the challenge of the fifth republic 141

chapter three

The challenge of the Fifth Republic

The wavering of some metropolitan officials vis-à-vis the Sawaba govern- ment lost much of its urgency when spectacular developments in Algeria demanded the undivided attention of the French government from the second half of May. The French had been engaged, since November 1954, in a bloody war of attrition against the nationalists united in the ‘Front de Libération Nationale’ (FLN). The Algerian nationalists opposed the idea of Algeria as an overseas part of metropolitan —a conception that took its strength from the presence of a million European colonists. After the ‘battle’ of Algiers in 1957 the war developed, from a military point of view, to France’s advantage but at the expense of massive human rights violations. Politically, therefore, the war became untenable, with metro- politan conscripts caught between the guerrillas of the FLN’s army, the ‘Armée de Libération Nationale’ (ALN), and the intransigence of colonists in fear of losing a privileged lifestyle. The Fourth Republic, which had al- ready suffered the loss of Indo-China, stumbled from crisis to crisis to the point that it satisfied neither side in the conflict.1 In the midst of a ministerial crisis in , French colonists on 13 May 1958 established a ‘Comité de Salut Public’ in the capital Algiers, which met with sympathy from high-ranking army officers frustrated by the politics of the Algerian crisis. One of them was General Raoul Salan, commander- in-chief of the French forces in Algeria. He supported the colonists’ call for a return to power of , the saviour of France’s honour dur- ing World War II, who was expected to finish the to French advantage. Other Comités de Salut Public followed and confronted the metropolitan government by taking over prefectorial powers. On 24 May paramilitary forces took power in Corsica. The threat of a coup d’état in Paris became imminent. With the High Command in Algeria having come out for de Gaulle and making it clear that it would not be able to prevent— indeed, was itself threatening—an attack on the metropole, political pres- sure became intolerable and the road to power was cleared for the esteemed general. De Gaulle, who refused to repudiate the actions of the military,

1 See generally A. Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (London and Basing- stoke, 1977). 142 chapter three agreed to assume the position of prime minister on the condition that the Assemblée Nationale provide him with full powers for six months and adjourn sine die. This period would be used to rewrite the constitution so as to do away with the Fourth Republic—and with it, its parliamentary indecision—that de Gaulle had loathed since his retreat from politics in 1946.2 Invited by President Coty to form a new government, de Gaulle demand- ed popular legitimation of what actually represented a coup d’état. On 1 June the Assemblée approved his taking office by 329 votes to 224, a par- liamentary ballot that disappointed the general. He had all along made clear that he would only return to power if a vast majority of the French expressed themselves accordingly.3 Since the new—‘Fifth’—Republic would mark a radical break with the past in providing for a strong execu- tive, this made popular approval of the constitution all the more impor- tant. As experience had shown that the holding of a constituent assembly would be too arduous an instrument to gain this sanction,4 it was by way of a referendum that de Gaulle hoped to legitimise his taking power. Both the stakes involved—a sweeping reinforcement of the French state and its institutions—and the constraints of time to achieve this5 meant that the team of de Gaulle was under considerable pressure to achieve a positive outcome. A substantial minority of ‘No’ voters would detract from the coup’s legitimacy and make the creation of a strong republic headed by decisive leadership difficult. Thus, after the formulation of the constitu- tion, in late August, early September the Gaullists embarked on a massive campaign for a ‘Yes’ vote involving direct appeals to the Paris crowds, a huge dispense of resources and a propaganda campaign that dwarfed the dissenting voices of a left that was pushed on the defensive. With the Gaul- lists, by then still a minority, taking control of key ministerial departments (foreign and colonial affairs, defence, the interior) in addition to state radio and television, the outcome of the referendum was not in doubt. With the whole state apparatus geared to ‘Yes’, the question was simply how large the favourable margin would be.6

2 Horne, Savage War of Peace, ch. 13 and C. de Gaulle, Mémoires d’espoir. vol. 1: Le renouveau 1958-1962 (Paris, 1970), 22-31. 3 Horne, Savage War of Peace, 280 and 298. 4 F. Rouvillois, Les origines de la Vè République (Paris, 1998), 26. 5 See Foccart parle. vol. 1: Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard (Paris, 1995). Its fifth chapter is entitled ‘Sept mois pour changer de régime’. 6 See P. Viansson-Ponté (an editor of the left-wing Le Monde), Histoire de la république gaullienne: Mai 1958-avril 1969 (Paris, 1971), 37-51. For the African context, Outre-Mers: Revue d’histoire, vol. 96 (2008), nos. 358-359 and for Niger, K. van Walraven, ‘Decolonization by