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January 03, 1947 Central Intelligence Group, ORE 5/1, 'The Situation in Korea'

Citation:

“Central Intelligence Group, ORE 5/1, 'The Situation in Korea',” January 03, 1947, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Record Group 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1894 - 2002, NAID: 6924248, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6924248. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/220049

Summary:

An intelligence report about both North and South Korea. The report explains what the situation currently is and what is projected to happen with Soviet and American interaction with their respective Koreas.

Original Language:

English

Contents:

Scan of Original Document DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 947003

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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. . . .THE SITU:ATION. IN KOREA

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ORE 5/1 3 January 194? Copy No. ----'15--

CEN'IRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

THE SITUATION IN KOREA

SUMMARY

Unity and .independence are the dominant aspirations of the Korean people, while partition and joint occupation by the US and USSR are the governing factors in the political and economic life of the peninsula. The promises of independence made at Cairo, and confirmed at Yalta, have not been fulfilled; The division of Korea at the 38th parallel has become an almost impenetrable barrier between the US and Soviet Zones. The Moscow Decision, which provides for the unifioation and eventual independence of Korea, has not been implemented, largely because of disagreement between the US and USSR over the interpreta­ t.i on of the document and the meaning of democracy. All efforts to reconvene the Joint Commission ~lnce its adjournment last May have failed.

In the current deadlock, both the US and. USSR are attempting to strengt.hen the political and. economic organization of their ow'n. zones. The USSR has made more rapid progress toward regimentation in North Korea tb8.n the US has m:W..e toward democracy in its zone. An in­ terim US policy for South Korea was not itnplemented until·after the adjournment of the Joint 'CoITlllission disclosed the fundamental dis­ agreement over interpretation of the Moscow Decision. The sovietiza­ tion of North Korea, on the other hand, began inmediately after .the occupation, and has proceeded without interruption since then. Soviet policy in Korea is directed toward the establishment of a friendly state which will never serve as a base of attack upon the USSR. In order to attain this objective at a minimum cost to its· own scanty resources in the Far F.a.st, the U~~tia.s attempted to rrake Nor-th Korea economically self-sufficient though ~ .oli t ically subord i­ nate. Soviets have given their zone a semblance .-0( autonomy by en­ trusting the administration to a hierarchy of "people's committees" dominated by the -Korean Communists. The economy of Nor~h Korea has also been reconstructed on the principle of state control. Bank i ng, . :· ! heavy industry and corrantinications have all been nationalized. The land has ·been redistributed, and pr-ivate enterpri se survi ves chi efly '· in agri culture and handicrafts. Membership is compulsory in a monop­ oli stic sys tem of unions under strict political s upervision. DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 947003

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Although a socialistic program is favored by the large najor­ ity of Koreans, the Soviet program does not appear to have won the sup­ port of the people. In South Korea the choice between opponents and supporters of the USSR has been resolved in favor of the former in every election. · rn the Soviet Zone indications of popular apathy and discontent have appeared despite the prevalence of censorship. The present administration of North Korea has nevertheless won an over­ whelming victory in the recent elections, which the Soviet authorities regard as a popular mandate to carry on their current policies.

In contrast to the Soviet discipline of North Korea, South Korea is in a state of unrest. The food shortage is the chief cause of unrest, but the well organized Comm.mist opponents of the US occu­ pation are endeavoring to give political direction to the current dis­ orders, which Soviet propaganda represents as a protest against the interim US policy in Korea. This policy endeavors to enlist the co­ operation of moderates in forming a coalition of parties and in estab­ lishing a provisional legislature in the US Zone. The majority is prepared to support the US interim program, which is now well advanced. The more radical wing of the Communist Party, with the support of So­ viet propaganda, has therefore resorted to a campaign of terrorism against the occupation. A Korean arJTlY is being trained in the Soviet Zone, and may be expected to intervene, probably by mass infiltration, in case US forces should lose control of the situation in South Korea.

