The Korean Community in the United States: Changes in the Twenty-First Century*

Pyong Gap Min

Queens College and Graduate Center of

the City University of New York

*This paper was presented at the International Conference on Korean Diaspora Studies, held at Korea University on September 28, 2013. Central Hub Project Group for Korean Diaspora Studies at Korea University organized the conference. Global Korean Community Research Center at Korea University, the Research Center for Korean Community at Queens College, and the Young Oak Kim Center for Korean American Studies at UC Riverside hosted the conference.

Introduction

The formal immigration of Koreans to the United States started in 1903, when about 7,200 Korean workers arrived in Hawaii to work on sugar plantations. This year, Korean community leaders celebrated the 110th anniversary of Korean immigration to the United States. Despite this long history of Korean immigration, Koreans were almost invisible in American cities outside of the

West Coast until the early 1970s. It was the 1965 liberalized immigration law that led to the flux of Korean immigrants to various American metropolitan areas. As a result of the massive 50-year immigration of Koreans to the United States in the post-1965 immigration period, the Korean-

American population increased from about 69,000 in 1970 to approximately 1.7 million in 2010.

Large Korean communities have been established in Los Angeles, New York, and several other metropolitan areas, with Korean enclaves established in both central cities and suburban areas.

Korean Americans comprise the fifth largest Asian group among the six major Asian groups in population size. However, they have attracted a great deal of both media and scholarly attention, probably more attention than any other Asian group, partly because of their frequent business-related inter-group conflicts and partly because of their highly congregationally-oriented

Christian religious practices. This paper intends to provide an overview of Korean-American experiences based on public documents, a review of the relevant literature, Korean daily newspaper articles, and the author’s insider’s knowledge obtained through his personal observations in the New York-New Jersey area. Since 1.5-generation and U.S.-born adult Koreans

(second and higher generation) still compose a small proportion of Korean Americans, this paper will focus on Korean immigrants’ experiences, although it will cover younger-generation Korean experiences in the sections on socioeconomic attainments and community organizations. The

Korean community in the United States has gone through many changes over the past 45 years. 2

This paper will try to capture major changes in Korean-American experiences and community organizations, made especially in the twenty-first century.

The History and Contemporary Trends of Immigration

For the convenience of analysis, we can divide the history of Korean immigration to the United

States into three periods: the old immigration period (1903-1949), the interim period (1950-1964), and the contemporary immigration period (post-1965). Small numbers of Koreans immigrated to the United States in the first two periods, with the vast majority of Korean Americans consisting of post-1965 immigrants and their descendants. Thus, I devote only a few pages to discussing the immigration of Koreans in the first two immigration periods. I examine post-1965 contemporary immigration trends in detail.

The Pioneer Immigration Period (1903-1949)

After diplomatic relations between the United States and Korea were established in 1884, a small number of Koreans, mostly students and politicians, came to the United States at the end of the nineteenth century. However, the first substantial wave of Korean immigrants consisted of approximately 7,200 labor migrants, who were brought in to work on sugar plantations in Hawaii between January 1903 and July 1905. In 2003, Korean communities throughout the United States organized a number of events to celebrate the centennial of Korean immigration.

The major push factor for the 1903 pioneer immigration was widespread famines in Korea at the turn of the twentieth century, while the predominant pull factor was the demand for cheap labor in

Hawaii. Regarding the demand for cheap labor in Hawaii, bringing Chinese laborers to Hawaii was out of the question, because the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act completely barred any Chinese

immigration. Japanese laborers composed the dominant workforce on Hawaiian sugar plantations in the beginning of the twentieth century, and sugar plantation owners preferred to bring Korean workers to counteract frequent strikes organized by Japanese workers (Patterson 1988). Finally, the intermediary role that Horace Allen, a medical Presbyterian missionary sent to Korea, played between the Korean government and plantation owners was central to the movement of pioneer

Korean immigrants to Hawaii.

Beginning in 1884, American Presbyterian and Methodist missionaries were active in converting Koreans to Christianity. About 40% of pioneer Korean immigrants were converts to

Christianity, and they chose to come to Hawaii for religious freedom, as well as for a better economic life (Choy 1979). The majority of pioneer Korean immigrants were non-farming workers who came from cities, such as Seoul, Incheon, Suwon, and Wonsan (Patterson 1992:103).

This provided a stark contrast with the earlier Chinese and Japanese immigrants in the nineteenth century, the predominant majority of whom were farmers. Most of the Korean labor migrants were single young men between the ages of twenty and thirty (Patterson 1992: 105).

Plantation owners in Hawaii needed far more Korean workers, especially to counteract frequent strikes organized by Japanese laborers. However, the Korean government was pressured to stop sending more workers to Hawaii by the Japanese government, which tried to protect

Japanese workers in the Hawaiian Islands. After its victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905,

Japan made Korea its protectorate, gaining a free hand in influencing the Korean government. In

February 1906, the Japanese government advised that all Koreans abroad be placed under the jurisdiction of Japanese consulates. Koreans in Hawaii and other U.S. cities organized a protest rally, passing a resolution condemning Japan’s aggressive policy in Korea (Choy 1979: 143).

Thus, Korean immigrants in the United States started the anti-Japanese movement even before the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910.

Between 1905 and 1924, approximately 2,000 additional Koreans came to Hawaii and

California. The majority of them were “picture brides” of the 1903-1905 bachelor immigrants.

Another 600 of them were political refugees and students who were involved in the anti-Japanese independence movement. The Immigration Act of 1924, which completely barred the immigration of Asians to the United States, nearly ended the immigration of Koreans to American shores. Most of the Korean political refugees and students studied at universities in New York and other East

Coast cities, such as Columbia, Princeton, and New York University. A small number of these students composed the core of the old Korean community in New York. By contrast, the pioneer labor migrants, their picture brides, and their children made up the majority of the Korean population in Hawaii. Most of the students and political refugees who settled on the East Coast returned to Korea after Korea won its independence from Japan in 1945, playing leading roles in the new Korean government and Korean universities.

The Interim Period (1950 and 1964)

Immediately after Korea gained independence from Japan in 1945, Korea suffered from internal political struggles and U.S.-Soviet struggles for hegemony over it. In 1948, Korea was divided into two political entities, a rightist government in South Korea supported by the United

States, and a communist government supported by the Soviet Union. The two Koreas went through the first major ideological conflict in the cold war period, known as the Korean War, between 1950 and 1953. To this day, relations between the two Koreas remain hostile. The United

States sent more than half a million soldiers to Korea during the Korean War, and it still maintains a significant military presence there. 5

The strong military, political, and economic linkages between the United States and South

Korea contributed to a steady increase in the annual number of Korean immigrants beginning in

1950. As shown in Table 1, between 1950 and 1964, approximately 15,000 Koreans immigrated to the United States. The McCarran and Walter Act of 1952 abolished the ban on Asian immigration, giving Asian-Pacific countries a small immigration quota (100 a year for each country) and making Asian immigrants eligible for citizenship.

Table 1: Number of annual Korean Immigrants to the US, 1946-1964 Number of of Number of Year Year Immigrants Immigrants 1946-1950 107 1960 1,507 1951-1955 581 1961 1,534 1956 703 1962 1,538 1957 648 1963 2,580 1958 1,604 1964 2,362 1959 1,720 Total 14,884 Source: Herbert Baringer, Robert W. Gardener, Michael J. Levin, 1995, PP.24-25.

An overwhelming majority of Korean immigrants admitted during the interim period were either Korean women married to U.S. servicemen in South Korea or Korean orphans adopted by

American citizens. The War Bride Act of 1946 helped American servicemen to bring their Korean wives and children to the United States. While the pioneer Korean immigrants were predominantly men, these two groups of Korean immigrants admitted during the interim period were predominantly women (Jo 1999: 9). These two groups of Korean immigrants continued to increase until the early 1980s.

Also, many Korean international students, predominantly men, entered the United States for graduate education during the interim period. Warren Kim (Kim 1971: 26) estimated that approximately 6,000 Korean students entered the United States between 1950 and 1964. The vast

majority of them found professional occupations, especially as professors, in the United States after completing their graduate educations. Almost all of them have retired now. Their children typically grew up in predominantly white neighborhoods, with little contact with other Koreans or even other Asians. Thus, they were highly assimilated to American society, losing much of their ethnic identity (Park 2013).

The Post-1965 Contemporary Immigration Period

More than 95% of Korean Americans consist of post-1965 Korean immigrants and their children. The Immigration Act of 1965, which went into full effect in 1968, made possible the influx of Korean immigrants to the United States. The earlier racist immigration law (the Chinese

Exclusion Act of 1884 and the Immigration Act of 1924) gave preference to people from

Northwestern European countries and completely banned immigration from Asian countries. The new 1965 immigration law abolished discrimination in immigration based on race and gave all countries equal opportunity for immigration to the United States. South Korea, along with other

Asian countries, is one of the major beneficiaries of the new immigration law.

As shown in Table 2, the annual number of Korean immigrants gradually increased beginning in 1965. It reached the 30,000 mark in 1976, and maintained an annual number of over

30,000 until 1990. The peak period for Korean immigration to the United States was between

1976 and 1990. During this period, Korea was the third-largest source country of immigrants to the United States, next to Mexico and the Philippines. The low standard of living, the difficulty in students’ gaining admission to major universities, the repression of freedom by the military government, and the military tensions with North Korea in South Korea were major push factors to the massive immigration of Koreans in the late 1970s and the 1980s. The strong military, political, and economic linkages between the United States and South Korea were also major 7

contributing factors. In particular, the presence of over 40,000 U.S. servicemen in South Korea contributed to many intermarriages between servicemen and Korean women. Many of these intermarried servicemen brought their Korean brides to the United States.

