Jordanian Armed Forces soldiers engage targets with M-16s on hasty defensive line manned by U.S. and Jordanian troops near Amman, Jordan, April 26, 2018 (U.S. /David L. Nye)

Getting American Security Force Assistance Right Political Context Matters

By Jahara Matisek and William Reno

f one accepts that the American mili- and resources, the United States should why the United States struggled to tary is the most powerful armed force be able to train and develop competent create effective throughout I in human history, why does it have a armed forces in any host nation. Yet Africa, despite the United States (and mixed record when it comes to build- evidence over the past several decades other countries) committing tremen- ing up foreign in weak states? has shown how difficult this task is. dous resources (for example, funding, With immense experience, capability, When a Senegalese general was asked equipment, trainers/advisors, among others), he explained, “The logic of their politics will show you the quality of their .”1 His remark should Major Jahara Matisek, USAF, is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Military and Strategic Studies at the U.S. Academy. Dr. William Reno is a Professor in the Political Science not come as surprise, yet in interviews Department at Northwestern University. with officials that oversee (and conduct)

JFQ 92, 1st Quarter 2019 Matisek and Reno 65 Soldier with 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade’s 3rd Squadron meets with Afghan Command’s senior enlisted leader (left) during routine fly-to-advise mission, Forward Operating Base Altimur, Afghanistan, September 19, 2018 (U.S. Army/Sean Kimmons) security force assistance (SFA), there undermined domestic political institu- alongside a host-nation government that is a massive disconnect between what tions as pro-government has national interests closely aligned with is believed possible and what can indirectly benefited from this assistance.5 the donor patron state.7 There are valid actually be accomplished given the These arguments rest on the assumption concerns, however, that all the money political context within each country.2 that any aid to militaries in weak states and energy spent on SFA without ad- This highlights a substantial problem does more harm than good. dressing internal political problems in a with Western SFA: it is too focused on Other scholars are less critical of weak state will just result in the creation building an army in the absence of a SFA and emphasize the ways that it can of a Fabergé egg army: expensive to viable state that has the institutional be used judiciously as an incentive for build but easy to crack.8 While SFA may capacity and political willpower to desired performance. Kristen Harkness, promote desired outcomes in some sustain that army. for instance, contends that SFA should recipient states, the resources and advice There are several sides to the SFA de- be provided on a “carrots-and-sticks” that donors provide in weak states just bate. First, there are critics who view SFA basis, where host-nation governments exacerbate the underlying problems as enabling host-nation militaries to en- are conduced into not politicizing their already present. gage in more violence and human rights armed forces by reforming them to be The Fabergé egg army problem abuses—an increase in capacity, but with- meritocratic in place of recruitment points to the central importance of politi- out proper discipline in its use.3 In this and promotion on the basis of loyalty cal context: weak states have governments vein, some argue that SFA in the form and patronage.6 This approach relies that lack legitimacy and a national sense of International Military Education and on assumptions that recipients of SFA of identity. Such regimes usually provide Training and the Countering Terrorism will respond to incentives in predictable few public goods and services and are Fellowship program leads to an increase and beneficial ways. Others contend prone to significant internal violence.9 in coups d’état.4 Others argue that that SFA is effective only when there The political environment encountered military assistance to Colombia played a is a substantial donor commitment in this type of weak state is notable for role in increasing political violence and (from the United States, for example) numerous embedded contradictions

66 Features / Getting American Security Force Assistance Right JFQ 92, 1st Quarter 2019 between national- and local-level politics. as patronage to reward loyalists or to forces focused on specific tasks. Despite This is where the formalities of the state eliminate rivals. these well-intentioned efforts, SFABs shift into the informal, as state authority Almost by definition, many of the and SIBs will struggle in future SFA is exercised through a series of bargains weak state’s government officials, mili- efforts for three reasons. with local powerbrokers rather than tary officers, , and others who are First, there are substantial bureau- on the basis of performance legitimacy the formal state’s main interlocutors with cratic hurdles impeding SFA as an gained through providing services and the United States and other SFA provid- important mission set. Western militaries protection to citizens. These alliances ers can at the same time be involved in rarely allow their best military personnel with various powerbrokers such as