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Subtitling in the Iranian Mediascape: Towards a Culture-Specific Typology

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Subtitling in the Iranian Mediascape: Towards a Culture-Specific Typology Subtitling in the Iranian Mediascape: Towards a Culture-Specific Typology Masood Khoshsaligheh1a, Saeed Ameri2a, Farzaneh Shokoohmand3a, Milad Mehdizadkhani4b Abstract Given the increasing pace of dissemination of cultural ARTICLE HISTORY: content across global borders, subtitling as a cost-effective Received May 2020 solution for rendering audiovisual programs is gaining more Received in revised form July 2020 popularity, even in societies, which have been traditionally Accepted July 2020 using dubbing as the dominant modality for foreign films and Available online August 2020 television series. Likewise, various types of subtitling practices have developed and are used in Iran both at official and non-official outlets. While official dubbing has failed in some aspect in addressing the growing interest of Iranian viewers of foreign content, a variety of non-professional subtitling has been filling the gap, and subtitling appears to be dominating the audiovisual media market. Despite such KEYWORDS: developments, the necessities of professional practice of Non-professional subtitling subtitling, including standardized guidelines, codes of ethics Amateur subtitling and practice, and training, have never been realized in Iran. Quasi-professional subtitling In the absence of a professional subtitling tradition, this Professional subtitling article presents the status quo of non-professional subtitling Subtitling for the d/Deaf and hard of into Persian and introduces the specific typology of this hearing practice in the Iranian mediascape. © 2020 IJSCL. All rights reserved. 1 Associate Professor, Email: [email protected] (Corresponding Author) Tel: +98-915-5012669 2 PhD, Email: [email protected] 3 Assistant Professor, Email: [email protected] 4 PhD Candidate, Email: [email protected] a Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Iran b University of Szeged, Hungary 56 Subtitling in the Iranian Mediascape: Towards a Culture-Specific Typology 1. Introduction market with the advertised function. This market provided foreign language enthusiasts esides the seven-decade-old prevalence with authentic foreign multimedia, mostly of dubbing in Iran as the exclusive English content, and helped them improve their B audiovisual translation (AVT) solution foreign language competency. That was a for watching foreign feature films and convenient excuse, helping to conceal the television series, a variety of Persian-language illegal nature of this unauthorized distribution subtitling practices has emerged and rose to of selling pirated foreign films (Jalili, 2001). fame among Iranian audiences, especially the However, it was legally problematic on two young generation, due to the expectations that grounds. Firstly, it was violating copyright laws, the official dubbing has failed to fulfill in recent and secondly, severe consequences such as years. Although dubbing has been practiced in ethical issues followed from the unauthorized Iran since the mid-1940s, it was not until the distribution of foreign cultural products. late 1990s, that Persian subtitling was born in Another early attempt in broadcasting foreign the Iranian society. Over the past decade, the use films along with Persian subtitles is MBC of subtitling has substantially risen in Iran. The Persia, a satellite television channel, starting in increase is due to the development of 2008. According to Naficy (2012), the subtitles broadband technologies and high-speed were of such poor quality mostly in terms of Internet access for the public, which in turn has consistency, coherence, and synchronization, paved the way for cheap and fast access to and the deficiencies were even notable to the original films and TV shows by the Internet lay public audiences who were not competent downloading. Enjoying this readily available in the source language. ocean of foreign cinematic programs—mostly pirated versions—requires a translation In the absence of a professional tradition of solution for which official dubbing could not be subtitling in Persian, this article aims to serve an option as the audiences look for a fast mode, as an introduction to the different types of which contains the least amount of cultural subtitling practices in the Iranian context. The intervention in the original content. clarification of the subtitling practice would help consistency and accuracy in the use of the related However, the absence of professional subtitling terminology in the growing research has led to the emergence of various types of publication on subtitling in Persian. In several subtitling practice in Persian. The practice has local studies, the distinction of professional, non- been