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2018Kuyumdzhievaadphd Establishing a Common EU Anticorruption Framework: Institutional Enablers and Inhibitors Albena Dimitrova Kuyumdzhieva Royal Holloway and Bedford New College, University of London Thesis for the University of London Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 1 Declaration of Authorship I Albena Dimitrova Kuyumdzhieva hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated. Signed: Date: 11.03.2018 2 Abstract The European Union is the world’s largest internal market comprising 28 member states and more than 500 million citizens. It is governed by complex regulatory structures which, if abused, can negatively affect the lives of millions of citizens. Whilst recognising the huge ramifications that corruption causes to the political and socio-economic structures of the European Union, this thesis identifies the drivers that have hampered the adoption of a robust common anticorruption approach. The thesis carries out this analysis by focusing on the role of the three main decision-making institutions of the European Union: the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. The research examines whether strong legislative resistance to counter-corruption measures results from a lack of supra-institutional leadership or reflects the reluctance of the Council to initiate and support the conclusion of legally binding anticorruption agreements. It evaluates the reactions of the European Union’s institutions to the need for installing better accountability and transparency standards in three policy cases: the establishment and management of EU decentralised agencies; the adoption of EU criminal antifraud directive and the adoption of regulatory framework for the work of EU lobbyists. The thesis shows that the European Commission and the European Parliament have committed themselves to boosting the transparency and accountability aspects of the existing governance arrangements, while the Council has exhibited a recurrent reluctance to do so. This demonstrates the Council's desire to maintain the status quo, albeit for reasons that have more to do with the protection of national sovereignty and allowing for political manoeuvring at national level, rather than with opposing anticorruption measures per se. The Commission and the Parliament, on the other hand, have demonstrated their 3 potential to become anticorruption flagships, capable of transforming the current patchy approach into a more robust anticorruption framework. 4 Table of Contents List of Figures 9 List of Tables 10 List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 11 1. Introduction 13 1.1 Corruption and its implications for the EU 16 1.1.1 What does the term ‘corruption’ mean? 16 1.1.2 Why is it important to fight corruption in the EU and its member states? 17 1.2 A brief history of European anticorruption policy development 19 1.3 Why is it important to research anticorruption policy development in the EU? 21 1.4 Analytical framework 24 1.5 Methodology and case study selection 33 1.6 Plan of the thesis 42 2. Corruption and Good Governance: Conceptual Framework 49 2.1 Defining corruption and its conducive environment 51 2.1.1 Corruption defined: practitioner and academic points of view 51 2.1.2 What are the underlying reasons for corruption? 56 2.2 Corruption correlations 65 2.2.1 Corruption, democracy and the rule of law: the chain reaction 66 2.2.2 Corruption, economy and social welfare: how do they interact? 69 2.2.3 What do these correlations mean for the European Union? 72 2.3 Corruption and anticorruption: what makes governance good? 76 2.3.1 Governance concepts: from practice to theory 77 2.3.2 Operationalising good governance via transparency and accountability 80 2.4 Good governance principles and the EU 82 2.4.1 Good governance: the EU response 83 5 2.4.2 Transparency and accountability in the context of EU governance 86 2.5 Concluding remarks: fighting corruption with transparency and accountability 88 3. Regulating the Fight against Corruption: EU and International Approaches 92 3.1 Streamlining the international anticorruption efforts: the European Union, United Nations and Council of Europe modes of operation 94 3.1.1 Development of the European Union anticorruption setting (1996-2016) 96 3.1.2 Developments in the establishment of the overall international anticorruption framework: the UN and CoE approach (1997-2016) 104 3.1.3 Compliance with the international anticorruption framework: are there any enforcement mechanisms? 108 3.2 Implementing the international regulatory tools in EU member states: strong commitment, weak performance? 