DOCSLIB.ORG

China's Domestic Dynamics: Implications for India & the U.S

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
China's Domestic Dynamics: Implications for India & the U.S China’s Domestic Dynamics: Implications for India & the U.S. CHENG LI hina is again at crossroads in its domestic central groups, including important areas such as for- politics. After becoming party boss in 2013, eign afairs, fnancial and economic work, cyber secu- President Xi Jinping surprised many people in rity and information technology, and military reforms. CChina and around the world with his bold and vigorous Altogether, Xi occupies a total of 11 top posts in the anti-corruption campaign and his impressively quick country’s most powerful leadership bodies. consolidation of power. Xi’s ascent to the top leadership rung raises a critical Within two years, Xi’s administration purged about 60 question: will his ongoing concentration of power re- ministerial-, provincial- and senior military-level leaders verse the trend of collective leadership, which has been a on corruption charges, including ten members of the defning characteristic of Chinese elite politics over the newly formed 18th Central Committee of the Chinese past two decades? In post-Deng China the party’s top Communist Party (CCP). In 2013 alone the authori- leaders, beginning with Jiang Zemin of the so-called ties handled 172,000 corruption cases and investigated third generation of leadership and followed by Hu Jin- 182,000 ofcials –– the highest annual number of cases tao of the fourth generation, were merely seen as “frst in 30 years. among equals” in the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the supreme decision-making body in the coun- In an even bolder move Xi purged three heavyweight try. Many observers argue that Xi’s leadership –– his politicians: former police czar Zhou Yongkang, who style, decision-making process, and public outreach –– controlled the security and law enforcement appara- represents the “reemergence of strongman politics.” tus for ten years; former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xu Caihou, who was in charge of But it is one thing to recognize Xi Jinping’s remarkable military personnel afairs for a decade; and Ling Jihua, achievements in consolidating power in just two years who was head of the General Ofce of the CCP Central as the top CCP leader and quite another to conclude Committee and oversaw all of the activities and docu- that he has become a paramount and charismatic lead- ment fow of the top leadership during the era of Presi- er in the manner of Mao Tse-Tung or Deng Xiaoping. dent Hu Jintao. Tese moves to clean up corruption in Te power and charisma of Mao grew out of his ex- the party leadership have greatly bolstered public conf- traordinary leadership in revolution and war. On the dence and support for Xi. other hand, despite his infuence, Deng did not hold any leadership positions in the fnal ten years of his life Equally signifcant is the consolidation of Xi’s person- except for the post of honorary chairman of the China al power: he holds the top position in many leading Bridge Association. Terefore, the fact that Xi holds 11 leadership posts is not necessarily a sign of strength. The Second Modi-Obama Summit: Building the India-U.S. Partnership. | 19 Moreover, Xi’s concentration of power and strong polit- primarily by factional politics; thus he has created many ical moves has more to do with the factional makeup of false friends and real enemies and an unpredictable and the PSC than with his authority and command. In the dangerous political situation for the country. post-Deng era, two major political coalitions associated with former party bosses Jiang and Hu (who both still Tough this relentless anti-corruption campaign has al- wield considerable infuence) have been competing for ready changed the behavior of ofcials (the sale of lux- power and infuence. Te former coalition was born in urious cars and watches has dropped dramatically, for the Jiang era and is currently led by Xi. Its core mem- example), it risks alienating the ofcialdom—the very bership consists of “princelings” –– leaders born into people on whom the system relies for efective func- the families of revolutionaries or other high-ranking tioning. Xi’s actions also undermine vested interests in ofcials. Both Jiang and Xi are princelings themselves. monopolized state-owned business sectors such as the oil industry, utilities, railways, telecommunication, and Te latter coalition, known as the Hu-Li camp, was pre- banking –– the “pillar industries” of state power. As of viously led by Hu Jintao and is now headed by Premier 2015, China’s fagship state-owned enterprises were re- Li Keqiang. Its core faction consists of leaders who ad- quired to cut the salaries of senior executives by as much vanced their political career primarily through the Chi- as 40 percent. Meanwhile, a large scale reshufing and nese Communist Youth League, as did both Hu and Li. retirement of senior military ofcers has been underway Leaders in this faction, known as tuanpai, usually have and this political move could be potentially very costly humble family backgrounds and leadership experience to Xi. His politically conservative approach, relying on in less developed inland regions. tight political control and media censorship, has also alienated the country’s intellectuals. During the 2012 leadership transition, the Jiang-Xi camp won an overwhelming majority of seats on the At the same time, Xi is very popular among three im- PSC. It secured six of the seven spots, while only Li portant groups in China. First, the general public ap- Keqiang now represents the Hu-Li camp on the PSC. plauds Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, his decisive and Tis six-to-one ratio in favor of the Jiang-Xi camp is a efective leadership role, and his “Chinese dream” vi- very important political factor in the present-day Chi- sion—defned as the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation nese leadership. It gives Xi tremendous power. It ex- and the opportunity to realize a middle-class lifestyle. plains why he can implement new initiatives so quickly. Second, private entrepreneurs are benefciaries of Xi’s economic reform agenda, as he defnes the private sec- Yet, the fve members of