French and American Intelligence Relations During the First Indochina War, 1950–54

The “Unquiet”“Unquiet Allies” Allies French and American Intelligence Relations During the First Indochina War, 1950–54

Jean-Marc LePage, PhD, and Elie Tenenbaum

French-American intelligence of communist expansion into relations were famously pre- Southeast Asia had increas- sented in literature through the ingly become a major objective. prism of Graham Greene’s bril- As early as 1950, the United liant novel, The Quiet Ameri- States was financing the main can. The book portrays Alden part of the French war effort, Pyle, a soft-spoken, intellec- supplying money and material. And so began a covert tual, serious, and idealistic CIA But even as the French gladly “ officer meddling in badly cor- accepted military aid, they small war between the rupt French colonial affairs. refused to return the favor with two allies for intelligence This embroidered vision, information or influence. And and influence. though not completely discon- so began, within the greater nected from reality, has con- conflict between the French and cealed the true nature of the revolutionary Viet Minh, a French-US intelligence rela- covert small war between the ” tions in the region, which were two allies for intelligence and part of a necessary, though influence. unwelcome by the French, alliance.a With this kind of a backdrop, the relationship of French and For war-torn France of the US intelligence during the first late 1940s, an alliance with the Indochina war was anything United States was a matter of but placid, but it could neither necessity. For Washington, be characterized as perpetually deeply distressed by the “loss” antagonistic nor as consis- of China in 1949, containment tently harmoniou?. They were

a This article is adapted from a presentation to the Department of State's Office of the Historian Conference on the American Experience in Southeast Asia, 1946–1975 on 30 September 2010. The authors wish to warmly thank Dr. John Prados for his untiring help in the writing of this paper, as well as Dr. John Carland, who greatly contributed to this production by inviting the authors to The Southeast Asia symposium at the State Depart- ment. At last, may Ms. Alexandra Schwartz be thanked for her tremendous work in making this article readable in proper English.

The endnotes for this article can be found only in its digital version on cia.gov.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the authors. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2011) 25 US and French Intelligence in Indochina

From the start, relations between the French and US services had to be formalized by a specific agreement. links with the CIA along similar lines. often both at the same time, military men. The SDECE was whether the subject was for- divided into four main sub-ser- In May and June 1951, Pierre eign intelligence collection or vices: HUMINT, COMINT, Boursicot met Director of Cen- covert action. Counterintelligence, and the tral Intelligence (DCI) Walter Action Branch. During Bedell Smith, his deputy Allen 1951–54, the SDECE director Dulles, and Frank Wisner, who was Pierre Boursicot. Under his was head of the CIA’s newly command, Colonel Maurice Bel- created equivalent to SDECE’s Institutional Cooperation leux was SDECE’s station chief Action Branch, the Office of Pol- and Personal Vendettas in Indochina. icy Coordination (OPC). A gen- Color Foreign Intelligence eral protocol agreement was Exchange In the United States, after the reached, which allowed the CIA After the end of WW II, issuance on 27 February 1950 to operate in Indochina through 4 French and US intelligence of the “Report by the National the US embassy in Saigon. cooperation in Indochina did Security Council on the Posi- Two officers were appointed as not resume in a significant way tion of the United States with liaison officers to the SDECE. until the early 1950s. The rela- Respect to Indochina,” (NSC 64) By 1952, there were three. tionship was naturally defined the CIA set up a station in Their mission was to exchange by the Cold War and the com- Indochina, first in the Ameri- intelligence on diplomatic and munist takeover of China in can legation, then in the US military matters in the region 5 1949, but quality of the rela- embassy when that was offi- on a weekly basis. tionship was also a product of cially established in 1952. From Not surprisingly, in the minds political and personal tensions the start, relations between the of SDECE representatives this between Cold War-minded US French and US services had to cooperation extended only to intelligence operatives and the be formalized by a specific military matters: domestic colonial mindset of French agreement. This national-level affairs in Indochina (i.e., local personnel. 1 agreement was all the more necessary because French local Vietnamese politics) were not to National agencies: the authorities—the high commis- be discussed. This separation did not exist in American think- gentlemen’s agreement sioner as well as the high coming, a factor that contributed to The French intelligence struc- mand in Saigon—were many misunderstandings ture in Indochina was complex suspicious of American activi- between the allies and made and dispersed. In addition to ties in Vietnam. cooperation difficult, especially the military’s Deuxième Bureau Precedents did exist for a rela- with the Action Branch. (G2) and agencies like the Ser- tionship, however. Since 1949, vice de Renseignement Opérat- the SDECE had maintained a Nevertheless, a CIA liaison ionnel (SRO), 2 present in relatively close relationship officer was attached to the Indochina were representa- with British intelligence. 3 An Action Branch, while at the tives of the Service de Docu- MI6 liaison officer was working same time, two French officers mentation Extérieure et de with the SDECE in Saigon, were assigned to the corre- Contre-Espionnage (SDECE), while a French counterpart sponding CIA service in Korea. 6 which was under the direct con- stayed in Singapore. The Thanks to this “exchange pro- trol of the prime minister, French idea was to develop gram,” if one can call it that, though it was mostly staffed by

