China’s Domestic Dynamics: Implications for India & the U.S.

CHENG LI

hina is again at crossroads in its domestic central groups, including important areas such as for- politics. After becoming party boss in 2013, eign afairs, fnancial and economic work, cyber secu- President Xi Jinping surprised many people in rity and information technology, and military reforms. CChina and around the world with his bold and vigorous Altogether, Xi occupies a total of 11 top posts in the anti-corruption campaign and his impressively quick country’s most powerful leadership bodies. consolidation of power. Xi’s ascent to the top leadership rung raises a critical Within two years, Xi’s administration purged about 60 question: will his ongoing concentration of power re- ministerial-, provincial- and senior military-level leaders verse the trend of collective leadership, which has been a on corruption charges, including ten members of the defning characteristic of Chinese elite politics over the newly formed 18th Central Committee of the Chinese past two decades? In post-Deng China the party’s top Communist Party (CCP). In 2013 alone the authori- leaders, beginning with Jiang Zemin of the so-called ties handled 172,000 corruption cases and investigated third generation of leadership and followed by Hu Jin- 182,000 ofcials –– the highest annual number of cases tao of the fourth generation, were merely seen as “frst in 30 years. among equals” in the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the supreme decision-making body in the coun- In an even bolder move Xi purged three heavyweight try. Many observers argue that Xi’s leadership –– his politicians: former police czar Zhou Yongkang, who style, decision-making process, and public outreach –– controlled the security and law enforcement appara- represents the “reemergence of strongman politics.” tus for ten years; former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xu Caihou, who was in charge of But it is one thing to recognize Xi Jinping’s remarkable military personnel afairs for a decade; and Ling Jihua, achievements in consolidating power in just two years who was head of the General Ofce of the CCP Central as the top CCP leader and quite another to conclude Committee and oversaw all of the activities and docu- that he has become a paramount and charismatic lead- ment fow of the top leadership during the era of Presi- er in the manner of Mao Tse-Tung or Deng Xiaoping. dent Hu Jintao. Tese moves to clean up corruption in Te power and charisma of Mao grew out of his ex- the party leadership have greatly bolstered public conf- traordinary leadership in revolution and war. On the dence and support for Xi. other hand, despite his infuence, Deng did not hold any leadership positions in the fnal ten years of his life Equally signifcant is the consolidation of Xi’s person- except for the post of honorary chairman of the China al power: he holds the top position in many leading Bridge Association. Terefore, the fact that Xi holds 11 leadership posts is not necessarily a sign of strength.