investigated from multiple angles, such as professional, and amateur subtitling is not its use in language learning (Ameri & Ghodrati, carefully observed, and the terms are 2019), its application in the rendition of graphic interchangeably used. Initially, in the following codes (Mehdizadkhani & Khoshsaligheh, section, the international literature on non- 2019), its status quo for deaf viewers professional subtitling is briefly surveyed. (Shokoohmand & Khoshsaligheh, 2019), eye- Later, the main types of Persian subtitling are tracking its readability (Zahedi & introduced and discussed, and real-life Khoshsaligheh, 2019), its pedagogy (Rastegar examples are also presented. In the concluding Moghaddam & Khoshsaligheh, 2020), and its section, contextual considerations in reception through using multimodal understanding these types, as well as the transcription (Abdi & Khoshsaligheh, 2018). potentials for prospective types of subtitling, Unexpectedly, the history of subtitling in Iran are discussed. has been scarcely researched, and therefore its birth and development are reasonably 2. Theoretical Framework uncertain. According to a few sporadic magazine articles (Jalili, 2001; Shajarikohan, Non-professional subtitling can be considered 2011), the birth of Persian subtitling dates back an umbrella term under which a range of to the final years of the last century. Original subtitling practices by fans, amateurs, contents were made widely available on the activities, and students are produced. In this illegal Iranian markets and even legal ones sense, the number of publications on non- under the ambitious and bold title “Language professional subtitling has been on a steady rise Learning Material”. Indeed, films were over the last decade including journal articles, unofficially subtitled and distributed in the edited books, and encyclopedic entries (e.g., Dwyer, 2019; Orrego-Carmona & Lee, 2017b; M. Khoshsaligheh et al. / International Journal of Society, Culture & Language, 2020, 8(2) ISSN 2329-2210 57 Pérez-González, 2020). To achieve a more As far as translation is concerned, non- comprehensive understanding of non- professional subtitling strives to bring to the professional subtitling, some factors, as light the foreignness of the original content translation scholars argue (Antonini, Cirillo, through foreignization approaches, such as Rossato, & Torresi, 2017; Martínez- Gómez, retention and glossing (Dwyer, 2019; 2020; Orrego-Carmona & Lee, 2017a), are to Massidda, 2015; Massidda & Casarini, 2017; be taken into account: training, remuneration, Nornes, 1999). Therefore, non-professional recruitment, ethics, and standards of practice. translations are “closer to the original, wordier, Non-professional subtitlers, according to [and] more word-for-word” (Gambier, 2013, p. Orrego-Carmona and Lee (2017a, p. 4), “do not 54). The reason appears to be clear; such a receive and do not require monetary strategy will increase “the visibility of the remuneration for the activities they perform and mediator and the process of mediation” and can the translations they provide”. For Evans “increase awareness of the foreign culture and (2020), fan translation differs from non- encourage the viewer to engage with it on its professional translation, as in the former, the own terms” (Dwyer, 2019, p. 459). strong focus is on foreign content that is Nonetheless, Chinese fansubbing apparatus on important for a community of fans. Non- the contrary to those of the Western and Iranian professional translation is mainly concerned fansubbing seems to be target-orientated and with “pro-bono work for non-governmental promotes and applies domestication strategies organizations” like TED (p. 177). Lee (2018) (Chang, 2017; He, 2017) probably to serve as contends that non-professional subtitling has “a means to best entertain Chinese audiences” developed as a social outcome of fansubbing. (Lee, 2018, p. 573). Failure or defiance to comply with commercial Fansubbers as a category of non-professional subtitling standards is the prime feature subtitlers work on various motivations associated with this phenomenon. (Cemerin & Toth, 2017; Duraner, Tunali, & Nevertheless, recent studies (Jiménez-Crespo, Koçak, 2017; Luczaj & Holy-Luczaj, 2017): 2017; Orrego-Carmona, 2019) claim otherwise, altruistic or non-altruistic. They may simply stating that non-professional subtitlers do not wish to help others access their favorite foreign tend to neglect or refuse mainstream subtitling program in a language they understand, or they conventions. This very contrast between the just do it as a recreational activity, or to improve scholars in this regard is the ultimate purpose of their command of the foreign language. Others writing this article to emphasize that first, the are involved to be recognized as an essential concept of non-professional
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