26 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2011) US and French Intelligence in Indochina

French authorities had a hard time accepting the US presence as soon as it began to challenge French influence. the French officer Roger Trin- quier, who was later to be known in the Battle of Algiers, On 31 August 1953, Boursicot higher levels, between various wrote that he was able to par- and Allen Dulles—by then the commanders in chief and their ticipate in Operation Ratkiller DCI—again strengthened this respective general staff officers. with the Americans against collaboration. The end of the Korean communist guerrillas. 7 Korean War and the perceived With US diplomatic recogni- expansion of the Chinese threat tion of Vietnam in February In July 1954, as the Geneva had expanded American collec- 1950, US intelligence services Peace Agreement was reached, tion needs, and Indochina came functioned through military the CIA offered a new collabo- to be seen as a solution. Ameri- attachés and officers of the ration proposal, which the can operators took positions in Pacific Command (PACOM) in French government accepted. the Seno Base in Laos because Hawaii. Some officers of the Although the details of this new the Okinawa stations were too CIA appeared to have been arrangement are not clear, far away to intercept Chinese posted to the embassy, but oth- French documentation indi- radio broadcasts coming from ers occupied positions in organi- cates that Colonel Belleux and South China. 10 zations like the Special Edward Lansdale’s Saigon Mili- Technical and Economic Mis- tary Mission (SMM) were to The Korean War and the sion (STEM). The STEM was establish this future armistice that stopped the managed in 1951 by Robert collaboration. 8 But the end of fighting had demonstrated the Blum, a man close to the CIA the war led to further reexami- importance of obtaining intelli- who that year also became pres- nation of the relationship and a gence about China. Indochina, ident of the Committee for a resumption of conflicts with as a Cold War battleground, Free Asia. 12 The committee was French officers who struggled provided a window onto Chi- dedicated to sustaining the against US agencies during the nese possibilities and inten- struggle of independent states tremendously complex political tions. In these more against communism as well as game in Saigon during international aspects of intelli- colonialism. From a French per- 1954–55. 9 gence collaboration, French- spective, Blum’s views were American intelligence relations easily seen to be verging on On the technical intelligence operated relatively smoothly. It Francophobia and to be under- collection level, a close collabo- would be a different picture at mining French influence in the ration was crafted before the the local level in Vietnam. region. General de Lattre de Geneva Agreement between the Tassigny, who held the ranks of SDECE’s COMINT component, high commissioner as well as the STR, and the young Relations with French commander in chief, expressly National Security Agency, Indochina authorities obtained Blum’s reposting. As which had been established late The CIA analyst of Vietnam- de Lattre’s intervention shows, in 1952. Paris and Washington ese affairs George W. Allen French authorities had a hard had agreed to exchange COM- recalled in his book None So time accepting the US presence INT data, pushing the Service Blind that day-to-day relation- as soon as it began to challenge Technique de Recherche (STR) ships between French G2 offi- French influence. and the NSA to work together cers and their foreign By January 1951 a foreign in a kind of intelligence “pool” counterparts were good, 11 but against a relatively new Cold he seemed to have missed how affairs section had been cre- War target, China. different feelings were at the ated within the Secrétariat Per-

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2011) 27 US and French Intelligence in Indochina

