Counterinsurgency in the Algerian Revolution and the Iraq Surge

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Counterinsurgency in the Algerian Revolution and the Iraq Surge ABSTRACT Learning Lackluster Lessons: Counterinsurgency in the Algerian Revolution and the Iraq Surge Patrick Kerry Ormsby Director: Dr. David A. Smith Ph.D. Modern American History The Algerian Revolution provided two distinct avenues for approaching irregular, population centric conflicts typical of the post-World War II world. Captain David Galula’s counterinsurgency campaign (1956-58) provided the blueprint for a hearts-and- minds counterinsurgency, while the Battle of Algiers (1956-57) displayed a more brutal approach that garnered short-term results at great strategic costs. Writers of modern American counterinsurgency doctrine purposefully drew from the former and inadvertently from the latter but removing the tactics making it “effective.” False historical narratives unfortunately clouded Galula’s campaign which had fundamental shortcomings undiscussed in his memoirs. Additionally, several noteworthy hearts-and- minds counterinsurgencies proved to bear more similarity with the brutal approach. The Iraq Surge (2007), the first practical application of modern American counterinsurgency doctrine and an example of progression in that it did not feature torture, owned fundamental flaws not only unique to it but also others eerily similar to those within French counterinsurgency campaigns in Algeria. APPROVED BY DIRECTOR OF HONORS THESIS: ________________________________________________ Dr. David Smith, History Department APPROVED BY THE HONORS PROGRAM: ________________________________________________ Dr. Elizabeth Corey, Director DATE: ___________________ LEARNING LACKLUSTER LESSONS: COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION AND THE IRAQ SURGE A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Baylor University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Honors Program By Patrick Kerry Ormsby Waco, Texas May 2019 TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter One: Introduction 1 Chapter Two: World War II, the Algerian Revolution, and Independence 6 Chapter Three: Hearts and Minds Counterinsurgency: Galula in Algeria 32 Chapter Four: Population Control Counterinsurgency: Battle of Algiers 55 Chapter Five: Timeless Mistakes: The Iraq Surge 76 Conclusion: Full of Sound and Fury 97 Bibliography 106 ii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ‘Begin at the beginning,’ the king said, very gravely, ‘and go on till you come to the end: then stop.’ -Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland The War on Terror has dominated American foreign policy since September 11, 2001 and has shown little sign of halting. The lethargic pace towards an acceptable end to the War on Terror underscores how much has transpired over the past seventeen years. Why had the execution of Saddam Hussein in 2006, the assassination of Osama-bin- Laden in 2011, and the recent declaration of victory over the Islamic State (ISIS) failed to produce any meaningful advances? New adversaries, new tales of terror appear seemingly every day. One thing, however is for certain and may explain the state of the War on Terror. American forays into the Middle-East were not the pitched battles of yesteryear, fought between two armies standing in neat, orderly lines. After the fall of Hussein’s Ba’ath Party in Iraq and his execution, opposition to American efforts began to take the form of an insurgency. Insurgency in the broadest sense represents a highly irregular style of warfare that pivots around guerrilla tactics and the use of a civilian population for cover, recruitment, and funding. While hardly a new style of warfare, the United States government and military were left hopelessly unprepared to effectively combat the insurgency with the shock and awe tactics used during the initial invasion of Iraq.1 No discussion concerning what 1Maccabean Revolt against the Seleucid Empire by Jewish guerrillas for an old example of insurgency. “Shock and awe” was the lay term for the doctrine of rapid dominance which used technology 1 exactly to do after removing Saddam Hussein from power materialized before the invasion, thus the prospect of performing a long-term stabilization operation was wholly unplanned for.2 It became apparent that the civilian population was the center of gravity, an idea that hearkened back to the controversial Vietnam War where American ineptitude in waging population-centric wars was put on full display. FM3-24 was created by General David Petraeus in 2007 to address this doctrinal void in counterinsurgency. He and other framers called upon previous British and French experiences with counterinsurgency for inspiration. They cited in particular the Malayan Emergency of 1948 and Algerian Revolution of 1954 respectively.3 These conflicts were singled out since revisionist narratives purported them to be exemplars of limited, restricted violence. Instead of using brutal measures unbecoming of a nation founded on democratic ideals, commanding officers of these wars creatively engaged and won over a population from their insurgent brethren. General Templer’s mixed policing and war making duties allowed him unprecedented authority in combining the intelligence acquisition capabilities of native Malayans and the awesome firepower of the British military. Joint civil-military powers were also a feature of Captain Galula’s counterinsurgency experiment in Aissa Mimoun, a remote countryside to gain complete control over the battlefield through superior intelligence, firepower, and speed to subdue opposition. 