the PSC who are Xi’s political tor as the “decisive driver” of the Chinese economy. Te allies are expected to retire, as a result of age limits, at ongoing fnancial reforms now give more loans to small the 19th National Party Congress in 2017. It will be and medium size private frms. And third, members of very difcult, if not impossible, for the Jiang-Xi camp the military, particularly younger and lower level of- to maintain such an overwhelming majority in the next cers, are inspired not only by Xi’s global feistiness and leadership transition because the Hu-Li protégés are far his nationalist spirit in confronting Japan and others better represented in the current Central Committee but also by the new opportunities for promotion and –– the pool from which members of the next Politburo prestige. and PSC are selected. Te Hu-Li camp will not remain silent if Chinese elite politics returns to the Mao era of Apart from political elite infghting, there are many se- zero-sum games where the winner takes all. In fact, Xi’s rious problems within China that could trigger a major strong anti-corruption campaigns have already been international crisis: slowing economic growth, wide- widely perceived, rightly or wrongly, as being driven spread social unrest, cyber system outage, and height- 20 | The Second Modi-Obama Summit: Building the India-U.S. Partnership ened Chinese nationalism particularly in the wake of Leaders in the United States and India should grasp the escalating tensions over territorial disputes with Japan, dynamics of Chinese domestic politics, especially elite some Southeast Asian countries and India. Taiwan’s cohesion and tensions. Tree policy recommendations 2016 presidential election, in which the pro-indepen- are in order. First, both the United States and India dence party will likely win, might also instigate strong need to clarify to the Chinese public that they neither reactions on the mainland. aim to contain China nor are they oblivious to China’s national and historical sentiments; this will help re- Tis does not necessarily mean that Xi intends to dis- duce anxiety and possible hostility in their relationship tract from domestic tensions with an international con- with China. Second, while President Barack Obama fict; contemporary Chinese history shows that trying to and Prime Minister Narendra Modi should continue distract the public from domestic problems by playing to cultivate personal ties with Xi, they should also de- up foreign conficts has often ended in regime change. velop broader contact with other prominent Chinese Yet, Xi may be cornered into taking a confrontational leaders. Enhanced contact with Chinese civilian and approach in order to defect criticism. military policymakers can help the United States and India better understand the decision-making processes Te broad public support that Xi has recently earned and domestic dynamics within China. Finally, a solid should allow him to concentrate on a domestic eco- consensus amongst U.S. allies in the region could re- nomic reform agenda and avoid being distracted by assure China that the United States and India are not foreign disputes and tensions that could otherwise ac- only frmly committed to their regional security frame- company the rise of ultra-nationalism. But one can also work in the Asia-Pacifc, but that the two countries are reasonably argue that Xi may use his political capital also genuinely interested in fnding a broadly acceptable on foreign afairs, including a possible military confict, agreement to the various disputes. which may help him build a Mao-like image and legacy. The Second Modi-Obama Summit: Building the India-U.S.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • China Data Supplement
    China Data Supplement October 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 29 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 36 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 42 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 45 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR................................................................................................................ 54 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR....................................................................................................................... 61 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 66 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 October 2008 The Main National Leadership of the
    [Show full text]
  • The Coming Show Trial of General Xu Caihou
    Lawyers, Guns and Money: The Coming Show Trial of General Xu Caihou James Mulvenon On 30 June 2014, the Chinese Communist Party expelled former Politburo member and Central Military Commission vice-chair Xu Caihou for corruption following a three-month investigation. His case was transferred from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to the military justice system for possible criminal prosecution, making him the highest- ranking military officer to be prosecuted since the founding of the PRC in 1949. His primary crime involved “trading offices for bribes,” and reportedly was uncovered during the investigation of General Gu Junshan. This article examines the Xu case, and assesses its implications for Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign and the military. Introduction On 30 June 2014, the Chinese Communist Party expelled former Politburo member and Central Military Commission vice-chair Xu Caihou for corruption following a three- month investigation. Xu, 70, joined the CMC in 1999 as director of the General Political Department and served as vice-chairman from 2004 to 2013. His case was transferred from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to the military justice system for possible criminal prosecution, making him the highest-ranking military officer to be prosecuted since the founding of the PRC in 1949. His primary crime involved “trading offices for bribes,” which was reportedly uncovered during the investigation of disgraced former General Logistics Department deputy Gu Junshan (see CLM 37).1 This article examines the Xu case, and assesses its implications for Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign and the military. Xu was born in 1943 in Liaoning, and joined the PLA in 1963.