Salan denounced the state of relations between French officers and foreign representatives. The “rumors” they collected, he said, were sent back and could be used against French in- Expeditionary Force Com- mander, General Raoul Salan terests. (1952–53), which can be traced in his personal notes. During manent de la Défense Nationale Indochina. But some were not his tenure, Salan denounced (SPDN)—a joint civilian-mili- satisfied by the quality or the the state of relations between tary council de Lattre initiated quantity of the data and French officers and foreign rep- to coordinate top-level national searched for more by round- resentatives. The “rumors” they security issues in Indo- about means. 14 According to a collected, he said, were sent china—to smooth out collabora- US consulate member, the back and could be used against tion between military attachés. State Department in particular French interests.17 Expedition- It was supposed to facilitate the was discontented with reports ary Force policy required exchange of intelligence data as of the military attachés and put French officers to make contact well as to control it. This unit pressure on them to improve. 15 with military security when- organized daily meetings in For instance, a Sûreté (the ever they met foreigners, even which the French G2 took bear- French political police in Indo- allies. As a result, 1952 was the ings of the military situation china) report from 1952 attests worst year in relations between and answered questions from that US representatives at the the two countries. It resulted in the US side.13 Nevertheless, all Hanoi Consulate bitterly com- an extreme poverty of Ameri- sensitive issues were scrupu- plained about the French, who can reports—probably wors- lously kept secret and away were overtly reluctant to help ened by the relatively weak from American ears. them solve the problem. 16 understanding of French among US intelligence operatives and Theoretically, this unit was This lack of cooperation was a lack of other, non-French- supposed to be the exclusive quite typical for the period and speaking sources, at least intelligence channel between was the result of the perspec- according to French archives. 18 French forces and their allies in tives, if not policy, of the French

Left, General de Lattre de Tassigny, French high commissioner and commander in chief in Indochina with Emperor Bao Dai on 1 January 1951. (image © Raymond Reuter/Sygma/Corbis). Right, Generals Raoul Salan and Rene Cogny reviewing troops on Salan’s final departure from Vietnam, October 1954. (image ©Bettmann/Corbis).

28 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2011) US and French Intelligence in Indochina

In the minds of many French, these incidents were proof that the United States was playing both sides. A second problem for the French authorities was the US practice of making contact with from his technical services. For tion, it had became obvious that Vietnamese personalities. This example, in the middle of 1953, the United States, through OSS activity brought suspicion upon Navarre wanted US help to Major Archimedes Patti’s mis- the CIA and triggered closer increase airborne collection. In sion in Hanoi, had given weap- surveillance of US representa- compensation, the Americans ons to the fledgling Viet Minh tives. The agreement theoreti- wanted the results of surveil- —Patti was present at the dec- cally excluded political affairs, lance conducted in South laration of Vietnam’s indepen- but as the United States China. Navarre at first refused, dence. In the minds of many started to look for intelligence in order to protect his COM- French, these incidents were in a broader context, its offi- INT organization, then his most proof that the United States cers started to get in touch with important intelligence service.23 was playing both sides. 25 some murky Chinese and Viet- But when he became privy to namese personalities, includ- the secret SDECE-NSA agree- The Bottom Line in Foreign ing Trinh Minh The—a Cao Dai ment mentioned above, he Intelligence Collection. defector in South Vietnam 19— finally agreed to the terms—he Differing French visions of the or Ngo Dinh Nhu—Diem’s was probably also under pres- purpose of intelligence collabo- brother. 20 The French political sure from Paris. At the same ration virtually assured ten- police thus reported the consti- time, according to Vietnam his- sion. For SDECE headquarters tution of a cell composed of a torian John Prados, the French in Paris, the Indochina War was dozen Chinese and Vietnamese proposed an agreement with another front of the Cold close to the US consul in north- CIA over the control of South War—like Germany or ern Vietnam. 21 It also appeared Vietnamese confessional sects Korea—and the collaboration that the Chinese had been in exchange for financial aid. 24 with US intelligence services given a radio transmitter. Some was natural and necessary. In Vietnamese and Chinese peo- In sum, two main factors Vietnam, the French high com- ple met the US representative explain the mediocrity of the mand had a “local vision” and directly and provided informa- US-French collaboration. First, protected its own interests, tion, although their reports French local authorities in which led to treatment of US were usually seen as biased.22 Indochina continuously tried to intelligence as a rival. Ulti- General Salan, as well as many retain control of the conduct of mately, despite the problems of officers and civil servants in the the war. The French could 1952, local opposition to cooper- country, could not stand the accept material and financial ation was overcome at the insis- maneuvers, and the intelli- aid, but it rejected interference tence of Paris. If de Lattre or gence relationship under Salan in its Indochina policy. Salan were both wary of US came close to breaking down. intentions in Indochina, they Second is the behavior of Gen- nonetheless accepted and initi- With General Henri Navarre, eral Salan, which in turn may ated Western intelligence who took over from Salan in have grown out of lingering exchanges agreed upon in Sin- 1953, relations were simpler anger over the killing in 1945 gapore in 1951. And, in this because he recognized the by the Viet Minh of a French game, France was the main degree to which his forces were officer in the presence of an beneficiary because what the dependent on the United OSS officer, who allegedly British and Americans offered States. But he was still reluc- declared himself a neutral and filled out their intelligence tant to provide intelligence refused to intervene. In addi- analysis.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2011) 29 US and French Intelligence in Indochina