The imrr~diate Soviet objective of establishing a firm Com­ munist regime in North Korea is, therefore, close to realization. The long-range objective of the USSR is, however, to integrate the entire peninsula in the Soviet system of Far Eastern defenses. Since the US occupation of South Korea is the chief obstacle to this plan, Soviet propa~da and Communist agitation have consistently sought to drive the US out of Korea. At the present time, the USSR has deferred fur­ ther diplomatic action pending the results of direct action by the Communist Party in South Korea.

A possibility remains, however, that the USSR will resort to compromise if radical methods fail, because certain long-term advan­ tages are on the side of the US. Since most Koreans fervently oppose domination by the USSR or any other power, a stable democratic govern­ ment in South Korea, which contains two-thirds of the population, would have the advantage over the Soviet-dom.i.JJ~ted regime in North Korea if US and Soviet troops simultaneously withdre~. Therefore, if order can . ~ be maintained in South Korea and progress is·~e toward establishing a provision~! goverrunent, the USSR may decide to make concessions in an effort to .."l·econvene the Joint Commission and carry out the Moscow D~cision before ~he democratic regime in South Korea gains a firm foothold. ~

A more complete study of this situation is enclosed herewith .

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ENCLOSURE

THE SITUATION IN KOREA

The· Dominating Influence of Partition

The partition of Korea into two zones dominates the political and economic life of the peninsula. The division of Korea at the 38th parallel has turned into a hard and fast boundary which cuts off all intercourse between the northern.and southern halves of.the country, except for the exchange of mail and the transfer of surplus electric power from North to South Korea.

Korean Aspirations and US-USSR Policies Unity and independence are the chief aspirations of the Ko­ rean people. Korean nationalism is a deep-rooted movement which sur­ vived forty years of Japanese repression and finally won international recognition at the Cairo Conference in December, 1943. The US, G~eat Britain, and China pledged therrselves at that time to restore the inde­ pendence of Korea. Soviet adherence to this declaration was subse­ quently obtained at Yalta in February, 1945, and the policy was reaf­ firmed at Potsdam in July of that year. The Conference of Foreign Min­ isters at'Moscow~'In December, 1945, agreed to establish a provisional government for all Korea in order to prepare the Korean people for in­ dependence and democracy. Since the occupation had divided the penin­ sula into separate zones, the Moscow Decision also provided for a Joint ·commission of the US and USSR to organize the provisional goverilment and consult with·it in working out a broad program of democratic re­ forms for a united Korea. This program in turn was to be submitted to the governments of the US, USSR, UK and China as the basis for a four­ power trusteeship which would last "for a period of up to five years 11 • All efforts to carry out the Moscow Decision have failed principally because of the conflict over trusteeship, and Korea remains bisected at the 38th parallel. Since the adjournment of the Joint Commission in May of this year·, the USSR has persistently refused to"t"et~n its delegation to Seoul, except on terrn.5 unacceptable to the US. - ~he Soviet Cormander . in North Korea has ma.de it clear that the USSR would not retreat from its contention that the opponents of trusteeship must be excluded from the provisional gove~nment of Korea. General Hodge is equally insis­ tent on the Koreans' r1ght of free speech and on a broad interpretation of the trusteeship clause of the Moscow Decision. There is consequently little prospect of reconvening the Joint Commission in the near future.

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Pending the unification of the peninsula, the US and the USSR .re both attempting to strengthen the political and economic organiza­ ion of their respective zones. The USSR began the sovietization of ts zone immediately upon occupation, whereas, Wltil the adjournment of he Joint Convnission, US pqlicy was based on the assumption tha.t the oscow Decision would soon be fulfilled. A separate interim program ' or South Korea was not implemented until after the breakdown of Joint · ~ , . I orrunission negotiations had revealed the antagonism of the US and Soviet onceptions of democracy, and the difficulty of finding a compromise be­ ~een them. The sovietization of North Korea therefore has progressed lrther than has the democratization of the US Zone.

