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April 2019 Venezuela Presentation 051019 English Venezuela National Public Opinion Survey April 2019 Methodology Figure 1 ❖ National survey o Conducted April 11 to 28, 2019 o 980 face-to-face interviews o Margin of error is +/- 3.1 at the 95% confidence level o Demographically and geographically representative Conclusions Figure 2 ❖ Extreme polarization ❖ Rejection of Maduro regime, but base of support ❖ Strong support for Guaidó ❖ U.S. and allied countries viewed positively ❖ Support for elections under Guaidó and targeted sanctions ❖ Division on military foreign intervention ❖ Chávez’s legacy mixed Maduro Widely Rejected, but Has a Base of Support Figure 3 Political blocs Figure 4 Political Blocs PSUV Supporters of anti-regime political parties 28 31 No party affiliation 41 Demographic breakdown of political blocs Figure 5 PSUV Anti-regime Unaffiliated 18 - 29 32 43 40 30 - 39 23 24 22 40 - 49 18 14 23 50 - 59 18 14 11 50+ years: 50+ years: 50+ years: 60+ 8 26 4 18 5 16 Some high school 27 17 21 High school graduates 54 48 45 Technical studies/some univ 12 25 26 University grad/post-grad 6 9 8 Rural 32 17 18 Urban 64 78 78 0 20 40 60 80 0 20 40 60 80 0 20 40 60 80 Profound dissatisfaction, but regime maintains considerable base Figure 6 Generally speaking, would you say the situation in the country is going in a very good, good, bad, or very bad direction? Very good Very good/good Very bad Very bad/bad 100 90 98 90 80 70 75 71 60 68 50 54 40 45 30 29 20 24 10 2 7 9 0 3 1 0 0 Total PSUV Anti-regime Unaffiliated Poor rating for Maduro's performance, and extraordinary polarization Figure 7 In general terms, how would you rate the government of Nicolás Maduro? Excellent/good Very bad/bad Excellent Excellent/good Very bad Very bad/bad February June April 2018 2018 2019 April 2019 – Bloc 100 100 99 90 90 95 80 75 74 73 80 86 70 70 69 70 60 60 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 24 23 25 10 10 12 0 3 0 0 6 PSUV Anti-regime Unaffiliated Maduro has lost support from lower social classes Figure 8 In general terms, how would you rate the government of Nicolás Maduro? Excellent Excellent/good Very bad Very bad/bad Education 100 90 80 84 82 70 70 60 66 65 60 50 40 49 43 30 31 20 29 10 16 17 0 Some High school Technical studies/ University grad/ high school graduates some university post-grad Venezuelans reject other PSUV leaders Figure 9 Now, I'd like to rate your feelings toward some people or institutions with one hundred meaning a VERY WARM, FAVORABLE feeling; zero meaning a VERY COLD, UNFAVORABLE feeling; and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold. Favorable Unfavorable 100 90 80 70 72 68 69 60 50 40 30 26 20 23 24 10 0 Nicolás Maduro Diosdado Cabello Vladimir Padrino Opinions of military and their families dovetail with those of civilians Figure 10 Now, I'd like to rate your feelings toward some people or institutions with one hundred meaning a VERY WARM, FAVORABLE feeling; zero meaning a VERY COLD, UNFAVORABLE feeling; and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold. Favorable Unfavorable Nicolás Maduro Diosdado Cabello Vladimir Padrino 100 90 80 70 69 71 72 69 60 65 68 50 40 30 20 28 26 23 23 25 24 10 0 Soldiers/ Non-military Soldiers/ Non-military Soldiers/ Non-military family in families family in families family in families military military military Government blamed for economic crisis and blackouts Figure 11 And who do you think is to blame for the economic Who is to blame for the electric blackout in situation in Venezuela: the Maduro government, the Venezuela: the Maduro government, the United United States, the opposition, or private States, the opposition, or private companies? companies? The government 64 The government 68 United States 12 United States 16 The opposition 12 The opposition 9 Private companies 4 Private companies 1 0 20 40 60 80 0 20 40 60 80 Frustration with rejection of humanitarian aid Figure 12 Do you think that the government of Nicolás Maduro should have allowed the entry of humanitarian assistance provided by the United States, Brazil and other countries that recognize Juan Guaidó or do you think the Maduro government was right to block the entry of humanitarian aid into the country? Total Bloc 100 90 96 93 80 78 25 70 60 50 40 30 73 20 10 15 4 5 0 PSUV Anti-regime Unaffiliated Allowed Blocked Allowed Blocked Disapproval of Maduro-backed institutions Figure 