Table 2: Number of annual Korean Immigrants to the US, 1965-2011

Number of Number of Number of Number of Year Year Year Year Immigrants Immigrants Immigrants Immigrants 1965 2,165 1977 30,917 1989 34,222 2001 20,742 1966 2,492 1978 29,288 1990 32,301 2002 21,021 1967 3,956 1979 29,248 1991 26,518 2003 12,512 1968 3,811 1980 32,320 1992 19,359 2004 19,766 1969 6,045 1981 32,663 1993 18,026 2005 26,562 1970 9,314 1982 31,724 1994 16,011 2006 24,386 1971 14,297 1983 33,339 1995 16,047 2007 22,405 1972 18,876 1984 33,042 1996 18,185 2008 26,666 1973 22,930 1985 35,253 1997 14,239 2009 25,859 1974 28,028 1986 35,776 1998 14,268 2010 22,227 1975 28,362 1987 35,849 1999 12,840 2011 22,824 1976 30,803 1988 34,703 2000 15,830 Total 1,048,017 Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, The 1965-1978 Annual Reports and the 1979- 2001Statistical Yearbooks; Office of Immigration Statistics, The 2002-2012Yearbooks of Immigration Statistics.

The annual number of Korean immigrants dropped from over 32,000 in 1990 to about

27,000 in 1991, and continued to drop each year thereafter. It hit the lowest number, about 13,000, in 1999. This drastic reduction in the Korean immigration flow in the 1990s provides a good contrast to the significant increases in the total number of immigrants to the United States and the numbers of annual immigrants from other Asian countries in the same decades (Min 2011). It was due mainly to the significant positive changes in the 1990s in the factors that pushed many Korean immigrants to the United States and other Western countries. South Korea made significant improvements in its economic conditions, which was reflected by the rise in its per capita income, from $1,355 in 1980 to $5,917 in 1990 (Min 2006: 15). South Korea also improved its political conditions through a popular election in 1987, and the end of the 26-year old military dictatorship.

Also, as Korea improved its economic conditions, fewer and fewer Korean women married

American servicemen, beginning in the late 1980s. Consequently, the number of Koreans who immigrated through intermarriage with U.S. servicemen drastically decreased in the 1990s. In addition, the number of Korean children adopted by American citizens drastically decreased in the

1990s, as fewer and fewer Korean babies were abandoned in Korea with the improved economic conditions. As shown in Figure 1, American citizens adopted about 2,500 to 5,600 Korean children each year in the 1970s and 1980s. They composed the majority of adoptees to American families during the period. However, in the 1990s and 2000s, the number dropped to below 2,000.

Figure 1: Numbers of Annual Korean Adoptees (A), Total Adoptees in the U.S. (B), and A as % of B in the Given Years 25,000 70 60 20,000 50 15,000 40

10,000 30 20 5,000 10

0 0

1978 1985 1995 2002 2009 1976 1977 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 2011

Total Number of Adoptees Korean Adoptees Korean Adoptees as % of Total Adoptees

Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Reports, 1965-1978 and Statistical Yearbook, 1979-2001; Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2002-2012.

Media coverage in South Korea of Korean immigrants’ adjustment difficulties in the

United States, especially the victimization of many Korean merchants during the 1992 Los

Angeles riots, also contributed to the reduction of Korean immigrants in the 1990s. Many Koreans had utopian ideas of the economic opportunities in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s.

However, the wide media coverage of Korean immigrants’ downward mobility and intergroup conflicts made Koreans hesitant to immigrate to the United States. On a related note, it is also important to note that a large number of Korean immigrants returned to South Korea for better occupational opportunities in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Min 2013b).

The annual number of Korean immigrants began to increase again beginning in 2000. The total annual number of Korean immigrants hovered around 25,000 in the 2000s, with the exception of the 2003 anomaly. We can point out two major contributing factors to the substantial increase in the number of annual Korean immigrants in the 2000s, compared to the previous decade. First, the long economic downturn between the 1998 financial crisis in Korea and the

2008-2010 global economic depression made it very difficult for college graduates to find meaningful occupations in Korea. In response, many Korean college graduates have come to the

United States for further study or temporary jobs (with H1B visas). Every year, a large proportion of them become permanent residents when they complete their education or temporary work.

Second, the strong linkages between the United States and South Korea have led many

Koreans to stay in the United States as temporary residents. They include international students

(including early-study students), interns/trainees, temporary workers, visiting scholars, employees of U.S. branches of Korean firms, and visitors who are simply visiting for sightseeing. Annually, a large proportion of these temporary residents have changed their status to permanent residents.

Immigration data show that the predominant majority of annual Korean immigrants during recent years had initially entered the United States as non-permanent residents but subsequently adjusted their legal status to permanent residents in the given year. For example, 81% of the 2009 Korean immigrants (N=20,805) were status adjusters, with only 19% having come directly from Korea

(Min 2011: 215). Above, I have emphasized “the strong linkages between the United States and

Korea” as a major factor contributing to the presence of a number of Korean temporary residents in the United States, because during recent years, annual Korean immigrants composed a much larger proportion of status adjusters than other Asian immigrants or immigrants to the United

States as a whole. Immigration data reveal that only 56% of all Asian immigrants and 59% of all immigrants to the United States in 2009 were status adjusters, compared to 81% of Korean immigrants (Min 2010: 215). Given the future prospect of an unusually large number of Korean temporary residents in the United States, the annual number of Korean immigrants is likely to remain around 20,000 in the foreseeable future.

Demographic Characteristics

The mass migration of Koreans over the past forty years has contributed to the radical growth of the Korean population in the United States. It increased from less than 70,000 in 1970 to over 1.7 million in 2010 (see Figure 2). Considering the undercount in the 2010 Census and additional

Korean immigrants over the past three years, the Korean population may be approximately two million in 2013. As of 2010, approximately 1.4 million Koreans were single-race (83%), with the rest being multi-racial Koreans (17%)—children of Korean and non-Korean intermarriages. The proportion of multiracial Koreans will continue to increase in the future, as younger-generation

Koreans have a greater tendency to marry non-Korean spouses (Min and Kim 2009).

Figure 2: Growth of Korean Population, 1970-2010

1,800,000 Multi Racial 283,038

1,600,000 Single Race (16.6%)

1,400,000 151,555 1,200,000 (12.3%)

1,000,000

800,000 1,423,784

600,000 1,076,872 Number of Korean Americans Korean of Number 400,000 798,849

200,000 69,150 354,593

0 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, the 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 U.S. Censuses

Table 3 provides population sizes of major Asian groups with proportions of multiracial people based on the 2010 U.S. Census. Chinese Americans composed the largest Asian ethnic group, with nearly four million people. Filipinos and Asian Indians closely followed Chinese as the second and third largest Asian groups, respectively. At present, the annual number of immigrants from India is substantially larger than the annual number from the Philippines. Thus,

Indian Americans will be the second largest Asian group in 2020. Vietnamese and Korean

Americans comprised the fourth and fifth largest Asian groups, but each population was only about half of the Filipino-American population in 2010. Japanese Americans composed the largest

Asian ethnic group in 1970 among the six major Asian groups, but in 2010, they became the smallest Asian group among the six. This is due to the fact that relatively few Japanese immigrants have annually come to the United States since 1970. Since the other four Asian countries—China, 12

India, the Philippines, and Vietnam—are likely to send far more or substantially more immigrants to the United States than South Korea in the foreseeable future, the Korean-American population, relative to the other four Asian populations, will become smaller and smaller. This means that the

Korean community will have disadvantages compared to other Asian groups in terms of its political, cultural, and manpower impact on the United States.

Table 3 also provides data on the proportions of multiracial people for the six major Asian groups in 2010. Japanese Americans have the highest percentage of multiracial people, with 42%.

Since relatively few Japanese immigrants have come to the United States in the post-

Table 3: The Asian Population by Ethnic Group in 2010

Ethnic Group Single Race Multiracial Total % of Multiracial

Chinese 3,137,061 657,612 3,794,673 17.3

Indian 2,843,391 339,672 3,183,063 10.7

Filipino 2,555,923 860,917 3,416,840 25.2

Vietnamese 1,548,449 188,984 1,737,433 10.9

Korean 1,423,784 283,038 1,706,822 16.6

Japanese 763,325 540,961 1,304,286 41.5

Total 12,271,933 2,871,184 15,143,117 19.0

Other Asians 2,042,170 755,999 2,798,169 27.0

Asian Total 14,314,103 3,627,183 17,941,286 20.2

Source: The 2010 U.S. Census

1965 immigration period, most Japanese Americans are native-born U.S. citizens. Most native- born Japanese Americans are likely to belong to the third or higher generation. Since the majority of native-born Asian Americans engage in intermarriage, most multiracial Asian Americans belong to the third or higher generation. These considerations explain why Japanese Americans include such a large proportion of multiracial people.

Figure 3 shows Korean Americans’ single-race and multiracial compositions by generational status. Almost all first-generation Korean immigrants (who came to the United States at 13 and older) are single-race Koreans, with only about 6,000 being multiracial Koreans.

