Preserving Financial Stability in Times of Crisis. a Tale of Two Public Banks: Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena and Banco Di Sicilia, 1929-1940
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
01-asso_7_40.qxp_01-asso_7_40 16/07/18 12:22 Pagina 9 Preserving Financial Stability in Times of Crisis. A Tale of Two Public Banks: Monte dei Paschi di Siena and Banco di Sicilia, 1929-1940 Pier Francesco Asso University of Palermo Sebastiano Nerozzi* Catholic University of the Sacred Heart ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate the contrasting business strategies and models adopted by two major Italian public banks in the 1930s. Monte dei Paschi di Siena and Banco di Sicilia are interesting case studies for a number of reasons: their strong regional connections; their prolonged struggle for political independence from the national monetary authorities; their common attempt to modify the scale and scope of their business with the creation of integrated banking groups; and their early internationalization of activities. We examine how the two banks were affected by (and involved in) the major fi- nancial and economic crisis of the 1930s and show how external shocks altered their banking strategies and models. We also recon- struct the role played by the banking authorities and other important stakeholders. 1. Introduction The interwar period saw the birth of modern banking regula- tion in Italy, as in many other countries. It was then that the struc- ture and functioning of Italy’s banking system was shaped along * Pier Francesco Asso, Università di Palermo, corresponding author, francesco.asso@uni - pa.it; Sebastiano Nerozzi, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, [email protected]. We wish to thank Ivo Maes, Michele Alacevich, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments on a previous version of this essay. The usual disclaimer applies. 9 01-asso_7_40.qxp_01-asso_7_40 16/07/18 10:12 Pagina 10 PIER FRANCESCO ASSO, SEBASTIANO NEROZZI the lines that would dominate in the decades after the Second World War and last at least until the 1980s. During the 1920s and early 1930s, several episodes of crisis shook the Italian banking system, involving both the major universal banks and an extensive network of small and medium-sized credit institutions. The former, having undertaken an aggressive transfor- mation of their short-term liabilities into long-term investments and industrial shareholdings, found themselves extremely illiquid and exposed to heavy losses. The latter had taken advantage of the ab- sence of a specific regulatory framework to multiply their leverage, speculate in low-quality commercial or financial paper and build a complicated web of interlocking financial and political relations. These factors augmented systemic risk at the regional and national level, compelling the Government and the Bank of Italy to adopt a battery of ad hoc emergency measures while preparing the ground for a regulatory framework to prevent massive failures and conta- gion (Gigliobianco and Giordano, 2012; Conti, 1999 and 2003). While the major commercial banks were bailed out and nation- alized under the Industrial Reconstruction Institute (IRI), many small regional banks were either taken over by sounder banking institu- tions or supported by financial facilities from the central bank or IRI itself. Between 1926 and 1936, two banking laws established new lim- its and requirements: commercial banks were prohibited from mak- ing long-term loans and acquiring industrial shareholdings; capital-to-deposit and reserve-to- deposit ratios were imposed for the first time; the opening of new branches and long-term credit sections was made subject to authorization. The new system had the shape of a pyramid, with the Bank of Italy at the top and, immediately below it, a set of eight big public banks under its close surveillance. In the last two decades a wealth of studies have given us a de- tailed picture of the processes described above and shed new light on several episodes of banking crisis (for general references see: Giordano 2007; La Francesca, 2004; Cova, La Francesca, Moioli and Bermond, 2008). Nevertheless, some important cases still require deeper historical inquiry. 10 THE JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 01-asso_7_40.qxp_01-asso_7_40 16/07/18 10:12 Pagina 11 PRESERVING FINANCIAL STABILITY IN TIMES OF CRISIS. A TALE OF TWO PUBLIC BANKS: MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA AND BANCO DI SICILIA, 1929-1940 Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) and Banco di Sicilia (BDS) were two of Italy’s most important banks in the twentieth century and two of its oldest financial institutions. By 1936 both had been trans- formed into public-law credit institutions (PLCIs); they would retain that legal status for most of their history up to the early 1990s, when they were turned into private limited companies with two newly es- tablished foundations as their main shareholders. Throughout those decades, Monte dei Paschi di Siena and Banco di Sicilia were under the close control of the national monetary au- thorities: the Treasury had the power to appoint (and, if necessary, remove) their respective chairmen and general