local the very activities and organizations that to be involved in SFA activities because strongmen, warlords, and militias usu- SFA troops identify as the problem. It is it is treated as a “backwater” that dam- ally are precarious. In some countries, problematic when Western advisors have ages career advancement and promotion these bargains extend into the realm to train Iraqi police and personnel who opportunities. Spending long periods of of illicit commercial activities, such as are connected to sectarian militias. This time in sub-Saharan African countries in drug-trafficking and financial frauds, as frustration is expressed well in a video of an advisory role is not a good formula for high officials turn a blind eye to (and a U.S. Army sergeant berating Iraqi po- rapid advancement through the ranks. themselves profit from) these activities lice trainees for their loyalties to sectarian Historically, there has been a tendency in return for political support.10 These militias instead of to their country.12 to treat such SFA efforts as a low prior- opaque relationships dictate—to varying SFA in the hands of these people may ity relative to conventional warfare. extents—the development of political have the effect of increasing the power Worse, military personnel systems in the coalitions and negotiations that leads to of particular militias at the expense of United States and UK are unwilling to the mobilization of power bases that are the effectiveness and legitimacy of the reward those who excel in their SFA du- coordinated through different forms of police or army as a whole. Likewise, ties.15 Even the well-intentioned AfPak authority and legitimacy. local government officials who oversee Hands program, with an emphasis on A substantial problem develops SFA program beneficiaries in some cases nation-building and improving SFA to within this context when Western militar- are the same people who are involved Afghanistan and , was misman- ies attempt to provide SFA and expect in criminal networks and large-scale aged, and many Servicemembers who their partners to undertake reforms as a corruption.13 The risk is that their SFA volunteered for it lamented how it hurt condition for this support. Many times, connections likely empower these people their careers.16 the actual SFA providers on the ground and their informal strategies that weak Second, military advisor units are not have to navigate local politics that make state officials use to exercise authority at designed to deal with the “bad” politics by-the-book operational procedures the expense of long-term donor aims. in a fragile state. Despite what Western impossible. This leads many SFA troops The critical problem for SFA in these politicians might say, the problems of on the ground to develop ad hoc rela- cases is that success would have to in- a weak state in the periphery are not tions between various armed actors and volve a massive overhaul of the way the treated as an existential threat, leading to government factions to achieve order recipient state is structured, not just a half-hearted attempts at SFA to contain and maintain relative safety. This is a few key reforms. This would amount to a security problem instead of address- particularly difficult situation for the a state-building enterprise, whether it is ing the root causes (for example, bad SFA provider when some of the govern- acknowledged or not. host-nation governance). The average ment officials who are supposed to play Western military would rather worry central roles in assistance programs are Challenges of Improving SFA more about developing AirLand Battle themselves implicated in the kinds of The United States and its allies, such concepts and practicing combined arms activities that SFA is meant to address.11 as the United Kingdom (UK), are not maneuver for war with a near-peer than SFA is made worse when there is a strate- interested in huge state-building proj- to concern its military with the parochial gic disconnect from this on-the-ground ects. Instead, they are adapting to the problem of SFA. This is because tactics experience, which can range along the demand for more SFA in these difficult and capabilities must be carefully adapted spectrum from merely establishing political contexts. Each has recently to the social milieu of a failed state, which military-to-military relations all the way created a specific unit: the United States requires Western advisors on the ground to building a new standalone army. Each is standing up six security force assis- to know the language and culture so that presents its own particular costs, risks, tance brigades (SFABs) and the British they can read the “political terrain.” This and benefits. Various elites from the are developing two new specialised can take years to properly develop. Those national down to local level, including infantry battalions (SIBs)—designed who do spend time to meet local people, people whose behavior and interests around strengthening their SFA abili- acquire a local language, and learn about contribute to the problems that SFA is ties.14 These programs essentially focus the intricacies of politics do so at the risk supposed to address, have an incentive to their training and assistance on creating of not tending to other priorities that will utilize SFA for their own purposes, either pockets (“enclaves”) of effective local help them advance up the career ladder.

