Security Sector Reform in Liberia June 2010
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Wider Lessons for Peacebuilding: Security Sector Reform in Liberia June 2010 John Blaney Blaney was a career diplomat and the US Ambassador to Liberia from 2002 to 2005. He successfully led US efforts to facil- itate an end to civil war and to promote Liberia’s transition to democratic governance. He is currently a senior advisor for Deloitte Consulting. Jacques Paul Klein Klein is a retired career US diplomat and a Major General in the US Air Force Reserve. He was also the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) from 2003 to 2005. Sean McFate McFate is an Assistant Professor at National Defense University and a Fellow at the New America Foundation. A scholar- practitioner, he was an architect of the demobilization and reconstitution of the Armed Forces of Liberia and Ministry of Defense. Key Points peace to counteract networks for violence. These leaders assisted in the building and rebuilding of • Avoid Formulaic Approaches. Failure is often multilateral, nongovernmental, and Liberian net- guaranteed by robotically following some works that wanted a warless Liberia as a check inflexible, linear list of things to do in chaotic on opportunistic warlords. and complex situations. Success is better pro- moted by innovative responses to circumstances • Consolidate the State’s Monopoly of Force to on the ground. Uphold the Rule of Law. Strengthening the rule of law in a country as anarchic as Liberia was • Maintain Momentum. The real objective in the an initial priority and remains an ongoing chal- immediate years following Charles Taylor’s lengeandobjective.However,forruleoflawto departure was to redirect the course of the situa- take root, the state must first have a monopoly tion from continuing chaos toward something of force to provide at least minimal protection more manageable. In other words, the intention for its citizens. In Liberia, this required robust was to create enough momentum in favor of and early disarmament, demobilization, and peace in an operating environment that remained reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform complex, nonlinear, and uncertain. Hope and (SSR) programs. progress are gained by keeping a steady tempo on your side. • Recognize That Restructuring Security Institutions is Deeply Political. DDR and SSR are political and • Mobilize Networks for Peace to Counterbalance dangerous efforts as they dismantle the de facto Networks for War. Serious ceasefire violations institutions of power in conflict-affected countries. and overall instability created a palpable sense A general or warlord may not welcome the sugges- that the brittle peace agreement could crumble at tion to put down his gun and become a farmer. As any moment. To reduce tension and limit risk, such, purely technical approaches to DDR and recovery leaders actively developed networks for SSR will fail. Policy Analysis Briefs are thought-provoking contributions to the public debate over peace and security issues. The views expressed in this brief are those of the authors and not necessarily those of Deloitte Consulting, the United Nations, the US government, or the Stanley Foundation. The author’s affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. 2 • Integrate DDR and SSR. Conventional wis- Liberia is a relatively rare success story—one dom holds that these two programs are sep- that underscores the inescapable complexity arate and sequential because they involve of post-conflict peacebuilding in both the different actors, priorities, time lines and short and longer term. functions. DDR is often viewed as a relative- ly quick process, while SSR is imagined to It is difficult to convey the extent of damage pick up where DDR leaves off and progress inflicted on Liberia and the suffering endured over an extended period of time. In reality, by its people under the regime of President they share the same objective—the consoli- Charles Taylor and the 14-year civil war. By dation of the state’s monopoly of force to 2003, the country was virtually post-apoca- uphold the rule of law. They should be lyptic. With a population of three million, planned, resourced, implemented, and eval- more than a quarter million people had been uated together. killed, while another million were displaced or missing. Abductions, torture, rape, and • “Operationalize” Human Security. Human other human rights abuses occurred on a mas- security is an abstract theory that does not sive scale, and it was estimated that at least translate well into practice. The goal of one child in ten had been abducted and forced Liberian peacebuilding efforts was to trans- into service as a child soldier or sex slave.1 form a soldier into a figure that women and children could run toward for protection, The country’s infrastructure was destroyed: rather than away from in fear. Recovery there were no electrical grids, public running leaders incorporated this concrete imperative water, sewage, or other utilities. There was into their approach to security sector reform little