5 December 2011
France: National Involvement in the Indian Ocean Region
Bruno de Paiva Future Directions International Research Intern Indian Ocean Research Programme
Key Points
France has traditionally held a high degree of influence in the western
Indian Ocean region and uses its cultural ties, external territories and military power to maintain its regional presence. The region is important to France, due to its strategic location and energy
security needs.
France’s regional influence is under threat from growing economies such as China, India and Brazil. While current French tactics will increase France’s influence in the Indian Ocean region in the short- and medium- terms, it is likely to lose influence over the longer term.
Summary
France has a long-standing presence in the western Indian Ocean. Despite the loss of its colonial possessions in India, Mauritius, Madagascar and the Seychelles, France retains the territories of La Réunion, Mayotte and the French Southern and Antarctic Territories. The former colony of Djibouti remains economically and militarily close to France, while relations with the United Arab Emirates have progressed to the hosting of a French military base in Abu Dhabi.
For France, the Indian Ocean region – or, at least, its western reaches – continues to be of strategic importance. Over the longer term, however, the increasing interest in the region from growing economies, and the potential competition for resources and influence, may very well lead to a reduction in French influence.
Analysis
French Activities in the Indian Ocean Region
Defence
Much of France’s activities in the region have been defence related, with Paris operating a number of military bases in the region. France maintains a naval base, Pointe des Galets, on its island départment of La Réunion, east of Madagascar. The base hosts three patrol vessels, a transport ship and a frigate. This helps to ensure that there is a constant French naval base in the Southern Indian Ocean, as well as in close proximity to the sea lines of communication off the southern and eastern coasts of Africa.
The overseas départment of Mayotte is home to the 270-strong Détachement de Légion étrangère de Mayotte (Foreign Legion Detachment in Mayotte, or DLEM). The smallest unit in the Foreign Legion, the DLEM is able to act as a ready reaction force, and contributes to regional security by conducting maritime surveillance in the Mozambique Channel, humanitarian assistance operations, and holding training exercises with the armed forces of neighbouring countries, particularly Madagascar.
France also bases members of its armed forces in Djibouti, a former French colony which maintains strong ties with France. The 5th Overseas Interarms Regiment (5e Régiment Interarmes d'Outre-Mer) of the French Army is based in the country. France also bases some of its fighter aircraft at Ambouli airport, the main airport in Djibouti. The military presence in Djibouti ensures France has a constant strategic presence in East Africa, as well as along the crucial sea lines of communication between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea. The latter reason is highly significant, as it carries the bulk of France’s energy imports. France is a major importer of crude oil, importing just under 1.3 million barrels per day in 2010.1 The United States and Japan also operate bases in Djibouti, further illustrating the strategic significance of the tiny country to Western interests in the region.
In 2009, France opened its first foreign base in the Middle East, Camp de la Paix (Peace Camp), in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. The base encompasses three military camps: a land base, which houses around 100 troops; a naval base; and an air base at nearby Al- Dhafra, which contains three Mirage 2000-5 multi-role combat aircraft. Based in French Somaliland/Djibouti from 1962, the 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion (13e demi- brigade de la Légion étrangère), was transferred to the UAE on 13 June 2011. Located adjacent to the junction of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, the Abu Dhabi base has increased the French presence in the region and may be used by Paris to help ensure the stability of its energy security requirements from the Persian Gulf.
The French bases in La Réunion, Mayotte, Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates have led to a “quadrilatère français” in the Indian Ocean region. This “French quadrilateral” covers the areas of the region that are most significant to France’s interests. These include the south- western section of the Indian Ocean, which contains France’s Southern and Antarctic
1 United States Energy Information Administration, ‘International Energy Statistics - Imports of Crude Oil including Lease Condensate (Thousand Barrels Per Day): France’.
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Territories (Territoire des Terres australes et antarctiques françaises), and its former island colonies. It also covers the sea lines of communication from the Middle East to Europe, which includes the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. As a leading military power, France’s military presence in the region – which includes its contributions to the European Union’s Operation Atalanta anti-piracy taskforce – could be drawn upon to ensure that its energy security requirements are addressed.
International Relations
France maintains warm relations with significant countries in the Indian Ocean region. Chief among them is India. In December 2010, France sold six Scorpène-class conventional diesel- electric submarines to India for US$5 billion and followed a 2005 order from France for six other Scorpènes. Two-way trade between the countries has also been strong, totalling €6 billion in 2010. Both countries aim to double that amount by the end of 2012. France and India signed a bilateral nuclear co-operation agreement in September 2008, which paved the way for co-operation in that field. A notable result of this agreement was a €7 billion deal for France to build two nuclear power plants in India.