2Gian Gentile, Lecture for the Georgetown University Center for Security Studies, “CSS Lunch Series: Confessions of a Recovering Anti-Coindinista ft. Gian Gentile,” Duration 1:32:37, Published on YouTube by Georgetown University Center for Security Studies Feb. 28, 2017, 56:40-58:08, accessed March 30, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OFVsL_tnQAs. The pre-invasion thinking was that the Iraqis would embrace democracy and “run with it,” a conclusion that would be retrospectively laughable save for its tragic consequences. 3David Howell Petraeus and James F. Amos, Counterinsurgency: FM 3-24 (2006) (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2006), viii, accessed March 30, 2019, https://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf. 2 of Kabylia in Algeria. Both leaders recorded their experiences and in post-wartime advocated for the efficacy of hearts and minds style counterinsurgencies. These counterinsurgencies provided important lessons to the writers of FM3-24 and justified their belief that adopting similar tactics was the best avenue for destroying the terrorist threat in the Middle East. The narratives constructed by Galula and Templer that were used as the basis for FM3-24 were unfortunately based on ahistoricisms and leaps in logic. Galula’s narrative failed to accurately reflect what happened in Aissa Mimoun according to French S.A.S. records.4 His counterinsurgency operation had far more mixed results than his memoirs claim. Templer’s narrative too fell like a house of cards with the recent declassification of over 1.7 million “discovered” documents detailing brutalities suffered by natives in Britain’s colonies during the Malayan Emergency.5 The Malayan Emergency in this regard was far more reminiscent of the Battle of Algiers than Galula’s more morally upright counterinsurgency. FM3-24 writers therefore borrowed from the ugly, brutal tradition of repressive counterinsurgency measures just as much as the more morally acceptable avenues pursued by Galula. The two narratives that formed the foundation of FM3-24 fail to faithfully create a winning counterinsurgency doctrine either by the lack of results or unintended results 4“Section administrative spécialisée.” The S.A.S. was a military organization focused on serving the poor, unemployed, homeless, and otherwise at-risk sections of the population in an effort to secure more intelligence. 5Brian Drohan, Brutality in an Age of Human Rights: Activism and Counterinsurgency at the End of the British Empire (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2017), 8-9. The British Government claimed to have no knowledge of these documents in an effort to avoid their eventual legal release according to the UK Freedom of Information Act of 2000 and were only released under court orders during a lawsuit filed by Kenyans against the British government for standing in violation of their human rights as subjects of torture. 3 stemming from brutal means. These narratives instead revealed two lines of thought equally useless in defeating insurgents. One line of thought was well represented by both the Battle of Algiers and the Malayan Emergency. That is, a counterinsurgent must perform brutal atrocities to win short term, tactical victories and risk losing the war as news of their human rights transgressions reach the ears of civilians and political masters alike. Alternatively, a counterinsurgent can conduct themselves with a moralistic approach designed to faithfully limit the use of force and to win the hearts and minds of a population, not simply control them. The downfall of the latter line of thought arose directly from its creator’s experience in Algeria. Galula’s counterinsurgency was completely ineffective despite owning more moral high ground than its brutal cousins in Malaya and Algiers. The lessons learned from Algiers and Aissa Mimoun fail to detail any recipe for success against insurgents as General Petraeus and his fellow writers had hoped. The lessons were simply exhibitions of what not to do, leaving no definitive answer for what will produce the desired political results. Regardless, Petraeus and others derived sundry
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