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Contemporary China: a Book List
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: Woodrow Wilson School, Politics Department, East Asian Studies Program CONTEMPORARY CHINA: A BOOK LIST by Lubna Malik and Lynn White Winter 2007-2008 Edition This list is available on the web at: http://www.princeton.edu/~lynn/chinabib.pdf which can be viewed and printed with an Adobe Acrobat Reader. Variation of font sizes may cause pagination to differ slightly in the web and paper editions. No list of books can be totally up-to-date. Please surf to find further items. Also consult http://www.princeton.edu/~lynn/chinawebs.doc for clicable URLs. This list of items in English has several purposes: --to help advise students' course essays, junior papers, policy workshops, and senior theses about contemporary China; --to supplement the required reading lists of courses on "Chinese Development" and "Chinese Politics," for which students may find books to review in this list; --to provide graduate students with a list that may suggest books for paper topics and may slightly help their study for exams in Chinese politics; a few of the compiler's favorite books are starred on the list, but not much should be made of this because such books may be old or the subjects may not meet present interests; --to supplement a bibliography of all Asian serials in the Princeton Libraries that was compiled long ago by Frances Chen and Maureen Donovan; many of these are now available on the web,e.g., from “J-Stor”; --to suggest to book selectors in the Princeton libraries items that are suitable for acquisition; to provide a computerized list on which researchers can search for keywords of interests; and to provide a resource that many teachers at various other universities have also used. -
Chinese Foreign Relation Strategies Under Mao and Deng: a Systematic and Comparative Analysis
Chinese Foreign Relation Strategies Under Mao and Deng: A Systematic and Comparative Analysis JOSEPH YU-SHEK CHENG AND FRANKLIN WANKUN ZHANG During the past half-century, Chinas foreign relations strategies evolved in an uneven way. Undeniably, both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping made significant impact on the evolution of Chinas foreign relations strategy and established their own models in their respective eras in effect dividing the history of Chinese foreign policy into two. In the shadow of the Cold War, Chinese foreign relations shifted between the United States and the Soviet Union as the future superpower struggled to safeguard national security, guarantee sovereignty and territorial integrity and enhance its international status under Mao. In the last two decades Chinese foreign relations strategies were less geared towards survival and security as Deng presided over the pursuit of the Four Modernizations and the establishment of a new international political and economic order in a framework of peace and non-alliance. As its impact on the shaping of world affairs grows, China's foreign relations strategies will continue to evolve in the next century when it becomes truly capable of an "overthrow of the planetary balance". The 20th century has witnessed Chinas rise from a weak, economically backward country to an important actor in the international system. From the founding of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). In 1949, Mao Zedong attempted to break the bipolar system and make China an independent and important strategic power. The reform and opening to the outside world policy program, also known as China's second revolution,1 initiated by Deng Xiaoping in late 1978, laid the foundation for Chinas spectacular economic growth and enabled it to become an effective actor in the international system. -
Three Prominences1
THE THREE PROMINENCES1 Yizhong Gu The political-aesthetic principle of the “three prominences” (san tuchu 三突出) was the formula foremost in governing proletarian literature and art during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) (hereafter CR). In May 1968, Yu Huiyong 于会泳 initially proposed and defined the principle in this way: Among all characters, give prominence to the positive characters; among the positive characters, give prominence to the main heroic characters; among the main characters, give prominence to the most important character, namely, the central character.2 As the main composer of the Revolutionary Model Plays, Yu Hui- yong had gone through a number of ups and downs in the official hierarchy before finally receiving favor from Jiang Qing 江青, wife of Mao Zedong. Yu collected plenty of Jiang Qing’s concrete but scat- tered directions on the Model Plays and tried to summarize them in an abstract and formulaic pronouncement. The principle of three prominances was supposed to be applicable to all the Model Plays and thus give guidance for the creation of future proletarian artworks. Summarizing the gist of Jiang’s instruction, Yu observed, “Comrade Jiang Qing lays strong emphasis on the characterization of heroic fig- ures,” and therefore, “according to Comrade Jiang Qing’s directions, we generalize the ‘three prominences’ as an important principle upon which to build and characterize figures.”3 1 This essay owes much to invaluable encouragement and instruction from Profes- sors Ban Wang of Stanford University, Tani Barlow of Rice University, and Yomi Braester of the University of Washington. 2 Yu Huiyong, “Rang wenyi wutai yongyuan chengwei xuanchuan maozedong sixiang de zhendi” (Let the stage of art be the everlasting front to propagate the thought of Mao Zedong), Wenhui Bao (Wenhui daily) (May 23, 1968). -