These 6,000 multiracial Koreans are likely to be children of intermarried couples, specifically

Korean women with American servicemen stationed in Korea. These first-generation multiracial

Koreans were born in Korea and were invited to the United States for permanent residence by their

American fathers after the age of 12. Foreign-born 1.5-generation Koreans who came to the

United States at 12 or before include a much larger number (about 26,000) than first-generation

Koreans because these interracial children have come to the United States at early ages.

Figure 3: Population Sizes of Single-Race and Multiracial Koreans by Generational Status

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2007-2011 American Community Survey

Figure 3 indicates that multiracial Koreans comprise almost one-third of native-born

Koreans. Considering that multiracial Koreans are the children of Korean and non-Korean unions, the finding about multiracial Koreans being predominantly U.S.-born Koreans is not surprising at all. While only a small proportion of first-generation Koreans (14%) engage in intermarriage, the majority of native-born Koreans (54%) intermarry (Min and Kim 2009). These statistics about

Korean Americans’ intermarriage rates suggest that the majority of U.S-born multiracial Koreans are third- and higher-generation Koreans. Since second- and third-generation Korean adults are likely to continue to have high intermarriage rates, the number and proportion of multiracial

Koreans will continue to increase in the future.

Table 4 analyzes the single-race Korean Americans’ life stages by gender. As expected, as a result of their longer life span, Korean-American women outnumber Korean-American men by

55% to 45%. The non-adult population (people under 18) comprises approximately 20% of the total Korean-American population, while the elderly population composes 9%. The elderly comprises almost 10% of Korean-American women, compared to about 8% of Korean-American men. By contrast, Korean-American men have a higher proportion of the non-adult population

(24%) than their female counterparts (17%). Nine percent of the Korean elderly population in

2010 is a radical increase from 5% in 1990 (Min and Kim 2012: 188). Many Korean immigrants

Table 4: Single-Race Koreans’ Distribution in Different Life Stages by Gender Life Stage and Age Total Number % Male Under 18 152,051 24.2 18-64 423,761 67.5 65 and Over 51,778 8.3

Total 627,590 100.0 Female Under 18 133,190 17.3 18-64 563,690 73.0 65 and Over 75,173 9.7 Total 772,053 100.0 All Under 18 285,241 20.4 18-64 987,451 70.6 65 and Over 126,951 9.1 Total 1,399,643 100.0 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2010 American Community Survey

who came to the United States in the 1970s and 1980s as young or middle-aged people have reached the elderly stage now. Many of them continue to run businesses or retired after successful businesses. A large number of them often donate for community events.

Table 5 shows the single-race Korean adult population by birthplace and citizenship for immigrants. Among approximately 1.15 million single-race Korean-American adults (18 years old and over), the native-born comprise only 15%. Of course, the native-born compose a much higher proportion of all single-race Korean Americans (25%). Among foreign-born adults, the majority

(57%) have become naturalized U.S. citizens, while the other 43% remain as non-citizen immigrants, predominantly with Korean citizenship. About 5% of foreign-born Koreans originated from countries other than Korea (Min 2012). These Korean immigrants are most likely to keep the citizenships of their countries of origin. The Census-reported foreign-born Koreans consist of two different groups in their legal status: (1) legalized permanent residents and (2) temporary residents.

As stated earlier, Korean temporary residents include international students, trainees/interns, visiting scholars, employees of U.S. branches of Korean firms, and visitors for sightseeing.

Table 5: Single-Race Korean Adults (18 Years and Over) by Citizenship Birth Place Status Total Number % Naturalized U.S. Citizen 536,091 48.1 Foreign Born Non-U.S Citizen 407,060 36.5

171,311 15.4 Native-Born

Total 1,114,462 100.0

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2010 American Community Survey

Settlement Patterns

This section takes an overview of Korean Americans’ settlement patterns. Korean Americans’ settlement patterns include their residential distribution in different regions, states, and major metropolitan areas. It also examines Korean immigrants’ suburbanization movement in different

Korean population centers, which started in the early 1990s. Finally, it also covers Korean enclaves in Los Angeles and the New York-New Jersey area.

Levels of Concentration in Regions and Metropolitan Areas

Figure 4 shows changes in the regional distribution of the Korean-American population between 1970 and 2010. Pioneer Asian immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were highly concentrated in the West Coast states, especially in California, Hawaii, and

Washington. Hawaii, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, in particular, were major areas where many

Korean immigrants settled at that time. However, Figure 4 shows that only 43% of Korean

Americans were settled in the West. In 1970, all other major Asian groups had much higher levels of concentration in the West than Korean Americans. For example, 71% of all Asian Americans were concentrated in the West in 1970 (Min 2006: 33).

It is not difficult to explain why a higher proportion of Korean Americans settled outside of the West in 1970 than other Asian groups. Under normal conditions, the predominant majority of new Korean immigrants would have chosen the West Coast cities, where they had relatives and friends. However, as noted in the previous section on immigration patterns, approximately 15,000

Korean immigrants admitted to the United States during the interim period (1950 to 1964) consisted of three major groups: Korean women married to U.S. servicemen, Korean children

Figure 4: Changes in the Regional Distribution of Korean Population, 1970-2010 (%)

100%

80% 42.6 43.4 44.4 44.5 43.7

60% West

South 18.2 19.9 19.2 21.4 24.0 Midwest 40% Population Northeast 19.1 13.6 17.5 12.6 11.8 20%

20.1 19.2 22.8 21.6 20.5

Percentage of the Regional Distribution of the of Distribution Korean the Regional Percentage 0% 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Sources: The 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 U.S. Censuses Note: The 2000 and 2010 numbers include both single-race and multiracial Koreans

adopted by American citizens, and Korean international students. The first two groups had no choice in their areas of settlement, because they were invited by their American husbands or parents, who were American citizens settled in particular areas. Even the third immigrant group—

Korean international students—were widely scattered in the United States at that time. These three groups of Korean immigrants continued to come to the United States in large numbers even after the United States adopted a new liberalized immigration law in 1965. These considerations help us understand why a larger proportion of Korean immigrants than other Asian groups resided outside of the West in 1970. The most significant change in Korean Americans’ regional distribution that we can discern from Figure 4 is a substantial increase in the proportion of Korean Americans

settled in the South during the 40-year period and a huge drop in the Midwest, from 19% in 1970 to 12% in 2010.

Table 6 indicates changing proportions of Korean Americans settled in the ten largest

Korean population centers. The Los Angeles metropolitan area has the largest Korean population in the United States, with about 330,000 in 2010, accounting for 19% of Korean Americans in the

United States. The New York-New Jersey metropolitan area, with approximately 220,000 Korean

Americans in 2010, has the second largest Korean population in the United States. Both areas went through significant reductions in the proportion of all Korean Americans in the United

States. The Chicago and Philadelphia areas experienced even higher levels of reduction in the proportion of Korean Americans. By contrast, the Seattle, Atlanta, and Dallas areas witnessed significant increases in the proportion of Korean Americans. In 2010, roughly 57% of Korean

Americans were concentrated in the ten largest Korean population centers, which was a significant reduction from 66% in 2000. This reduction indicates the tendency of Korean Americans to move to smaller metropolitan areas during the last decade or so. Such metropolitan areas as San Diego,

Denver, Miami, and Las Vegas witnessed substantial increases in the share of the Korean population.

Table 6: Numbers of Korean Americans and Growth Rates in the Ten Largest Korean Population Areas, in 1990, 2000, and 2010

1990 2000* 2010* Metropolitan Area N % N % N % Los Angeles CMSA 194,437 24.3 272,498 22.2 324,586 19.0 New York CMSA 118,096 14.8 179,344 14.6 221,705 13.0 Washington D.C. CMSA 39,850 5.0 80,592 6.6 90,157 5.3 Seattle CMSA 23,901 3.0 49,139 4.0 64,771 3.8 Chicago CMSA 36,952 4.6 49,972 4.1 61,229 3.6 San Francisco CMSA 42,277 5.3 65,218 5.3 50,867 3.0 Atlanta CMSA 10,120 1.3 24,232 2.0 48,788 2.9 Honolulu CMSA 22,646 2.8 36,069 2.9 41,689 2.4 Philadelphia CMSA 24,568 3.1 31,820 2.6 40,292 2.4 Dallas CMSA 11,041 1.4 20,140 1.6 33,593 2.0 Total in 10 Metropolitan 523,888 65.6 809,024 65.9 977,677 57.3 Total in the United States 798,849 100.0 1,076,872 100.0 1,706,822 100.0 Sources: The 1990, 2000, and 2010 U.S. Censuses Note: Ten metropolitan areas with more than 10,000 Korean Americans, excluding multi-racial cases, in the 1990 Census are selected. a) The names of the metropolitan areas follow the 2010 definitions: Los Angeles-Orange-Riverside CMSA New York-Newark-Bridgeport, NY-NJ-CT CMSA Washington-Baltimore-Northern Virginia, DC-MD-VA-WV CMSA San Francisco-Oakland CMSA* Chicago-Naperville-Michigan City, IL-IN-WI CMSA Seattle-Tacoma-Olympia CMSA Philadelphia-Camden-Vineland, PA-NJ-DE-MD CMSA Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Gainesville, Atlanta CMSA Honolulu, HI MSA Dallas-Fort Worth, TX CMSA In the 1990 and 2000 Censuses San Jose, San Francisco, and Oakland were included in the San Francisco CMSA. But San Jose was separated in the 2010 Census and Fremont was added to the San Francisco-Oakland CMSA. * The 2000 and 2010 numbers include both single-race and multiracial Koreans

The Suburbanization Movement

In the 1970s and 1980s, new Korean immigrants had a tendency to settle in Korean enclaves in Queens. However, as they became more economically stable and improved their

English language skills, many Korean immigrants began to move from Korean enclaves to suburban areas. Also, as South Korea improved its economic conditions, many new Korean immigrants were settled directly in suburban areas, bypassing Korean enclaves. Thus Korean immigrants, like white immigrant groups in the first half of the twentieth century, started their 21

suburbanization movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s in different metropolitan areas. We can measure the level of their suburbanization most effectively by examining changes in the proportion of Korean Americans settled in central cities compared to suburban areas between 1990 and 2000 and between 2000 and 2001 in each of the major Korean population centers.

