Wider Lessons for Peacebuilding: Security Sector Reform in June 2010

John Blaney Blaney was a career diplomat and the US Ambassador to Liberia from 2002 to 2005. He successfully led US efforts to facil- itate an end to civil war and to promote Liberia’s transition to democratic governance. He is currently a senior advisor for Deloitte Consulting.

Jacques Paul Klein Klein is a retired career US diplomat and a Major General in the US Air Force Reserve. He was also the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) from 2003 to 2005.

Sean McFate McFate is an Assistant Professor at National Defense University and a Fellow at the New America Foundation. A scholar- practitioner, he was an architect of the demobilization and reconstitution of the Armed Forces of Liberia and Ministry of Defense.

Key Points peace to counteract networks for violence. These leaders assisted in the building and rebuilding of • Avoid Formulaic Approaches. Failure is often multilateral, nongovernmental, and Liberian net- guaranteed by robotically following some works that wanted a warless Liberia as a check inflexible, linear list of things to do in chaotic on opportunistic warlords. and complex situations. Success is better pro- moted by innovative responses to circumstances • Consolidate the State’s Monopoly of Force to on the ground. Uphold the Rule of Law. Strengthening the rule of law in a country as anarchic as Liberia was • Maintain Momentum. The real objective in the an initial priority and remains an ongoing chal- immediate years following Charles Taylor’s lengeandobjective.However,forruleoflawto departure was to redirect the course of the situa- take root, the state must first have a monopoly tion from continuing chaos toward something of force to provide at least minimal protection more manageable. In other words, the intention for its citizens. In Liberia, this required robust was to create enough momentum in favor of and early disarmament, demobilization, and peace in an operating environment that remained reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform complex, nonlinear, and uncertain. Hope and (SSR) programs. progress are gained by keeping a steady tempo on your side. • Recognize That Restructuring Security Institutions is Deeply Political. DDR and SSR are political and • Mobilize Networks for Peace to Counterbalance dangerous efforts as they dismantle the de facto Networks for War. Serious ceasefire violations institutions of power in conflict-affected countries. and overall instability created a palpable sense A general or warlord may not welcome the sugges- that the brittle peace agreement could crumble at tion to put down his gun and become a farmer. As any moment. To reduce tension and limit risk, such, purely technical approaches to DDR and recovery leaders actively developed networks for SSR will fail.

Policy Analysis Briefs are thought-provoking contributions to the public debate over peace and security issues. The views expressed in this brief are those of the authors and not necessarily those of Deloitte Consulting, the United Nations, the US government, or the Stanley Foundation. The author’s affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. 2 • Integrate DDR and SSR. Conventional wis- Liberia is a relatively rare success story—one dom holds that these two programs are sep- that underscores the inescapable complexity arate and sequential because they involve of post-conflict peacebuilding in both the different actors, priorities, time lines and short and longer term. functions. DDR is often viewed as a relative- ly quick process, while SSR is imagined to It is difficult to convey the extent of damage pick up where DDR leaves off and progress inflicted on Liberia and the suffering endured over an extended period of time. In reality, by its people under the regime of President they share the same objective—the consoli- Charles Taylor and the 14-year civil war. By dation of the state’s monopoly of force to 2003, the country was virtually post-apoca- uphold the rule of law. They should be lyptic. With a population of three million, planned, resourced, implemented, and eval- more than a quarter million people had been uated together. killed, while another million were displaced or missing. Abductions, torture, rape, and • “Operationalize” Human Security. Human other human rights abuses occurred on a mas- security is an abstract theory that does not sive scale, and it was estimated that at least translate well into practice. The goal of one child in ten had been abducted and forced Liberian peacebuilding efforts was to trans- into service as a child soldier or sex slave.1 form a soldier into a figure that women and children could run toward for protection, The country’s infrastructure was destroyed: rather than away from in fear. Recovery there were no electrical grids, public running leaders incorporated this concrete imperative water, sewage, or other utilities. There was into their approach to security sector reform little evidence that Liberia had once been a and used it to shape the reconstructed mili- premier European and American vacation tary and police in unconventional ways. destination, with lush beaches, luxury high- rise hotels, and three direct flights a week Introduction: What Worked in Liberia from New York City to Monrovia on Pan In 2003, The Economist predicted that Am Airlines. By mid-2003 those hotels were Liberia would soon be “the world’s worst burned husks packed with squatters. Bullet place to live.” Indeed, it was a horrible year holes adorned the buildings, lampposts, and to be in Liberia. Today, after a troubled his- street signs. Hundreds of thousands of inter- tory and 14 years of civil war, Liberia is nally displaced Liberians fled to Monrovia, a slowly recovering. The country’s future may city that could accommodate far fewer, result- not yet be secure, and much progress has yet ing in massive slums of tin shacks, garbage, to be made, but most of those present in the human waste, and disease. Unemployment was immediate aftermath of the war in 2003 rife, and despite a tenuous ceasefire, child sol- would agree that today’s Liberia is a compar- diers still stalked the night with Kalashnikovs. ative miracle. It was grim.