    [Show full text]
  • Xi Jinping's War on Corruption
    University of Mississippi eGrove Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors Theses Honors College) 2015 The Chinese Inquisition: Xi Jinping's War on Corruption Harriet E. Fisher University of Mississippi. Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Fisher, Harriet E., "The Chinese Inquisition: Xi Jinping's War on Corruption" (2015). Honors Theses. 375. https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis/375 This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College) at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Chinese Inquisition: Xi Jinping’s War on Corruption By Harriet E. Fisher A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies at the Croft Institute for International Studies and the Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College The University of Mississippi University, Mississippi May 2015 Approved by: ______________________________ Advisor: Dr. Gang Guo ______________________________ Reader: Dr. Kees Gispen ______________________________ Reader: Dr. Peter K. Frost i © 2015 Harriet E. Fisher ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii For Mom and Pop, who taught me to learn, and Helen, who taught me to teach. iii Acknowledgements I am indebted to a great many people for the completion of this thesis. First, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Gang Guo, for all his guidance during the thesis- writing process. His expertise in China and its endemic political corruption were invaluable, and without him, I would not have had a topic, much less been able to complete a thesis.
    [Show full text]
  • Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
    China Data Supplement March 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 31 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 38 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 54 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 56 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR ................................................................................................................ 58 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR ....................................................................................................................... 65 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 69 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 March 2008 The Main National Leadership of the
    [Show full text]
  • China's 17Th Communist Party Congress, 2007: Leadership And
    Order Code RS22767 December 5, 2007 China’s 17th Communist Party Congress, 2007: Leadership and Policy Implications Kerry Dumbaugh Specialist in Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 17th Congress, held from October 15 - 21, 2007, demonstrated the Party’s efforts to try to adapt and redefine itself in the face of emerging economic and social challenges while still trying to maintain its authoritarian one-Party rule. The Congress validated and re-emphasized the priority on continued economic development; expanded that concept to include more balanced and sustainable development; announced that the Party would seek to broaden political participation by expanding intra-Party democracy; and selected two potential rival candidates, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, with differing philosophies (rather than one designated successor-in- waiting) as possibilities to succeed to the top Party position in five years. More will be known about the Party’s future prospects and the relative influence of its two potential successors once the National People’s Congress meets in early 2008 to select key government ministers. This report will not be updated. Periodically (approximately every five years) the Chinese Communist Party holds a Congress, attended by some 2,000 senior Party members, to authorize important policy and leadership decisions within the Party for the coming five years. In addition to authorizing substantive policies, the Party at its Congress selects a new Central Committee, comprised of the most important figures in the Party, government, and military.1 The Central Committee in turn technically selects a new Politburo and a new Politburo Standing Committee, comprised of China’s most powerful and important leaders.