I can effectively illustrate these changes by using the New York-New Jersey area as an example. Table 7 shows changes over time in the Korean population in the New York-New Jersey

Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (hereafter NY-NJ CMSA) by separating New York

City and suburban counties outside of the central city. In 1990, the majority (59%) of Korean

Americans in the metropolitan area lived in New York City, heavily concentrating in Korean enclaves in Queens. However, more and more Korean immigrants who had originally settled in

Queens moved to suburban areas in Long Island, NY and Bergen County, NJ in the 1990s. Also, many new arrivals from Korea settled directly in suburban counties, particularly Bergen County.

Between 1990 and 2000, suburban counties experienced a 66% increase rate in the Korean population, compared to 29% in New York City. This suburbanization of the Korean population continued in the 2000s. While the Korean population in suburban counties recorded a 48% increase rate between 2000 and 2010, New York City experienced only a 14% increase rate.

Table 7: Changes in the Korean Population in the New York-New Jersey CMSA, 1990-2010

1990 2000* % Change 2010* % Change NY-NJ Area N N 1990-2000 N 2000-2010 Total 118,096 170,509 44.4 221,705 30.0

NY Central City 69,718 90,208 29.4 102,820 14.0

Suburban Areas 48,378 80,301 66.0 118,885 48.0 Source: The 1990, 2000, and 2010 U.S. Censuses * The 2000 and 2010 numbers include both single-race and multiracial Koreans.

There are two major reasons why Korean immigrants moved from Korean enclaves in New

York City to suburban counties in Long Island, Upstate New York, and Bergen County in New

Jersey. First, they moved to suburban areas in search of better public schools. Public schools in suburban counties tend to be much better than those in New York City, partly by virtue of their huge advantages in funding due to higher property taxes and partly because of parents’ higher class backgrounds. Most Korean immigrant parents are willing to pay higher property taxes for the benefit of their children’s quality education. Second, Korean immigrants prefer to live in suburban counties because of lower crime rates, less traffic, and other suburban amenities. White Americans began to move from New York City to suburban counties for the same reasons much earlier, and have continued to do so.

Table 8 shows that Queens had a much larger Korean population than suburban counties in

1990. However, the Korean population there achieved only a 31% increase rate between 1990 and

2000 and almost no increase in the next decade. By contrast, the Korean populations in suburban counties achieved remarkable increase rates during the two decades. Bergen County in New

Jersey, in particular, experienced a radical increase (130%) between 1990 and 2000 and a much higher increase rate even in the next decade. The Korean population in Bergen County in 2010

(58,236) was only slightly smaller than that in Queens (66,124). If the current trend continues,

Bergen County may soon have more Korean Americans than Queens. In addition to quality public schools, low crime rates, and other suburban amenities, the convenience of commuting to

Manhattan and the establishment of suburban Koreatowns in Fort Lee and Palisades Park are other major factors that have attracted so many Korean immigrants to Bergen County.

Table 8: Growth Rate of Korean Population in Queens and Two NY-NJ Suburban Counties, 1990-2010 Year 1990 2000* % Change 2010* % Change NY-NJ Suburban counties N N 1990-2000 N 2000-2010 Queens, NYC 49,088 63,885 30.1 66,124 3.5

Bergen County, NJ 16,073 37,015 130.3 58,236 57.3

Nassau County, NY 5,704 8,769 53.7 14,338 63.5

Sources: The 1990, 2000, and 2010 U.S. Censuses * The 2000 and 2010 numbers include both single-race and multiracial Koreans.

Nassau County in Long Island recorded the highest increase rate (64%) in the Korean population among all suburban counties in New York between 2000 and 2010. It had a much larger Korean population (over 14,000) than other suburban counties in 2010. Nassau County is attractive to Korean immigrants mainly because there are several school districts with highly rated public schools. The neighborhoods where Korean immigrants are concentrated in Long Island, such as New Hyde Park, Great Neck, Port Washington, Syosset, and Jericho, have many first-class high schools.

Establishment of Korean Enclaves

Chinese immigrants all over the world have created Chinese enclaves called Chinatowns.

Chinese immigrants in major American cities are highly concentrated in central cities to a much greater extent than other Asian immigrant groups (Min 2006b: 39). They have created Chinatowns close to downtown central business districts in two dozen American metropolitan areas; New York and Los Angeles each have two or more Chinatowns (Zhou and Kim 2003).

Korean immigrants are dispersed far more widely in suburban areas than Chinese immigrants (Min 200b: 39). Yet Korean enclaves in the United States have attracted more attention than any other Asian enclaves, including those of Chinese immigrants (Min and Joo 24

2010; Yoon 2007; Yu et al. 2004). Los Angeles Koreatown, which is located close to downtown

Los Angeles, is the largest Koreatown in the United States. Thus it has attracted a great deal of media and scholarly attention (Lee 2009; Park and Kim 2008; Park and Lee 2009; Yu 1985; Yu et al. 2004).

Since Korean enclaves in New York City have not been studied much (Min and Joo 2010;

Oh 2007), I devote two pages to describing them here. However, due to space limitations, I cannot provide statistical data on the racial composition of residents in Korean enclaves. New York City’s

Korean immigrants created their first enclave in Flushing in the early 1980s. Approximately

28,000 Korean Americans, roughly one-fourth of the Korean Americans in New York City, lived in Queens Community District 7, encompassing Flushing, Whitestone, and College Point, in 2010.

Asian Americans comprised about half of the population in the district, with Chinese Americans, numbering about 76,000 in 2010, composing the majority of the Asian-American population.

Korean immigrants established the Korean business district in Flushing, using distinctive Korean- language commercial signs. The intersection of Roosevelt Avenue and Union Street is the core of the Korean business district that Koreans commonly refer to as Hanin Sangga (Korean

Commercial District). Numerous Korean businesses that cater mainly to Korean customers with distinctive Korean cultural products are dotted along Union Street for nine blocks between 32nd and 41st Avenues. Korean immigrants cannot expand their businesses west of Union Street because the next block, Main Street, is the heart of the business district of Flushing’s Chinatown.

Blocked from moving westward, Koreans have expanded their ethnic businesses eastward two and a half miles (about eighty blocks) along Northern Boulevard, up to 220th Street in Bayside. This expansion reflects the residential concentration of Korean immigrants for about two miles on both sides of Northern Boulevard between Flushing and Bayside. In 2012, we counted over 1,000

Korean businesses in the Flushing-Bayside Korean business district catering primarily to Korean customers.

Two significant suburban Koreatowns have been established by Korean immigrants in Fort

Lee and Palisades Park. The Korean enclave in Fort Lee was established in the late 1980s; a few years later, in the early 1990s, another Korean enclave was established in nearby Palisades Park.

Both towns are located in Bergen County, New Jersey. However, since the establishment of the enclaves, the Korean population in Palisades Park has outgrown the Korean population in Fort

Lee, as the former neighborhood has more suburban amenities than the latter. In 2010, about

10,000 Korean Americans in Palisades Park comprised 52% of the residents, whereas about 8,300

Korean Americans in Fort Lee composed only 24% of the residents. Korean immigrants in each neighborhood established Korean business districts in the early 1990s (Oh 2007). In 2012, we counted about 330 Korean businesses in the Palisades Park Korean business district and 250

Korean businesses in Fort Lee.

Socioeconomic Adaptations

This section examines Korean Americans’ socioeconomic adaptations in the United States. Post-

1965 Korean immigrants, like other immigrant groups in the United States, are highly selective in their class background. The first section is about Korean Americans’ educational levels and it focuses on intergenerational comparisons. The second section examines Korean immigrants’ business activities and the intergenerational reductions in self-employment rates. The third section covers Korean immigrants’ business-related intergroup conflicts and reactive solidarity. The fourth section examines Korean Americans’ economic conditions based on census data.

Educational Level

The first wave of post-1965 Korean immigrants consisted mainly of highly educated college or at least high-school graduates, many of whom worked as professionals or in other white-collar occupations in Korea (Kim 1981: 101-112; Min 1988: 57; Yoon 1997). Many Korean medical professionals—nurses, medical technicians, physicians, dentists, and pharmacists— immigrated to the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Kim 1981). Also, many Korean international students who completed their education in the United States changed their status to permanent residents. Thus they had a much higher educational level than the general adult population in Korea at that time.

