), p. 14.

, 3 lbid., pp. 12-17.

^Ibid., p. 9.

5Ibid.. p. 11. .

^"African Labor News", vol. 4, no. 280, August 1-31, 1968, p. 1.

7lbid., p. 1.

^Kweku Dadson, "How American Secret Agents Operate in Africa" (Winneba: Victory Press, 1967), pp. 3-5.

^Financial reports of IFPCW and League for 1966 filed with U.S. Department of Labor.

^Richard Dudman, "Agent Meany", in "New Republic", May 3, 1969, p. 14.

1 Ibid., p. 14.

l^xbid., p. 14.

l^ibid., p. 14.

14"Appendix I-191SFC/4a", pp. 4-5 of ICFTU ISC minutes. BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS:

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Bentum, B. Trade Unions in Chains. Liberty Press, Accra 1966.

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Brunschwig, H. French Colonialism.1871-1914. Praeger, New York 1966.

Brzezinski, Z. Africa and the Communist World. Stanford University Press, Stanford 1963. 268

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Carter, G. M. (ed.). African One-Party States. Cornell, Ithaca 1962.

._ Five African States: Responses to Diversity. Cornell, Ithaca 1963.

L National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States. Cornell, Ithaca 1966.

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Charron, K. C. The Welfare of the African Laborer in Tanganyika. McGraw- Hill, New York 1962.

Chauleur, P. Le regime du travail dans les territoires d'Outre-Mer. Encyclopedie d 1Outre-Mer, Paris 1956.

Clark, Michael K. Algeria In Turmoil. Praeger, New York 1959.

Cohen, John. Africa Addio. Ballantine, New York 1966.

Cooley, John K. East Wind Over Africa. Walker and Company, New York 1965.

Cox, Richard. Pan-Africanism in Practice: PAFMECSA 1958-1964. Oxford Press, London 1964.

Crabb, C. V. The Elephants and the Grass. Praeger, New York 1966.

Davidson, Basil. Which Way Africa? Penguin, Baltimore 1967.

Davies, loan. African Trade Unions. Penguin, Baltimore 1966.

Decraene, Phillipe. Le Panafricanisme. Presses Universitai.res, Paris 1959.

Dia, Mamadou. The African Nations and World Solidarity. Praeger, New York 1960.

Doxey, G. V. The Industrial Colour Bar in South Africa. Oxford University Press, Capetown 1961.

Dumon, Frederic. La communaute franco-afro-malgache. Institut de Sociologie Solvay, Brussels 1960. 269

Dumont, Rene. False Start In Africa. Praeger, New York 1966.

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Farer, Tom J. (ed.) Financing African Development. M.I.T., Cambridge 1965.

Fauvet, Jacques. Histoire de Parti communiste francais. Tome I. Fayard, Paris 1964.

Fawzi, Saad Ed Din. The Labour Movement in the Sudan.1946-1955. Oxford Press, London 1957.

First, Ruth. South West Africa. Penguin, Baltimore 1963.

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Friedland, William H. Unions, Labor and Industrial Relations in Africa: An Annotated Bibliography. Cornell, Ithaca 1965.

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Galenson, W. (ed.). Labor and Economic Development. Wiley, New York 1959.

Gann, L. H. and Peter Duignan. Burden of Empire. Praeger, New York 1967.

Geiger, T. and W. Armstrong. The Development of African Private Enterprise. NPA, Washington 1964.

Geiss, Imanuel. Panafrikanismus: Zur Geschichte der Dekolonisation. Europaeische Velaganstalt, Frankfurt 1968.

Gendarme, R. L'Economie de Madagascar. Edition Cujas, Paris 1963:

Green, Reginald and Ann Seidman. Unity or Poverty. Penguin, Baltimore 1968.

Gottfurcht, Hans. Die Internationale Gewerkschaftsbewegung von den Anfaengen Bis zur Gegenwart. Bund Verlag, Koeln 1966.

Hailey, Lord. Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa. HMSO, London 1940.

Hatch, John. Africa. Today and Tomorrow. Praeger, New York 1962.

Hazlewood, A. (ed.). African Integration and Disintegration. Oxford Press, New York 1967. 270

Hodgkin, T. African Political Parties. Penguin, Baltimore 1961.

. Nationalism in Colonial Africa. N.Y.UJ, New York 1957.

Horrell, M. South African Trade Unionism. Institute of Race Relations, Capetown 1961.

Hoskyns, Catherine. The Congo Since Independence. Oxford Press, London 1965.

Hovet, T. Africa in the United Nations. Northwestern, Evanston 1963.

Hunter, Guy. The New Societies of Tropical Africa. Oxford, London 1962.

Huntington, S. P. Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale University Press, New Haven 1968. >

James, C. L. R. The Black Jacobins. Seeker and Warburg, London 1938.

Janowitz, Morris. The Military in the Political Development of New States. University of Chicago, Chicago 1964.

Julien, Charles-Andre. L'Afrique du Nord en Marche. Julliard, Paris 1952.