    [Show full text]
  • The Guo Boxiong Edition James Mulvenon
    So Crooked They Have to Screw Their Pants On Part 3: The Guo Boxiong Edition James Mulvenon On 30 July, the Central Committee announced that General Guo Boxiong, who served as vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission between 2002 and 2012, was expelled from the Chinese Communist Party and handed over to prosecutors for accepting bribes “on his own and through his family . for aiding in the promotion [of officers].” Guo’s expulsion comes one year after similar charges against his fellow CMC vice-chair Xu Caihou, who died of bladder cancer in March 2015. This article examines the charges against Guo, places them in the context of the larger anti-corruption campaign within the PLA, and assesses their implications for Xi Jinping’s relationship with the military and for party-army relations. The Rise and Fall of Guo Boxiong On 30 July, the Central Committee announced that General Guo Boxiong, who served as vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission between 2002 and 2012, was expelled from the Chinese Communist Party and handed over to prosecutors for accepting bribes “on his own and through his family . for aiding in the promotion [of officers].”1 Guo’s explusion comes one year after similar charges against his fellow CMC vice-chair Xu Caihou, who was expelled from the party in June 2014 and died of bladder cancer in March 2015.2 This article examines the charges against Guo, places them in the context of the larger anti-corruption campaign within the PLA, and assesses their implications for Xi Jinping’s relationship with the military and for party-army relations.
    [Show full text]
  • Chinese Military Leadership After the 17Th Congress: Hu’S Guys Or Whose Guys?
    Mulvenon, China Leadership Monitor, No. 23 Chinese Military Leadership After the 17th Congress: Hu’s Guys or Whose Guys? James Mulvenon The civilian political leadership changes at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007 have received close scrutiny from outside observers, but important and interesting personnel adjustments in the military have garnered less attention. This article examines recent Chinese military leadership changes in detail, focusing principally on the Central Military Commission but also tracking significant moves at the Military Region and Service level. Military Leadership Changes Leading Up to the 17th Congress Prior to the 17th Party Congress and the selection of the new Central Committee, Politburo, and Politburo Standing Committee, systematic and sweeping changes were made in the leadership structures of all seven military regions and the services. These reshuffles were not a purge, but an unusually intense round of the PLA’s regular command rotations and age-based removals of personnel. According to a reliable, Beijing-owned newspaper, commanders of the Beijing, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Lanzhou, Chengdu, and Shenyang Military Regions were replaced, as well as the heads of important units such as the General Staff Headquarters, General Armament Department, Air Force, and National Defense University.1 Table 1 Major Military Region Leadership Changes, 2007 Name Previous Position New Position Fang Fenghui COS, GZMR2 CDR, BJMR3 Zhao Keshi COS, NJMR CDR, NJMR4 Zhang Qinsheng DCOGS (Intel), GSD CDR, GZMR5 Li Shiming DCDR, CDMR CDR, CDMR6 Zhang Youxia DCDR, BJMR7 CDR, SYMR8 Wang Guosheng COS, LZMR Commander, LZMR9 Liu Chengjun DCDR, PLAAF CDT, AMS Wang Xibin COS, BJMR CDT, NDU Zhang Yang Dir., Poltical Dept., GZMR PC, GZMR Li Changcai DPC, NJMR PC, LZMR Chen Guoling DPC, GZMR PC, NJMR Zhang Haiyang DPC, BJMR PC, CDMR Tong Shiping Asst.
    [Show full text]
  • Chinese Politics in the Xi Jingping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership
    CHAPTER 1 Governance Collective Leadership Revisited Th ings don’t have to be or look identical in order to be balanced or equal. ⃺ڄ Maya Lin — his book examines how the structure and dynamics of the leadership of Tthe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have evolved in response to the chal- lenges the party has confronted since the late 1990s. Th is study pays special attention to the issue of leadership se lection and composition, which is a per- petual concern in Chinese politics. Using both quantitative and qualitative analyses, this volume assesses the changing nature of elite recruitment, the generational attributes of the leadership, the checks and balances between competing po liti cal co ali tions or factions, the behavioral patterns and insti- tutional constraints of heavyweight politicians in the collective leadership, and the interplay between elite politics and broad changes in Chinese society. Th is study also links new trends in elite politics to emerging currents within the Chinese intellectual discourse on the tension between strongman politics and collective leadership and its implications for po liti cal reforms. A systematic analy sis of these developments— and some seeming contradictions— will help shed valuable light on how the world’s most populous country will be governed in the remaining years of the Xi Jinping era and beyond. Th is study argues that the survival of the CCP regime in the wake of major po liti cal crises such as the Bo Xilai episode and rampant offi cial cor- ruption is not due to “authoritarian resilience”— the capacity of the Chinese communist system to resist po liti cal and institutional changes—as some foreign China analysts have theorized.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 3 China: Xi Jinping's Administration— Proactive Policies
