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Article Platform Surveillance and Resistance in Iran and Russia CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Erasmus University Digital Repository Platform Surveillance and Resistance in Iran Article and Russia: The Case of Telegram Azadeh Akbari Rashid Gabdulhakov Heidelberg University, Germany Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands1 [email protected] [email protected] Abstract Telegram messenger, created by an exiled Russian entrepreneur Pavel Durov, brands itselF as a non-mainstream and non-Western guarantor of privacy in messaging. This paper ofFers an in-depth analysis of the challenges Faced by the platForm in Iran, with 59.5% of the population using its services, and in Russia, where Telegram is popular among the urban dissent. Both governments demanded access to the platForm’s encrypted content and, with Durov’s reFusal, took measures to ban it. Relying on the concept oF surveillant assemblage (Haggerty and Ericson 2000), this paper portrays how authoritarian states disrupt, block, and police platforms that do not comply with their intrusive surveillance. Additionally, we consider the tools and actors that make up internet control assemblages as well as the resistance assemblages that take shape in response to such control. Introduction The cloud-based messaging platForm Telegram was created in 2013 to protect its developer, Pavel Durov, from state surveillance in Russia. Durov, an entrepreneur whose successful Facebook-resembling VKontakte social network gave him the title “Russia’s Zuckerberg” (Hakim 2014), refused to hand user data to the authorities and, consequently, Fell under severe surveillance. In response to these circumstances, Durov developed Telegram with an emphasis on encryption and privacy, integrating diverse communication capacities, such as groups with unlimited members, voice call, polls, and channels for broadcasting public messages to large audiences. Telegram quickly attracted users in Iran and Russia enticed by its ideology, outspoken commitment to internet privacy, and user data protection From third parties, namely the government, marketers, and advertisers (Telegram n.d.) Contrary to its rival platForm, WhatsApp, Telegram has deliberately avoided the market-based rules of platForm development, such as merging with bigger companies, and receives all of its Funding From Durov himselF. The platForm Functions through a complicated web of decentralized companies and, therefore, defies any state regulation. In this sense, Telegram simultaneously positions itselF in opposition to the economic outlooks that dominate the global IT market and to the localized restrictions on data privacy. However, this position comes with a price tag, as Telegram was eventually banned in both Iran and Russia. Despite the extensive body oF work on privacy, surveillance, and democracy in Western countries, only recently have these concepts received academic attention in the context oF authoritarianism and 1 Both authors contributed equally to this work. Akbari, Azadeh, and Rashid Gabdulhakov. 2019. Platform Surveillance and Resistance in Iran and Russia: The Case of Telegram. Surveillance & Society 17(1/2): 223-231. https://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and-society/index | ISSN: 1477-7487 © The author(s), 2019 | Licensed to the Surveillance Studies Network under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives license Akbari and Gabdulhakov: Platform Surveillance and Resistance in Iran and Russia undemocratic governance. For instance, theories such as networked authoritarianism (MacKinnon 2011) investigate China’s encompassing surveillance policies as well as online activism in response to it and show how “an authoritarian regime embraces and adjusts to the inevitable changes brought by digital communications” in the context where “the single ruling party remains in control while a wide range of conversations about the country’s problems nonetheless occurs on websites and social-networking services” (33). Setting aside the particularities of the Chinese political system, this paper aims to contribute to the field of surveillance studies by demonstrating, through the example of Iran and Russia, how authoritarian states disrupt, block, and police platForms that do not comply with their intrusive surveillance. Additionally, we discuss the tools and actors that make up internet control assemblages, as well as the resistance assemblages that challenge platForm surveillance and censorship. Focusing on the case of Telegram, this paper scrutinizes platForm surveillance as a process with social, political, and economic aspects and ramiFications. Using the concept of surveillant assemblage (Haggerty and Ericson 2000) we assess the state of internet governance and control in both countries. Thus, the paper discusses Iran’s preventive, interceptive, and reactive measures (Small Media 2018: 26) that are applied to repress internet use through a complicated and overlapping assemblage of ofFicial and semi-ofFicial organizations. We also analyze the online and offline actors of internet control in Russia and demonstrate how the strategic ownership of platForms, as well as the strategic legislation, are manipulated by the state to curb freedom of expression. Based on such assessments, this research provides an overview of the actors, methods, and tools that are instrumentalized against Telegram by the regimes of both countries; it also seeks to identify some parallels and divergences in platForm surveillance and resistance. Internet Governance in Iran and Russia Technological development has transFormed the methods, approaches, and actors in surveillance. The long praised Foucauldian panopticism Fell short of explaining the Fluidity and omnipresence of a surveillance that reduces individuals to pure information and imposes its gaze on “groups which were previously exempt from routine surveillance” (Haggerty and Ericson 2000: 606). This paper applies the concept of the surveillant assemblage to emphasize the heterogeneous nature of the objects that work together in order to make intrusive undemocratic surveillance possible. Through their attempts to surveil Telegram, both Iran and Russia instrumentalize a multitude of actors and techniques to establish governmental control over information and citizens. In addition to the state, which establishes the hegemonic narrative, a number of other agents, such as users, civil society, regional and international flows, technological advancements, things and code, fabricate other assemblages that interact, converge, and diverge From the surveillant assemblage. While the rhetoric justiFying the ban oF Telegram in Iran and Russia is not completely analogous, both governments strive For Full control over traditional and social media channels. Iran accuses Telegram of spreading moral decadence and reiterates Russian indictments of Telegram’s facilitative role in terrorism by ofFering anonymity and data protection to its users. The autocratic states take measures to mute, limit, discourage, and otherwise eradicate narratives that challenge their stability. The Following section spotlights the techniques and technologies within the surveillant assemblages of Iran and Russia. It also draws attention to the blurring lines between police and citizens, which questions the traditional theorization of state power and suggests new ways of looking at surveillance in undemocratic environments. Iran: Totalitarian Surveillance Listed as one oF the 15 enemies oF the internet (Reporters Without Borders 2016), Iran has a complex assemblage of overlapping governmental and non-governmental institutions that are mandated with the regulation of internet content and access. The Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) stands above any governmental body and works directly under the supervision of Iran’s Supreme Leader to set the general policies For internet access and content control. The Commission to Determine the Instances of Criminal Content shares seven members with the SCC and predominantly occupies itselF with identifying “online content that violates public morals, contradicts Islam, threatens national security, criticizes public ofFicials Surveillance & Society 17(1/2) 224 Akbari and Gabdulhakov: Platform Surveillance and Resistance in Iran and Russia or organizations, or promotes either cyber crimes or the use of circumvention tools” (Small Media 2018: 20). While these two bodies enjoy an extra-legal status, governmental bodies, such as the Information and Communication Technology Ministry, play a solely executive role and lack any decision-making power. Additionally, the Iranian Cyber Police and Cyber Army are exclusively tasked with monitoring content posted on the internet as well as preventing and prosecuting cybercrimes. The Cyber Police (FATA), established in 2011, mainly covers cases of Fraud, scams, and harassment. The Cyber Army, an “underground network of pro-regime cyber activists, hackers and bloggers…monitors the internet and launches cyber attacks on opposition and anti-Islamic websites” (Small Media 2018: 20). In this way, what is deemed to be undesirable content according to the regime’s ideology, is actively policed and, consequently, many websites, keywords, and social media platForms are blocked.2 In addition to controlling content, access to the free internet is also hindered through technical means, such as keeping the bandwidth and the speed of internet intentionally low. Table 1 demonstrates Iran’s methods of internet censorship, divided by preventive, interceptive, and
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