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The Gender Agenda and Islam: Where Next? Gender Equality and Islam: Why Muslim Men Must Recall the Spirit of the Progressive Prophet

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The Gender Agenda and Islam: Where Next? Gender Equality and Islam: Why Muslim Men Must Recall the Spirit of the Progressive Prophet The Gender Agenda and Islam: Where Next? Gender Equality and Islam: Why Muslim men must recall the spirit of the progressive prophet Ed Husain is the author of two bestselling books: “The House of Islam: A Global His-tory” (Bloomsbury, 2018) and “The Is- lamist” (Penguin, 2007). He advises political leaders and governments around the world on national security and political ideology. He was a senior adviser to former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. For five years, he was a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, focusing on US foreign policy and the Middle East. Twitter: @Ed_Husain EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Some will say that because I am a man I women should be left less? A survey of people in seven Muslim-majority Saudi fashion Aisha bint Talha, a niece of Aisha bint designer Arwa al- cannot write about women. But as a man, I Much of the literalist, rigid reading of countries by the University of Michi-gan’s Banawi poses in her Abu Bakr, famously refused to wear the say that it is incumbent upon men to become religious texts (usually out of context) Institute for Social Research in 2014 found studio on October veil, claiming that God had created female 25, 2017, in Dubai. champions for achieving full gender equality. emerges from a lack of confidence among that only 14 per cent of Egyptians agreed AFP beauty, and her own attractiveness, and It is men who, too often, hold women back modern-day male clerics. They were too that a woman can decide to dress however so it was too precious to hide. Sakina bint from being seen — and therefore treated busy defin-ing themselves in terms of she wants.2 In Pakistan, 22 per cent felt Al-Husayn, a granddaughter of the Prophet, — as equal citizens in the eyes of the law. their opposition to the West, rather than the same way, and 27 per cent in Iraq. The also protested against wearing the veil, Men control most parliaments, law-making pioneering a new, more relevant and modern number was somewhat higher in Saudi and refused to allow her third husband to processes and law-enforcement institutions, identity for their fellow citizens. The office Arabia, at 47 per cent, rising to 52 per cent in take a second wife. She divorced him when write many of the books, and interpret of ayatollah in Iran is an invention of the Turkey and 56 per cent in Tunisia. she discovered he was having an affair. religious teachings. 20th century, as is forcing women to wear a What has happened to undermine Muslims’ Neither woman was punished for their Change comes through all of us working veil, and many other forms of institutional confidence in ourselves, to the extent that independence, nor did their menfolk seek together, not pitting ourselves against each discrimination against women. we want to control and contain the beauty to force them to cover up. They were rooted other. Our identity is as equal citizens of To be free from this literalism, this lack of of Muslim women, that we feel threatened in Qur’anic knowledge instinctively, and our nation states — not as members of clubs confidence, this defining of Islam based on by their freedom? The approach by Muslim understood the Prophet’s disposition. They segregated by gender, sexuality, race or its stance against the West, we must find new men to our past, present and future atti- were not busy defining their identity based religion, fighting for political power. ways to bring Muslims and modernity into tudes toward women must change. on opposing the West. The greatest obstacle to women being harmony. If we fail to do this, not only will This was not the Islam of the Muslim A contemporary Muslim scholar, treated as equal citizens comes from men the rest of the world continue to pro-gress masses throughout its 1,500-year history. Mohammed Akram Nadwi, has produced a who exploit religious texts and history to and the gap in ideas and productivity widen, The Prophet Muhammad was married to 40-volume encyclopedia of female Muslim suppress the rise of women as peers in every but Islam itself will become unat-tractive to a Khadija for 25 years until her death. He scholars who taught men and women.3 sphere of life. In my paper, I tackle this new generation of Muslims. remarried a number of times, including Imam Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani (1372–1449), obstacle head on. Why should they believe in a religion that The approach to Aisha bint