JFQ 92, 1st Quarter 2019 Matisek and Reno 67 Moreover, the dedicated operator may be and its politics toward its own efforts states provide environments conducive surrounded by “bad apples” who are as- at long-term state-building without to insurgency and terrorism and can signed to these lower priority missions. trying to forcefully push democratiza- create humanitarian crises (for example, Third, little strategic thinking is put tion, which can promote violence and refugees) that contribute to domestic into SFA. It is assumed that resources, destabilization.18 This is precisely why political instability (extremist domes- in terms of advisors provided and host- an Ethiopian general relayed in an inter- tic politics caused by an immigration nation troops trained and equipped, view, “If we copied your military [U.S. influx).23 Yet there is almost an inherent will generate the desired product—a Armed Forces] it would be dangerous to moral hazard with helping prop up host-nation army capable of marching Ethiopia.”19 Learning about and acting an army that the host-nation govern- and shooting straight. However, such on the nuances of a complicated politi- ment cannot afford, sees as a threat, or SFA efforts to provide the “ABCs” of cal context is an information-intensive is treated as something to manipulate military training to an army in a fragile exercise and requires adjusting SFA to fit toward its own consolidation of power. state is a dubious effort because the specific contexts so that a more capable This observation points to three types organization of politics in a weak state military is viewed as compatible to politi- of SFA traps, which are best illustrated has considerable overlap. There are cal and societal elites. Pursuing such an with the cases of Afghanistan, Somalia, numerous unconventional ways of assert- alternative path may mean accommodat- and Iraq. ing authority and legitimacy in political ing some of the practices and priorities of Unaffordable. Afghanistan encap- and military affairs. Instead of formal local elites that are not in total alignment sulates the issues facing a country that government structures dictating politics, with the way the United States wants to cannot afford an army it needs to main- the exertion of control is informally con- conduct SFA. tain the illusion of control and stability. ducted through networks, surveillance, Finally, Western ideas of a subservi- A 2014 Special Inspector General for and kinship. The destabilizing aspect of ent military in such a weak state context Afghanistan Reconstruction report noted SFA is that Western militaries typically might do more harm than good. Due that without Western combat troops, try to create an apolitical host-nation to the nature of violence and politics in the Afghan government would need to military designed for a liberalized demo- this context, known as limited access maintain a security force of over 370,000 cratic state. However, this can create orders, military elites generally behave personnel to control and defend the substantial problems for the viability of as co-equals with other political actors country from Taliban infiltration. The the host-nation government, especially if and societal elites.20 Any attempt to make report also indicated that it would cost the newly trained military believes itself these actors subservient without stron- over $5 billion annually for the Afghan to be better at governing. This problem ger institutions, including checks and government to maintain a military that arose in Gambia with the aborted coup balances, may tip the balance of power, large. This is highly problematic given of Lamin Sanneh, a reform-minded leading to fragmentation in the govern- that this would take up the majority of Gambian officer who earned a master’s ment and military. If the United States the Afghan budget, leaving only enough degree at the National Defense University can adapt SFA to the realities of such a to fund one-third of other government in Washington, DC. Upon returning political context—specifically avoiding functions (for example, infrastructure, to Gambia, Lieutenant Colonel Sanneh the common pitfalls of building an army civil servants, among others).24 More re- concluded that serving his president, who in a weak state—then smarter SFA could alistically, the Afghan army will only exist was involved in massive corruption and be provided to build a stronger state with if the United States and other donors drug-trafficking, was at odds with his an effective military. pay for it. Open-ended foreign financing professional military education.17 means Afghans have no incentive to make In this article we argue that success- Weak State or Weak Army? sacrifices and reforms needed to sustain ful SFA has little to do with doctrinal The Three SFA Traps such a security force. The smart Afghan approaches or the type or form of train- Engaging weak states is in America’s will just sit back, letting the West subsi- ing provided to host-nation militaries. national interest. As first identified dize bad governance. An Afghan military Instead, effective SFA requires overt in the Bush administration’s 2002 without a state is not a viable future or signals of commitment from Western National Security Strategy (NSS), “weak desirable outcome, yet current policies do governments to a targeted set of elites in states . . . pose as great a danger to our not provide incentives for Afghans to cre- the weak state. This requires a willingness national interests as strong states.”21 ate a stronger state. by Western leaders to provide long-term Such language about weak states was The United States and its allies have support to reform-minded people in recently updated by the Trump adminis- learned that the Afghan National Army fragile governments as long as reforms tration in the 2017 NSS to indicate that (ANA) can be effective when Western are undertaken. Such actions facilitate the United States “will give priority to combat troops are attached, but these the removal of these militaries from the strengthening states where state weak- ANA units become militarily ineffective bad politics of the state. Successful SFA nesses or failure would magnify threats when operating on their own. In short, must be tied to strengthening the state to the American homeland.”22 Weak the ANA works well when Western

