Deontology and Epistemic Justification: Ethics and Epistemology

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Marta Reolon V* Research article Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil Volume 4 Issue 2 Received Date: May 12, 2021 *Corresponding author: Vera Marta Reolon, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Carlos Published Date: June 23, 2021 Bianchini, 1149/04, Caxias do Sul, RS, Brazil, Tel: 555435384041; Email: verareolon@terra. DOI: 10.23880/phij-16000185 com.br

Abstract

the use of a deontological vocabulary for the assessment of an epistemic status of our beliefs. John Locke emerges as one The deontological notion of epistemic justification arises from a parallel drawn between ethics and epistemology through

of his most illustrious representatives. Relationship between justification and normativity. ‘Epistemic duties’ to explain the concept of ‘epistemic justification’. Epistemic concepts are not reducible to ethical concepts. After this debate, the connection established between Ethics and Epistemology has been merely analog. Keywords: Epistemology; Deontological; Ethics

Epistemic Normativity

throughThe deontologicalthe use of notiona deontological of epistemic vocabulary justification for arises the assessmentfrom a parallel of an drawnepistemic between status ethicsof our beliefs. and epistemology John Locke emerges as one of his most illustrious representatives. Having knowledge is a matter of whether the world cooperates to the point of giving back justified belief with truth. If Smith can be justified in believing a false preposition, RelationshipDeontology between comes justification from deontos and = normativity.duty, logos = treated, and there was nothing wrong with the way Smith acquired his belief Ψ, it seems plausible to assume that the sense of epistemic justification that Gettier was thinking of hence deontology would be treated from duty. Study of the when presenting his counterexamples was that of to be ethics that guides each profession. In epistemology, two epistemically irreproachable when believing. theories of justification: deontological and non-deontological. deontological component. The usual explanation of the Epistemic justification Epistemic justification has an indispensable deontological element. concept of epistemic justification is associated with some Theories of justification, two groups: deontological, which use deontic terms, similar to those used in ethics, to show the normative character of epistemic concepts; and prepositionAlvin Goldman p consists stated of being that: “[d](intellectually) epistemic ethologistsbound or Epistemicnon-deontological concepts ones. are not In areducible line of to thought, ethical ‘epistemicconcepts. commonly maintain that to be justified in believing a duties’ to explain the concept of ‘epistemic justification’. and Epistemology has been merely analog. authorized to believe that p; and to be unjustified in believing After this debate, the connection established between Ethics that p consists in not being allowed, or being prohibited, in believing that p ”(2001, p.116) [1].

Deontology and Epistemic Justification: Ethics and Epistemology Philos Int J 2 Philosophy International Journal

The notion of epistemic justification invoked by Gettier hebelieve has good what reason. is epistemically probable in relation to his total is in Theline with Origin the deontological of Duty-Based notion. Epistemic evidence. One should only believe in prepositions for which Justification lightLocke’s and misuse objective those duty faculties would that be have to regulate been given his you”.beliefs. Someone who does not do so, he says: “go against your own Chisholm and Ayer use normative terms imported from Ethics to explain the concept of epistemic justification. John epistemic end, the truth. The pursuit of this end imposes Yolton comments that “distinguishing good from bad bases certainAs intellectualduties on beings,us: objective we have, and what subjective we might epistemic call, an for belief constitutes what was called Locke’s ‘ethics of belief’” duties. (1996, p.67) [2]. This view uses the notion of epistemic Deontology.duties to explain For theLocke, concept the notion of “epistemic of duty justification”. plays a central The The use of Normative Terms rolelabel in given, the veryepistemic recently, enterprise. to this viewHe is is guaranteeing that of Epistemic the normativity of his speech on the basis of belief. In Epistemology, people make comparable judgments

Violating a duty means neglecting an important using the same normative language. Roderick Firth and Roderickbetween opinionsChisholm andclaimed other that cognitive there are acts, deontological sometimes being subject to epistemic guilt or disapproval. components at the base of epistemological concepts. epistemic quality. Not violating an epistemic duty means not of as the basic deontological terms, obligation and duty as epistemically culpable. Requirement, prohibition and permission can be thought Believing that p, when p does not seem likely => similar terms as derivatives. Epistemic concepts are not reducibletypes of requirement,to ethical concepts. and responsibility, The use of the guilt deontological and other vocabulary, to make epistemic judgments, is only analogous. Alvin Plantinga argues in the following terms: isTo notact subject in accordance to any guilt with or these disapproval; duties or it obligations is not to have is to neglectedbe within anywhat duty; is right; it is itto is be to deontologicallydo only what is approvable; allowed; it The connection between epistemic justification and ethical justification is also analogous. it is, in a word, to be justified. [...] epistemic justification is The concept of ‘justification’ can be analyzed using deontological justification; deontological justification with deontological terms in a sense specifically relevant to the respect to the norm of belief (1993a, p.13-14) [3]. pursuit of knowledge. true belief is not enough to make someone epistemically a normative character. To have a duty is to be subject to a It is not enough to accidentally reach the truth. Acquiring If justification is due to fulfilling duties, then it has his beliefs are false. for the action. Similarly, having an epistemic duty means blameless. One may be justified in believing, even if most of normative requirement. Duties provide some justified reason depend on any external factor or doxastic agent. Everything being subject to a normative requirement. If S is able to Epistemic justification, in this perspective, does not haveexplain a formal why he epistemic took A, claiming duty as it intellectual was his duty, beings then heto offerstry to doa justification our best to for achieve his doxastic the epistemic action. Chisholm end of believing states that truths we the subjectWhat achieves needs to merit be justified to the doxastic belongs agent to his and, mental therefore, life. and not believing falsehoods, in order to believe propositions makes it irreproachable is not to truly believe, but to believe if and only if they are true. or to stop believing according to the command of his reason. Teleological normativity