~ tuatlon in North Korea Soviet Policy and Political Program. Soviet policy in Korea directed toward the establishment of a friendly state which could ~ver serve a~ a base of attack upon the USSR. Since the USSR intend~ > attain this objective at a minimum cost to its own scanty resources 1 the Far East, a corollary of Soviet policy is to combine political ibordination with economic self-sufficiency. The most striking fea­ :re of the··Soviet regime in Korea as elsewhere is the stern rep["ession all opposition. Unlike the US Military Goverrunent in South Korea, .e Soviet authorities in the North have not tried to be arbiters be­ een contending factions. Immediately after taking over control of e region from the Japanese, the Soviets set up a system of "interim ople's conmittees"-to liquidate the remnants of Japanese rule. Al­ ough these cormiittees were selected by the Soviets, they are composed tirely of Koreans. These interim committees have now been replaced permanent committees as a result. of the elections of 3 November. ~ USSR has thus given the Koreans a semblance of autonomy and avoided ~ responsibilities of direct administration. The hierarchy of local 1 provincial people's corrmittees culminates in a central committee, ier the leadership of Kim Il Sawng, who has been publicized by the 1iets as a hero of the resistance to Japan and a lea.de~ of the people the model of Stalin. This regime depends for popular support upon a lgle-party system. After eliminating all opposition, the Soviets pro­ :d.ed to consolidate· the parties favorable to their goverrunent in a lopolistic organization known as the North Korean Labor Party. The :.cl of this Labor Party, Kim Doo Bong, constitutes together with Kim Sawng a sort of Korean · d~uinvirate Wlder the supervision of the USSR. " .. .. , Soviet Economic Measures . The economy of North Ko~ea has also ·n reorganized on the principles of regimentation and indirect control. h approximately one-thirQ of the total population of Korea and 35% of total food production, the' Soviet Zone is agriculturally self-sup­ ·ting. Korean mining, electric · p~wer , and, heavy industry are, more- r, concentrated north of the 38th parallel. After inspecting 601- of industrial areas of ·the Soviet Zone, Ambassador Pauley concluded t only minor items of equipment had been removed from North Korea.

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Soviet propaganda stresses the economic progress of North L1· Korea in contrast to the stagnant c·ondition of the US Zone, and revo­ 1· lutionary changes have in fact taken place under Soviet rule. Korean and Japanese landowners have been liquidated as a class, and the tra­ ditional system of land tenure, which the Japanese exploited, has been abolished. The Soviets boast that one million hectares C2,471,000 acres> of land have been distributed free of charge to the tenants. Banking, co!TITiunications, and transportation, as well as heavy industry, are all controlled by the people's committees. In other words, · all enterprises susceptible of immediate socialization have been taken over by the state. Private enterprise survives only among small pro­ ducers, such as artisans and farmers·. The Soviets also claim to have instituted the eight-hour day for Korean workmen together with social insurance, and a guaranteed minimum wage. Child labor has been pro­ hibited, and equal rights, both political and economic, have been given to women. '!·

Korean Reactions to the Soviet Program

i There is no doubt of the propaganda value of the Soviet pro­ I gram, especially in the US Zone. Almost. all Koreans are leftists by ,. .current us standards, and not even the conservative parties can be I consi6ered defenders of traditional capitalism. The socialization of basic industries and the redistribution of land figure in the po­ litical platforms of every party in South Korea. Soviet policies might therefore be expected to have great popular appeal in Korea. Despite a lack of evidence, there are indications, however, that the Soviet program has not won the support of the people·. Corrmunism and Soviet ascendancy are in fact the main issues between the parties of the left and the right in South Korea, where freedom of express ion prevails in spite of occasional and temporary restrictions on the press. The leftist parties in South Korea are in general sympathetic, while the rightist parties are opposed to the Soviet regime. The Ko­ reans of the US Zone have thus a clear choice between the opponents and the supporters of the USSR. It is therefore significant that every election held in the US Zone has given the rightist parties a large majority. These results can be explained onl~~Y a strong aversion to Soviet Conununism among Koreans south of the· ~Bth parallel. The popular decision, however, is not taken in full knowr~4ge of con­ ditions in the Soviet Zone, and may be the product of prejudice rather than of judgment . ··, ·