68 Features / Getting American Security Force Assistance Right JFQ 92, 1st Quarter 2019 Forces Armées Nigeriennes soldier watches his sector in training mission during Flintlock 2018 exercise, at Agadez, Niger, April 17, 2018 (U.S. Army/Mary S. Katzenberger)

troops operate alongside as “co-com- order and stability or have an ANA oper- favored armed groups (state-sanctioned batants.” When the ANA must operate ate independently makes the viability of and nonstate) to attack other compo- independently, they fall apart. The only the Afghan state tenuous at best for the nents of the government and security exception are the U.S.-trained Afghan foreseeable future. institutions. This problem persists despite army commandos, who are elite soldiers Threatening. It makes sense that American military assistance, from 2007 capable of rapidly deploying and handling most governments, weak ones especially, to present, totaling over $2 billion, with crises.25 Unfortunately, this is not enough are most worried about soldiers with over 1,500 SNA troops trained.29 Since for the vast expanses and rough terrain guns. This problem is the civil-military 2010, the European Union Training of Afghanistan. The harsh reality is that, problematique, where the “military Mission in Somalia has been providing as of late 2017, the Afghan government [is] strong enough to do anything the mentoring and advising to the SNA.30 only controls 30 percent of the country, civilians ask them to with a military sub- Despite such aid, pathological “clann- which are districts with Western troops ordinate enough to do only what civilians ism” politics continues to pervade Somali assigned to ANA units.26 Thus, the authorize them to do.”28 In practical security institutions, where various SNA survival of Kabul depends on foreign terms, this is a serious issue in Somalia, factions are more loyal to their kinship troops being attached to as many ANA where clan politics dominate how differ- groups than the national government.31 units as possible and its few elite com- ent components of the Somali National The establishment of a Turkish mili- mando units. But there are long-term Army (SNA) and other security orga- tary training base in Mogadishu further implications because few (if any) Western nizations are configured. The problem complicates SFA matters.32 Turkey’s governments are willing to make such an becomes more complex when one ac- presence provides a different venue for open-ended commitment of SFA to an knowledges the reality that many Somali the politicization of the SNA with ties to Afghan government that is perceived as politicians perceive different factions of Turkish strategic interests. Subsequent weak, corrupt, and incapable.27 The fact the military as a threat to their personal interest in Somalia’s military on the that the Afghan government cannot af- rule and their family clan ties. In response part of the governments of Qatar, the ford the sizable army needed to maintain to perceived threats, they empower their United Arab Emirates (UAE), and others

JFQ 92, 1st Quarter 2019 Matisek and Reno 69 complicates the situation even more, es- al-Shabaab is the most effective military Sunni protestors in Anbar Province who pecially as ideological and strategic strains force and state-builder in Somalia, par- complained that their government was develop among these various funders. ticularly considering the limited resources attacking them and reneging on earlier For example, SNA troops assaulted UAE at its disposal. agreements to incorporate more Sunnis troops at their military training center in Politicized. The failure and eventual into the Iraqi security forces.44 Given that Mogadishu, partially under the premise collapse of the Iraqi military after U.S. these forces were attacking them, some to loot—but also to send a signal to the trainers left in 2011 is not an indictment people allowed their neighborhoods to UAE about its decision to build a military against Iraqi soldiers and their willingness fall into the hands of IS fighters. This base and port in the secessionist state of to fight the so-called Islamic State (IS), outcome was more a product of bad Somaliland.33 but highlights a failed political system. political decisions by Maliki to empower The only credible Somali partner The Iraqi prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, loyalty over competence, which meant on the ground appears to be the Danab started packing the military with loyalists aggressive behavior toward a sectarian (“Lightning”), an elite Somali com- and politicized (and personalized) dif- community rather than empowering the mando unit specifically trained by U.S. ferent components of the Iraqi security fighting abilities of the Iraqi army.45 . Its military effectiveness forces.37 Such sectarian