Bilateral relations between France and Pakistan have also strengthened, particularly since the election of Nicholas Sarkozy to the French Presidency in 2007. Although France announced abruptly in May 2011 that it would stop sales of heavy equipment to Pakistan, bilateral business and trade relations have gained increasing focus. Bilateral France-Pakistan trade totalled €800 million in 2010; this had increased by fifty per cent in the first three months of 2011. A joint business council was formed in May 2011, to aid and further promote Franco-Pakistani trade.
Kenya and France have signed a partnership agreement for closer co-operation in the areas of international security, climate change, economic partnership, development aid and education, and cultural and scientific collaboration. Signed in April 2011, the agreement coincided with the launch of the Paris-Nairobi Climate Initiative, which aims to facilitate initiatives in Africa to combat the effects of climate change. France also donated a patrol ship to the Kenyan Navy in June 2011, to help Nairobi combat piracy in the waters off the Kenyan coast.
Relations with South Africa have also become a higher priority for France, as shown by the March 2011 visit to Paris by South African President Jacob Zuma, which followed a visit to South Africa by President Sarkozy three years earlier, and the November 2011 visit to Pretoria of French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé. The two countries are negotiating an agreement on co-operation in the southern Indian Ocean, an area which contains islands administered by both France and South Africa. Both countries hold regular joint military exercises and are working together with other regional countries to improve maritime security. Recognising the growing threat to shipping and security from the southward movement of Somali piracy, the French frigate Nivôse – based at La Réunion – joined the South African frigate SAS Mendi and the Mozambican navy to conduct “Operation Oxide”, an anti-piracy training exercise in the Mozambique Channel in October 2011.
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Bilateral relations between France and Indian Ocean states, such as those mentioned above, have helped to cement France’s strategic influence in the region. India and Pakistan sit on the Arabian Sea, the security of which is vital for ships leaving the Persian Gulf. The East and Southern African regions are located close to French-administered islands and former colonies in the Indian Ocean. Strengthening bilateral relations with countries in these areas can contribute to France’s energy security and the security of its citizens in its Indian Ocean départments.
France has also been active multilaterally in the Indian Ocean region, mainly through its membership in the Indian Ocean Commission (officially known by its French name, Commission de l'Océan Indien, or COI). Established in 1984, the COI includes the Seychelles, Mauritius, Comoros and Madagascar, as well as France.
The island states have been significant in the increasing geopolitical focus that has been taking place in the Indian Ocean in recent years. This can be seen through India’s naval involvement in Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles, and China’s increased diplomatic and economic links with all of the island states. In Comoros, for instance, China sent a senior envoy, Hao Ping, to the Presidential inauguration ceremony of Comoros’ new president, Ikililou Dhoinine, in May 2011. China was one of the few countries to do so.
In the face of increased involvement in the region, the COI gives France an official avenue to maintain its cultural bonds in the region as other countries vie for influence. Although not necessarily a zero-sum game, this will likely be a long-term asset for France’s regional interests as developing countries continue to gain global prominence.
France’s Interests in the Region
One aspect of France’s continued involvement in the region is its desire to remain globally relevant in the long-term future. This makes increased involvement in the region attractive to France, given its presence in the west of the ocean. While France is currently the world’s fifth-largest economy, measured in terms of nominal Gross Domestic Product,2 it has already been overtaken by China, and faces stiff competition from Brazil and India, the second-, seventh- and ninth-largest economies, respectively. The maximum annual economic growth experienced by France since 2003 has been 2.1 per cent (in 2006), with 1.6 per cent growth in2010.3 China and Brazil, on the other hand, respectively had growth rates of 10.3 per cent and 7.5 per cent in 2010. Such growth gives the latter two countries an increasing amount of leverage with which to gain influence in Indian Ocean countries, potentially at the expense of France. As a result, France attempts to use its economic, cultural and military strength to ensure its interests in the region are met into the future.
The security of France’s territories and citizens in the Indian Ocean is another primary reason for its continued regional involvement. France’s Indian Ocean territories are home to approximately one million people, mostly located on the islands of La Réunion and Mayotte.
2 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database September 2011, ‘Nominal GDP List of Countries, 2010’.
