China Reform Monitor: No. 1066 | American Foreign Policy Council

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

China Reform Monitor: No. 1066 | American Foreign Policy Council China Reform Monitor: No. 1066 November 13, 2013 Joshua Eisenman Related Categories: China October 16: A Chinese company, Panyn Chu King Steel Ltd, has “pulled out” of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline “after Pakistan refused to extend the validity of its bid.” Pakistan is looking to replace the Chinese firm, which had bid $500 million to build Pakistan’s side of the pipeline, with Russian energy giant Gazprom. The Russian firm will provide financing worth $1.5 billion for the project, The Express Tribune reports. October 20: Participants of a mandatory media training program for 250,000 Chinese media professionals have been told to reject democracy and human rights, arguing that principles “the West claims are universal are targeting China's Communist Party.” Participants have also been told not to support positions advocated by the U.S., Japan, Vietnam or the Philippines, which are “trying to undermine our country.” Instructors did praise Russian President Vladimir Putin, however. After the training program, journalists must pass an exam to obtain press cards. This is the first time the CPC has carried out such a program before the press accreditation renewal, Kyodo News reports. October 21: President Xi Jinping has set up a special unit headed by Beijing police chief and deputy minister of public security Fu Zhenghua to investigate retired politburo standing committee member Zhou Yongkang. For nearly a decade Zhou was national security chief with control over nearly all law enforcement agencies. The South China Morning Post reports that Xi bypassed the Communist Party’s internal disciplinary apparatus and ordered Fu, who is also leading probes into Wu Bing and Guo Yongxiang, to report directly to him. Wu, a Sichuan billionaire with close ties with Zhou, was seized in Beijing in August. Guo, Sichuan’s former deputy governor, was detained in June for “serious disciplinary violations.” Jiang Jiemin, ex-chairman of the China National Petroleum Corporation, and another former Zhou associate have also been detained. Authorities endorsed the decision to probe Zhou and his associates at the secretive annual party meeting held in August at the Beidaihe resort in Hebei. [Editor’s Note: No Politburo Standing Committee member - retired or sitting - has been investigated for economic crimes since 1976. Fu is the first person in party history to concurrently serve as head of Beijing’s police, Standing Committee member of the party’s Beijing municipal committee and deputy minister of public security] Tens of thousands of protesters in black T-shirts rallied in Hong Kong claiming that the decision to deny Hong Kong Television Networks (HKTV) a free-to-air TV license without explanation was a threat to the city’s core values, reports the South China Morning Post. Police said 36,000 took part, while HKTV placed the number at 80,000. Last week the government granted only two licenses, one to i-Cable’s Fantastic TV and the other to PCCW’s Hong Kong Television Entertainment. Protesters called on the government to explain the rationale behind the issuing only two licenses since there is no cap on the number of licenses they can issue. President of the Legislative Council, Jasper Tsang Yok-sing, asked for the criteria to grant free-to-air licenses to reveal “the assessment of the applicants’ competitiveness.” . October 24: Pakistan has acquiesced to China’s request to add the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) to its list of banned groups. The delayed decision comes at the request of China’s premier Li Keqiang during his visit in May. “The Chinese officials had told Pakistan that members of these outfits were in contact with likeminded people in Xinjiang and they may use the Chinese population to pursue their plans,” Pakistan’s The News reports. “The government has enhanced the security of Chinese diplomats in the country against possible attacks by these militants.” Pakistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan have held consultations about ETIM and IMU, concluding that over 50 members – including 10 women – were wanted by authorities. Pakistan has caught ETIM members during military operations against militants in South Waziristan and other tribal areas, The News reports. © 2021 - American Foreign Policy Council .
