Preventing Violent Extremism

House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee Preventing Violent Extremism Sixth Report of Session 2009–10 Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 16 March 2010 HC 65 Published on 30 March 2010 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £25.00 Communities and Local Government Committee The Communities and Local Government Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Communities and Local Government and its associated bodies. Current membership Dr Phyllis Starkey MP (Labour, Milton Keynes South West) (Chair) Sir Paul Beresford MP (Conservative, Mole Valley) Mr Clive Betts MP (Labour, Sheffield Attercliffe) John Cummings MP (Labour, Easington) Andrew George MP (Liberal Democrat, St Ives) Mr Greg Hands MP (Conservative, Hammersmith and Fulham) Anne Main MP (Conservative, St Albans) Dr John Pugh MP (Liberal Democrat, Southport) Alison Seabeck MP (Labour, Plymouth Davenport) Andy Slaughter MP (Labour, Islington South and Finsbury) Mr Neil Turner MP (Labour, Wigan) Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk. Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at www.parliament.uk/clgcom. Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Huw Yardley (Clerk of the Committee), Sarah Ioannou (Second Clerk), Josephine Willows (Inquiry Manager), Emma Gordon (Committee Specialist), Lorna Horton (Senior Committee Assistant), Nicola McCoy (Committee Assistant), Stewart McIlvenna (Committee Support Assistant), and Hannah Pearce (Select Committee Media Officer). Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Communities and Local Government Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 1353; the Committee’s email address is [email protected] Preventing Violent Extremism 1 Contents Report Page Summary 3 1 Introduction 5 2 Prevent and CONTEST 8 Focus on Muslims 9 Allegations of spying and surveillance 11 The Channel Project 14 The unintended consequences of Prevent 18 Other forms of extremism and Prevent 20 What it is to be ‘Muslim’ 21 The way forward 22 3 Risk factors for radicalisation 24 Identity 25 Foreign policy 28 Socio-economic factors 30 Religion and radicalisation 31 Theological matters: who should be engaged; who should advise; who should intervene? 34 4 Central and local control of Prevent 44 The role of CLG 44 Local authorities’ capacity to deliver 44 Lack of risk-based assessment 47 The Prevent funding formula 50 Monitoring and evaluation 51 The overlap between Prevent and Pursue 52 5 Prevent and Cohesion 56 Conclusions on Prevent and cohesion 61 Conclusions and recommendations 63 Annex 69 Visit to Birmingham, Amana Centre, 11 January 2010 69 Formal Minutes 71 Witnesses 72 List of written evidence 74 List of unprinted evidence 75 2 Communities and Local Government Committee List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 76 Preventing Violent Extremism 3 Summary The Government’s Preventing Violent Extremism programme is a complex and sensitive agenda which has met with widely varying perceptions as to what the programme stands for and what it aims to deliver on the ground. Our inquiry has shown that the current overall approach to Prevent is contentious and unlikely ever to be fully accepted in its existing form by those it is most important to engage. The current breadth of focus of Prevent—from community work to crime prevention—sits uncomfortably within a counter-terrorism strategy. We support the logic behind the ‘Four P’s’ of the CONTEST strategy—Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare—and we do not wish to see this approach deconstructed. We also strongly support the need for a clear national strategy which deals with the specific threat from al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism. However, we question the appropriateness of the Department of Communities and Local Government—a Government department which has responsibility for promoting cohesive communities—taking a leading role in counter-terrorism initiatives. We agree with the majority of our witnesses that Prevent risks undermining positive cross-cultural work on cohesion and capacity building to combat exclusion and alienation in many communities. We see a very important role for CLG in continuing such work and acknowledge its contribution to the aims of Prevent. However, we believe that this work can be successful only if untainted by the negative association with a counter-terrorism agenda. The single focus on Muslims in Prevent has been unhelpful. We conclude that any programme which focuses solely on one section of a community is stigmatising, potentially alienating, and fails to address the fact that that no section of a population exists in isolation from others. The need to address extremism of all kinds on a cross-community basis, dependent on assessed local risk, is paramount. We remain concerned by the number of our witnesses who felt that Prevent had been used to ‘spy’ on Muslim communities. Our evidence suggests that differing interpretations of terminology relating to concepts such as ‘intelligence gathering’, ‘spying’ and ‘surveillance’ are posing major challenges to the Prevent agenda. Information collected for the purposes of project monitoring and community mapping—both of which are to be encouraged—are sometimes being confused with the kind of intelligence gathering and surveillance undertaken by the police and security services to combat crime and actively pursue suspects. However, despite rebuttals, the allegations of spying retain widespread credibility within certain sections of the Muslim community. If the Government wants to improve confidence in the Prevent programme, it should commission an independent investigation into the allegations made. Regarding the Government’s analysis of the factors which lead people to become involved in violent extremism, we conclude that there has been a pre-occupation with the theological basis of radicalisation, when the evidence seems to indicate that politics, policy and socio-economics may be more important factors in the process. Consequently, we suggest that attempts to find solutions and engagement with preventative work should primarily address the political challenges. We therefore recommend that opportunities be provided for greater empowerment and civic engagement with democratic institutions, to 4 Communities and Local Government Committee strengthen the interaction and engagement with society not only of Muslims, but of other excluded groups. Our witnesses demonstrated widely ranging views as to how Government and local authorities should fund, seek advice from, and engage with organisations in the development and execution of the Prevent programme. There is a sense that Government has sought to engineer a ‘moderate’ form of Islam, promoting and funding only those groups which conform to this model. We do not think it is the job of Government to intervene in theological matters, but we are also concerned that local authorities have been left with too much responsibility for deciding how engagement and project funding should be managed. We make a range of recommendations on this topic and conclude that this is an area requiring immediate attention by Government. Preventing Violent Extremism 5 1 Introduction 1. Prevent is a cross-cutting policy led across Government by the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office and delivered by a number of departments and agencies which all have specific policy interests in the Prevent strategy. Its aim is to stop radicalisation, reduce support for terrorism and violent extremism and discourage people from becoming terrorists.1 CLG contributes to the delivery of all elements of the strategy and leads the community-based response to violent extremism.2 2. Since 2000, the UK has enacted five main pieces of legislation to deal with terrorism.3 However, the Government also recognised that in the years following the events of 11 September 2001, legislation and security measures were not sufficient to deal with all of the consequential issues raised by terrorism. These issues included: x Finding practical ways to foil an attack rather than securing a conviction after the event when fatalities have occurred4 x Understanding why people become involved in terrorism5 x Working out how the UK can best protect its infrastructure6 x Understanding how the Government can assist the general public and the business community in being more resilient to the threat of terrorism7. 3. Prevent is aimed at the group of people who are vulnerable to persuasion to provide tacit or silent support to terrorists in certain circumstances and possibly “reject and undermine our shared values and jeopardise community cohesion”.8 However, they are not necessarily breaking the law and to this extent, legislation can be ineffective. 4. In 2003, the government launched CONTEST as its new multidimensional counter- terrorism strategy. It contained four priorities: Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. In March 2009 the Government launched a revised strategy, popularly known

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