Information to Users
INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript Pas been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissenation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from anytype of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely. event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material bad to beremoved, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with smalloverlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back ofthe book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. UMI A Bell &Howell Information Company 300North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor. MI48106-1346 USA 313!761-47oo 800:521·0600 THE LIN BIAO INCIDENT: A STUDY OF EXTRA-INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY AUGUST 1995 By Qiu Jin Dissertation Committee: Stephen Uhalley, Jr., Chairperson Harry Lamley Sharon Minichiello John Stephan Roger Ames UMI Number: 9604163 OMI Microform 9604163 Copyright 1995, by OMI Company. -
Asia Pacific Visual Cultures
Massachusetts College of Art and Design 2021 Student Research Symposium on ASIA PACIFIC VISUAL CULTURES Monday, April 26, 2021, 5:00 to 6:15 PM Virtual Event via Zoom https://massart.zoom.us/j/87217651809 Welcome! The Team: Organizers: Shouchih Isaac Yen, PhD [email protected] Duncan Givans, PhD [email protected] Timothy Correll, PhD [email protected] Event Manager: Candis Hilton [email protected] Technology Adviser: Antony Flackett [email protected] Poster and Program Designer: Amenda Wong [email protected] Program Printing Advisers: Clint Baclawski and Jamison Wright Venue and Schedule Adviser: Kyle Brock Media Adviser: Nicky Enriquez Student Managers: Alexandru Zaharia, Tatyana Andreeva, and Zhiyao Zhang Poster and Program Designer: Amenda Wong [email protected] Olivia Fair Dante Canario The Animated Nezha and the From Olympic Harmony Héxié to Confucian Doctrine of Filial Piety River Crabs Héxiè Olivia Fair The Animated Nezha 哪吒 and the Confucian Doctrine of Filial Piety Nǎzhā 哪吒 Nezha fights the dragons, Baoguang Wang, Smash the Gang of Four. 1978. Nezha Conquers the Dragon King (1979). Poster, 53 x 77 cm. The Gang of Four Consisted of Jiang Qing (wife of Mao Zedong), Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan They were charged with treason. Poster for Nezha/Nezha: Birth of the Demon Child. Directed by Yu Yang, Beijing Enlight Pictures, 2019. 110 minutes. Dante Canario From Olympic Harmony Héxié 和諧 to River Crabs Héxiè 河蟹 Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe Peter Eisenman 2005, Berlin Germany Grey Boxes Representing Printing Blocks 2008 Bird's Nest Stadium, Beijing China Ai Weiwei River Crab Feast 2010, Shanghai China Héxié 和諧 Héxiè 河蟹 Harmony River Crabs Panel Discussion: Questions and Answers Olivia Fair Dante Canario Panel Discussion: Questions and Answers THANK YOU SO MUCH!. -
Reimagining Revolutionary Labor in the People's Commune
Reimagining Revolutionary Labor in the People’s Commune: Amateurism and Social Reproduction in the Maoist Countryside by Angie Baecker A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Asian Languages and Cultures) in the University of Michigan 2020 Doctoral Committee: Professor Xiaobing Tang, Co-Chair, Chinese University of Hong Kong Associate Professor Emily Wilcox, Co-Chair Professor Geoff Eley Professor Rebecca Karl, New York University Associate Professor Youngju Ryu Angie Baecker [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0003-0182-0257 © Angie Baecker 2020 Dedication This dissertation is dedicated to my grandmother, Chang-chang Feng 馮張章 (1921– 2016). In her life, she chose for herself the penname Zhang Yuhuan 張宇寰. She remains my guiding star. ii Acknowledgements Nobody writes a dissertation alone, and many people’s labor has facilitated my own. My scholarship has been borne by a great many networks of support, both formal and informal, and indeed it would go against the principles of my work to believe that I have been able to come this far all on my own. Many of the people and systems that have enabled me to complete my dissertation remain invisible to me, and I will only ever be able to make a partial account of all of the support I have received, which is as follows: Thanks go first to the members of my committee. To Xiaobing Tang, I am grateful above all for believing in me. Texts that we have read together in numerous courses and conversations remain cornerstones of my thinking. He has always greeted my most ambitious arguments with enthusiasm, and has pushed me to reach for higher levels of achievement. -
Qinghua University and Chinese Politics During the Cultural