The high educational level of Korean immigrants was somewhat moderated beginning in the mid-1970s because Korean high-status occupational immigrants before 1975 were gradually replaced by family-preference immigrants, especially sibling-preference immigrants. The 1976

Amendment of the Immigration Act of 1965, which reduced the number of professional- preference immigrants and the invitations of their siblings to the United States for permanent residence by naturalized Korean immigrants, were two major contributing factors to this change.

However, the Immigration Act of 1990 increased the quota for both the number and proportion of professional immigrants, which, in turn, gradually raised the educational level of Korean and other

Asian immigrants. In particular, college graduates have experienced much difficulty in finding meaningful occupations in Korea beginning with the financial crisis in the late 1990s, which has led to the influx of highly educated and highly skilled Korean immigrants to the United States

(Min 2011: 209).

Table 9 shows Korean immigrants’ educational levels compared with the Korean population in Korea, all immigrants in the U.S., and all native-born Americans. Fifty-one percent 27

of Korean immigrants 25 years old and over completed a four-year college education, with 91% having completed a high-school education. They have a much higher educational level than the comparable adult populations in Korea. Only 18% of the population in Korea completed a college education and 75% finished a high-school education. Despite a high college enrollment rate in

Korea, when all adults (including middle-aged and elderly people) are taken into account, their college graduation rate still remains low. These data indicate that Korean immigrants are a highly selective group in terms of their class background.

Table 9: Single-Race Korean Americans’ (25-64) Education Level, Compared to the Populations in Korea and the U.S. ______Total Men Women

High School College H.S. College H. S. College

1st -Generation Koreans 92.8 55.9 96.1 62.0 90.7 46.6

1.5-Generation Koreans 98.3 65.3 98.5 64.1 98.1 66.1 2nd + Generation Koreans 98.3 70.5 97.8 68.6 98.7 72.3

Koreans in Korea (b) 75.2 17.9 All Immigrants in the U.S.(c) 68.3 27.4 All U.S.-Born People (d) 88.6 28.2 ______Sources: (a), (c), and (d) are based on the 2007-2011 American Community Surveys (b) is based on the 2010 Korean Census of Population

Korean immigrants have a much higher education level than all U.S. immigrants in both high-school and college graduation rates. As a group, they are also much more highly educated than all American-born adults. Asian immigrants are generally highly educated, much more highly educated than native-born white Americans, whereas Latino immigrants have a much lower educational level than white Americans. Among Asian immigrant groups, Indian and Taiwanese immigrant groups have the highest educational levels (respectively 75% and 70% completing a 28

college education). Korean, Filipino, and Japanese groups follow these two top groups in educational level, while Chinese immigrants are polarized in their class background, with 45% having completed college but 25% having not completed high school. Overall, Asian immigrant groups have much higher educational levels than other immigrant groups and American citizens, mainly because they are highly selective in their class background. For example, while only 3% of the general population in India completed a college education, 75% of Indian immigrants completed college. Since Asia has a very large population (60% of the world population), a tiny fraction of people from each of the major Asian source countries of immigrants have become U.S. permanent residents annually.

Table 9 shows the intergenerational educational mobility of Korean Americans by gender.

As expected, 1.5- and U.S.-born Koreans have substantially higher educational levels than first- generation Korean immigrants. However, given that first-generation Korean immigrants are much older than 1.5-generation and U.S.-born Koreans, the age differences among the three generations can be said to be mainly responsible for the intergenerational difference in education.

What is more important for understanding Korean Americans’ educational mobility patterns is a significant gender difference in the level of intergenerational mobility. Native-born

Korean men have raised the college graduation rate only by 7% (from 62% to 69%), but native- born Korean women raised it by 25% (from 47% to 72%). Native-born Korean women have a slightly higher college graduation rate (72%) than their male counterparts (69%). Considering the significant age difference between the first and native-born generations, native-born Korean-

American men can hardly be said to have achieved intergenerational mobility in education.

However, native-born Korean-American women have indeed achieved significant mobility in education.

From White-Collar Occupations to Small Businesses

A unique aspect of post-1965 Korean immigrants’ occupational adaptations in the United

States is their concentration in labor-intensive small businesses. My own and other scholars’ research indicate that Korean immigrants in major Korean population centers are concentrated in several types of small businesses (Light and Bonacich 1988; Min 1988, 1996, & 2008; Yoon

1997; Yu et al. 2009). As shown in Table 10, the most recent census data indicate that 28% of first-generation Korean immigrants 25-64 year old in the United States are self-employed.

Table 10: Occupational Characteristics of Korean Americans (age 25-64) Managerial Public Sector Self-Employment Ratea Professional/ Employment Rate (%) Technician b (%)

Single Ethnic Koreans 1st Generation 28.4 7.7 42.3 1.5 Generation 12.3 12.3 57.9 2nd + Generation 8.9 12.8 61.2

Other 2nd + Generation Asian

Americans Chinese 8.8 16.8 65.7 Japanese 10.2 23.6 53.1 Filipino 5.0 16.7 46.3 Asian Indian 8.0 11.9 71.6 Vietnamese 9.6 13.2 48.9

11.9 15.1 39.4 Non-Hispanic Whites Non-Hispanic Blacks 5.0 20.3 26.2 Hispanics 7.0 17.6 29.2

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, The 2007-2011 American Community Surveys Notes: a Among those who participate in labor market activities; b Among those who are currently employed

The U.S. Census underestimates Korean immigrants’ self-employment rate because many

Korean immigrant couples who run businesses together only report one partner as self-employed,

often just the husband, without reporting the other partner. Moreover, Korean immigrants settled in large metropolitan areas have higher self-employment rates than those who live in small cities.

For example, results of my 2005 survey conducted in New York City show that 46% of Korean male immigrants and 39% of Korean female immigrants were self-employed (Min 2008: 32).

Since about 40% of Korean workers are employed in Korean-owned businesses, only about 20% of them are in the general economy. This means that Korean immigrants are highly occupationally segregated in the ethnic economy. Their occupational segregation often means that they are also socially segregated, which means that they have little chance to socially interact with non-

Koreans.

My study of Korean businesses in Atlanta conducted in 1981 (Min 1984 & 1988) revealed that Korean immigrants turned to small business for two major reasons. First, they were forced to operate small business because they could not find meaningful white-collar and professional occupations commensurate with their educational levels due to their language barriers and other disadvantages for employment in the general labor market. Second, many Korean immigrants started small businesses because, in their view, they could achieve economic mobility more quickly through their own businesses than through employment in the general labor market.

However, Korean merchants were not satisfied with being small-business owners because it did not enhance their social status (Min 1988: 61). This is the reason why many successful Korean businessmen in the New York-New Jersey area tried to find meaningful social positions as staff or board members of ethnic organizations through giving donations (Min 1996: 202-207).

Korean merchants in the New York-New Jersey area are concentrated in several types of labor-intensive businesses: (1) grocery and greengrocery retail, (2) retail of manufactured goods imported from Asian countries, (3) garment manufacturing, (4) dry cleaning services, and (5) nail

salon services (Min 2008: 38). In the early 1980s, they were heavily concentrated in retail businesses, especially in the first two types listed above. However, the emergence of mega retail stores, especially their movement to minority neighborhoods, since the mid-1990s have created the difficulty for Korean and other retail stores. As a result, the number of Korean-owned retail stores has decreased significantly. Instead, the numbers of two service businesses--dry cleaning service and nailing services—have exponentially increased, respectively to 3,000 and 4,000 (Min

2008: ).

There are some differences in business lines in different Korean communities. But three business lines that are dominant universally in all major Korean communities are retail stores selling manufactured goods imported from Korea and other Asian countries, grocery/liquor stores, and dry cleaning service. Produce stores and nailing service are two major Korean businesses that are popular in the New York-New Jersey. But neither business is active in the Korean community in Los Angeles or another city. Many former grocery or produce retail owners in the New York-

New Jersey area have purchased American supermarkets whose number has increased to over 100.

In addition, Korean immigrants have developed Korean supermarket chains, such as Hanyang and

H Mart, in major U.S. metropolitan areas. By expanding the seafood and produce/fruit sections and offering items related these two areas for about half of U.S. regular supermarket prices, they have attracted huge numbers of non-Korean customers, as well as Korean. Because of their health consciousness, Americans tend to consume far more seafood and produce items than they did twenty years ago. Korean and Chinese immigrants have developed supermarket chains successfully in the United States to meet the demand for more and more seafood and produce items.

Business-Related Intergroup Conflicts and Reactive Solidarity

New immigrants maintain contact with native-born whites and other minority groups in their neighborhoods and workplaces. They encounter intergroup conflicts and discrimination mainly in these two contexts. However, Korean immigrants encountered severe business-related conflicts with other groups and government agencies in the 1980s and the early 1990s. However, these business-related conflicts ended almost completely in the mid-1990s. One positive aspect of

Korean merchants’ business-related intergroup conflicts is that they have contributed to Koreans’ ethnic solidarity. This section examines Korean merchants’ multifaceted intergroup conflicts in the

1980s and early 1990s and explains why they all but disappeared in the mid-1990s. This section also summarizes the positive effects of Korean immigrants’ business related intergroup conflicts on ethnic solidarity and political consciousness.