One of the officers dropped into Southeast Asia late in the war, Col. Jean Sassi, and others started to apply the counterguerrilla skills acquired in Europe and briefly applied against the Jap- most heavily infiltrated by Viet Minh maquis. anese to fight the fledgling Viet Minh. Signs of this French-Ameri- Action Branches: From teams were known as can collaboration on counter- French-operated to CIA- Jedburghs. 26 guerrilla issues can be traced back to 1950. Secretary of State funded Counter-maquis in In the jungle war against the Dean Acheson outlined its fea- Indochina Japanese in the Pacific, the tures in a memorandum to the On the operational level, the Allies had tried to use similar National Security Council enti- French and American covert techniques. Two examples are tled “Collaboration with action branches cooperated a Orde Wingate’s Chindits in friendly governments on opera- great deal in the then rela- Burma and the British-led tions against guerrillas.” 29 tively young field of counter- Force 136 in Southeast Asia. 27 guerrilla operations. In Indo- French units were used in the While there has been a china, the Action Branch of the same way in Indochina, certain amount of SDECE was probably one of the although not until the Japa- exchanges of views most advanced and innovative nese were in retreat.28 between military repre- services in the French military. sentatives, as in the case But it is generally unknown With the defeat of the Japa- of…the French in South- that its main innovation, the nese and the rise of the Viet east Asia, it does appear use of what were essentially Minh, one of the officers that an organized effort guerrilla forces to counter guer- dropped into Southeast Asia has been made to pool rillas opposing established late in the war, Col. Jean Sassi, information, skills and rule—which proved to be semi- and others started to apply the techniques among the nal in the future of counterin- counterguerrilla skills acquired friendly nations who have surgency strategy across the in Europe and briefly applied a common interest in world—was closely linked to US against the Japanese to fight defeating this kind of intelligence in Indochina. the fledgling Viet Minh, which [communist] activity. was itself organizing into The French-American Birth maquis. In effect, the French On the ground, those of the GCMA aimed to use guerrilla warfare “exchanges,” as Acheson put it, The roots of French-American techniques to mount counter- were performed by intelligence collaboration in irregular war- guerilla operations in the rear service officers on both sides. fare operations can, of course, of the Viet Minh-controlled Indeed, it appears that CIA be found in WW II, as many areas. may have introduced a “coun- French, US, and British intelli- ter-maquis” plan as early as gence operatives had fought in However, material (planes and May 1950, when the French the French Resistance, with weapons) and money (to pay were setting up their SDECE Americans often parachuting local countermaquisards) were station in Indochina. into France from England to required, and the French did Mystery surrounds the actual activate guerrilla networks of not have much. It was in this identity of the person who made resisters known as maquis. In environment that the United the proposal. Memoirs of France, these joint British- States arrived with a proposal Frenchmen in the SDECE American-French guerrilla to activate countermaquis in Tonkin, the part of Indochina (Trinquier, Aussaresses or Puy- Montbrun) 30 assert that

30 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2011) US and French Intelligence in Indochina

