Proquest Dissertations

University of Alberta The Supplicant Superpower: Reexamining the Soviet-Egyptian Relationship from 1965 to 1975 by Frederick Victor Howard Mills A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in History Department of History and Classics 1 Frederick Victor Howard Mills Fall, 2009 Edmonton, Alberta Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Libraries to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only. Where the thesis is converted to, or otherwise made available in digital form, the University of Alberta will advise potential users of the thesis of these terms. 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While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis. 1*1 Canada Oral Examining Committee Committee Chair & Examiner Academic Rank Department Dr. Heather Coleman Associate Professor History & Classics Supervisor Academic Rank Department Dr. David Marples University Professor History & Classics Committee Member Academic Rank Department Dr. Guy Thompson Associate Professor History & Classics Dr. W. Andy Knight Professor Political Science Dedicated to my family: Frederick William, Anne Marie, Chelsa Marie and Axle Abstract From 1965-1975, the Soviet-Egyptian relationship was the cornerstone of Moscow's policy in the Middle East. The Kremlin's alignment with the epicenter of the Arab world permitted the articulation of military, political and economic objectives designed to enhance its own power and prestige, while erode that of the United States. This research demonstrates that the Moscow-Cairo nexus was of greater scope than hitherto recognized by the scholarly community. Certainly, political and military acrimony between the Arabs and the Israelis provided the Kremlin a timely entree into regional affairs. Yet, to frame Soviet-Egyptian relations by this variable has limited both our understanding of and the benefits accrued to Moscow from its relationship with Cairo. Ultimately, the scholarly community views the Soviet Union under Brezhnev as a conservative and status-quo global actor infected with gerontocratic malaise. This thesis reveals that the Brezhnevian Politburo was far from conservative; rather, it was opportunistic and aggressive. Acknowledgments The work involved in completing a Master's Thesis was once described to me as, "reading a couple books and writing a couple pages." Let me assure you, it is slightly more consuming than that. So, I would like to first acknowledge me, Frederick Mills, for all the hard work and dedication that were involved in the completion of this thesis. Jest aside, I would like to recognize my supervisor Dr. David R. Marples. His patience, helpful advice, and commentary (see above) were appreciated every step of the way. I would like to thank the Department of History and Classics at the University for Alberta. Its financial assistance and travel grants were indispensable to the completion of this thesis. I would also like to thank the Russian, East European and Eurasian Center at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Its summer research laboratory gave me access to its extensive Slavic collections and its librarians helped me to locate important sources. To my parents, the room and board was certainly a plus! So too was your unwavering love and support. I would be remised if I failed to thank my friends. The cups of coffee, the pints of beer and the casual conversations made for an enjoyable and unforgettable experience. H 1-12 will always feel like a second home. I want to thank particularly those who took the time to provide insightful comments on the thesis: Alice Chelich - my wonderful grandmother, Alexander Dimitroff, Justine Gill, Rylan Kafara and Fred Senior. Of course, any errors that remain in this document are entirely their fault. Table of Contents Introduction 1 Chapter One: Egypt's role in the Kremlin's Pursuit of Global Military and Strategic Objectives 17 Chapter Two: The Soviet-Egyptian Relationship and the Kremlin's Objectives in the Third World 48 Chapter Three: The Collapse of the Soviet-Egyptian Relationship and Moscow's Policy Shifts 80 Conclusion 112 Bibliography 116 1 Introduction On 14 March 1976, President Mohamed Anwar El Sadat called upon the Egyptian People's Assembly to abrogate unilaterally the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and to expel Soviet scientific, technical and military advisers. Two days later, in an interview with the Cairene daily Al Ahram, El Sadat stated that, "Egypt has benefited little from our 20 year relationship with the Soviet Union."2 Soviet cultural emissaries and exchanges were denied entry into Egypt, Egyptian students studying in Soviet academic institutions were recalled, Moscow's naval concessions were revoked and Soviet citizens not affiliated with the diplomatic corps were expelled. Moscow's immediate response to El Sadat's action was silence. It was not until 20 March 1976, when a small article appeared in the back pages of Pravda, that the Soviet Politburo acknowledged its eviction from the banks of the Nile. "Reactionary, imperialist forces," opined Observer, "infiltrated Egyptian politics, slowed the advance of progressive elements and set back the advancement of common interests." This reading seems to have been widely accepted, yet, accepting ideological dissonance as the principal factor in the collapse of this relationship prevents an understanding of the common interests upon which the Soviet-Egyptian association was constructed. Contradictions between Soviet and Egyptian objectives ultimately formed the foundation of discord upon which the relationship disintegrated. The collapse of the partnership signaled much more than the nadir of the Kremlin's influence in the Middle East during the Cold War. Moscow's The Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed on 27 May 1972 between Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny and Mohamed Anwar El Sadat. 2 Mohamed Heikal, "Al Infifar [The Explosion]," Al Ahram, 16 March 1976. Observer, "Lozhnye pokazaniia weli v zabluzhdenie Egipetskuiu politsiiu [Wrong evidence misguides Egypt],"Pravda, 20 March 1976. In Soviet press organs, articles authored by Observer are generally understood to reflect the official opinion of the Politburo. 2 AINaqsa necessitated a reevaluation of global and regional strategic objectives and military doctrine. The collapse of the relationship obliged the Kremlin to reassess its foreign policy and influence building tactics in the Third World. For Moscow, events were not supposed to have happened this way. Moscow's attempts to build influence in the decade after the 1955 Czechoslovak- Egyptian arms deal focused on granting Egypt access to Moscow's financial, economic and military largesse.5 Concomitantly, in "appreciation" of Soviet support, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev expected Jamel Abdel Nasser's regime to delineate foreign and domestic policy objectives similar to those enunciated by Moscow.6 In particular, this implied the adoption of Communist ideology and the centrality of anti-Western proclivities. When Egypt proved less pliable than Moscow had hoped, particularly concerning domestic reforms, polemical attacks against each other became

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