Recommended publications
  • Hong Kong SAR
    China Data Supplement November 2006 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC 30 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership 37 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries 47 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations 50 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR 54 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR 61 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan 65 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Affairs Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 November 2006 The Main National Leadership of the PRC LIU Jen-Kai Abbreviations and Explanatory Notes CCP CC Chinese Communist Party Central Committee CCa Central Committee, alternate member CCm Central Committee, member CCSm Central Committee Secretariat, member PBa Politburo, alternate member PBm Politburo, member Cdr. Commander Chp. Chairperson CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference CYL Communist Youth League Dep. P.C. Deputy Political Commissar Dir. Director exec. executive f female Gen.Man. General Manager Gen.Sec. General Secretary Hon.Chp. Honorary Chairperson H.V.-Chp. Honorary Vice-Chairperson MPC Municipal People’s Congress NPC National People’s Congress PCC Political Consultative Conference PLA People’s Liberation Army Pol.Com.
    [Show full text]
  • China Turns up Heat on Ex-Security Chief with Crash Probe
    CHINA PRIME TARGET: Zhou Yongkang was head of domestic security and a member of the Communist Party Standing Politburo Committee, making him one of the most powerful people in China, until he stepped down in 2012. REUTERS/STRINGER Authorities have begun investigating a crash in 2000 that killed the first wife of Zhou Yongkang, the prime target in China’s biggest corruption scandal, Reuters source says. China turns up heat on ex-security chief with crash probe BY BENJAMIN KANG LIM, CHARLIE ZHU AND DAVID LAGUE SPECIAL REPORT 1 CHINA’S POWER STRUGGLE BEIJING/HONG KONG, SEPTEMBER 12, 2014 ittle is known about the exact circum- stances in which Wang Shuhua was Lkilled. What has been reported, in the Chinese media, is that she died in a road ac- cident sometime in 2000, shortly after she was divorced from her husband. And that at least one vehicle with a military license plate may have been involved in the crash. Fourteen years later, investigators are looking into her death. Their sudden inter- est has nothing to do with Wang herself. It has to do with the identity of her ex-hus- band – once one of China’s most powerful men and now the prime target in President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. Investigators are probing the death of the first wife of Zhou Yongkang, China’s HUNTING TIGERS: President Xi Jinping has launched the biggest corruption crackdown since the retired security czar, a source with di- communists came to power in 1949, going after “tigers” or high-ranking officials as well as “flies”.
    [Show full text]
  • Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
    3/2006 Data Supplement PR China Hong Kong SAR Macau SAR Taiwan CHINA aktuell Journal of Current Chinese Affairs Data Supplement People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: Institute of Asian Affairs Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax:(040)4107945 Contributors: Uwe Kotzel Dr. Liu Jen-Kai Christine Reinking Dr. Günter Schucher Dr. Margot Schüller Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC LIU JEN-KAI 3 The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC LIU JEN-KAI 22 Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership LIU JEN-KAI 27 PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries LIU JEN-KAI 30 PRC Laws and Regulations LIU JEN-KAI 34 Hong Kong SAR Political Data LIU JEN-KAI 36 Macau SAR Political Data LIU JEN-KAI 39 Taiwan Political Data LIU JEN-KAI 41 Bibliography of Articles on the PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, and on Taiwan UWE KOTZEL / LIU JEN-KAI / CHRISTINE REINKING / GÜNTER SCHUCHER 43 CHINA aktuell Data Supplement - 3 - 3/2006 Dep.Dir.: CHINESE COMMUNIST Li Jianhua 03/07 PARTY Li Zhiyong 05/07 The Main National Ouyang Song 05/08 Shen Yueyue (f) CCa 03/01 Leadership of the Sun Xiaoqun 00/08 Wang Dongming 02/10 CCP CC General Secretary Zhang Bolin (exec.) 98/03 PRC Hu Jintao 02/11 Zhao Hongzhu (exec.) 00/10 Zhao Zongnai 00/10 Liu Jen-Kai POLITBURO Sec.-Gen.: Li Zhiyong 01/03 Standing Committee Members Propaganda (Publicity) Department Hu Jintao 92/10 Dir.: Liu Yunshan PBm CCSm 02/10 Huang Ju 02/11
    [Show full text]
  • Sopa-Scoopzhoutarget
