Class 19: Spinoza 3 (Ethics Iip14-49)
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
269 Class 19: Spinoza 3 (Ethics Proposition 17. If the human body is affected in a way [modo] that involves the nature of some IIp14-49) external body, the human mind will regard that same external body as actually existing, or as present to Proposition 14. The human mind is capable of itself, until the human body undergoes a further perceiving a great many things, and this capacity modification which excludes the existence or will vary in proportion to the variety of states presence of the said body. which its body can assume. Proof: This is evident; for as long as the human body Proof: The human body (Posts. 3 and 6) is affected is thus affected, so long will the human mind (Pr. 12, II) regard this affection of the body that is (by the by external bodies in a great many ways and is so preceding Proposition), so long will it have the idea structured that it can affect external bodies in a great of a mode existing in actuality, an idea involving the many ways. But the human mind must perceive all that happens in the human body (Pr. 12, II). There- nature of an external body; that is, an idea which does not exclude but posits the existence or presence of fore, the human mind is capable of perceiving very the nature of the external body. So, the mind (Cor. 1 many things, and . etc. of the preceding proposition) will regard the external body as actually existing, or as present until…etc. Proposition 15. The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but Corollary: The mind is able to regard as present composed of very many ideas. external bodies by which the human body has been once affected, even if they do not exist and are not Proof: The idea which constitutes the formal being present. of the human mind is the idea of the body (Pr. 13, II), which is composed of a great number of very Proof: When external bodies so determine the fluid composite individual parts (Postulate 1). But in God parts of the human body that these frequently impinge there is necessarily the idea of every individual on the softer parts, they change the surfaces of these component part (Cor. Pr. 8, II). Therefore (Pr. 7, II), softer parts (Post. 5). Hence it comes about (Ax. 2 the idea of the human body is composed of these after Cor. Lemma 3) that the fluid parts are reflected many ideas of the component parts. therefrom in a manner different from what was previously the case; and thereafter, again coming into Proposition 16. The idea of any mode wherein the contact with the said changed surfaces in the course human body is affected by external bodies must the object of thought in the mind (Pr. 12, II); that is involve the nature of the human body together (Pr. 17, II), the mind will again regard the external with the nature of the external body. body as present. This will be repeated whenever the fluid parts of the human body come into contact with Proof: All the modes wherein a body is affected those same surfaces in the course of their own spon- follow from the nature of the body affected together taneous motion. Therefore, although the external with the nature of the affecting body (Ax. 1 after bodies by which the human body has once been Cor. Lemma 3). Therefore, the idea of these modes affected may no longer exist, the mind will regard will necessarily involve the nature of both bodies them as present whenever this activity of the body is (Ax. 4, I). So, the idea of any mode wherein the repeated. human body is affected by an external body involves Scholium: So, we see how it comes about that we the nature of the human body and the external body. regard as present things which are not so, as often Corollary 1: Hence it follows that the human mind happens. Now it is possible that there are other causes perceives the nature of very many bodies along with for this fact, but it is enough for me at this point to the nature of its own body. have indicated one cause through which I can expli- cate the matter just as if I had demonstrated it through Corollary 2: Secondly, the ideas that we have of its true cause. Yet I do not think that I am far from the external bodies indicate the constitution of our own truth, since all the postulates that I have assumed body more than the nature of external bodies. This I contain scarcely anything inconsistent with experi- have explained with many examples in Appendix, ence; and after demonstrating that the human body Part I. 270 exists just as we sense it (Cor. Pr. 13, II), we may not and the mind, in imagining one of them, will doubt experience. straightway remember the other as well. In addition (preceding Cor. And Cor. 2 Pr. 16, II), Scholium: Hence we clearly understand what this gives a clear understanding of the difference memory is. It is simply a linking of ideas involving between the idea, e.g., of Peter which constitutes the the nature of things outside the human body, a linking essence of Peter’s mind, and on the other hand the which occurs in the mind parallel to the order and idea of Peter which is in another man, say Paul. The linking of the affections of the human body. I say, former directly explicates the essence of Peter’s firstly, that it is only the linking of those ideas that body, and does not involve existence except as long involve the nature of things outside the human body, as Peter exists. The latter indicates the constitution not of those ideas that explicate the nature of the said of Paul’s body rather than the nature of Peter; and things. For they are in fact (Pr. 16, II) ideas of the so while that constitution of Paul’s body continues affections of the human body which involve the to be, Paul’s mind will regard Peter as present to him nature both of the human body and of external although Peter may not be in existence. Further, to bodies. Secondly, my purpose in saying that this retain the usual terminology, we will assign the word linking occurs in accordance with the order and “images” [ imagines] to those affections of the human linking of the affections of the human body is to body the ideas of which set forth external bodies as distinguish it from the linking of ideas in accordance if they were present to us, although they do not with the order of the intellect whereby the mind represent shapes. And when the mind regards perceives things through their first causes, and which bodies in this way, we shall say that it “imagines” is the same in all men. [imaginari]. Furthermore, from this we clearly understand At this point, to begin my analysis of error, I should why the mind, from thinking of one thing, should like you to note that the imaginations of the mind, straightway pass on to thinking of another thing looked at in themselves, contain no error; i.e., the which has no likeness to the first. For example, mind does not err from the fact that it imagines, but from thinking of the word “pomum” [apple] a only insofar as it is considered to lack the idea which Roman will straightway fall to thinking of the fruit, excludes the existence of those things which it which has no likeness to that articulated sound nor imagines to be present to itself. For if the mind, in anything in common with it other than that the imagining non-existing things to be present to it, man’s body has often been affected by them both; knew at the same time that those things did not exist that is, the man has often heard the word in fact, it would surely impute this power of “pomum” while seeing the fruit. So, everyone will imagining not to the defect but to the strength of its pass on from one thought to another according as own nature, especially if this faculty of imagining habit in each case has arranged the images in his were to depend solely on its own nature; that is, body. A soldier, for example, seeing the tracks of a (Def. 7, I) if this faculty of imagining were free. horse in the sand will straightway pass on from thinking of the horse to thinking of the rider, and Proposition 18. If the human body has once been then thinking of war, and so on. But a peasant, affected by two or more bodies at the same time, from thinking of a horse, will pass on to thinking when the mind afterwards imagines one of them, of a plough, and of a field, and soon. So every it will straightway remember the others too. person will pass on from thinking of one thing to thinking of another according as he is in the habit Proof: The mind imagines (preceding Cor.) any given of joining together and linking the images of body for the following reason, that the human body things in various ways. is affected and conditioned by the impressions of an external body in the same way as it was affected when Proposition 19. The human mind has no know- certain of its parts were acted upon by the external ledge of the body, nor does it know it to exist, body.