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1.Dergi Ingilizce.Pdf 2016/1 DENGE JOURNAL Journal owner Thinking platform for international Iranian Turks Editor Prof. Dr. Haydar Çakmak Associate Editor Assoc. Prof. Dr. ġennur ġenel Prof. Dr. Yonca Anzerlioğlu Editorial Board Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nail Alkan Assoc. Prof. Dr. Bilal Karabulut Assoc. Prof. Dr. KürĢat Turan Assis. Prof.Dr. Fatma Güngör Akkan Dr. Hatem Cabbarlı Peer – Review Board Prof. Dr. Haydar Çakmak Prof. Dr. Çınar Özen Prof. Dr. Yonca Anzerlioğlu Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol Prof. Dr. Süleyman Erkan This is a trianval peer-reviewed academic journal. Address 1669.Cad.No:16 Filiz Site-Beytepe Ankara E-mail: [email protected] (Journal Free) I II PREFACE Publishing a new journal is demanding effort and time; because, it is not also demanding, but also it is hard to find articles in quality continuously. Higher Education Institution gives more grades to the articles published in foreign languages. Those who make academic career have to publish books and articles. It results in increase in scientific writings which is expected and needed. Developed countries encourage their citizens to write scientific writings in their own languages. They create opportunities, provide basis, and encourage reaching scientific writings more in quantity and in quality. Quantity of scientific publications is closely related to the scientific life and development levels of those countries. In this respect, Western academicians are more fortunate, because they have been encouraged publishing in their own languages. Turkey must also have to encourage academicians publishing in their own languages. The country wins; correspondingly, academic journals do not have difficulties to find academic articles. In addition to this, it will lead Turkish language to become a science language. The aim of this journal is to serve to science life, academic circles, related people and institutions by publishing in the subjects of the Middle East generally and of Iran specifically. With the help of this journal, the aim is to contribute to science and international peace, to provide a platform to academicians who have to publish their articles. This journal is published in Turkish, English, and Persian. Correspondingly, ideas of Turkish and foreign academicians will reach more audiences in different languages. Foreigners will have a chance to know about the ideas of Turkish academicians. This journal will provide convenience for researchers interested in the topics of Turkey and Iran. We aim this journal to become well-known in the international arena. We have the complete infrastructure, knowledge accumulation, and the support. After a short period of time, the journal will have a website. We will announce the other activities and publications that would contribute to academic life from this website. We will have events like conferences, meetings, symposiums, and panels. IIII This issue of the journal has nine academic articles on the subject of Iran. We congratulate the writers and thank to all of them. We also want to thank to those who contribute in publishing this journal, especially to journalist and writer Mehmet MüĢtak who is also the Head of International Iranian Turks Opinion Platform. We wish the journal will be useful for the academic life, and demand your advices and support. On Behalf of Editorial Board, Editor, Prof. Dr. Haydar Çakmak IIIV From the beginning to the early 20th century Turk-Iran Relations Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şennur Şenel 1 Turkey-Iran relations, mostly, is seemed restricted as Ottoman-Safavid relations; in fact, dual-rooted nations of Middle East and Asia Minor territory Turkey-Iran relations are old and rooted in terms of politics, military, and culture. First stage of these relations that passed into history as Iranian-Turanism relations goes back to Hun Era in B.S. IV. After the developments in the Asia, Turks those who move proceeded to the west brought under control Iranian-rooted regions in between Aral-Khazar, and while some of them chose to settle down there, the others kept at going to the west, Anatolia. Meanwhile it is known that Sassanians who was established after Medes and Persians existed in Iran. Most particularly in Ak Hun Empire reign, struggles became tough with Sassanians. After about a century, Sassanians accepted the superiority of Turks and they were forced to pay taxes (484). In the meantime, it is observed that there were failures and obstacles in Iran‟s struggle with Byzantine. In thi era, Mazdak‟s Revolt occurred in Iran led to political and social chaos. The country get rid of the obstacles that created by Mazdak‟s Revolt with the support of Ak Hun Empire. In the era of shah of Sassanians (531-579), Anushirvan, the country relatively found peace by means of establishing justice. In 552, with the establishment khanate of Gokturk and their rivalry with Ak Hun Empire, Gokturks