A subject’s epistemic destiny should always be in his hands. It would be within the power of the subject to always do his discourse in relation to the evaluative character of the bestLocke and be is away clearly from thinking censorship. of subjective duty or obligation, Parallels between ethical discourse and epistemological since he is thinking of innocence and guilt, responsibility normativeconcepts ofconcept. justification, The concern rationality is to anddescribe guarantee. rules that The accessible to the agent. But in addition to the subjective, he concept of epistemic justification is, in some sense, a isand also blamelessness. talking about an Being objective justified duty. depends For Locke, on one what must is cannot be violated by an agent. There are two points of view regarding the normativity of moral judgments: the

Marta Reolon V. Deontology and Epistemic Justification: Ethics and Epistemology. Philos Int J 2021, Copyright© Marta Reolon V. 4(2): 000185. 3 Philosophy International Journal teleological and the deontological. Epistemic judgments are perform an action. more naturally understood in teleological lines.

For a teleologist, the epistemic value of doxastic attitudes depends on a non-epistemic value that gives rise or seeks to by meansEpistemic of doxastic Deontologism epistemic deals duties. properly Therefore, with epistemicduties do give rise. Teleological theories place the obligatory and the duties in relation to beliefs. He explains epistemic justification epistemically good in dependence on the non-epistemically only to take doxastic attitudes according to some epistemic rule.not require the subject to seek or consider more evidence, good. To find out what is the right doxastic attitude, one must The result of the phenomenology of belief has cast doubt on orfirst is findintended out what to promote is good, the in good the non-epistemic in that sense. sense, and then ask whether the doxastic attitude in question promotes havewhether voluntary people control have theover ability their beliefs. to control their beliefs as they have the ability to control their actions. People rarely According to Richard Feldman, it seems reasonable to interpret the term “law” not as “duty”, but as “objective” or “end”, since it only tells us what we should obtain, but not the There is dissimilarity with Ethics. There is a distinction means and the ways in which obtain such ends or objectives. between objective and subjective justification. Having in order to believe in many or all truths; and to believe in subjective epistemic justification does not seem to be Faced with two extreme positions, believe in everything, sufficient to achieve the desired epistemic excellence. Some fundamentaltry to identify characteristic the deontological of this notion notion, with namely, objective the excellence.little, in order to believe in as few falsehoods as possible, it is epistemic justification, but this seems to put aside the necessary to find a suitable mix in order to achieve epistemic Epistemic ethics epistemicReferences irreprehensible [4-9]. Richard Feldman argued that prudential, moral and 1. Steup M (Ed.). pp: 115-133. Goldman A (2001) Internalism Exposed. Reprinted. In: epistemic merit does not always coincide. On the other hand, 2. Yolton JW (1996) Dicionário Locke. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar. it is possible to imagine a situation in which someone, when doing x, at the same time fulfills his prudential, epistemic and 3. moral duty or obligation. If fulfilling your epistemic duty is, at Plantinga A (1993a) Warrant: The Current Debate. a given moment, incompatible with fulfilling your moral duty 4. Oxford: Oxford University Press. at that moment, then which one should be fulfilled? Do moral nd (Edn.). duties always outweigh epistemic duties? For Feldman, there Chisholm R (1966) Theory of Knowledge. Englewood is no problem with the idea that duties of the same type can 5. Cliffs: Prestice-Hall. 2 have equal importance. The relevant point is that there may 2. pp: 235-256. value.be some The scale problem, of values. according Fulfilling to Feldman, a duty contributesis that there moreis no Feldman R (1988) Epistemic Obligation. Philosophical than fulfilling the other to achieve that which has intrinsic 6. PerspectivesFeldman R (1998) Epistemology and Ethics. In: Craig E. of various types of duties. clarity on how to conduct an assessment with a rating scale 7. 3. pp: 667-695. Epistemic factors can lead in some cases to results Feldman R (2000) The Ethics of Belief. Philosophy and different from those achieved by moral or prudential duties. 8. Phenomenological Research of epistemic doxastic duties is called epistemic deontology. Goldman A (1986) Epistemology and Cognition. The view that the concept of justification is defined in terms 9. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. must believe, disbelieve, or suspend judgment in the face The difference between epistemic and moral duty is that one Locke J (1959) An Essay concerning Human Understanding. New York: DOVER. of a proposition, in which one can lawfully perform or not