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From Votes to Seats: FOUR FAMILIES of ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

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From Votes to Seats: FOUR FAMILIES OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS Prepared by Larry Johnston under the direction of the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly Secretariat TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Chapter 1 Introduction to Electoral Systems . .1 Chapter 2 Plurality Family First Past the Post . .9 Chapter 3 Majority Family Alternative Vote . .17 Two-Round System . .23 Chapter 4 Proportional Representation Family List Proportional Representation . .27 Single Transferable Vote . .36 Chapter 5 Mixed Family Mixed Member Proportional . .41 Parallel . .50 Glossary . .53 DESIGN AND LAYOUT www.citizensassembly.gov.on.ca WWW.PICCADILLY.ON.CA CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO ELECTORAL SYSTEMS and the selection of its leader. ELECTORAL So the significance of the electoral system goes SYSTEM far beyond its immediate function of translating votes into seats. It also affects the party system, Having citizens elect members of the legislature is the nature of the government, and the composition a feature common to all democracies. These elected of the executive (the Cabinet). representatives are responsible for making laws, and for approving the raising and spending of public funds. The electoral system is the way citizens’ Political parties group voters with similar political beliefs so preferences, expressed as votes, are translated they can elect candidates who will promote common policies. into legislative seats. In contemporary democracies, where polling and mass market- Most people who seek election to the legislature ing expertise drive election contests, parties are indispensable do so as candidates of a political party. This means for their ability to gather the resources (human and financial) that turning votes into seats is also a process of distributing the legislative seats among the different needed for a successful campaign. Parties may also play a key political parties (and successful “independent” role in recruiting and training candidates to run for office, and candidates). The electoral system determines in getting people out to vote. which parties take part in the business of the legislature, and how many seats they have. Responsible government is the principle that the executive In a parliamentary system, the makeup of the (the Cabinet) needs to maintain the confidence (the support of legislature also determines the type of government a majority) of the legislature. In many places, including Ontario, (majority, minority, or coalition), as well as the responsible government also means that the members of the number and strengths of the opposition parties. In a system of responsible government, the head of Cabinet (ministers) will have seats in the legislature. In this government (the prime minister or premier) is usually way, those who administer the laws are made accountable to the leader of the largest party on the government the people’s elected representatives. side of the legislature. The electoral system strongly influences the makeup of the government This booklet discusses four families of electoral systems, how they work, and how LEGISLATURE counting votes under each ELECTORAL system produces different SYSTEMS outcomes, whether in the GOVERNMENT makeup of the legislature, VOTING the characteristics of the party system, or the nature of government. PARTY SYSTEM Terms in bold are defined in the Glossary. From Votes to Seats: Four Families of Electoral Systems 1 Figure 1.1 The Families of Electoral Systems chapter 2 chapter 3 chapter 4 chapter 5 Plurality Majority Proportional Mixed Representation (PR) First Past Alternative Two-Round List Proportional Single Mixed Member Parallel the Post Vote System Representation Transferable Vote Proportional FPTP AV TRS List PR STV MMP FOUR FAMILIES OF ELECTORAL Electoral systems can be adjusted to suit their SYSTEMS designers or users, but this booklet will look primarily at actual electoral systems now in use. In The electoral systems discussed in the next four evaluating the effects and results of these chapters are used in both national and subnational systems, local factors have been separated as elections around the world. But this booklet focuses much as possible from the characteristics of the primarily on the national level, which provides the systems themselves. best opportunity to illustrate broad trends. Plurality and majority systems generally share ELEMENTS OF ELECTORAL the characteristic of electing one representative SYSTEMS per electoral district; they differ in the electoral formulas that decide which candidate wins the All electoral systems have three basic elements. seat. The two variations of majority systems (the Two-Round System and Alternative Vote) use 1. District Magnitude different ballot types to reach their final results. District magnitude (DM) means the number of members elected in each electoral district Proportional representation systems seek to (constituency or riding). There are three basic minimize the differences between each party’s options: share of the votes cast and its share of seats: they make the distribution of seats proportional to the • citizens vote in single-member districts, or distribution of votes. To do this, PR systems use • citizens vote in multi-member districts, or multi-member districts, constituencies that elect more than one member, usually several. The differ- • citizens vote in a single-member district and a ence between List Proportional Representation national or regional multi-member district: this is and Single Transferable Vote is in their types of called a mixed system. ballots and their counting systems. 2. Electoral Formula Mixed systems combine a group or tier of single- The rules determining who wins the seat or seats member seats (decided by plurality or by majority) is called the electoral formula. This element too with a second group of proportional seats. They has three basic options: differ mainly in the relationships between the two groups of seats. In the Mixed Member Proportional • the winning margin is plurality: the successful system, the distribution of the proportional seats candidate receives at least one more vote than adjusts for the results of the single-member districts, any of the other candidates; or so that the overall outcome is more proportional. • the winning margin is majority: the successful When the second-tier seats are used this way, candidate receives at least one more vote than they are identified as adjustment or compensatory all of the other candidates (50% +1 vote); or seats. In the Parallel system the second tier of • the winners are determined by proportionality seats are distributed proportionally but in a non- rules, which allocate seats among the candidates compensatory way. in proportion to their shares of the vote. 2 From Votes to Seats: Four Families of Electoral Systems 3. Ballot Type citizens in the constituency. Once elected, all members will certainly strive to represent all their The ballot type covers how the choices (candidate constituents, but they will also, in most cases, be or party) are presented to the voters, and the expected to support their party in the legislature – options available for choosing between them. even if most of their constituents voted for other Again there are three basic possibilities: parties. • voters use a categorical or exclusive ballot, which One way to increase the support enjoyed by the allows each voter to choose only one candidate or winning candidate in broadly contested single- party in each race; or member ridings is to require a majority of votes to • voters use an ordinal or preferential ballot, win, rather than a plurality. When no one candidate which allows each voter to rank the candidates gets a majority at first, majority systems find ways in order of preference; or to consolidate the votes of two or more candidates. • voters use a ballot that is categorical in one Proportional systems tackle the problem from respect (for example, in choosing between parties) another angle. By using multi-member districts, and ordinal in another respect (for example, in they attempt to provide representation to more ranking the chosen party’s candidates). portions of the electorate. The higher the district magnitude – the number of members elected in The various electoral systems combine options for the constituency – the easier it is to provide a each of the three elements in different ways. Any proportional distribution of seats. Implementing electoral system represents a trade-off between multi-member districts can diminish the close the advantages and disadvantages of the combination attachment of each member to a specific local of options chosen. community and may reduce the ability of voters to The plurality formula for determining who wins the hold individual members accountable. seat has its origin in contests where there are two Mixed systems aim to combine the local candidates. In a two-party (or two-candidate) contest, representation associated with single-member the winner by plurality (the most votes) also has a ridings with the proportionality that is possible in majority (more than half the votes). Although plurality multi-member districts. Voters then have some systems make it difficult for new parties to flourish elected representatives whose mandate was – for the simple reason that winning requires derived locally, as well as elected members whose attracting more support than all the other, established mandate was derived “at large” (either regionally parties – democracies have tended to develop or nationally). This mixture can add a different
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