Business-Related Conflicts in the 1980s and early 1990s

Initially, Korean immigrants started wholesale and retail businesses selling Korean- imported manufactured goods (such as clothing, handbags, costume jewelry, and hair-care items) and garment-manufacturing subcontracts in the late 1960s. They started grocery/liquor retail stores

(in different U.S. cities) and produce stores (in New York City) in the 1970s. Of these four types of retail businesses, three were heavily concentrated in lower-income black and Latino neighborhoods in the 1970s through the early 1990s (Chang and Diaz-Veizades 1999; K. Kim

1999; I. Kim 1981; Min 1984, 1996, & 2008; Yoon 1997). In the 1980s and early 1990s, Korean merchants in black neighborhoods in New York, Los Angeles, and other metropolitan areas encountered many cases of boycotts, arson, physical violence, and other forms of rejection organized by black customers and black community leaders. These conflicts between Korean merchants and black customers received much media coverage. They were also intensively studied 33

by social scientists, leading to a dozen books on the subject being published (Abelmann and Lie

1995; Joyce 2003; C. Kim 2000; K. Kim 1999; J. Lee 2002; Min 1996 & 2008; Yoon 1997).

Korean merchants in Los Angeles and New York, the two largest metropolitan areas and also the two largest Korean population centers in the United States, experienced the most intense

Korean-black conflicts. As Joyce (2003) adequately pointed out, Korean-black conflicts in New

York were characterized by many long-term boycotts of Korean stores, whereas the Korean-black conflicts in Los Angeles involved more shootings and other forms of physical violence, including the destruction of many Korean stores during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. My research shows that

Korean merchants in New York City encountered 13 black boycotts between 1981 and 1995, with six of them being long-term boycotts lasting one month or longer (Min 2008: 76). The 1990 boycott of two Korean produce stores in Flatbush, Brooklyn, which lasted 17 months, was the longest black boycott of Korean stores in the United States. Both Korean and black communities mobilized all community resources for collective actions—active political and administrative lobbies, group shopping, donation campaigns, lawsuits, demonstrations, and picketing—to continue or block the boycott. The most serious form of victimization of Korean merchants in black neighborhoods in Los Angeles was the destruction of about 2,300 Korean stores during the

Los Angeles riots (Min 1996: 90). Most of the destroyed (looted and/or burned) Korean stores were located in South Central Los Angeles (predominantly black neighborhoods). However,

Korean stores located in Koreatown and other areas also became targets of destruction.

Korean retail business owners also had conflicts with their white suppliers, Latino employees, and white landlords (heavily Jewish) (Min 1991; 1996: 169-183). Among the three types of major Korean retail businesses, those selling manufactured goods imported from Korea and other Asian countries purchased their merchandise mainly from Korean suppliers. Thus they

had some advantages in ordering merchandise, including getting hot items, speedy delivery, and the ability to buy merchandise on credit (a fairly common practice among Korean co-ethnic wholesalers and retailers). However, Korean grocery and produce retail owners had to deal with white suppliers, and in the process, they experienced much discrimination and sometimes hostility.

In particular, Korean produce retail owners in the New York-New Jersey area who purchased their produce from Hunts Point Market suffered rude treatment, discrimination, and physical violence

(beatings) by employees and managers of Italian and Jewish-owned produce wholesalers (Min

2008: 58-61). They also had to pay penalties for parking violations. Over 700 Korean immigrants in the New York-New Jersey area ran fish retail stores in the early 1990s (Min 1996: 54). They also suffered discriminatory treatment and beatings at Fulton Fish Market.

Korean merchants’ heavy dependence upon white landlords (according to a 2005 survey in

New York City, 72%; see Min 2009: 149) also have made them vulnerable to financial loss. Many landlords do not renew their releases when businesses have been successful. Also, they have doubled or tripled commercial rents within a short period of time. Thus many Korean produce store owners in Manhattan have been forced to make their stores twenty-four hour businesses in order to pay escalating rents (Min 1990 & 1996: 177).

Korean business owners also heavily depend upon Latino employees with whom many of them have experienced labor-related legal problems or picketing. Results of my 2005 survey (Min

2009) reveal that Latinos composed 40% of employees of Korean businesses in New York City, with Korean employees comprising 52%. Korean professional offices, such as law firms, medical and dental offices, and accounting firms heavily depend upon Korean employees. Korean nail salons, the largest source of employees in the Korean community, also heavily depend upon

Korean female employees. However, Korean produce and grocery stores, Korean restaurants, and

dry cleaning shops heavily depend upon Latino employees. Between 1995 and 1998, Latino and

Korean employees in Koreatown in Los Angeles, organized by Korean Immigrant Workers’

Advocates, jointly participated in picketing against Korean restaurants several times (Chung 2007:

159-163). Between 2001 and 2004, some Latino employees of Korean businesses in New York

City participated in picketing again Korean stores, organized by labor unions.

Disappearance of Black Boycotts

Korean-black conflicts were so prevalent in the 1980s and early 1990s that we thought they would never go away. However, everything has an end, and black boycotts of Korean stores and other forms of Korean-black conflicts have disappeared since the mid-1990s. I found that the last black boycott of a Korean store in New York City occurred in 1995, in Greenwich Village in

Manhattan, which is not a black neighborhood (Min 2008: 76). To my knowledge, the last black boycott of a Korean store in South Central Los Angeles occurred in June 1996 (Sae Gae Times

1996). Since that time, I have not read a single Korean newspaper article that has reported interracial conflicts that occurred in a Korean-owned store in any other city. Thus the virtual disappearance of Korean immigrants’ business-related conflicts with black customers seems to be a national trend. In my 2008 book focusing on Korean greengrocers in New York City (Min 2008:

89-96), I have tried to explain the disappearance of black boycotts of Korean stores in New York

City. In the following paragraph, I briefly summarize my explanation given in the book.

To explain Korean merchants’ conflicts with black residents and black community leaders,

I used the middleman minority theory (Min 1996 & 2008). According to this theory, alien middleman merchants existed in preindustrial agrarian or colonial societies characterized by a big status gap between the ruling group (producers) and minority or lower-class customers (Bonacich

1973; Eitzen 1971; Zenner 1991). Thus middleman minorities played an economically 36

intermediary role bridging ruling producers and minority or lower-class customers. Middleman merchants, sandwiched between the two groups, encountered host hostility in the forms of boycotts, riots, and sometimes even expulsion. Jews in Medieval Europe and in Poland before

World War II, Chinese in South East Asian countries, and Indians in East and South Africa played middleman minority roles and thus encountered similar forms of anti-middleman hostility. Using middleman minority theory, I argued that lower-income black neighborhoods needed Korean and other immigrant merchants because of large corporations’ and white business owners’ reluctance to invest in lower-income black neighborhoods (Min 1996 & 2008). I also pointed out that like middleman merchants in other societies, Korean merchants in black neighborhoods in the United

States encountered boycotts, arson, physical violence, and riots.

Middleman minority theory is as useful for explaining the end of Korean-black conflicts as it is for explaining the beginning. I conducted ethnographic research in 2006 in the three major lower-income black neighborhoods (Harlem, Jamaica, and Flatbush) in New York City where many Korean immigrants had run retail businesses in the 1980s and early 1990s. I found that these black neighborhoods went through major changes in such a way that they no longer needed middleman merchants. Under the impact of the urban renovation plan by New York City (changes in zoning laws), many mega-stores moved in to black neighborhoods, which in turn contributed to sudden hikes in commercial rents. Korean retail store owners, unable to compete with mega-stores and to pay commercial rents (which had doubled or tripled), were forced to close their stores. For example, in 1992, about 55 Korean-owned retail stores were located in the heart of Central

Harlem; in 2006, there were only 14 Korean-owned stores remaining in the same area (Min 2008:

89-90). Also, many other non-Korean immigrant business owners—Indian, Pakistani, Middle

Eastern, and African—moved to Harlem for small businesses and peddling. The remaining small

number of Korean merchants in Harlem were no longer targets of rejection because of the presence of other immigrant business owners.

The urban renovation of lower-income black neighborhoods and the influx of many mega- stores have led many native-born whites and Latino and black immigrants to reside in black neighborhoods. These changes have transformed Harlem and other lower-income black neighborhoods into multiracial neighborhoods. Table 11 shows the changes in the racial composition of residents in Central Harlem, where many Korean immigrants ran retail businesses in the 1980s and 1990s. Blacks, almost all African Americans, comprised 94% of the population in Central Harlem in 1980. However, the proportion of the black population gradually decreased over the years, dropping to 63% in 2010. African Americans may compose a smaller proportion than 63% in 2010, as many blacks are likely to be African and Caribbean black immigrants and their children. By contrast, Latinos and non-Hispanic whites respectively compose 10% and 22%.

These two groups will continue to increase in the future. Other black neighborhoods in New York

City have gone through similar changes in their racial compositions. The changes in the racial composition of the residents in Harlem and other black neighborhoods over the years have significantly weakened the African-American sense of their own territory. They can no longer claim that immigrant business owners should move out of “my own neighborhoods.”