Kamarck, A. M. The Economics of African Development. Praeger, New York 1967.

Kanaev, G. E. Profsoiuznoe Dvizhenie v Marokko. Profizdat, Moscow 1962.

Kassalow, E. (ed.). National Labor Movements in the Postwar World. North­ western Press, Evanston 1963.

Kenyatta, Jomo. Facing Mount Kenya. Seeker & Warburg, London 1953.

Kilson, Martin. Political Change in a West African State. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1966.

Klerruu, Wilbert. One-Party System of Government. Mwananchi, Dar-es-Salaam 1964.

Kuper, Hilda. Urbanization and Migration in West Africa. University of California Press, Berkeley 1965.

Lavergne, Bernard. Afrique du Nord et Afrique Noire. Larose, Paris 1956.

Lefranc, Georges. Juin 36: L'explosion Sociale. Rene Julliard, Paris 1966.

Legum, Colin. Pan-Africanism. Praeger, New York 1965.

Lessing, Pieter. Africa's Red Harvest. John Day, New York 1962. 271

Little, Kenneth. West African Urbanization. Cambridge Press, New York 1965.

Liska, George. The Greater Maghreb: From Independence to Unity? Johns Hopkins, Washington 1963.

Lloyd, P. C. Africa in Social Change. Penguin, Baltimore 1967.

Lodge, George C. Spearheads of Democracy. Harper & Row, New York 1962.

Lofchie, M. F. Zanzibar: Background to Revolution. Princeton University Press, Princeton 1965.

London, Kurt (ed.). New Nations in a Divided World. Praeger, New York 1963.

Lubembe, C. The Inside of Labour Movement of Kenya. Equatorial Publishers, Nairobi 1968.

Lynd, G. E. The Politics of African Trade Unionism. Praeger, New York 1968.

Mare, W. S. African Trade Unions. Longmans Green & Company, London 1949.

Martin, L. W. (ed.). Neutralism and Nonalignment. Praeger, New York 1962.

Marvin, David K. Emerging Africa in World Affairs. Chandler, San Francisco 1965.

Mazrui, Ali A. The Anglo-African Commonwealth. Pergamon Press, London 1967.

. Towards a Pax Africana. University of Chicago, Chicago 1967.

Mbeki, G. South Africa: The Peasants Revolt. Penguin, Baltimore 1964.

Mboya, Tom. Freedom and After. Little, Brown, Boston 1963.

McKay, V. (ed.). African Diplomacy. Praeger, New York 1966.

Meister, Albert. East Africa: The Past in Chains. The Future in Pawn. Walker and Company, New York 1966.

Meynaud, J. and A. Salah-Bey. Trade Unionism in Africa. Methuen, London 1967.

Mezu, S. 0. (ed.). The Philosophy of Pan-Africanism. Georgetown, Washington 1965. 272

Micaud, Charles A. Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization. Praeger, New York 1964.

Millen, Bruce H. The Political Role of Labor in Developing Countries. Brookings, Washington, D.C. 1963.

Moraes, Frank. The Importance of Being Black. Macmillan, New York 1965.

Morgenthau, Ruth Schachter. Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1964.

Morrow, J. H. First American Ambassador to Guinea. Rutgers Press, New Brunswick 1968.

Moussa, Pierre. The Underprivileged Nations. Peter Smith, New York 1962.

Murteira, Mario. Sindicalismo e_ Evolucao Social na Africa ao Sul do Sahara. Estudos de Ciencas e Socias, Lisbon 1960.

Nielsen, W. African Battleline. Harper & Row, New York 1965.

Nkrumah, Kwame. ]1 Speak of Freedom. Praeger, New York 1961.

. Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. International Publishers, New York 1966.

. Challenge of the Congo. International Publishers, New York 1967.

O'Brien, C. C. To Katanga and Back. Hutchinson, London 1962.

Onyemelukwe, C. C. Problems of Industrial Planning and Management in Nigeria. Columbia Press, New York 1966.

Oser, J. Promoting Economic Development. Northwestern Press, Evanston 1967.

Padmore, George. Pan-Africanism or Communism? Dobson, London 1956.

Paulus, J. P. Le droit public du Congo beige. Institut de Sociologie, Brussels 1958.

Plum, Werner. Gewerkschaften Im Maghreb. Verlag fuer Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, Hannover 1962.

Post, Ken. The New States of West Africa. Penguin, Baltimore 1968.

Poupart, R. Premiere Esquisse de 1'evolution de syndicalisme au Congo. Solvay, Brussels 1960. 273

Powdermaker, H. Copper Town: Changing Africa. Harper, New York 1962.

Presence Africaine. Le Travail en Afrique Noire. Editions du Seuil, Paris 1952.

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Quaison-Sackey, A. Africa Unbound. Praeger, New York 1963.

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Rice, Berkeley. Enter Gambia. Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1967.

Rivkin, A. Africa and the Common Market. Social Science Foundation, Denver 1964.

