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Safety Evaluation Report for the American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio

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Safety Evaluation Report for the American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio NUREG-1851 Safety Evaluation Report for the American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio Docket No. 70-7004 USEC Inc. Manuscript Completed: September 2006 Date Published: September 2006 Prepared by: Division of Fuel Cycle Safety & Safeguards Office of Nuclear Material Safety & Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 This page intentionally left blank ABSTRACT The report documents the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff review and safety and safeguards evaluation of USEC Inc.’s (USEC’s) application for a license to construct a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility and possess and use special nuclear material (SNM), source material, and byproduct material. USEC proposes that the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility be located on the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) reservation in Piketon, Ohio. The facility will possess natural, depleted, and enriched uranium, and will be authorized to enrich uranium up to a maximum of 10 weight percent uranium-235. The objective of this review is to evaluate the facility’s potential adverse impacts on worker and public health and safety, under both normal operating and accident conditions. The review also considers physical protection of SNM and classified matter, material control and accounting of SNM, and the management organization, administrative programs, and financial qualifications provided to ensure safe design and operation of the facility. NRC staff concludes, in this safety evaluation report, that the applicant’s descriptions, specifications, and analyses provide an adequate basis for safety and safeguards of facility operations and that operation of the facility does not pose an undue risk to worker and public health and safety. Potential environmental impacts associated with the proposed facility and its reasonable alternatives are addressed in a separate document, Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio, NUREG-1834, which was made available to the public in April 2006. iii This page intentionally left blank iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ............................................................... iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................v LIST OF FIGURES......................................................... xv LIST OF TABLES......................................................... xvi EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................... xvii LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ...................................xxiii 1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION .............................................. 1-1 1.1 FACILITY AND PROCESS DESCRIPTION ..................... 1-1 1.1.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS.......................... 1-1 1.1.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ..... 1-1 1.1.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS .......................... 1-1 1.1.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS ................................. 1-3 1.2 INSTITUTIONAL INFORMATION............................. 1-4 1.2.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS.......................... 1-4 1.2.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ..... 1-4 1.2.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS .......................... 1-4 1.2.3.1 Corporate Identity ................................ 1-4 1.2.3.2 Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence (FOCI) ........ 1-5 1.2.3.3 Financial Qualifications ........................... 1-6 1.2.3.4 Type, Quantity, and Form of Licensed Material ........ 1-10 1.2.3.5 Authorized Uses................................ 1-11 1.2.3.6 Special Exemptions or Special Authorizations......... 1-11 1.2.3.7 Security of Classified Matter....................... 1-14 1.2.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS ............................... 1-16 1.3 SITE DESCRIPTION..................................... 1-18 1.3.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS......................... 1-18 v 1.3.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA .... 1-18 1.3.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS ......................... 1-18 1.3.3.1 Site Geography ................................ 1-18 1.3.3.2 Demographics ................................. 1-19 1.3.3.3 Meteorology................................... 1-21 1.3.3.4 Hydrology..................................... 1-24 1.3.3.5 Geology...................................... 1-25 1.3.4 Evaluation Findings .................................... 1-35 1.4 REFERENCES ......................................... 1-35 2.0 ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION .................................. 2-1 2.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS............................ 2-1 2.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA....... 2-1 2.