Three individuals who partnered with Now, seven years later, the country continues Liberian leadership and assisted Liberia’s tran- its slow process of recovery, with the help of sition from war to peace authored this report the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), one of to help bridge the gap between theory and the largest peacekeeping missions in the practice in peacebuilding. While emphasizing world. Liberia has resisted backsliding into that every conflict is unique, they hope that conflict and, in 2005, elected Africa’s first- some of their insights into what worked—and ever democratically-installed female presi- why—may prove useful to others engaged in dent. Its progressive stability is a significant similar efforts around the world. achievement, given the myriad of would-be spoilers along the way and the tough geopo- litical neighborhood of West Africa. Though violence could erupt anytime, as most Economic Community of West African States 3 assumed it would in 2003, it has not. Rather, (ECOWAS) units, hastily moved from Sierra confidence in Liberia’s future is growing. Leone to form the Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia The Larger Lessons for Peacebuilding (ECOMIL). Given the size of the units, there Below are a few ideas from those on the was little confidence that ECOMIL could ground in the early days, the so-called “gold- provide enough immediate security to form en hour” of Liberia’s post-war recovery. the conventionally-required basis of a work- able peace. Avoid Formulaic Approaches Doctrinal templates, standardized metrics, and In this context of anarchic violence, the only received wisdom should serve on-the-ground alternative to a bloodbath was creative bat- leadership, not vice versa. Failure is often tlefield mediation. In fact, local diplomacy guaranteed by robotically following some effectively sealed the peace long before inflexible, linear checklist in a nonlinear, friendly forces secured any ground or the chaotic situation. Often these “solutions,” Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was concocted from afar, are built on dubious signed in Ghana. This involved eschewing assumptions that stem from abstract theory. In formulaic thinking and encouraging individ- some ways, the overadherence to such ual leaders on the ground to be innovative approaches is understandable, as donor coun- and responsive to local circumstances. tries, international organizations, and non- governmental organizations (NGOs) expend Achieving a peaceful end to conflicts as com- great intellectual and real capital developing plex and deeply rooted as Liberia means commendable handbooks, frameworks and being open to all possibilities, including those other materials for peacebuilding, and are that others see as unworkable. In this case, it eager to implement these tools in missions. meant being receptive to the possibility of However, the temptation to let the tool drive working with an unlikely interlocutor—a the mission should be resisted. warlord. Received wisdom holds that such characters are impossible vehicles for peace For example, the peacekeeping maxim that and stability. However, received wisdom was security, in the form of a ceasefire, must pre- wrong in the case of General Mohamed cede any additional progress toward peace Sheriff (aka “Cobra”), the field commander did not really hold in Liberia. During the of the biggest army of the largest rebel group, most intense fighting from June to August the Liberians United for Reconciliation and 2003, which Liberians referred to as “World Democracy (LURD). War Three,” the possibility of large-scale mil- itary intervention on behalf of the United Sheriff’s LURD rebels spearheaded the attack States or NATO to end the violence and cre- on Monrovia that ignited this period of ate a secure context for peace negotiations chaos. Sheriff intended to press the attack, was remote, though thoroughly considered in overrun downtown Monrovia, and seize some quarters. In fact, Ambassador Blaney power for LURD while his men sacked the and his staff were urged strongly by some to city. But he did not. Interestingly, Sheriff abandon the US embassy, though they broke with LURD political leadership and refused to do so. acted independently. He ultimately negotiated and delivered a LURD ceasefire and pullback, Without potential for US or NATO reinforce- which allowed the permissive entry and inter- ment, the only peacekeepers initially avail- positional placement of the ECOMIL peace- able to help secure the situation and pave the keepers. He agreed to this pullback as a result way for a peace agreement were a few small of an unconventional battlefield mediation effort on behalf of the US ambassador, and 4 others, who he viewed with some credibility. tight and wait to see what happens next. This mid-battle agreement essentially ended Hope and progress are gained by proactively the war and laid the groundwork for conclu- keeping a steady tempo on your side. sion of the CPA, which is the reverse order of many “textbook” solutions. For example, in the weeks and months follow- ing the signing of the CPA, those charged with Additionally, the creativity required to for- its implementation had to maintain the ward the peace process may involve strategic momentum of the peace agreement and dis- deception. A large US Marine Expeditionary suade aggrieved armed groups from reviving Unit (MEU) was nearby, but not visible, in the the war. Momentum was a vital tool since course of these battlefield negotiations. At recovery leaders then lacked enough peace- that time, they had no mandate to intervene keepers to control widespread violence. Simply militarily in Liberia. Fortunately, neither rebel put, one needed to create the impression that army knew how limited the US military’s the proverbial “train was leaving the station,” scope of action truly was. The ambassador and that those who wanted a stake in post- and the MEU commander decided to have a war Liberia had to get on or be left behind. To