112 3.2.1 National ratification of the international anticorruption tools: the cases of CoE Anticorruption Conventions and UNCAC 113 3.2.2 The national anticorruption legislative motivations of member states: the case of Germany 118 3.3 EU anticorruption legal framework: potential reasons behind the lack of legally binding commitments 122 3.4 Concluding remarks: zooming in on the EU’s regulatory efforts 127 4. European Union Institutions and Anticorruption Policy-Making 129 4.1 The EU institutional triangle: the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament 132 4.1.1 Institutional composition and policy-shaping powers 132 4.1.2 Evolution of the EU legislative process: the co-decision procedure 140 4.2 Who is responsible for the fight against corruption in the EU: the Council, the Commission or the Parliament? 145 4.2.1 Division of powers between the EU and its member states: focus on anticorruption 145 4.2.2 How are the European Union anticorruption competences applied in practice? 149 4.3 Regulating sensitive domains: EU competition policy 152 4.4 What are the factors that may determine the regulatory power transfer from the Member States to the EU supranational institutions? 162 6 4.5 Concluding remarks: regulating the EU anticorruption domain – is the mission possible? 168 5. Creating a Good Governance Framework for the EU’s Decentralised Agencies: a Smooth Operation or a Bumpy Ride? 171 5.1. The EU decentralised agencies: key features and institutional arrangements 174 5.1.1 European decentralised agencies: key features 175 5.1.2 The role of the main EU institutional players vis-à-vis the DAs 181 5.2 Unifying the divergent approaches: reality or chimera? 185 5.2.1 Phase 1 (2002–2007): the struggle to establish inter-institutional agreement 185 5.2.2 Phase two (2008–2012): from a mandatory framework to non-committal political agreement 194 5.3 The operational framework of the EU regulatory agencies: a matter of good governance or something else? 197 5.3.1 EU regulatory agencies: what is wrong with the current framework? 198 5.3.2 Why it took so long? Similarities and differences between the 2005 draft IIA and the 2012 Joint Statement 200 5.4. Concluding remarks: political preferences versus good governance needs 208 6. Protection of EU Financial Interests – Another Struggle? 212 6.1. Fraud against EU financial interests: key characteristics and responsible institutions 215 6.1.1 What is EU fraud and how much does it cost? 215 6.1.2 Who is responsible for preventing fraud against EU financial interests? 220 6.2. The evolution of the EU criminal approach in protecting the EU’s financial interests 223 6.2.1 Phase 1 (1995–2012): The attempted adoption of a Directive on the criminal law protection of the financial interests of the European Union 224 6.2.2 Phase 2 (2012–2016): New attempt to adopt a Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law 232 6.3 Twenty years of loose protection: results and reasons 238 6.3.1 How effective is the existing intergovernmental regulatory approach? 239 6.3.2 What are the motivations for having a loose regulatory framework? 242 6.4 Concluding remarks: it is not about anti-fraud, it is about interests 249 7 7. Lobbying Regulations – Time for Change? 253 7.1. What is lobbying and why it is important to regulate it? 257 7.1.1 What constitutes lobbying? 257 7.1.2 Corrupt lobbying: the intertwined connections between corruption and unethical lobbying 259 7.2 Lobbying regulatory regimes and modalities: a snapshot 267 7.2.1 Voluntary and mandatory approaches in regulating lobbying: brief overview 269 7.2.2 EU member states’ lobbying regulatory approach 272 7.3 Regulating lobbying activities at EU level: the struggle for better transparency 275 7.3.1 The first EU steps in regulating lobbying at the EU level: the voluntary approach, 1992-2008 276 7.3.2 The following steps: establishing a common inter-institutional register, 2008–2016 284 7.4 What shaped the approaches of the EU institutional actors? 290 7.5 Concluding remarks: the winding path towards the establishment of the regulatory framework for the work of EU interest representatives 294 8. Conclusion: Two Institutional Enablers and One Inhibitor 298 8.1 Summary of the research and its findings 299 8.2 Does the EU actually need a common anticorruption legal framework and what should it look like? 310 8.3 What has been achieved by the current research and how can these findings be utilised? 314 8.4 Future research on the process of EU anticorruption policy creation 319 Bibliography 322 8 List of Figures Figure 2.1 Correlations between corruption, trust, democracy and governance 67 Figure 2.2 Correlations between corruption and economic indicators 72 Figure 2.3 Comparison: Global Competitiveness Index and the TI Corruption Reception Index for EU of 15 75 Figure 3.1 Mapping the member
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