Abu Bakr. She was strong in the great commentator on Hadith, noted The commercial and economic advantages teaches them women are impure during character and deeply involved in spreading that 800 of his Hadith narrations included by Muslim to a nation with greater gender parity are their period, while authorities in Scotland, the Prophet’s message. women in the chain of teaching and con- obvious. But how do we send a female for example, are providing women with free men to our After his death, she led an army against necting a saying back to the Prophet. This astronaut into space when her family, influ- tampons and celebrating menstruation?1 past, present the fourth caliph, Imam Ali. The fact that a illustrates the central role many women enced by religious leaders, insists she cannot The rise of atheism will endure. As citizens, and future woman could lead troops in battle speaks played in education and the preservation of travel anywhere without a male guardian? men, brothers and sons, and as clerics, attitudes volumes about the strong women the knowledge in early Islam. How does a father ensure his daughter and we must all make an effort to reassess our toward Prophet had around him, and about the In the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, son inherit wealth equally when the imam understanding of our old religious texts in a women must acceptance of them in leadership roles by women taught in the main hall. In the days in the mosque cites scripture and suggests modern context. change early Muslim men. of Imam Al-Tabari (839–923), whose Qur’anic assertive wearing of the veil in the Muslim they were now recognized as fully human. public space was a reaction to the miniskirts But in their determination to oppose the and sexual freedoms of the 1960s in the This loss West, modern-day Islamists flouted the West. At first, the women of Kabul, Jeddah, of confidence spirit of the Prophet. Their assumption is Tehran and Cairo wore miniskirts too. We within Islam, that the wearing of the hijab symbolizes a see that from the photographs of being at safe Muslim society. They argue that the of our grandmothers.7 8 ease with the West is home to decadence and immorality But as the Muslim Brotherhood organized contemporary and that its women are activities on campuses in Egypt in the 1950s, world, lewd and promiscuous. King Farouq Islamized the public space as However, a 2013 UN report found that occurred a way of attacking the Egyptian nationalist almost all Egyptian girls and women socialists; and in the 1970s the Iranian cleric some (99.3 per cent) who took part in the study Ruhollah Khomeini led a revolution against decades ago reported being sexually harassed. Of those, the US-backed Shah in Iran. 96.5 per cent said they had been subjected In all instances, in Egypt, Iran and Saudi to unwelcome physical contact, and 95.5 per Arabia, the Islamists were fighting against cent were verbally harassed on the streets.9 symbols of the West — and what more In Yemen, another fully veiled society, pertinent emblem of Westernization than studies suggest that 90 per cent of women the visible Muslim woman who, once have experienced some form of harassment, brought into line, would showcase the especially being pinched by men in public. paradigm shift on beaches and in workplaces In Saudi Arabia, 86.5 per cent of men and homes across the Muslim world? blame such experiences on “women’s If the West is about immodesty, then we in excessive make-up.” the Muslim world are modest. If the West The ugly reality is that many Muslims, exports high heels and miniskirts, then we and Islamists in particular, have missed the exegeses are still a leading resource for People attend tice of passing women on to heirs by way of return to the Shariah of literalism and bring point: it is not women’s clothes and make- a hackathon in scholars,4 his school of thought held that Jeddah on July 31, inheritance; and he changed the rules on back the burqa. By the time of the Iranian up that are the threat, it is male attitudes. women may lead men in prayer. 2018, prior to the dowries so that money went to the woman revolution in 1979, a new dress code had Forcing women to hide their hair, ears, start of the annual What happened to this Islam that Hajj pilgrimage directly and she owned it, not her parents. solidified. If Shiite women could wear those necks, arms and legs in case they provoke championed freedom for women? It is in the holy city of Even in the event of a divorce, a woman chadors and fight in the armed forces, then lust in a man is not the way to create a Mecca. AFP believed that in pre-Islamic Arabia men retained her own financial assets. Where so could Sunni women in Pakistan and the healthy, free and confident society.
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