evidence that Liberia had once been a and used it to shape the reconstructed mili- premier European and American vacation tary and police in unconventional ways. destination, with lush beaches, luxury high- rise hotels, and three direct flights a week Introduction: What Worked in Liberia from New York City to Monrovia on Pan In 2003, The Economist predicted that Am Airlines. By mid-2003 those hotels were Liberia would soon be “the world’s worst burned husks packed with squatters. Bullet place to live.” Indeed, it was a horrible year holes adorned the buildings, lampposts, and to be in Liberia. Today, after a troubled his- street signs. Hundreds of thousands of inter- tory and 14 years of civil war, Liberia is nally displaced Liberians fled to Monrovia, a slowly recovering. The country’s future may city that could accommodate far fewer, result- not yet be secure, and much progress has yet ing in massive slums of tin shacks, garbage, to be made, but most of those present in the human waste, and disease. Unemployment was immediate aftermath of the war in 2003 rife, and despite a tenuous ceasefire, child sol- would agree that today’s Liberia is a compar- diers still stalked the night with Kalashnikovs. ative miracle. It was grim. Three individuals who partnered with Now, seven years later, the country continues Liberian leadership and assisted Liberia’s tran- its slow process of recovery, with the help of sition from war to peace authored this report the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), one of to help bridge the gap between theory and the largest peacekeeping missions in the practice in peacebuilding. While emphasizing world. Liberia has resisted backsliding into that every conflict is unique, they hope that conflict and, in 2005, elected Africa’s first- some of their insights into what worked—and ever democratically-installed female presi- why—may prove useful to others engaged in dent. Its progressive stability is a significant similar efforts around the world. achievement, given the myriad of would-be spoilers along the way and the tough geopo- litical neighborhood of West Africa. Though violence could erupt anytime, as most Economic Community of West African States 3 assumed it would in 2003, it has not. Rather, (ECOWAS) units, hastily moved from Sierra confidence in Liberia’s future is growing. Leone to form the Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia The Larger Lessons for Peacebuilding (ECOMIL). Given the size of the units, there Below are a few ideas from those on the was little confidence that ECOMIL could ground in the early days, the so-called “gold- provide enough immediate security to form en hour” of Liberia’s post-war recovery. the conventionally-required basis of a work- able peace. Avoid Formulaic Approaches Doctrinal templates, standardized metrics, and In this context of anarchic violence, the only received wisdom should serve on-the-ground alternative to a bloodbath was creative bat- leadership, not vice versa. Failure is often tlefield mediation. In fact, local diplomacy guaranteed by robotically following some effectively sealed the peace long before inflexible, linear checklist in a nonlinear, friendly forces secured any ground or the chaotic situation. Often these “solutions,” Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was concocted from afar, are built on dubious signed in Ghana. This involved eschewing assumptions that stem from abstract theory. In formulaic thinking and encouraging individ- some ways, the overadherence to such ual leaders on the ground to be innovative approaches is understandable, as donor coun- and responsive to local circumstances. tries, international organizations, and non- governmental organizations (NGOs) expend Achieving a peaceful end to conflicts as com- great intellectual and real capital developing plex and deeply rooted as Liberia means commendable handbooks, frameworks and being open to all possibilities, including those other materials for peacebuilding, and are that others see as unworkable. In this case, it eager to implement these tools in missions. meant being receptive to the possibility of However, the temptation to let the tool drive working with an unlikely interlocutor—a the mission should be resisted. warlord. Received wisdom holds that such characters are impossible vehicles for peace For example, the peacekeeping maxim that and stability. However, received wisdom was security, in the form of a ceasefire, must pre- wrong in the case of General Mohamed cede any additional progress toward peace Sheriff (aka “Cobra”), the field commander did not really hold in Liberia. During the of the biggest army of the largest rebel group, most intense fighting from June to August the Liberians United for Reconciliation and 2003, which Liberians referred to as “World Democracy (LURD). War Three,” the possibility of large-scale mil- itary intervention on behalf of the United Sheriff’s LURD rebels spearheaded the attack States or NATO to end the violence and cre- on Monrovia that ignited this period of ate a secure context for peace negotiations chaos.