Although this US effort to establish a bilateral countermaquis effort appears to have failed, the French nevertheless went Edward G. Lansdale made the ahead on their own. proposal floated in May 1950. This seems unlikely, as Lans- dale, who was still a captain in rated by documents in French Richard G. Stilwell, a future the Air Force at the time and archives,34 he was sent to commander of UN forces in just beginning to achieve some Saigon to establish a Franco- Korea, had been temporarily success in the Philippines with American collaboration on attached to the CIA and would Magsaysay,31 would not have counterguerrilla issues. The supervise the American-led had the stature to propose a plan, supposedly decided upon training. program of this scope. Further- by Allen Dulles himself, was to more, a search of French have Though the French were ini- archives shows that Lansdale tially cautious about Saint did not visit Vietnam until 1953 Vietnamese “irregulars” Phalle because he would not with Maj. Gen. John O’Daniel trained by the Ameri- tell them he came on CIA’s and returned with the Saigon cans…. The Americans behalf—French archives talk of military mission in 1954. It selected would have had some “obscure American orga- seems likely that the French guerrilla warfare experi- nizations” that appointed memoirists may have confused ence during the [Second him—they finally reached an the early period of 1950–1951 World] war. They would agreement in principle when and the later one of 1954–1955, train the Vietnamese, par- they understood on whose when Lansdale was indeed the ticularly the so-called behalf Saint Phalle was “omnipotent American” who Montagnards…. The Viet- preaching. 36 traumatized the French mili- namese troops led by tary at the end of the war. This Americans would then be But the plan quickly fizzled confusion may tells us a lot turned over to the French out when General de Lattre about the climate of suspicion high command that took over in December 1950. and continuous fantasy that would fit these irregular Characteristically, de Lattre weighed on the two relation- units into their military feared the Americans would ship of the two allies. strategy. 35 meddle too much in French business and oppose the plan. If it was not Lansdale, then Saint Phalle was well aware He first obtained Saint Phalle’s who? In a memoir published in that his “Far Eastern military expulsion from the country. 37 2003, Thibaut de Saint Phalle experience” behind Japanese Then, at the 1951 Singapore claims to have carried the lines played a great deal in his conference de Lattre managed proposal. 32 Saint Phalle—with appointment for this mission to oust the CIA from the coun- an ancient French heritage but and his selection further estab- termaquis project entirely. 38 a US citizen and WWII OSS lishes the role of World War II Letters and telegrams from his operative in China—negotiated experience in the framing of personal archives reveal that he on behalf of CIA in 1950 with counterguerrilla ideas. violently opposed the project the French high commissioner and stated that his priority was to Vietnam Léon Pignon and The CIA plan was elaborated to “avoid the Americans’ stick- Maurice Belleux, the head of jointly by Saint Phalle and a ing their nose in his business” the SDECE in Indochina. very pro-American French and that “the secret goal of the intelligence officer, Col. Jean Americans was the realization According to Saint Phalle’s Carbonel, who would play a of a guerrilla system that they account, 33 which is corrobo- later role in this story. Lt. Col. controlled.”39

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2011) 31 US and French Intelligence in Indochina

But the most impressive instance of SMM use of French methods was the very idea of countermaquis. Civic Action Teams, which were, like the GAMOs, sup- Although this US effort to (TRIM). According to Lansdale, posed “to go out in the country- establish a bilateral counter- who seemed very enthusiastic side and work in the villages to maquis effort appears to have about it in the beginning, the foster self-rule, self-develop- failed, the French nevertheless TRIM 43 was a French-Ameri- ment and self-defense.”48 This went ahead on their own, inter- can institution that aimed “to kind of activity, resembling the nalizing it into the French mili- push French and Americans to usual practice of the Viet Minh tary as what would later be work together to help the Viet- peasant-soldiers, will be found called the GCMA (Groupes namese to take the control of again in the Revolutionary Commandos Mixtes their own affairs.” 44 The official Development set up by Tom Aéroportés), 40 an impressive US Army history of the period Donohue in 1964, then in the countermaquis network—in the describes it as a joint training Civil Operations and Revolu- Tonkin and Laos High- institution intended to improve tionary Development Support lands—some of which the the ability of the Vietnamese (CORDS) after 1967. 49 Americans took over after the military to stand up to commu- French-Indochina War. nist attacks.45 The reality was In the words of CIA historian somehow gloomier, as the Thomas Ahern in his study of French and the Americans CIA pacification programs: The French waged a silent war over who counterguerrilla legacy would have the most influence [They] incorporated sug- and its American heirs over the fledgling state. The gestions into a plan based on French pacification As the French were retreat- mission only lasted until April practice. The idea, bor- ing from Indochina in mid- 1956, when the French with- rowed from the so-called 1954, US intelligence returned drew the remainder of their French Mobile Adminis- to counterguerrilla issues as it expeditionary force from the trative Group and realized it would have to carry country. modified to reflect Ameri- the burden of preventing a com- can experience in the munist takeover of Southeast Within the TRIM was the Philippines, called for a Asia after the French depar- National Security Division, small coordinating group ture. which was in fact another name for pacification and counterin- in Saigon to send “trained During this period, there is no surgency operations. The suspi- government employees doubt about Col. Edward G. cions caused by political into the provinces to set Lansdale’s involvement in conditions and power struggles up a government at the French-American collaboration made for an uneasy collabora- level and connect it to the 50 as head of the so-called Saigon tion between the French and national government.” Military Mission (SMM), 41 “a the Americans.46 Nevertheless, But the most impressive covert group…entirely sepa- the mission allowed Lansdale to instance of SMM use of French rate from the regular CIA learn French know-how in methods was the very idea of station.” 42 The SMM fit in the counterinsurgency, in the form countermaquis. The appropria- framework of the Military of the Mobile Administrative tion of this operational strat- Assistance Advisory Group. For Groups (GAMOs—Groupe- egy is owed less to Lansdale a time the SMM was under the ments Administratifs Mobiles than to his controversial sec- cover of the Training Relations Opérationnels),47 from which he and Instruction Mission derived a new kind of unit: the