The attitude of Koreans in the Soviet Zone is the only sure indication of the success ·of Soviet policy. But, aside from Soviet propaganda; almos t no information is available on the s tate of public opinion north of the boundary. Occasiona l rumors of resistance, such

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· ?EGRET

as the report of rLots in Pyongyang last June, reach the US Zone. Both Ambassador Pauley and Minister Bunce have remarked on the friendliness

of the North Koreans toward Americans and their apparent hostility to­ I . I ward the Soviets. The Soviet forces in North Korea are living off the I country and antagonizing the people. According to Minister Bunce, the ! ' I Soviet authorities consider the Red Anny a political liability in Korea I and would gladly be rid of it. The alleged unpopularity of the Soviet regime, however, cannot be entirely ascribed to the misconduct of its troops. Excessive regimentation may also have produced a certain an­ I tagonism among the Koreans. -For example, the' single-party system of politics is duplicated in the organization of labor. Union membership ·.I ' is compul~ory in North Korea, and every union is incorporated in the All Korea Labor Union under the direction of the ·communist Party. Al­ though the eight-hour day has been guaranteed by law in the Soviet Zone, union members were recently required to contribute an extra hour of work each day to build up a fund for ·south Korean strikers. Discontent probably exists in North Korea, as in other areas of Soviet control. At present, however, the Soviet regime north of the 38th parallel appears more firmly established than ever. The Moscow press has boasted that, in the elections of 3 November establishing permanent people's contnittees, 99.6$ of the registered voters went to the polls in a ·great demonstration of loyalty to the existing govern­ ment. In accordance with Soviet practice, the voters were not given the embarrassment of a choice, since all candidates figured on a single slate. The Soviets regard the results· as a popular mandate to carry on their present system of goverrunent in North Korea.

I i!f.•::;:· Situation in South Korea I. . ! General. While Soviet discipline reigns north of the 38th 'parallel, South Korea is in a state of unrest. Factionalism and party strife have recently culminated in a series of strikes and riots threat­ ening the security of the Military Government and calling for armed in­ tervention by US troops. The strike of railroad workers and printers at the end of September led to an outbreak of violence centering in the southeastern provinces of Kyongsang Pukto and Kyongsang Nam:io. Accord­ ing to official estimates, approximately 40 policemen and 40 rioters were killed in street fighting in the Taegu and Pusan areas at the be- g inning of October. Property losses totalled millions of yen, while arrests numbered 3,782. US troops were occasionai}y· ferced to fire into the mobs during the course of these disturbances. ·~uiet was tem­ porarily restored toward the middle of October, as the strikers gradu­ ally returned to work. · A.. recrudescence of unrest set in, ·however, to­ ward the end of the month, while the scene shifted from the southeast to the southwest and to the area about Seoul. An uprising in the cap­ ital, scheduled for 22 October, was prevented by timely action on the part of the Military Gov~rnment. The end of these. disorders is not yet

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f ~ I ·l . in sight, and reports continue to come in of attempted assassination and sabotage. General Hodge has publicly accused the Communists of fo­ menting insurrection against the Military Government in order to break up the unification of the right and the left and block the establish­ I: I ment of a provisional legislature in South Korea. Soviet propaganda implicitly agrees with this interpretation by ascribing the agitation to popular discontent with the "attempts of the American administration to manufacture· an 'independent government' of southern Korea with reac­ tionary elements."

