The “Unquiet”“Unquiet Allies” Allies French and American Intelligence Relations During the First Indochina War, 1950–54 Jean-Marc LePage, PhD, and Elie Tenenbaum French-American intelligence of communist expansion into relations were famously pre- Southeast Asia had increas- sented in literature through the ingly become a major objective. prism of Graham Greene’s bril- As early as 1950, the United liant novel, The Quiet Ameri- States was financing the main can. The book portrays Alden part of the French war effort, Pyle, a soft-spoken, intellec- supplying money and material. And so began a covert tual, serious, and idealistic CIA But even as the French gladly “ officer meddling in badly cor- accepted military aid, they small war between the rupt French colonial affairs. refused to return the favor with two allies for intelligence This embroidered vision, information or influence. And and influence. though not completely discon- so began, within the greater nected from reality, has con- conflict between the French and cealed the true nature of the revolutionary Viet Minh, a French-US intelligence rela- covert small war between the ” tions in the region, which were two allies for intelligence and part of a necessary, though influence. unwelcome by the French, alli- ance.a With this kind of a backdrop, the relationship of French and For war-torn France of the US intelligence during the first late 1940s, an alliance with the Indochina war was anything United States was a matter of but placid, but it could neither necessity. For Washington, be characterized as perpetually deeply distressed by the “loss” antagonistic nor as consis- of China in 1949, containment tently harmoniou?. They were a This article is adapted from a presentation to the Department of State's Office of the Historian Conference on the American Experience in Southeast Asia, 1946–1975 on 30 September 2010. The authors wish to warmly thank Dr. John Prados for his untiring help in the writing of this paper, as well as Dr. John Carland, who greatly contributed to this production by inviting the authors to The Southeast Asia symposium at the State Depart- ment. At last, may Ms. Alexandra Schwartz be thanked for her tremendous work in mak- ing this article readable in proper English. The endnotes for this article can be found only in its digital version on cia.gov. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the authors. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US gov- ernment endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations. Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2011) 25 US and French Intelligence in Indochina From the start, relations between the French and US services had to be formalized by a specific agreement. links with the CIA along simi- lar lines. often both at the same time, military men. The SDECE was whether the subject was for- divided into four main sub-ser- In May and June 1951, Pierre eign intelligence collection or vices: HUMINT, COMINT, Boursicot met Director of Cen- covert action. Counterintelligence, and the tral Intelligence (DCI) Walter Action Branch. During Bedell Smith, his deputy Allen 1951–54, the SDECE director Dulles, and Frank Wisner, who was Pierre Boursicot. Under his was head of the CIA’s newly command, Colonel Maurice Bel- created equivalent to SDECE’s Institutional Cooperation leux was SDECE’s station chief Action Branch, the Office of Pol- and Personal Vendettas in Indochina. icy Coordination (OPC). A gen- Color Foreign Intelligence eral protocol agreement was Exchange In the United States, after the reached, which allowed the CIA After the end of WW II, issuance on 27 February 1950 to operate in Indochina through 4 French and US intelligence of the “Report by the National the US embassy in Saigon. cooperation in Indochina did Security Council on the Posi- Two officers were appointed as not resume in a significant way tion of the United States with liaison officers to the SDECE. until the early 1950s. The rela- Respect to Indochina,” (NSC 64) By 1952, there were three. tionship was naturally defined the CIA set up a station in Their mission was to exchange by the Cold War and the com- Indochina, first in the Ameri- intelligence on diplomatic and munist takeover of China in can legation, then in the US military matters in the region 5 1949, but quality of the rela- embassy when that was offi- on a weekly basis. tionship was also a product of cially established in 1952. From Not surprisingly, in the minds political and personal tensions the start, relations between the of SDECE representatives this between Cold War-minded US French and US services had to cooperation extended only to intelligence operatives and the be formalized by a specific military matters: domestic colonial mindset of French agreement. This national-level affairs in Indochina (i.e., local personnel. 