few harrier jets hover in a training flight this end, the Disarmament, Demobilization, above the building where the negotiations Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRR) with Cobra were taking place. The deafening program was initiated as quickly as possible, roar of the jets sent an unmistakable message beginning on December 7, 2003. On the to the warring parties: you want the United ground, the dynamic was simple: either start States as your friend and not as your enemy, to disarm the warring factions very soon, or so listen up and let’s negotiate a peace deal. risk a quick return to war. This helped tip the negotiation calculus in favor of peace. In Liberia, DDRR was an early step in the transition from conflict to peace by removing Strategic deception is an idea that is ignored weapons, demobilizing armed units, returning and even shunned in peace studies literature combatants to civilian life, and enabling them yet, as Sun Tzu told us 2500 years ago, it is to earn livelihoods through peaceful means fundamental to the art of war.2 Clearly, decep- instead of violence. Starting the DDRR pro- tion can sometimes be useful in the art of gram quickly kept the combatants, whose peace as well. chains of command were still intact, focused on material gain through employment rather Maintain Momentum than on coup attempts or fighting. It also The immediate objective in the years follow- demonstrated to the populace that the forces ing Taylor’s resignation and exile was to of peace retained critical momentum and had redirect the course of the situation from con- the capacity to shape the future. tinuing chaos toward something more man- ageable. In other words, the intent was to The DDRR program in Liberia disarmed and create enough momentum in favor of peace demobilized 101,449 combatants, collected to enable progress in an operating environ- 61,918 weapons, and 6,486,136 units of ment that remained complex, nonlinear, and ammunition, ranging from AK-47s to rocket uncertain. Conflicts like Liberia are highly propelled grenades, heavy machine guns, and complex and defy simplistic cause-effect crew-served weapons. Simultaneously, the analysis, especially by outsiders. When end- United Nations disposed of ordinance and ing armed conflicts and reducing chaos, it is addressed the tough challenge of sealing imperative to keep the tempo of events in Liberia’s borders. Meanwhile, hundreds of your favor, sometimes by acting boldly even thousands of internally displaced Liberians when unsure about the possible results of and refugees were returned home. your actions. Rarely can you afford to sit Detractors argue that the United Nations first modern, and currently the only, elected 5 started the DDRR program in Liberia too female head of state in Africa. More impor- quickly, before enough UN peacekeepers were tantly, there is absolutely no doubt who is the present. Indeed, for ten days during December, legitimate head of government in Liberia. serious riots erupted at Camp Schefflin, a DDRR site just outside of Monrovia, and this Mobilize Networks for Peace to initial effort was shut down. However, the Counterbalance Networks for War riots were a planned attempt to disrupt the The period between the signing of the CPA United Nations’ efforts and create instability, and the demobilization of the combatants largely to increase monetary profits for war- proved a difficult time on the ground. Warring ring factions, and would have happened groups with access to weapons still wandered whenever the DDRR program began. The the streets, a fact which threatened to reignite DDRR program was resumed four months the civil war if they preemptively attacked ene- later, without incident, and remains one of the mies in a classic “prisoner’s dilemma” sce- most comprehensive programs of its kind. nario. Moreover, it was evident to all that This sent a reassuring message to all Liberians: insufficient numbers of peacekeepers were peacebuilding was moving forward and would present to contain the violence. Numerous not be derailed. serious ceasefire violations created a palpable sense that the brittle CPA could crumble at Similarly, momentum was critical to keep the any moment. Such violations and other nefar- 2005 presidential election on schedule, despite ious activities were countered, at first by numerous challenges. Some senior statesmen ECOMIL and US Embassy personnel, and and other respected Liberian figures suggested later by UN peacekeepers. national conventions and a rewriting of Liberia’s Constitution before any election took To reinforce the peace process against these place. Such a process would likely have taken pressures, recovery leaders actively helped years. At the same time, and often with entire- develop networks for peace to counteract ly different motives, several interim govern- networks for violence. They assisted the ment officials moved to prevent, or at least building and rebuilding of multilateral, postpone, the 2005 elections. Their concerns national, and nongovernmental webs of peo- were mostly self-serving: a delay would have ple and organizations that wanted a warless prolonged their time in office as unelected offi- Liberia as a way to check opportunistic war- cials. Moreover, many interim officials sought lords. Indigenous Liberian networks expand- a personal slice of the $520 million raised ed, as the country was seized with genuine war from the February 2004 donor conference. fatigue. A number of Liberian women’s peace Liberians have termed this time-honored prac- groups, in particular, autonomously and tice of government corruption “chopping,” as actively struggled to promote the peace. As in chopping off bits of one’s budget for person- formerly evacuated foreign embassy staff and al gain. For some, more sinister motivations NGOs trickled back into the country, they joined with personal profit incentive in their were quickly integrated into post-conflict sta- efforts to undermine the elections. bilization efforts and informal contact groups.