Economic Situation. The basic cause of the current disorders in South Korea is perhaps less political than economic. Like other oc­ cupied areas, the US Zone in Korea suffers from scarcity and inflation. Cormnmist leadership has only exploited the discontent aroused by want . The food situation in South Korea has been critical ever since last June when floods spoiled the sWTITler grain crop. The free market in grain I . which the Military Government maintained last winter permitted a waste­ I' ful distribution of existing reserves of rice. Food controls were put I ~· into effect last March, too late to prevent a shortage. Having once been allowed to profiteer on the black market, the farmers have resisted the forced collect.ion of grain at fixed prices. Only 36$ of the barley .crop, which is the principal summer grain, had been collected by the gov- ernment at the beginning of September. The fall harvest of rice, which Was expected to relieve the acute food shortage in South Korea, is also coming in very slowly. Less than 1% of the· collection quota was met in October as against an anticipated 5$, and collections were still well be­ ; hind schedule on 15 December. I I ',.,:...;;..•.. The br eakdown of transportation because of strikes, floods, I...., ""\ ·~ i and wartime deterioration, has further complicated the distribution of • available supplies in South Korea. Grain shipments from the US during ! ~ August and September were 25% short of minimum requirements. Under these i conditions the price of black market rice has soared beyond the reach of ' i the average conswner. As a palliative measure, the Military Government I has tolerated a limited free movement of rice, in spite of previous an­ ,.' npuncements that controls would be rigidly enforced. While complaining of inflation, the Korean population is generally opposed to government collection and distribution of rice. The Korean police undertook to search incoming trains during September in order to seize black market rice. Thi s procedure provoked a storm of protest, and was soon abandoned . Because it respects free speech, the US MilitaryGo'-'ernment in Korea must take public opinion into account in all its policies}'"-,whatever t he cost to efficiency. • Korean resistance to the US occupation has been encouraged by the leniency of US policy: .. Economic discontent has been conver t ed i nto politi cal unrest by the opponents of the Military Government in South Korea who calculated on the tolerat ion of the US authorities. The

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current upr1s1ngs are not so much the product of popular grievances as of uncertainty. The US has not imposed uppn the Koreans the kind of government to which they had become accustomed under the Japanese. By attempting to hold the balance between rival factions, the Military Gover11ITent has confused ·the public as to its intentions, and impartial­ ity has been interpreted as irresolution.

Political Situation. The US intends to educate the Koreans, not to indoctrinate them. The Military Government has accordingly per­ mitted thP Koreans to criticize its program at every stage of develop­ ment, ·and to campaign incessantly for' a prompt termination of the occu­ pation. There is no doubt but that the majority of Koreans desire the immediate withdrawal of both US and Soviet troops. Foreign control is • unpopular in both the US and the Soviet Zones. The moderates of both right and left in South Korea will nevertheless support. the US -Military Goverrunent as the alternative to Soviet domination. General Hodge has endeavored to enlist the cooperation of these moderates in forming a coali~ion of parties and in establishing a provisional legislature in the US Zone. South Korea would thus gain a measure of self-government pending th~ execution of the Moscow Decision. the majority is prepared to support the US interim program, which has now advanced to the poin·t of realization. The unification of the right and the left was announced early in October, and elections have been held to the provisional legis­ lature which was convoked during December •

. Soviet Program for South Korea. The interim US policy for Korea has provoked the desperate re­ sistance of the Camrunists and the sarcastic reflections of Soviet prop­ aganda. The unification of the right and the left was not achieved un­ til after the Cozmrunist party had been split, and its most violent leaders driven undergrowid. The USSR is clearly opposed to the estab­ lishment of a democratic government in South Korea under the aegis of the US. In this opposition it can count on the allegiance of the Conmunists

under Pak Heun Yung. After denouncing the provisional legislature as a ~. separatist government in South Korea, and as a revival of the advisory council of the Japanese, the Comnrunists have apparently embarked on a campaign of terrorism against the occupation.

