Alcock and Harris. Foreign Diplomacy in Author(s): John McMaster Reviewed work(s): Source: Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 22, No. 3/4 (1967), pp. 305-367 Published by: Sophia University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2383072 . Accessed: 07/10/2012 12:01

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http://www.jstor.org Alcock and Harris FOREIGN DIPLOMACY IN BAKUMATSU JAPAN

by JOHN MCMASTER

T W ENTY-ONE timesthe guns shattered the noonday quiet of Bay. As they roared, thered-ball flag ofJapan was hoisted to join what Japanese called the flowery flag of theAmericans. It wasJuly 29th, the year was i858and the warship was acknowl- edgingthat a commercialtreatyhadjust been signed on board. The roar, the smoke and the shudderthroughout the wooden ship was appropriate. The proximatecause of the treaty hadbeen cannon. Although theJapanese then had no ship to match the "Powhattan," the solitaryvessel was notas importantas thenews she had brought from Shanghai. Other foreignvessels were on theway to Japan, not alone but in fleets.A Britishsquadron was to be followedby a French,both fresh from forcing treaties upon China. A Russianfleet was expectedsoon. There had beenlittle discussion. The Americanenvoy, ,had said simply that to refuseto a singleforeigner what it wouldshortly have to giveup to mightyfleets would disgrace the Tokugawa bakufu, the military government ofJapan,in theeyes of its own people. Better to makethe best of the situation. The Japa- nesehad done so butit cannot have been a happygroup of bakufu officials who went ashore thatafternoon. Bycontrast the American must have been jubilant. The manwho had left New York an alcoholicfailure in I849 hadnow achieved a finediplomatic success for his country as well as hisown personal redemption. Duringten years of exile Harris had roamed the Pacific and Indian oceans possibly even as a remittanceman paid by his family to stay away. 1 That was over now. He hadachieved an honourableplace in thehistories. Moreover no manhad more reason to dislikeJapan thanHarris. The needlessprivations forced upon him by thebakufu at Shimodaand all theweary months of negotiation should have disgusted him with Japan and everything Japanese."The mendacityof these men passes all belief," runs a typicalentry in his Your- nal,". . . I amreally ill, yet I amforced day after day to listen to uselessdebates on points

MTHE AUTHOR is gratefulto the staffsof the courtesyand assistance.The Dutch translations Anderson Room of the UniversityLibrary, would have been impossiblewithout the patient Cambridge,the Special CollectionsDepartment helpof Miss H. Walburghschmidt. at the , the Public 1 Hyman Kublin, "A Salute to Townsend RecordOffice, the Ministeredes AffairesE1tran- Harris",7apan 6arterly, v, No. 3,July-September geres and the AlgemeenRijksarchief for their I958, pp. 2-5. 306 MonumentaNi.pponica, xm, 3-4 thathave been exhausted and are only varied by some new phase of falsehood."2 In spite ofit all he was enthusiasticabout "his belovedJapan and expatiatesupon her beauties withall theardour of an elderlylover contemplating the charms of a youthfulfiancee."3 "Evenmore eulogistic than the Dutch", wrote another foreigner who knew him at the time.4 Whatthis meant in practice was thatHarris would give the Japanese the benefit of the doubtin any matter arising between them and foreign nations. Unlike some later foreign- erswho also loved Japan, he hadno intentionof remaining there. An interest in helping to put histreaty into force was enough to hold him for a fewmonths but he was a tempo- rarydiplomat come to do a particularjob. Thatjob was done. A sincereChristian, Harris hoped to bringJapan into the comity of nations under more reputableconditions than India or China.This was nowpossible as histreaty provided fora verygradual opening of relations with the West. It was as muchas he coulddo. To put possibilityinto practice was beyondthe power of Townsend Harris or anyother American. Wanderingsthat had touched Calcutta, Penang, Singapore, Hong Kong and Shanghai had taughtHarris that British merchants formed the majority of the foreigners in Asia anddid the bulk of its foreign trade. As soonas Japan was opened to trade,Britain would inevitablybecome the chief arbiter of its foreignrelations. Harris's importance would end withthe arrival of the first British representative. It hadto be so.Even before the outbreak of its civil war in the spring of i86o the United Stateshad littleinterest in thecommercial prospects of Japan and an almostcomplete indifferenceto the welfare of Harris.5 Its tradewas smalland its desire to back up a diplo- matwith warships even smaller. In contrastto Palmerston'ssupport of tenuous claims to Britishcitizenship with a navalbombardment, American policy reckoned that its citizenswho dared foreign adventures in hopesof profit should face the penalties when thosehopes went sour. Although the bakufu feared colonization, most Western nations had as littleinterest in Japan as theAmericans. NapoleonII hadinstructed his diplomats to cooperatewith Britain precisely because Frenchinterest in the area was so small.The Emperorhoped that British good will earned inChina andJapan might be usefulin somearea of genuine French interest.6 Russian con- cernwas confinedto buyingprovisions for her Siberian colonies and thewarm-water anchorageat Nagasakifor her fleet in winter.She would nibble tentatively at islandsto thenorth and west but seems to have had little interest in thethree most populatedJapa- neseislands. Aside from the hope that the old relations of the East-India Company would

2 Townsend Harris, Complete7ournal, New ElginsMission to Chinaand 7apan,2 vols., New York,I930, p. 327. York,i86o, p. 345. 3 E. B. Fonblanque,Ni.ppon and Pe-chi-li,Lon- 5 Kublin,pp. 3, 7. don,I862, p. Io5. 6 AlexanderMichie, The Englishmanin China, 4 LaurenceOliphant, Narrative of theEarl of 2 vols.,London, I900,i, io6. MCMASTER. "... ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 307 givethem a specialbusiness advantage in Japan,the was almostentirely involvedin Indonesia.Of all theWestern powers only Britain combined a sufficientin- terestin theJapan trade with the power to enforce it. As longestresident diplomat, Harris would have the honoraryposition of doyen. Whenthe diplomatic corps as a groupdealt with the bakufu, he would be itsspokesman. It was a ceremonialhonour. In practicethe arrival of a Britishrepresentative would rel- egateHarris to beingmerely the minister of a second-ratepower. Personality or persua- sionmight help him to influence events but the major decisions must lie with the British ambassador.Pending his arrival,Harris had littleto do but caretakingchores. These hadtheir importance. During the next eleven months the bakufu would decide howbest to deal with the unwanted foreign trade. Much that it didin thisinterim period woulddetermine the later history ofJapan. As Donker Curtius stayed on at in his traditionalposition as Netherlandsbusiness agent, Harris was theonly knowledgeable foreignerdealing directly with the bakufu. Unlike later foreigners, he was toohumble to write.Not a wealthyman and hardly lazy with his pen, he yet turned down a publisher's offer,7writing to a friend"We havequite enough of error relating to thiscountry in the shapeof books, and I earnestlyhope that we shallhave no more inflicted on us untilsome manfitted for the work by havingfully learned the language... shallgive us an honest, truthfulwork on Japan."8 Others were not to be so modest. Chiefamongst these and the only one to sharea knowledgeof diplomatic matters was RutherfordAlcock, the first British ambassador. In i86i-62,he wrotea bookThe Capital ofthe Tycoon, from which almost all laterhistorical writing derives. So muchso thatit is scarcelyrealized that Harris remained in Japan more than four years after the last entry inhis Yournal on February 27th, i858. Alcock wrote a bookand burned his private papers. Harrisrefused to write but left his private papers. These are worth study because he was betterqualified to writeon Japan than Alcock. For many months they are also the only Westernevidence coming out ofJapan. Giventhe widespread popularity of Alcock's book, it is a healthycorrective to look at Japaneseaffairs through the eyes of Townsend Harris. Unlike Rutherford Alcock, he was nota careerdiplomat looking to future promotion and a pension.Harris had done his work, recoveredhis reputation, and wanted only to returnto hisbeloved Manhattan. With a deeplove of Japan and its people, and no professionalambitions to colourhis vision, he was perhapsthe most disinterested observer of the scene. Backfrom treaty-making, Harris settled into familiar surroundings at Shimodaand awaitedthe British fleet. A longletter to Secretary of State Cass in Washington explained varioussections of his treaty.9

7 HarrisPapers, City College of New York, Edo,22 AugustI895. Book4, No. 20, to Childs & Peterson,Shimoda, 9 Harris Papers, Book 4, No. 37, to Cass, 29 MarchI859. Shimoda,7 Augusti858. 8 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. I57, to E. Garrett, 308 MonumentaNipponica, XXi, 3-4

Althoughit vexedmany minds and tempersa decadelater, the question of extrater- ritorialitywas easilydismissed in i858. Japanesemunicipal laws were "very peculiar" wroteHarris. It wouldbe unfairto makeforeigners live under them. It wouldbe equally unfairto demandthat the Japanese abrogate them. Seeing justice in neitherproposal, Harrischose a separateforeign settlement where foreign consuls could apply their re- spectivelegal codes to theirown nationals. These consularofficers themselves presented a problem.Aside from controlling their country'smerchants and seamen, their main duty was to reportupon the prospects for theirnation's trade with Japan. In mostparts of theworld consular officers made periodic horseback trips to visit farmingand mining districts. It wasa chanceto getaway from the routine of the seaport. Usuallyseveral foreigners would go together,combining duty with hunting, fishing and anyother amusement that came their way. Having had a vacationthey would return bringinga littlecommercial information with which to impresstheir superiors. The presenceand price of foreign imports in inland towns, the state of the crops, possible im- provementsto increaseexports, and a generalcomment on theprosperity of the district theyvisited made up a reportin an agewhich did not teach its children economics. This rightof consular travel was a standardpractice in most countries, but once again the "very peculiar"laws ofJapan intruded. Havingsigned the treaty the bakufu now began raising objections to it. This travelof consularpersonnel outside the narrow limits of the treaty ports could embarrass them. Foreignersmight intrude in the domainsbelonging to the"eighteen great Daimyos." Theymight also interfere with the "sanctity which attaches to , the residence of the SpiritualEmperor."10 VerballyHarris gave way without giving up the treaty right, noting whatwas to be thetouchstone of his Japan policy: he would not embarrass the bakufu on secondarymatters but would hold firm to theessentials of his treaty. One ofthese was hisresidence at theEdo capital.The bakufuwished to postponethis fora yearand a halfuntilJanuaryi86i, butHarris stood fast on this question. The changes wouldbe so greatthat a responsibleperson must be therewhen trade starts, he wrote to Washington.Additionally, his interpreter,Heusken, had beentold by Moriyama,his Japaneseopposite, that many daimyo did not care about exchange or shipping regulations, butobjected strongly to visible concessions such as theright of foreign diplomats to live at Edo.11As thebakufu did not take much interest in tariffs,Harris set the import tariff at 20% on mostgoods in orderto ensurea sufficientincome for the government. IfHarris was pro-Japanese, hewas also reputedly anti-British. "Tell thetruth, fear God andhate the British" was reportedlythe keystone of his life-long conduct.12 Of the first twothere is littledoubt. The thirdis opento question. There is littleevidence of it in his

10 See also, W. G. Beasley,Select Documents on 12 W. E. Griffis,Townsend Harris, London, I895, 7apaneseForeign Policy, London, I955, p. 220. P.4. 11 Harris,7ournal, p. 538. McMAsTER. ". .ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 309 papers,yet it maybe true.The agedHarris had one interview with his future biographer in NewYork in I874. At thistime he mentionedthe influence of his grandmother whose homehad beenburned by Britishtroops in I8I2. As a youthin upstateNew Yorkhe probablywas anti-British.Again in hislast years he maywell have been so. Americans in generalwere bitter about British support for the rebel cause during its civil war. Harris in particularmay have been bitter about recent British policy in Japan.However, his contemporaryletters and despatches from Japan were not anti-British. The finalpoint in hisAugust 7th letter to Washingtonput this matter in theproper perspective.In ithe described the use of Nagasaki as oneof the most important provisions ofthe treaty, for the present U.S. Naval depotat Hong Kong"is placedin one ofthe worstspots in thewhole East, as it regardsinsalubrity and the vile population that exists there,to whichmay be addedthe important fact that the whole of the supplies for our EasternSquadron are in thehands of our great political and commercial rival." Harris's desireto removenaval stores from the colony of a powerwith whom there might be war wasonly common sense. Britain and the United States had been on theverge of war over theOregon boundary when Harris had left for Japan. To describeBritain as "our greatpolitical and commercialrival" was a simplestate- mentof fact rather than prejudice. Harris puts it at theend of his list after a climatewhich maderecovery difficult for invalid seamen and a busyharbour which made desertion only tooeasy. Harriswas on goodterms with Sir John Bowring, governor of Hong Kong.Bowring hadwritten that he did notwish to bringa largefleet to Japan unless it was necessary. Harrishad replied that it wouldnot be needed.13It thereforeseems odd to claima moral superiorityforElgin in employing fewer warships than thePerry expeditions,14 but foreign writersthen and since have enjoyed abusing their own or each other's nations for intimi- datingthe Japanese.'5 There is notmuch in anyof the claims. By drivingoff the one or two shipmissions which had attemptedto communicate peacefullywith Japan the bakufu had forced foreigners to use powerfulsquadrons. Once thesehad been seen and the number of cannon counted it did notmatter much whether latersquadrons were large or small. More ships could always be summoned.The question did affordHarris some later amusement. A leadingarticle in theTimes of November 2nd, i858 hadstated that "the guns of the Peihoand theroar of the British Lion alone securedthe AmericanTreaty." Another leadingarticle in the same paper two years later announced that the American Treaty had onlybeen secured "by thepresence of an overwhelmingAmerican naval force in theBay ofYedo." As this"overwhelming force" had consisted of one ship, Harris sent the clip-

13 Harris,7ournal, p. 624. I930, p. I40. 14 F. C. Jones,Extraterritoriality in 7apan, New 15 E. g.,P. J.Treat, Diplomatic Relations Between Haven, I93I, p. 20. Montague Paske-Smith, U.S.and 7apan, Stanford, I932, andW. L. Neuman, WesternBarbarians in Tokugawa7apan, Kobe, AmericaEncounters 7apan, Johns Hopkins, I963. MonumentaNipponica, xm, 3-4 pingsalong to hercommander noting, "It is wellsaid that liars should have good mem- ories."16 To LordElgin, Harris admitted that his treaty had been secured by theAnglo-French actionin Chinaand went on to givethe British negotiator all ofthe help he could.Elgin was briefedon thenegotiations leading up to thetreaty. More important, Harris loaned theservices of his interpreter, . These wereinvaluable as he combined Japanesewith his native Dutch, the only Western language known to theJapanese inter- preters.For theirhelp both Harris and Heusken were awarded gold snuff boxes bearing thecipher of Queen Victoria in diamonds.These were presented a year later after a sus- piciousAmerican Congress had approved the foreign gifts to itsagents. The urgingsof Harris that Britain quickly accept the treaty, coupled with the stub- bornnessof the Japanese negotiators who fought long and hard over the slightest deviation fromthe Harris Treaty-"I sayit to theircredit," wrote Lord Elgin-brought the com- mercialtreaty with Japan through almost verbatim to a finalham and champagne dinner aboardthe warships. Harris had been able to keephis promise to thebakufu that it would getmore lenient treatment by dealing with him before the British arrived. As LordElgin noted,the treaty concessions were "not, in someimportant particulars, as considerable as thoseacquired from China under the Treaty negotiated by meat Tien-tsin."'17 The onlymajor change made by Lord Elgin was to lowerthe import duty on cottons andwoolens from 20% to 5?%.As thesewere the major imports from Britain into Asia, thiswas a sizableloss to theJapanese treasury. LordElgin had not acted in ignorance.A yearpreviously, British merchants in China had writtento himin responseto his requestfor advice before making the Tientsin Treaty.One firmwriting about tariffs had noted,"As merchantswe ofcourse desire to see theseplaced on thelowest possible scale, but as theyare looked to by theChinese governmentas a sourceof Revenue, we thinkin thisview that, with some few exceptions, theyare as moderateas theywell can be, andcertainly contrast favourably with similar dutiesin ourown country."318 Knowingthe importance of tariff revenue in influencingan Asiangovernment to sup- portforeign trade, why the only important change he madein theHarris Treaty was to slashthat revenue is difficultto understand.Lord Elgin was muchgiven to discoursing uponthe Christian duty of Westerners to "civilize"Asians.19 He wasalso a Scot.Perhaps,

16 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. 329, to Tatnall, bridge,Box 2, H. Wilkinsonand Co., to HM Yedo, 26 Julyi86o. Consul Canton,Hong Kong,5 SeptemberI857. 17 ParliamentaryPapers, Accounts and Papers, 19 E. g., "This abominableEast ... strewed Second Session,I859, Letter no. I99, Elgin to all over with recordsof our violenceand fraud Malmesbury,"H.M.S. Furious", 30 August and disregardof truth", quoted in Richard i858. Harris, China,BBC Publications,March I966, 18 Parkes Papers, UniversityLibrary Cam- p. 30. MoCM A .TPP R. F7nr,icrn ninlnmov-r in RPTAlnmft.si T1 n "3 I TT as a Germancleric wrote after a sojournin igthcentury Britain, "so hypocritical,they say Christand mean cotton."20 Britishmerchants in Hong Kongwere happy with the Elgin Treaty, its commercial arrangementsbeing "on themost liberal possible scale." The low tariffon textileswas particularlywelcome. "We aremuch mistaken if, from what we hearof the Japanese, the marketthus created for our home manufactures will not rival that afforded by thevast empirelately thrown open by theTreaty of Tien-tsin."521 LordElgin had referred to theHarris Treaty as a "verymaterial advance," but this HongKong British newspaper upped that rating to an "extraordinaryadvance" over the wood,water, and provisionstreaty for which Sir James Graham "had the gall to take creditand Parliament the stupidity to votemoney for the presentation yacht." It wasin strikingcontrast to therecent Dutch treaty which in returnfor 200 yearsof commercial relationsgranted them a tradewhich passed entirely through the hands of the Japanese governmentofficials "under the most annoying restrictions and subject to a dutyof 3 5 %."' The articleconcluded by happily referring tothe futureJapanese treaty port of Kanagawa as "theWhampoa of Edo." Its onlylapse from optimism was to notethat owing to thepeculiarity of government in Japanunder which some 360 feudalprinces rule "separate and almostindependent principalities",foreigners would not be allowedto travelin theinterior. LordElgin too had had somesecond thoughts about the situationin Japan.With Harrishe considered that much depended upon the prudent conduct ofthe first foreigners. He hadbeen impressed with the power of the Japanese police who had merely to tapwith a fananyone who pressed too close to theline of march to sendhim back into the crowd. Yet he hadonce strayed away from his police escort and been stoned by small boys from a hostilemob. They may have thought he was Chineseand, given the samurai contempt forcommerce, had jeered him with "have you anythingto sell?"22The factremained. Foreignerswould not be popularin Edo. LikeHarris, Elgin refused to postponethe residence of a Britishambassador at Edo. He hadwritten the Minister of Foreign Affairs who had managed the Harris Treaty only to be informedthat this man no longerheld office, a newministry having taken over. LordElgin was unable to obtain any accurate information about this change but assumed itboded no good.Apparently the men who had signed the Harris Treaty had been driven fromoffice on thataccount. They had been replaced by men hostile to foreigners who had thenbeen forced to signeven more treaties. "All that remained ... afterpassing through

20 Theodore Fontane, Der Stechlin,in the unidentifiedHong Kong paper included in box chapter"In Missionto England." labelled"Printed Miscellaneous." 21 Jardine,Matheson & Co. Archive,Univer- 22 H. S. Williams,Shades of the Past,Tokyo, sityLibrary, Cambridge, news clippingfrom an I960 p. 57. 3I2 MonumentaNipponi ca, xxI, 3-4 thesesuccessive stages of humiliation was ... to render... theTreaties ... ofnon-effect in theirworking."23 At ShimodaHarris was also disturbed.His nextletter to Washingtonwas lessopti- mistic.After noting that he hadnursed eleven Russian sailors left ashore with scurvy-a dietofbread, fowls and claret pulled ten of them through-he wenton towriteofpolitics.24 Epilepticand dropsical, the shogun had died that August. The resultingquestion of suc- cessionhad causedthe dismissal of "Hotta, Prince of Bitchii, (Hotta Masayoshi), Chief ofthe Great Council of State" (a rojyu)and minister for foreign affairs, as wellas another roji,"Naito, Prince of Kii" (Nait6Nobuchika).25 Their places had been taken by "Ota, Princeof Bingo" and "Manabe, Prince of Shimoda" (Manabe Akikatsu).26 As hadLord Elgin, Harris assumed these men had been dismissed for supporting his treaty.This was trueenough as faras it went.27They had alsobeen dismissed for sup- portingthe candidature of Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu,28 a mature man with some qual- itiesof leadership and a fairlyopen mind towards foreign trade. These did not recom- mendhim to ,29who had been namedregent in June-a positionwith dictatorialpowers filled only in timeof emergency. The signingof the Harris Treaty was the weaponhe used in the powerstruggle of thatsummer to dismissthe more progressiveof therojui along with their candidate Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu. The new shogunwould have little to do withgovernment. He wasfourteen. Now firmlyin power, theregent began to justify the forebodings ofElgin and Harris. Followingupon a choleraepidemic which reportedly killed I o,ooo personsin Edo and tookmore than IoO livesin thehamlet surrounding the American consulate at Shimoda, thefirst problem seemed a pettyone. A letterfrom Nagasaki dated July gth was not deliveredto Harrisuntil October 28th. In orderto educatethe new ministers of foreign affairs,Harris demanded a fullexplanation, writing that it was a seriousinsult among Westernnations to interferewith diplomatic mail. He regrettedthis evidence of bakufu ill-will,declaring that if refused his government would know how to secure redress.30 It was bluff.Harris could not order a rowboat, much less a gunboat, to hissupport. Ota's replymerely referred Harris to a minorofficial for a verbalanswer.31 "As Representative ofthe United States I do notacknowledge any superior on earth,"countered Harris, "I