    Friday, August 30, 2013 A3 Beam me up LEADING THE NEWS K-pop stars are embracing hologram COMMERCE Oil giants technology to reach a wider audience > L I F E C 7 banned Unwelcome guest Create your dream home Health headache from new Aquino cancels visit to China: Chic, stylish furniture Migraines can cause INVESTMENT TEAMS TO BE REINED IN Beijing says he was never and accessories for permanent brain damage projects invited in the first place discerning buyers and raise risk of strokes Commerce Ministry targets extravagance by delegations sent Foreign direct investment is a Previously, investment jun- key economic indicator used to kets were believed to be immune > LEA D ING T HE N EWS A 3 > 20-PAG E SPE CIA L REP O R T > WORLD A15 to Hong Kong and Macau to seek investment for their regions gauge officials’ performance, and from the campaign against offi- Beijing makes state ................................................ dozens of delegations from local cial extravagance. overstated the number of partici- His remarks followed the flag- governments flock to Hong Kong The The People’s Daily said busi- energy companies pay Daniel Ren pants and the value of deals ship newspaper’s harsh criticism every year to seek such invest- ness delegations stayed in five- [email protected] phenomenon the price for failing to signed during their promotional on Monday of investment dele- ments. star hotels and invited business- activities. gations travelling to Hong Kong. Yao admitted that the delega- reflects a severe men to expensive restaurants, meet pollution targets The Ministry of Commerce has “They were desperate to get This was the first time that a tions played a positive role in level of spending as much as 1,000 yuan pledged to rein in extravagance abig number of foreign business- Communist Party mouthpiece spurring the nation’s economic (HK$1,260) per head for a break- ...............................................
    [Show full text]
  • Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
    China Data Supplement May 2007 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC .......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 30 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 37 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 42 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 44 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR ................................................................................................................ 45 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR ....................................................................................................................... 52 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 56 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 May 2007 The Main National Leadership of the PRC
    [Show full text]
  • Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
    China Data Supplement February 2007 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC 30 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership 37 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries 43 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations 45 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR 48 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR 55 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan 59 Political, Social and Economic Data LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 February 2007 The Main National Leadership of the PRC LIU Jen-Kai Abbreviations and Explanatory Notes CCP CC Chinese Communist Party Central Committee CCa Central Committee, alternate member CCm Central Committee, member CCSm Central Committee Secretariat, member PBa Politburo, alternate member PBm Politburo, member BoD Board of Directors Cdr. Commander CEO Chief Executive Officer Chp. Chairperson COO Chief Operating Officer CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference CYL Communist Youth League Dep.Cdr. Deputy Commander Dep. P.C. Deputy Political Commissar Dir. Director exec. executive f female Gen.Man. General Manager Hon.Chp. Honorary Chairperson Hon.V.-Chp. Honorary Vice-Chairperson MPC Municipal People’s Congress NPC National People’s Congress PCC Political Consultative Conference PLA People’s Liberation Army Pol.Com.
    [Show full text]
  • Xi Jinping's Inner Circle (Part 4: the Mishu Cluster I) Cheng Li
    Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle (Part 4: The Mishu Cluster I) Cheng Li Mentor-protégé ties play an important role in elite formation in virtually all kinds of political systems. But arguably no country gives more prominent advantage in terms of later political career promotions to those who have previously served as personal assistants to senior leaders than China. This phenomenon of having a large presence of leaders with such experience in Chinese officialdom has led to the romanization of the Chinese term mishu (秘书) to refer to this group. At present, more than three-quarters of cabinet ministers and provincial governors have served as mishu.1 Of the current 25 members of the Politburo, 16 (64 percent) have served in such roles, and of the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee, five (71 percent) have mishu backgrounds. Xi Jinping himself served as a mishu for the minister of defense for three years in his late 20s, and this experience helped him tremendously later as he advanced in his career, especially in enhancing his credentials in military affairs. Xi’s personal assistants, both previous and current, have constituted a major cluster of his inner circle. Because of their very close working relationships with Xi, they are often among his most trusted confidants. It is also important and interesting to note that while the power and influence of Xi’s mishu cluster in the leadership was growing rapidly, the recent purges of senior leaders, such as Zhou Yongkang, Xu Caihou, and Ling Jihua, all began with the removal or prosecution of their mishu.