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Other islands such as the Kerguelen Islands (L’Archipel des Kerguelen), the Crozet Islands (Îles Crozet) and a number of islands in the Îles Éparses, or Scattered Islands, administrative district, are home to small military garrisons and/or teams of scientific researchers. Many have meteorological stations and aircraft landing strips. Importantly, all the islands, whether inhabited or not, have 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones, totalling some one million square kilometres. Fisheries, although often remote, have been subject to poaching by foreign fleets. Occasional naval patrols are conducted. Catches from these waters are destined for France and La Réunion.
The island of Mayotte sits alongside Comoros at the northern entrance to the Mozambique Channel, between Mozambique and Madagascar. This places it on the sea lines of communication between south-east Africa and the greater Indian Ocean. Mayotte’s significance to the French Government increased again following a popular vote in 2009 to determine whether the island would become a fully-fledged overseas départment of France or retain a slightly lesser status as a collectivité d’outre-mer, or “overseas collectivity”. The majority of Mahorais – over 95 per cent – voted in favour and, as such, Mayotte became the 101st French départment, comparable to the départments of metropolitan France. This has further strengthened the bond between Mayotte and the métropole, helping to make the island’s security an increased priority for the French Government, particularly in view of the Comoros’ claims to Mayotte.
Energy security is also another motivating factor behind France’s desire to remain a key actor in the Indian Ocean region. Although France’s oil imports from the Middle East have decreased overall, imports from that region still amount to over a quarter of all of France’s oil imports. French oil imports from Africa, on the other hand, form slightly less than one- fifth of France’s overall oil imports. Alongside the significant international role played by French oil company Total, this contributes to the continued importance of the region to France’s national interests. Given the rising overall global demand for oil, largely from fast- growing economies such as China and India, France may feel that its share of oil imports from the Middle East is at risk from the increased competition. This helps to explain why France has used its status as an established and leading economic and military power to cement its influence in the Indian Ocean region at a time when its competitors are in the developing stages.
Implications for the Region
The most obvious and most likely repercussion of increased French involvement in the Indian Ocean region is further competition from India, China and other developing countries to consolidate their influence in the region. This will particularly be the case if France further uses its cultural ties and military capabilities to cement its regional influence. France’s tactics will help to keep its influence strong. Countries such as China and India, however, will have a greater ability to influence the region as their economies continue to grow, particularly if they can remain unaffected by the financial upheavals confronting Europe. This raises the possibility of large-scale Chinese and/or Indian economic assistance to Mayotte and La Réunion. Both islands, while having growing economies, are still relatively underdeveloped and have high unemployment rates, meaning that such financial aid would likely be well
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received. This could then put France’s long-term influence in the Indian Ocean in jeopardy, as the French economy would struggle to compete with China and India once their economies become fully developed.
While this is a possibility, France’s efforts in the Indian Ocean are likely to maintain or increase French influence in the region, at least in the short-term. This is because France is still a significant economic and military force in the region. This should help to keep France’s influence in the Indian Ocean region strong for the next two to three decades. However, as well as growing economically, India and China are also developing their military capabilities in order to advance their own global interests.
In the context of the Indian Ocean, both countries will be able to compete militarily with France when they have established blue-water navies. India is in the process of establishing a blue-water navy and China has expressed an intention to establish one in the next two decades. The eventual establishment of Indian and Chinese blue-water navies could decrease France’s influence in the region. This eventuality may have been foreseen by Paris, as evidenced by the continued presence of French forces in Djibouti, La Réunion, Mayotte and the establishment of the base in Abu Dhabi.
Relations between France and Australia have traditionally been cordial, something that may be an asset to France’s regional ambitions. Australia is to assume the role of Chair of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation (IOR-ARC) in 2013. As an IOR-ARC Dialogue Partner, France may use its warm relations with Australia (and current Chair, India), as a way to increase its involvement in IOR-ARC, should it see that organisation as an effective way to further increase its regional influence.
Conclusion
Given the increasing involvement of countries such as China, India and Brazil in the Indian Ocean region, France may look to increase its own regional involvement as a way of staying relevant in that part of the world. Despite efforts such as those above, they are likely to only be effective in securing French interests in the short and medium-term future. Current financial uncertainty aside, the long-term financial, military and diplomatic capabilities expected to be possessed by the rising powers in the next two to three decades are likely to reduce France’s regional influence.
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