23 Foreign Office, Japan Correspondence, 27 W. G. Beasley,The Modern History of Yapan, F.O. 46, III, Alcockto Malmesbury,Edo, 28 July London,i963, pp. 72-73. I859. 28 24 Harris Papers, Book 4, No. 38 to Cass, 29 Shimoda,i Septemberi858. 30 Harris Papers, Book 4, No. 87 to Ota, 25 % Shimoda,29 Octoberi858. 26 "Ota, Princeof Bingo": This mandoes not 31 Westerndiplomats resisted strongly owing seem to appear in the biographicalsection of to theirChina experience in whichminor officials W. G. Beasley,Select Documents, which has been had been used to delayall negotiation."I had at used forthe other identifications. He is identified Foochow preciselythe same battle to fight". in Frenchrecords as Ota Bitchiiof Kakegawa in F.O. 46, III, Alcock to Malmesbury,Edo, 28 T6tomi.Manabe Akikatsu1'j4p &4f.. July I859. M c M A S T E R. ". .. ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 3I3 shalldecline to receive any communications that carry with them any insistence ofan intentiontoset up such a claim."32 Postalservice thereupon improved and the Nagasaki officials were punished. Harris regretteditbut hoped that Ota had learned that the "old Deshima days have passed away neverto return."33 It was doubtful that the lesson had been learned, for as I859 began anotheranti-foreign move appeared. It camefrom a different quarter. Inorder to quiet opposition, the bakufu asked a year'sdelay before sending its embassy toWashington toratify the treaty. This was because "of a lasteffort which some of the daimyosare making with the Mikado, to preserve ifpossible the ancient law which in- flictedthe penalty of death on any Japanese who may leave the country."34 Oneyear earlier, bakufu officials had "roared with laughter"35 when Harris suggested thatJapanese held the emperor in veneration.They had replied that he waswithout money,political power or anything else that mattered inJapan. A monthlater, the same mentold Harris they were having to send more bribes as thingshad come to a standstill inKyoto.36 Obviously, the position of emperor held some importance. Hewas no longer thesubject of unrestrained laughter. This move to usethe prestige of the man Harris referredtoas "theSpiritual Emperor" was successful. Harris gave in andthe embassy waspostponed for one year. He wasadding to his education. InJanuary I859, Harris took up moreimportant matters, going to choose the site for Americanstolive at Kanagawa. As no other foreign diplomats were sent, he was in effect actingfor all the Westerners. Kanagawa was an important advance in his treaty. It wasa newport for foreigners, away from the restrictive practices ofNagasaki's Deshima or the naturallimitations ofHakodate, a poor northern port useful mainly to supply booze and brothelsto whalermen. Kanagawa by contrast was a busytown some thirty miles from Edowhich had a populationofmore than one million. It shouldhave provided a good settingfor the new free trade which Harris desired. To builda marketfor Western goods, the foreigners had to be on or near the Tokaido. Alongthis highway passed most of the pilgrims, pedlars and travellers ofnineteenth- centuryJapan. Then as nowthe Japanese delighted in buyingsouvenirs ofa journeyso thatTakaida travellers would take a knowledgeofWestern goods to manycorners of thecountry. Above all, many of the great trains of daimyo, sometimes with more than a thousandretainers and servants, on theirway to andfrom their enforced residence as hostagesof the Edo bakufu,would trudge slowly past the Kanagawa shops, or pass the nightat its many inns. These straggled along both sides of the narrow highway for some

32 Harris Papers, Book 4, No. 88 to Ota, 34 Harris Papers, Book 4, No. 66, to Cass, Shimoda,22 Novemberi858. Shimoda,29 Januaryi859. 33 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. 2, to Churtius, 35 Harris,Yournal, p. $I7. Shimoda, IO Januaryi859. Note: the letter 36 Carl Crow,He Openedthe Door to 7apan,New numbers of this collection are not in strict York,I939, p. 240. chronologicalorder. 3I4 MonumentaNpponi ca, XXII, 3-4 threemiles. Harris reckoned that half of the travel of the kingdom passed through this town. Havinghimself gone in processionto Edo in I857 he knewthe value of this traffic and pickedout twopossible locations at Kanagawa.Both had shallow water at lowtide, but Harrisdecided their other advantages made a longwooden landing jetty worthwhile.37 Bakufuofficials proposed a graverdifficulty than shallow water. As theattendants of the daimyowere "insolent adventurers ... whoclear the road without any regard for person ornation,"38 there might be incidents.The dangerwas real enough but as Harrispointed out,if the bakufu did notuse itsefficient police force to protectforeigners it would soon be in veryserious difficulties.39 Boththe poor anchorage and the danger of clashes could be avertedif a thirdlocation suggestedby the bakufuwas accepted.This had a deep-wateranchorage but Harris thoughtthe advantage too dearly bought. It was fivemiles from the Takaida and seven milesfrom the center of Kanagawa. Separating itfrom the Tokaido were three wide pieces ofwater, then without bridges, and a precipitoushill. The onlylink with populated Japan wasa footpathso steepas tobe impassibleon horseback.No tradecould be hopedfor ex- ceptfrom those who went there expressly to buy or sell. Foreign residents would be almost as isolatedas Harrishad been at Shimoda.40The reasonfor Harris's choice of Kanagawa had beento breakthe bakufutradition of imprisoning foreigners by geography."For thatreason I placedYokohama out ofconsideration."'41 "Findingthat I couldnot be inducedto acceptof Yokohama they suddenly informed methat as no actionwas actuallyrequired before the 4th ofJuly next, they would post- poneany future consideration ofthe subject until that time. They probably feel that they cannotbe ina worseposition than now and are willing to trustto thechapter of accidents as to thefuture."42 Harris seems to havebeen worried about the bakufu's good faith. He wasalso planning to go home,for he closes his long and detailed letter: "I havefelt it pro- perto giveyou this statement of the matter, so thatwhoever may have the future set- tlementof the question, may have all thefacts that I possess."43 As Harriswas planning to leave,another man was beingordered to Japan. Far to the

37 Harris Papers, Book 4, No. 74, to Cass, trainedobserver with four books to his credit, he Shimoda,I4 MarchI859. seemsaccurate in mattersof personal experience. 38 C. P. Hodgson,A Residenceat Nagasakiand Previousservice in Abyssiniaand Australiahad Hakodate,London, i86i, p. 284. Hodgson was givenhim considerable training. dismissedfrom the consularservice late in i86o. 39 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. 74 to Cass, The fulsomepraise for British policy and Ruther- Shimoda,4 March I859. fordAlcock found in his introduction-contrast- 40 HenryHeusken, 7apan 7ournal, Rutgers ing as it does withmuch of his text-seems to be Press,I964, p. I23. explainedby the factthat he was thenapplying 41 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. 74, to Cass, foranother consular position in Franceand Alcock Shimoda,I4 MarchI859. was due homeon leave.His reportingof rumours 42 Ibid. on such thingsas mineralwealth or the armed 43 Ibid. forcesof the daimyoare widelyinaccurate. As a MCMASTER. "... Foreign Diplomacyin BakumatsuJapan" 3I5 south,Rutherford Alcock, Her BritannicMajesty's consul at Canton,was writingto Londonacknowledging his appointment as consulgeneral to Japan. Oddly enough, he wascomplaining about his promotion. Insteadof a positionnearer home "I amnow transferred ... tothe most outlying region in theworld ... eitherto diein theseregions where so manyhave gone before me, with twoor three years more service or to be expended,as navalstores are expended, so longas wearand tear will let them hold together, with no unnecessaryregard to whatis to be- comeof them afterwards."44 It was nota happyman who would take over as thechief foreigndiplomat in Japan. Whenhis instructionsarrived they cannot have improvedhis temper.They were simpleof expression but very difficult ofapplication. Alcock was toinsist upon fulfilment ofthe treaty but also to contenthimself with gradual progress, making no threatsand allowingfor the supposed "timidity and ignorance" of the Japanese.45 Memories of the Crimeawere still fresh in Whitehallso thathe was also to takeevery opportunity of spyingupon the Russians and to preventthe bakufu from ceding any territory to them. Yet he was to do thiswithout promising any British support for Britain did notaspire to paramountinfluence in Japan.This was curiousadvice. Owing to herdominant positionon theChina coast she would unavoidably have the most residents in Japan, the mostships enteringJapanese harbours and the lion's share oftheJapan trade. The answer was simple.Appeasement had come into vogue at theForeign Office following criticism ofthe recent war in China.As therewas to be suchlittle support from home, perhaps Alcockwas wiseto begincomplaining even before his task began. InJapan Harris continued putting things into order for the opening of trade. The first oil wellsin Pennsylvaniahad quietlybegun to pumpthe deathknell of thewhaling industry,but Harris had no way of knowing this. One ofhis main interests in Japan was at Hakodate,the northern port to which the U.S. whalingfleet resorted each spring. The whalermenhad been gettingfirewood, drinking water and suppliesthere under the PerryTreaty since I854. This was notenough. They "want women and mustand will have'em" wroteConsul Rice.46 They also wanted sake and had been getting both, for theywere a welcomesource of revenue to thispoor town. The peoplewere willing but nowthat the bakufu had taken the town from the local daimyo the officials were not, follow- ing theAmericans everywhere ashore to forbidor raisethe price of each transaction.47 Unlessbakufu officials ceased interfering, the whalers promised to take and hold the town. "Theycan do it andtheir officers will lead them" wrote Rice. Five hundred whalermen whocould have been enjoying the delights of the Hawaiian Islands were not to be put offeasily. The bakufuseems to have seen the error of its ways in timebut Consul Rice was

44 F.O. 391, I, to EdmundHammond, Per- i859. manentForeign Under-Secretary I854-73, Can- 46 Harris7ournal, p. 503. ton,22 FebruaryI859. 47 Harris Papers, Book 4, No. io6 to Ota, 45 E.. 46, III, Malmsburyto Alcock,i March Shimoda,23 FebruaryI859. MN; XXII, 3-4 E 3I6 MonumentaNipponica, XXII, 3-4 himselfprovinga problem for Harris. After complaining to thebakufu that the new gover- norof Hakodate was a manlacking in wisdom,overflowing in dislikeof foreigners and givento drinkingconsiderably beyond his capacity,Harris had in turnto admonish ConsulRice. The consul'sservant was takingsake to thecrew of the "U.S.S. Mississippi."He was also sellingthem tickets to brothelson shore.Consul Rice was apparentlyinvolved as Harriswrote him not to letthe desire for gain get the upper hand.48 The remonstrance waswasted. Six weeks later Harris wrote Washington that U.S. Navalofficers were still complainingthat Consul Rice was profitingon supplies,pilotage, liquor and brothels. A copywas sentto Mr. Rice. Thingswere brighter at Nagasakiwhere Harris found a steadierman, the American merchant,J.G. Walsh,and appointed him consul. At thattime only Britain had a career service.All other nations appointed local merchants to handle consular duties in return for fees.Often he was not even a nationalof the country concerned. At smallerports one man mightrepresent several nations. Atthe time Britain regarded the United States as anenemy, was attempting to contain Russianexpansion and on theverge of war with France. "We areall turnedriflemen here, withfine guns and uniforms, determined to barbecueevery unfortunate French frog who maybe rashenough to land on our happy soil,"49 wrotean Englishman at home.In Japan all foreignersstood together. The Britishconsul at Hakodatewas Frenchconsul as well, flyingthe two flags side by side. A Frenchmissionary priest was his voluntary interpreter and translator.The Frenchconsul at Yokohamawould be anotherBritish subject, Jose Loureiro,a Macoese. At Nagasaki, the French consul would be a Scot,Kenneth Macken- zie,the Portuguese consul would be anAmerican named Evans, U.S. Consul Walsh would lookafter Russian affairs, whilst German merchants would become honorary British or Dutchsubjects. At Nagasaki,Harris was examinedby a U.S. Navydoctor and sentto Shanghaifor a rest.50While he was in China,M. Duchesnede Bellecourt,newly appointed consul generalforJapan, wrote a notein Paris. He hadbeen studying the Dutch records ofJapan. Whenhe arrivedin thatcountry he would take a doctor,a naturalist,a businessman and a miningengineer and begina systematicexploration of the interior.51 It hadthe fine progressivesound of the Second Empire but in Japan events were moving in a different direction.Although France had beenquick to followLord Elgin and obtain a treatyof herown, de Bellecourtdid not reach Japan until mid-September ofI859.

51 48 Harris Papers, Book 4, No. 23, to Rice, Archivesdes AffairesEtrangeres, Direction Shimoda,2I AprilI859. des Consulats et des AffairesCommerciales, 49 CharlesWaterton, Letters of Charles Waterton, Yeddo, I859-6I, i, de Bellecourtto Ministry, London,I955, p. I26. I4 May I859. Some commercialdespatches are 50 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. I26, to Cass, 26 enclosedin volumesone and two of Direction AprilI859. Politique. M CMASTER. ". .. ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 3I7

The Britisharrived at Edo inJuly, the Netherlands consul general arrived at Nagasaki at theend ofFebruary i86o. None ofthese powers bothered to inspectthe Kanagawa locationbetween Harris's visit in January and the opening of trade onJuly Ist. Theywere to pay thepenalty of this neglect. While Harris appointed consuls and prepared for the openingof trade, the bakufu was workingto nullifyhis free trade before it everbegan. Withthe field clear of foreigners it worked rapidly to undoone of the most important of thetreaty provisions. Hundreds of men were set to workto turna fishingvillage into a seaport.The expenseof a road,bridges, a seafront,houses, godowns (warehouses), and a stone-facedlanding pier at Yokohamawas fargreater than the cost of a woodenjetty at Kanagawa.Expense was not the primaryconsideration. One of the world'sgreatest seaportsbegan life as a deliberateeffort to strangletrade. The meaningof the previous summer's political turnover was now becomingclear. At Yokohamathe regent Ii Naosukewas applyingthe traditionalJapanese method of handlingforeigners. It was simpleenough-shut them into a cage. Oncein thatcage, all transactions could be supervisedby bakufu officials, thus deriving themaximum profit from the minimum amount of trade.52 With the foreigners shut up awayfrom populated areas and confined within gates guarded by shogunal troops, some ofthe bakufu'sprestige might still be salvaged. The mainargument put to Harristhat the Kanagawa location might provoke clashes betweenforeigners and followersof the daimyomay well have enteredIi Naosuke's calculations.As hewas not a manafraid to use the police power of his office,53 it was prob- ablysecondary to hiswish to restricttrade. Whatis clearis thathe had decidedto tryand regainthe ground lost by theHarris Treaty.54Neither Harris nor Alcock thought that the bakufu would fight but both be- lievedit would try the foreigners' mettle to the point of war.55 InJanuary Harris had writ- tenthat the bakufu had been pressing Yokohama upon him for several months so thatthe decisionto challengethe foreigners must have been made soon after Ii Naosuketook powerthe preceding summer. It was a boldmove, possibly taken against the advice of hissubordinates.56 Not onlyhad the American been deliberately deceived but the bakufu wasstaking its prestige upon a verypublic issue. Largenumbers of workmen had been employed in building the customs house and land- ingstages at Yokohama.Government notices had been posted in Edo offeringtax relief, landand houses to Japanese merchants who would move to thenew port. Their result was plain.Yokohama's first Japanese population was heavywith adventurers whose smallcapital was matchedwith equally small scruples.57 In placeof the large wholesale

52 Hodgson, pp. IO-I3. I859; HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. I90, to Cass, 13 Beasley,Modern History of 7apan, p. 75. 3 SeptemberI859. 54 CorrespondenceCommerciale, i, No. I8, 56 P. J.Treat, i, 86. to Walewski,Edo, 20 NovemberI859. 57 JosephHeco, Narrativeof a 7apanese,Yoko- 55 F.O. 46, III, to Malmesbury,Edo, i i August hama, I899, I, 249. 3 I8 MonumentaNipponica, xxii, 3-4 merchantsCtonyas3 towhom Harris had been promised access for foreign businessmen,58 theywere to meetmainly small shopkeepers and pedlars who were often the dregs ofEdo's business community. To emphasizethe challenge, workmen dug out the swamp in the back of the settlement linkingthe two rivers which bounded it, thus making the muddy beach flat into an island. Thecomparison with Deshima was now complete. When foreign diplomats arrived they wouldbe faced immediately with an open violation ofthe treaties. Itwas a daringgamble forthe bakufu. Western diplomats always travelled inwarships.59 Allwould depend upon the temper ofthe diplomats involved. Harris had already proven amenableon several issues. Although Alcock had used gunboats to good effect inChina,60 Londonhad counselled appeasement inJapan. The bakufu was to be lucky. OnJune 30th, the day before trade was to begin, the British diplomat finally arrived. Alcockhad spent some three weeks in Nagasaki settling local matters which would bet- terhave been left to Consul Hodgson. It seemedreasonable enough at the time. Nagasaki wasexpected to continue as themain port of foreign trade at leastuntil the opening of Osakain I862. Therewas also a smallBritish colony already in residence trading under earlierDutch and Russian agreements whom it was desirable to bring under the control ofa Britishconsul. It was all very understandable, butAlcock's late start from China and thelost weeks at Nagasaki were to have serious consequences atYokohama. Harrisand Alcock both arrived onJune 30th. The American still had a fewdays in hand forhis trade was not to start until the 4th. Unable to see the humour of this, Lord Elgin hadmoved the date forward tothe Ist in the British treaty. Confronted with the new town atYokohama, Alcock had left himself less than one day to arrange matters. Harriswas the only foreigner who could really appreciate the change. When he had left inJanuary, Yokohama had been a mudflat supporting a few scattered fishermen's huts. Whenhe returned inJune, the muddy beach had become a bustling town of many dozens ofbuildings. The air was filled with the buzz of carpenter's saws and the commotion of Japaneseshopkeepers unpacking and moving into their new homes. Fromthe deck of the "U.S.S. Susquehanna," Harris and U.S. Consul Dorr surveyed the scene."I supposetheJapanese Government intend this for a secondDeshima, but of course wecannot accept that sort of thing," said Dorr. "Certainly not" replied Harris, "but that willbe a battleyou will have to fight since you are the consul of the port."'61 Alcock and BritishConsul Vyse came aboard that day to discuss the situation while the foreign mer- chantsbegan going ashore to see what the new port offered inthe way of business.

58 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. 5, toJ. G. Walsh, travelin a merchantship as thebakufu despised Shimoda,7 FebruaryI859. Also 7ournal,p. 520. merchants.Correspondence Politique, i, No. 2, 59 This was not fromany desireto intimidate toWalewski, Shanghai, ii AugustI859. the Japanese.Mermet de Cachon, the Catholic 60 A. Michie,I, I3I. priestwho had assistedBaron Gros to negotiate 61 Heco,I, 20I. the FrenchTreaty, warned de Bellecourtnot to MCMASTER. "... ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 3I9

The U.S.warship had towed Heard & Company'sschooner "Wanderer" from Shanghai. AnotherAmerican firm, Walsh & Co., was representedby Dr. Hall,while Joseph Heco and hispartner E. M. Van Reed had comeas passengerson thewarship hoping to start tradingin a smallway. Jardine, Matheson & Co. hadchartered the schooner "Nora" with a mixedsample cargo of textiles and Chinese medicines. Jardine's great rival Dent & Co., was representedby Jose Loureiro on boardthe chartered steamer "Carthage." Several Dutchtraders had come up fromNagasaki to trytheir luck in thenew port. Their goods andsilver dollars to buyproduce were on theNetherlands barques "Schiller," "Princess Charlotte"and "Jacob & Anna."The Britishsteamer "Countess of Seafield" completed thelist. It wasa smallgroup but in treasureand cargo they were ready to begin business. One optimisticDutch merchant had I o,ooo silverdollars with which to buyJapanese goods. Joinedashore on the4th by the officers ofthe "Susquehanna," Harris and Consul Dorr celebratedthe national holiday in champagne.Tying an Americanflag to thetallest tree in its graveyardthey transformed the HongakujiTemple62 into the U.S. consulate. LeavingDorr to handletrading problems, Harris left to establishhis legationat Edo. Althoughboth Harris and Alcockadvised their nationals not to acceptthe houses and godownsoffered at Yokohamaby thebakufu they did notprovide any alternative. Ratherthan settle Consul Vyse in a consulateand begin trade on July Ist as pertreaty, Alcockchose to takehim to Edo. There they presented a ratified copy of the treaty to the bakufuand soughta templefor use as theBritish legation. Delay was oneof the bakufu's bestweapons against foreign cannon. Alcock ran into "more trouble of a paralysingkind thanI shouldhave thoughtpossible."63 The two simpletasks, which had takenpref- erenceover the Yokohama trade, took three weeks to accomplish.Both seem to have beenbungled. Althoughboth Americans and Dutch began trading immediately, Alcock was no doubt formallycorrect in instructing his consuls not to startwork until he hadhanded over his copyofthe Treaty to the bakufu.64 In doing this he staged a paradeof armed sailors through thecapital. The ForeignOffice had assumedthat Alcock's experience in Chinawould helphim in Japan. This parade was one result of that experience. In Chinait mighthave gainedrespect. Japan was notChina. Edo hadthe highest proportion of samurai popula- tionof any city in Japan.This proudmilitary caste justified its parasiticprivileges by claimingto be thewarrior guardians of the national security. They had no equivalentin Chinesesociety. There could be no surerway to humiliatethem than to paradearmed foreignersthrough Edo. ForHarris the first few weeks in Edo passedquietly without parades. He settledhap- pilyin theZempukuji Temple, much pleased with the ancient trees, the crepe myrtles

62 *t+ 64 Ibid.,enclosure No. 3 in I5 JuneI859 to 63 F.O. 46, mI,to Malmesbury,I4July I859. Malmesbury. 320 MonumentaNipponica, XXII, 3-4 in blossomand the huge "tame goldfish which eat outof my hand."65 He was homesick andplanned to leaveearly in i86i. Harrisseems to havefelt no jealousy in relinquishinghis unique position to theBritish diplomat.Rather, he seemed pleased. "I neednot say how vast a reliefitis tome, and what a loadof responsibility it removes"66 he wrote a friendin Shanghai.Alcock corroborates this,writing to Londonthat although Harris was hissenior in rankas wellas in timein Japan,the American "seemed willing, if not desirous, to see memove first."67 On thepersonal level Harris found "Mr. Alcocka kindneighbour, a good friend; the bestunderstanding exists between us and ourwhole intercourse is cordialand agreea- ble."68Although a kindneighbour, Alcock was a distantone. "I amfurther from Mr. Alcockthan I couldwish," wrote Harris, for the Briton had turned down the proffered locationin the centreof Edo in favourof a templeat Shinagawa,a mileand a half away. This too hadbeen a resultof China experience. Running for the boats was a familiar customwith old Chinahands, so thatAlcock's choice of the Shinagawa site as being "nearerthe ships"69 represented good strategic sense if it did notshow much confidence in thebodyguard furnished by the bakufu. As thegrounds were extensive and still shared withthe Temple priests it was difficultto defend.Worse, the Tozenji Temple stood on theT6kaido in an areawhere "numerous sake houses abound with young and impetuous blood"anxious to trytheir blades.70 The Britonscould not leave their front gate without encounteringsamurai inebriates. Withthree weeks of the month gone, Alcock sent Consul Vyse to opena Britishcon- sulateat Kanagawa.As a salarieddiplomat he couldafford a leisurelypace. Foreign merchantswith their ships off Yokohama could not.71 The charterof a simplesailing vesselcould be $2,500 a month.72Day afterday the ships swung idly at anchor,cargoes unlanded,and the Mexican silver dollars brought from China losing interest. Forits partthe bakufu did notflatly refuse to allowtrade at theKanagawa location. It merelydelayed matters on the one hand while offering immediate facilities atYokohama. The cagewas baited,its door was open, the foreigners walked in. Time is money.While diplomatstalked, money decided the matter. Withthe foreigners settled ashore it onlyremained to defeattheir diplomats. The matterwas spun out over many months with a finecombination ofdeceit and delay which