The authors positions on this point were con- This group networking approach served to sistent and firm: nothing should prevent or absorb failures and shocks, hedging the risk postpone the 2005 election. Doing so would of a relapse into war. It also began to address retard the momentum for peace, jeopardize the fundamental requirement of post-conflict the stability of the country, and imperil the peacebuilding that distinguishes it from freedom and rights of ordinary Liberians. broader state-building processes: the need to Today, Liberians stand proud with the elec- repair social ties severed and structures tion of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the destroyed by years of systemic violence. 6 Consolidate the State’s Monopoly of Similarly, the program to restructure the Force to Uphold the Rule of Law Liberian National Police force involved purg- Strengthening the rule of law in a country as ing unqualified policemen, extensive recruit- anarchic as Liberia was an initial priority and ing and training of new police forces, creating remains an ongoing challenge and objective. a police academy, and developing an emer- However, rule of law is one of those concepts gency infrastructure, such as a national toll- that briefs well in Washington, New York, free emergency telephone number (e.g., the and Geneva but is elusive in the field. This is equivalent of dialing 911 in the ). partly because it is a broad notion that resists These innovations go well beyond simple common or comprehensive definition. The “train and equip” programs. Consolidating the UN secretary-general defines it as the “prin- state’s monopoly of force to uphold the rule of ciple of governance in which all persons, law is a highly complex process. institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to Recognize That Restructuring Security laws that are publicly promulgated, equally Institutions is Deeply Political enforced and independently adjudicated, and Conducting DDR and SSR is dangerous which are consistent with international because they are inherently political process- human rights norms and standards.”3 But es, as they dismantle the de facto institutions what exactly does this look like in post-con- of power in conflict-affected countries. flict Liberia? Convincing a general or warlord to put down his gun and become a farmer may not be wel- Before there is rule of law, the state must pos- comed and might even provoke violence, as sess a monopoly of force.4 States that do not occurred in neighboring Cote d’Ivoire. In enjoy the monopoly of force must compete 2002, the government of Cote d’Ivoire with insurgents, militias, organized crime, attempted to demobilize 750 soldiers, who and revolutionary movements, all of which then staged a coup, requiring a French and challenge the state’s legitimacy and effective UN armed intervention to maintain peace. governance. Worse, they can cast a state, or Unfortunately, this intervention did not pre- entire region, into war. Accordingly, consoli- vent a civil war, which still simmers today. dating the state’s monopoly of force through DDR and SSR are inherently political and DDR and SSR was an early priority and even dangerous efforts, and purely technical mandated in the CPA.5 approaches will fail.