Roper, J. I. Labour Problems in West Africa. Penguin, London 1958.

Ross, Arthur M. (ed.). Industrial Relations and Economic Development. Macmillan, London 1966.

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Said, Abdul. The African Phenomenon. Allyn & Bacon, Boston 1968.

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Sklar, Richard. Nigerian Political Parties. Princeton University Press, Princeton 1963.

Stewart, I. G. and H. W. Ord. African Primary Products & International Trade. University Press, Edinburgh 1965. 274

Sufrin, Sidney C. Unions in Emerging Societies. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse 1964.

Thiam, Doudou. The Foreign Policy of African States. Praeger, New York 1965.

Thompson, V. and R. Adloff. The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa. Stanford Press, Stanford 1960.

UNESCO. Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization In Africa South of the Sahara. UNESCO, Paris 1956.

Van der Horst, S. Native Labour in South Africa. Oxford Press, London 1942.

Wallerstein, I. Africa, The Politics of Unity. Random House, New York 1967.

Weiss, Herbert. Political Protest in the Congo. Princeton University Press, Princeton 1967.

Welch, Claude E. Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa. Cornell Press, Ithaca 1966.

Windmuller, J. P. American Labor and the International Labor Movement 1940- 1953, Cornell, Ithaca 1954.

Woddis, Jack. Africa, The Lion Awakes. Lawrence and Wishardt, London 1961.

. Africa, The Way Ahead. International Publishers, New York 1963.

Worsley, Peter. The Third World. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 1964.

Yesufu, T. M. An Introduction to Industrial Relations ija Nigeria. Oxford 1962.

Young, Crawford. Politics in the Congo. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1965.

Zack, Arnold. Labor Training in Developing Countries. Praeger, New York 1964.

Zartman, I. W. International Relations in the New Africa. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs 1968. BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTES

PERIODICALS USED EXTENSIVELY;

"Africa Confidential". Published weekly by private publisher, London.

"Africa Diary". Published weekly by Africa Publications, New Delhi. This is most valuable as a chronology of African affairs as it reprints articles and comments from most of the world press, particularly rely­ ing on "West Africa" magazine, the London "Times", the "New York Times", "Le Monde", and "Jeune Afrique".

"Africa Report". Published monthly by the African-American Institute, Washington. In addition to articles, it contains a monthly chronology of events in Africa.

"Africa South in Exile". Published quarterly (until 1962), London.

"Africa Today". Published bi-monthly by the American Committee on Africa and the Africa Today Associates, Denver.

"Azione Sociale". Published monthly by ACLI, Rome. It oftain contains valuable documentation on the activities of the IFCTU affiliates in Africa, particularly the UPTC.

"African Forum". Published quarterly by the American Society of African Culture, New York.

"African Labour News". Published weekly by the ICFTU-AFRO, Nigeria. It often includes transcripts of speeches and useful conference resolutions from AFRO and ATUC.

"Foreign Affairs". Published quarterly by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, often on African affairs.

"Free Trade Union News". Published monthly by the ICFTU, Brussels.

"International Conciliation". Published monthly by the Carnegie'- Endowment for International Peace, frequently on African subjects, New York.

"Labor". Published bi-monthly by the IFCTU, Brussels.

"Maghreb Digest". Published monthly by the University of Southern California, Los Angeles. Contains both articles and useful translations from Maghreb periodicals.

"Pan-African Journal". Published quarterly by the Pan-African Students Organization, New York. 0

276

"The African Chronicler". Published weekly by the Bureau of African Affairs of the Republic of Ghana, Accra (to 1966).

"The Journal of Modern African Studies". Published quarterly by the Cambridge University Press, London.

"Trade Union Africa". Published irregularly by the ATUC, Dakar.

"Trade Union Press". Published fortnightly by the WFTU, Prague. It contains translated reprints from trade union journals from many countries, particularly WFTU affiliates.

"Voice of Africa". Published monthly by the Bureau of African Affairs of the Republic of Ghana, Accra (to 1964).

"World Trade Union Movement". Published monthly by the WFTU, Prague.

DOCUMENTS AND INTERVIEWS:

Space does not permit listing the'volumes of documents, letters, and

memoranda which provided much of the bulk of this work. The author is

particularly grateful to Mr. William Steen and Miss Elizabeth Howland of the

U.S. Department of Labor for making available the conference proceedings of

the numerous ATUC and AATUF meetings and, with Mr. Alvin Rucker of the U.S.

Department of State, much of the non-classified correlative diplomatic

correspondence. The author is also grateful to the International Affairs

Department of the United Auto Workers Union, in particular its Director,

Mr. Victor G. Reuther, for providing the complete documentation of the

ICFTU Congresses, Executive Board meetings, and financial reports as well as

for providing access to the correspondence files between the UAW and many

African labor leaders.

The author is also grateful to the UAW for the opportunities of

interviewing scores of African labor leaders during their visits to the

UAW offices, conventions and trade union functions.

&