In addition to more difficulties in running retail businesses in Harlem and other black neighborhoods, few new Korean immigrants are willing to run businesses in black neighborhoods, as they have other options now. With greater amounts of starting capital, they can invest in other semi-professional businesses, such as insurance, mortgage and real estates. Thos who have completed their college or graduate education in the United States can find their jobs in the mainstream economy. As noted above, Korean immigrants are concentrated in two types of

Table 11: Changes in the Racial Composition of Residents in Central Harlem (Manhattan Community District 10), 1990-2010 Year 1980 1990 2000 2010

Racial N % N % N % N % Category Total 108,160 100.0 99,519 100.0 107,109 100.0 115,723 100.0 Population Non- 101,830 94.1 87,149 87.6 82,750 77.3 72,858 63.0 Hispanic Black Hispanic 4,540 4.2 10, 055 10.1 18,019 16.8 25,692 22.2

Non- 1,058 1.0 1,511 1.5 2,189 2.0 11,050 9.5 Hispanic White Asian 575 0.5 382 0.4 938 0.9 2,833 2.4

All Others 157 0.2 422 0.4 3,213 3.0 3,290 2.8

Source: New York City Department of City Planning, Community Data

personal-service businesses: nail salons and dry cleaning shops. Many Korean women who ran retail businesses in black neighborhoods in the 1980s and 1990s now are employed in Korean nail salons (Min 2008). The implication of this shift for Korean immigrants’ adaptations to American society is that Korean immigrant merchants and co-ethnic employees need to maintain more social interactions with their non-Korean customers (Min 2013a).

Finally, and most significantly, younger-generation Korean adults participate in the mainstream economy to a much larger extent than their forebears did, with most of them engaging in professional and managerial occupations. Going back to Table 10, 1.5- and second-generation

Koreans have much lower self-employment rates than Korean immigrants. In fact, the self- employment rate of U.S.-born Koreans is as low as other native-born Asian groups, whereas other major Asian immigrant groups have much lower self-employment rates than Korean immigrants.

This means that younger-generation Korean Americans have achieved a high level of occupational assimilation. To lump together the changes that have occurred to Korean immigrants and younger- generation Koreans, Korean Americans today socioeconomically participate in the mainstream

American society to a far greater extent than they did two or three decades ago. To put it another way, Korean Americans today are incorporated into the mainstream society much more than they were a few decades ago.

The Positive Effect of Business-Related Intergroup Conflicts on Ethnic Solidarity

Korean merchants’ business-related inter-group conflicts resulted in financial losses, physical danger, and stress. However, when members of an immigrant/minority group occupy a distinctive position in the labor market and encounter threats to their economic survival and physical security, they are supposed to maintain reactive solidarity (Hechter 1975 &1978). Korean retail business owners who suffered discrimination and physical violence at the hands of employees and managers of white wholesale suppliers have used ethnic collective action to protect their business and physical security interests. Black boycotts of Korean merchants in black neighborhoods contributed not only to Korean merchants’ ethnic collective action but also to community-wide solidarity.

As summarized above, Korean produce retail owners in the New York-New Jersey area encountered the most severe forms of conflicts with produce suppliers at Hunts Point Market. As I documented in detail in my 2008 book, Korean produce store owners used several different forms of ethnic collective action through the Korean Produce Association of New York to protect their economic and physical security interests, including group purchases, political and administrative lobbies, demonstrations, and boycotts. Their most effective form of collective action was picketing

against and boycotting white suppliers. The Korean Produce Association of New York organized ten demonstrations and/or boycotts against the produce suppliers that treated Korean produce owners unfairly or with physical violence (Min 2008). All of the boycotts were successful in making the suppliers apologize and accept KPA’s demands to change their services to Korean business owners.

Black boycotts of Korean produce and other retail stores were more threatening to Korean immigrants’ economic survival than discrimination from white suppliers and thus contributed to stronger Korean community-wide solidarity. The black boycotts of two Korean produce stores in

Brooklyn, New York City, summarized above, contributed to different forms of Korean immigrants’ collective action (Min 1996 & 2008). They included donation campaigns to help the two owners of the boycotted stores, group shopping at the two stores, multiples lobbies (of the

New York City Mayor, Brooklyn Borough President, and local politicians) to terminate boycotts quickly, and a massive demonstration in front of City Hall to put pressure on Mayor David

Dinkins to take action to terminate the boycott. In addition to Korean produce store owners, other

Korean merchants and community leaders participated in the donation campaign, which collected approximately $150,000 (Min 2008: 88). Approximately 7,000 Korean immigrants participated in the demonstration, the largest Korean demonstration even organized by Korean immigrants in

New York City (Min 1996: 151). Many Koreans from Philadelphia and Washington, DC drove to

New York City to participate in the demonstration.

Korean immigrant merchants suffered the most severe victimization during the 1992 Los

Angeles riots. The destruction of 2,300 Korean-owned stores during the riots, which accounted for

40% of the total riot damage, was a massive financial loss to the Korean community. However, the

Los Angeles Police Department’s failure to take quick action to protect Korean businesses, the

biased media coverage of Korean-black conflicts, and the federal and local governments’ failure to take proper measures to compensate the Korean riot victims, angered the merchant victims and

Korean community leaders even more than the amount of damage and destruction inflicted upon their businesses and finances.

Different forms of Korean immigrant collective action were taken following the end of the riots, including a large solidarity rally held at Ardmore Park in Koreatown on the day after the end of the riots, in which about 30,000 Koreans participated (Min 1996: 155). Moreover, to help the riot victims, Korean Americans from all over the United States joined the donation campaigns that collected five million dollars. Also, Korean riot victims and many other Korean groups, including

Korean college students, staged protest rallies against Los Angeles City Hall, President Bush when he visited Koreatown, and the local ABC TV affiliate. Most significantly, the victimization of many Korean merchants during the riots and the government’s failure to protect Korean stores and to compensate the Korean victims led Korean community leaders to realize the lack of Koreans’ political power in the United States. Thus they heightened Koreans’ political consciousness. Many

Korean political empowerment organizations have been established in different Korean communities following the victimization of Korean merchants during the riots.

Economic Conditions

Table 12 shows the generational differences in economic conditions among Korean

Americans, compared to native-born Asian and other racial groups. Although Korean immigrants have a higher educational level than native-born non-Hispanic white Americans, they have slightly lower earnings. This may be partly due to their language barrier. But remember that almost half of

Korean immigrants run their own businesses. Since self-employed people, whether Koreans or non-Korean Americans, report substantially lower earnings than employed people, Korean 42

immigrants with a high self-employment rate are likely to have underreported their earnings. They may actually have higher earnings than native-born white Americans. Korean immigrants’ poverty rate seems to have been underestimated because many

Korean employees working for Korean businesses work under the table.

Younger-generation Korean Americans do much better economically than Korean immigrants. They have substantially higher earnings than native-born white Americans too. Most younger-generation Koreans who are in the labor force are in their twenties and thirties, whereas most Korean immigrant workers are in their prime years. Given this, younger-generation Koreans’ economic advantages over Korean immigrants are significant. In particular, 1.5-generation

Koreans have slightly higher individual and household earnings than native-born Koreans, although, as noted in Table 9, they have a substantially lower college graduation rate than native- born Koreans.

Table 12: Economic Characteristics of Single-Race Korean Americans a Labor Force Annual Below Annual HH Participation Earnings b Poverty Lined Income c ($) (%) ($) (%)

All Single-race Koreans 1st Generation 66.9 47,538 72,289 17.7 1.5 Generation 83.5 66,542 106,529 14.8 2nd Generation 83.7 65,462 98,670 15.2

Other Races—Native Born Only Non-Hispanic Whites 78.5 50,535 74,570 11.3 Non-Hispanic Blacks 69.0 34,787 46,216 31.1 Hispanics 76.6 38,827 60,384 24.5

Other 2nd Generation Asian Americans Chinese 84.8 73,598 111,344 12.8 Japanese 82.7 63,436 92,431 7.7 Filipino 85.8 48,936 86,963 8.3 Asian Indian 84.2 76,150 118,231 9.3 Vietnamese 82.4 47,008 75,819 16.1 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, The 2007-2011 American Community Surveys Notes: a Samples are limited to the prime age population (age 25-64) unless noted otherwise; b.Restricted to positive earnings; c. Statistics based on household heads; d. Statistics based on all samples.

Further Changes in the Twenty-First Century

I have examined Koreans’ immigration, settlement, and business patterns in the previous sections, with a focus on changes that have occurred in the twenty-first century. However, I would like to summarize further changes in Korean Americans’ experiences that have occurred in the twenty- first century. To illustrate recent developments in twenty-first century Korean-American experiences, I use examples of changes that have occurred in the Korean community in the New

York-New Jersey area. However, I believe these changes in Korean Americans’ experiences are also applicable to most other Korean communities in the United States.

Greater Linkages to the Korean Ethnic Community and Homeland

According to the classical assimilation theory (Park 1950; Warner and Srole 1945), assimilation to American society and ethnic attachment are mutually exclusive. Thus a higher level of assimilation is supposed to reduce ethnic attachment. However, Korean immigrants’ higher level of incorporation into American society today has not reduced their attachment to the

Korean community and homeland. On the contrary and somewhat paradoxically, they are more strongly attached to ethnic networks, ethnic culture, and their homeland than they were a few decades ago. Two major factors have contributed to their stronger attachment to the ethnic community and homeland.