SSR is the complex task of transforming the In the case of Liberia, the problem was even “security sector”—those institutions that pro- more severe. For many years, corrupt securi- tect the state and its citizens from security ty forces ravaged Liberia and Liberians, threats—into professional, effective, legitimate, resulting in a broad consensus that the coun- apolitical, and accountable actors. SSR is more try needed a new police force, new armed than simple “train and equip” programs. forces, and a new (or resurrected) judicial While training and equipping actors is neces- system that would work in concert to estab- sary for SSR, its comprehensive achievement lish the rule of law. The United Nations took requires considerably more. For instance, the the lead in creating a civilian law enforce- SSR program that drove the reconstitution of ment capacity, which included a judiciary, a the Armed Forces of Liberia and Ministry of police force, and corrections facilities. National Defence involved recruiting, vetting, Meanwhile, the United States was largely training, equipping, fielding, sustaining, and responsible for the demobilization and reinte- mentoring the force. It also involved construct- gration of the legacy military followed by the ing bases across the country, establishing a pro- reconstitution of the Armed Forces of Liberia fessional ministry, drafting a national defense (AFL) and Ministry of Defense. This task was strategy, and designing a new force structure. outsourced to private companies such as DynCorp International, which had advan- monopoly of force to uphold the rule of 7 tages and disadvantages worth exploring but law—and they should be planned, resourced, are beyond the scope of this report. implemented, and evaluated together.