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS............................ 2-1 2.3.1 Organization ........................................... 2-2 2.3.2 Organizational Responsibilities and Qualifications .............. 2-2 2.3.3 Management Control .................................... 2-8 2.3.4 Pre-operational Testing and Initial Start-Up .................. 2-10 2.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS ................................. 2-11 2.5 REFERENCES ......................................... 2-11 3.0 INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS (ISA) AND ISA SUMMARY................................................. 3-1 3.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS............................ 3-1 3.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA....... 3-3 3.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS........................... 3-3 3.3.1 Safety Program and ISA Commitments ...................... 3-5 3.3.1.1 Process Safety Information ........................ 3-5 3.3.1.2 ISA Commitments ............................... 3-6 3.3.1.3 Management Measures ........................... 3-7 3.3.1.4 Safety Program and ISA Commitments Conclusion ...... 3-8 3.3.2 ISA Methodology ....................................... 3-8 vi 3.3.2.1 Hazard Identification and Evaluation ................ 3-13 3.3.2.2 Definition of Receptors for Consequence Evaluations . 3-17 3.3.2.3 Likelihood Evaluation Method ..................... 3-18 3.3.2.4 Chemical Consequences ......................... 3-19 3.3.2.5 Radiological Consequences ....................... 3-21 3.3.2.6 Environmental Consequences ..................... 3-21 3.3.2.7 ISA Methodology Conclusion ...................... 3-21 3.3.3 Compliance with the BDC and Defense-In-Depth Requirements . 3-21 3.3.3.1 BDC......................................... 3-22 3.3.3.2 Defense-In-Depth............................... 3-23 3.3.3.3 Conclusion for BDC and Defense-in-Depth ........... 3-23 3.4 EVALUATION .......................................... 3-24 3.5 REFERENCES ......................................... 3-24 4.0 RADIATION PROTECTION.............................................. 4-1 4.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS............................ 4-1 4.1.1 RP Program Implementation............................... 4-1 4.1.2 As Low As is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Program ......... 4-1 4.1.3 Organization and Personnel Qualifications .................... 4-1 4.1.4 Written Procedures ...................................... 4-1 4.1.5 Training............................................... 4-1 4.1.6 Ventilation and Respiratory Protection Programs ............... 4-1 4.1.7 Radiation Survey and Monitoring Programs ................... 4-2 4.1.8 Additional Program Requirements .......................... 4-2 4.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA....... 4-2 4.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS............................ 4-2 4.3.1 RP Program Implementation............................... 4-3 4.3.2 ALARA Program........................................ 4-3 4.3.3 Organization and Personnel Qualifications .................... 4-5 4.3.4 Written Procedures ...................................... 4-6 vii 4.3.5 Training............................................... 4-6 4.3.6 Ventilation and Respiratory Protection Programs ............... 4-7 4.3.7 Radiation Survey and Monitoring Programs .................. 4-10 4.3.8 Additional Program Requirements ......................... 4-14 4.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS ................................. 4-16 4.5 REFERENCES ......................................... 4-16 5.0 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY ........................................ 5-1 5.1 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS............................ 5-1 5.2 REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA....... 5-1 5.3 STAFF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS............................ 5-2 5.3.1 Management of the NCS Program .......................... 5-2 5.3.1.1 Program Elements............................... 5-2 5.3.1.2 Program Objectives.............................. 5-3 5.3.2 Organization and Administration ............................ 5-3 5.3.2.1 NCS Responsibilities ............................. 5-3 5.3.2.2 NCS Staff Qualifications .......................... 5-3 5.3.3 Management Measures .................................. 5-4 5.3.3.1 Procedure Requirements .......................... 5-4 5.3.3.2 Posting and Labeling Requirements ................. 5-4 5.3.3.3 Change Control ................................. 5-5 5.3.3.4 Operation Surveillance and Assessment .............. 5-6 5.3.4 Methodologies and Technical Practices ...................... 5-7 5.3.4.1 Adherence to ANSI/ANS Standards .................. 5-7 5.3.4.2 Process Evaluation and Approval ................... 5-7 5.3.4.3 Design Philosophy and Review .................... 5-11 5.3.4.4 Criticality Accident Alarm System Coverage .......... 5-12 5.3.4.5 Technical Practices ............................. 5-14 5.3.5 Use of National Consensus (ANSI/ANS-8 Series) Standards ..... 5-24 5.3.6 CAAS Exemption ...................................... 5-27 5.3.7 Criticality Code Validation Report and Margin
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