favoritism led to The only bright spot was the emer- against al-Shabaab appears to correlate fragmentation of the Iraqi military when gence of the “Golden Division” in Iraq’s with its ability to transcend bad Somali IS started conquering territory in 2013, Counter-Terrorism Service, which played politics by having a meritocratic mixed- as Iraqi army units chose to flee instead of a substantial role in liberating IS-held clan organization.34 However, its ability fighting small contingents of IS fighters.38 territories in Iraq with minimal U.S. assis- to operate as an enclave outside of preda- Since Maliki explicitly chose Shia con- tance. The Golden Division was effective tory Somali politics is only possible with stituents over Sunnis, this undermined because its origins were based on being the presence of U.S. military trainers. Iraqi military cohesion.39 Disenfranchised trained outside of the contentious politi- Danab troops are housed in a compound Sunnis found it relatively easy—besides cal environment after 2003. Moreover, its separate from Somali politics and society. for basic survival—to swap alliances from leadership, specifically Lieutenant General Thus, Danab military effectiveness is a Baghdad to IS because they had been Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi, had “zero toler- function of its removal from the nega- abandoned politically and materially.40 ance for sectarianism,” which prevented tive influences of what is the façade of When the U.S. military finally came his units from being politicized and per- a government in Mogadishu and the to the rescue of the Iraqi government, sonalized by corrupt Iraqi politicians.46 clan-based politicians who serve in of- it was only because IS fighters were The performance of the Iraqi military ficial posts. Is this sustainable, or does the within 15 miles of the Baghdad airport during the rise and fall of the IS “caliph- United States and its allies have to make in late 2014.41 When the United States ate” (2013–2017) suggests that the Iraqi the entire SNA like the Danab? That (and other Western allies) deployed their military is capable of being effective in its would simply make this militia an exten- combat troops and advisors alongside own enclave when separated from cor- sion of U.S. military training and advising Iraqi military units, they were able to rosive Baghdad politics. rather than a part of a real Somali security help the Iraqi army overcome politicized However, positive Iraqi military out- force. Worse, what will the Danab do if and sectarian splits. This improvement in comes either requires “babysitting” by the U.S. military leaves? Will the Danab Iraqi military effectiveness was a function foreign military personnel or exemplary be a threat to the Somali government of these troops operating outside of the leadership as seen in the Iraqi Golden if it is the only competent organization corrosive sphere of sectarian politics that Division. How can the Iraqi military in Somalia? Already, there have been had undermined unit cohesion, loyalty, institutionalize such nonsectarianism multiple incidents of SNA components and morale. Beyond politicians helping to and robust leadership? Or is the Iraqi and other Somali security institutions hollow out the Iraqi army, various com- military only bound to be further po- getting into gunfights with one another manders were pocketing funds meant for liticized by ambitious Iraqi politicians and against the Danab.35 This problem their units.42 For instance, an American seeking to consolidate their own power reflects the on-the-ground reality that advisor working in Baghdad in early 2015 through divide-and-rule strategies? The each armed faction is vying for control of was appalled to discover that most Iraqi future looks difficult as Iranian-backed the government and also that each faction troops hurt in anti-IS combat operations militias in Iraq, known as the Popular regards others as more of a threat than a were “kicked out of the military because Mobilization Forces (PMF), have been viable component of a collective Somali their commanders did not want to pay integrated into the formal structures of state-building effort. Providing SFA to their medical bills out of their own pock- the Iraqi military.47 The PMF will likely Somalia, when there is so much in-fight- ets.”43 No wonder so many Iraqi troops play a disruptive role in building Iraqi ing, is troubling when al-Shabaab should fled when faced with the prospect of security institutions devoid of politics. be viewed as the bigger threat since it fighting IS. The PMF represent a considerable “still controls large swathes of Somalia” The greater failure of the Iraqi army challenge, as some Iraqis perceive them as as of April 2018.36 Indeed, it appears that was based on Maliki’s decision to target serving the interests of sectarian political

70 Features / Getting American Security Force Assistance Right JFQ 92, 1st Quarter 2019 parties and individual strongmen rather than a broad Iraqi national interest. Some PMF units even fly the flags of sectarian political parties alongside the national flag, which raises concerns among some Iraqis that these elements of the national army are interested in protecting only their supporters, as opposed to all Iraqi citizens.48 The problem for SFA in this context concerns how to ensure that skills and supplies are not transferred from the army to sectarian militias. This is a hard distinction to make when the United States, Iran, and many neighboring coun- tries are all vying to influence Baghdad in different directions.