654$44. Janvierletters, New York Public 22 AugustI859. Library,Harris to Miss Drinker,20 August, 69 F.O. 46, In, to Malmesbury,Edo, 9 July I859. I859. 66 Harris Papers, Book 4, No. i6o to Rev. 70 . Hodgson,pp. 8o-8i. Lyles,Edo, 22 AugustI859. 71 Hodgson, p. I4. 67 F.O. 46, III, to Malmesbury,Edo, I3 July 72 J-M & Co. Archive,Box Shanghai I859, i859. J. Whittallto J. Jardine,Shanghai, 2I October 68 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. I 59, to A. Heard, I859. MCMASTER. ". .. ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 32I lentforce to a Britishconsul's rueful comment that the Japanese had "evidently studied Machiavel."73Bakufu tactics can be followedin Harris'sletters. His immediatereaction was thatYokohama "can onlybe consideredas a new De- shima."74Several weeks later after an interviewwith the bakufuforeign ministers, he reportedthat they had agreed to a Kanagawasite but wished to examine the ground again beforeselecting one.75 A monthlater Harris wrote that the matter was so faradvanced thathe could state "the quarter will be onthe To Ky Do, which as youknow was the vital question."76 Apparentlya location was finallyagreed for in mid-October.Harris wrote to Manabe Akikatsuthat as thesite had been selected the Yokohama customs home should be moved toKanagawa.77 Early in December he was still advising Americans that "the best interests ofall will be advancedby refusing to reside at Yokohama, and I amalso of the opinion that whenthe Japanese see thatwe arebuilding at Kanagawathey will require all foreigners togo there as theydo not desire to have two distinct settlements for them. In themeantime theywill do all theycan to induce short-sighted persons to prefer a residence at Yokoha- ma."78In DecemberHarris wrote that he had finallygotten the bakufuto acceptKa- nagawa.79By thenit was toolate. The tradewas firmlysettled at Yokohama. In thewinter of i86o theforeign diplomats quietly accepted defeat. Skilful diplomacy in a littleless than a yearhad undone a majoradvance of the Harris Treaty. At Nagasaki Japanesestudents told their Dutch instructor that the bakufu swelled with conceit as it broadcastits triumph over the foreigners.80 The bakufu'svictory did not alter the task of foreign diplomacy. It merelymade it more difficult. Becauseit madehis job moredifficult, Alcock complained to London.8'The Foreign Officereplied philosophically that Yokohama was all rightas longas theforeigners were notconfined there.82 In theautumn Alcock issued a circulartelling British subjects to moveto Kanagawa.The largermerchant houses such as Jardine,Matheson & Co. tried tocomply by renting lots at both places.83 The bakufuaccepted applications for Kanagawa lotsbut did notanswer them. Nor did Britishmerchants think that it would.84 Alcock retaineda grudgeagainst the merchants who had moved into Yokohama throughout his

73 Hodgson,p. 26. 80 J. C. Pompe van Meerdervoort,VJ/f 7aren 74 Harris Papers, Book 4, No. I37 to Cass, en7apan, Leiden, I867, II, 57. 4 JulyI859. 81 F.O. 46, III, to Malmesbury,Edo, I4 July 75 Ibid., No. i8i to Cass, 22 JulyI859. i859. 76 Ibid.,No. I 59 to A. Heard,22 AugustI859. 82 F.O. 46. II, to Alcock,London, 7 October 77 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. 227 to Manabe, i859. Edo, I5 OctoberI859. 83 J-M & Co. Archive,Box ShanghaiI859, to 78 Ibid., No. 267, to Mr. Warden, Edo, 9 W. Keswick,20 OctoberI859. DecemberI859. 84 J-M & Co. Archive,Box Yokohama I859, 79 Ibid., No. 269, to E. Rice, Edo, I9 Decem- J.Barber toJ. Whittall, 5 OctoberI859. ber I859. 322 MonumentaNipponica, XXII, 3-4 stayinJapan.85 This too had been typical of his attitude in Chinawhere he had tended to blamemerchants for behaving as merchants.86 Yokohamawas largerthan Deshima. In additionthe wish to staywithin the letter of thetreaty while violating its spiritcalled for more sophisticated measures. The object was thesame. The majormethod by which the bakufu exploited its advantage was tradi- tional.That methodwas money.Although in timethe Japanese would come to use the Mexicansilver dollar which financed most of the trade of Asia, Africa, and passed for legal tenderin NorthAmerica, it wouldbe strangeto themat first.Therefore Harris wrote a simpleexchange provision into his treaty. It hasbeen argued about ever since. Reamsof discussion have been written on thematter, yet it waseasy of solution at the time.The twoPerry expeditions had broughtMexican silver dollars with them from China.Having retained better than an 8o% purityfor more than three hundred years, thiscoin passed current nearly everywhere on theglobe.87 If you did notwant it as a coin,you melted it up foringots as theydid in theinterior of China. However you used it,silver remained silver. When Perry's officers went out souvenirhunting, they found thatthe good name of the Mexican did nothelp in Japan. For eachdollar, the bakufu's treasuryofficers at Shimodaand Kanagawa gave them only one oblong silver coin. This had severaldrawbacks. It tookthree of them to equal thedollar in weight,it borethe strangesounding name of ichibu and it did not buy very much at all. However, when they steamednorth to theremote port of Hakodate all was changed.The Americanwarship hadoutrun the bakufu's orders, for here there was as yetno customshouse to exchange monies.When their dollars were weighed in thescales which every shopkeeper seemed to possess,88they were given three ichibus instead of one fortheir dollars. Prices were accordinglycheaper. These shopkeepershad bookswith pencil impressions of foreign coinsand their Japanese values written next to them.89They were not much interested in theAmerican gold dollars which they weighed, tested for purity and pronounced as worthabout I,200 oftheir small round cash coins with the square hole in thecentre. By contrastthe silver dollar was acceptedeagerly. The Americanswere told that its exchangevalue was threeichibus at i,6oo casheach or 4,800 cashcoins for each dollar.90 A fewweeks of shopping at Shimodataught Harris the same lesson. He beganto fight for thethree-for-one exchange, obtained it forhimself, then for foreign ships buying provi- sionsand finally wrote it intohis treaty.

85 Michie,II, I23. silverlumps as wellas coins."Report on Weights, 86 Ibid.,I, 249-252, also Nathan Albert Pel- Measuresand CurrencyofJapan," Parliamentary covits,old ChinaHands, New York, I948, p. i8, Papers,Accounts and Papers, LXIX (3 869), I867. 67. 89 H. A. Tilley,7apan, the Amoor and the Pacific, 87 JohnMcMaster, "The Use of the Mexican London, i86i, p. I33. Dollar in Asian Trade", HistoriaMexicana, viii, 90 J. D. Morrow,A Scientistwith Perry, Chapel No. 3,January-March I959. Hill, I947, pp. i8o-i8i. 88 Scales werenecessary for the Japanese used MCMASTER. ".. .Foreign Diplomacyin BakumatsuJapan" 323

On thesurface it seemedunfair to theJapanese. At Shanghaithe Mexican dollar ex- changedfor I,300 or so cash.In JapanHarris was demandingthat it exchangefor 4,800 cash.His reasoningwas thatthe purchasing power of cash in Chinawas at leastthree timesthat ofJapan.91 Harris claimed he couldlive more cheaply in Calcuttathat in Shi- moda.92This difference between cash coins inJapan and in Chinahad at leasttwo causes. Cashin China was scarce at thetreaty ports, in Japan it was abundant. Cash in China was ofbrass, its coppercontent giving it a smallbut realintrinsic value. Cash in Japanby I859-60was mostlyiron.93 On assayreports which took values down to 1/,othof an Englishpenny the iron cash is succinctlyvalued "nil."94 Althoughthe worthlessiron cash was thebasis for calculating all Japaneseprices95 and usefulfor making small change, another and larger coin was in moregeneral use.96 This was a well-madeoval coinof copper alloy. It was calledthe Tempi-Ven.97On its faceit borethe worth of I0o cash.In practiceit shareda fatecommon to manylate To- kugawacoins and actuallycirculated at aboutits intrinsic metallic value. Instead of its one-hundredcash face value it passedfor about ten cash.98 This discrepancybetween a fineexterior and a lowcontent was so strikingthat the epithet "TempJ-sen" was common slangfor those whose intelligence was equallybelow par. In copperits intrinsic value as metalwas about two American cents. As itexchanged at aboutfifty to thedollar and seventeento theichibu, both Japanese copper and Japanese silvercoins were at roughlyworld standards in metallicvalue as wellas in purchasing power. Harrisproposed a simplesystem by whichfor the one yearit shouldtake Japanese merchantsto becomeaccustomed to foreignsilver dollars, the bakufu would exchange money.It wouldgive the foreigner, wishing to buyJapanese produce, three ichibu coins foreach of his dollars. The Japanesemerchant who accepteda dollarfor goods would be giventhree ichibus for it. Althoughthe dollars were rung for purity they were ex- changedwithout weighing. It was a simplesystem and should have sufficed.99 Instead,the bakufu were able to turnthis instrument of free trade against its author withsuch good effect that a Britishconsul could write, "Somehow or other, the Japanese Governmentand theforeigners could not agree at all on moneymatters: a remarkable fact,because they are theonly nation on earthwith whom we everhad suchdifficul- ties."100

91 RutherfordAlcock, The Capital of the Tycoon, 95 Harris,7ournal, p. 343, 373. Tilley,p. I3I. London,I863, II, 4I2, makesthe same point. 96 S. Wells Williams,Chinese Commercial Guide, 92 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. I93, to Ota, 8 Hong Kong,I863, pp. 255-257. AugustI859. 97 93 F.O. 46, m, Enclosurei in No. 2I or II 98 Neil GordonMunro, Coins of 7apan, London, August I859 to Malmesbury,also Hodgson, I905, p. I49. XIX, 293, 42, Tilley,p. I3I. 99 Hodgson,p. 299. 94 Hodgson,p. 295. 100 Hodgson, p. i6. 324 MonumentaNipponica, XXII, 3-4

The deviceadopted for meeting the wording of the treaty while violating its spirit wasingenious and wvell in keeping with the bakufu's long history of coinage manipulation. Whenforeigners first went ashore to exchangetheir dollars for ichibus at thecustoms house,everything seemed in order.Treasury officials sat behind their sword racks, the inevitabletea cupson one side,piles of silver coin on theother. Expecting three ichibu coins,the foreigner passed over his dollar. He was giventwo strange new coins. A trial testingin thehand showed them as heavyas a dollarso thatthe weight-for-weight word- ingofthe treaty was being met. The firstattempt to buy souvenirs provided a rude awaken- ing.Prices had gone up 200% ina singlenight. Tempers frayed, arguments grew heated and one Britoneven remembers beating a Japanesemerchant with his walkingcane. Undercover ofdarkness the victim returned to apologize andprovide theproper change. 101 Whathad happenedwas shrewdbut simple.To havethe same purchasing power in thecash coins by whichall priceswere fixed, each of the new coins should have been markedone-and-one-half ichibu. Instead each was markedone-half ichibu. As a halfichibu, eachnew coin had the purchasing power of 8oo cash. Two ofthem, or one dollar's worth, exchangedfor i,6oo cash.Three of the old ichibus,or onedollar's worth, brought 4,800 cash.A bakufuofficial had noticedthat although the Harris Treaty provided for equal weightsof silver exchange, it hadsaid nothing about the purchasing power of that silver in cash.Harris had relied upon the good intentions of the contemporary bakufu negotia- tors.These were lacking in their successors. The foreignerswere neatly duped. Overnight Japanbecame one of the most expensive countries in theworld. There would not be much buyingdone. Whatlittle was done would be veryprofitable for the bakufu. There was already a small silverhalf ichibu coin in circulation. It had been assayed after the Perry expedition at some I7 U.S. cents.Thus a Japanesewho received the new heavy half ichibu from a foreigner hadto turnit in at thecustoms house for its lighter namesake.102 Every time a pairof the newlarge coins was exchangedfor the old smallones, the bakufu had bought I00 cents worthof Western silver for 34 cents. Each time a braceof these new coins made the round tripfrom customs house to foreigner toJapanese merchant and back to the customs house, thegovernment made a profitof over 6o% in puresilver. Unlike gold or copper,silver wasin shortsupply in Japan. Thereremained another loophole to be blocked.Japanese merchants might accept Westernsilver dollars. This was simplicity itself. When they brought their dollars to the customshouse to be exchangedinto Japanese coin they were given one ichibufor each dollar.Again the bakufureceived an ounceof silverfor one thirdof its weight.Once burned,Japanese merchants would not acceptdollars again.103 "If there is one money

101 Tilley, pp. I33-I35. 103 Edward Griffin,Clippers and Consuls,Ann 102 F.O. 46, xxxix, Arbuthnotto Hammond, Arbor,I938, p. 222. Treasury,I S JanuaryI863. MCMASTER. "... Foreign Diplomacyin BakumatsuJapan" 325

forJack and another money for Bill and he will not take mine and I willnot take his, there is notmuch business to be done,nor much free intercourse either."104 "A triumphof financialskill," wrote Alcock, "the Treatythus interpreted would remaina deadletter."105 With his warship still in harbourand supported by Harris, he persuadedthe bakufu to withdraw the new trade coin. Both men recorded success in their despatcheshome. The victorieswere illusory. Having knocked down one obstacle, they merelyfound themselves faced with another. Exchangeat threeicbibus to thedollar would be provided.The treatysaid that it must be. The treatyhowever did notsay howmuch exchange must be provided.Jardine's, withmore money to exchange than most, was able to exchange only $s,ooo of its $60,000 in eightweeks. At Yokohamathe exchange might be $25 a day,while at Nagasakia representativeofone of the largest houses was given$5 withwhich to trade.106 The excuseis usuallymade that the bakufu mints lacked the capacity to furnish enough coins.It seemsdebatable. The combinedcapacity of theEdo and Osaka silvermints seemsto havebeen about nine million ichibus a year or say $3,000,000. 107 This could have financedforeign trade, particularly as foreignersthemselves furnished the silver. Their needswere not so great.Of the twenty merchants at Yokohamaonly five can be easily identified,as connectedwith large China firms: Jardine's, Dent's, Fletcher, Sassoon's, and Walsh,Hall & Company.These couldask forand receive$ioo,ooo or $I50,oooa monthfrom China. Others such as MichaelMoss, Joseph Heco or hispartner G.M. Van Reedcould command no more than ten thousand at most.Again, there were at leastfive monthsin thewinter when almost no producewould be availableas wellas deadspots duringthe summer. The Edo silvermint itself followed a simpleoperation of pouring meltedsilver into strips, cutting it into icbibu blanks with hand shears and then stamping theblanks with a malletand die. Therewas no operationwhich could take more than twentyminutes to learn.Expanding production would have been simple. Since Alcock wasoffered I6,ooo ichibusa day in I859 andtotal production was recorded as being20,000 a dayin i866,there was obviouslynot much effort made in thisdirection.108 The mint wasrecorded as beinga sinecurefor incompetent officials. 109 Combined with a workyear ofonly 240 days,it didnot help production. Alcockknew the falsity of the argument. When bakufu officials explained that there was no steammachinery for the mintwhich had to relyupon humanlabour, the Briton pointedout that the bakufu had no difficultyin finding three or fourthousand labourers to erecta newfort threatening the foreigners at Yokohama."10 The pittanceof money exchanged had the desired effect. Foreigners grew bored with

104 Hodgson, p. i5. rencyofJapan, I867. 109 105 F.O. 46, III, to Malmesbury,I3 JulyI859. Harris,7ournal, p. 322. 106 Hodgson, p. I3. 110 CorrespondencePolitique, i, No. I9, to 107 Munro,p. 220. Walewski,Edo, io DecemberI859, also No. 3I 108 ParliamentaryPapers, Report on the Cur- of26 DecemberI859. 326 MonumentaNipponica, XXII, 3-4 theiridle life. Japanese merchants drifted away in disgust. At theend of August the bore- domended suddenly. A Russiansquadron carrying over one hundred cannon on nineships appeared in Edo Bay.It hadcome to negotiatethe northern boundary on Sakhalin.The bakufumay have beenimpressed by thisdisplay. Certain samurai were also impressed. The fleetprovided an opportunityboth to embroilthe bakufu with a powerfulforeign nation as wellas earn reputationand possible promotion for themselves. On theevening of August 26th they acted. A Russianofficer and twoseamen were ashore at Yokohamabuying fowls and fresh vegetablefor their ship's mess. Burdened with purchases they had just passeda cross streetwhen they were attacked from behind. The officerand a seamanwent down im- mediatelyunder a flurryof chopping swords. The otherseaman escaped wounded into a Japaneseshop whose owner bravely slid fast the door in thefaces of his pursuers. Althougha singleblow of the Japanese sword was usuallyfatal, the victims had been hackedsavagely while lying on theground. The officerhad been "fearfully wounded by twocuts extending over the shoulder blade and crossing at thespine, so deeplyas even to haveinjured the lung, another gash had openedthe skull,while a fourthhad cut throughthe fleshy part of the thigh. . . Butif the officer's wounds were fearful, no words candescribe those . . . ofthe poor sailor ... hishead was split in two down to the nostrils, hisright shoulder cut throughand throughso thathis arm was merelyattached to his bodyby a pieceof flesh. His armsand hands had the flesh sheared off in severalplaces ... hepresented a picture of the most barbarous mutilation.""'1 The officerlived for several hours and died at midnightcalling for his mother. Huddled in thelamplit room, the little group of listening foreigners realized for the first time the dangersof their position in Japan. Thereis onlyone excuse for quoting young interpreter Cowan's gory despatch to Al- cock.The habitof not merely killing but of hacking every bit of life out of a victim,coupled withthe terriblebutchery of theJapanese blade, made a strongimpression upon the foreigners.This colouredall oftheir later actions.112 At Yokohamathey had theresiliency of youth and thecomfort of companionship. At Edo, an olderman cut offby positionand personality from his fellows was alsoim- pressed.An army surgeon in theCarlist Wars, Alcock was to write that he had never seen suchhorrible wounds on any battlefieldas he sawin Japan. At Yokohama,some of the foreigners were "panic stricken ... andnot to do thingsby halves,they swaggered about the streets, armed to theteeth with swords, revolvers and otherhorrible affairs.""13 After several days of painful tumbles caused by theirswords

ill F.O. 46, III, No. 23 enclosure,to Malmes- Service,London, I92I, p. 53. bury,Edo, 3 SeptemberI859. 113 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. 250, to Heard, 112 ErnestSatow, A Diplomatin 7apan,Seeley, i NovemberI859. M c M A S T E R. ". .. ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 327 gettinginconsistently between their legs, they gave it up. Harrisdid not thinkthis displayhad caused the Japanese much concern. Russianretaliation however did worry them, and the bakufu suddenly became friendly towardsAlcock and Harris.14 The formerhad suggested that the bakufu take in foreign dollars,re-coin them into ichibus and return them a fewdays later to theforeigners. The figurehe hadaccepted was i6,oooichibus or just over $s,ooo a day.Harris did not think thatAlcock should have agreed to anyfigure putting a limitupon exchange but saw no reasonwhy Americans should not use thearrangement.15 Alcock had actually told the bakufuthat i6,ooo ichibus per day was notenough for even one foreign trading firm. The figurehad only been accepted upon the bakufu promise that it wouldrapidly increase the sumavailable for exchange.1"6 Jardine's,which had been able to exchangeonly $s,ooo all summerquickly exchanged andinvested $25,000 inJapanese produce, and went another $35,ooo into debt to Japanese dealers.Letters were hurried off to China for more funds. The summer'sminute quantities ofmushrooms, raw silk, silk cloth, seaweed, beans, isinglass (a fishglue used in India ink), be'chedemer (sea slugsor iriko), peas, fish oil, cuttle fish, shrimps, tea and goldcoins, now becamerespectable shipments. Allof these had been kept to small quantities by the lack of exchange. Now as thegood newswent out thatexchange was available,dollars began to pourin fromShanghai to meetproduce coming in fromthe countryside. By September i6th Jardine's agent could reportthat an unusualquantity of silk had comeon to themarket. He contractedfor $30,000worth of it. He alsocollected I,000 tubsof oil. Others were also doing well. The Dutchhad opened the market at nearChina prices for silk. This enforcedcaution upon foreignbuyers. Dent's felt it worthwhileto bring in a silkinspector from China. With his helpthey bought and shipped off"a large parcel" of 200 piculs (the picul was I33 and 1/3 lbs.).Jardine's shipped I70 piculsof silk, received $i5,ooo from Shanghai, another $I0,000 fromNagasaki, spent both and stillowed $35,000 on October24th. After four months at Yokohama,Jardine's loaded its first substantial cargo from Japan."17 This wasin mid-Novemberwhen the "Chryseis" took 2,500 piculsof oil, 2,000 piculs ofseaweed, 250 piculs ofsilk, 3,300 piecesof cotton cloth, 500 piecesof silk cloth, a few hundredpiculs of "muck and truck" isinglass, shrimp, mushrooms, etc., a boxof bad dol- larswhich the customs house had rejected and five boxes ofJapanese gold coins. As "Chryseis"was leaving port, others were loading for sea. The "HenryEllis" carried seaweedfor Shanghai, Dent's had chartered the "Dennis Hill" to take peas to Hong Kong, theDutch barque "Princess Charlotte" was loading seaweed and general cargo for Hong

114 Alcock, I, 247. 117 All tradereferences are fromthe twenty- 115 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. 203, to Dorr, fourYokohama lettersof I859 in the Jardine- I2 SeptemberI859. Mathesoncollection. Dates are mentionedwhen 116 CorrespondencePolitique, i, enclosurein theyseem to have sometopical value. No. i9, to Walewski,IO DecemberI859. 328 MonumentaNipponica, XXII, 3-4

Kong.Another Netherlander, the "Maria Louisa" was takingon the samecargo for Shanghai.With it all,Keswick ofJardine's was ableto assurehis superiors in Chinathat "no onehas gottena greatershare than yourself."18 He wasout of money, too deeply in debtto go on buyingand even giving I.O.U.'s at thecustoms house for export charges. It wasjust as well,for he alsoregretted to informthat the exchange was "againalmost entirelysuspended and now only change is givenfor about $25 perdiem.""119 Assurednow that there would be no immediateRussian retaliation and surprisedby thesudden burst of business at Yokohama,the bakufu had again cut back the exchange. The tradeslowed with it. The excusegiven was thatthe money was neededto rebuild theshogun's palace which had just burned.120 To makethe matter more certain, it forbade Japanesemerchants to bringin morethan token quantities of silk, oil or seaweed.'12 Althoughenough money for trade was neversupplied,122 individuals could gaina temporarymonetary advantage over others, through the system itself. Alcock described thisas being"so entirelywithout system or impartiality that injury has been inflicted on individualmerchants without reason or justification."'123 The systemcould, however, be burlesqued.Exchange was doledout by a simplerule. You nevergot what you re- quested,but the more you requested, the more you received. If you asked for $5o worth ofichibus you might get $5. Ifyou asked for $ioo worth,you might get $io. Oneperceptive foreignernoticing this, simply multiplied his demand and walked off with the bulk of the day'slimited exchange. There was much laughter that night and several imitators on the morrow.As therewas so littleavailable anyway, it did notmatter much who gotit. Requestsfor exchange skyrocketed past the thousands, through the millions, up to the billionsand on into the trillions until one gentleman solemnly asked for $I,200,666,777,- 888,999,222,23 I worthof ichibus. This requestwas fora Mr.Jack Ketch. Foreigners had discovereda variationon the joke.Chits would be acceptedfor persons not physically present in thebuilding, in Japan or in lifeitself Among those requesting exchange were to be foundMr. Wellerout of Pickwick,Mr. Bones of the then popular minstrel shows, the ubiquitous Mr. Lucky Cove, suchBiblical gentlemen as Mosesand Aaron, and a fewobscenities.124 Theseflights of fancy seem mainly to havebeen confined to twomerchants, Tatham and Eskrigge.They venturedseveral extensive efforts. Initiator seems to havebeen a Mr. Telgewith a simplerequest for $250 millionworth of exchange. The finaloffender, youngJardine's clerk, Mr. Barber,requested a merefour million for himself, Jones (A