    [Show full text]
  • 2013 Annual Report on China's Judicial Reform
    Empowered lives Resilient nations The information and designations used and the presentation of the material throughout this publication do not in any way imply the expression of an opinion on the part of the United Nations Development Programme or the United Nations System in China, concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The presentation of the data and information contained in this publication, and the opinions expressed therein, do not necessarily reect the position of the United Nations Development Programme or the United Nations System in China. Published by the United Nations Development Programme © 2014 All rights reserved Annual Report on China’s Judicial Reform 2013 Annual Report on China’s Judicial Reform 2013 Foreword Rule of law and access to justice are essential to human development. The protection of the law protects people from vulnerabilities to abuse, guarantees their access to basic services and expands their abilities to participate in the decisions that shape their lives. In China, one key objective of judicial reform is to build the institutional capacity of the judiciary to ensure justice for all. UNDP has been supporting China’s judicial reform since the first five-year judicial reform programme was launched by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) in the 1999. Throughout the three five-year judicial reform programmes, UNDP has offered policy advice and international expertise to assist the SPC on a number of its judicial reform priorities, such as people’s assessors pilots, open trial, alternative dispute resolution and judicial aid system reform.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Political Ecology and the Fight Against Corruption
    China’s Political Ecology and the Fight against Corruption Joseph Fewsmith Since the 18th Party Congress convened in November 2012, China has undertaken a wide-ranging campaign against corruption. The campaign has gone on longer, cut deeper, and affected more people than anyone might have imagined two years ago. The course of the campaign has exposed in considerable depth many of the ills of political life in China. Although it seems intended to break up many of the “small circles” that pervade China’s political life, there is no question that the campaign has focused particular attention on the networks around Zhou Yongkang, the former head of China’s security forces, and Ling Jihua, the former head of the General Office. China’s leadership has promised the campaign will continue, so there are likely to be more surprises; perhaps one or more new “tigers” will be exposed. China’s fight against corruption really began with the conviction of Bo Xilai (薄熙来), the former party secretary of Chongqing municipality and an apparent contender for a seat on the party’s powerful Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). But since Bo’s case was concluded prior to the 18th Party Congress, he is not mentioned in the running tab the People’s Daily website has maintained of ministerial-level cadres who have been taken in for investigation, and he is rarely mentioned in media articles discussing corruption. Perhaps the relative silence surrounding the Bo Xilai case since the 18th Party Congress is intended to minimize the political nature of the current campaign, though the recent arrest of Zhou Yongkang (周永康), the retired former head of the security apparatus, inevitably raises questions about Bo and politics in general.
    [Show full text]
  • Shanghai-Expo-2010.Pdf
    F i n a l COMM i SS i O n ER GE n ER a l ’S REPORT USA PAVILION EXPO 2010 SHANGHAI 美国国家馆 上海2010年世界博览会 美国展区总代表最终报告 This report is dedicated to our Student Ambassadors who made U.S. participation at Expo 2010 Shanghai an overwhelming success. 谨以此献给美国馆的学生大使们。 是他们使美国馆参与2010年世界博 览会的努力取得了巨大成功。 “A great presence for America . .” Philip BrEdesen FOr mE r Gove rnor of the StAtE of tE N N ESSE E “感谢美国馆如此出色地呈现美国!” 菲利普·布雷德森,田纳西州州长 “May China-U.S. friendship last forever.” Liu Xiaoming AmbassadOr of the People’S r E PU BLIc of c HINA tO the UnitE d King dOm of G r eat BrItain an d NOrthe r N Ir elan d “愿中美两国友谊长存。” 刘晓明,中国驻英国大使 T a b l E of CO n te n T s 目录 I N t r O d U c t ion 5 前言 H ighligh t S F r O m t he 8 美国国家馆亮点 U S A Pavilion r I S I N G t O t he 16 拥抱挑战,迎接世博 E xpo c H A L L E N G E W E B uilt I t an d 28 精心打造,游客如云 t H E y c A m E U S A N At ional d Ay 42 国家馆日,众星熠熠 c O m m E r c ial d I P L O m A c y 46 拓展商机,宣传品牌 m O r E t H A N 54 传播文化,扩大交流 “We are very proud of this U.S. exhibit J us t A Pavilion and the friendship it engenders between P r O m O t ing 64 促进外交,加深联系 China and America.” U.S.- c H I N A r E L At ions JImmy CartEr and Rosalynn CartEr S ha r ing O U r S t O ry 72 广用媒体,讲述美国 FOr mE r Pr esident an d FIrSt L Ady wi t H t he c H I N E S E of the UnitE d StAtes of AmE rIcA “我们为美国馆及其为美中两国带来的友谊感到非常自豪。” 吉米·卡特和罗萨琳·卡特,美国前总统及前第一夫人 “Great job in picturing America in a way that makes us proud.” JOhn t.