    Chapter 3 China: Xi Jinping’s Administration— Proactive Policies at Home and Abroad or China, 2014 was a year when initiatives of the Xi Jinping administration Fcame to the forefront. In domestic politics, it was a year of important changes, as the anti-corruption campaign continued to make itself felt, resulting, for example, in Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and Xu Caihou, former vice chairman of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Military Commission (CMC), being expelled from the party. Xi Jinping, who was already president as well as general secretary of the party, took the position of chairman of the new National Security Commission and created a number of small leading groups, part of his efforts to strengthen his structural authority. Meanwhile elements of instability grew as well, such as the number of bombings that took place in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and the CPC is cracking down vigorously. President Xi has assertively engaged in foreign policy, leading at times to strong unilateral positions such as China’s location of oil drilling equipment in the South China Sea. China is seeking to form “a new type of major-power relations” with the United States, but China’s actions in the South China Sea and the confrontation over cyber spying make it unclear whether China will be able to achieve the kind of US-China relations it desires. President Xi is also engaging in periphery diplomacy, seeking to ensure China’s peaceful development by reinforcing its economic relations with its neighbors and calling for an Asian New Security Concept, while strengthening its criticism of the system of alliances centered on the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • The CCP Central Committee's Leading Small Groups Alice Miller
    Miller, China Leadership Monitor, No. 26 The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups Alice Miller For several decades, the Chinese leadership has used informal bodies called “leading small groups” to advise the Party Politburo on policy and to coordinate implementation of policy decisions made by the Politburo and supervised by the Secretariat. Because these groups deal with sensitive leadership processes, PRC media refer to them very rarely, and almost never publicize lists of their members on a current basis. Even the limited accessible view of these groups and their evolution, however, offers insight into the structure of power and working relationships of the top Party leadership under Hu Jintao. A listing of the Central Committee “leading groups” (lingdao xiaozu 领导小组), or just “small groups” (xiaozu 小组), that are directly subordinate to the Party Secretariat and report to the Politburo and its Standing Committee and their members is appended to this article. First created in 1958, these groups are never incorporated into publicly available charts or explanations of Party institutions on a current basis. PRC media occasionally refer to them in the course of reporting on leadership policy processes, and they sometimes mention a leader’s membership in one of them. The only instance in the entire post-Mao era in which PRC media listed the current members of any of these groups was on 2003, when the PRC-controlled Hong Kong newspaper Wen Wei Po publicized a membership list of the Central Committee Taiwan Work Leading Small Group. (Wen Wei Po, 26 December 2003) This has meant that even basic insight into these groups’ current roles and their membership requires painstaking compilation of the occasional references to them in PRC media.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress
    U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress Shirley A. Kan Specialist in Asian Security Affairs October 27, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32496 U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress Summary This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses policy issues regarding military- to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and records major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, President Clinton reengaged with the top PRC leadership, including China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic alignment against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral engagement have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and the PLA’s aggressive maritime and air confrontations. Issues for Congress include whether the Administration complies with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and pursues contacts with the PLA that advance a prioritized set of U.S. security interests, especially the operational safety of U.S. military personnel. Oversight legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246) and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000 (P.L.
    [Show full text]
  • The Chinese Communist Party and Its Emerging Next-Generation Leaders
    U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report March 23, 2012 The China Rising Leaders Project, Part 1: The Chinese Communist Party and Its Emerging Next-Generation Leaders by John Dotson USCC Research Coordinator With Supporting Research and Contributions By: Shelly Zhao, USCC Research Fellow Andrew Taffer, USCC Research Fellow 1 The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission China Rising Leaders Project Research Report Series: Part 1: The Chinese Communist Party and Its Emerging Next-Generation Leaders (March 2012) Part 2: China’s Emerging Leaders in the People’s Liberation Army (forthcoming June 2012) Part 3: China’s Emerging Leaders in State-Controlled Industry (forthcoming August 2012) Disclaimer: This report is the product of professional research performed by staff of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, and was prepared at the request of the Commission to support its deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commission's website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 108-7. However, the public release of this document does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the Commission’s other professional staff, of the views or conclusions expressed in this staff research report. Cover Photo: CCP Politburo Standing Committee Member Xi Jinping acknowledges applause in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People following his election as Vice-President of the People’s Republic of China during the 5th plenary session of the National People's Congress (March 15, 2008).
    [Show full text]