From Mao to Xi: Chinese Political Leadership and the Craft of Consolidating Power
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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Boise State University - ScholarWorks From Mao to Xi: Chinese Political Leadership and the Craft of Consolidating Power Dexter Lensing: McNair Scholar Dr. Michael Touchton and Dr. Shelton Woods: Mentors Political Science Abstract During 1965-66, a great power struggle engulfed Chinese politics while the Vietnam War escalated. While most scholars study this period for the Cultural Revolution Mao launched, this research proposes to examine the role the Vietnam War played in China’s political power struggle. Specifically, my research will show how Mao used the issue of Vietnam to defeat his rivals and consolidate power. The Chinese political structure has changed considerably since the mid-1970s. Yet, current President Xi Jinping has attempted to purge rivals and consolidate power during his term in office. Given this largely successful attempt, I want to know the extent to which Xi has the power to personally dictate how to handle problems along China’s periphery. This question is important because China is becoming a world class naval power, has an ever-growing economy, and has the potential to become a hegemon in Southeast Asia. This research compares the Vietnam War’s impact on Chinese politics during 1965-66 with Xi Jinping’s contemporary anti-corruption campaign. Specifically, I use Causal-Process tracing to compare and contrast consolidation of power under Mao and current President Xi Jinping. I draw from primary government sources of the time period, but also employ secondary sources to contrast them with each other. The results of this study finds that the PLA was the dominant source of strength for both Mao and Xi. Additionally, both Mao and Xi’s wives played critical roles in their success. Furthermore, the creation of new organizations helped both Mao and Xi circumvent the Party apparatus when they needed to further consolidate their personal authority. Current indications suggest that Xi Jinping is attempting to hold onto power for the foreseeable future, even after his expected retirement in the year 2023. Introduction China has a long and colorful history of stories regarding power and politics. This article focuses on two individuals from two important time periods who consolidated power: Mao Zedong during the mid-1960s and China’s current President Xi Jinping. Mao consolidated power from 1965-1966, just as the Vietnam War started to escalate. Xi has rapidly consolidated power from the time he took over as president in November of 2012.1 China’s leadership moved away from a strong man rule after Mao’s death in 1976, to a government led by a collective group of leaders. Between 1992 and 2012, no individual dramatically stood out from the rest. However, China has turned again to strong man rule since Xi has taken power.2 Because of the change, this article explores the potential political, economic, and social changes that might result from the shift toward strong man rule. This is important for numerous reasons. China’s sheer physical and economic size, as well as its geographical location, render Chinese geopolitics more influential than any other Asian country. Furthermore, China is building a world class navy,3 and 1 Zheng Yongnian and Lance L. P. Gore, China Entering the Xi Jinping Era (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2014), 1, accessed May 27, 2015, <http://public.eblib.com/choice/PublicFullRecord.aspx?p=1864786> See also Joseph Fewsmith. "Xi Jinping’s fast start." China Leadership Monitor no.41 (2013): 3-4, accessed June 3, 2015, http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/748504/xi- jinpings-fast-start.pdf 2 Willy Lam, Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, Reform, or Retrogression? (Routledge: 2015), 7, accessed May 20, 2015, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=966034 see also Elizabeth Economy, "China’s Imperial President." Foreign Affairs 93, no. 6 (2014): 80-91, accessed May 28, 2015, http://sites. saschina.org/innovationinstitute/files/2014/10/FA_Chinas-Imperial-President-14j2thu.pdf 3 Robert Kaplan, Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (New York: Random House, 2014), 14. See also Jeremy Page and Rob Taylor, "Deep Threat: China’s Submarines Add Nuclear-Strike Capability, Altering Strategic 59 its economy has become critical to the global economy.4 Because of these characteristics, anything that happens to China in the future will certainly have an impact on the rest of the world. I employ a case-oriented qualitative comparison to explore how both Mao and Xi consolidated power in this study. The main variables I use to explain consolidation of power include: international crises, economic conditions, leadership qualities, corruption, and control of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The