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introduction 1

Introduction

In a recent review of Guy Halsall’s Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450-900, which is ostensibly meant to be a new standard in the field, Bryan Ward-Perkins approves of the author’s findings, summarizing of early that: It remains very difficult to imagine a seventh- or eighth-century army, except as a hairy and ill-equipped horde, or as a Beowulfian band of heroes, and almost impossible to envisage what such an army did when faced with an obstacle such as a walled town[.]1 Ward-Perkins is being willfully—not to say wonderfully—provocative. He is well aware of the substantial and growing body of scholarship on early medieval warfare that has rendered clichés of hairy barbarians obsolete.2 But quips aside, he highlights a serious gap in existing historiography. While many scholars recognize the similarity (and to varying extents con- tinuity) between Roman and high medieval warfare, this has never been demonstrated in any detail. Hence, a notable number of scholars favor a minimalist interpretation of warfare in which the siege is accorded little importance, especially in the West, arguing that post-Roman society lacked the necessary demographic, economic, organizational and even cultural prerequisites. Continuity of institutions is unquestioned in the case of the East Roman, or Byzantine Empire, but Byzantine siege warfare has received only sporadic attention, and it has been even more marginal in explaining the Islamic expansion.3 This study seeks to examine the organization and practice of siege - fare among the major successor states of the former : The

1 Ward-Perkins 2006, reviewing Halsall 2003. Quote at 524. 2 Older preoccupations, such as Germanic essentialism, the feudal paradigm, and focus on battlefield , are found in varying degrees in the standard works of Delbrück 1920/90, Oman 1924, Lot 1946, Verbruggen 1954/97, Ganshof 1968a, Beeler 1971 and Contamine 1984. Their contributions increased in sophistication when dealing with the Carolingians and are still useful on certain issues, but much of their conceptual framework has long been abandoned. Nevertheless, similar clichés still appear, couched in more fash- ionable anthropological or sociological terms, as will be seen presently. 3 For Roman and high medieval siege warfare, see MCuS, Marsden 1969-71, Kern 1999, Rihll 2007, Rogers 1992; for observations on continuity, see e.g. Bradbury 1992, Bachrach 1994, and Morillo 1994:136ff. For a discussion of existing historiography on late Roman and early medieval siege warfare, see below. 2 introduction East Roman Empire, the Western successors (, Visigoths, Lom- bards and Franks), and states that were established later, or on the fringes of Roman territory, most importantly the early Islamic Caliph- ate. The point of departure is the united Roman Empire shortly before 400, when it still had a fairly homogenous military infrastructure, to around 800, when the three major and distinct civilizations were well established and the exponential increase of source materials allows for a more nuanced image.4 While a large undertaking, the geographic and chronological scope avoids significant fault lines in scholarship, as it treats the problematic transition from late antiquity to the early middle ages as a whole, and also comprises societies that all too often are studied in splendid isolation.

0.1 Historiography

The relative paucity of sources with reliable, detailed information - fare in general in this timeframe, compared with Roman and high medieval periods, has made it difficult to study. Existing research is therefore epi- sodic, mostly found in works with a different focus, and often determined by the scholar’s view of society as a whole.5

0.1.1 Exceptionalism, Eastern and Western To some, the question of siege warfare in the West before the 9th century is nigh irrelevant. They believe that early medieval society lacked the ca- pacity for organizing large-scale military campaigns, necessary to conduct siege warfare, which, apart from , has always been one of the most resource-intensive forms of war.6 In this view, which may be termed

4 While a dedicated study of siege warfare is still a desideratum for the 9th-11th centu- ries, the basic framework for large-scale warfare in an increasingly urbanized and diversified economy is less in doubt. For a distinct Western , see e.g. the works by , Gillmor, B. Bachrach, D. Bachrach and Bowlus listed in the bibliography. For per- spectives on in a wider economic and political setting in West and East Frankia, see Nelson 1986, 1992, 1995; Goldberg 2006; D. Bachrach 2012; and Hill 1988 on the role of cities in warfare. For Byzantium and , see below. However, this still leaves a significant gap of well over four centuries, from about 400 to 800 ad. Purton 2009 has a comprehensive survey, but generally follows existing scholarship. 5 Bradbury 1992: 1-19 is symptomatic: he argues briefly for continuity from Roman siege warfare and interrelationships between successor states, but spends most of his energies on the high and late medieval West. Even Bachrach 1972 hardly identifies any instances of siege warfare among 7th-c. Franks, but see chapter 4.2 below. 6 On siege warfare in general, see n. 3 above. On naval warfare, see Ahrweiler 1966, Fahmy 1966, Haywood 1999, Rose 2002, Pryor and Jeffreys 2006. Thompson 1958 regards the