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American Security Force Assistance Right Political Context Matters

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American Security Force Assistance Right Political Context Matters Jordanian Armed Forces soldiers engage targets with M-16s on hasty defensive line manned by U.S. and Jordanian troops near Amman, Jordan, April 26, 2018 (U.S. Army/David L. Nye) Getting American Security Force Assistance Right Political Context Matters By Jahara Matisek and William Reno f one accepts that the American mili- and resources, the United States should why the United States struggled to tary is the most powerful armed force be able to train and develop competent create effective militaries throughout I in human history, why does it have a armed forces in any host nation. Yet Africa, despite the United States (and mixed record when it comes to build- evidence over the past several decades other countries) committing tremen- ing up foreign armies in weak states? has shown how difficult this task is. dous resources (for example, funding, With immense experience, capability, When a Senegalese general was asked equipment, trainers/advisors, among others), he explained, “The logic of their politics will show you the quality of their military.”1 His remark should Major Jahara Matisek, USAF, is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Military and Strategic Studies at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Dr. William Reno is a Professor in the Political Science not come as surprise, yet in interviews Department at Northwestern University. with officials that oversee (and conduct) JFQ 92, 1st Quarter 2019 Matisek and Reno 65 Soldier with 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade’s 3rd Squadron meets with Afghan Command’s senior enlisted leader (left) during routine fly-to-advise mission, Forward Operating Base Altimur, Afghanistan, September 19, 2018 (U.S. Army/Sean Kimmons) security force assistance (SFA), there undermined domestic political institu- alongside a host-nation government that is a massive disconnect between what tions as pro-government paramilitaries has national interests closely aligned with is believed possible and what can indirectly benefited from this assistance.5 the donor patron state.7 There are valid actually be accomplished given the These arguments rest on the assumption concerns, however, that all the money political context within each country.2 that any aid to militaries in weak states and energy spent on SFA without ad- This highlights a substantial problem does more harm than good. dressing internal political problems in a with Western SFA: it is too focused on Other scholars are less critical of weak state will just result in the creation building an army in the absence of a SFA and emphasize the ways that it can of a Fabergé egg army: expensive to viable state that has the institutional be used judiciously as an incentive for build but easy to crack.8 While SFA may capacity and political willpower to desired performance. Kristen Harkness, promote desired outcomes in some sustain that army. for instance, contends that SFA should recipient states, the resources and advice There are several sides to the SFA de- be provided on a “carrots-and-sticks” that donors provide in weak states just bate. First, there are critics who view SFA basis, where host-nation governments exacerbate the underlying problems as enabling host-nation militaries to en- are conduced into not politicizing their already present. gage in more violence and human rights armed forces by reforming them to be The Fabergé egg army problem abuses—an increase in capacity, but with- meritocratic in place of recruitment points to the central importance of politi- out proper discipline in its use.3 In this and promotion on the basis of loyalty cal context: weak states have governments vein, some argue that SFA in the form and patronage.6 This approach relies that lack legitimacy and a national sense of International Military Education and on assumptions that recipients of SFA of identity. Such regimes usually provide Training and the Countering Terrorism will respond to incentives in predictable few public goods and services and are Fellowship program leads to an increase and beneficial ways. Others contend prone to significant internal violence.9 in coups d’état.4 Others argue that that SFA is effective only when there The political environment encountered military assistance to Colombia played a is a substantial donor commitment in this type of weak state is notable for role in increasing political violence and (from the United States, for example) numerous embedded contradictions 66 Features / Getting American Security Force Assistance Right JFQ 92, 1st Quarter 2019 between national- and local-level politics. as patronage to reward loyalists or to forces focused on specific tasks. Despite This is where the formalities of the state eliminate rivals. these well-intentioned efforts, SFABs shift into the informal, as state authority Almost by definition, many of the and SIBs will struggle in future SFA is exercised through a series of bargains weak state’s government officials, mili- efforts for three reasons. with local powerbrokers rather than tary officers, police, and others who are First, there are substantial bureau- on the basis of performance legitimacy the formal state’s main interlocutors with cratic hurdles impeding SFA as an gained through providing services and the United States and other SFA provid- important mission set. Western militaries protection to citizens. These alliances ers can at the same time be involved in rarely allow their best military personnel with various powerbrokers such as local the very activities and organizations that to be involved in SFA activities because strongmen, warlords, and militias usu- SFA troops identify as the problem. It is it is treated as a “backwater” that dam- ally are precarious. In some countries, problematic when Western advisors have ages career advancement and promotion these bargains extend into the realm to train Iraqi police and personnel who opportunities. Spending long periods of of illicit commercial activities, such as are connected to sectarian militias. This time in sub-Saharan African countries in drug-trafficking and financial frauds, as frustration is expressed well in a video of an advisory role is not a good formula for high officials turn a blind eye to (and a U.S. Army sergeant berating Iraqi po- rapid advancement through the ranks. themselves profit from) these activities lice trainees for their loyalties to sectarian Historically, there has been a tendency in return for political support.10 These militias instead of to their country.12 to treat such SFA efforts as a low prior- opaque relationships dictate—to varying SFA in the hands of these people may ity relative to conventional warfare. extents—the development of political have the effect of increasing the power Worse, military personnel systems in the coalitions and negotiations that leads to of particular militias at the expense of United States and UK are unwilling to the mobilization of power bases that are the effectiveness and legitimacy of the reward those who excel in their SFA du- coordinated through different forms of police or army as a whole. Likewise, ties.15 Even the well-intentioned AfPak authority and legitimacy. local government officials who oversee Hands program, with an emphasis on A substantial problem develops SFA program beneficiaries in some cases nation-building and improving SFA to within this context when Western militar- are the same people who are involved Afghanistan and Pakistan, was misman- ies attempt to provide SFA and expect in criminal networks and large-scale aged, and many Servicemembers who their partners to undertake reforms as a corruption.13 The risk is that their SFA volunteered for it lamented how it hurt condition for this support. Many times, connections likely empower these people their careers.16 the actual SFA providers on the ground and their informal strategies that weak Second, military advisor units are not have to navigate local politics that make state officials use to exercise authority at designed to deal with the “bad” politics by-the-book operational procedures the expense of long-term donor aims. in a fragile state. Despite what Western impossible. This leads many SFA troops The critical problem for SFA in these politicians might say, the problems of on the ground to develop ad hoc rela- cases is that success would have to in- a weak state in the periphery are not tions between various armed actors and volve a massive overhaul of the way the treated as an existential threat, leading to government factions to achieve order recipient state is structured, not just a half-hearted attempts at SFA to contain and maintain relative safety. This is a few key reforms. This would amount to a security problem instead of address- particularly difficult situation for the a state-building enterprise, whether it is ing the root causes (for example, bad SFA provider when some of the govern- acknowledged or not. host-nation governance). The average ment officials who are supposed to play Western military would rather worry central roles in assistance programs are Challenges of Improving SFA more about developing AirLand Battle themselves implicated in the kinds of The United States and its allies, such concepts and practicing combined arms activities that SFA is meant to address.11 as the United Kingdom (UK), are not maneuver for war with a near-peer than SFA is made worse when there is a strate- interested in huge state-building proj- to concern its military with the parochial gic disconnect from this on-the-ground ects. Instead, they are adapting to the problem of SFA. This is because tactics experience, which can range along the demand for more SFA in these difficult and capabilities must be carefully adapted spectrum from merely establishing political contexts. Each has recently to the social milieu of a failed state, which military-to-military relations all the way created a specific unit: the United States requires Western advisors on the ground to building a new standalone army.
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