Framing the Event: Qinghua University and Chinese Politics during the Cultural Revolution On 5 August 1968 Mao Zedong regifted mangoes, given him by the Pakistan foreign minister, to the Workers’ Propaganda Teams who were then bringing two warring factions of Red Guards, the Jinggangshan Corps (tuanpai) and the Fours (sipai), under control at Qinghua University. Mao’s gesture signaled an important change of direction in the mass campaigns of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The student Red Guards, who had been the main force in the first stage of the Cultural Revolution and taken out the “capitalist roaders”, had run amok. Henceforth the working class would take charge of forwarding the Cultural Revolution. From 27 July to 26 August was an anxious and confusing time for Red Guards in China. On the morning of 27 July, huge crowds of workers and a scattering of PLA men appeared before the campus gates at Qinghua University, demanding an end to all violent confrontations. At dawn on 28 July Mao Zedong summoned the five Red Guard leaders in Beijing to the Great Hall of the People for a meeting, which lasted from 3:30 A.M. to 8:30 A.M. Mao lambasted the Red Guard leaders for disobeying his order to “struggle, criticize and transform” Chinese campuses and instead forming viciously opposing factions which degenerated from diatribes even to armed combats. He revealed that he was the “black hand” behind the order sending in work 1 teams to quell the violence and told his “little generals” [Red Guards] that “they have now made mistakes (xianzai shi xiaojiang fan cuowu de shihou le).1 On 5 August Mao instructed his bodyguard Wang Dongxing to distribute the case of mangoes given him by the Pakistani foreign minister to the workers who were occupying Qinghua University campus. -
China Perspectives
China Perspectives 2016/1 | 2016 Photo Essay: Deng Xiaoping’s Failed Reform in 1975-1976 A Photo Essay of a Failed Reform Beida, Tiananmen Square and the Defeat of Deng Xiaoping in 1975-76 David Zweig Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/6893 DOI: 10.4000/chinaperspectives.6893 ISSN: 1996-4617 Publisher Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine Printed version Date of publication: 1 March 2016 Number of pages: 5-28 ISSN: 2070-3449 Electronic reference David Zweig, « A Photo Essay of a Failed Reform », China Perspectives [Online], 2016/1 | 2016, Online since 01 March 2016, connection on 28 October 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ chinaperspectives/6893 ; DOI : 10.4000/chinaperspectives.6893 © All rights reserved Photo Essay China perspectives A Photo Essay of a Failed Reform Beida, Tiananmen Square and the Defeat of Deng Xiaoping in 1975-76 DAVID ZWEIG ABSTRACT: In mid-1975, Deng Xiaoping, with Mao’s blessing, initiated reforms that targeted the negative consequences of the Cultural Revolution. To bolster Deng’s effort, Mao endowed him with penultimate authority over the Party, government, and military. However, in late October, Mao turned on Deng, and within five months, Mao and the radicals toppled Deng from power. As a foreign student at Peking University, David Zweig observed and photographed four key points in this historic struggle: (1) the initial establishment of a “big character poster” compound at Peking University; (2) emotional mourning for Zhou Enlai in Tiananmen Square following his death: (3) the intensified assault on Deng in February 1976 in the posters at Peking University; and (4) the massive demonstration of support in Tiananmen Square on 3-4 April for the end of Maoist politics. -
Mao's Failure, Deng's Success
MAO'S FAILURE, DENG'S SUCCESS Roderick MacFarquhar Professor of History and Political Science, Harvard University June 24, 2010 Revolutionaries have to be optimists as well as believers, and revolutionary leaders have to be able to inspire their followers, convince them that "Yes, we can!" How could they endure years of struggle on a long march towards a seemingly ever-receding promised land without believing, as Mao Zedong put it during the darkest days of the Chinese revolution, that "a single spark can start a prairie fire?" During the anti-Japanese war, Mao laid down that in the aftermath of defeat, a communist should correct his ideas "to make them correspond to the laws of the external world, and thus turn failure into success; this is what is meant by 'failure is the mother of success' and 'a fall into the pit, a gain in your wit."1 Twenty years later, during the upheaval within international communism brought about by Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and the subsequent Hungarian revolt, Mao remained determinedly optimistic, claiming that bad things can be turned into good things ... In given conditions, a bad thing can lead to good results and a good thing to bad results. More than two thousand years ago Lao Tzu said: "Good fortune lieth within bad, bad fortune lurketh within good."2 Alas for Mao, not only was Lao Tzu right, but, more importantly, Mao's countrymen and his successors did not agree with him as to what constituted good and bad things. On his deathbed, Mao claimed that the Cultural Revolution was one of his two major lifetime achievements, the other being the victory that brought the communists to power in 1949.3 But within the utopian vision of Mao's Cultural Revolution, egalitarian and collectivist though it was, lurked the seeds of its antithesis, the Chairman's bête noire, the helter- skelter capitalism of the Deng Xiaoping era. -