32 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2011) US and French Intelligence in Indochina

Endnotes

1. US intelligence thinking about the implications of communist victory in Southeast Asia is documented in Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948–1975, published by the National Intelligence Council in 2005. It is available at www.foia.cia.gov/nic_collection.asp (see NIC Vietnam Collection). 2. Service de Renseignement Opérationnel specialized in HUMINT. 3. Centre des Archives de l’Outre-mer (CAOM), Carton 224, Visite de Wilson (chef de la Special Branch à Hong-Kong) du 21 au 24 Mars 1949 ; CAOM, Con- spol 23, Rapport des conversations entre Blade (chef de la Special Branch à Singapour) et Pierre Perrier (Directeur de la sûreté fédérale en Indochine) à Saigon les 9, 10 et 11 Février 1949. 4. Michel David (Lt-Colonel),Guerre secrète en Indochine, Paris : Lavauzelle, 2000, 65; SHD/DAT, 10 H 266, « Lettre de Belleux au général Cogny », 25 Sep- tember 1951 ; Service historique de la Défense (SHD)/Direction de l’Armée de Terre (DAT), 10 H 525, Note de service no. 2175/EMIFT/2 sur les services spé- ciaux américains en Indochine, 21 May 1952. 5. SHD/DAT, 10 H 266, « Note sur les Américains en Indochine », n°1025/RD/LP/1000 du SDECE, 10 May 1952. 6. SHD/DAT, 10 H 266, « Lettre de Belleux au général Cogny », 25 September 1951. 7. Roger Trinquier, La guerre moderne, Paris, Economica, 2008 (1961), 109. 8. SHD/DAT, 10 H 266, « Lettre de Belleux au général Ely, commissaire général et commandant en chef », 8 July 1954. 9. For an eyewitness account of these internal fights, read Rufus Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008). 10. SHD/DAT, 10 H 525, Fiche pour Navarre, n°3 196/EMIFT/2 sur l’aide américaine et l’échange de renseignements, 21 August 1953 ; Fiche pour Navarre, n°3 289/EMIFT/2/TS sur la localisation électromagnétique de émet- teurs ennemis et l’échange de renseignements avec les Etats-Unis, 29 August 1953 ; CAOM, HCI, Dossier 355, Lettre du général Navarre au secrétariat d’état chargé des relations avec les États Associés, n°4 453/CAB/CC. 11. George W. Allen, None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam (Ivan R. Dee, Publisher, 2001). 12. Laurent Césari, La France, les Etats-Unis et l’Indochine (1945-1957). PhD, Paris X, 1991, 501; Andrew Defty, Britain, America, and anti-communist pro- paganda, 1945-53: the Information Research Department, (Routledge, 2004), 207; André Kaspi, « La mission du général de Lattre aux Etats-Unis (13-25 Septembre 1951) », Revue française d’histoire d’Outre-mer. Tome LXXIX, 1992, n°295, 213–26. 13. CAOM, HCI, Dossier 797, Instruction n°46/SPDN concernant l’organisa- tion et le fonctionnement du Secrétariat permanent de la Défense nationale, 6 January 1951 ; SHD/DAT, 10 H 234, SPDN activities syntesis 1952 to 1953. 14. SHD/DAT, 10 H 611, Fiche n°23 and 24/S de « Afrique », 19 February 1952. B/1 quotation.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2011) 33 US and French Intelligence in Indochina

Endnotes (cont.)