13 Now, I'm going to read some institutions: When I read each name, please tell me if you strongly approve, approve, disapprove or strongly disapprove of the role that institution has played in the present political situation. Approve Disapprove 100 90 80 70 67 66 60 63 59 50 40 38 30 34 31 33 20 10 0 Asamblea Nacional Asamblea Nacional Tribunal Supremo Consejo Nacional Constituyente de Justicia Electoral Large-scale migration will continue, with political impact Figure 14 Thinking about the next few months, what would you prefer: move to another country or stay in Venezuela? Total Bloc 100 90 96 9 80 70 32 60 50 40 47 40 43 30 36 56 20 8 10 4 0 15 0 PSUV Anti-regime Unaffiliated Move to another country Stay in Venezuela Depends on how things go Move to another country Stay in Venezuela Depends on how things go Strong Backing for Guaidó Figure 15 Guaidó is only politician with favorable rating Figure 16 I would like to measure your feelings towards some people and institutions. Favorable Unfavorable 100 90 80 70 60 50 52 54 54 40 45 39 30 36 29 30 20 10 0 Henrique Capriles Leopoldo López María Corina Machado Juan Guaidó Confidence in Guaidó’s leadership Figure 17 How would you rate the role played by Juan How much confidence do you have in Juan Guaidó Guaidó as interim president appointed by the to lead a political transition in Venezuela: a lot, National Assembly: excellent, good, bad or very some, little or no confidence? bad? Excellent Excellent/good A lot A lot/some Very bad Very bad/bad None None/little 100 100 90 90 80 80 70 70 60 60 59 50 58 50 40 40 39 30 30 33 32 30 20 20 22 10 16 10 0 0 Guaidó seen as more than just a transition figure Figure 18 If presidential elections are held while Guaidó is interim president, do you think he should run as a candidate or should he only serve as president during the transition? Total Bloc 100 90 80 85 70 28 60 65 68 50 40 30 60 20 10 14 13 15 0 PSUV Anti-regime Unaffiliated Run as candidate Only transitional Run as candidate Only transitional Guaidó would easily defeat Maduro Figure 19 If presidential elections are held this year, and the candidates are Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó, for whom would you vote? Total Bloc 100 90 95 93 8 80 70 28 75 60 50 40 30 20 61 10 6 1 3 1 2 13 0 PSUV Anti-regime Unaffiliated Maduro Guaidó Don't know yet Maduro Guaidó Don't know yet Maduro would lose election under any scenario Figure 20 And if the candidates were Nicolás Maduro and And if the candidates were Nicolás Maduro, Leopoldo López, for whom would you vote? Leopoldo López and Henry Falcón, for whom would you vote? 100 100 90 90 80 80 70 70 60 60 50 57 50 48 40 40 30 30 28 27 20 20 10 10 9 10 9 0 0 Maduro López No sabe Maduro López Falcón No sabe todavía todavía Support for Elections Under Guaidó and Targeted Sanctions Figure 21 Clear majority wants Armed Forces to support Guaidó Figure 22 And what do you want the members of the armed forces to do: maintain their loyalty to Maduro and the military high command or support the government of Juan Guaidó? Total Bloc 100 90 97 91 80 70 31 60 67 50 40 58 30 20 10 1 2 9 0 PSUV Anti-regime Unaffiliated Maduro Guaidó Maduro Guaidó Soldiers and their families want military to support Guaidó Figure 23 And what do you want the members of the armed forces to do: maintain their loyalty to Maduro and the military high command or support the government of Juan Guaidó? Maduro Guaidó 100 90 80 70 60 59 50 55 40 30 33 31 20 10 0 Soldiers/ Non-military families family in military Opponents support amnesty for government and army Figure 24 As you know, Juan Guaidó has offered an amnesty to senior government officials, including Nicolás Maduro, and members of the army who support a transition to a new constitutional government. Crimes against humanity, such as murder and torture, would be exempt from amnesty. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with amnesty for government officials and army members who support a transition to a new constitutional government? Strongly agree Strongly disagree Strongly/somewhat agree Strongly/somewhat disagree 100 90 80 70 77 60 70 62 64 50 52 40 42 30 35 36 20 29 28 20 24 13 10 6 16 15 0 Total PSUV Anti-regime Unaffiliated Support for elections under Guaidó, sanctions and action by army Figure 25 Now I am going to read you a list of possible ways to solve the political situation in Venezuela.
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