managers, while the Bank of Italy wielded extensive powers of supervision and control over credit aggregates. The central bank also relied on public-law banks (together with a group of three major “banks of national in- terest”) to enforce its objectives of monetary control over the whole banking system and, more generally, over macroeconomic aggre- gates. The public nature of BDS and MPS was not limited to their close relationship with the Government and the central bank: under their statutes, their governance was widely exposed to the influence of local institutions (provinces and municipalities) that appointed the majority of members of their management and administrative boards. In this respect, the two banks’ governance differed from that of the other public-law credit institutions, where the representation of local powers was weaker and their influence less intrusive. Another important feature of the two banks was the geograph- ical concentration of their branch networks: in Tuscany for MPS, in Sicily for BDS. Their performance therefore depended to no small extent on economic trends in their respective home regions and they faced considerable difficulty in differentiating their assets more widely both geographically and by productive sector; on the other hand, both banks did enjoy substantial market power that enabled them to capture a large share of total deposits raised in their respec- tive regional areas and to record relatively high operating margins. However, MPS and BDS were dominant players in two regions with contrasting features and divergent development trajectories. JEEH • 2/2018 11 01-asso_7_40.qxp_01-asso_7_40 16/07/18 10:12 Pagina 12 PIER FRANCESCO ASSO, SEBASTIANO NEROZZI Tuscany (especially its more backward provinces where MPS main- tained a strong presence) was an agricultural and commercial region that never attracted investment from big industrial enterprises. A diffuse process of sustained industrialization only began in Tuscany in the 1970s with the emergence of industrial districts populated by SMEs mainly producing traditional labor-intensive, high-quality manufactures. By contrast, the Sicilian economy centered on the pri- mary sector, both mining and agriculture, the latter characterized by large-scale landholding and monoculture. Industrialization got under way in Sicily in the 1950s thanks to the efforts of regional and national political forces to attract large-scale investments by public and private firms mainly in capital-intensive sectors (chemicals, en- ergy, engineering, and shipbuilding) to turn out semi-finished prod- ucts for the more advanced industries of northern Italy. The differences of context may help explain the divergent bank- ing models adopted by MPS and BDS in the mid-twentieth century. In the postwar years, MPS carried on business as a quite traditional, not particularly innovative commercial bank, whose activity con- sisted chiefly in providing short-term credit to a growing number of small enterprises and local governments; BDS, instead, emerged as a development bank widely engaged in providing long-term credit to spur new economic initiatives and support regional economic de- velopment, mainly in construction and heavy industry. This paper draws on two monographic essays devoted respec- tively to MPS and BDS (Asso and Nerozzi, 2016; Asso, 2017), based on extensive archival research, for a comparative analysis of some turning points in the history of the two banks. More specifically, we shall examine how MPS and BDS were affected by the banking and economic crisis of the 1930s and how they reacted and changed their banking model. We shall also analyze the role played in this respect by the banking authorities and other important stakeholders, such as the regional and local authorities, that were deeply involved in the governance of the two banks. Our investigation raises some problems of interpretation. Was the increasing concentration of the banking system and the tighter 12 THE JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 01-asso_7_40.qxp_01-asso_7_40 16/07/18 10:12 Pagina 13 PRESERVING FINANCIAL STABILITY IN TIMES OF CRISIS. A TALE OF TWO PUBLIC BANKS: MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA AND BANCO DI SICILIA, 1929-1940 controls imposed over public-law credit institutions just a necessary corollary of the short-term emergency measures or was it part of a more comprehensive and deliberate long-term strategy? Was the limitation of the territorial expansion of the two banks meant as pun- ishment for their turbulent management during the crisis, or was it instead intended to restrict banking competition and assure monopoly gains to each player, with a view to strengthening finan- cial stability? Did the particular relationship that the Bank of Italy had with MPS and BDS during the 1930s follow a sort of “moral sua- sion” approach, limiting their expansion in relation to their ability and willingness to cooperate loyally in preserving financial stability and regulating credit conditions? In the rest of this article we shall try to provide an answer to these questions. 2. Two long-established public institutions: MPS and BDS before the 1929 crisis At the time of the great crash, MPS and BDS were certainly not newcomers.