Adjusting SFA to the Weak State Paradigm Each of these specific (and overlapping) problems in the armies of Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq is illustrative of the American SFA-paradox: helping weak governments create effective security Third Air Force/17th Expeditionary AF commander (right) walks with 323rd Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron commander toward MQ-9 Reaper, at Nigerien Air Base 101, Niger, October institutions that will remain strong 19, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Joshua R.M. Dewberry) without American involvement. If history is any guide, the success of how important they believed it was for pathologies of most weak states, no American SFA hinges on long-term these militaries to develop self-sufficiency amount of aid or assistance will remake commitments to support state institu- and military effectiveness.50 However, this context, short of a massive state- tions alongside the building up of a there is substantial naiveté in believing building effort. Context matters and SFA host-nation military. However, with the that Western SFA can overcome deep- should be adapted to it. If we return to rise of globalized insurgencies and col- rooted political problems that prevent the thoughts of the Senegalese general, lapsed states, domestic audiences in the long-term defense-institution building the U.S. military must be willing to play West are unwilling to back politicians (DIB). In fact, an overemphasis on tacti- a positive role in developing good politics who suggest open-ended commitments cal expertise and operational education in the host nation so as to produce a posi- to countries that seem so dissimilar to and training in SFA does a disservice to tive outcome—a competent and effective their own.49 The idea of a contemporary most militaries in a weak state precisely host-nation military that behaves in a American strategy that emulates a post- because this may not be sustainable benign fashion. This is a discomforting 1945 commitment seems untenable and given the political context—whether for position for Western military personnel unsellable. At the same time, experience budgetary reasons, issues of civil-military who are taught to remain apolitical. Yet shows us that the stationing of substan- relations, and/or politicization of security in underdeveloped weak states, politi- tial numbers of U.S. troops—with no forces. What good is a tactically proficient cal cohesion is at a premium, and if this timeline for withdrawal—in Germany, military, with expensive weaponry and requires the development of militaries Italy, and Japan (and South Korea considerable training, in a context where that are more politically involved in after the Korean War) illustrates a path state officials lack political willpower and state-building, it is better to have them toward success that no politician or capacity to support such a force? This is engaged in positive state-building rather military leader dares now suggest. a recipe for the expensive to build, yet than being used as tools against domestic The alternative solution is a bitter easy-to-break Fabergé egg army. These rivals. Such a blended form of civil- pill to swallow, but is more grounded problems suggest that American SFA in military relations might upset those who on the harsh realities of politics in weak weak states needs to be just as focused on subscribe to Samuel Huntington’s vision and fragile states. While interviewing doing politics as that of providing specific for dichotomous relations between the American and British military personnel military training.51 Soldier and the State.52 However, some who conducted SFA in weak states, they Without developing the necessary weak African states, such as Rwanda, consistently talked about their roles in political and social space for militaries Uganda, and Ethiopia, have managed helping develop tactical capabilities and to professionalize free from the political to develop highly effective militaries