In addition, there is sometimes a natural ten- Integrating DDR and SSR was our approach sion between transitional justice programs to transforming the AFL. The United Nations and efforts to restructure security institutions. disarmed the legacy military. The United In theory, it is assumed that justice and secu- States then, in a single program, combined the rity buttress one another in situations like demobilization and reintegration with SSR. post-conflict Liberia, but in practice this rela- The natural point of intersection between tionship is less clear. Take for example the DDR and SSR was reintegration, as many ex- notion of amnesty. Granting amnesty to those combatants sought employment in the new who committed atrocities during the civil war military. Assuming they were fit for duty is anathema to transitional justice, which and properly vetted, this transference was a seeks to redress past crimes through special “win-win” for everyone. First, it provided courts or truth commissions. However, pro- ex-combatants a quick reintegration into grams like DDR and SSR depend on some society, maintaining that critical momen- form of temporary amnesty to succeed. For tum for peace. Second, it provided a ready- example, ex-combatants seldom show up to a made labor pool to the SSR effort. Third, it DDR site if they have not been granted tem- reinforced the peace settlement by encourag- porary amnesty. If they suspect they might be ing ex-combatants and their followers to arrested, detained, or investigated for the pur- actively participate in the road to peace. This poses of a special court or truth commission, was particularly true if ex-combatants had a it would discredit the DDR process and per- perception that they would have a substantive haps encourage ex-combatants to bury their role in crafting and serving in the new govern- weapons and clandestinely regroup their com- ment. Fourth, it built mutual trust between mand structures. former enemies who now served in uniform together for a single purpose: a better Liberia. To be clear, in spite of pressure from various warlords and factions, blanket or general Of course, in a downsized new AFL, most ex- amnesty was never issued in Liberia as it combatants could not become part of the new would have compromised the later Truth and military and had to be reintegrated elsewhere Reconciliation Commission. However, efforts or retired. This fact is directly linked to one of were made early to postpone implementation the primary challenges that continues to frus- of transitional justice long enough to at least trate further peacebuilding progress in Liberia: disarm and demobilize armed groups. In the difficulty of absorbing large numbers of short, some form of amnesty may prove vital young, unskilled workers into a highly fragile to DDR, yet it can also be contrary to transi- post-conflict economy. While it could not tional justice. address the entirety of the idle youth problem, reintegrating vetted former combatants into a Integrate DDR and SSR professionalized, retrained army was one use- Conventional wisdom holds that DDR and ful tool applied within a much larger and SSR are separate and distinct programs longer-term reintegration process that contin- because they involve different actors, priori- ues today. ties, time lines, and functions. DDR is often viewed as a relatively quick process, while One hurdle faced in the larger DDR and SSR SSR is imagined to pick up where DDR process was funding for security-related pro- leaves off and progress over an extended peri- grams. Although there was a balanced multilat- od of time.6 In reality, they share the same eral approach to overall donor funding, the objective—the consolidation of the state’s security sector was the exception. Financing 8 support for foreign security forces is unpopular through the instruments of development among the parliaments of the world. Thus rather than military means.9 The problem, much of the funding obligation to restructure however, is obvious: what do “freedom the Liberian armed forces fell to the United from want” and “freedom from fear” look States. Though implemented by the United like on the ground? Furthermore, what are Nations, the United States also financed most the immediate needs on the ground in con- of the rebuilding of the police force. The cor- texts where an adequate level of genuine rupt police force that operated during the “human security” is not achievable in the Taylor years was left largely intact after the war foreseeable future, as in the case of Haiti? stopped. Had it remained, its officers would have posed a threat to peace, and to the entire Given the nature of the Liberian conflict, reconstruction and recovery effort. In response recovery leadership charged with security sec- to this threat, the United States initially put tor reform relied more heavily on the human even greater attention and priority into creat- security paradigm than a traditional national ing an effective police force than into building security model to inform the restructuring of Liberia’s army. Both of these efforts, however, the AFL. There was no precedent to emulate, were challenged by the lack of balanced and and scholarship on the topic was too abstract multilateral sources of funding. to be useful on the ground. In many ways this effort was experimental. The primary concern “Operationalize” Human Security was ensuring that the population had “free- “Human security” is an attractive idea that dom from fear” of the military (which had cer- has stood up better in theory than in practice, tainly not been the case during the civil war) and for valid reasons. First, it was born of and that the military was competent, apoliti- academia and institutional headquarters cal, and supportive of the rule of the law. rather than the field. Second, it remains a highly ambiguous and abstract idea. The International recovery leaders worked in part- term comes from a fundamental rethinking of nership with the Liberian government to “security” in the post-Cold War era, as the attain a seemingly simple, yet often elusive nature of warfare evolved from primarily inter- objective: the transforming of a soldier into a state to intrastate. In other words, warfare figure that women and children would run between states was decreasing and replaced toward for protection rather than away from with what one theorist calls “war amongst the in fear. First, the legacy armed forces were people.”7 These wars, such as in the Balkans or fully discharged, given their reputation for Liberia, were often fueled by the failures of past atrocities. All discharged soldiers were development, such as social injustice, dispro- then offered the opportunity to reapply for portionate distribution of wealth, political service in the new AFL, requiring them to exclusion, ubiquitous economic hardship, undergo the same vetting and qualifying tests ethnic tensions, inadequate public security, that all other recruits undergo. This was done and the failure of democracy. to help reestablish the credibility of the mili- tary in the eyes of the population, which did Accordingly, the focus of security in some not fully welcome the rebuilding of the army, quarters shifted from the state to the and also to assure them that the new military individual, encapsulated in the 1994 UN was in fact “new.” Background checks were Development Programme (UNDP) report, an important part of this process. which termed this new paradigm “human security.”8 This idea held that in intrastate Second, the human security imperative “free- conflicts, state security could be achieved dom from fear” largely influenced the force only when individuals are first secure from structure of the re-formed army. The size of “freedom from want” and “freedom from the AFL is now slightly more than 2,000 sol- fear,” which are principally accomplished diers, which can be scaled up if necessary. Clearly it would require more than this num- transcend tribal loyalties in service to the 9 ber to fully secure the borders of Liberia. state. For this classes were taught on Liberian However, in the Liberian context, the pri- history, the constitution, and civics. Literacy mary threat was not a neighboring country’s was included in the curriculum for those blitzkrieg across the border to seize needing it. One of the tragedies of the old Monrovia. While this secondary threat was, Liberia was that not all 14 ethnic tribes had and remains, a genuine concern in Liberia’s equal access to education; consequently, not dangerous geopolitical neighborhood, the everyone was fully literate. However, the greater threat was soldiers staging a coup. reconstruction process sought an ethnically Owing to this, the size of the military was balanced military so that one or two tribes limited according to the government’s ability would not dominate and abuse the military to pay them consistently and on time. for parochial interests.