118 J-M& Co. Archive,Box YokohamaI859, toJ.Whittall, i6 NovemberI859. to J. Whittall,Yokohama, ii NovemberI859. 122 Michie, II, 2I. 119 Ibid. 123 F.O. 46, III, enclosureNo. 2 in No. 42, to 120 CorrespondencePolitique, i, Manabe to de Russell,io DecemberI859. Bellecourt,i5 November I859. In No. i6 to 124 ParliamentaryPapers, Printed Correspon- Walewski,Edo, i5 NovemberI859. denceRespecting the Stoppage of Trade in Japan, 121 J-M & Co. Archive,Box YokohamaI859, presentedto theCommons, 2I Februaryi86o. MCMASTER. "... ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 329

Jardine'scaptain), Troas (his ship),and "A. Friend."As Barber'sbusiness letters were so vaguethat his superiors did not know what he was doing in the market,'25 he was soon sentback to Chinawhere there would be moresenior men on handto supervisehim.126 Thejokes of young men at Yokohama did not seem very funny to an older man at Edo. Whenthe exchange supply he had negotiated was cut offby the bakufu after only six weeks, Alcocksat downto writea despatchto London.There it was printedin Parliamentary Papersand has become part of almost every subsequent history ofJapan. In commonwith all ofhis despatches it is lengthy.Even after tutoring by Heusken, bakufutranslators could only write short letters in bad Dutch.With almost no English whatthese men can havemade of Alcock's tortuous logic and fulsomeVictorian style cannothave been much. Presumably most went unanswered as simplybeing incompre- hensible.127Alcock rejected a bakufucomplaint that his letters were not understood and tookmany days to translate,128 but his French colleague described one ofAlcock's consular noticesas "a veritablevolume" which he did not have time to translate for his superiors.129 One is carriedalong on a powerfulflow of excellent prose through which the underlying factsare seen but dimly. Although it is anarduous business the November ioth despatch is worthsome attention.130 Alcockbegins by looking "to theindiscreet conduct, to usethe mildest term, of many, ifnot all theforeign residents." Harris thought that "a portionof them are neither pru- dentnor discreet."'13 Arriving in Japan two or three years later, a Britishdiplomat wrote that"a smallminority"'132 misbehaved. Given "the innumerable and daily recurring caus- es ofdispute and irritation between the Japanese officials of all gradesand theforeign traders,both as to thenature of the trade they enter into, and the mode in whichthey conductit, openin manyinstances to graveobjection," Alcock could not but wonder "at theexistence of muchill-feeling." A favourablebiographer, who had also been a Britishmerchant in Chinaand Japan during Alcock's service there, noted that years beforewhen Chinese officials had impeded trade, Alcock had not blamed them. Refusing to admitany deeper or more general causes, he hadclaimed that rudeness or imprudence by Britishindividuals was solelyresponsible for treaty violations.'33 Greater age had merelysettled this opinion. It wasa convenientline to takeabsolving the diplomat from enforcinga treaty. Some eight days later the French charge mentions nothing about the

125 J-M & Co. Archive,Box ShanghaiI859, Walewski,3 DecemberI859. to W. Keswick,22 OctoberI859. 130 F.O. 46, iv, No.4I, Alcockto Russell,Edo, 126 Ibid.,to JosephJardine, 28 NovemberI859. IO NovemberI859, enclosureNo. 7, Alcock to 127 For a similarsituation see W. G. Beasley, bakufuforeign ministers, 8 November I859. "The Language Problemin the Anglo-Japanese 131 HarrisPapers, Book 5, No. 7, to Cass, i Negotiationsof I854", BulletinoftheSchoolof Orien- Augusti86o. taland African Studies, xiI, part 3, I950. 132 LordRedesdale, A Tragedyin Stone, London, 128 CorrespondencePolitique, IV, NO. 9I, en- I9I2, p. I73. closesAlcock to bakufu,II Julyi86i. 133 Michie, I, 253-254. 129 CorrespondencePolitique, I, No. 2I, to 330 MonumentaNpponi ca, XX, 3-4

exchange,devotinghishomedespatchto thebakufu's thoroughgoing restriction oftrade.134 Writingat thesame time as Alcock,Harris mentions no troublescaused by foreign mer- chants,only that his old entente cordiale with the bakufu is gone,its animosity is nowvery real.135 Havingcharged all theforeign residents with misbehaviour and gone on to claimthat samemisbehaviour caused Japanese animosity towards foreigners, inboth of which opin- ionshe was apparentlyalone, Alcock moved on to surerground. Everyone agreed with himwhen he mentionedthe drunken disorder of sailors ashore. Burlesquing a consular court,Japan Punch noted that "several sailors were fined for having returned to their shipssober in violationof the practice of the service."136 Two monthsbefore the Alcock despatch,the British consul at Nagasakihad hired a constableand paid $io for"a pairof handcuffs-muchneeded."'137 In Japaneseports W.S. Gilbert'sBritish tar was indeeda soaringsoul, and no doubt his fist was ever ready for a knock-downblow. That this should botherthe Japanese authorities very much is doubtful.Japanese merchants did quite well doingbusiness with sailormen. If a Japanesemerchant profited from the foreigners, a bakufuofficial shortly profited from the merchant. Japanese police were accustomed to draggingsword-waving samurai drunks to the groundwith long fire hooks.138 A for- eigner'sfists cannot have been very frightening. Yokohama was a kindergartencompared to thebrothel quarters of nearby Edo. Aftertwo false notes Alcock had struck a trueone with his drunken sailors. He went on to another:"The foreignershave, without distinction of nation, the enmity of a large classof feudal princes and theirretainers ... thehappy state of order and obedience on whichKaempfer and Thunberghave been so eloquent... arepictures which have but littlefoundation in reality... theyneither desire our trade nor our friendship." Leading fromthis solid ground upon which all foreigners were agreed, he launches on toa personal opinion."All commercialand politicalrelations under such circumstances must be in greatdegree unsatisfactory and unpromising for the future were there no othergrounds ofdistrust and irritation. But our own people. . . takecare that there shall be no lackof these.Utterly reckless of the future, intent only on profiting,ifpossible, by thepresent momentto theutmost, regardless of Treaties or futureconsequences, they are wholly engagedjust now in shippingoff all thegold currency ofJapan. This can only be effected surreptitiouslyin defiance of Japanese laws and edicts and with small regard to Treaty objectsor obligations." The phrase"regardless of Treaties" is a surprisingone froma diplomat.The treaty specificallyallowed for the export ofJapanese gold coin. Harris had prohibitedit in his

134 CorrespondenceCommerciale, i, Edo, 136 A magazineirregularly issued at Yokohama. I859-6I, No. i6, toWalewski, i8 NovemberI959. This is froman I866 issue. 135 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. 257, to Cass, 137 M. Paske-Smith,p. 256. 7 NovemberI859. 138 Alcock, I, 243. M c M AS T E R. ". .. ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 33I draftof the proposed treaty. It was thebakufu itself who had proposed the export of gold andsilver coin to theastonished American.139 As to beingwholly engaged in shippingoff gold, this would have left precious little timefor the shipment of silk, seaweed, tea, oil, shrimps and the rest. Many of these articles requiredconsiderable repacking before shipment, as wellas a greatdeal of time in weigh- ing,passing through customs, loading on to lighters,and checking on to theship's deck. Tea, forexample, arriving at Yokohamain jars had to be repackedinto tea chests. Alcock musthave known this. The thingold coins would not ballast, much less fill a ship,and loadedships were leaving Yokohama. The goldcoins themselves were brought to Yokohamaby Japanese and offered to the foreigners.The latterdid not go out and seekthem. On NovemberI7th Keswickof Jardine'swrote that he had to refuse gold coins as hehad no more money. It wasone of the fewproducts theJapanese had to offer, and some small businessmen are said to have gotten theirstart by selling gold to foreigners.The Frenchconsul at Yokohama,Jose Loureiro, was alsoa merchantbuying and shipping gold coins. He reportedthat they were sent to Yokohamaby daimyo. The profitto thesewas supposedlyabout 30%. Afterthe trouble ofshipping and sale at Shanghai,the foreigner earned 50%.140 One saleof shirtings and chintzesis recordedas beingpaid for in gold coins, 200 ofthem.141As thecoins were boxed andpassed through the customs it is doubtfulthat the bakufu officials did not know what wasin the boxes. When it chose to stop the export it did so, simply by its police powers.142 The thingold coins sold for seven or eight ichibus, say $2.30 to$2.50 toforeigners atYoko- hama,and were insured for shipment at $3.50.143 As theJapanese coast was treacherous, andwithout lighthouses, it may be assumedthat the insurance value was fairlyclose to thesale price. That all thegold coinage of the country was shippedoff is also unlikely.The bakufu didnot complain of it. Goldwas reported as beingin plentifulsupply, whereas the silver whichpurchased it was scarceand welcome.144 Gold was simplylumped with all other producebeing exported by foreigners.145 Followingits traditional method of meeting financial difficulties, the bakufu was causing an inflationby increasing the quantity of coinage in thecountry. Millions in ironcash, coppertempos, other metal varieties and papermoney were being issued. To thiscould be addedthe surplus of foreign silver left by a veryfavourable balance of trade. Inflation

139 Harris,7ournal, p. 529 Yournal,p.409. The profitHarris mentions is not 140 CorrespondenceCommerciale, Edo, I859- onJapanese but on foreigngold and was owingto 6i, i, No. I2, to Walewski,29 OctoberI859. theexchange rates between Asia, through London 141 J-M & Co. Archive,Box YokohamaI859, to America.He was not profitingat theexpense toJ.Whittall, 2I NovemberI859. ofJapanese.Cf. W. L. Neumann,p. 56. 142 Ibid.,3 DecemberI859. 145 J. McMaster, "The JapaneseGold Rush 143 Ibid.,i5 DecemberI859. of i859", 7ournalof Asian Studies,xix, No. 3, 144 E. g., ratherthan melt and use foreigngold May I960. coins,the bakufusold themto Harrisfor silver. MN: XXII, 3-4 F 332 MonumentaNipponica, XXI, 3-4 wasuseful as a nationaldefense measure, but as alwaysthe economy suffered rapidly risingprices.146 These were blamed upon the foreign export of goods including gold.147 The bakufudid notwant its goldback. Jardine's could not sell them gold bars six months later.148These barswere such a gluton theChina market that Jardine's cancelled all furthershipments from San Francisco.149 Had therebeen any need for gold in Japan, the Californiaships usually stopped at Yokohamaand/or Nagasaki before proceeding to China. Ifthe gold export was not actually doing Japan much damage, Alcock's reporting of it thoroughlyblackened the reputations ofthe British merchants inthat country. It achieved sucha successthat the Secretary of the India and China Association wrote to theForeign Officeregretting that the conduct of British merchants had caused the Japanese to stop thetrade.150 Since it was thestoppage of trade by thebakufu which had caused the mis- conductthis was a tourde forceof misrepresentation. Itsripples spread far afield. The LondonTimes eventually reached Batavia where the Netherlands governor general wrote to hisrepresentative inJapan not to letDutch citizens take part in therobbery.15' This notearrived in Japan during the summer of i86o somesix months after the gold export hadceased. The Frenchconsul general ordinarily cooperated fully with Alcock, but theattack uponthe foreign merchants was toomuch for him. He wrotean articleattacking Alcock in a Parispaper and sentalong clippings from the China Coast Press pointing out that onlysailors caused any trouble.152 To hissuperiors he wrotethat the pranks of some of Alcock'snationals did not in anyway justify the bakufu treaty violations which had given riseto them.153 As to theactual gold export from Japan it was solvedeasily enough. With the defeat ofits special trade coin in July the bakufu had to thinkagain about its coinage. One of its foreignministers wrote to Harrison thesubject. Old ideaswere dying hard. The bakufudid not wish to giveup itstraditional profit on coinageoperations, above all on silvercoins. Harris pointed out thatwhereas Japanese silverwas at worldvalues, Japanese gold coins were not. The answerhe suggestedwas simple.154Gold coinswere not in circulationat theirbook value of one gold coinfor

146 Paul Einzig, How Money is Managed, to the Commons,2I Februaryi86o. Penguin,I954, p. 38, I99. 151 ConsulaatYokohama, Bundle i, Batavia, 147 E. J. Hamilton,American Treasure and the 7 May i86o to de Wit enclosingthe London PriceRevolution in Spain,Harvard, I934, pp. 283- articleas reprintedin theJavasche Courant. 285 describesa similarsituation in Spain. 152 CorrespondenceCommerciale, i, clipping 148 J-M & Co. Archive,Box Nagasaki i86o, fromLa Patrieof I9 Februaryi86o. toJ. Whittall, 3 May i86o. 153 CorrespondencePolitique, i, No. 2I, to 149 Ibid.Box Hong Kong i86o, to Parrottand Walewski,3 DecemberI859. Co., Hong Kong,I0 Augusti86o. 154 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. I93, to Ota, 150 ParliamentaryPapers, Correspondence Res- Edo, 8 AugustI859. pectingthe Stoppage of Trade inJapan, presented M CMASTER. ". .. ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 333 foursilver ichibus. Rather, they were hoarded by daimyo,upper-ranking samurai and wealthymerchants. In a countrywhich knew no banksthese lightweight coins were the bestmeans of concentrating wealth. If a new goldcoin worth intrinsically four ichibus werestruck and issued, there would be no problem.There were already several issues of goldcoins of different metallic values and different ages sellingfor different prices. The newcoin would merely fill the empty slot at theofficial rate. As it wouldnot be worth exporting,Japan would have a gold currency.The bakufufinally took this advice six monthslater. The exportstopped. What had happened in theinterim was its own fault. Althoughaccepting Alcock's claim that the Yokohama merchants were scoundrels, LordRussell made the same point as hadHarris some seven months earlier. The remedy to anygold export lay in thehands of the bakufu which had only to adjustits coinageto worldvalues. Russellalso reminded Alcock of his power to deportany British subject whomisbehaved.155 As there had been time for reflection no onewas deported. Alcockdoes not mention a far more damaging coinage export. That was in the shipment ofold coppercash coins from Nagasaki. Unlike the gold, it was prohibitedby treaty. Unlikethe gold coins which probably did not exceed IOO,OOO pieces,the copper cash were exportedby themillions. In thesingle year of i86o,93,869,900 cash were reported as reachingShanghai.156 Again unlike the gold which was kept in private hoards, the copper cashwas theactual currency of the country. Its replacementby greatquantities of iron cashcannot have helped but raise prices for the poor.157 As it had beenfor years, this tradewas in Chinesehands and remainedso. Althoughwilling, Europeans could never seemto bribe their way into the operation by which bakufu customs officials and Chinese tradersdrained Japan of its coppercash. This happenedat Nagasaki,which is perhaps whyAlcock does not mention it. Goldis moreinteresting, and in thiscase it was only twentymiles away at Yokohama. Alcockhad built up a pictureof an entireforeign merchant community recklessly in- sultingbakufu officials and breakingJapanese laws to ship offall the gold coin ofthe country withno thoughtto thefuture and at theexpense of all legitimate trade. His colleaguesin Japandid notrecognise this picture at all. It is onlyat its very end that the motive behind this blend offact and fiction is disclosed. Althoughthe murderers of the Russians were well-known popular heroes,158 orperhaps becausethey were well-known popular heroes, the bakufu made no arrests.The daybefore writinghis despatch, Alcock had received word that a Chineseservant, a British national fromHong Kong, had been murdered in Yokohama. An employee of Dent's, he hadbeen

155 CorrespondencePolitique, II, Cowley to thissubject is bestinvestigated from Japanese Thouvenel,Paris, 28 Februaryi86o enclosing businessrecords, personal letters, diaries, etc. Russellto Alcock,London, 25 Februaryi86o. The authorhopes that Japanese scholars will add 156 Paske-Smith,p. 2II. tohis knowledge on thissubject. 157 OfficialTokugawa recordson coinagedo 158 Satow,p. I38. not always coincidewith actual usage so that 334 MonumentaNipponi ca, xxI, 3-4 killedon thefirm's doorstep. A lanternhad been thrust into his face to blindor identify himwhilst he was run through from behind. Counting on theprotection of their masters, theChinese made a pointof insulting samurai customs.159 Often they wore European clothes,so whetherthe man was killedfor some misbehaviour of his own,simply as a foreigner,or mistakenfor a European,is unknown.The nightwas dark.To an isolated manat Edo itdid not make much difference. He hadhardly finished reading of this killing whenhis own life was threatened. Ridingfor exercise on theTakaida, only a fewyards from the gate of his legation, a drunkensamurai blocked the way. When one of the grooms tried to stophim pushing Alcock'shorse towards the roadside, he put hishand to hissword and threatened to cut theman down. Armed only with a ridingwhip, Alcock writes that he was ready to inter- pose himselfbetween samurai and groom.At thispoint his interpreter,Dan Kitchie, pointeda pistolat thesamurai. "But for this, both the groom and myself might have very probablybeen wounded if not murdered by this ruffian, maddened with drink and armed to theteeth."160 In consequencewhat has been described as a "trulybrave despatch" 161 seems to have beenjust theopposite. The attackupon Alcock coming as it doesat theend of the long despatchseems to tietogether the whole lengthy skein of truth, half-truth and misinfor- mation.If it is thepanic response of a frightenedman, then the story makes sense. If later on,after emotions had cooled, Alcock realised that he had gone too far, the story had been giventoo much publicity to be retracted. His consularcircular written at thesame time is posedin ratherdifferent terms than his despatchto London.162The Yokohamamerchants were better informed than his ForeignOffice superiors. The majortheme of this notice is thatthe acts of any one foreigner reactupon all foreigners. The innocent may suffer for the guilty. There have been murders ofgreat "atrocity and vindictiveness." The Russianswere killedbecauseofthemisconduct ofother sailors ashore. The Chinesewas killedbecause of the misconduct of some other foreignresident. Alcockattacks Keswick ofJardine's. Surely Mr. Keswickcannot mean it as an excuse thathis firm made a falseapplication to thetreasury for exchange because others were doingso? He cannotmean it as a justificationthat he was defending the interests entrust- ed to hiscare. He mightas wellseize the treasury officials by thethroat and demand ex- change.The lastphrase is literaryfancy but the earlier attack displays a curiouslack of understandingofthe British trade he was paid to promote.When Keswick justified a falseclaim at thetreasury as defendingthe interests entrusted to his care it was the simple truth.He was entrustedwith investing other people's money in Japaneseproduce. If

159 Hodgson, p. 284. 161 Lord Redesdale(Mitford), p. I73. 160 F. 0. 262, III, enclosureNo. 9, Alcock to 162 Enclosed in CorrespondencePolitique, bakufu,8 NovemberI859, in despatchNo. 37, I, No. 2I to Walewski,3 DecemberI859. to Russell,io NovemberI859. M c M ASTE R. "... ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 33 5 theJapanese government would not adhere to thetreaty then each foreign merchant mustdo thebest he couldunder the circumstances. The responsibilitylaywith the foreigndiplomats to enforce the treaty. The noticecloses with a statementthat it was betterthere should be no trade at all than a tradewhich included gold coins. It is a curious statementfrom a diplomatsent to enforce a commercial treaty. Ifa combinationofignorance and fear had caused the attack upon the British merchants, theignorance was gone a monthlater. Early in Decemberthe three foreign diplomats joinedtogether at Alcock'srequest against what all nowrecognized as a deliberate bakufucampaign against foreign trade.163 Reports from Nagasaki, Hakodate and Yoko- hamawere similar. The only exception was that restrictions were more severe at the first twoports. From all three came the story of bakufu officials forbidding Japanese merchants to bringcertain goods for sale, fixing high prices on goodssold, allowing only small quantitiestobe sold, demanding squeezes from Japanese who sold to foreigners and from foreignerswho wished customs permits, coolies or lighters.A limitedexchange was unfairlydistributed. Japanese who attacked foreigners went free. Japanese who broke contractswith foreigners shared their advance payment with the officials and both en- joyedthe profits ofthe theft. It wasa melancholypicture. Actingas leader of the foreign diplomats Alcock wrote the two bakufu foreign ministers foran appointment. The answver was insulting. They did not have an hour to spare, he hadbest see two subordinate officials. Alcock replied that as it was a questionof peace or warthey had best find an hour.164They did. On Decembergth the three foreign representatives jointly accused the Japanese of deliberatelyviolating almost every clause of the treaty. They carried on theattack for fourhours. Most severe was Harris speaking as a manbetrayed. After warning the inter- pretersnot to water down his meaning, Alcock carried the attack until he was too tired tospeak any longer, upon which de Bellecourttook it up.The joint effort was an utter failure.The foreigners were answered with the standard argument. Foreign trade was drainingthe country of necessities, therefore prices were rising. Rising prices caused sufferingand anger among the people. This anger resulted in themurder of foreigners. Foreignersmust leave Edo and Yokohama and go back to Nagasaki and Hakodate. Then theywould be safe.Alcock demanded they stop the murder of foreigners. The Japanese repliedthat there was no lack of young swordsmen inJapan anxious to demonstrate their courage.Through his interpreter, theAbbe Girard, the French diplomat asked if this was anexcuse or a threat?The priest replied that it was the latter. The final word was from theJapanese side. Were the cannons being sent as a giftby Napoleon III rifled? De Bellecourtsummed it upsimply. "In truththe treaties no longer exist, we merely