The Second Modi-Obama Summit: Building the India-U.S. Partnership. | 19 Moreover, Xi’s concentration of power and strong polit- primarily by factional politics; thus he has created many ical moves has more to do with the factional makeup of false friends and real enemies and an unpredictable and the PSC than with his authority and command. In the dangerous political situation for the country. post-Deng era, two major political coalitions associated with former party bosses Jiang and Hu (who both still Tough this relentless anti-corruption campaign has al- wield considerable infuence) have been competing for ready changed the behavior of ofcials (the sale of lux- power and infuence. Te former coalition was born in urious cars and watches has dropped dramatically, for the Jiang era and is currently led by Xi. Its core mem- example), it risks alienating the ofcialdom—the very bership consists of “princelings” –– leaders born into people on whom the system relies for efective func- the families of revolutionaries or other high-ranking tioning. Xi’s actions also undermine vested interests in ofcials. Both Jiang and Xi are princelings themselves. monopolized state-owned business sectors such as the oil industry, utilities, railways, telecommunication, and Te latter coalition, known as the Hu-Li camp, was pre- banking –– the “pillar industries” of state power. As of viously led by Hu Jintao and is now headed by Premier 2015, China’s fagship state-owned enterprises were re- Li Keqiang. Its core faction consists of leaders who ad- quired to cut the salaries of senior executives by as much vanced their political career primarily through the Chi- as 40 percent. Meanwhile, a large scale reshufing and nese Communist Youth League, as did both Hu and Li. retirement of senior military ofcers has been underway Leaders in this faction, known as tuanpai, usually have and this political move could be potentially very costly humble family backgrounds and leadership experience to Xi. His politically conservative approach, relying on in less developed inland regions. tight political control and media censorship, has also alienated the country’s intellectuals. During the 2012 leadership transition, the Jiang-Xi camp won an overwhelming majority of seats on the At the same time, Xi is very popular among three im- PSC. It secured six of the seven spots, while only Li portant groups in China. First, the general public ap- Keqiang now represents the Hu-Li camp on the PSC. plauds Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, his decisive and Tis six-to-one ratio in favor of the Jiang-Xi camp is a efective leadership role, and his “Chinese dream” vi- very important political factor in the present-day Chi- sion—defned as the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation nese leadership. It gives Xi tremendous power. It ex- and the opportunity to realize a middle-class lifestyle. plains why he can implement new initiatives so quickly. Second, private entrepreneurs are benefciaries of Xi’s economic reform agenda, as he defnes the private sec- Yet, the fve members of the PSC who are Xi’s political tor as the “decisive driver” of the Chinese economy. Te allies are expected to retire, as a result of age limits, at ongoing fnancial reforms now give more loans to small the 19th National Party Congress in 2017. It will be and medium size private frms. And third, members of very difcult, if not impossible, for the Jiang-Xi camp the military, particularly younger and lower level of- to maintain such an overwhelming majority in the next cers, are inspired not only by Xi’s global feistiness and leadership transition because the Hu-Li protégés are far his nationalist spirit in confronting Japan and others better represented in the current Central Committee but also by the new opportunities for promotion and –– the pool from which members of the next Politburo prestige. and PSC are selected. Te Hu-Li camp will not remain silent if Chinese elite politics returns to the Mao era of Apart from political elite infghting, there are many se- zero-sum games where the winner takes all. In fact, Xi’s rious problems within China that could trigger a major strong anti-corruption campaigns have already been international crisis: slowing economic growth, wide- widely perceived, rightly or wrongly, as being driven spread social unrest, cyber system outage, and height-

20 | The Second Modi-Obama Summit: Building the India-U.S. Partnership ened Chinese nationalism particularly in the wake of Leaders in the United States and India should grasp the escalating tensions over territorial disputes with Japan, dynamics of Chinese domestic politics, especially elite some Southeast Asian countries and India. Taiwan’s cohesion and tensions. Tree policy recommendations 2016 presidential election, in which the pro-indepen- are in order. First, both the United States and India dence party will likely win, might also instigate strong need to clarify to the Chinese public that they neither reactions on the mainland. aim to contain China nor are they oblivious to China’s national and historical sentiments; this will help re- Tis does not necessarily mean that Xi intends to dis- duce anxiety and possible hostility in their relationship tract from domestic tensions with an international con- with China. Second, while President Barack Obama fict; contemporary Chinese history shows that trying to and Prime Minister Narendra Modi should continue distract the public from domestic problems by playing to cultivate personal ties with Xi, they should also de- up foreign conficts has often ended in regime change. velop broader contact with other prominent Chinese Yet, Xi may be cornered into taking a confrontational leaders. Enhanced contact with Chinese civilian and approach in order to defect criticism. military policymakers can help the United States and India better understand the decision-making processes Te broad public support that Xi has recently earned and domestic dynamics within China. Finally, a solid should allow him to concentrate on a domestic eco- consensus amongst U.S. allies in the region could re- nomic reform agenda and avoid being distracted by assure China that the United States and India are not foreign disputes and tensions that could otherwise ac- only frmly committed to their regional security frame- company the rise of ultra-nationalism. But one can also work in the Asia-Pacifc, but that the two countries are reasonably argue that Xi may use his political capital also genuinely interested in fnding a broadly acceptable on foreign afairs, including a possible military confict, agreement to the various disputes. which may help him build a Mao-like image and legacy.

The Second Modi-Obama Summit: Building the India-U.S. Partnership. | 21