In deference to these realities, the AFL was Lastly, the courses were designed and deliv- structured in such a way that it now has a ered by Liberians, not foreigners. The only defense-oriented force posture with limited exception was the International Committee force projection capability. This allows the mil- of the Red Cross, which taught classes on the itary to defend Liberia, yet makes it not so laws of war. Sadly, this classroom portion of capable as to provoke its neighbors. For exam- basic training was ultimately dropped due to ple, the AFL has very limited aircraft, tanks, lack of funding, though it remains a valuable artillery, etc. The AFL also has very few special model for what can be done. operations units, militias, and other secret organizations that can easily become the per- Conclusion: Effective Peacebuilding and sonal weapon of corrupt politicians. Previously the Security-Development Nexus there had been a number of special units, such In accordance with a guiding focus on as the Special Secret Service (SSS), which were “human security,” the true mission of the mil- loyal to individuals and not to the state, and itary being created was to further peace by occasionally went rogue. Those structuring the securing space for development, a purpose new armed forces strongly desired to prevent incorporated into the early drafts of the this practice by not introducing the concept of Liberian National Defense Strategy. The prin- special units in the first place. cipal threats to Liberian security were frankly acknowledged as not interstate but intrastate. Third, nontraditional training was incorporat- Since the 1980 coup staged by Sam Doe, ed into basic training. Basic training, or boot armed nonstate actors have waged the majori- camp, is a fairly standard affair, no matter ty of armed conflict. Such groups find it easier what military you hail from. It involves copi- to change governments through violence ous amounts of physical, tactical, and weapons rather than through the legitimate means of training. Our training challenge was not basic democracy, given the political exclusion of rifle marksmanship—many Liberians already many regimes, paltry rule of law, easy access to knew how to shoot a rifle—but rather when to small arms, and expanses of ungoverned terri- shoot it and at whom. Discipline, moral judg- tory in which to find sanctuary. ment, and respect for the laws of war were the true training needs of the basic recruit. However, armed rebel factions face a poten- Accordingly, they spent less time on the firing tially debilitating obstacle: they must rely range and more time in the classroom learning upon the support of local populations to about the civil-military relationship, military hide, survive, and thrive within the borders of professionalism, and the laws of war. a country. To attain this support, they must gain public sympathy by exploiting public Another challenge was the creation of a grievances—real or perceived—that often can strong Liberian national identity that would 10 be attributed to failures of development, such nomic growth, and social recovery, for which as social injustice and economic hardship (i.e. DDR and SSR provide a crucial foundation. roughly the elements that threaten “human To be clear, the AFL’s mission is not, nor security”). Therefore, the best way to prevent should it be, to direct the implementation of conflict is by promoting and protecting forms development projects. Yet, the failures of of development that address core grievances development may shape the AFL’s future mis- and deny nonstate actors a popular support sions. Only by addressing the challenges of base for refuge and resupply. development can security be achieved and maintained: this is the core of the security- Effective peacebuilding thus implies a long- development nexus. term commitment to institution building, eco-