163 CorrespondencePolitique, I, No. 2I, to Walewski,6 DecemberI859 enclosingbakufu to Walewski,3 DecemberI859. Alcock,5 December and his replyof the 6th. 164 CorrespondencePolitique, i, No. 23 to 336 MonumentaNipponica, XXII, 3-4 playwith promises and words." Against bakufu reaction there existed no further weapon exceptforce. "It is thelast cardto play."165 The interviewwas much more than a temporarysetback for the Briton had finished by threateningthe bakufuwith war. The Japanesewould not be bluffed.Although there wereusually one or twoBritish warships visiting Japanese ports there was no British squadronstationed in Japan. Having suffered a defeat at thehands of the Chinese at the Peihothe previous summer, Alcock knew that naval energies would be tiedup in China whensummer brought good sailing weather again. From London he earneda rebuke, LordRussell writing, "You shouldnot havethreatened war. . . we risk... earninga reputationfor quarrelling with every nation in theEast."166 Worse, Alcock had earned thecontempt of the bakufu for threatening a war he couldnot make.167 Harrishopefully asked for another interview alone. At thejoint interview he had scornedthe bakufu as notbeing the ruler ofJapan as it claimedbut merely a delegatefor thedaimyo. If it continuedin its presentpath, war would be inevitable.With war the bakufuwould lose its power of negotiating as thegovernment ofJapan. He developedthis themeat hisprivate interview on DecemberI3th, taunting them that the daimyo, not thebakufu, were the defactogovernment ofJapan. If war came, the foreigners would no longerrecognize the bakufu but wouldnegotiate with the Mikado at Kyoto.These last remarkshad a profoundeffect.168 Whetherit wasimpressed by thisthreat or whether it trustedHarris personally, as a manwhose veracity had been tested for more than three years, is uncertain.In contrastto thegloomy reports of the British and French, he was ableto writeWashington that the bakufuhad promised to make 20,000 ichibusavailable a dayfor trade, to stampforeign dol- larswith the value of three ichibus and the bakufu seal, to punishofficials interfering with tradeand to takehis advice of the previous August and strike a newgold coin.169 Whetheror not the officials were punished, some dollars were stamped, more exchange was madeavailable, and the new gold coin was issued. Harris who had been given a de- liberatelyinsulting reception by theshogun in Novemberwas promisedanother with properceremonial. Harris assumed that his insistence on thishad caused the removal of ManabeAkikatsu from his office as rjffiin charge offoreign affairs.170 A week later he could

165 Described by de Bellecourtin Corres- i6 Januaryi86o. pondencePolitique, i, No. I9 to Walewski,io 169 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. 278, to Cass, DecemberI859. The Japanesenegotiators were I6January i86o. Manabe Akikatsu and a new roji for foreign 170 l4p-4 *. Ibid.,No. 279, to Cass, i Feb- affairsidentified as WakisakaNakatsukasa ),A. ruaryi86o. De Bellecourtthought Manabe was 4 -. The lattercommented on swordsmen. merelytired of negotiating with foreigners noting 166 F.O. 46, Iv, No. 44, Russell to Alcock, that he retained his position as rnjgfi t . London,28 Februaryi86o. CorrespondencePolitique, Ii, No. 23, January 167 Hodgson, p. I63. i86o. 168 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. 278, to Cass, McMAsTER. ".. .ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 337 writethat his relations with the new ministry were so pleasantas to remindhim of his firstvisit to Edo in i857.171 Whetheritwas the force of Harris' argument, the embassy leaving for the United States inFebruary, or the feeling it mighthave gone too far for the moment, the bakufu did relax its restrictions. WritingWashington of his success, Harris begged indulgence for theJapanese govern- mentowing to its longexclusion and ignoranceof commerce. He answeredits fearof exportscausing hardship by offeringto prohibitany export which it couldprove was causingsuffering to the Japanese people.172 This offerwas neveraccepted. Alcockshowed the Dutch consul from Yokohama the government's letter announcing thatdollars would pass at threefor one and that this notice would be postedthroughout thecountry. Van Poelsbroek thought that relations between bakufu and diplomats were better.In spiteof this, Alcock told him he loathedthe bakufu for all thedifficulties it had made.Because of them Japan must be madeto repenther deeds. At thismoment, Harris cameto calland defended the bakufu. Resentfully Alcock said "Harris, you always excuse Japanesemisdeeds."173 A smallopening crack had begun to appearbetween the two men who had previously workedso welltogether. The immediatereason for Alcock's feelings seems to havebeen anothermurder, to whichhis reaction cannot have suited Harris very well. Alcock'sJapanese interpreter had beena commonfisherman. As a castawayworking on Americanships he had learnedspoken English. Now underthe protectionof the foreignershe swaggeredabout wearing Western clothes and carryinga Colt revolver. Whenout riding with his foreign employers he returned samurai insults freely. By point- inghis revolver and threatening to shoothe mayhave saved Alcock's life in November, I859. The presenceof thisman at negotiationsmust have infuriatedbakufu officials. Morepractically he is saidto haveinterfered in the profits of the Japanese guarding the Britishlegation. These samurai marked up theprice of all suppliesentering the legation, thedifference augmenting their own meagre salaries. The bakufuwarned Alcock of the man's danger. Neither the warning nor Dan Kitchie's Coltdid him any good. While talking to somechildren he was runthrough from behind infull daylight. At leasta dozenpeople saw the murderer. Dan was notonly figuratively but literallyunder the protection of the Union Jack. He was leaningupon the legation flagstaffat the time. With death at hisown gate Alcock had reason for nerves. When the governorsofYokohama refused to attend the funeral of the commoner, Alcock threatened to landthe entire crew of "H.M.S. Roebuck,"send to Chinafor a fleet174and even quit

171 Ibid.,No. 280, to Cass, 6 Februaryi86o. sulaatYokohama, Bundle i, No. 22, 2I February 172 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. 278, to Cass, i86o to de Wit. i6January i86o. 174 CorrespondencePolitique, ii, No. 28, to 173 AlgemeenRijksarchief, the Hague, Con- Walewski,4 Februaryi86o. 338 MonumentaNi.pponica, XXII, 3-4 Edo to liveon boardthe warship at Yokohama.175This lastmust have been a blowfor Harris.The Edo residencehad only been secured with the greatest difficulty. The threat workedthe first time. The officialsattended the funeral. Presumably the interview was writtendown for consideration at a higherlevel. It was customary.176A fortnight later Alcockwas toldthat the "Roebuck" should leave. Her presence was "exciting the popu- lace."177 A weekafter writing of his interview wvith Alcock the Dutch consul had burials of his ownto thinkabout. On theevening of February 26th, two Dutch sea captainsfinished theirmeal at theYokohamaHoteland walked out into the moonlit street. Onewas middle- aged,the other sixty, neither were armed. They were going to buy some soy sauce to liven up shipboardmeals. Ten minuteslater they were both dead. Attacked from behind, both hadbeen hacked to bits in themain street of the little settlement. Each had been slashed morethan a dozentimes, the head of one havingbeen deliberately severed with many cuts.Fingers, hands, an armlay about the bodies. Nothing was stolen,one still had one hundredichibus in hispocket. Watches and rings had not been touched. As in mostJapa- nesetowns, every street was closed and gated in the evening and every gate had its watch- man.These gates had been closed at thetime ofthe murders. The watchmenwere on duty but theassailants were never found. Therewas no needfor Alcock to threatena retreatto compelJapanese attendance at thefuneral. The captainof a Prussianwarship in portsimply informed the two Japanese governorsof Yokohama that if they did not attend he would send marines to bring them. Theyattended. The Prussianswerejoined by Russian marines, British sailors, the consuls and thesmall foreign community in theirtrip to thelittle foreign cemetery which was growingsteadily larger. There had now been six killings without the efficient Japanese policehaving found a singlekiller. As fiveof the murdershad been at Yokohama,Ii Naosuke'sclaim that the location was forthe protection of foreigners no longerseemed veryvalid. The foreignersbegan to providetheir own protection.At nighta squad ofRussian marinespatrolled the streets, a dutythey later alternated with other naval vessels. The Netherlandsstationed a warshipat Yokohama,foreigners wore a revolverall day and putit beneaththe pillow at night.The clumsyrevolvers were not much use as weapons. It tooka trainedman to usethem accurately, they were slow firing and almost useless at night.Against the usual ambush from behind they were totally without value. But they didhave a deterrenteffect. There were no morekillings inside Yokohama. Twentymiles away at Edo lifewas notso safe.To thebakufu Harris wrote that the sixkillings in six monthswithout an arrestwas theconduct of cannibals in theSouth

175 177 ConsulaatYokohama, Bundle i, No. 22, CorrespondenceCommerciale, No. 56, 2I Februaryi86o to de Wit. includedin PolitiqueIa, 23 Februaryi86o. 176 Hodgson,pp. 46, 48-49. MCMASTER. ".. .Foreign Diplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 339

Seas excitingthe indignation of thewhole civilized world. Continued, it mustbring war and thesubversion of Ii Naosuke'sgovernment.178 The daimyoof the Mito fief, whoseadopted son, Hitotsubashi, had been passed over for the shogunate,' was said to haveordered the killings to bringa foreignwar which might mean his own restoration to power.179 Whateverthe truth of that, there were Mito meninvolved in thenext killing. This timeit was theregent, Ii Naosukehimself, who fell to theswords. As Marchended in a dayof rain and snow,the regent's cortege approached the shogun's castle. The body- guardin strawrain capes had theirsword hilts wrapped for protection, heads bent low intothe storm. Their master was shutinto his palanquin. A suddenrush, the slash of swords,and a bodytumbled from a shatteredcarriage. An attackerrushed away, the severedhead of Ii Naosukegripped by its hair. Fightingbroke out in theMito fief, the Japanese guards furnished by thebakufu to the foreignlegations were doubled and a generalcivil war seemedimminent. Although Ii Naosukehad beenthe author of their misfortunes, his demisedid theforeigners little good.Probably the only man in thebakufu with the resolution to reallygovern, his loss was a seriousblow. He had beentoo conservativeto encourageforeign trade and gain therebythe alliance of those daimyo who profited from it, yet by allowing a minimumof tradehe hadleft himself open to thecharge of being pro-foreign. Thus a sordidpolitical murderbecame a deed ofhigh patriotism. AlthoughAlcock's diplomacy had been a failure,he hadbeen able to improvehis own positionconsiderably. Alcock had come to Japan as consulgeneral. Harris had just been promotedto minister.The Americansuggested Alcock ask forthe same rank to help himnegotiate with the bakufu. It met a consulgeneral with members of its second council, whereasa ministercould deal directlywith the Gorogio'stwo ministersfor foreign af- fairs.180Using Harris as a reference,Alcock promoted himself and asked London to ap- provethe move. This was done.News ofhis promotion arrived in thewinter of i86o. Withpromotion came a risein salaryfrom /i,8oo to ?3,ooo a year.As June ended Alcock founda meansto add almostone thirdagain to thisfigure. AfterJune i 86o,the bakufu was no longerbound by treatyto provideforeigners with Japanesemoney. "On theissue must wholly depend what answer can be giventhe ques- tionof trade or no trade,"Alcock wrote of the exchange.181 Oddly his French colleague complainedthat in practicethe British minister was indifferentLothe matter.182 What- everthe case, the foreign merchants were abandoned to thebakufu. The dollarwhich had

178 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. 293, to bakufuused the same argumentto achievehis own foreignministers, 27 Februaryi86o. promotion.Sadly it wasmerely honorary. 179 Ibid.,No. 302, to Cass, I0 Marchi86o. 181 F.O. 39I, I, toHammond, 3 August i86o. 180 CorrespondencePolitique, i, No. 4, to 182 Correspondencecommerciale, No. 86, to Walewski, I0 SeptemberI859. De Bellecourt Thouvenel,6 Marchi86i. 340 MonumentaNipponica, XXII, 3-4 begunto circulatefreely at threeichibus was nowcut suddenlyto twoand a quarter.183 Alcockdid notjoin hiscountrymen in thisfinancial loss. Rather he accepteda proposal whichthe bakufu had been making for some time. 184 This was to continue the old exchange forhimself, his subordinates and all armyand navy personnel. The arrangementfitted in withsamurai ideas that the official class, even if foreigners, shouldbe privileged.The bakufuapparently regarded this new special exchange for offi- cialsas a bribe.Although it costthe government money the bakufu refused to giveit up whenasked to do so bythe Prussians. It admittedthat three for one was correct but said thenthat its currency needed reform. This would take time.185 In theinterim the diplo- matswould get the right exchange. The assumptionapparently being that Japanese and Englishofficials should not bother themselves about monetarv losses by commonmer- chants.186Alcock did not pressthe bakufuagain on the exchangequestion. Whether throughhonest ignorance or deliberate intent, both bakufu and British diplomat profited by thearrangement. The bakufu,exchanging dollars at just overtwo ichibus, pocketed a profitof about 30 centsworth of silver on everydollar. Alcock and other foreign officials, givenichibus at threeper dollar, sold those they did notwant to foreignmerchants and pocketedthe profit. Ernest Satow, then a youngstudent interpreter, was ashamedof the business.187 Whenthe bakufuproposed the same system at Nagasaki,the American and French consulsjoined the Netherlands consul general in refusing it. It couldonly lead to ill feeling betweendiplomat and merchant as wellas beingopen to misconstructions.Although, as merchants,itwould have given them a distinctbusiness advantage, itwas the two trading consuls,Walsh and Mackenzie,who suggestedthe refusal. The threeagreed to go on fightingfor the old exchange for all.188 Fouryears later the Foreign Office reached the same conclusion. It did notlike the printedremarks about bribery in ChinaCoast papers.189 It had takenfour years and as manyinvestigations atLondon to clear up thequestion. For Alcock inJapan they had been profitableyears.190 Whenhe hadfirst arrived in Japan, Alcock had told the bakufu that the Foreign Office hada strictrule that its servantsshould accept no presentsfrom a foreigngovernment. The new specialexchange posed a question:how to explainto one's superiorsthat a sizeableincrement to one'ssalary is in effectbeing paid by a foreigngovernment?

183 CorrespondencePolitique, i, No. 68,-this 186 Robert Fortune,Edo and Peking,London, is a commercialdespatch included in a political I863, p. 295. volume-to Thouvenel, I9 August i86o. In 187 Satow,p. 26. Capitalof the Tycoon,II, 422, Alcock gives the 188 ConsulaatYokohama. Bundle I, No. 2I3 impressionthat he suggestedthe exchange. de Wit to Walsh,Deshima, II JulyI86o. 184 Ibid.Correspondence Politique. 189 Alcock,II, 433. F.O. 46, XLIX, Treasury 185 F.O. 262, CDLXXX, to Alcock, Edo, 27 to ForeignOffice, 9 JulyI864. Octoberi864. 190 Satow,p. 26. MCMASTER. "... ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 34I

It was done by claimingthat foreignmerchants would cheat British diplomats in exchangingtheir salaries. It wasa matterof simplejustice not to leave the diplomat at the mercyof the Yokohama merchant. 191 During the gold export days Alcock had written a NorthChina paper calling the merchants scum. It wouldno doubt be embarrassingtoask bankingservices from these same men. That theywould cheat him is, on theface of it, ridiculous.Alcock had the power to fine and deport them fromJapan. They competed with eachother for banking business and they looked to theBritish minister to assistthem in theirclaims against the Japanese. Refusing an offerto waivethe commission Harris ex- changedhis salary at Yokohama.The changewas one per cent.192 Alcock made the claim anyway,and his November gold export despatch helped lend authenticity to it. Alcockdid notactually mean the claim that foreign merchants at Yokohamawould cheatthe diplomats.193 This was onlyfor public consumption. At theForeign Office he tolda differentstory. "Sir R. Alcockalways used to admitthat the privilege-viz. a premiumon theexchange of something like 33% wasindefensible inprinciple, only he saidif you take it awayyou must raise our salaries."194 Why a lowlypaid student inter- preterfound himself drinking champagne and running a ponyon ?200 a yearwhile the Britishminister complained of hardship on ?3,000takes a littleexplaining. A partof the answeris simplythat Alcock was a carefulman who was puttingas muchaside towards retirementas possible.Another element also enters the picture. At Yokohamaprices of foodstuffswere high but it was a relativelyfree market as so muchcame in by shipfrom China,Europe and NorthAmerica. At Edo all suppliesfor the legations had to pass throughthe hands of their samurai guards. On oneoccasion the French interpreter, the AbbeGirard, slipped away from his escort and foundthat normal Japanese prices were 200% lessthan what the diplomats had been forced to pay.195 Ifthe foreign diplomats were the victims of an extortion racket at Edo thenthis should havebeen admitted. If nothing could have been done about it thena specialallowance couldhave been made limited to the Edo legations.A moredevious path had been chosen. Havingmade a falseclaim in supportof the official exchange Alcock had still to explain whyit was rightfor diplomats but wrong for merchants. This he did by attackingthe HarrisTreaty. It was "erroneousand viciousand the soonerit is departedfrom the better."196Others followed his lead. It was a "monstrousstipulation"197 and an "extraor- dinary"monetary article.198 It seemsodd thata merchantby training should have gone so farwrong. In facthe hadnot. Eventually the treasury in Londondecided Harris had

191 Alcock,II, 422. io June I863. 192 Harris Papers, Book 4, No. I44, to J. 195 CorrespondencePolitique, ii, No. 48, to Loureiro,Edo, 3 AugustI859. Thouvenel,25 Septemberi86o. 193 Alcock,II, 422. 196 Alcock,II, 4I4-4i6. 194 F.O. 46, xxxix, memo Arbuthnotat 197 Michie,ii, I8. Treasuryto Hammondat ForeignOffice in re 198 Paske-Smith,p. 2I3. Prussianrequest to drop the special exchange, MonumentaNiiirnnica- XXTT. --A beenright and Alcock wrong. It recommendedthat the Foreign Office drop the Alcock exchange,which it didin I864. Forthe merchants in July i86o thebakufu began depreciating the dollar, giving fewer andfewer ichibus for it at thecustoms house. Things never went back to theyear before whenat theopening of trade two half ichibu coins worth 3 5 centsor so had purchaseda silverdollar. Trade had now built a flooringunder the value of the dollar, for if it felltoo lowJapanesemerchants would not bring it to the customs house at all. Instead they would buyWestern imports, usually cotton or woollen cloth, to sellin theinterior. There thus sprangup a freeexchange independent of the government customs house which now had to competewith Japanese merchants to buy dollars.Sometimes falling as low as two ichibus,often between 220 and240, theexchange still left the bakufu a profit on buying and meltingsilver dollars.199 Tradein generalslumped. The smallermerchants who had to turnover their capital quicklyand almost constantly to stayin businessbegan to be forcedout.200 The larger Westernfirms who could ride out a bad seasonor twopersevered, for there were some brightspots.Japan was beginning to develop a demandfor imported textiles which helped workoff surplus stocks from the depressed trade in China.Ships could now takesome cargoinstead of going to Japan in ballast.The tradein foodstuffsto China had beena temporarything. In i86o,an Anglo-Frenchforce fought its way to Peking. As a resultof thisvictory, new river and coastal ports were opened. These, rather than Japan, fed the populationsof Shanghai and Hong Kong. Copper,the old money-maker ofthe Dutch trade, was seldom allowed for export by the bakufu.When it was, those shipments which did go out often proved disappointing against thenew Indian industry at Calcutta.Japan tea was notpopular in Britainbut began to sellin North America. Its export increased steadily at a pacewhich allowed for the plant- ingof the quickly maturing shrubs and the harvesting of previously unpicked leaves. Anotherproduct with a surplusfor export was silk.Unlike tea, its exportboomed withamazing speed. It quicklybecame the life-blood ofJapan's foreign trade, a position it heldwell into the present century. Mulberry plantings took more time to expand than tea bushesbut apparently there were unused trees available as wellas newplantations. Japan'sopening coincided with the silkworm disease which decimated European produc- tionfor the decade of the sixties. By thetime that Pasteur discovered its curein I870, Japanesesilk had become established in theEuropean market. As Europeansilk produc- tionfell, prices boomed in Asia. As export prices soared in Japan, domestic prices increased apace.Roughly ten per cent of the population were samurai families. Many of these suf- feredfrom the price rise. True, they could have worn cottons or woolens,but wearing silkwas one ofthe privileges which set theirclass apart from the commoners. Not all

199Consulaat Yokohama, Bundle 4, P. F. 6 June i86i. Von Sieboldto Ministerof Colonies,Yokohama, 200 J.Heco, I, 277-278. M c M A S T E R. ". .. ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 343 samuraisuffered. With agents at bothNagasaki and Yokohama, the daimyo were doing wellout of foreign trade.201 Their profits, however, were going into their own coffers and notinto increasing the stipends of their dependent samurai. The risein silkprices was certainlyto be blamedupon the foreigners. Other things had alsoincreased, including rice,which Westerners did notexport. Foreigners were blamed for everything. As the lower-rankingsamurai were almost the only group in Japanesesociety who werenot benefitingfrom foreign trade, it was thesemen who had been strikingat foreigners. Althoughtheir motives were often those of personal advancement, the price rise was a realenough grievance. Blame for it was anothermatter. As theprice rise was oneof the excuses for killing foreigners Alcock was worried.His promotionand thespecial exchange rate would be oflittle use to himif he werekilled. A year'shome leave was also owing to himif he could remain alive until I862. His panic- borndespatch of November was not a passingthing. As thenew year began de Bellecourt wroteParis that Alcock was deeplyworried by theinsecurity of their position at Edo. He enclosedAlcock's letter to Lord Russell.202 "With a perpetualmenace of assassination on theone hand and of incendiarism on theother, while earthquakes almost every week shakethe houses to theirfoundations, I cannot say the post of diplomatic agent in Edo is to be recommendedfor nervous people."203 Hearing a rumourin Maythat a newFrench diplomatwas to be sentto Edo from Shanghai, he wrote the Foreign Office to try and stop it. The manwas so devoidof discretion "it mightcost us all ourlives."204 Alcock was sufferingas well from his self-imposed solitude. "You littleknow at theForeign Office whata lifethis is tolead-away from all civilizing influences ... noman can bear it for many yearswithout deterioration.... I amutterly used up andall thesprings of life so spoiled andweakened that life anywhere will be withoutsavour or value."205 Thatsame summer Harris did some shopping for the widow of Commodore Perry-she wantedJapanese vases-sent off his subscriptionsto theEvening Mail, Punch, and In- dependenceBelge, joined a Frenchscientific society sending them some Japanese seeds, askedthe U.S. consulat Singaporeto sendhim some upland rice seeds as thesewould be "a greatboon" to theJapanese, had a properlyceremonial reception by the shogun, wrote happilyof the good reception given the Japanese embassy in Americaand of the growing foreigntrade. As theyear ended finding Alcock utterly used up, Harriswrote that the cordialityof the bakufu left nothing to be desired.206 ForAlcock there was no suchcontentment. Autumn was thehunting season and this huntingbrought him again into conflict with his fellow Britons at Yokohama. These had