JFQ 92, 1st Quarter 2019 Matisek and Reno 71 precisely because their armies have with key actors. These qualities in turn DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 10 William Reno, Warlord Politics and “partnerships” with the state and are rest on the willingness of U.S. plan- African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner strategically integrated into the “shared ners and politicians to remain focused Publishers, 1999); Vanda Felbab-Brown, vision” for state-building.53 on these countries, pursue consistent Harold Trinkunas, and Shadi Hamid, Militants, policies, and provide the necessary ca- Criminals, and Warlords: The Challenge of Local Conclusion reer rewards to the professionals on the Governance in an Age of Disorder (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2017). The basic dilemma for providing SFA ground who devote substantial time and 11 William Reno, “The Politics of Security to weak governments is that the ben- energy to getting this job done. Assistance in the Horn of Africa,” Defence eficiaries are often implicated in the This sounds easy on paper, but suc- Studies 18, no. 4 (2018), 498–513, available at activities that this assistance is meant cess will only come with national security . 12 “U.S. Army Sgt. Gives Iraqi Police a undermine national unity and Bagh- seems unlikely since the 2015 shuttering Telling Off,” video, 5.36, November 25, dad’s legitimacy. SFA cannot build a of the DISAM Journal of International 2010, available at . conduct DIB) in such a context. Defense Department–funded journal that 13 Fieldwork, Baghdad, Iraq, and Kurdistan, Corrupt officials in Afghanistan do not focused on improving SFA.54 Future SFA April 9–26, 2018. 14 U.S. Army Public Affairs, “Army Creates need the ANA to defend them from the success rests on supporting the necessary Security Force Assistance Brigade and Military Taliban because America subsidizes it intellectual foundations and frameworks Advisor Training Academy at Fort Benning,” through SFA. Practitioners can think needed to develop and sustain commit- Army.mil, February 16, 2017, available at of any number of examples of this sort ments to militaries and politicians in ; Michael Fallon, “Strategic Defence and It is tremendously hard to sustain a Fabergé egg armies that easily break Security Review—Army: Written Statement— Western-styled military that is profes- when the U.S. military leaves. JFQ HCWS367,” UKParliament.uk, December sional and capable in a fragile state. Many 15, 2016, available at . benefits of SFA in this context, at least 15 Authors’ interviews with American and 1 Authors’ interview, Dakar, Senegal, Au- beyond distributing SFA as patronage. British personnel involved with Security Force gust 14, 2017. Assistance, February 7, 2018, and July 17, At present, the best the U.S. military can 2 Authors’ interviews, Pentagon, July 2018. do in these situations is to build a militia 26–29, 2017; authors’ interviews, U.S. Africa 16 Thomas E. Ricks, “It May Be the Top that is insulated from the bad politics Command (Stuttgart, Germany), August 1–5, Personnel Priority of the Chairman of the Joint 2017. of the state and to use that militia for Chiefs—But Is the AfPak Hands Program Flop- 3 Kersti Larsdotter, “Security Assistance in counterterrorism or other specific tasks ping?” Foreign Policy, April 8, 2011, available Africa: The Case for Less,” Parameters 45, no. at ; Hans Winkler Capitol: Foreign Aid in the Form of Military ment with these states. It would include and Robert Kerr, “AFPAK Hands: Time for Training and Coups,” Journal of Peace Research more coercive measures to force reforms Strategic Review?” Small Wars Journal, June 54, no. 4 (2017), 542–557. 4, 2018, available at ; authors’ interviews with AfPak Hands public is reluctant to return to the failed Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia,”Journal members, 2015–2018. of Politics 77, no. 1 (2015), 249–267. politics of state-building. Attempts to 17 Jeffrey Meiser, “The Dilemma of an 6 Kristen A. Harkness, “Security Assistance install Western-friendly officials in weak African Soldier,” War on the Rocks, January 26, in Africa: The Case for More,” Parameters 45, 2015, available at . be criticized by opponents for serving Ryan Baker, “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: 18 Julia Leininger, Sonja Grimm, and The Military Effectiveness of Security Force Western interests. Tina Freyburg, eds., Conflicting Objectives in Assistance,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, nos. These problems present real risks. Democracy Promotion: Do All Good Things Go 1–2 (2018), 89–142. Together? (New York: Routledge, 2017). But there are some pathways out of this 8 Jahara Matisek, “The Crisis of American 19 Authors’ interview, Addis Ababa, Ethio- dilemma, through limited engagements, Military Assistance: Strategic Dithering and Fa- pia, August 7, 2017. savvy political maneuvering, and patience bergé Egg Armies,” Defense & Security Analysis 20 Douglass C. North et al., eds., In the 34, no. 3 (2018), 267–290. on the part of U.S. officials and practi- Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the 9 Robert I. Rotberg, ed., State Failure and tioners. This requires deep knowledge Problems of Development (New York: Cambridge State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington, of local political contexts and familiarity University Press, 2013).

