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Religion and Ethics Theme 1: Ethical Thought

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Delivering the Specification Component 3: Religion and Ethics Theme 1: Ethical Thought The first section of Theme 1: 1A, Divine Command Theory, is designed to introduce candidates to the link between religion and ethics. The second section of this theme, 1B Virtue Theory is intended to illustrate to candidates that ethical theories can have both a philosophical and religious foundation. The third section of this theme, 1C Ethical Egoism, is to introduce candidates to the idea that not all ethical theories have a religious foundation. 1A. Divine Command Theory Candidates should be able to: explain with clarity what the Divine Command Theory is (see The Elements of Moral Philosophy, Chapter 4 by James Rachels (McGraw-Hill)); have a good understanding of Adams’ version of the theory; appreciate the differences between Adams’ version of the theory and a more traditional version of the theory; have a clear knowledge of each of the three criticisms given and why each is specifically damaging to the Divine Command Theory. All of the criticisms should be exemplified to aid candidate understanding. 1B. Virtue Theory Candidates should be able to: explain with clarity, what Virtue Theory is, with reference to the teachings of Aristotle and Jesus; particularly Aristotle’s understanding of moral virtues; use examples of Aristotle’s moral virtues and his guide to following the moral virtues by considering their excess, deficiency and mean; Jesus’ promotion of virtues in the Beatitudes. Candidates should be able to give examples of the virtues Jesus encouraged and their eschatological importance. Some useful information can be found in The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, Chapter 5 by Joseph J. Kotova (Georgetown University Press). Candidates should have a clear knowledge and understanding of each of the criticisms listed and why each is specifically damaging to Virtue Theory. All of the criticisms should be exemplified to aid candidate understanding. 1C. Ethical Egoism Candidates should be able to explain with clarity what Ethical Egoism is (see Ethical Studies 2nd edition, Chapter 14 by Robert Bowie (Nelson Thornes)); they must have a good understanding of Stirner’s understanding of Ethical Egoism, with particular emphasis on his assertion that self-interest in the root cause of all human actions, egoism is not fundamentally associated with material gain and that egoism is not anti-social (Union of Egoists). Candidates should have a clear knowledge and understanding of each of the criticisms listed and why each is specifically damaging to Ethical Egoism. All of the criticisms should be exemplified, in order to demonstrate understanding. Candidates should also carefully consider the issues for analysis and evaluation that arise out of the AO1 content, including those listed in the specification. Sections D, E and F in Theme 1 are all meta-ethical approaches (Naturalism, Intuitionism and Emotivism – some useful information can be found in Ethical Studies 2nd edition, Chapters 6 & 7 by Robert Bowie (Nelson Thornes)). They are designed to introduce candidates to the wider debate in ethics of what meaning do ethical terms actually have. The approach taken for these three sections is chronological so that the candidate can study the development of the debate. 142 1D. Meta-ethical approaches: Naturalism Candidates should be able to explain with clarity what Naturalism is (some useful information can be found in Ethical Studies 2nd edition, Chapter 6 by Robert Bowie (Nelson Thornes)); they must have a good understanding of Bradley’s view on Naturalism and understand the challenges to meta-ethical theory of Naturalism. Candidates need to study the listed criticisms of Naturalism and have a clear knowledge and understanding of each criticism and why it is specifically damaging to the meta-ethical theory of Naturalism. All of the criticisms should be exemplified, in order to demonstrate understanding. 1B. Meta-ethical approaches: Intuitionism Candidates should be able to explain with clarity what Intuitionism is (see Moral Philosophy: A Guide to Ethical Theory by G., Hayward, J. and Cardinal, D. (Hodder Murray)); they must have a good understanding of Pritchard’s view on Intuitionism. Candidates need to study the listed criticisms of Intuitionism and have a clear knowledge of each criticism and why it is specifically damaging to the meta-ethical theory of Naturalism. All of the criticisms should be exemplified, in order to demonstrate understanding. 