Chinese Cultural Revolution
Chinese Cultural Revolution Background Guide Written by: Sruthi Venkatachalam and Patrick Lee, Case Western Reserve University The Rise of Modern China The reign of the Chinese dynasties ended in 1911 leading to China’s emergence into the modern world. China’s weakness in the 20th century, as seen in the devastating loss in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, stirred unrest and murmurs of uprising among the population. In 1911, armed rebellions broke out in response to the nationalization of railways in the Sichuan province, word of which spread across China. This snowballed and lead warlords to rebel against the weak imperial regime. Such rebellion in Wuchuan led to the overthrow of the provincial government and revolutionary leader Sun Yixian took advantage of the regime’s weakness. He later returned from exile, elected provisional president He saw that the emperor be abdicated, and resign power allowing Yuan Shikai, imperial minster entrusted with full power via the courts, to become the nation’s first president.1 In early 1912, the reign of Imperial China, Yuan Shikai’s attempt to become military dictator was thwarted and the Nationalist party, the Guomindang, also known as the Kuomintang (GMD) took control of the country in 1923. Sun Yixian, now president, reorganized the party that made it a centralized, democratic party. The GMD worked with the nearly formed Chinese Communist Party, with Soviet assistance, to reunite China and end the control of warlords running rampant in the 1 Wang, Yi Chu. “Sun Yat-sen : Chinese Leader.” n.d. Britannica. Accessed November 9. 2018. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sun-Yat-sen country. -
Bibliography
Bibliography AJIL (1912) ‘The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China’, American Journal of International Law, 6, 3, 149–54. Akita, G (1967) Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan, 1868–1900 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Albrow, M (1970) Bureaucracy (London: Pall Mall). Amnesty International (2012) ‘China: Annual Report 2012’, http:// www.amnesty.org, date accessed 14 January 2013. Angle, S (2002) Human Rights & Chinese Thought: A Cross Cultural Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Angle, S and Svensson, M (eds) (2001) The Chinese Human Rights Reader: Documents and Commentary, 1900–2000 (New York: M.E. Sharpe). Anon (1963a) ‘Quanli Pian’ (On Rights) in Zhang Nan and Wang Renzhi (eds) Xinhai Gemingqian Shinian Jianshi Lun Xuanji (Collected Works from the Ten Year Period Before the Xinhai Revolution) Vol. 1 (Beijing: Sanlian Chubanshe). Anon (1963b) ‘Shuo Guomin’ (On Citizens) in Zhang Nan and Wang Renzhi (eds) Xinhai Gemingqian Shinian Jianshi Lun Xuanji (Collected Works from the Ten Year Period Before the Xinhai Revolution) Vol. 1 (Beijing: Sanlian Chubanshe). Ayers, W (1971) Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Baker, H (1979) Chinese Family and Kinship (New York: Columbia University Press). Bao Jialin (1979a) ‘Xinhai Geming Shiqi de Funu Sixiang’ (Women’s Thought at the Time of the 1911 Revolution) in Bao Jialin (ed.) Zhongguo Funushi Lunji (Materials on the History of Chinese Women) (Taibei: Mutong Chubanshe). Bao Jialin (1979b) ‘Qiu Jin yu Qingmo Funu Yundong’ (Qiu Jin and the Women’s Movement in the Late Qing) in Bao Jialin (ed.) Zhongguo Funushi Lunji (Materials on the History of Chinese Women) (Taibei: Mutong Chubanshe). -
Zheng He and the Confucius Institute
California State University, San Bernardino CSUSB ScholarWorks Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations Office of aduateGr Studies 3-2018 The Admiral's Carrot and Stick: Zheng He and the Confucius Institute Peter Weisser Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd Part of the Asian Studies Commons Recommended Citation Weisser, Peter, "The Admiral's Carrot and Stick: Zheng He and the Confucius Institute" (2018). Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations. 625. https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd/625 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Office of aduateGr Studies at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of CSUSB ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE ADMIRAL’S CARROT AND STICK: ZHENG HE AND THE CONFUCIUS INSTITIUTE A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of California State University, San Bernardino In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in Social Science by Peter Eli Weisser March 2018 THE ADMIRAL’S CARROT AND STICK: ZHENG HE AND THE CONFUCIUS INSTITIUTE A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of California State University, San Bernardino by Peter Eli Weisser March 2018 Approved by: Jeremy Murray, Committee Chair, History Jose Munoz, Committee Member ©2018 Peter Eli Weisser ABSTRACT As the People’s Republic of China begins to accumulate influence on the international stage through strategic usage of soft power, the history and application of soft power throughout the history of China will be important to future scholars of the politics of Beijing.