1 agreement was all the more necessary because French local Vietnamese politics) were not to National agencies: the authorities—the high commis- be discussed. This separation did not exist in American think- gentlemen’s agreement sioner as well as the high com- ing, a factor that contributed to The French intelligence struc- mand in Saigon—were many misunderstandings ture in Indochina was complex suspicious of American activi- between the allies and made and dispersed. In addition to ties in Vietnam. cooperation difficult, especially the military’s Deuxième Bureau Precedents did exist for a rela- with the Action Branch. (G2) and agencies like the Ser- tionship, however. Since 1949, vice de Renseignement Opérat- the SDECE had maintained a Nevertheless, a CIA liaison ionnel (SRO), 2 present in relatively close relationship officer was attached to the Indochina were representa- with British intelligence. 3 An Action Branch, while at the tives of the Service de Docu- MI6 liaison officer was working same time, two French officers mentation Extérieure et de with the SDECE in Saigon, were assigned to the corre- Contre-Espionnage (SDECE), while a French counterpart sponding CIA service in Korea. 6 which was under the direct con- stayed in Singapore. The Thanks to this “exchange pro- trol of the prime minister, French idea was to develop gram,” if one can call it that, though it was mostly staffed by 26 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2011) US and French Intelligence in Indochina French authorities had a hard time accepting the US presence as soon as it began to challenge French influence. the French officer Roger Trin- quier, who was later to be known in the Battle of Algiers, On 31 August 1953, Boursicot higher levels, between various wrote that he was able to par- and Allen Dulles—by then the commanders in chief and their ticipate in Operation Ratkiller DCI—again strengthened this respective general staff officers. with the Americans against collaboration. The end of the Korean communist guerrillas. 7 Korean War and the perceived With US diplomatic recogni- expansion of the Chinese threat tion of Vietnam in February In July 1954, as the Geneva had expanded American collec- 1950, US intelligence services Peace Agreement was reached, tion needs, and Indochina came functioned through military the CIA offered a new collabo- to be seen as a solution. Ameri- attachés and officers of the ration proposal, which the can operators took positions in Pacific Command (PACOM) in French government accepted. the Seno Base in Laos because Hawaii. Some officers of the Although the details of this new the Okinawa stations were too CIA appeared to have been arrangement are not clear, far away to intercept Chinese posted to the embassy, but oth- French documentation indi- radio broadcasts coming from ers occupied positions in organi- cates that Colonel Belleux and South China. 10 zations like the Special Edward Lansdale’s Saigon Mili- Technical and Economic Mis- tary Mission (SMM) were to The Korean War and the sion (STEM). The STEM was establish this future armistice that stopped the managed in 1951 by Robert collaboration. 8 But the end of fighting had demonstrated the Blum, a man close to the CIA the war led to further reexami- importance of obtaining intelli- who that year also became pres- nation of the relationship and a gence about China. Indochina, ident of the Committee for a resumption of conflicts with as a Cold War battleground, Free Asia. 12 The committee was French officers who struggled provided a window onto Chi- dedicated to sustaining the against US agencies during the nese possibilities and inten- struggle of independent states tremendously complex political tions. In these more against communism as well as game in Saigon during international aspects of intelli- colonialism. From a French per- 1954–55. 9 gence collaboration, French- spective, Blum’s views were American intelligence relations easily seen to be verging on On the technical intelligence operated relatively smoothly. It Francophobia and to be under- collection level, a close collabo- would be a different picture at mining French influence in the ration was crafted before the the local level in Vietnam. region. General de Lattre de Geneva Agreement between the Tassigny, who held the ranks of SDECE’s COMINT component, high commissioner as well as the STR, and the young Relations with French commander in chief, expressly National Security Agency, Indochina authorities obtained Blum’s reposting. As which had been established late The CIA analyst of Vietnam- de Lattre’s intervention shows, in 1952. Paris and Washington ese affairs George W. Allen French authorities had a hard had agreed to exchange COM- recalled in his book None So time accepting the US presence INT data, pushing the Service Blind that day-to-day relation- as soon as it began to challenge Technique de Recherche (STR) ships between French G2 offi- French influence.