15. SHD/DAT, 10 H 611, Fiche “opinion d’un membre du consulat des USA au sujet des relations du personnel consulaire avec les autorités françaises, 15 Février 1952. 16. SHD/DAT, 10 H 5337, Note d’orientation n°101/EMOTCC/2/C, 23 January 1953. 17. A US staff Mémo, n°124 in September 1951, said, “There have been sev- eral reports, almost all of doubtful reliability, that the French, failing to get greater Western support and in an effort to salvage what they can in Indo- china, will attempt to reach a modus vivendi with the Viet-Minh.… it appears most unlikely that the French would make such a deal.” This information was absolutely wrong. It had never been General De Lattre’s intention to negotiate with Uncle Ho. NIE, Staff Memo 124 French Problems in Indochina 4 Septem- ber 1951. 18. SHD/DAT, 10 H 611, Fiche n°23/S de “Afrique,” 19 February 1952. B/1 quotation 19. SHD/DAT, 10 H 4223, Fiche n°2196/2F, 10 December 1952. 20. Thomas L. Ahern, CIA and the House of Ngo, Covert Action in South Viet- nam, 1954–63 (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 2000), www.cia.gov/vietnam.asp. 21. SHD/DAT, 10 91, BR du SSHC n°7355 C-SG/BCST, 29 November 1951. 22. SHD/DAT, 10 H 91, Intelligence n°75-55 SG/BCST, au sujet de la création à Hanoi d’une cellule de renseignement sino-vietnamienne sous l’égide du consulat américain, 29 November 1951 ; Centre d’Histoire de Science Po, Papiers Bolotte, carton 5, Synthèse de la DGD sur les activités américaines en Indo- chine au cours du second semestre 1951 et du premier trimestre 1952, 12 May 1952. 23. SHD/DAT, 10 H 266, Télégramme de ministère États associés au Commis- saire Général à Saigon, n°1332-1333, sur la position du Ministre de la Défense nationale, 17 August1953. 24. John Prados, Les guerres secrètes de la CIA, Paris: Les éditions du Tou- can, 2008, 194. 25. About this question: Arthur J. Domnen and George W. Dalley, “The OSS in Laos: The 1945 Raven Mission an American Policy” in the Journal of South- east Asian Studies, no. 22, September 1991: 327–46; Henri Jacquin (general), Guerre secrète en Indochine (Paris: Olivier Orban, 1979), 162; Pierre Journoud, Les relations franco-américaines à l’épreuve du Viêt-Nam (1954–1975), 130; Jean Le Morillon, Un Breton en Indochine. Mission “Oiseau mouche” (Cheminement, Collections Gens d’ici, 2000), 178. 26. Will Irwin, Les Jedburghs. L'histoire secrète des Forces spéciales alliées en France en 1944 (Paris: Perrin, 208), 434. 27. Fabienne Mercier-Bernadet, “La force 136 et L’Indochine,” in Les forces spéciales : concept et histoire, actes du colloque des 11 et 12 Juin 2001 au Cen- tre d’Etudes et d’Histoire de la Défense, Cahier E2 (32) (Paris, 2007).

34 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2011) US and French Intelligence in Indochina

Endnotes (cont.)

28. For an insider account of these late anti-Japanese operations, read Colonel Jean Sassi, Opération spéciales : vingt ans de guerres secrètes (Paris: Nimrod, 2009). Sassi was a Jedburgh who joined Force 136 in 1945 and was parachuted by the British into Laos. He was the very first officer to use Hmong fighters as irregulars against the Japanese but also against the Viet Minh. 29. Report to the National Security Council by Executive Secretary on Office of Special Projects, Secret, NSC 90, October 1950, 5, in Intelligence Commu- nity Collection, Digital National Security Archives (DNSA). 30. Roger Trinquier, Les Maquis d'Indochine. Les missions spéciales du service action en Indochine. 1952–1954 (Paris: Albatros, 1976), 38; Paul Aussare- sses, Services spéciaux. Algérie. 1955–1957 (Paris: Perrin, 2001), 354; Déodat Puy-Montbrun, L’Honneur de la Guerre (Paris: Albin Michel, 2002), 134. 31. Jonathan Nashel, Edward Lansdale's Cold War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 278. 32. Thibaut de Saint Phalle, Saints, Sinners and Scalawags. A lifetime in Sto- ries (Hobblebush: Brookline: NH, 2003), 301. 33. Ibid, 292. 34. SHD/DAT, 10 H 608, “Extrait d’une lettre de M. du Gardier à M. Baeyens, Directeur d’Asie-Océanie,” R.M.G./R.G., 17 November 1950. 35. Thibaut de Saint Phalle, 292. 36. SHD/DAT, 10 H 266, “Fiche I – Liaisons avec le CIA”, Saigon, 5 September 1951. 37. Edouard Axelrad ( former SDECE agent in charge for cooperating with Saint Phalle in 1951) interview by Pierre Journoud. 38. Note de travail, 10/05/1951 “Série Papiers d'Agent-Archives Privées / Code 271 (Henri Bonnet)” Volume 1, Archives from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See also “Note de service – Mai 1951” in Carton H84/Dossier 308/Série B/Amérique/États-Unis, Archives from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 39. Télégramme du Gal de Lattre à Jean Letourneau [ministre des États asso- ciés] », Jean Lattre De Tassigny's personal archives published as Indochine 1951. Archives personnelles du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny (Paris: Plon, 1987), 228. 40. SHD/DAT, 10 H 608, “Annexe à la lettre de M. du Gardier à M. Baeyens, Directeur d’Asie-Océanie”, R.M.G./R.G., 17 November 1950. 41. For a long time, the only source on the SMM was the report published in the Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel Edition (5 vol), Boston, 1971, Vol. I, 575. Senator Gravel Edition, Volume I (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 575. This version of the papers was published in five volumes and includes documents that were not a part of the official government version. The Gravel Edition is available online beginning at www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent1.htm. Links to subsequent chapters and volumes are provided at the end of the first chapter. But we recently benefited from an eyewitness account by an SMM staff member, Rufus Phillips in Why Vietnam Matters (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008).