201 CharlesDavid Sheldon,Rise of the Merchant 7 Januaryi86o. Classin Tokugawa7apan, New York,I958, p. I62. 204 F.O. 39I, I, to Hammond;5 May i86o. Hodgson,p. I99. 205 Ibid.,i Septemberi86o. 206 202 CorrespondencePolitique, ii, No. 23, to Harris Papers,Book 5, to W. Russell at Walewski,7 Januaryi86o. Shanghai,Edo, ii Decemberi86o. 203 Enclosure in above, Alcock to Russell, 344 MonumentaNipponi ca, XXII, 3-4 preciouslittle available by way ofrecreation, nor very much variety to theirdiet. In consequencethey hunted. It wasnot forbidden by treaty but it was saidto be a violation ofaJapanese edict-there was no codifiedlaw-which forbade the use of fire-arms within twenty-fivemiles of Edo. As thetwo places were only about twenty miles apart, foreigners whowere allowed to travelabout twenty-five miles from Yokohama were bound to clash withthis domestic edict. After the accidental wounding of a Japanesein Hakodatethe matterhad been settled simply. Any shooting in thetown, except in self-defence,would be punished.Hunting outside the town would be allowed.At Yokohamait was notso simple.Riding horseback and carryingweapons were samurai privileges forbidden to commoners.InJapanese society the merchant class was officially the most despised section ofthe common people. Samurai who mighthave allowed foreign officials the privilege wereinfuriated to seeforeign merchants riding and shooting. They may have feared the examplemight spread to theirown people.207 As samuraithemselves demanded fire-arms ofevery European at Yokohama,they did notobject to theweapons as such,so longas theykept a monopolyof their use.208 As thefirst hunting season opened at Yokohama,one of its governorsapproached the foreignconsuls asking them to forbidshooting. Apparently they all did so. The notices didnot carry much force. There was no penalty attached, so thatmany Britons and Amer- icanshunted daily. In Octoberof the following year a Yokohamagovernor said thata Japanesewoman hadbeen accidentally shot by a foreignhunter. Would the consuls again forbid hunting? The Dutchconsul at leastdid so, this time adding a $200fine. He reportsthat his country- menlost their love of the sport. Other foreigners did not. Led by theFrench consul and theinterpreter from the British consulate many still took the field. The governorbecame angryand ordered his police to takethem in.209 This was unknown to theforeigners who hadassumed from watching their own offiicals shoot that the notices would have no more forcethan the previous year. As therewere only some forty or so foreignersatYokohama, it was simpleenough to reportthem to theirconsuls for punishment. The governor seemsto havepreferred seizing the foreigners bodily. The firstvictim must have been a welcomecatch. He was a Germannamed Telge, living under British protection. To the rudenessof customs officials he alwaysreplied by beingat leastequally rude himself. Seizedin thefield, tied and hidden within a sedanchair he was beingcarried to Yoko- hamawhen a passinggroup of British hunters noticed his boots hanging out of the car- riage.One presented a revolver at thepolice and Telge was freed. Two dayslater, a Briton was deprivedof his gameand his weapon by thepolice, but otherwise untouched. The followingday a smalltrader named Michael Moss shot a goose,hired a Japaneseto carry it forhim and turned homewards to Yokohama.At theKanagawa ferry a group of police

209 207 Hodgson, pp. 37I-374. ConsulaatYokohama, Bundle i, No. I74, 208 Alcock, I, 330. to de Wit,30 Novemberi86o. MCMASTER. "...Foreign Diplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 345 seizedthe gooseand advancedupon Moss. Whetherdeliberately or accidentally,his shotgunwent off in theensuing scuffle and wounded one of the police seriously, but not as it was feared,fatally. The policetied up Moss,took him to a Japanesejail andgave him a beatingwith their ironpolice staves. Beaten and bound, he was left in a cell.The foreignconsuls, upon hear- ingof the matter, went to thegovernor. He saidthe man was a Netherlander.The Dutch consulsaid to keephim overnight and he wouldpick him up in themorning. British consulVyse was thereat thetime and advisedthe governor to treatBritons the same way. The two menthen went to havedinner together. As theywere eating, the French ministerde Bellecourtcame in. An excitable man, he declaimedheatedly that police had no rightto beatthe man Moss withiron staves. Polsbroek told the Frenchman that no one shouldshoot police officers, after which they parted with a certaincoolness. Vyse, nowrealizing it was a Britonin jail, did not know what line to take.Polsbroek reminded himof his promise to the governor to leavethe man overnight in jail, but he left the hotel in an excitedframe of mind.210 ConsulVyse reversed his previous decision. The onlywarship in portwas Prussian. He contactedher commander. The latterlanded a squadofarmed sailors. At midnight they freedMoss and took him to theBritish consulate. Polsbroek wrote disgustedly that the Britishofficials thought their countrymen were too good to be touchedbyJapanese police. As he also mentionsa groupof some thirty armed merchants who werepreparing to freeMoss by force, Vyse was probably wise to getthere first with a disciplinedand sober group.As thePrussians had not yet negotiated a treaty, they hardly had the right to be sendingarmed men ashore to breakinto a Japanesejail, but it was probablythe best courseat thetime. 211 Vyse,who was on hisfirst consular post,212 quickly passed the problem to Alcockat Edo. Writingto Londonon January Ist, Alcock begins his letter by saying he is luckyto be aliveto see a newyear. The samuraiassassin is a typeof "bravo" unknown to his China experience.The Britishmerchants are "a lawlessclass of filibusters." Evidence of this wasthe case of Moss; notonly a merchantbut doubly damned as "ofJewishconnection." Alcockapparently shared the anti-Semitismwhich started with the Sovereignand permeatedmuch of the ruling class of Victorian England. "I feltthe absolute necessity of makinga severeexample." The reasonfor this necessity emerges, for his letter ends as it began.It is rumouredthat Mito ronin plan to massacreall foreignersat Yokohama and at Edo where"we areunder a perpetualmenace of massacre."'213 210 Ibid. competent.As Vyse was dismissedfrom the 211 Hodgson,p. i88. consularservice in i868 forbungling a consular 212 ConsulaatYokohama, Bundle i, to de Wit, courtcase theDutchman was probablyright. I7 Februaryi86o, recordsthat the British agent 213 *-P tA. F.O. 39I, I, to Hammond,i of the P and 0 SteamshipCompany asked the Januaryi86i. Dutchconsul to handlehis affairs as Vysewas not 346 MonumentaNipponi ca, xxI, 3-4

Spurredby thisfear the older man bungled the job. He firstordered that in violation oftreaty Moss would not be triedby a Britishconsular court but would be turnedover to theJapanese courts. In thesethere was no codifiedlaw, torture was standardpractice, theevidence given was unreliableand theaccused was notallowed to questionhis ac- cusers.214 Moss wroteto hisfriends "to sendme mypistols as I haddetermined not to go into Japanesehands once more. "215 They had as littleconfidence inbakufu jails as Moss.Almost theentire community, some thirty men, turned out with revolvers and sporting guns at theBritish consulate. Four of them saw Alcock personally. They told him that if he did notkeep Moss in Britishcustody they would take him by force and stand the blame as a community.Alcock gave way. The incidentis notmentioned in his despatches home, but perhapsexplains the term "filibusters." Alcock'snext move with Moss was equallyunfortunate. He hadthe man tried on the chargeof deliberately shooting a Japanesepoliceman in thecourse of his duty.As the Japaneseevidence on thispoint was contradictory,some saying Moss aimedthe gun, othersthat it wentoff when it fellstriking the ground, and one shopkeeper even saying it was in thehands of one of the police when it wentoff,216 it was impossibleto prove. NeverthelessConsul Vyse found him guilty and sentencedhim on twocounts. Alcockfelt this was inadequateand added a third.From distant Nagasaki a merchant wroteto HongKong, "Matters continue in an unsatisfactorystate as a Japaneseofficer hasbeen accidentally shot by a Britishmerchant, a Mr. Moss; thatgentleman had been triedand acquittedby threeassessors called in by H.M. Consulbut Mr. Alcockhad sentencedhim to deportation,the payment of a fineof $i,ooo and threemonths' im- prisonmentin Hong Kong gaol!"217 Alcock'sadditional jail sentenceshowed how he feltabout British merchants. Mackenzie's exclamation point was nearerto thegeneral consensus.All threepenalties were revoked by the ForeignOffice in Londonwhich orderedAlcock to returnthe $i,ooo fineto theYokohama merchants who had sub- scribedit forMoss. Additionally, the Foreign Office had to pay Moss $2,000 damages awardedby a HongKong court for the prison sentence. The Mosscase seems to havebeen bungled because it wasnot tried on its own merits. Rather,it was decidedby fear. The previouswinter, all threeWestern diplomats at Edo hadbelieved in thedanger of attacks by fanatics.218 Alcock was afraid that the wounding of the samuraipolice officer would provoke a retaliatoryattack upon the foreigners. Isolatedin hisEdo legation,he would be a primetarget. Therefore a stern example must

214 F.C. Jones,pp. 79, I04. 217 J-M & Co. Archive,Box Nagasaki i86I, 215 F.O. 46, xxx, to D. Moss, Yokohama,3 Kenneth Mackenzie to Jardine's,Nagasaki, 4 Decemberi86i. Related by Moss in a letterto Januaryi86i. hisfather, forwarded to theForeign Office. 218 CorrespondenceCommerciale, i, No. 6o, 216 Ibid, transcriptof the trial. to Thouvenel,29 March i86o. MCMASTER. "...Foreign Diplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 347 be made.It wasthe same motive which had inspired his gold export despatch a year earlier. Harriswas considering this same problem of samurai killers but from a less personal angle.By treaty the city of Edo was to be opened for residence and trade by foreign mer- chantsin January I862. Onthis subject the three foreign diplomats who lived there were unitedwith the bakufu in opposingthe treaty. Eighteen months' residence had shown Harristhat this provision ofhis treaty might seriously damage relations between Japan andthe West without doing foreign merchants much financial good. Edo was not a pro- ductioncenter but a retailingone, importing itsneeds and exporting nothing. Like Al- cock,Harris was afraid of the samurai swordsmen. "The aggregate number of these re- tainersand followers, all ofwhom are armed, is verygreat-it is saidto be over300,000 men-thecharacter of this class is an importantconsideration; they lead a lifeof idleness andmany of them are exceedingly dissolute; towards those whom they regard as being theirinferiors, they are arrogant and aggressive, they haunt the streets in great numbers- frequentlyin a stateof intoxication-and being always armed are notonly prompt in takingoffence, but ready to seekit."3219 Harriswas notpersonally afraid. "I haveno causefor complaint for myself but when- everI leavemy residence I am attendedby a retinuethat commands respect, and in ad- ditionto thismy official position is wellknown. But themerchant could have no such protection.He couldnot afford to supportsuch an escort,and even if he did retainone, hissocial position would deprive him of nearly all thebenefit of it."220 He did notfind the entire merchant group "filibusters" but did notethat "a portion ofthem are neitherprudent nor discreet" which, combined with the pugnacity of the samurai,could lead to murder. Admitting he had been wrong to include this in his treaty, he joinedwith Alcock and de Bellecourtin askinghis homegovernment to postpone openingEdo to commerce. Harris'sestimate of the dangersof Edo was cruellydemonstrated in Januaryi86i whenthe American lost his oldest companion in Japan. To helpthe Prussians negotiate a treatywith Japan, Harris had loanedthem the servicesof his interpreter,Henry Heusken.Although warned by Harris not to expose himselfat night, Heusken was young andenchanted with the night life of the city. Bakufu officials had remonstrated with him forendangering foreigners at night by taking some Prussians to watch a fire.221Heusken had takenlittle notice and falleninto the habit of visiting the Prussian legation almost nightly,returning between eight and elevenwith only two Japanese mounted guards anda lanternbearer. The nightofJanuary isth was rainyand dark. Passing a sidestreet he was ambushedby a groupof about seven swordsmen. As was theusual custom, his

219 HarrisPapers, Book 5, No. 7 to Cass, i 221 ConsulaatYokohama, Bundle 5, to de Wit, Augusti86o. [8 AprilI862. 220 Ibid.

MN: XXII, 3-4 G 348 MonumentaNipponica, XXII, 3-4 bakufuguards deserted the scene. Armed only with a ridingcrop, Heusken whipped his frightenedhorse through the circle of attackers but shortlyfell to theground. He was broughtinto the American legation at nine-thirtywhere he lay dyingfor three hours. The middle-agedAmerican and the young Dutchman had been together for more than fiveyears. As suitedtheir generations Harris had sometimescomplained that Heusken had carelesslylet thestove go out or spentan amountof timewith teahouse girls at Shimnodathat was notbefitting the consular service, but "our relations were rather that offather and son than chief and employee."222 A bakufuofficial had demandedHeusken keep off the streets at night.Heusken had repliedwith spirit, rudenesses had beenexchanged on bothsides. When his superiors refusedhis request for police powers against foreigners inthe streets at night, the man had committedsuicide. His followerswere suspected of doing the killing. No proofwas forth- coming.Harris took the moresensible view. When first coming to Edo he had been warnedby bakufuofficials that they never went out at nightunless absolutely necessary andthen only with a largeescort and many lanterns.223 Heusken's routine flouting of this cautionhad made him an easy target. Harris was warned by a bakufuofficial not to attend thefuneral as he mightalso be assassinated."I answeredthat I shoulddo so regardlessof anydanger."224 De Bellecourtwas furious that the bakufu had the gall to utterthis threat. Allforeigners attended. All carriedloaded weapons.225 Heuskenhad beenpersonally popular with all ranksof Japanese. As a diplomat,the firstto fallto theassassins, there were no problems of social rank connected with attend- inghis funeral. Oguri Tadamasa226 and four other daimyo led the funeral procession with theirescorts. They were followed by themassed foreign flags, an honourguard of Prus- sianmarines, the band from the Prussian frigate, a second guard of Prussian and Nether- landsMarines, the diplomatic and consular officers and the officers ofthe Netherlands and Prussianwarships. Harriserected a memorial,surrounding the grave with his own favourite camelia japo- nica,and arranged for flowers at Christmas,New Year's,All Souls'Day andthe anniver- saryof his death.227 Heusken's diamond snuff box from Queen Victoria, his gold watch andchain from Lord Elgin, his seal ring, a lockof hair and twophotographs were sent hometo Amsterdam.The youngman's picture had been taken on theday of his death. The littleforeign cemetery had nowclaimed seven victims of murder. No one hadyet been punished.228 Harrishad losthis onlyWestern companion. He was now completelyalone at the

222 Harris Papers,Book 5, No. 88, to Cass, 226 T tq 2I Januaryi86i. 227 Harris Papers,Book 5, No. i86, to Mrs. 223 Ibid. r. T. Heusken, 2I December i86i and ibid., 224 Ibid. No.I39, 23 Julyi86i. 225 CorrespondencePolitique, III, No. 66, 228 Ibid.,No. 89, to Cass, 23 Januaryi86i. to Thouvenel,25 Januaryi86i. MCMASTER. " ...ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 349

Americanlegation. Yet it was notHarris who broke under the strain but Alcock. As the yearbegan he hadspoken of going on boarda Britishwarship if Edo becametoo danger- ous.229At theend ofthe first week in Januarybakufu warnings of a roninattack upon foreignershad upset him visibly.230 Although living at thewater's edge surrounded by hisstaff, the young Dutchman's death proved too much for the elderly Briton. Threedays after Heusken's murder Alcock called a meetingof the five foreign diplo- mats:Harris, de Bellecourt,Eulenberg, the new Prussian minister and de Wit,who was makingone of his periodic visits from Nagasaki. As doyenof the diplomatic corps it was Harriswho should have acted when the group approached the bakufu in a jointeffort.231 Eversince July of I859 Harrishad voluntarily allowed Alcock to takethe lead.232 When thethree men had joined ranks to threaten the bakufu in Decemberof that year it hadbeen doneon Alcock's initiative and with full support from Harris. As a courteousrecognition ofthe realities of naval power in theChina Seas the American had allowed Alcock leader- shipof the group. The factremained that it wasnot a positionto which the British diplo- matwas entitledbut merely a courtesyfrom Harris. It was Alcockwho felta jointaction was necessaryand calleda meeting.The five menmet at theBritish legation on January igth. Describing the meeting de Bellecourt madethe natural mistake of referring to Alcockas "doyendu corpsdiplomatique."233 The Britonbegan by stating his view of the situation. The foreigndiplomats at Edo were inimminent danger of their lives. A foreignrepresentative was not justified in submitting to terrorism"for the sterile duty of dying at hispost."234 In orderto forcethe bakufu to protectthem at Edo theyshould jointly retire to Yoko- hama.It was a curiousstrategy. Two weeksearlier Alcock had written London that the bakufuwanted the diplomats to leaveEdo.235 Now in orderto bringpressure upon the bakufu,he proposedthat the diplomatsleave Edo. All agreedexcept Harris. Having cooperatedwith his colleaguesfor eighteen months, he now brokeranks. It was very regrettable,wrote de Bellecourt,because without him the action would lose much of its force.236 In the26-page summary of the meeting Alcock devotes the first I4 pagesto putting hisview of the case. The remainingpages contain the views of the other four men. The opinionof Harris was givenroughly three quarters of one page. This was not necessarily

229 CorrespondencePolitique, III, No. 63, to 'doyen'or longest resident." Thouvenel,3 Januaryi86i. 232 F.O. 46, III, to Malmesbury, I3 JulyI859. 230 Same, No. 65, io Januaryi86i, "a frappe 233 CorrespondencePolitique, iII, No. 68, to assez vivement". Thouvenel,Yokohama, 30January i86i. 231 HarrisPapers, Book 4, No. 323, to Rice, 234 Compte-renduofmeeting by Alcockenclosed Edo, 23 Julyi86o. To consul Rice he explains in above despatch. thatAlcock as "Ministerplenipotentiary" has a 235 F.O. 39I, I, to Hammond,i Januaryi86i. higherrank than himself as "Ministerresident" 236 Correspondence Politique, III, No. 66, 25 but "ifwe desiredto speakto or receivefrom the Januaryi86i. Tycoonfor the corpsdiplomatique I should do so as 350 MonumentaNipponica XII, 3-4 discrimination.Harris always spoke shortly and to thepoint.237 The foreignersshould uniteat Edo againstthe very bad situationwhich existed at presentrather than run awayin fear of a futurecalamity. If they left Edo theymight not be ableto return. If they landedtroops to protectthemselves at Yokohamathe Japanese might consider this an attemptat colonizationand go to war.238 The fourother ministers quit Edo withfull ceremony. Alcock had a guardof British sailors,de BellecourtborroNved one from the Prussians. At Yokohama the diplomats were giventwenty-one gun salutesas theywent on boardthe warships. The nextday de Bellecourtwent ashore to liveat a Dutchhotel which also housed the twelve men of the BritishConsulate at Kanagawawho had just movedthe short distance into Yokohama forsafety. The hotelwas guardedby armedBritish sailors. Writingto Paris, de Bellecourtexplained their plans. Troops would be landedto defend Yokohamafrom the Takaida junction to thesea-front. Those samuraiattached to the governorswould be theonly ones allowed to wearswords in thetown and their number wouldbe keptto a minimum.The surroundinghills would be garrisoned.The bakufu wouldpay damagesfor any foreign property that burned. The dollarwould circulate at threeichibus. All foreignmerchants would be takenon theships at thefirst alarm. The bakufuwould pay for all ensuingbusiness losses. Finally, as in China,the foreigners wouldtake over all customsreceipts at Yokohama.239Harris had struckvery close to Alcock'sintent. Had theBriton's plan been carried out Yokohama would have been little differentfrom a foreigncolony. Harrisdid notwrite a dissentingopinion nor would he signthe compte-rendu Alcock had writteneven as a witnessthat it was a truestatement. Partly this was becauseit containedmaterial from a second conference onJanuary25sth atwhich Harris had not been present.The Americanexcused his colleagues of any deliberate attempt to excludehim. His understandinghad been that the second meeting would not discuss policy but merely ratifyAlcock's compte-rendu as a true statement. As he had givenhis opinion and had an appointmentwith the bakufu to pushthe search for Heusken's killers, Harris did notat- tend.He wroteAlcock that he assumedthe decision to go aheadwith the discussion, whichended in theflight from Edo, had beentaken on thespur of the moment rather thanas a deliberateslight to himself. The Americanhad otherand morepersonal reasons for not signing the compte-rendu. He doesnot mention them in hisown letters but the situation is describedin theFrench archives. Duringthe first meeting after Harris had givenhis reasons for opposing the flight to Yokohama,the Prussian minister had charitably noted that perhaps the American could beexcused as heenjoyed better relations with the bakufu and had suffered fewer indignities

237 p.J. Treat, p.88. Yokohama,30January i86i. 238 CorrespondencePolitique, III, No. 68, 239 Ibid. M c M A S T E R. "... ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 35I at Japanesehands. To thisAlcock countered that he wouldpass overthe Prussian's remarkin silence.If he included it inhis compte-rendu he would also feel obliged to include hisown opinion of Harris. This was that the American attributed to himself a special role inJapan merely because he hadbeen there first, that he was no differentfrom the other diplomatsin hisrelations with the bakufu, that his treatywas gainedsolely by Anglo- Frenchvictories in China and that Harris's false view of his own influence with the bakufu couldbe flatteredif the situationwere not so important.With pain Harris noted the omissionof this personal attack from Alcock's summary of the meeting and refusedto signthe document as correct.240 Asidefrom the lack of diplomatic courtesy involved this personal attack upon Harris is a curiousone. The Americanhad never concealed the fact that his treaty was owing to Anglo-Frenchvictories in China.Whether Harris felt himself to havea specialinfluence withthe bakufu is difficult to say.241He didnot conceal the humiliating reception he had beengiven by the shogun in NovemberI859 fromhis colleagues. When the Netherlands ministerwrote Harris for help in obtaininga treatyfor Denmark in thespring of i86i, theAmerican replied that he woulddo all thathe couldbut thathe no longerhad as muchinfluence with the bakufu as whenthe Prussian treaty had been negotiated.242 As to a specialposition in Japan he hadquite simply been dealing with bakufu officials for at leastthree years longer than any of the others. The goodrelations the Prussian mentioned seemto have sprung from Harris's refusal to goout at nightor in the daytime without his escort.The Frenchminister had written that the diplomats' habit of riding out without a largeescort made them appear ridiculous to all, particularlyto samurai.The insults, thestones and the threats arose from this habit.243 There seems no way to explainsuch a gratuitousattack except the stateof Alcock's nerves. He was undoubtedlyannoyed at the American'sopposition. He may also have consideredthe American,a former merchant,as beingbeneath him socially, he mayhave been jealous as well,but the out- burstitself does not speak well for the self-control ofthe British ambassador at thetime. Therehad been no pointupon which Harris had had to fightharder than to gainthe Edo residence.244When his four colleagues quit the scene on January 25th, the American remained.At Yokohama, Keswick ofJardine's wrote that Alcock "had struck his flag but nothaving vouchsafed to furnishthe community with any information on thesubject, I amunable to giveyou any further particulars."245 The retirementfrom Edo "hasbeen a petscheme of the Japanese of late," commented the China Record, "and having succeed- ed inall their other little games they were confident inthe success of this one also, and they wereright." Tongue in cheek, the newspaper went on to conclude that the "much abused

240 Ibid. Walewski,I NovemberI859. 241 See Beasley,Select Documents, pp. 204-205. 244 Quotedin Heco, I, 274. 242 ConsulaatYokohama, Bundle 3, No. 38, 245 J-M & Co. Archive,Box Yokohamai86i, Harristo de Wit,Edo, 29 AprilI86I. to A. Percival,26 Januaryi86i. 243 CorrespondencePolitique, i, No. I2, to 352 MonumentaNipponica XXII, 3-4