    [Show full text]
  • Anti-Corruption Campaigns in Authoritarian Regimes: the Case of China
    Anti-Corruption Campaigns in Authoritarian Regimes: the Case of China By Anthony J. Laurence Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations CEU eTD Collection Supervisor: Dr. Youngmi Kim Word Count: 16,157 Budapest, Hungary 2016 Abstract Authoritarian regimes face two problems, described by Milan Svolik as the “problem of authoritarian control” (controlling the masses) and “problem of authoritarian power-sharing” (controlling the elites). As a way of alleviating the “problem of authoritarian power-sharing”, authoritarian regimes tend to use corrupt practices like bribery to maintain intra-elite loyalty or to ‘grease the wheels’ of bureaucratic rule. Why then do authoritarian regimes undermine their own source of power by enacting anti-corruption campaigns? Authoritarian regimes require legitimacy to replace the lack of democratic or otherwise accountable institutions or mechanisms that justifies their mandate of authoritarian rule. While economic prosperity and reform are two ways authoritarian rulers can maintain their legitimacy, economic liberalization is nearly a prerequisite to integrate into the global economy. Yet, intra-regime politics may prevent this from occurring. This intra-regime politicking tends to devolve into political factionalization which drives the internal power dynamics of authoritarian regimes. While using the anti- corruption drive in China that began in 2012 to investigate why authoritarian regimes enact anti- corruption campaigns, this research suggest the current anti-corruption campaign in China is multi-faceted to fight off Xi’s rivals in the Chinese Communist Party while simultaneously creating space for reform so as to maintain growth and political stability.
    [Show full text]
  • Autocrats Untying Their Hands-Political Prosecution of Corruption In
    ISA Hong Kong 2017 Jia Li June 15 [email protected] Autocrats Untying Their Hands: Political Prosecution of Corruption in a Limited Autocracy Jia Li, University of Chicago Abstract Autocrats have an incentive to purge rival elites in the course of anticorruption. But can an autocrat purge his rivals by political prosecution in a limited autocracy where power-sharing arrangements tie his hands? Empirical observation from China, an institutionalized autocracy with a history of politicized anticorruption, sheds light on this question. Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign provides network evidence that the autocrat is untying his hands and purging rivals despite the constraints on his power. Studying the network where purged elites are nodes and their colleague relations are ties, this paper argues that the emphasis on political prosecution against an elite explains his centrality in the purged network, which suggests that political prosecution drives the campaign as much as cleansing graft does. The independent variable, emphasis on political prosecution, is estimated by the ratio of intraparty duration to procuratorial duration. Centrality, as the dependent variable, is constructed by PageRank algorithm. The finding suggests that an autocrat in a limited autocracy is capable of reneging on power sharing. Keywords: limited autocracy; network analysis; corruption; China 1 ISA Hong Kong 2017 Jia Li June 15 [email protected] Autocrats with hands tied: can they purge rivals by political prosecution? Autocrats have an incentive to purge rival elites in the course of anticorruption. As a strategy to enforce political order, they manipulate judicial processes and employ courts to monitor regime elites (Magaloni, 2008b).
    [Show full text]