1F. Meta-ethical approaches – Emotivism Candidates should be able to confidently explain with clarity what Emotivism is (see Moral Philosophy: A Guide to Ethical Theory by G., Hayward, J. and Cardinal, D. (Hodder Murray)); they must have a good understanding of Ayer's view of Emotivism. Candidates need to study the criticisms listed of Emotivism and have a clear knowledge of each criticism and why it is specifically damaging to the meta-ethical theory of Emotivism. Candidates should also carefully consider the issues for analysis and evaluation that arise out of the AO1 content, including those listed in the specification. Theme 2: Deontological Ethics The first two sections of this theme (2A and 2B) are designed to introduce candidates to the deontological normative ethic of Natural Law by St Thomas Aquinas (some useful information can be found in The Puzzle of Ethics, Chapter 4 by Peter Vardy and Paul Grosch (HarperCollins). The third section (2C) expects candidates to apply the knowledge and understanding they have gained in 2A and 2B to the issues listed. 2A. St Thomas Aquinas’ Natural Law: laws and precepts as the basis of morality Candidates should be able to explain Aquinas’ four levels of law, understand each level of law and also how they relate to each other. An appreciation is needed of the idea that Natural Law is derived from rational thought which was given to humans by God; based on a belief in a divine creator; rational thought should lead moral agents to the view that the highest good is the rational understanding of God's final purpose. Candidates should understand that Natural Law is an absolutist theory, but that it has both deontological (a duty to obey the fixed rules on good and bad actions that are derived from the precepts) and teleological aspects (aiming for the goal of eternal life in heaven with God). Candidates should understand how the five primary precepts derive from rational thought and are based on the premise (key precept) of 'doing good and avoiding evil'. Candidates need to be able to illustrate how the secondary precepts are derived from the primary precepts and the importance of keeping to the precepts to establish a right relationship with God. 143 2B. Aquinas’ Natural Law: the role of virtues and goods in supporting moral behaviour Candidates should be able to explain how the development of virtues helps humans to be more God- like; the three revealed virtues (with reference to scripture) and the four cardinal virtues (with reference to Aristotle). Candidates should be able to explain how Aquinas differentiated between types of acts: (internal/external) as well as types of goods (real and apparent). 2C. Aquinas’ Natural Law: application of the theory Candidates then need to apply the knowledge and understanding of the theory they have gained in 2A and 2B to the issues of abortion and voluntary euthanasia. A detailed overview of how the various aspects of Aquinas’ Natural Law (precepts, virtues, acts and goods) apply to these two ethical issues is required. Candidates should focus on the application of the theory to the issues and not on a broad and detailed description of the ethical issues themselves. Candidates should also carefully consider the issues for analysis and evaluation that arise out of the AO1 content, including those listed in the specification. Sections 2D and 2E of Theme 2 are designed to illustrate the development of Natural Law. 2D considers John Finnis’ development of Natural Law and 2E considers Bernard Hoose’s Proportionalist development of Natural Law. Section 2F expects candidates to apply the knowledge and understanding they have gained in 2E and 2F to the issues listed. 2D. John Finnis’ development of Natural Law: Candidates should be able to explain all seven of Finnis’ basic human goods; the distinction between theoretical and practical reason; the nine requirements of practical reason; what Finnis meant by the ‘common good’ and finally Finnis’ concession that there is a need for authority. 2E. Bernard Hoose's Proportionalism Candidates should be able to explain how Hoose’s Proportionalism developed Natural Law (some useful information can be found in The Puzzle of Ethics, Chapter 4 by Peter Vardy and Paul Grosch (HarperCollins) proportionalism as a hybrid deontological / teleological ethic based on the maxim ‘it is never right to go against a principle (deontological) unless there is a proportionate reason which would justify it (teleological); how Hoose’s differentiated between an evil moral act and a pre- moral/ontic evil act; a right act and a good act. Finally, candidates should understand that proportionality, according to Hoose, should be based on agape (altruistic love). 2F. Finnis’ Natural Law and Hoose’s Proportionalism: application of the theory Candidates need to apply the theory they have learnt in sections 2D and 2E to both ethical issues of immigration and capital punishment. A detailed overview of how the various aspects of Finnis’ Natural Law (with reference to the appropriate elements of the seven basic human goods, the nine requirements of practical reason and the common good) and Hoose’s Proportionalism (only breaking a principle if there is a proportionate reason and based on agape love) apply to these two ethical issues is needed. Candidates should focus on the application of the theory to the issues and not on a broad and detailed description of the ethical issues themselves. Candidates should also carefully consider the issues for analysis and evaluation that arise out of the AO1 content, including those listed in the specification.
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