(swamp'" and " 'secondDeshima'" ofAlcock's diplomatic despatches had becomea "sanctuaryfor fugitive ambassadors."246 Writing later that year on "themodern tactics ofdeserting legations and givingup consulates,"Consul Hodgson noted "where the flagis, or where there was a Consul,I everthought that he shouldhave been the last to runaway."247 From his cabin aboard "H.M.S. Encounter"Alcock wrote to theBritish merchantsashore "I didnot run to Yokohama for my own safety but for your benefit."248 To hisown government hewrote that Harris was playing the old American game of peace at anyprice, that if the bakufu could not be forcedto protectlife the foreigners had best leave.He also addsthe rumour that Harris was drinkingagain and even suffering from deliriumtremens.249 No oneelse mentions Harris as drinkingbut it may have been true. He washeartbroken overthe American Civil War. "I cannotbear to write about it. I canonly pray God in His Mercyto bring this awful contest to an end."250Drinking or not, the American remained aloneat Edo negotiatingwith the bakufu over Heusken's death and keeping up a regular correspondence. To thenew secretary of State he wrote,"The murderof Mr. Heusken. .. produceda panicterror among my colleagues, who all left this city ... theEnglish and French Rep- resentativesare both extremely nervous men and for the last sixteenmonths they have beenin a chronicstate of excitement and alarm. Should they succeed in impressingtheir respectivegovernments with their peculiar views of affairs here, I do notsee howa war withthis country can be avoided."3251 FromYokohama Alcock began writing to Harris.The firstletter asked Harris to ap- provethe action taken as a resultoftheJanuary 25th meeting. Harris refused. He hadnot attendedthe meeting and he did notapprove of its conclusions. Onceagain Harris stated his position. Bakufu officials had warned foreign diplomats to takethe same precautions as theydid themselves. The retirementtoYokohama relieved thebakufu of responsibility and expense.Finally, Japan was nota civilizedbut a semi- civilizedcountry. To holda governmentresponsible for the acts of individuals was un- knownin internationallaw and not even practicedby the mostadvanced Western nations. He concludedupon a sadnote. "The peopleofJapan cannot be raisedto our standard of civilizationby thestroke of a diplomaticpen, not even if they have 50,000 soldiers for theirschoolmasters. It is onlytime, patience, and forbearance, that can produce the desired

246 F.O. 46, xxx, News clippingdated Hong 251 HarrisLetters, Book 5, No. IO9, to Seward, Kong,2 Februaryi86i. I3 February i86i. In Consulaat Yokohama, 247 Hodgson, p. i65. Bundle4, Bataviato de Wit, 9 Novemberi86i. 248 Alcock,II, 455. The governorof the Netherlands Indies counsels 249 F.O. 39I, I, to Hammond, "H.M.S. de Wit to use his influenceupon his Britishand Encounter",26 Januaryi86i. Frenchcolleagues to calm themand encourage 250 JanvierLetters to Miss Drinker,Edo, i6 them towardsa peacefulpolicy "vredelievend Septemberi86i. staatkunde." M c M A S T E R. "... ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 353 result.I hadhoped that the page of future history might record the great fact that in one spotin theEastern world, the advent of Christian civilization did notbring with it its usualattendants of rapine and bloodshed. This fondhope I fearis to be disappointed.I wouldsooner see all thetreaties with this country torn up andJapan returned to itsold stateof isolation than witness the horrors of war inflicted upon this peaceful people and happyland."252 Livingin securityaboard "H.M.S. Encounter,"the British minister began to realize fromthe attitude of the naval officers and the civilians ashore that he hadbeen hasty. At Yokohamamen carried revolvers and wereprepared to taketheir chances. The mere presenceof the solitary American at Edo,while Alcock had fledwith all hisstaff, was a tacitreproach. Although Harris had made no personal accusations Alcock wrote him that hewas not a cowardbut had only left Edo as hisdeath would involve his country in war. It was a thirty-threepage letter.253 The answerwas shorter. Harris disclaimed "any intention to cast any aspersions on the actionsof my colleagues, or to cast any aspersions on their motives."254The Briton charged Harriswith threatening the Japanese with war in DecemberI859. Harrisanswered thatall three had done so andany war was an action reserved to the U.S. Congress.Alcock thencharged the American with exacting undue ceremony from the bakufu.Again all threehad agreed upon this. Alcock had postponed his own reception by the shogun until Harrishad been received with proper courtesy.255 It was a smallbut constant battle to preventthe bakufu from returning to thehumiliating conditions it hadforced upon the Dutch. Alcockthen came to themain issue, the safety of diplomats at Edo. "Have notyou yourselfbeen assaulted by one ofthese two-sworded retainers in yourown courtyard and placedin bodilyfear of your life? Were you not warned by thegovernment that if you prosecutedyour assailant you would be in danger ofa vendetta from his companions which wouldvery likely cost you your life?" To thisthe American replied that he hadbeen jostled by a drunkensamurai "and it was no doubta technicalassault for which a juryin mycountry would have awarded me a farthingdamages had I appliedto them. To admitthat a manin thelast stage of intoxi- cationput me 'in bodilyfear of my life' would be to impeachmy own manhood." The "warningof the Government" was merelythe voluntary advice of an interpreter.The offenderwas arrestedand punished. Harrisended his letter: "I haveread with great surprise and deep regret your declara- tionthat you feel authorized to makeuse ofmy private conversation with you because

252 HarrisPapers, Book 5, No. 94, to Alcock, 254 HarrisPapers, Book 5, No. 96, to Alcock, I2 Februaryi86i, quotedin Heco, pp. 275-276. 23 Februaryi86i. 253 CorrespondencePolitique, III, No. 76, Io 255 CorrespondencePolitique, I, Nos. iS & i6 Marchi86i enclosedAlcock to Harris,Yokohama of 9 & I5 NovemberI859 and II, No. 42, 30 i6 February i86i. Augusti86o. 354 MonumentaNipponica XXI, 3-4 youwere not placed under the seal of secrecy. I must decline to follow your example believ- ing as I do thatit is calculatedto destroyall confidencebetween man and manand to makesocial intercourse impossible. I am fainto believethat the expression escaped you in a momentof excitement, and that cool reflection will cause you not only to regretbut to retractit." To WashingtonHarris wrote that he would not allow himself to be drawninto an angry correspondencewith Alcock.256 Although he refusedto meetthe Briton, Harris wrote agreeingto join hiscolleagues in any"well-considered measures that may be calculated to improvethe state of our relations with the Japanese Government."257 The relationshipwhich had started so sunnilyinJuly I859 wasfinished. For the fifteen monthsremaining until both men left Japan they did notspeak. Alcock had takenthe quarreldeeply to heart,the French minister could not persuade him to a reconciliation withHarris.258 Threeweeks after the flight to Yokohama, Alcock had also realized how futile the action hadbeen. The bakufuwas notat all impressed.It hadnot contacted him in theinterim. He proposedwritingtoChina for the British fleet. De Bellecourtadvised him not to appear tooanxious. The betterplan was to writethe bakufu announcing a trip in theinterior.259 It was verysensitive on thispoint. Alcock agreed. Therewas little choice. British admiral Hope had rejected Alcock's plan for garrisoning Yokohamaand taking over its customs house. Writing to London,Jardine's Hong Kong officegave themercantile opinion. "We understandthat Admiral Hope in theabsence ofinstructionsfrom the Home Government declines making any demonstration insupport ofMr. Alcock'spretentions, so thatwhether the latter returns to Yedo or remainsat Yokohama,it cannow only be at somesacrifice of prestige."260 In Edo, Harris urged the bakufuto askthe British and the French back. Whether this succeeded, as he thought,or whetherthe French suggestion of travel in theinterior had thedesired result, the two diplomatswere asked to return. Theirreply to theinvitation was lengthy.One sectiondemanded the removal of all traderestrictions at Yokohama. The other,which ran to twelvepages, concerned their ownsecurity at Edo. Newpolice stations must be built,no daimyotroops were to guard foreignersbut onlythe shogun'smounted escort, these must immediately arrest any Japaneseshowing insult or violence towards a foreigner,allwho have attacked foreigners mustbe arrested,and anybakufu guard who extorted money from Japanese tradesmen supplyingforeigners must be dismissed. "Finally,as it is generallyknown that the Representatives aforesaid left Yedo under

256 HarrisPapers, Book 5; No. iii, to Seward, tellementa coeurla lutte." Edo. 25 Februaryi86i. 259 Same,No. 7I, i6 Februaryi86i. 257 Ibid.,No. I52; to Seward,3 IJuly i86i. 260 J-M& Co. Archive,Box Hong Kong i86i, 258 CorrespondencePolitique, iii, No. 77, to to Mathesonand Co., 2 Marchi86I. Thouvenel, I2 March i86I, "parait avoir pris M CMASTER. "... ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 355 menacesof assassination, derogatory to their position, and their departure has further tendedto unsettle the public mind," it was essential that they be received back with due ceremonialand publicity. This included that they be metat theboat landing by the foreignministers ofthe bakufu and escorted to their legations. A twenty-one gun salute wasto be firedfor each and the bakufu was to write a letterhumbly begging them to return.261 The bakufu'sreply was short. One page announced that the diplomats were invited backand that it would comply with the conditions. Readingofthese conditions inEngland a formerBritish consul in Japan did not think they would be honoured by the bakufu.262 He wasright. By mid-summer they had all been broken.263 How much ceremonial was giventhe two foreigners isunknown. De Bellecourtwrote a colleague "We have returned withthe honours ofwar."264 Neither he nor Alcock stayed very long. The French minis- terrented a house at Yokohamaand became a permanentresident there, only coming to Edo on "flyingvisits" while Alcock went off to Chinafor three months.265 The Moss Case demandedhis presence in HongKong. This furtherlowered his standing with the bakufuwhich could not understand why an officialshould have to defendhimself in court againsta commonmerchant.266 The Netherlandsconsul general had long since returned to hisheadquarters at Deshimawhile the Prussian minister had goneoff to negotiatea treatywith China. "My lifeis almostas isolatedas it was at Shimoda",wrote Harris, addingthat the weather was charmingand the crops good.267 By splittingthe foreign diplomats and remaining at Edo,Harris believed he hadmade hostilitiesalmost impossible.268 He had certainlyweakened Alcock's position, which hingedupon the claim that Edo wasunsafe for diplomats. If this could not be guaranteed thenthe foreign nations should withdraw from Japan.269 It was a curiousclaim to make as theforeign presence in Japan was notto providea secureambience for diplomats at Edo butto providea tradeat theports. For better or forworse the American's lonely act of couragehad forced his colleagues to a peacefulcompromise with the bakufu. The nextthreat of war came not from the actions of Alcock and de Bellecourtbut from Harris'sown superiors in Washington. In thatcity his Democratic party had been replaced by a new politicalgroup headed by an unknownpresident named Abraham Lincoln. In contrastto thecustom of the time which handed out all diplomatic posts to loyalsup- portersof the winning party, Harris was asked to stay on inJapan. The newadministra-

261 ConsulaatYokohama, Bundle 3, to de Wit, 265 JanvierLetters, to Miss Drinker,Edo, i Yokohama,7 Marchi86i enclosesAlcock and de Julyi86i. Bellecourt'sdemands upon the bakufu."Nederig 266 CorrespondencePolitique, i, No. 8i, to zou verzoeken"is thephrase used in Dutch. Thouvenel, i8 April i86i. 262 Hodgson,p. I87 footnote. 267 Harris Papers, Book 5, No. I32 to Eulen- 263 CorrespondenceCommerciale, i, No. 94, berg,Edo, 2 Julyi86i. to Thouvenel,i6 Augusti86i. 268 HarrisPapers, Book 5, No. II2, to Seward, 264 ConsulaatYokohama, Bundle 3, to de Wit, 6 Marchi86i. 2I Marchi86i. 269 F.O. 39I, I, to Hammond,26January i86i. MonumentaNipponica XXII, 3-4 tion'sfirst contact with Japan arose with the bakufu's "two cities, two ports," letter to all theforeign powers asking that the opening ofthe cities of Edo and Osaka, and the harbours ofHyogoandNiigata be postponed.It arrivedinWashington inmid-July. Theotherplaces couldwait but Edo hadto be decidedbefore the treaty date for its opening next January. Atfirst Harris's suggestion that it remainclosed had been received favourably. Then the newsof Heusken's murder arrived. Secretaryof State Seward consulted with President Lincoln and then wrote the British, Netherlandsand French ambassadors in Washingtonasking for a jointnaval demonstra- tionagainstJapan. Seward's argument was that to give way on the Edo questionfollowing the murderof Heuskenwould merelyencourage the anti-foreignelements in Japan towardsa civilwar during which all theground gained by thetreaties would be lost.270 As thebakufu had an excellentpolice force it was onlynecessary to makea showof force to encourageits use forthe protection of foreigners.271 Under the proposed convention, eachtreaty nation would send steam warships to Edo Bay. Ajoint note would be presented demandingthe execution of every treaty provision. A time limit would be set,the warships wouldreturn to theirnormal duties coming back to Edo on thedate set. If the bakufu's answerwas evasiveor negativethe foreign diplomats were to be removedfrom Edo. The navalcommanders were then to commencehostilities. Foreignjealousies intervened in favourof the bakufu.The NetherlandsAmbassador inWashington wrote that the proposed convention should take place at theHague, where allof the long Dutch experience in Japan could be utilized,and not at Washingtonwith a newand untried government. Seward had unfortunately tied the convention to approval by theU.S. Senateso thatall ofthe powers might have agreed, only to havethe plan rejectedby thatbody. Seward'sinitiative fared no betterat London.Alcock was told that"Lord Russell hasno intentionof postponing the opening of the ports," and further advised not to let theAmericans use himas "a catspaw"in negotiatingHeusken's murder.272 They had triedin Washingtonand beenrejected. There was a noteof satisfaction in theclosing sentencethat Lincoln had troubles enough at home,his army having just beendefeated at BullRun. The Palmerston-Russellgovernment in Britainwas on theside of the rebels in America.273 Fortunatelyfor Seward, he was able to retreatgracefully. Before he had beencom- pletelyrejected by the other powers, Harris's letter of May 8tharrived, advising that Edo be keptclosed. In explanationhe pointed out that the sudden price rise of from IOO to 300 percent since the opening of trade was fallingheavily upon "all officialpersons of fixed andlimited incomes, and it is fromthis class that the loudest complaints are heard and

270 ConsulaatYokohama, Bundle 4, Sewardto 272 F.O. 39I, I, to Alcock,London, 25 August Roest van Limburg,Washington, I4 May i86i. i86i. 271 Ibid.,Roest van Limburgto van Zuijlen 273 See Chapterx, TheEducation of Henry Adams. van Nijevelt,Washington, 22 May i86i. M CMASTER. ".. .ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 357 thesecomplaints will continue while they are in a transitionstate towards a higher sal- ary."274Harris also put his finger upon the culprits. "The Dimios receive a large portion oftheir revenues in kind and as theydispose of all their surplus, they find their incomes greatlyincreased. The effect ofthis is clearlyshown by the fact that when I firstcame to Yedoin November I857 onlythirteen ofthe Dimios out of some three hundred were in favourof opening the country while at thepresent time about one half of them are in favourof the new order of things." Harris closed by asking for discretionary power to settlematters on the spot. Seward withdrew his proposed demonstration admitting his lackof knowledge and the difficulty ofoperating atsuch a distance.In closing he warned Harrisabout the diplomatic residence at Edo."The principle however seems to us too importanttobe abandoned.Ifthe western states can keep their representatives safely in Japanthey can perhaps wait for the facilities stipulated; but if their ministers shall be obligedby force or terror to withdraw, all willbe lostthat has at suchgreat cost been gained."275 Heusken'sdeath was left to Harris for settlement inJapan. Meeting with Anda Nobu- masaand Kuze Hirochika,276 the two rojZu in chargeof foreign affairs, Harris did the best hecould. Demanding a salute, as hadthe British and French upon their return to Edo, wasuseless. The harbour forts were practice firing all day long. No onein the city would realizethat twenty-one shots fired at intervals represented anapology from their govern- mentto the foreigners. Morepractical would be thepunishment ofthe murderers. Anda answered that this wouldbe done but "Whether itcould be done in a monthor a yearwas more than he could foresee."277The bakufuhad found it politicallyunwise even to arrest those involved in thekilling of its regent the previous March. What else did the American want? Harris thenexplained that Heusken had been the sole support of his widowed mother. The bakufuagreed to pay $io,ooO to purchase an annuity for Mrs. Heusken. Beyond assuring themthat he wasnot selling Heusken's blood and that they must continue the search forthe murderers, there was little else Harris could do. The mountedguards who had desertedHeusken were dismissed from their positions. The fourstreet watchmen involvedwere punished.278 Harrishad used his influence toprevent a clash with Japan. In theNetherlands, the governmentwas glad that the Washington negotiations had fallen through but thought theplan of an armeddemonstration worth pursuing. Consul general de Withad sug- gestedthe same thing even before Heusken's death.279 It seemed that appeasement had

274 HarrisPapers, Book 5, No. I21, to Seward, Edo, 27 November i86i. 8 May i86i. 278 Same,No. I24, to Seward,7 Julyi86i. 275 HarrisPapers, Loose LetterBox, No. I29, 279 ConsulaatYokohama, Bundle 4, No. 26, to Harris,Washington, i Augusti86i. Van Zuijlenvan Nijeveltto Ministerof Colonies, 276 fl, The Hague, 5 Junei86i. 277 HarrisPapers, Book 5, No. I24, to Seward, 358 MonumentaNipponica XXII, 3-4 been thewisest course. Neither Lord Russellnor the Frenchwanted war. Sincethe Westernpowers had been giving ground ever since the opening it did notseem wise to suddenlytake the drastic move suggested in Washington.280 It was onlyfrom Europe that Japanese affairs seemed quiet. In thatcountry Lord Russell'speaceful intentions were receiving a severetrial. After three months spent in China,Alcock returned to Japan.Instead of coming directly to Yokohamaby sea, he choseto makethe trip overland from Nagasaki. A Britishwarship carried him through theInland Sea toOsaka. It wasa usefulthing to exercise the treaty right to travel.It was alsoa bravething to do. Although samurai hostility was concentrating atEdo, Alcock and hiscompanion, the Netherlands consul general, might have been attacked upon the way. A yearearlier the Russian envoy, M. Gaskevitch,had thought nothing of travelling over- landfrom Edo to hispost at Hakodatebut thenthe Russians were widely respected in Japan.281 Alcockarrived back at theBritish legation in Edo on thesth ofJuly. It wasa finenight. The littlegroup of Britons stayed outside until late watching a cometand singingthe songsof home. They did not retire until after midnight and were not yet asleep when the soundsof a scuffleand the barking of a petdog alerted them. Emerging from their rooms intothe darkened corridor they were slashed at by swordsmenin maskedhelmets and armour.Two werewounded. Expecting discovery and death at any moment the eight men coweredbehind a screenin thedining room listening to thesmash of glass, the slashing ofpartitions and the ripping of bed clothes as theirassailants flailed about seeking them in thedarkness. Their Japanese bodyguard then counterattacked and droveoff the as- sailants.Still in hisnightdress one of them remembers the body of one ofthe attackers uponthe dining room floor and stepping barefooted upon a humaneye. It wasenough to shakethe strongest nerves.282 Alcockhad been very close to death. After bandaging Morrison and Oliphant, he wrote toLondon. "We areall resting on our arms; and otherwise quiet, with beacon fires, watch lightsand patrolsmuch like a besiegedplace.... IfI can securethe Admiral's support andsome material means of protection I am loath to abandonthe field; since by so doing H.M.'s Governmentwill be moreor lesscommitted to a decidedcourse of action. What a triumphantvindication of the view I tookin January of the reality of the danger! Even Harrisseems convinced."283 This lastwas notquite true. Harris wrote Alcock in sympathyexpressing his horror at theattack, his gladness at Alcock'struly providential escape and offering his appoint- mentwith the bakufu to theBriton so thathe couldcomplain immediately. Alcock ap- parentlytook this as a completesurrender by Harris, so thatthe American had to write

280 Ibid.,P.V.C. Maesende Sombreffto Mi- 282 L. Oliphant,"The Attackon the British nisterfor Foreign Affairs, 22, Julyi86i. Legation", BlackwoodsMagazine, CXLI, No. 281 CorrespondencePolitique, ii, No. 3I, to DCCCLV, JanuaryI887, pp. 45-57. Thouvenel,i Marchi86o. 283 F.O. 39I, I, to Hammond,6July i86i. MCMASTER. "...Foreign Diplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 359 a secondletter saying "You misconstruemy meaning," he had notgiven up hopethat thebakufu would protect foreigners and would abide the future.284 Althougha guardof armed British sailors was sentto protectthe British legation, Alcockdid not think them sufficient in number and retired to Yokohamafor the second time.285Remaining in Japan until the end of I864 he neveragain lived at Edo. Neither did de Bellecourt."We havedriven the Ministers from Edo," thebakufu is supposedto haveboasted.286 Writingto de Witthe day following the attack Alcock noted, "Such a deedof atrocity perpetratedin thecapital of a Governmentto whichForeign Representatives are ac- creditedby the Western Powers needs no comment.What measures it maybe expedient to adoptfor the future security of this, and the other Legations in Yedo; and themain- tenanceof those International rights and immunities, so grievouslyattacked, becomes a seriousconsideration."287 It was thesame tone to whichHarris had objected at thetime ofHeusken's killing. Alcock was againholding the bakufu to standardsachieved only in a fewof the most advanced European states. Harrismay have been convinced of danger but he remainedalone at Edo trustingto hisbakufu guard for protection. His trustwas vindicated for when the American legation was attackedthe following month the assailants were driven off.288 To Washington,Harris wrote that he hadinterviewed the bakufl foreign ministers to impressthe seriousness of the British attack upon them. They complained that Alcock had not let thempost the guardas theywished. This was partlytrue. Because these bodyguardsnormally acted as spiesupon the foreigners all theWestern diplomats refused tohave them share the same building. The templesite which Alcock had chosen, in place ofthe one selected by the bakufu, had spacious grounds and many buildings. Some of these werestill occupied by thepriests. It was notan easyspot to defend.Harris reported the bakufuopinion that the attack had been an effortto embroilit in a warwith Britain.289 AtYokohama British merchants took the same position as Harris."Everything is going prettyquietly here at present,but our officials have been much disturbed by an attack thatwas made on theBritish legation a fewnights ago.... He (Alcock)was successfully protected,however, by hisnative guard, and theGovernment have taken measures to ensurehis safety."290 The attackupon the British legation had severalresults. British warships were now stationedat Yokohamainstead of making regular visits as heretofore.an armedguard of