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2011) 35 US and French Intelligence in Indochina

Endnotes (cont.)

42. Phillips, 12. The mission is also discussed in Thomas Ahern’s series of his- tories on CIA engagement in Vietnam in www.foia.cia.gov/ vietnam.asp. 43. Edward G. Lansdale, interview by Ted Gittinger, 5 June 1981 (Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, TX), 6. Available at www2.millercen- ter.org/lbj/oralhistory/landsdale_edward_1981_0605.pdf 44. E.G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 216. 45. Brig. Gen. James Lawton Collins, Jr., The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1991). This publication, first printed in 1975, is available online from the US Army Center for Military History at http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/devtrainrvn/ch1.htm. 46. For one example, see Ahern, CIA and Rural Pacification in South Vietnam (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence,CIA, 2001), 9, fn. 23. The declassified version is available on www.cia.gov/vietnam.asp. Ahern writes, “…the SMM officer working with Operation Brotherhood, shared Lansdale’s conviction of French perfidy. He recalled how…one of the few Frenchmen in the National Security Division not affiliated with French intelligence…tried to shake the SMM commitment to Diem with fabrications. 47. Jean-Marc Le Page, “Le Tonkin, laboratoire de la pacification » en Indo- chine ?” in Revue historique des armées, n° 248, 2007: 116–25. 48. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 213. 49. Robert Komer, Organization and Management of the “New Model” Pacifi- cation Program. 1966–1969 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, D(X)- 2014-ARPA, 1970), 139. 50. Ahern, CIA and Rural Pacification in South Vietnam, 8. 51. Jean Kohn, A Civilian in Uniform, manuscript, 1995. Kohn was an OSS operative in a three-man team with Conein. In these unpublished memoirs, he tells of operations in 1945 in Indochina south of China. Available at the Office of Strategic Services, Operational Group’s website (www.ossog.org). 52. Department of Defense, The Pentagon Papers: the Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, Senator Gravel Edition (5 vol) (Boston, 1971), Vol. I, 575. 53. Ibid. 54. For an extensive account of those countermaquis, read Michel David’s published PhD thesis, Guerre secrète en Indochine (Panazol: Lavauzelle, 2002), 426. 55. Raymond Muelle (former GCMA operative), interview by the author, 5 May 2009. 56. Douglas Blaufarb, “Organizing and Managing Unconventional War in Laos. 1962–1970” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1972), 102. This report, numbered R 919 ARPA and classified SECRET, was prepared for the Advanced Research Projects Agency. ARPA approved the report for public release in August 1997.

36 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2011) US and French Intelligence in Indochina

Endnotes (cont.)

57. Then chief of Saigon Station. It should be noted that Colby was himself a former Jedburgh and thus very well aware of the potential of such countermaquis operations. 58. Stuart Methven, interview with the author, 8 May 2009. Methven published a memoir, Laughter in the Shadows: A CIA Memoir (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008). It is reviewed in the Intelligence Officer’s Book- shelf in this issue. ❖ ❖ ❖

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2011) 37