According to General Hodge's informants, the Communists in the US Zone are planning a general revolt for t~is ~inter in concert with the Soviets in North Korea. There is no immediAte evidence of Soviet complicity, except the parallel efforts of Sovfet p~opaganda to stir up unrest against the US occupation. Soviet intervention through the agency of th~ Korean Communist Party may nevertheless be assumed and can be expected to increase if the current disorders lead to a general insurrection. After returni ng from a recent visit to the

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' ' " If l l . ~. ~ ~ r Soviet Zone, a prominent leftist lead.er in South Korea declared that .. 10,000 Soviet agents have infiltrated across the border during the. . 'i l l j past few months. Reliable reports indicate·that a large Korean armed t ; f I force, possibly numbering a.s many as 30J,OOO to 400,000 men, is being : ·~ i organized in the Soviet Zone. In case a revolt should break out which :~ • ·us troops could not subdue, the Soviets might intervene indirectly in '.- ~ South Korea by.means of these Korean irregulars.

General Hodge ·has issued warnings of an impending invasion I of the US Zone by Soviet-trained Koreans, and has accordingly requested ~ that the US forces be brought up to TIO strength without delay. This f. invasion w~uld probably take the form of na.ss ·infiltration, rather than of a regular military expedition. The Soviet army in North Korea, esti­ mated at approximately 150,000, will presumably not cross the border, unless US troops.should ·withdraw entirely from the peninsula.

.· . .. : FutU.re Soviet Objectives a.nd Probable Developments lr f The USSR has a twofold policy for Korea, which applies to both t the US and the Soviet Zones. Soviet policy in North Korea is directed ' at the establishment of a Conununist-controlled regime oriented toward complete collaboration with the USSR. The recent election of a perma­ nent people's committee in the Soviet Zone represents the achievement of this il11nediate objective. The long-range objective of the USSR is ~o integrate the entire peninsula in the Soviet system of Far F..8.stern defenses. Since the US occupation constitutes the chief obstacle to the accomi)lishrnent of this purpose, Soviet propaganda and Communist agitation ·have been directed toward driving the US out of Korea. The attack on the Military Government in South Korea, which has been t pressed continuously since the beginning of the occupation, has become I '· I intensified with the consolidation of Soviet authority in North Korea J and the development of an interim US policy for the South.

J Joint Conmission nego~iations for the execution of the Moscow i· Decision are still deadlocked, while the Cormrunists strive to prevent j by violence the establishment of an interim government in the US Zone. Diplomacy by the US!:R has apparently given way to direct action by the Comnrunist Party in South Korea, although the possibility always remains that the USSR will resort to compromise if radical methods fail. The first Soviet overtures to reconvene the Joint,Commission coincided with the success of the unification movement of the riR'Q.t and the left in South Korea and the declaration of the coalition committee in favor of an interim legislature. The prospect of agreement faded rapidly as the US determination to' pursue the democratic reorganization of South Korea became apparent. In the end the USSR rejected the formula which the Soviet Political Adviser in North Korea had worked out together with Minister Bunce as a basis for reconvening the Joint Commission.

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There is therefore little prospect that the Moccow Decision may be carried out in the near future. Meanwhile, although the USSR gained the initial advantage by immediate sovietization of its zone, certain long-term ~vantages are on the side of the US. The large majority of Koreans in both zones are fervently opposed to domination by the USSR or any other power. Therefore, a stable democratic gov­ ernment in South Korea, which contains two-thirds of the population, would have the advantage over the Soviet-dominated regime in North Korea in the event of simultaneous withdrawal of US and Soviet troops . The influence of the leftists in the US Zone derives more from skill­ ful maneuvering and the desire of Military Goverrunent . to appear impar­ tial, than from popular support. As the administration passes into the hands of native Koreans, therefore, the leftists will presumably lose ground provided US forces can maintain order. Developments in the inlnediate future, therefore, depend upon the maintenance of order in South Korea and the successful establishment of a provisional South Korean government. If substantial progress is ma.de in this direction, the USSR ma.y decide to make concessions in an effort to reconvene the Joint Comnission and carry out the Moscow Decision before a democratic regime in Sout·h Korea .gains a firm foothold •

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