Endnotes 5 See Articles VI, VII, VIII of the Comprehensive 1 US Agency for International Development (USAID), Peace Agreement between The Government of Overview of Activities in Liberia, May 4, 2004, Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/afr/lr.ht and Democracy (LURD) and The Movement for ml, accessed August 26, 2007. Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties, Accra, August 18, 2003.

2 “All war is based on deception.” Sun Tzu, The Art of 6 War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p 66. This view is confirmed in recent academic literature and even in practitioner-focused manuals, which 3 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General: have developed in relative isolation of one another. The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in See for example: UN Integrated DDR Standards Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN Doc. (IDDRS), http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/iddrs S/2004/616 (August 23, 2004). See also David _guide.php; Organization for Economic Co-opera- Tolbert and Andrew Solomon, “United Nations tion and Development—Development Assistance Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law in Post- Committee, The OECD DAC Handbook on SSR: Conflict Societies,” Harvard Human Rights Journal Supporting Security and Justice, www.oecd.org 19, Spring, 2006, www.law.harvard.edu/stud /dac/conflict/if-ssr. ents/orgs/hrj/iss19/tolbert.shtml. 7 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War 4 The concept of “monopoly of force” is derived in the Modern World (New York: Penguin, 2006).

from German sociologist Max Weber’s classic defi- 8 nition of the state as “a human community that UNDP, “New Dimensions of Human Security,” claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physi- Human Development Report, 1994, http://hdr.undp cal force within a given territory.” See: Weber, Max. .org/en/reports/global/hdr1994 (accessed July 20, 2008).

“Politics as a Vocation,” From Max Weber: Essays 9 in Sociology. Hans Heinrich Gerth and C. Wright For more information on “human security,” see S. Mills, editors and translators (New York: Oxford Neil Macfarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Human University Press, 1958), p. 77. Security and the UN: A Critical History (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006). The Stanley Foundation Stanley Foundation reports, publications, 11 The Stanley Foundation is a nonpartisan, pri- programs, multimedia products, and a wealth vate operating foundation that seeks a secure of other information are available on the Web peace with freedom and justice, built on at www.stanleyfoundation.org. world citizenship and effective global gover- nance. It brings fresh voices and original ideas The Stanley Foundation encourages use of to debates on global and regional problems. this report for educational purposes. Any The foundation advocates principled multilat- part of the material may be duplicated with eralism—an approach that emphasizes work- proper acknowledgment. Additional copies ing respectfully across differences to create are available. This report is available at fair, just, and lasting solutions. http://reports.stanleyfoundation.org.

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