284 CorrespondencePolitique, Iv, No. 9I, I9 6 Julyi86i. July i86i encloses copies of the two Harris 288 CorrespondencePolitique, Iv, No. ioo, letters. to Thouvenel,I9 Augusti86i. 285 Same,No. 96, 8 Augusti86i. 289 HarrisPapers, Book 5, No. I42, to Seward, 286 J.C. Pompevan Meerdervoort,Vyf 7aren, Edo, 9 Julyi86i. 290 II, 35. J-M & Co. Archive,Box Yokohamai86i, 287 ConsulaatYokohama, Bundle 4, to de Wit, to A. Percival,I2 JUlyi86i. t6o MnnumentdMibbonirc4 XXTL I-A

sailorsand marines protected Alcock ashore at Yokohamaand Alcock wrote to London thatthe bakufu should be heldto allits treaty obligations. The timelag ofat leastfour months in whichit tooka letterto reachEurope and the answerto return to Japan, could have its humorous aspects. Alcock's despatch describing thelegation attack and demanding the bakufu now be held to its treaty obligations crossed theForeign Office's letter noting with satisfaction that President Lincoln's proposal to holdthe bakufu to its treatyobligations had been refused. New orderstelling Alcock to concedenothing arrived in Japan that autumn. Alcock's emotions had cooled and he now hadto explainto hissuperiors why he was concedingthe Edo residencefor foreign mer- chants.Harris was amused.291All thepowers agreed to keepforeign merchants out of Edo. Harrisremained its only foreign resident. As thenew year began Alcock wrote the Foreign Office that he was glad to still be alive. He hadalso started writing a book to make the British public realize the necessity of using forcein Japan.292 Havinggiven up theEdo locationin spiteof his orders to be strict,Alcock now wrote hisFrench and Netherlandscolleagues that he intendedto takea strongline with the bakufu.In a secretmemorandum to themhe summarizedhis orders from London. He was to makeno concessionswithout equivalents, he was to do nothingthat would curtail tradeand he was to upholdthe honour of the British name. As Hyogoand Osakawere veryimportant to tradetheir opening could not be postponedas thiswas verymuch a curtailmentof trade. After seeing Osaka, Alcock had toldde Bellecourtthat it was the centerofJapan's economy. "Our trademust be there."293As to thehonour of the British nameand the furnishing ofno concessions without equivalents, Alcock thought that Edo andNiigata-a westcoast port which had been surveyed by the Netherlands brig "Balli" and givena negativereport owing to itspoor harbour-should be exchangedfor a port onthe island ofTsushima and thejapanese-garrisoned harbour in Korea (probably Pusan). Thisdisgusted his French and his Netherlands colleagues, both of whom wished to discuss portsof commercial advantage with the bakufu. De Bellecourtnoted that Alcock did not botherto disguisehis purely political motives, refusing even to discussother ports with hisFrench colleague.294 The threediplomats addressed ajoint note to the bakufu insisting thatOsaka be openedon schedule. As an alternativeto theserearrangements ofthe existing treaties Alcock thought that the foreignersmight go directlyto Kyotoand negotiatefor the Mikado's approval. Harrishad been warning the bakufu that this might happen ever since December I859. Alcockclosed his memorandum noting that bakufu promises were worthless, that any delaygranted to thembefore opening the new ports would only be usedto preparere-

291 HarrisPapers, Book S, No. 59, to Seward, 293 CorrespondencePolitique, Iv, No. 88, Edo, 30 Decemberi86i. to Thouvenel,4 Julyi 86i. 292 F.O. 39I, I, to Hammond,iO Januaryand 294 Same,v, No. I4o-bis,26 FebruaryI862. 7 FebruaryI862. M c M ASTE R. "... ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 36I

sistance.295Indeed any concession would encourage resistance. "Might not everything be gainedpeaceably by firmness and determination in our dealings with the government at thismoment? That seemspossible, probable even."296 Russian behaviour, he added, seemedto provethe point. All threemen agreed that bakufu promises were useless. Indeed in a privateinterview theJapaneseministers had admitted as muchto Alcock telling him they could not promise anyfuture improvement but couldonly hope.297 They were optimistic that the Kazu- nomiya298wedding would slowly improve conditions. Foreigners feared that a condition ofthe wedding had been that the new ports remain closed.299 De Witthought that Osaka andHyogo must be opened.As toequivalents for Edo andNiigata he wanted either more portsor that the existing ones be madefree ports on theexample of Singapore and Hong Kong. Enclosingthe Britishand Netherlandsopinions to his homegovernment, de Bellecourtadded that Harris was leaving the matter for his successor.300 The latterarrived withinstructions to cooperatewith the British and French.301 There was no hopethat Alcockcould negotiate the matter in Japanbefore going home as the bakufuexpected to getmuch better results from the embassy it thenhad in Europe.De Bellecourtclosed hisdespatch on thesame note as Alcockhad taken in hismemorandum. So many foreign complaintshad goneunanswered that if foreigners did notput on thebrake now, the bakufuwould go toofar.302 The foreigndiplomats must use stronglanguage, continued de Bellecourt.This was preciselythe point upon which Alcock wavered. Whenever foreigners demanded the treatiesbe upheld,the bakufu replied that to do so wouldmean civil war. At Cantonthe sameargument had been met and found to be false.Foreign policy was merelythe most convenientweapon to hand with which its opponents could attack the bakufu.303 Opening newports would provide bakufu opponents with additional material for their propaganda campaign.If the ports were kept closed the attack upon the government as thefriend of theforeigners would not stop. As longas Yokohamaremained it couldcontinue in use. Openingnew ports would bring the profits of foreign trade to a greaternumber of daimyo.Some of these already profited from foreign trade on theone hand while verbally attackingforeigners upon the other. As in Chinathe danger of civil war would remain whetherthe foreign treaties were enforced or not. Havingbeen consul at CantonAlcock knew this history. All of his experience in Japan broughthim to the same belief as hisFrench and Dutch colleagues. The bakufuwould give

295 Same,No. I40, 26 FebruaryI862. 300 Ibid.,v, No. I40,26 FebruaryI 862 encloses 296 Ibid. Also in Beasley,Select Documents, p. Alcock's memorandumof I4 February.Also in 2II. Beasley,Select Documents, p. 2II. 297 CorrespondencePolitique, Iv, No. 99, to 301 Ibid.,v, No. I53, 8 May I862. Thouvenel,i6 Augusti86i. 302 Ibid.,v, No. I40, 26 FebruaryI862. 298 303 jat. Cf. pp. 290-304 above. F.O. 39I, I, Alcock to Hammond, I9 299 Ibid.,v, No. I36, 2 FebruaryI862. Augusti86i. 362 MonumentaNipponica XXII, 3 -4 waybefore firm pressure. It alwayshad. Yet onthe other side lay the private theme which setAlcock apart from his colleagues, the fear of massacre. As in hiswriting at thetime of thegold export or theMoss Case it is thistheme of danger upon which he closeshis memorandumofFebruary I4th. Firmness with the bakufu involved such peril of war that it mustbe decidedin London.He wouldnot attempt it inJapan. In mid-MarchAlcock wrote his last letter to thebakufu before going home on leave.It accusedthe Japanese of violating the treaty for three years, of following a policy marked bybad faith and of making the false claim that theJapanese people were hostile to foreign- ers.Popular discontent was "purelyof a factiousorigin traceable to thosewho seek from personalmotive to embarrass the Tycoon's government oroverthrow it."304 Concessions wrestedfrom foreigners would merely whet their appetite, leaving both foreigners and bakufuworse off. Havingstated this opinion of concessions the British minister did an about-faceand finishedhis letterby tellingthe bakufuhe wouldhelp it get the Osaka concessionin London.The bravewords of February were forgotten in March.There was no moretalk aboutequivalents, the honour of the British name or theimportance of Osaka. This re- versalhas never been clearly understood unless the attack upon and wounding of Ando Nobumasawas thefinal act of terrorism needed to breakAlcock's resolve. AndoNobumasa was one of a groupof relatively low-ranking officials whose ability in dealingwith the troubled times had broughtthem rapid promotion. His risehad been so rapidthat his old nickname of "Bimbo Anda"305 (Poor Anda) still clung to him. In mid- Februaryhis escort had been attacked in Edo. Scramblingfrom his carriage and drawing swordhe had helped his bodyguard drive off the attackers. He hadbeen seriously wound- ed. The affairworried Alcock as firearmshad been used by theattackers. As Andahad previouslywarned Alcock that all publicmen, Japanese or foreign,must expect attack, hisown fate lent credence to thealready considerable anxiety of the British diplomat. Whetherit was Anda'swounding coupled with two meetings with Kuze Hirochika duringwhich the bakufu minister dwelt upon the domestic difficulties ofhis government or whetherAlcock merely continued his opinionafter the legationattack of thepre- vioussummer that enforcing the treaties meant war, is unknown.306Ifthe latter, then thejoint front of February was persiflage to satisfyhis superiors that he was carrying out theirorders to be firmand his colleagues that he was notselling out the foreign position inJapan. In eithercase the Briton was already well along the road to believing the bakufu's argumentof danger. Alcockleft Japan in May to go homefor one year's leave. His lastletters home continue earlierthemes. Harris comes under pretty steady attack. He is "likea badgerin hishole," onlymaking occasional visits to Yokohama.307Harris has gottenHeusken's indemnity

304 F.O. 262, CDLXX, to bakufuforeign mini- 306 F.O. 39I, I, to Hammond,I9 Augusti86i. sters,i5 MarchI862. 307 F.O. 39I, I, to Hammond,Yokohama, 27 305 _;I@,g FebruaryI862. M c M AS TE R. ". . ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 363 at theprice of "the unlimitedconcessions" his governmentis now readyto make.308 Alcockalso sent the Foreign Office a clippingfrom a SanFrancisco paper to whichU.S. merchantshad written complaining that Harris was allowingthe bakufu to conduct"a systemof swindling and extortionunparallelled in thehistory of nations."309 It was a strangepoint to maketo one'ssuperiors. British merchants at Yokohamasuffered under thesame system. FromMalta, Alcock wrote the Foreign Office to giveway to bakufudemands as Kuze Hirochikahad pointed out "howsmall our commercial interests really are."'310 Later he wrotethat they were small because of bakufu restriction.311 They wouldremain small untilsomething was doneabout that restriction. At Paris,Alcock continued the sameargument, telling the French foreign minister thatto demandenforcement ofthe treaties would mean a longand costlywar.312 This advicewas repeated to Lord Russell. The resultwas the London Protocol ofJune 6, I 862. This documentagreed to a five-yeardelay in returnfor the removal of all restrictionsto tradeand social contact betweenJapanese and foreigners. Asit noted, this was no less than whatthe bakufu was alreadybound to do by the I858 treaties.Twelve days after the Protocol,Alcock was madea KnightCommander of the Order of the Bath. Whennews of the protocol reached Edo thebakufu ministers, although pleased by the victory,told the French minister that the promised improvements would take much time. Popularopinion was againstforeigners. Trying to changeit waslike throwing oil upon a fire.313Alcock had nottold British merchants at Yokohamathat Osaka mightbe kept closed.They only discovered it afterhe left. Their letter of protest does not seem to have reachedLondon in timefor the negotiations. Ifit did,it didnot influence them. In Japan, Osakamerchants were reported as eagerfor foreign trade. They believed that if Britain insistedHyogo would be opened.A Dutchconsul reported that the bakufu had already appointeda governorfor Hyago.314 A FrenchNaval officer summed up Alcock's protocol simply;"l'inanite de ces concessions."'315Entering a horsein thefirst Yokohama race meetingthat summer, a British merchant listed him as "ShutUp, formerly named Osaka." In Europe,the Netherlands Colonial Minister talked to thebakufu embassy about the LondonProtocol. They were not sincere, was his simple judgement. Enforcing the treaty willbe moredifficult in fiveyears.316 Seenthrough The Capital of the Tycoon or the edited selection of his despatches published inParliamentary Papers, Alcock's view ofJapanese affairs is a reasonableone. Set into the

308 Ibid.,28 Novemberi86i. hama,22 AugustI862. 309 Ibid.,Io JanuaryI862. 314 Ibid.,vi, No. i6i, ii JuneI862. 310 Ibid.,Valetta, 22 May I862. 315 Andre Roussin, Une Campagnesur les cotes 311 Alcock, I, 3 5.I du 7apon,Paris, i866, p. 48. 312 CorrespondencePolitique, v, Thouvenel 316 Consulaat Yokohama, Bundle 5, p.v.d. to Flahault(in London),Paris, 27 May 62. Maesen de Sombreffto de Wit, the Hague, 24 313 Ibid.,vi, No. I84, to Thouvenel,Yoko- OctoberI862.

MN: XXII, 3-4 H 364 MonumentaNipponica XXII, 3-4 matrixof British business letters, the personal papers of Townsend Harris or theFrench and Netherlandsdiplomatic correspondence, a different picture emerges. It is thepicture of a frightenedman. "We areunder a perpetualmenace of massacre"317 typifiedmany of his despatches. No one elsebelieved this.318 Harris and de Bellecourt thoughtthey were individually indanger from fanatics but neither mentioned any general massacre.Indeed, de Bellecourtassumed that rumours of it weredeliberately used by the bakufuto frighten foreign diplomats into giving up Edo.If so, Alcock took the bait. Even sucha commonplaceevent as theabsconding oftwoJapanese servants caused him to write thebakufu demanding to knowif there was a plotagainst his life.319 Secondarycharacteristics were also involved. Bored or humiliated by the role of a simple commercialagent, Alcock seems to havewished to cuta figureon thepolitical stage by counteringthe southward expansion of the Russian Empire on the Asian mainland. When he writesof going to theMikado it maybe thathe wasjealous of Harris. A newtreaty negotiatedat Kyotoby himself would undoubtedly provide more personal renown than themere enforcement ofthe existing trade treaties. Whereas Harris had wanted only one warship,Alcock found that three were not enough to protecthim.320 It was partlyfear perhaps,and partly the desire to be incommand of large fleets and armies natural enough to an ambitiousman in a minordiplomatic post. Finally there was thequestion of the careerdiplomat. The drawbackof this was that its members were loathe to sacrificetheir careersfor the interests of their nationals abroad. It was onlyhuman for Alcock to let Britishmerchants lose moneyrather than risk the displeasure of his superiors.If the postponementof the opening of Osaka meantgreater fleets and armiesin I867, it also meantgreater importance for the diplomat involved. If Alcock stayed in thegood graces ofthe Foreign Office for a fewyears more he wouldhave a respectablepension. Twenty yearsof service was not to be riskedlightly and Lord Russell did not want war withJapan. TownsendHarris also went home in thespring of I862. He hadhoped to leavea year earlier.He had beenin Japanfor five-and-one-half years with one month'svacation in China."Your long residence here must be wearisome"said the shogun at theAmerican's lastaudience.321 The Portugueseconsul at Yokohamawas an American.As he thought olivetrees might be usefulin Japan one of Harris's last official acts was to writeto San Franciscofor saplings. It wasa typicalaction. As usualthere was no American warship in portso thatHarris left on a Jardine'ssteamer. The bakufurefused to firethe customary saluteto a merchantship. With commendable decency, de Bellecourtordered the French warship"Le Monge"to firethe salute for Harris. The bakufuwas forcedto returnthe compliment.It was all over.

317 F.O. 39I, I, to Hammond,i Januaryi86i-. 320 CorrespondencePolitique, iv, Nos. 95-96, 318 F. V. Dickens, Life of Sir HarryParkes, to Thouvenel,4 & 8 Augusti86i. London,I894, II, 34. 321 HarrisPapers, Book 5, No. 2I3 to Seward, 319 F.O. 262, CDLXX, to bakufu,3 February Edo,26 AprilI862. I862. MCMASTER. " ... ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 365

At homein New York,Harris was swallowedup by theexcitement of the Civil War. No onewanted to listen to an old man reminisce aboutJapan. A youngman just back from Tokyowent to see Harris in I 874.He foundhim in a cornerat theUnion Club. As always hewas alone. Harris's first question summed up his efforts inJapan; "What do theJapanese thinkof me?", he asked.322 In theirlives the two men epitomized foreign diplomacy in Japan. It cannotbe claimed thatHarris was a greatdiplomat. His sinshowever, are attractive ones. He wastoo friend- lytowards the bakufu for its own good. He was toowilling to trustto the good intentions ofmen who did not possess them. He was toopatient, too forbearing. He didnot excuse theshady dealing of individual Western merchants but he was not too proud to represent merchants.He was nota pacifistbut he onlywanted one warship to applylimited pres- sure.He refuseda fleet. Being denied that one ship through the exigencies of civil war at homehe was alsodenied any real chance to takean independentrole in dealingwith the bakufu.323As Alcock told the bakufu, the Americans could do nothingin Japan.324 Pushed backupon his own personal resources Harris did the best he could. He insistedon proper ceremonialand frequent meetings with the bakufu foreign ministers. On theone occasion whenhis own personal courage could keep the bakufu to its treaty obligations he remain- ed alonein Edo,the only foreigner in whatall agreedwas a dangerouscity. Throughout he encouragedthe bakufu along the path towards its own survival, but example and per- suasionhad theirlimits. In histask Harris often admitted ignorance of the complexities ofJapanese politics. No one will everknow how muchof his successwas owingto the linguisticabilities of HendrikHeusken. It musthave been considerable. Until the young man's death Harris was thebest informed of all theWestern diplomats. The Dutchconsul at Yokohamawas alsoa businessman and does not seem to have readJapanese although, in common with the Westernmerchants, he was a masterof that amazing dialect, "the Yokohama pidgin." The Frenchwere better served. Their archives are correspondingly more reliable than the Britishfor these years. The AbbeGirard spoke, but did not read or write Japanese, but a youngNetherlander, Bleckman, seems to havebeen fairly proficient as a translatorfor theFrench legation after i86o. Additionallythe French minister kept open all theYoko- hamasources of intelligence which Alcock had denied his nation by attackingthe mer- chantsin his gold export despatch. At Yokohama the Western merchants were in constant contactwith Japanese traders coming in fromthe country and with bakufu customs of- ficials.The Frenchalso utilized several Japanese officials and at leastone Buddhist priest as an intelligencesource. The Britishhad to dependupon what they could pick up from otherdiplomats until the spring of I 862 whenyoung Siebold began to achieve proficiency.

322 W. E. Griffis,"Townsend Harris, Centre of 7apan Puarterly,I958 v, No. 3. JapaneseDrama", New TorkTimes Magazine, 28 324 CorrespondencePolitique, v, No. I46 to DecemberI919, p. 26. Thouvenel,22 MarchI862. 323 H. Kublin,"A Saluteto Townsend Harris," 266 MonumentaNiPPonica XXTT. I-it

Harris'spolicy of some concessions but of clinging to theessentials of the treaty by a limitedshow offorce offered the only alternative to British policy. The Netherlandsstart- ed out sidingwith Britain. After the fiasco of the retreatfrom Edo theyswitched to Harris.325TheFrench were committed inadvance to supportBritish policy regardless. The Prussianscame, made a treaty,and then went offto China to make another. Foreign policy towardsJapan had to be Britishpolicy. Before the telegraph came in, a nationwas very muchrepresented by an individual so thatforeign policy was, in effect, RutherfordAlcock. WhereasHarris lacked neitherjudgement nor courage, Alcock seems to have lacked both. Althoughless noisy than gunboat diplomacy, appeasement is alsoa policy.Beguiled by Alcock'slack of determination during those early years the bakufu misjudged foreign re- solutionto stay injapan. It badlyweakened its own position thereby. Told byAlcock that he wouldsupport its claim to keepOsaka closed for another five years, in thesummer of I862 thebakufu gave way to itsKyoto opponents. The shogunpromised to go to Kyoto anddo homage.New officials were named to high positions in thegovernment.326 These newmen knew little or nothingabout foreign affairs. In theautumn they ac- complishedthe downfallof the bakufuby abolishingits last effectivecontrol over the daimyo,the sankin kJtai327 hostage system. Havingseen the foreigners retreat steadily under pressure for more than three years, thebakufu undoubtedly felt it easierto push the foreigners than to disciplineits own do- mesticdissidents. The chancethat the foreigners might retaliate with a forcegreater thanit could match must have seemed very slight. After London, the foreigners must have seemedvery pliable material indeed. Yet thisis whathappened. With its powermuch diminished, the bakufu was slowly forcedto giveup its effortsagainst foreigners and attemptto reassertcontrol over the daimyo.In thisit failed.Having shown such astute diplomacy against the foreigners, whyhad thebakufu made this miscalculation? A possibleanswer is RutherfordAlcock. It canbe arguedthat the actions of this one manunwittingly did muchto engineerthe downfall of the bakufu. When trade began in I859, it was feelingits way in a newsituation. Its policyof chipping away at theHarris Treaty,up to,but notpast, the point of war depended heavily upon foreign responses. Ifforeignersmet each probing operation with a firmbut limited response, then the bakufu wouldhave been forced to acceptmost of the treaty and turnto increasingits domestic power.Neither the regent Ii Naosukenor the rJji Anda Nobumasa were afraid to use theirpolice powers to purge political opponents. Given foreign pressure that police power couldhave been used to enforcethe treaties. The historyofJapan during the first years of foreign residence should not be discussed

325 CorrespondencePolitique, Iv, No. 95, to i64 ofJune ii & June I5, i862. Also Beasley, Thouvenel,4 Augusti86i. ModernHistory, p. 82,Select Documents, p. 60. 326 CorrespondencePolitique, vi, Nos. i6i & 327 MCMASTER. "... ForeignDiplomacy in BakumatsuJapan" 367 merelyin terms of a tightropeperformance inwhich the bakufu traded off political conces- sionsto a stillnebulous group at Kyoto against concrete concessions by the foreign powers. Thisbalance did not depend upon Kyoto agitation or bakufu diplomatic skill. It couldonly existif one man, representing the West, allowed it. The extentto whichRutherford Alcock enforced the treaty determined the pressure thebakufu must put upon its opponents. The enforcementofthe commercial treaty had beenthe single major instruction given Alcock by his home government. Rather than con- centrateupon his assigned mission, he choseto followa phantomsearch for personal se- curitywhich involved him in a completebreak with the merchants whose interest he was paidto serve.The merchantsthemselves bought revolvers and went on doingbusiness. Thereare limitsto the extentany nationcan interferein the domesticpolitics of another.In theinterests of his own present security and the future interests of his diplo- maticcareer, Alcock chose not to explorethem. There was almostalways at leastone RoyalNavy shipat Yokohama.While Naval commandersbalked at grandioseactions withoutauthority from home, they generally were willing to land a fewsquads of sailors. Othernations, including the Russians, also cooperated in defendingwhat was primarily a Britishinterest. Alcock in China was a differentman from Alcock in Japan. The samurai assassinhad not existed in China. The continuingappeasement in whichAlcock's had beenthe deciding voice left the foreignerswith no alternative but hostilities. Western diplomacy had thus failed. Whether or notthis had to be so willalways be a matterfor conjecture. Duringthe last century the British Foreign Office was chronicallyshort of competent mento handle its expanding responsibilities. The fieldof choice was further limited by the Britishclass system. The largenumber of former army officers in theforeign service often giveit the appearanceof a dumpingground for out-of-work gentlemen. The distant postsin Asia were the least desirable in theservice. They involved little political ability, beingalmost purely commercial in importance.328It is to be doubtedthat the best men weresent to Asia. All three ofAlcock's consuls inJapan left the service under a cloud,while Alcock'scharge during his home leave was bitterly complained against.329 Although the lastcentury did not demand the specialization of the present one, it is notunfair to ques- tionwhether Alcock's training as a surgeonfitted him for diplomacy. In a sensehe is a sad figure.Nervous and self-isolated, he was experiencedenough to knowhe was doing the wrong thing in Japan, but afraid for life and career to do otherwise. He hadhoped that London would back him up witha strongpolicy and a strongfleet. LordRussell left him to fighthis battle alone. He couldnot face it. It was not thefirst northe last time that the course ofJapanese history was determinedby assassins.

328 N. Pelcovits,p. 58. 7apan,London, i88o, I, I4I. 329 F. Jones,pp. 49-50.John R. Black, roung