72 Features / Getting American Security Force Assistance Right JFQ 92, 1st Quarter 2019 21 The National Security Strategy of the 33 “UAE to Train Somaliland Forces Amid Politics,” Reuters, June 13, 2014, available at United States of America (Washington, DC: Somalia Rift,” Middle East Monitor (London), ; “Somali Forces BN0EO2FK20140614>. House, 2017), 39–40. Clash with UAE Troops,” Middle East Monitor, 43 Authors’ interview, U.S. military officer, 23 Edward Newman, “Weak States, State March 16, 2018, available at . 10–16, 2018. 24 John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General 34 Joseph Steigman, “Logistics at the Edge 45 Elise Labott, “5 Questions: What’s Going for Afghanistan Reconstruction: Quarterly of the Empire: U.S. Army Logistics Train- on in Iraq?” CNN, January 6, 2014, available Report to the United States Congress (Arlington, ers in Somalia,” Small Wars Journal, Febru- at . Reconstruction, July 30, 2014). op4/2018/feb/146795/logistics_at_the_ 46 Peter Bergen, “Bergen: It Wasn’t Trump 25 Shashank Bengali, “These Are Afghani- edge_of_the_empire_us_army_logistics_train- but This General’s Elite Soldiers Who Defeated stan’s Best Troops: The U.S. Is Backing a Plan ers_in_somalia.aspx>. ISIS,” CNN, December 16, 2017, available to Create Many More of Them,” Los Angeles 35 Ismail Akwei, “Somali Security Forces at . cial-operations-20171209-htmlstory.html>. July 27, 2017, available at ; Mohamed Olad Hassan, “At Least at . Six Killed as Rival Somali Troops Clash in more-than-militias-iraqs-popular-mobilization- 27 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Weak, the Mogadishu,” VOA News, September 16, 2017, forces-are-here-to-stay/>. Bad, and the Ugly: Policy Options in Af- available at ; “Somalia: NISA, Military 49 William Reno and Jahara Matisek, “A the-weak-the-bad-and-the-ugly-policy-options- Soldiers Clash in the Capital Mogadishu,” New Era of Insurgent Recruitment: Have in-afghanistan/>; Alicia P.Q. Wittmeyer, “What Garowe Online (Puntland, Somalia), October ‘New’ Civil Wars Changed the Dynamic?” Civil Went Wrong in Afghanistan?” Foreign Policy, 10, 2017, available at . .2018.1497314>. in-afghanistan/>; R. Jeffrey Smith, “American 36 Jane Ferguson, “Trump’s Military 50 Authors’ interviews, American and British Leaders Persistently Ignored Warnings That Escalation in Somalia Is Spurring Hope and personnel, 2017–2018. Afghan Government Corruption Would Undo Fear,” The New Yorker, April 5, 2018, available 51 Mara E. Karlin, Building Militaries in Rebuilding,” Public Radio International, at . 2017). tently-ignored-warnings-afghan-government- 37 Derek Harvey and Michael Pregent, 52 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and corruption-would>. “Who’s to Blame for Iraq Crisis,” CNN, the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil- 28 Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military June 12, 2014, available at . 53 Rocky Williams, “Toward the Creation Society 23, no. 2 (1996), 149–178. 38 John Beck, “Iraqi Soldiers Fleeing ISIS of an African Civil-Military Relations Tradi- 29 “Security Aid Data,” Security Assistance Claim They Were ‘Abandoned’ by Senior Of- tion,” African Journal of Political Science/ Monitor, April 1, 2018, available at ; fleeing-isis-claim-they-were-abandoned-by- Military Effectiveness: Armies and Contempo- “Trainees Data,” Security Assistance Monitor, senior-officers>. rary African States” (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern April 1, 2018, available at . Anbar,” CNN, January 7, 2014, available at eration Agency (DSCA) Web site to see its 30 Common Security and Defence Policy, . available at . In an interview with a DSCA load/1125/>. 2016, available at . decision” made by a departing DSCA deputy tional Army: An Assessment,” Small Wars & 41 Mary Grace Lucas, “ISIS Nearly Made It director who saw “no purpose” to the Defense Insurgencies (forthcoming). to Baghdad Airport, Top U.S. Military Leader Institute of Security Assistance Management 32 Tom O’Connor, “Turkey’s Military to Says,” CNN, October 13, 2014, available at [DISAM] Journal. Move into Somalia after Backing Qatar in Gulf . . Military Breakdown Fueled by Corruption,

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