results of my analysis demonstrate that leadership qualities and control of the PLA proved to be important for both Mao and Xi’s consolidation of power. Additionally, I employ a historical timeline analysis of events to assist in identifying the causal factors that are important for both Mao and Xi’s consolidation of power. I argue that two causal factors were important for both Mao and Xi. (1) Both Mao and Xi’s wives played critical roles in their success and (2) both Mao and Xi established new organizations to sidestep existing power structures and build more personal authority. The first section of the article provides the background to the research question. Next, I describe the variables I use and explain why they played an important role for both Mao and Xi. Next, I provide historical analysis that highlights additional causal factors for both Mao and Xi’s ability to consolidate power. Finally, I summarize the results of my analysis and address potential implications for China. Background 1962 Li Zhisui—Mao’s personal physician—described 1962 as a turning point in Mao’s political life.5 That turning point began in January, at the seven thousand cadre’s conference—so named as a meeting of the top seven thousand officials from across the country. The previous three years were a tumultuous period for the Chinese Communist leadership. In 1959, Mao relinquished his post as head of state to Liu Shaoqi. Liu was Mao’s handpicked successor, and the number two man in China behind Mao. Although Mao remained chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Great Leap Forward (GLF) damaged his credibility. The GLF from 1958-1961 is a dark hole in China’s history that the CCP still does not acknowledge. Estimates vary, but most scholars agree the death toll is anywhere between 30-45 million people—most of the deaths occurred from a great famine that it produced.6 Mao started the GLF to accelerate the economy and catch up with the West, but it resulted in disaster. Mao blamed the results on the weather conditions. The CCP—and the country—is run by the handful of men that make up the Political Bureau Standing Committee (PBSC). Usually consisting of 7-9 members, it is led by the general secretary, or chairman during Mao’s time, who is the president of China and leader of the party. From 1962-1966, the members consisting of the PBSC were Mao (who was chairman of the Party), Liu Shaoqi (head of state), Deng Xiaoping (general secretary of the party), Zhou Enlai (premier), Lin Biao (Minister of Defense), Chen Yun, and Zhu De.7 Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were trying to right the ship after the tragedy of the GLF, which meant opposing Mao’s disastrous domestic policies. Liu gave a speech criticizing GLF policies at the seven thousand cadre’s conference, which, in essence, was a criticism of Mao.8 More importantly, Mao offered a self-criticism at this conference.9 Mao had become an immortal figure, and this self-criticism was a shock to many people. Philip Short writes, “Minimal though it was, Mao’s acknowledgement of liability electrified the meeting. He did not need to say more: in a Party Balance." Wall Street Journal October 24 2014, accessed May 24, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-submarine-fleet- adds-nuclear-strike-capability-altering-strategic-balance-undersea-1414164738. 4 Justin Yifu Lin, “China and the Global economy” accessed July 22, 2015, http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/ Lin.pdf. See also Jonathan Fenby. Tiger Head, Snake Tails: China Today, How It Got There, and Where It Is Heading (New York: Overlook, 2012), 4-5. 5 Li, Zhisui, and Anne F. Thurston, The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao's Personal Physician. (New York: Random House, 1994), 385. 6 Frank Dikotter puts the figure at 45 million, or possibly even more, in his account of the Great Leap Forward, Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962 (New York: Walker & Co, 2010) 7 Roderick Macfarquhar, The Politics of China, 1949-1989, Appendix 2 (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 535. 8 “Factionalism in the Central Committee: Mao’s opposition since 1949” CIA Caesar, Polo and Esau documents. (May, 2007): 21, accessed June 20, 2015, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/14/polo-23.pdf. 9 Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, 387. 60 which had learned to regard him as infallible, it was extraordinary enough for him to admit to any failings at all.”10 Furthermore, Mao did not have plans on stopping the campaign of the Great Leap Forward.11 Liu’s speech caught Mao off guard, and more importantly, Liu’s speech was supported by the majority of cadres in attendance. The top officials throughout China expressed their disapproval of Mao’s policies.12 A bitter experience, this triggered a counterattack that would begin later in the year.