made an alliance with Sassanians against Ak Hun Empire. Because of the pressure, Ak Hun Empire was collapsed after a while. Then, the struggle particularly based on economy and domination was started between old allies Gokturks and Sassanians. In consequence of uncomprimising attitude of 1 Gazi Univ. Faculty of Literature Department of History, Academic Member. E-mail: [email protected] 1 Anushirvan, Gokturks made an agreement with Byzantine and decided to act together against Sassanians. Sassanians - Byzantine war, started in 571, was lasted until 590; and it was ended with the result that Sassanians had exhausted too much. Earlier in 7th century, Iran, who even targeted the capital of Sasani, lost its power completely. Afterwards, Islamic armies went to Iran and spread the Islamic thought. Especially, in Nehavand war Sassanian emperor was defeated in 641; Caliph Umar had conquered the whole Iran by having two new army prepared in Basra and Kufe; therefore, Sassanian culture which was rooted in Medes and Persians had replaced with Islam2. In 634, Islamic armies took the Syria from Byzantine, and got under control the Iran which had been dominated by Sassanians for a long time. After the invasion of Iran, Islamic armies arrived Amu Darya in Central Asia and came into contact with Turks. In those years, by reason of the fact that they had political and military crisis, Gokturk state could not help Turkic tribes during the invasion of Islamic armies3. Later in 10th century after Abbasids, Iran had come under the domination of Turkic state Gazneli Sultanate. Greater Seljuk Empire domination had started there in 1040. In this period, it is known that Turks in mass were settling down in Iran region. By this time, half of the Iran population was comprised of Turks. By second half of the 11th century Anatolia and Azerbaijan were islamisationed at the same time being Turk. However; the invasion of Mongols in the region after a while caused destruction on the existing structure and formed a basis for the disintegration of branches of Islam. The most important case in accordance with the course of Iran history and Turkish -Iran relations is the establishment of sheikh Safiyuddin sect in the east of Tabriz, Ardabil, in the midst of 13th century. This sunni sect that had rapidly expanded made an impression also on Ġlkhanid statemen at this period of time. Shiah notables of the era 2 Mehmet Saray, Turk-Iran Relations(Turkey-Iran Relations), Atatürk Research Centre puV., Ankara, 1999, p.4. 3 Ġbidem, p.6 2 infiltrated the sect as part of the precaution; such that, the sect turned into exactly a shia propagandist later in 14th century. Particularly Iran, and Iraq, Syria, Anatolia, and even Turkistan became the domain of the sect. When Ardabil and its neighborhood became privileged and sheikhs of Safiyuddin sect became effective in the region in associated with the attitude and policies of Timur, the Ottoman Empire, which is a sunni Islamic state, felt uncomfortable with the situation. This was the apparent fundamental reason of the Timur-Yildirim struggle, and then of the one between Selim I-Shah Ismail4. In the Iran region, during the first Qara Qoyunlu and, after its dissolution, Aq Qoyunlu Turkish states reigns5 , this controversial Islamic sect had grown and at the same time was armed and politicized by Sheikh Haydar the nephew and the brother-in-law of Uzun Hasan the sultan of Aq Qoyunlu state.6 Power struggles within the Aq Qoyunlu state gave a chance for exploiting the sects to the grandsons (Ali and Ġsmail ) of sheikh Safiyuddin; and first, Ali gained power and become sheikh in this manner. Even if the sultan of Aq Qoyunlu Rustam made struggles with them; after his death, Ismail established an army, by making get together his followers those who are members of seven different Turkic tribe, with the help of his capability and intelligence although he was just 14 at that time. Despite his attack to Ismail's armies Nakhchivan‟s neighborhood Alvand, the sultan of Aq Qoyunlu state was defeated. Ismail gained the control of the half of the Aq Qoyunlu state (1502). He declared his sovereignty and gained the title of „Shah of Iran‟. 4 Ġsmail Hakkı UzunçarĢılı, Osmanlı Tarihi(Ottoman History), V.I, TTK publ., Ankara, 1988, p.301-330; idem, ibid, V.II, p.225-233 and p.257-272. 5 Two rivalry Turkic state Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu states had Azerbaijan, Iran, East Anatolia and Iraq under control. The most remarkable of these relations is the Ottoman- Aq Qoyunlu relationp. Although benevolent attitude of the Ottoman Empire, especially Ġn Uzun Hasan era they did not hesitate to make alliances with European states against the Ottoman Empire. 6 Mehmet Saray, Turk-Iran Relationsnde ġiiliğin Rolü, Türk Kültürünü AraĢtırma Enst tüsü Publ cat on, Ankara, 1990, p.27. 3 Shah Ismail stayed in Tabriz about a year and in the meantime largened the army by jointing new groups from his followers.
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