One major factor is the expansion of a dozen large Korean communities in the United

States with more ethnic organizations, more active ethnic media, and bigger ethnic business districts. The other major factor is the stronger transnational ties Korean immigrants and their children maintain with their homeland, which have been facilitated by technological advances

(Min 2012a, 2013c). It is easier and less expensive for Koreans to talk on the phone with their relatives and friends in Korea and to visit them than it was twenty years ago. These days, they can also use Skype and instant messaging via the Internet to communicate with friends and relatives in

Korea. For news and information about Korea, the vast majority of Korean immigrants primarily depend upon Korean ethnic daily newspapers and TV/radio programs that largely reproduce media materials written and produced in Korea (Min and Kim 2009). It is also much easier and cheaper to visit Korea now than twenty years ago. According to a survey study conducted in the New

York-New Jersey area, only 15% of Korean permanent residents and naturalized citizens reported they had never visited Korea, with the majority (54%) having visited Korea three times or more

(Min 2013c: 145). 45

No doubt, younger-generation Koreans maintain much lower-level ties with their mother country than do their parents. Nevertheless, most of them are also physically, socially, and culturally connected with South Korea. First of all, a large proportion of younger-generation

Koreans regularly watch Korean dramas and other Korean cultural programs from Korean TV broadcasts (which are now widely available via cable and the Internet). Moreover, the vast majority of younger-generation Koreans have taken a homeland tour during their childhood for roots education programs, with the majority having visited Korea twice or more (Min 2013c: 145).

A significant proportion of them live in Korea for one or more years to teach English in elementary and secondary schools, private institutes, or international summer schools at various universities (Min 2013: 136-146). The emerging economic, diplomatic, athletic, and cultural influences of South Korea have stimulated more and more younger-generation Koreans to visit

Korea.

Weakening of Business Associations’ Power and Influence and the Concomitant Increase in Social Service and Empowerment Organizations’

As I have pointed out elsewhere, Korean business associations in New York increased their power and influence in the Korean community in the course of trying to resolve business- related intergroup conflicts (Min 1996: 202-209). To resolve long-term black boycotts, conflicts with white suppliers, and tough government regulations of commercial activities, Korean business associations mobilized community forces for ethnic collective action. This process enhanced their influence in the Korean community. However, the disappearance of business-related inter-group conflicts has weakened the unity of Korean merchants and reduced the power of major business associations. The Korean Produce Association (KPA) received only a few cases of complaints monthly from members in 2006, as Korean greengrocers had little conflict with black customers or 46

with white suppliers (Min 2008:133). As the demand for services by its members declined, the

KPA’s membership and budget also declined. As a result, the KPA now has less manpower and fewer resources to provide services for the Korean community than it did during the period of frequent intergroup conflicts. Other major Korean business associations have gone through similar changes in their budgets and services to members and the Korean community in general. Thus business associations have seen their power wane in recent years, although they still play a more important role in providing services for the Korean community than they do in other Asian communities.

Instead, Korean social service and empowerment organizations have increased, not only in their number, but also in their power and influence. Taking the New York-New Jersey area as an example, at the end of the 1990s, I located approximately 40 Korean social service and empowerment organizations in the New York-New Jersey area. The number has grown to approximately 100 in 2013. About ten of them are large organizations with an annual budget of

$300,000 or more. They include Korean Community Services (with an annual budget of 2.5 million dollars), MinKwon Center for Community Action, Korean American Civic Coalition,

Korean Family Counseling Center, Young Women’s Christian Association, Asian Women’s

Christian Association, Korean American Community Foundation, and Beautiful Foundation. The last two organizations, one established in 2002 and the other in 2006, collect donations from the

Korean community and American corporations and get government grants, and distribute funds to

Korean social service agencies. The Jewish-American community also has many of these types of foundations.

While all Korean business associations are still headed by Korean immigrant business owners in the New York-New Jersey area, several major Korean social service organizations are

headed by 1.5- or second-generation Korean Americans and mainly staffed by younger-generation

Korean Americans. The Korean American Community Foundation, probably the most powerful

Korean ethnic organization in the New York-New Jersey area, was created by younger-generation

Koreans. Major Korean social service and empowerment organizations get major grants from government agencies and private foundations for funds, supplemented by community donations.

Korean ethnic organizations that are headed and mainly staffed by younger-generation Korean organizations use American corporations to get donations. For example, about 1,000 people attended the 2010 annual donation gala held by Korean American Community Foundation at

Chelsea Piers in Manhattan, at the cost of $400 a ticket. The organization raised roughly one million dollars at the gala. I learned that the majority of Korean participants were 1.5- and U.S.- born Koreans, with non-Korean participants comprising a significant proportion. Second- generation leaders were able to use personal contacts to bring many representatives of American corporations to the gala.

I have thus far described the emergence of social service and empowerment organizations, which have replaced Korean business associations, as the most influential and powerful ethnic organizations in the New York-New Jersey area. I believe that most other major Korean communities in the United States have experienced similar changes in terms of the emergence of social service organizations and also generational shifts in the leadership of these ethnic organizations. The Korean communities in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Honolulu, which have had longer immigration histories than East Coast Korean communities, went through these same organizational and generational transitions in the 1990s.

Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendations

It has already been over 45 years since Korean immigrants began to migrate to the United States in large numbers as beneficiaries of the 1965 Immigration Act. The above analyses indicate that different Korean communities in the United States have gone through major changes over the past four or five decades since the liberalized immigration laws were put into effect. They are no longer merely communities full of new immigrants struggling for economic survival by doing business in minority neighborhoods. These Korean communities are ethnic communities, most of whose members are long-term residents, old-timers, and native-U.S.-born Koreans. The number and proportion of temporary residents have also increased over the years, and they—international students, visiting scholars, interns, and family visitors—have filled much of the annual immigration quota assigned for Korea. Although Korean enclaves established within central cities have expanded, Korean Americans are widely dispersed throughout entire metropolitan areas, which also shows a high level of suburbanization.

One important demographic change in the Korean community is a significant increase in the multiracial population. We expect the proportion of multiracial Koreans to continue to increase, as 1.5-generation and U.S.-born Korean Americans have a great tendency to marry non-

Korean partners. Multiracial Koreans, like other multiracial Americans, have their own separate identity. Starting in 2000, the U.S. Census Bureau began classifying multiracial Americans into a separate category, which brought even further attention to the fact that they maintain an identity separate from their single-race counterparts. Nevertheless, the Korean community and even

Korean government agencies need to make greater efforts to embrace them as Korean Americans.

The U.S. Jewish community includes people with one biological Jewish parent or even one Jewish step-parent in the Jewish population. Another important demographic change that has occurred in 49

the past two decades or so is a great increase in the elderly population. While the elderly Korean population has achieved a phenomenal increase during recent years, the overall Korean immigration flow has decreased since the early 1990s. Thus, taking care of elderly people, which used to strictly be the domain of white and black Americans, has now also become a concern for the Korean community.

The most important demographic change that has occurred in the Korean community in the

United States over the last two decades is the radical increase in the number of younger-generation

Korean adults and their emergence in the community. Historically, U.S.-born second-generation adults’ movement into the Korean community created intergenerational conflicts. Korean-black conflicts prior to the 1992 riots and the victimization of many Korean merchants during the riots led many younger-generation Korean leaders and organizations to intervene in community issues in the Korean community in Los Angeles. This created substantial conflicts between Korean immigrant merchants and younger-generation community leaders (Chung 2007; Min 1996).

Fortunately, in the New York-New Jersey area, Korean immigrant leaders have trained second- generation leaders by creating second-generation organizations, such as Youth Foundation and

KALCA (Korean American League for Civic Action). As a result, there have been gradual and smooth intergenerational transitions in leadership in ethnic organizations in the New York-New

Jersey Korean-American community. Both immigrant and younger-generation community leaders need to recognize the strengths of the other side and to coordinate with each other in community activities.

We noted above that the Korean community is now linked to both American society and to their homeland to a much greater extent than they were twenty years ago. This is something that we Korean immigrants never expected before, but it is a happy development that we graciously

embrace. To be successful in the United States, we and also second-generation Koreans should not give up our cultural traditions and our linkages to Korea. Strong transnational ties facilitated by technological advances and the strong multicultural policy of the U.S. government have made this dual-nationality life possible. Korean Americans are in a good position to do important things in the United States to help their homeland diplomatically, culturally, economically, and in other ways. For example, twenty years ago, even major Korean cultural festivals in the New York area attracted only Korean immigrants and their children, with very few non-Korean participants.

However, each Korean cultural festival now draws a dozen local politicians and many non-Korean participants. Thus, Korean immigrants publicize Korean food and other elements of Korean culture to New Yorkers through Korean cultural festivals. Overall, younger-generation Koreans have a lower level of attachment to their mother country. However, many of them feel proud of

Korean cultural traditions and Korea. They are in a better position to publicize Korea and Korean culture to non-Korean-American citizens because they have far more non-Korean friends than most Korean immigrants. This is good ground on which the Korean government should extend dual citizenship, not only to naturalized Korean immigrants, but also to second-generation

Koreans.

A number of studies have shown that children of immigrants who have strong ethnic identity and who are bilingual are more successful in school performance than those who have weak ethnic identity and who are English monolingual (Gibson 1988; Rumbaut and Cornelius

1995; Zhou and Bankston 1998). This means that teaching second-generation Koreans their mother tongue and Korean culture is important not only for their relationships with their parents and Korea, but also for their success in school and in their careers. However, the global U.S. cultural influence is so strong that it is not easy for Korean parents alone to teach their children the

Korean language and culture. The Korean community and the Korean government also need to take measures to establish institutions to provide ethnic education for younger-generation Korean children systematically.

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